“An AFV in combat is not some product of engineering, it is the beating heart of its crew.” Bruce Cameron, 14 April 2021
“Never be afraid to raise your voice for honesty and truth and compassion against injustice, lying and greed. If people all over the world…would do this, it would change the Earth.” William Faulkner, 1949 Nobel Prize in Literature.
If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together. ” (African saying)
————————————————————————–
A Story in Seven Parts. (This provides an introduction and background to the Blog, which follows below on a daily basis since February 2015, and a weekly basis since July 2021. Scroll down to the most recent date.)
Once upon a time there was a 1AR Assn Members’ Forum. This was a page on the Assn’s website and members used it to keep in touch and discuss matters relevant to the Assn. Suddenly the Forum was closed. It was explained that it was costing members too much to keep operating. When it was discovered that this was not the case (ie. there was no cost to the Assn), the Forum was reopened.
The topic which was being discussed on the Forum when it was closed was a request for information about the history of the Centurion held by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. This led to a discovery that all the log books for the Centurions at Puckapunyal had mysteriously disappeared from the Tank Museum.
After the Forum was reopened, discussion on the topic continued. Suddenly the Forum was closed again. A number of reasons were given for the closure, all of which turned out to be untrue. One of them was that a post or posts on the Forum had brought the Assn into discredit. No-one was prepared to say what the post was or who had posted it. Misconduct by members was publicly announced as the reason for the closure.
One member lodged a grievance as provided for under the Constitution. He felt that members should be informed as to what their misconduct was (supposedly) and the opportunity to defend themselves, provided. He also started a blog to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters.
While the grievance process was underway, members were informed that the Assn’s Constitution had to be changed. This was duly done, disciplinary provisions being extensively strengthened. The member who had submitted the grievance was now found to be guilty of misconduct under the new Constitution. He was expelled from the Assn and his grievance went unheard.
Part 2
Service in the military, no matter what capacity, inculcates a commitment to doing ‘the right thing’. This became obvious when a group of members banded together to lodge a grievance to protest at the lack of natural justice provided to the member who had been expelled. While preparing this they noticed that actions taken against the member were not in accord with the Assn’s Constitution.
Delving into this more deeply, they discovered that the process required to change the Constitution had not been followed. Furthermore, the reasons given to members for having to change it were not correct. The group sought advice from Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), the authority for associations incorporated in that State. The outcome was that the Constitution was declared to be invalid, as were actions taken on the basis of its provisions.
The group of members who had brought about this outcome, asked for an apology from those who had misled members as to the reasons for changing the Constitution. This was not forthcoming. Not long after, the President and other committee members resigned. The new President and Committee spent $960 of members’ funds to get an independent legal opinion re the Constitution.
The findings confirmed the view of CAV that the Constitution was invalid. Furthermore, any member adversely affected by it was entitled to take action against the Association. The member who had been expelled was reinstated, together with his Life Membership. He agreed not to seek an apology, so as to avoid causing any divisiveness in the association.
The new C’tee examined the original Constitution and found valid reasons for changing it, eg. the CAV’s default ‘Model Rules’ are ok for a State based association, but have limitations as far as a national organization is concerned. A proposed draft was sent to members. The group which had taken action against the now invalid constitution saw that the required process was still not being adopted (by oversight).
Bringing this to the attention of the C’tee stirred up something of a hornets’ nest among some members of the Assn. Social media went into a frenzy, accusing ‘constitutionalists’ of forcing younger members to leave the association because they had become fed up with “rules and BS” which mean nothing to them.
This is a recognized situation within many ex-service organizations. At least one PhD thesis is being compiled on the subject of maintaining the interest of younger members. The C’tee have been put in touch with the author. As one member of the ‘constitutionalists’ has stated, however, the Constitution is the members’ contract with their association. It must be got right, both for the members’ and Association’s sake. There is no other option. Those donating their time and energy to help the C’tee ensure the Constitution is a valid one, should be thanked, not persecuted, by the wider membership.
Part 3
The C’tee decided to withdraw what would’ve been an illegal constitution if the draft had been approved by members. A new draft constitution was prepared by the members group (who invested immense time and energy in the matter), incorporating the changes desired by the C’tee, but based on the CAV Model Rules. (It seems that the earlier draft may have been based on the NSW Department of Fair Trading Rules, which are different to those required of an association incorporated in Victoria).
The Assn AGM was held on 8 July 2017. It augured well for the Assn that there are a number of members who are prepared to stand for the vacant C’tee positions. There was hope that a valid and well thought through Constitution would soon be able to be presented to members for approval.
Part 4
A powerful ‘clique’ gathered at the AGM, intent on installing ‘their men’ in a number of C’tee positions. They addressed the AGM, venting their spleens … the person who had been expelled and reinstated, was described as a bully and a coward, “a bad apple who needs to be cut out”. The clique’s candidate for President referred to the need to clear out “disruptive” elements in his pre-election speech. Once a new Constitution was finalised, the findings of the original disciplinary hearing would simply be enforced again. The ‘clique’ didn’t attend the 1AR Birthday Dinner on the evening of the AGM … they gathered instead at a local hotel. The retiring Vice President expressed his disgust at this on social media
It has subsequently been discovered that considerable irregularities occurred in the conduct of the AGM: in particular, there were enormous discrepancies with proxy voting; the numbers of votes stated in the AGM Minutes were 30% more than figures given at the meeting to those attending; membership records were inaccurate and wrongly disallowed at least one member from voting; a person addressed the meeting, described as a “financial Affiliate Member”, but there is no provision for affiliate members in the Constitution; another ‘member’ addressed the meeting, but there is no mention of him in the list of those attending; and the financial statement was not only not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, but also it failed to encompass the whole FY and did not disclose reasons for the expenditure of funds.
All irregularities with respect to the Constitution were brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response was received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past 12 months.)
It is to be hoped that governance provisions as required by law can be enacted so that the Assn will be able to move ahead with its good work looking after former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt.
Part 5
Much of the new (2017) C’tee’s time was taken up with governance matters which had been long in the making. A firm of accountants were appointed to set up an accounting system to better enable the Assn to manage its financial transactions. Interestingly, as a part of this, advice was given to the C’tee that my donations of royalties from my book, made for the purpose of “assisting the Association’s endeavours” (stated publicly in the Author’s Note), had “created a constructive obligation in respect to the donated funds”.
Supposedly this meant that the funds could only be used as I stipulated. Of course, nothing was further from the truth … which was proven by the fact that I had no knowledge of the use of the funds to purchase either a TV set for D Squadron in South Australia, nor building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club. A firm of lawyers was employed to tell me not to make any further donations. I asked what I had to do to make an acceptable donation, but received no response.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM stated that “… any future donations would be accepted without conditions”. The present C’tee was asked to consider the question: “Could the C’tee please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement? No response has been received.
Despite all the above, the financial status of the Assn has been moved onto a sound basis with stringent controls. This is a major step forward. The fact that the Defence Fraud and Investigation Unit conducted an investigation might have been an additional spur to this end. The investigation related to $25,000 in donations being made to 1 Armd Regt from Rheinmetall. These payments were ‘masked’ by being transferred through the 1 AR Assn accounts. This ‘routing’ is possibly explained by the fact that such ‘donations’ were in complete breach of Defence regulations; Rheinmetall being a contender for a major Defence contract at the time. The 1AR Assn C’tee responded by saying that the Assn was bound by Victorian Law, not Defence regulations. [After submissions by members, the matter was investigated by the Defence Force Ombudsman and procedures within Defence amended as a result. The point here is that materiel procurement MUST be based solely on impartial assessment; every effort has to be made to guard against unconscious bias of any sort.]
The other step required was that of putting in place a valid and relevant Constitution. The hard work of a group of dedicated members, especially Ron Baikie and Geoff Stelmach, paid dividends. The draft Constitution prepared by them, with some amendments, was approved by members at the 2018 AGM.
One of the amendments inserted by the then C’tee was that which stated that just because you served in 1 Armd Regt, this no longer made you eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. Previously you were automatically eligible and would only cease to be a member if you were to be in breach of disciplinary provisions. Overnight, the C’tee has given itself the power of veto on their own terms. Now, if you apply to join (or renew your membership) and the C’tee does not consider you ‘suitable’, then your application is not approved. There is no definition as what “suitable” means in the eyes of the C’tee.
Part 6.
The story continues … The final Constitution approved by the then C’tee differed from that which the group of members had drafted. One point of difference was that a clause was inserted which gave the C’tee the right to refuse someone’s application for membership, without telling them why and without giving them any right of appeal. These are the sort of powers that back the governance of a totalitarian regime. A number of members raised objections to this, but their protests were ignored.
The C’tee with whom the group of members had been working to draft the new Constitution had included a provision in the Constitution for ‘existing’ Life Memberships to be continued. The draft sent to members made this very clear. (Background here is that when Life Memberships were originally awarded, there was no provision in the Constitution for this to be done. The revised Constitution included such provision.)
Although I was a Life Member, I received a request to pay membership fees. I did so, thinking that it would be somewhat arrogant of me to say that as a Life Member, I’m not required to do so. Next, I’m advised that as I was deemed to have criticised the C’tee (with my suggestions re continual improvement of due process), I was therefore deemed not to support the Purposes of the Assn as set out in the Constitution.
As a result, my membership would not be renewed. (The basis for and against the supposed criticisms are detailed in Blog posts for March 2019.) Furthermore, I was advised that I would not be entitled to appeal this decision (which, for a disciplinary offence by a member whose m’ship was current, would be granted and heard by a General Meeting of members.)
I said “but I’m a Life Member, I was only applying for membership renewal on a voluntary basis”. Surprisingly, I was told that all Life Memberships had been scrapped, (ie. the provision continuing Life Memberships mentioned above, was deleted from the Constitution by the C’tee, before a vote was taken for approval). I asked why the decision to continue Life Memberships was overturned and why weren’t members informed of this? I have not received a response to either question.
Nevertheless, as the Constitution provides for a Life Member to do, I’ve appealed the decision to revoke my membership. What will the next chapter bring, I wonder?
In a letter dated 2 August 2019, the President 1AR Assn advised me that the reason that the C’tee did not notice that the provision for existing Life Memberships to be continued had been removed from the draft of the Constitution considered at the AGM, was an “oversight” which the Association “failed to detect”. As a result, resolutions for the continuance of each former life member’s membership are to be considered at the AGM on 12 October 2019. Each resolution must be approved by three quarters of the members voting, whether in person or by proxy. I was not allowed to vote.
My Life Membership was not renewed. I asked to see both the proposal that was put to members with respect to me and the Minutes of the AGM … neither was allowed.
Part 7: The Ideal World
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have to draw attention to.
This would mean:
The memorial plaques provided by DVA for those who DOW would include reference to Mentioned in Dispatches (MiD) when this award had been received.
There would be two tank squadrons in the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade (to facilitate the formation of an adequate number of battlegroups).
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool.
No-one on RAAC or related personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to Defence’s ‘official’ position.
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense.
All information panels re RAAC exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery at the AWM and audio-visual narratives would be correct
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the First Australians who lost their lives defending their families, land and possessions, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
A system of Operational Analysis (OA) would be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience, which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise ”to assist the Association’s endeavours” (and not be rejected because a perceived obligation would be created).
1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by 1 AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
ADF and DVA medical procedures would take account of the unique stress factors associated with operating AFVs in combat (and in training) when assessing the mental health of serving and former RAAC personnel.
RAAC personnel would be able to wear an AFV crewman’s badge following initial qualification as an AFV crewman and until no longer qualified.
ADF personnel would be able to wear dress embellishments which indicated the number of times they had been WIA and deployed on active service in a particular conflict.
The Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) to to be introduced under LAND 400 Phase 3 would be operated by the RAAC.
Oral history interviews would be conducted with those who have crewed the different AFVs used by the Australian Army, so that their experience might be recorded before they all pass away (and only the AFVs are left).
The submission made by the RAAC Corporation (when asked by Defence if they supported my submission to Minister for the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard) would be made available to those who may seek to view it (given that the Corporation state that no prior submissions were looked at by them).
The reason that an application for membership of the 1AR Assn is denied by the C’tee must be made known to the applicant and members; the applicant must have the right of appeal.
Pending …
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
The RAAC tank fleet would be right sized’ from 59 to the 90+ that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons. (It has been reported that project LAND 907 Phase 2 incorporates an additional 29 Abrams, to bring the tank fleet to 88; with what seems to be a ‘trade-off’ in terms of two tanks for increased simulators, including one for troop tactical training.)
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool. (See above.)
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege. (The 1AR Assn C’tee is making available an ‘extract’ of the Minutes that is thought to be relevant to members.)
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour. (The need for appropriate training has been acknowledged, however, it is yet to be formalised via the SOA.)
The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)
The identity of the person who holds the logbooks for the Centurions at Puckapunyal would be known, as would the reason for the logbooks not being in Tank Museum where they belong. (It is now known that Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM, has or has had access to, at least one of the missing logbooks. Footnote 55, p121, Vol1 , ‘Canister1 On! FIRE!’ refers. (Mr Cecil initially issued a denial, however, subsequently admitted that he once transcribed info from the logbook. He hasn’t volunteered where the logbook was at the time.)
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’. (Acceptance of this is becoming much more widespread, however, it is still far from universal.)
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned. (Minutes of C’tee meetings are now made available to members, however, not all decisions are open and transparent.)
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which provided effective rapid and hard hitting firepower. (A carbine is now available for a tank crewman/commander to use should he have reason to leave the tank and are also provided for ASLAV crew members.)
RAAC related technology exhibits at the AWM would not focus entirely on the technical aspects of the vehicles/equipment, but also would incorporate the human dimension, ie. the roles of (and stress associated with) the crew operating AFVs in combat. (The Director of the AWM, Dr Nelson, advises that he has adopted this policy, ie. he “continually reminds AWM staff that it is the experiences of those operating the equipment, rather than the machines themselves, which are of most importance”.
Crossed off the List:
The RAAC Corporation has amended its website to correctly describe the vehicles operated by the RAAC.
The AWM has resolved the conflict between its different website references to the number of crew that operated its Japanese Ha Go tank.
The Ombudsman has undertaken a review of the perceived conflict of interest created when Rheinmetall ‘routed’ $25,000 through the 1AR Assn accounts to avoid scrutiny, at the same time as tendering for a $5b Defence contract. Procedures within Defence have been amended as a result
The 1AR Assn have had a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
Serving members of B Sqn 3/4 Cav are eligible to wear the UCG insignia for Coral-Balmoral.
Those former 1AR members who desire to do so, can use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
The 1AR Assn now has a valid Constitution approved by members
The 1AR Assn Constitution is now available to be viewed by members on the Assn’s website.
The history of 1 Armd Regt has been updated on the 1AR website to reflect its present role (what a pity the RAAC Corporation has not followed suit).
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provides suitable housing and schooling for families (as well as good access to training areas). There is to be no move to Central Queensland (… for now?)
Minutes of the last 1AR AGM were published without any defamatory material.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings are now being made available to members.
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral are now entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry (with Federation Star)..
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
The C-B Battlehonour has been emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard have been corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modeled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
The LAND 400 Phase 2 timetable is on track, despite the anticipated delays associated with a change in the Minister for Defence. (This means that the capability gap that would have resulted from a delay in the replacement of the ASLAV, has been avoided.)
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal advocated by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
DVA withdrew the lapel pin comprised of crossed Australian and Socialist Republic of Vietnam flags which the RAAC Corporation advocated be worn at the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
The Minister for Defence considered an account in a book by a Vietnam veteran, with a ‘glowing’ Foreword by a serving senior officer … if true, the incident amounted to premeditated murder. The investigation found that it was ’embellishment’ by the author. The Minister advised that Army training standards had been reviewed to ensure that such actions would be recognised for what they are and not be seemingly ‘condoned’ in the future.
Attention is now given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
The National Archives/AWM have acknowledged that a mistake made, for example in an After Action Report, CAN be brought to the attention of those who refer to the original documents in order to better understand what happened.
An RAAC veteran has received just and compassionate treatment from the Federal Court, overruling the Immigration Minister. (What a pity justice and compassion were not to be found more widely from within RAAC ESO ranks.)
DVA has advised aged care providers of the assistance that they can provide for the conduct of ANZAC Day Services for those who are mobility impaired.
————————————————–
The blog continues below, the story remains unfinished. ‘Doing the Right Thing VII’ lists daily Blog posts from 1 January 2021. Earlier day by day posts follow after that (through to February 2015).
IMPORTANT.
Should anyone see something which is incorrect in any Blog post, please inform me so that I can immediately correct the information and apologise to anyone inadvertently affected. (See example Corrections at the Blog posts for 3 June 2019 and 26 January 2019.)
NB 1. Advertisements. I’m sorry … I had no idea about the advertisements that have been incorporated into my posts (that some readers have experienced). I guess this is all about the number of readers … when the number increases, so there is commercial value in incorporating ads. Paradoxically, it seems this has also made it more difficult to access the Blog. (I wouldn’t dare think that a hacker had been tasked to ‘close me down’.)
Thank goodness! Just place armouredadvocates.wordpress.com in the top search bar of Google and it should all be ok. (Fingers crossed.) I should mention that I have no association whatsoever with the products advertised, indeed I can’t see the ads myself.
NB 2. Index. A lot of readers have said how good it would be to have an index of blog posts on a subject by subject basis. This was suggested to me right at the start of the Blog, but I foolishly thought that the Blog would have a very limited life and it wouldn’t be worth it. I’ve realised for some time, how useful it would be … and will do something accordingly. (Latest): The Index is now updated for each Blog post; that from 16 March 2020 to 31 December 2020 can be found at the end of Doing the Right Thing VI; that from 1 January 2021 follows the last post of Doing the Right Thing VII; and that for Doing the Right Thing VIII and IX is at the end (below).
NB 3. Email Contact. Should anyone wish to provide feedback by email, the address is cameronshome@bigpond.com
—————————————————————————————————–
19 April 2024
The Lack of a National Army Memorial
Not having heard anything from Heston Russell (22 Mar 24) or the RAR Corporation, I’ve sent the following message to Barnaby Joyce, Shadow Minister for Veterans’ Affairs; as well as Andrew Hastie, Shadow Minister for Defence.
Dear Mr Joyce,
Are you aware that the Australian Army National Memorial (on ANZAC Parade, Canberra) honours only those involved in 20th Century conflicts (up until Vietnam) and that there is no national memorial to the service and sacrifice of those who served in Timor, Iraq, or Afghanistan? [The seven pillars which are a major part of the existing Memorial, stand for the seven major conflicts of the 20th Century.]
How can this be? What on earth were those responsible thinking in 1989 when the present Army National Memorial was dedicated? It’s simply unbelievable that anyone could imagine that, at that time, there would be no more wars.
After writing to Minister Keogh in May 2023, I was put in touch with Army’s project manager. I now know that the Government’s intention is to demolish the existing Memorial (relocating the statues) and to build another Memorial to honour soldiers who have served in all conflicts, including future ones.
There has been no public consultation. Why? Surely such an undertaking deserves the widest possible stakeholder involvement.
The intention had been to unveil the new Memorial on Army’s 125th Anniversary (1 January 2025). Lack of available funding and the low priority allocated to the project, however, mean that this is no longer possible.
It is my belief that the families of soldiers lost on active service since Vietnam, and their fellow veterans, deserve much better. Happy to provide full background should you be interested in helping to reverse the current failure of Government to properly honour the service and sacrifice of Australian soldiers.
Yours sincerely,
——————————————————————————————————-
12 April 2024
Recognition of Bravery (A Vain Hope)
Up until 1979, the only award that could be made to a soldier who was killed in an act of gallantry or distinguished service was either the VC or MID. Another peculiarity of British awards, was that some were restricted to officers and others to other ranks. This has been done away with as well. One anomaly remains, however. While it is recognised as an award, the MID is not classed as a decoration; post nominals, and therefore the abbreviation, cannot be used on either Office of Australian War Graves (OAWG) headstones or memorial plaques.
I wrote to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. This seems to me, I said, to be a case of officialdom reigning over respect. MID recipients receive an oak leaf to wear on their campaign medal. They may have narrowly missed out on being awarded a VC, yet they are not entitled to official recognition in death.
Because a custom has been in place for many years (contributing to the lack of recognition for many deserving soldiers), does not dictate that it cannot be changed for the benefit of remaining recipients (and their families) going forward. In acknowledgement of their bravery and respect for their families, I asked the Minister to please consider allowing OAWG to use the abbreviation MID on headstones and memorial plaques of award recipients.
After the success of getting a replacement MID certificate for Peter Cadge from St James Palace a few years ago, it was particularly disappointing to be advised that use of the abbreviation MID on memorials was not possible as a person is not “awarded a mention in despatches”, a person is “mentioned in despatches”. Heaven help me!
—————————————————————————————————–
5 April 2024
The Complexity that is a Tank: Challenger 2
The following is an extract from the Times obituary for Major General Nick Ansell, CB, OBE.
I hadn’t realised the problems associated with Challenger 2.
“In 1989, not long before the Gulf War, Major General Nick Ansell, director of the Royal Armoured Corps (DRAC), was preoccupied with one thing: the problems encountered in the planned upgrade of the army’s new tank, the Challenger.
In many respects, Challenger, built by Vickers Defence Systems, was outstanding, and certainly a vast improvement on the Chieftain, which it had been progressively replacing since 1983. Its revolutionary “Chobham” composite armour gave far better protection than the rolled homogeneous armour that was then the standard for Nato tanks.
Its hydro-pneumatic suspension made for outstanding cross-country mobility. Its 120mm gun and ammunition were devastating. So certain, indeed, was the Ministry of Defence about Challenger’s superiority that in 1987 the British army team for the Canadian Army Trophy, the annual Nato tank gunnery competition at Grafenwöhr in Germany, were confidently predicted to win. They came last.
There were other factors, not least the team’s comparative ill preparedness because of training commitments elsewhere, but the Challenger’s target acquisition system was simply not fast enough. Britain subsequently withdrew indefinitely from the competition.
Ansell was mortified. Competitive by instinct, especially after 20 years in the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (the “Skins”) where every day was an inter-squadron competition, as DRAC he was not, however, responsible for procurement policy. Nevertheless, as professional head of the Royal Armoured Corps, whose crews depended on firepower as well as mobility and protection, he spoke up forthrightly: “That turret needs sorting out.”
A fire-control upgrade had already been delivered to the Armoured Trials and Development Unit (ATDU) at the RAC Centre in Bovington, Dorset, Ansell’s headquarters, for formal “User Trials”. This was meant to be the end of the acceptance process, when all the technical bugs were supposed to have been found and eliminated in the development stage.
Instead, the ATDU found the chassis flexed under the weight of the new turret when the tank fired in certain positions, causing significant backlash in the traverse. As the final aim of the gun depended on a settled position of the turret, round-to-round consistency could not be assured and often did not occur. Repeated trials with both live ammunition and simulation conducted by Major the Lord Crofton of the 9th/12th Royal Lancers proved that the chassis, whose armour had been reduced to allow for the heavier turret, was not up to the job.
The ATDU’s commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Selfe of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars, briefing Ansell throughout, concluded that the MoD’s proposed upgrade and therefore life-extension programme for Challenger was fundamentally unsound.
It was a risky call, given that there seemed to be no alternative, but Ansell, together with Brigadier Derek O’Callaghan, the programme’s sponsor on the operational requirements staff, backed Selfe and told the MoD bluntly that the upgrade “won’t do”. He said he would prefer the German Leopard 2, despite its inferiority in armoured protection. After the personal intervention of the prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, the MoD decided to ditch the upgrade and put Challenger’s successor to a procurement competition.
The contenders were Leopard 2, the French Leclerc, the US Abrams, and “Challenger 2” a private enterprise by Vickers. With only some 3 per cent of parts interchangeable with Challenger 1, Challenger 2 was in reality a new tank. It won the competition. Ansell had got his way, and despite the considerable extra cost, Challenger 2 entered service in 1994, deploying to Kosovo five years later and seeing action in Iraq in 2003.
—————————————————————————————————-
29 March 2024
Centurions in Vietnam
I received an invitation to participate in an on-line discussion in the next week or so. The stories below have been posted before, but are relevant and I thought worth putting up again.
Tanks, Crews, Books, and Models
Introduction.
The preface of my book ‘Canister! On! FIRE! : Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’ (COF), includes the following story:
“I graduated into the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) as a second lieutenant in 1969. Just prior to taking up my posting, I asked Captain Bill (Jungles) Ruttledge, who had been the Armoured Corps instructor during my officer training, if he could recommend a book about what life was like in an armoured unit. It was a surprise to learn that few such accounts had been written. After thinking for a while, he suggested Warriors for the Working Day, by Peter Elstob. This is a fictional story, based on the author’s service in the Royal Tank Regiment during the Second World War. Re-reading it recently, I felt an immediate affinity with the tank crews at the time.
The crew commander, gunner, loader and driver of a Comet tank had essentially the same responsibilities as the crew of a Centurion tank on operations in Vietnam, 25 to 30 years later. This is not altogether surprising, as the first Centurion tanks were built in 1945. The main difference was that Peter Elstob’s story is one of crews perfecting drills to counter enemy tanks and anti-tank guns; whereas our focus was on countering rocket-propelled grenades and antitank mines.”
Background
While working on my book I was contacted by Brigadier Stephen White, MBE (Retd). Stephen’s interest in Centurions was multifaceted: he had served with the Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), commanding 2RTR; he had been attached to 1st Armoured and 2nd Cavalry Regiments RAAC as a subaltern in 1973; and furthermore, he was making a one sixth scale model of one.
These models, put together from kits made by the UK firm Armortek (http://www.armortek.co.uk/), are highly engineered. As well as being very accurately detailed, they are radio controlled, have an obstacle crossing capability, and produce realistic sound effects from both engine and gun (which recoils on firing).
Stephen’s intention was to base his model on a Centurion which had been operated in Vietnam. He subsequently considered a couple of different tanks, finally deciding on ARN 169064. This was 22Bravo at Binh Ba (Barry Bennier) and 2Alpha on Operation Hammersley (‘Rip’ Riley); importantly, it is now in private ownership and being restored. Background research and the model’s on-going construction can be seen here http://www.armortek.co.uk/Forum3b/viewtopic.php?f=23&t=3931.
The Elstob Link
While in England in May (2014) I caught up with Brigadier White. He noticed that I had referred to Peter Elstob in COF and thought I might be interested in a related story. Prior to starting on his Centurion model, he had completed a model of a Comet, also to one sixth scale. Looking for an actual tank on which to base his project, he came across T335335, ‘Celerity’ [noun: swiftness, speed]. This happened to have been the Comet commanded by Peter Elstob during WWII.
Before long Stephen was being helped in his research by someone else with a vested interest, Dr Stephen Pannell, the son of Elstob’s driver. Together they traced the life of the tank from manufacture in 1944, through WWII operations with 3RTR in Germany, to its time in Hong Kong from 1949 to 1959 (then renumbered 20ZR65). Whether it was one of the Comets later offered to Australia is unknown (see COF Vol 1, p27). The story of the model’s research and construction is recorded at: http://www.armortek.co.uk/Forum3b/viewtopic.php?f=18&t=3511. ‘Celerity’, seen ‘tarped down’ in the photo, has also become the subject of a number of plastic model kits.
The Aller Crossing
But there’s more …
Sergeant Elstob was involved in establishing a bridgehead for the crossing of the Aller River in Germany in April 1945. Apart from War Diaries etc, there are two published accounts of this action: ‘The Sharp End : A Personal Account of Life in a Tank Unit in the Second World War’ by Major John Langdon MC; and ‘A View from the Turret : A History of 3RTR in the Second World War’ by Bill Close.
Langdon, Elstob’s troop leader (1 Tp, A Sqn), recounts how they had just put on a brew when a Tiger tank appeared. Not being able to react quickly enough to prevent the troop corporal’s tank being knocked out, they were lucky that the Tiger broke off contact because of fading light. Fortunes were reversed next morning. The Tiger appeared side-on to a tank from C Sqn 3RTR; the entry hole made by the Comet’s 77mm AP round can be seen in the photo below.
The three tanks, Centurion ARN 169064, Comet T355355 and Tiger F01, were crewed by armoured soldiers of different nations. Some of these men were killed in action, some were wounded. All, however, shared the unique bond of having been an AFV crewman. Models and publications such as those above (and restored AFVs) serve to remind us of them.
Tanks, Crews, Books, and Models. (Part 2)
Following on from the Elstob story, another of Stephen White’s Armortek builds represents the service of a gallant tank commander. The model is the final version of a Panzer III (PzKpfw III Ausf N). Produced in 1942/3 to provide close support for infantry, the tank was armed with a 75-millimetre low-velocity gun (capable, for the first time, of firing HEAT projectiles). The particular vehicle on which the model was based was that commanded by Hans-Günther Stotten.
This armoured officer had a remarkable career, fighting throughout WWII from Poland and France to North Africa and Russia. Having survived numerous ‘bail outs’, he was one of Germany’s most highly decorated soldiers. Among his awards was the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves (the equivalent of the VC) which he received in recognition of his bravery and leadership during the last German attack in North Africa at Kasserine. Captured later by Soviet Troops, he was shot while trying to escape on 5 April 1945. The war ended just weeks later.
Footnotes:
1. According to the son of Peter Elstob’s driver, rather than being “a fictionalstory” (see Introduction), Warriors for a Working Day is autobiographical in large part.
2. Another person I caught up with in the UK was Simon Dunstan, the prolific author of AFV publications. His next book, a magnum opus on the Centurion (including sections on its operational service worldwide), is to be launched on 15 Sep 16. This, of course, is the Centenary of the first action involving tanks at the Battle of Flers-Courcellette (part of the First Battle of the Somme which commenced on 1 Jul 16) The 49 Mark I tanks achieved mixed results: some were knocked-out by enemy fire; some broke down; and some ditched; others, however, successfully destroyed enemy strong points. Importantly, commanders saw the potential and orders were given for the urgent manufacture of as many tanks as possible. As the saying goes … the rest is history.
————————————————————————————————–
22 March 2024
Army National Memorial
[Sorry for the late post … time got away from me. Where do the days go?]
The last post about this was on 2 Feb 24. I believe that the time has come to act and to raise awareness of Army’s failure to honour its veterans. The following letter has been sent to Heston Russell.
Hi Heston,
Are you aware that the Australian Army National Memorial (on ANZAC Parade, Canberra) honours only those involved in 20th Century conflicts (up until Vietnam) and that there is no memorial to the service and sacrifice of those who served in Timor, Iraq, or Afghanistan? [The seven pillars which are a major part of the Memorial, stand for the seven major conflicts of the 20th Century.]
How can this be? What on earth was the Chief of Army’s staff thinking in 1989 when the present Army National Memorial was dedicated? It’s simply unbelievable that anyone could imagine that, at that time, there would be no more wars.
After writing to the Minister, I was put in touch with Army’s project manager. I now know that the intention is to demolish the existing Memorial (relocating the statues) and to build another one to honour soldiers who have served in all conflicts, including future ones.
There has been no public consultation. Why the secrecy? Surely such an undertaking deserves the widest possible stakeholder involvement.
It turns out that the intention had been to unveil the new Memorial on Army’s 125th Anniversary (1 Jan 25). Lack of available funding and the low priority allocated to the project, however, mean that this is no longer possible.
It is my belief that the families of soldiers lost on active service since Vietnam, and their comrades in arms, deserve much better. Happy to provide full background should you be interested in helping to reverse this failure to properly honour the service and sacrifice of Australian soldiers.
—————————————————————————————————-
15 March 2024
An Ethical Quandary
Apologies: Gremlins seem to have prevented the Blog post for 8 Mar 24 being displayed. It has been added (again) below.
The Army has produced a set of values and a soldiers’ contract. Is this enough to manage the vacuum caused by the absence of a code of ethics?“
“Our Values
The Australian Army is a national institution, a professional fighting force and a force for good.
Army personnel do the right thing. Hold themselves to the highest ethical standards through self-discipline and personal accountability. They set high standards and live the following values:
Service: The selflessness of character to place the security and interests of our nation and its people ahead of my own.
Courage: The strength of character to say and do the right thing, always, especially in the face of adversity.
Respect: The humanity of character to value others and treat them with dignity.
Integrity: The consistency of character to align my thoughts, words and actions to do what is right.
Excellence: The willingness of character to strive each day to be the best I can be, both professionally and personally.
Contract
Army’s soldiers have a solemn obligation to the nation. Their contract with Australia states:
I’m an Australian soldier who is an expert in close combat I am physically and mentally tough compassionate and courageous I lead by example, I strive to take the initiative I am committed to learning and working for the team I believe in trust, loyalty and respect for my Country, my mates and the Army the Rising Sun is my badge of honour I am an Australian Soldier – always.”
In my opinion, the absence of a code of ethics is a fundamental flaw in the culture of the organisation; one that cannot be compensated for in any other way.
Why not expand the soldiers’ contract to embrace a code of ethics?
‘I recently heard someone submit that emphasis on character is all that is needed to meet the need of the ADF in terms of ethical standards. I believe that, in addition, a Code of Ethics is necessary. A short extract from a lengthy essay on the subject is provided below.
“If you become aware of someone asleep at the wheel, it is your ethical responsibility to wake them. Sadly, for those in the ADF, the wreckage caused by failure in this space is omni-present. The military has been under the spell of an insidious malaise with respect to ethics for decades. Why? … because complacency is easy; it requires neither self-discipline nor courage. On the other hand, both these qualities are needed if someone is to stand up for what is right and not be cowered by a pervasive culture into simply going along with the mob.
What is to be gained by the ADF encouraging its members to take an ethical approach to matters they deal with on a day-to-day basis? In a word, the benefit is Trust … the result of a working environment in which human values are paramount: the dignity of the individual is respected; undertakings are honoured; those in need are helped; and decisions are taken which result in just outcomes. There is no profession in which trust is more important, than the profession of arms.”
Examples of standards that would be part of an ADF Code of Ethics are:
‘I will never knowingly breach, nor condone the breach, of authorised regulations.
If I learn of breaches of authorised regulations or unethical behaviour, I will report this to my chain of command without delay and without fear or favour.
I will never place loyalty to my unit or to an individual, above the interests of the nation, the lives of my fellow service members, or the truth in all matters.’
Readers can readily envisage the other standards that would apply.’
——————————————————————————————————-
8 March 2024
Army Lessons Online
Following on from last week …
“It can be easy for a hard-earned lesson to get lost in the Army. For this reason, Army Lessons Online was established to help collect, store, and make available observations, insights, and lessons when needed.
Army is a big organisation; and it’s been around for a long time. Often, others have learnt and recorded lessons so that we don’t need to learn things the hard way.
There are a range of resources to help you easily learn the hard lessons of others. These include The Cove, other PME websites, Army doctrine, history books, and The Army Lessons Online.
Watch the video below to get a better understanding of Army Lessons Online and how this site can help you easily learn the lessons of those who have gone before us.
“Congratulations on a great resource. I note that the video refers to the importance of lessons being recorded so that, should there be a second deployment to a theatre, earlier experience will not have been lost. True, but what about reinforcements going to the same theatre? The lack of any such system during Vietnam meant that everyone had to learn from their own experience. Lessons learnt were passed back to neither training establishments nor replacement units. My next comment relates to responsibility. I saw no mention of this in the video, only reference to “ideally” and “perhaps”. Surely, we need someone to be designated as being responsible for ensuring that lessons learnt are recorded and doctrine and training revised accordingly. My tank driver in Vietnam should never have been wounded. Drivers in each of the preceding three squadrons had been wounded in exactly the same way, but we had no idea. There was just one of the many failures in such command responsibility.
The British system of Operational Analysis (OA) has much to commend it. Sub-unit elements responsible for recording lessons learnt are imbedded in operational units. Their OA command headquarters receives reports from theatres and ensures that solutions are found and implemented both in-theatre and the home base. Responsibility is sheeted home to ensure that this happens. An optional system without anyone having direct responsibility (for which they are specifically held accountable), will not work.
Saying that responsibility is vested in all levels of command will not cut it either. The ADF is the archetypal hierarchical organisation; mandates come from the top and are acted upon automatically and without question. It is taken for granted that the way things are done has successfully evolved over time, as a result of the combined experience of those in charge; i.e. it is assumed that all options have been considered. In many cases, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Someone must be held specifically accountable if battles are to be won and lives saved. BTW. At the end of the Video, did I see someone prodding for an IED with a metal bayonet? Surely that lesson has been learnt and fibreglass prodders are now used.”
———————————————————————————————————
1 March 2024
Learning from History (or Not?)
The website “Mike’s Research” has a page entitled ‘Centurion Tanks in Vietnam”, part of which is a description of Operation Hermit Park in 1971. It is copied below.
“Operation Hermit Park was an assault on an enemy bunker system. The attack force consisting of centurion tanks, an APC troop and 1 Platoon, V6 Company (4RAR/NZ) crossed the start line and headed towards the objective. Not long after the advance began, a leading Centurion ran over a buried 40-gallon (151.4 Liters) drum. It caused the trooper’s eyes in the surrounding area to water profusely and it made their skin itch and burn. The drum or cylinder probably contain tear gas. The attack force advanced about 50-70 meters (54 to 76 yards) towards the bunker system when the forward left Centurion received a direct hit from an RPG round. The RPG hit the top of the turret around the area just in front of the tank commander’s cupola. Both the commander and his operator were immediately wounded as both turret hatches were fully open. Smoke was coming out of the turret with no sign of crew movement. Once the wounded were evacuated, the attack continued in the same direction towards the objective. The forward Centurions swung left into a line in front of the infantry and fired canister, 50 and 30 caliber into the general direction. The fire fight raged for about 15 minutes. The fire was intense with rounds flying in every direction. The surrounding vegetation above knee height was totally shredded.”
Commenting, I pointed out that this description was misleading in terms of what actually happened. I offered an alternative …
“Operation Hermit Park was an assault on an enemy bunker system undertaken by C Squadron, commanded by Major Peter Bourke. The attacking force, comprising SHQ, two troops of tanks, an APC troop and 1 Platoon, V6 Company (4RAR/NZ), crossed the start line at 2.45pm. They had not gone far when a drum became caught in the tracks of one of the tanks. Crystals were scattered everywhere, causing the eyes of the tank crew and nearby infantry to sting and water profusely. It was probably tear-gas.
Unfortunately, the enemy position was not where it had been reported and the assault continued for over an hour. All surprise was now lost and the enemy had time to consolidate their defences. At this point, one of the tank drivers was injured by a dead branch which fell from a tall tree. He was quickly replaced, but soon after, the forward left Centurion was hit by an RPG. It struck the top of the turret just in front of the cupola, and, with the turret hatches open, both the commander and operator were wounded. Once the casualties were evacuated, the attack continued … another tank was hit, wounding the ‘new’ driver.
The frontage was saturated with fire, with the surrounding vegetation above knee height being totally shredded. Despite this, a third tank was hit by an RPG, wounding the commander. Although the RPGs had damaged the barrels of both tanks, they continued firing. Finally, the position was dominated and the enemy withdrew (towards the attackers to avoid artillery cut-off fire). It was 7pm by the time the tanks re-bombed with ammo. They had fired sixty canister, four HE, two APCBC, 11,000 .30cal and 800 rounds of .50cal.”
While specific differences are one thing, another is the importance of highlighting the tactical lessons to be gained. Failure in this respect, means that lessons have to be relearnt, incurring additional casualties. The critical lesson here is the importance of shock action. It had been achieved in the Squadron’s previous contact (operation Overlord), with a major objective being taken without casualties. The circumstances of Hermit Park saw three tanks badly damaged, with four crew casualties.
My follow up comment was a follows …
“A quandary. It is sometimes said that the perfect is the enemy of the good. There is enormous work involved in putting the above presentation together and this must be acknowledged. Errors detract, however. For example, the account of Op Overlord states that “The infantry assault pushed through an enemy bunker system with the Centurion tanks in close support crushing many bunkers and their occupants with their tracks.” Initially a tank troop assaulted without infantry support; a second tank troop joined it, infantry caught up and supported the subsequent capture of the position; the bunkers were too strongly built for the tanks to collapse.
I suggest that the following reference be incorporated in the blog for those interested in operational details: ‘Canister! On! FIRE!: Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’, Bruce Cameron, Big Sky Publishing (2012). E-books are available from the publisher.”
———————————————————————————————————
23 February 2024
The Importance of Trust
Letter to the ‘Canberra Times’ …
“Later this year, ACT residents will be asked to decide which candidates deserve our vote, i.e. which are to be trusted to best represent our interests. This creates a quandary, as our society has reached the point where the default position is to distrust everything, unless proved otherwise.
It has been said that a measure of the maturity of a society is the extent to which it cares for its veterans. The same thing could be said as regards our confidence that our institutions will treat us fairly. What do you do, however, when faced with secrecy, fabrication and deceit?
The answer must be to evaluate the evidence. Could it be that the breakdown in trust is a result of deliberate cognitive warfare efforts by a third party, aimed at destabilising the moral basis of our society? Possibly, but then again, where does trust come from in the first place?
It is the result of a working environment in which human values are paramount: the dignity of the individual is respected; undertakings are honoured; those in need are helped; and decisions are taken which result in just outcomes. It is unsurprising that these same values provide the very foundation of the laws that govern our society as a whole. Our institutions (at least most of them) have codes of conduct or ethics, but the essence of trust is something distinctly personal; confidence of one person in another to do what is right on behalf of their community as a whole.”
I found the Chief of Army’s start of the year message encouraging re his emphasis on trust ….
Something is Very Wrong. The Late WO2 Kevin Conway, AATTV, and his Family Have Been Dealt a Major Injustice. Will the AATTV Association Advocate on his Behalf?
On 6 July 1964, Warrant Officer Conway, AATTV, became the first Australian to be killed in combat during the Vietnam War. (36448 Sgt W F Hacking, AATTV, was the first Australian serviceman to be killed in Vietnam: accidently, Jun 63).
The Last Post Ceremony for Kevin, at the AWM, can be seen here: https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=590592202517338 At about the 20 minute mark, reference is made to him being recommended for the Victoria Cross for his actions at the Battle of Nam Dong. This was not approved (it is suggested that this was because Australia was not officially at war and that it was not until an Australian battalion was committed on 29 April 1965, that this changed).
Conroy received the following awards: US Silver Star; Knight, National Order of Vietnam; Vietnam Armed Forces Honour Medal; Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, and Vietnam Campaign Medal.
It will be seen in the photo above (Conway’s niece in 2016 when his remains were reinterned in Qld) that these awards are absent from his medal rack. It includes only those foreign awards previously approved by the Govt (from his Malaya and Vietnam service). From 2012, individual recipients of foreign awards were permitted to apply to wear them.
The medal rack for WO2 Wheatley is shown below. It shows the US Silver Star, together with the Knight, Order of Vietnam and Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, awarded to him.
In his speech to Parliament (above), Laming states that his office had searched for Serong’s recommendation, but the Archives couldn’t find it. In his Commander’s Diary at the time (attached), Serong states that he spoke to General Westmoreland about “joint action on posthumous awards for Conway and Alamo” [Alamo was the US advisor killed with Conway].
Serong, immediately following his reference to an award for Conway, states that he had received a signal in relation to decorations: “we are to have VN and US decorations referred to us, and adapt them to appropriate Australian decorations, and we may get it in the half yearly list. For heavens sake! Replied suggesting that we let things go as they are until they get us sorted out as an operational area, then let them through”.
There were obviously problems associated with the administration of gallantry awards at the time. Defence has previously acknowledged that such difficulties are grounds for reconsideration of the circumstances which may have adversely affected an award being made.
Laming’s statement to Parliament describes something of the action during the Battle of Nam Dong. Conway and Alamo were both involved in providing supporting mortar fire. Further detail is provided at … https://army.togetherweserved.com/army/servlet/tws.webapp.WebApp?cmd=ShadowBoxProfile&type=BattleMemoryExt&ID=52337 An extract follows: “It was at this contact that the Australian member of the Australian Army Training Team (Vietnam) AATTV, Warrant Officer Kevin Conway, was cited by his commander, then Colonel Francis Philip (Ted) Serong for a Victoria Cross, the highest gallantry award for Australian service personnel. Kevin Conway was in a forward weapon pit with an American Master Sergeant, Gabriel Alamo, who was killed in the North Vietnamese assault.
Conway alone fired his mortar upon the assaulting enemy in ever decreasing range fire until he was forced to bring his mortar fire upon himself to save the perimeter of the base. Warrant Officer Conway has never received the cited award for valour. He was the first Australian to be killed in action in the Vietnam war. Serong stated that it was American Special Forces politics that denied Conway his Victoria Cross.”
One has to wonder if, in fact, ‘politics’ was the reason; or whether it was an administrative failing caused by a lack of familiarity with the process for recommending and approving Australian gallantry awards. There was, unfortunately, no precedent to follow. For the US Army, however, the opposite was the case; the Battle of Nam Dong saw the first Medal of Honour awarded for the Vietnam War.
What recognition did Master Sergeant Alamo receive? He was awarded the US Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star; as well as the Vietnam Military Merit Medal; Vietnam Cross of Gallantry; and Vietnam Campaign Medal. Noticeable here, in comparison with Conway, are two things: the presence of the DSC and the absence of the Knight, National Order of Vietnam. The former is the US’s second highest award for gallantry; the latter was the highest honour that could be bestowed by Vietnam.
In Wheatley’s case, the DHAAT found that, when it was realised that the VC is an award for a single act of valour only, other acts of gallantry were simply deleted from the citation. In Swanton’s case, it was found that Defence should have made themselves aware of the circumstances and that an act of gallantry on his part had been overlooked.
It will be seen from the reports on the hearings, that hard evidence to substantiate any award, is the key. Conway’s VC citation couldn’t be found in the Archives, but what about the resources of the Army History Unit (AHU) and the AWM. The Commanders’ Diaries held by the latter, are an enormous source of information (as shown in the attached two sheets).
What, in good conscience, needs to be done?
Steps should be taken to determine if Conway’s family have the medals that he was awarded by the US and the Republic of Vietnam. If so, these should be mounted on his ‘rack’; if not, action should be initiated to obtain them.
A submission should be made to Defence for metallic recognition of Conway’s bravery at the Battle of Nam Dong on 4 Jul 64. (This email could provide the basis for this.) It is suggested that, at a minimum, a Medal of Gallantry is deserved.
To deny an award, Defence must show that they have rigorously searched all possible sources of evidence to support an award. In addition to the AHU and Commanders’ Diaries, considerable information should be available from the US Government. This should include the tape recording describing the Battle of Nam Dong made by Dr Hickey (a witness to the events). Colonel Serong states, in his Comander’s diary, that the tape makes it clear that “advisors and Nungs did the lot”.
All US advisers present received appropriate US gallantry awards, including a Medal of Honor and DSC. Australia’s WO2 Conway, however, received no recognition at all from his country.
Surely, we are better than this!
——————————————————————————————
9 February 2024
How Well do we Know Our Military History?
The following excerpt from its article, appeared in ‘Frontline’ (news@frontline.asn.au) on 3 Feb 24:
“Vietnam War’s Inaugural Medal of Honor Awardee, Roger H.C. Donlon, Passes Away.
Upon enlisting in the Army in 1958, Roger H.C. Donlon, already acquainted with military life from a stint in the Air Force in 1953, embarked on a journey that would lead him to become the first Medal of Honor recipient of the Vietnam War. Leaving the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1957 after initially enrolling, Donlon chose to pursue his destiny in the Army. Following Officer Candidate School, he qualified for Special Forces and was deployed to Vietnam in 1964. It was in July of that year that he displayed exceptional courage and tenacity in defending an American training camp, earning him the prestigious Medal of Honor.”
Amazed that there was no mention of Kevin Conway, I sent the following email to the editor: “The article about America’s first MoH recipient in the Vietnam War … fails to mention that in the same battle, Australia’s first KIA was lost [WO2 Kevin Conway]. Suggest this warrants its own story as a matter of national significance and pride.”
I didn’t realize it, but a comment from Ernie Chamberlain had been posted immediately following the article. It just about says it all:
“Battle of Nam Dong – July 1964: WO2 Kevin Conway – the first Australian to die of enemy action in the Vietnam War. A nine-page account by US Captain Roger Donlon of the Nam Dong Battle can be found at https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/images.php?img=/images/213/2130413003.pdf. He records that an Australian AATTV member was killed in the battle., noting: “Besides the 12 of us in Team A-726, there were only two other westerners in the camp: Kevin Conway, an Australian warrant officer who represented his country the way we did the United States, and Gerald C. Hickey, an American anthropologist expert on the Vietnamese mountain tribes.”
The Australian War Memorial Records notes: 13097 Temporary Warrant Officer Class 2 Kevin George. Conway, Age 35. Australian Army Training Team Vietnam Attached to US Special Forces.
He was killed in action at Nam Dong, Thua Thien Province on 6th 6 6 July 1964.
He was [Australia’s] first combat casualty.
He held the Medal of Knight, National Order of Vietnam , Cross of Gallantry with Palm. He was also awarded a Campaign Service Medal with clasp South Vietnam (this is a very rare award only 68 issued, all to the AATTV). He also was awarded the US Silver Star and the Vietnamese Armed Forces Honour Medal.
Kevin Conway was recommended for the Victoria Cross, but this was denied at that time, because Australia was not at war.
The Australian Government saw fit not to award Conway with anything, but the South Vietnamese awarded him their highest award being the National Order of Vietnam.”
Response from Frontline to my email: “Coming up, Bruce”
Interestingly, there are any number of references on Google to Kevin Conroy being the first Australian killed in Vietnam. This error is explained in the following email which I sent to the curator of pictures at the AWM:
“This photo https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1103074 includes the following caption: “WO2 Conway was the first of the team’s [AATTV, Jul 64] advisers to be mortally wounded.”.
I believe you may wish to reconsider this as:
Kevin Conway was actually the first Australian serviceman to be killed in action, i.e. in combat, in Vietnam (not ‘just’ the first member of the AATTV); and
36448 Sgt W F Hacking was the first Australian serviceman to be killed in Vietnam (accidently, when his rifle caught in vegetation, Jun 63); he was a member of the AATTV, so the quote above is questionable.
More to follow re the injustice experienced by the late Kevin Conway and his family.
——————————————————————————————–
2 February 2024
The Army National Memorial
The following communications are self-explanatory.
Letter to the Minister for VA on 13 May 23 … Dear Minister,Thank you for DVA’s response (9 May 2023) to my letter of 19 April 2023.I wrote to you about the Australian Army National Memorial on Anzac Parade. My letter highlighted the fact, as stated on the Memorial’s plaque, that its seven very large cylindrical pillars represent the seven major conflicts in which the Australian Army has been involved in the twentieth century (Boer War; World War I; World War II; Korea; Malayan Emergency; Borneo Confrontation; and Vietnam).Since Vietnam, therefore, there has been no National Memorial to the service and sacrifice of Australian Army personnel in subsequent conflicts (East Timor; Second Gulf War; and Afghanistan).Given that DVA has responsibility for honouring ALL Australian service men and women involved in wars, conflicts and peace operations, I asked you: “What steps are being taken to honour them?”.In response, I was informed that the National Capital Authority (NCA) manages memorials on Anzac Parade and advised to contact them.I cannot believe that this advice is correct. The NCA has no responsibility for honouring Australian service personnel, this is the responsibility of DVA, as has been clearly pointed out. Furthermore, it is to be expected that DVA would have a plan to meet its on-going responsibilities in this respect. Presumably DVA intends that Australian Army personnel are to be honoured for their service and sacrifice post-Vietnam. Should consultations with the Chief of Army and Army veterans lead to this being done by either modifying the existing Australian Army National Memorial or creating a new twenty-first century National Memorial, it is suggested that it would be appropriate for DVA to liaise with the NCA in this regard (if no such consultation has occurred already).Can you please advise what steps are being taken to create a National Memorial to honour the service and sacrifice of Australian Army personnel in conflicts post-Vietnam.Many thanks for your consideration, [Copy to Chief of Army]
Letter from the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters on 31 May 24:
“The Memorial belongs to the Australian Army; its location, however, is managed by the National Capital Authority“.
“I’m pleased to tell you work is underway to address your concerns. Army has initiated a project to examine options for contemporary inclusions, redesigns or updates. This endeavour is framed on the requirement to reflect the service of all Australians who have served in the Army, including those campaigns post-Vietnam.
Any future design must also allow for future expansion, and provide a suitable space for reflection and site accessibility. As the project progresses there will be opportunity for community consultation.”
Given that six months had elapsed, I followed up with a phone call to the CA’s project manager on 29 Nov 23. The brigadier had recently taken up his position, one of his responsibilities being to deliver a new Memorial which will honour the sacrifice of all soldiers in all conflicts, up to the present and into the future. I felt confident that there was a positive commitment to this end.
——————————————————————————————–
5 January 2024
An Oversight Agency for the Prevention of Veterans’ Suicides
I received the following email recently: “Please find below an opportunity to contribute to the Royal Commission [Veterans Suicide] deliberations on the future of consultation for the ESO community … https://defenceveteransuicide.royalcommission.gov.au/ “.
My submission is copied below.
The Creation of a Government Oversight Agency for the Prevention of Suicide Among ADF Members
The Problem.
A loss of self-respect, associated depression, and deterioration of well-being, coupled with overwhelming stress … resulting in suicide of serving and former ADF members.
Task.
Ideally, to create a multi-disciplinary agency whose employees’ role is to oversee the anticipation, identification, treatment, follow-up, and elimination of causation factors associated with the problem.
Pragmatically, to create an administrative body, without powers of compulsion as far as ADF is concerned, in response to a perceived requirement to ensure the oversight and active management of the problem into the future.
Nature of Agency.
Ideally, a centralisedbody with qualified employees (civilian) regionally located and on-call for consultation with ADF members, either at the member’s request or on a referral basis.Important functions would include researching advances in treatment and keeping employees, veterans, and the ADF up to date; as well as the development of procedures for managing at risk ADF members and former members, and countering causation factors.
Pragmatically, a bureaucratic entity with no hands-on contact with ADF members at risk and no accountability for outcomes. Oversight exercised by ‘memos’ and recommendations only; no enforcement powers available.
Pre-requisites for the Ideal Agency.
The following essential requirements are discussed in more detail in the paragraphs under:
A common Code of Ethics must be embraced by ADF members;
The agency must be independent of the chain of command and its employees must have authority to protect ADF members and former members assessed to be at risk of self-harm;
Procedures must take into account the fact that ADF employment roles, and the stresses associated with them, are all very different from each other.
All contact between ADF members and agency employees must be confidential, any release of personal information requiring approval by the ADF member or former member; and
The oversight agency must be accountable to the Ministers of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs for the success or otherwise of its actions.
Code of Ethics. A Code of Ethics sets out the values, principles and responsibilities that govern the functions of an organisation. It is often coupled with a statement of guidelines that characterise professional conduct by its members. Nearly all Australian commercial, not for profit, and charitable entities have a code of ethics tailored to their mode of operation. Not so the ADF, however. Until there is a common understanding of, and support for, what constitutes ‘the right thing to do’, a major factor associated with the problem will remain. A supporting paper is attached.
Differing Nature of ADF Employment. ADF employment roles are all different to each other, eg. assaulting an enemy machine gun position is very different by nature for an infantry soldier, compared to a member of a tank crew. Both roles, even during training, involve major stresses for the individual, albeit of differing kinds. Understanding these myriad differences across the ADF is essential when anticipating, identifying, and treating something like post-traumatic stress disorder. A paper describing the unique stressors experienced by a tank crewman in combat (or training) is attached. A ‘one hat fits all’ model across the ADF must not be adopted.
Confidentiality. To be effective, an oversight agency must provide a conduit for confidential advice from and to those whose well-being is affected; together with the power to bring about changes to harmful practices and to ensure appropriate rehabilitation, without any possibility of reprisal.
Accountability. Human nature is such that little is ever able to be achieved, if no-one is able to be held responsible for outcomes. This goes hand in hand with open and transparent governance. Ministers must be accountable to the Australian public and provide periodic progress reports.
Conclusion
Without on-going management and close oversight, implementation of the findings of the Royal Commission could easily come to nothing. Recognition of this fact, however, does not solve the problem. The widest possible consultation and collaboration is needed to create a body capable of achieving the results required. An ADF without a code of ethics is part of the problem. This deficiency must be addressed as a priority.
For there to be any hope of the Commission’s recommendations being put into effect, those charged with oversight must be accountable. Without Oversight Agency leaders who can be held to account, the Commission’s report will be consigned to the dust shelves of the bureaucracy.
———————————————————————————————————-
2 February 2024
The Army National Memorial
The following communications are self-explanatory.
Letter to the Minister for VA on 13 May 23 … Dear Minister,Thank you for DVA’s response (9 May 2023) to my letter of 19 April 2023.I wrote to you about the Australian Army National Memorial on Anzac Parade. My letter highlighted the fact, as stated on the Memorial’s plaque, that its seven very large cylindrical pillars represent the seven major conflicts in which the Australian Army has been involved in the twentieth century (Boer War; World War I; World War II; Korea; Malayan Emergency; Borneo Confrontation; and Vietnam).Since Vietnam, therefore, there has been no National Memorial to the service and sacrifice of Australian Army personnel in subsequent conflicts (East Timor; Second Gulf War; and Afghanistan).Given that DVA has responsibility for honouring ALL Australian service men and women involved in wars, conflicts and peace operations, I asked you: “What steps are being taken to honour them?”.In response, I was informed that the National Capital Authority (NCA) manages memorials on Anzac Parade and advised to contact them.I cannot believe that this advice is correct. The NCA has no responsibility for honouring Australian service personnel, this is the responsibility of DVA, as has been clearly pointed out. Furthermore, it is to be expected that DVA would have a plan to meet its on-going responsibilities in this respect. Presumably DVA intends that Australian Army personnel are to be honoured for their service and sacrifice post-Vietnam. Should consultations with the Chief of Army and Army veterans lead to this being done by either modifying the existing Australian Army National Memorial or creating a new twenty-first century National Memorial, it is suggested that it would be appropriate for DVA to liaise with the NCA in this regard (if no such consultation has occurred already).Can you please advise what steps are being taken to create a National Memorial to honour the service and sacrifice of Australian Army personnel in conflicts post-Vietnam.Many thanks for your consideration, [Copy to Chief of Army]
Letter from the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters on 31 May 24:
“The Memorial belongs to the Australian Army; its location, however, is managed by the National Capital Authority“.
“I’m pleased to tell you work is underway to address your concerns. Army has initiated a project to examine options for contemporary inclusions, redesigns or updates. This endeavour is framed on the requirement to reflect the service of all Australians who have served in the Army, including those campaigns post-Vietnam.
Any future design must also allow for future expansion, and provide a suitable space for reflection and site accessibility. As the project progresses there will be opportunity for community consultation.”
Given that six months had elapsed, I followed up with a phone call to the CA’s project manager on 29 Nov 23. The brigadier had recently taken up his position, one of his responsibilities being to deliver a new Memorial which will honour the sacrifice of all soldiers in all conflicts, up to the present and into the future. I felt confident that there was a positive commitment to this end.
——————————————————————————————————–
26 January 2024
Thoughtful tank gunner who was the last veteran of theregiment that spearheaded the D-Day landings on Sword Beach
An obituary of note: Tuesday, 2 January 2024, ‘The Times’
In the grey dawn of D-Day, June 6, 1944, 20-year-old Trooper Lawrence Burn’s 35-tonne DD (duplex-drive) Sherman tank, its canvas flotation screen raised, edged down the ramp of the landing craft into the Channel. The tank settled low in the water — just 3ft of freeboard — the driver engaged the two propellers driven by off-takes from the rear sprockets, and headed for Sword Beach, the easternmost of the Normandy landing zones 5000 yards away.
The idea of the “DD” was to get ashore so low in the water as to be unnoticeable or else to look like a small boat, and put down suppressive fire so that the infantry could assault directly from their landing craft and get across the open beach into cover. Steering was by tiller operated by the tank commander standing on the turret, in Burn’s tank Lieutenant Derek Spencer. On the engine deck behind Spencer, unable to see over the screen, were the other three members of the crew: Burn (the gunner), the loader/radio operator, and the co-driver/hull machine-gunner, Burn’s adoptive elder brother Peter.
They had had a rough crossing from Portsmouth. The storm that had delayed the landings for 24 hours had barely passed, the wind still Force 5. All five men had thrown up at least once into a bucket hung on the back of the tank (the planners had thought of everything). “It wouldn’t have bothered me whether the thing had sunk or not, I was so seasick,” Burn said.
Their Sherman and the other 39 of the 13th/18th Royal Hussars’ (13/18H) two DD squadrons had a 50-minute swim ahead of them to “touch down” at H-Hour minus seven and a half minutes — H Hour being the time the assaulting infantry would land. The squadron leader, Major Derek Wormald, steering his own tank, reported that on launching he “could see we were about opposite the church in Lion-sur-Mer and that our beach was about 45 degrees to our port bow. No bombing had started on the beach and the houses were clearly visible.” All that Burn could hope for was the Germans did not see them, the swell rose no higher and no landing craft ran into them. They wore the Davis submarine escape apparatus and “Mae West” life jackets, and they had an inflatable dingy, but Burn could not swim.
Five hundred yards out, all but Spencer climbed inside to prepare for “touchdown”. The loader fed a 75mm HE round into the breach in anticipation. Two hundred yards on, as the tracks made contact with the beach some 300 yards below high-water mark, the Germans opened fire. Spencer guided the driver by intercom another 50 yards, managing to avoid the steel obstacles with their Teller anti-tank mines, until the water was shallow enough to break the pneumatic struts to drop the screen, and Burn was at last able to see his targets. He recalled the sudden realisation “there was nothing and no one in front of us but Germans”.
Burn in 1947, the year of his discharge.
Burn’s tank put down as much fire as it could until the men of the South Lancashire Regiment assaulting that sector of Sword Beach made it to the seawall, and then prepared to advance. However, they had landed on a rising tide, water had now flooded the engine compartment and the engine would not restart. Spencer called for his troop sergeant to back his tank to the front of theirs so that they could cross-load the machineguns and ammunition and take the crew up the beach. Meanwhile, Burn traversed and elevated his 75mm and fired off all the HE ammunition inland.
Although the beach was now under considerable fire from artillery and mortars, they managed to make it to the sand dunes unscathed, Burn’s brother even salvaging “all his tins of cigarettes”. Remarkably, they were quick to get a replacement Sherman and rejoined the action towards midday.
That night they bivouacked in Hermanville-sur-Mer just a mile inland, and “slept out by the side of our tanks, but then we were stonked. So I immediately went under the tank and ever after that I always slept in the tank.” Burn had nicknamed his tank “Icanhopit”, so the replacement was “IcanhopitII”. By the end of the war, he was in “IcanhopitIV”.
Lawrence “Laurie” Andrew Burn was born in a home for unmarried mothers in Bradford in 1924, and adopted by an aunt and uncle informally, for there was no legal provision for adoption until 1926. After primary school he attended Harrogate Technical College before becoming a salesman at Montague Burton’s, the “Tailors of Taste”.
When war broke out he joined the Home Guard as soon as he was old enough, and then in 1942, when his brother came home one day and said he had enlisted, went out the next day and enlisted too. His brother had met some hussars in the dance hall in Harrogate who were encamped at nearby Skipton, the regiment having been sent to Yorkshire to re-form and re-equip after Dunkirk. The brothers thought they would therefore be doing their training near home. Instead they were sent to the Royal Armoured Corps centre at Bovington in Dorset.
Burn, 5ft 10in tall, slim, fit and thoughtful, took to both driver and gunnery training well, but being an observant Methodist, objected to his exclusion from worship: “The Catholics were allowed to go at 8am on a Sunday, and the C of E at 10am, but the ‘odds and sods’, as they called us, were given duties to do, such as scrubbing the wooden floors. Sergeant Hayter gave us a piece of soap and a brush and said, ‘Get on with it,’ you know. I said, ‘Excuse me, sergeant, we’re not prisoners.’ He said, ‘Well you bloody well will be soon if you don’t get on with that.’ So we got that changed, so the ‘odds and sods’ could go to worship.”
After their six months’ training the brothers were posted back to 13/18H, which by now had been designated a “water assault regiment” and moved to Wickham Market in Suffolk for flotation training with Valentine tanks on Fritton Lake. Conversion training on the Sherman followed, after which the crews went to Gosport in Hampshire for familiarisation with the Davis apparatus.
“There was a big water tank for escape training,” Burn recalled. “We were dressed in denim and we had to get inside the empty tank and climb about 20ft down a ladder and into a Sherman tank at the bottom. Once inside we had to sit in our positions and then the water was poured in. We had to wait till it was up to our chins and then put on a nose clip and turn on the oxygen. At that point divers would glide down from the top of the tank, tap us on the shoulder and that was our cue to get out of the tank and to make our way to the surface. Some of the lads forgot to take their nose clips off and were going red in the face. That was quite an experience, because I couldn’t swim.”
Tactical training continued through the winter of 1943-44 in the Moray Firth near Inverness, and in the spring off the south coast. By D-Day they felt confident, although the reassurance of the landing’s commander-in-chief, General (later Field Marshal) Sir Bernard Montgomery, that what the army was about to do was “a perfectly normal operation of war” must have sounded more than a little hopeful. Nevertheless, the landings were carried out very nearly to plan, although the subsequent battle to break out of Normandy was tougher than expected.
Nearing the Seine in August, Burn’s Sherman detonated a mine. None of the crew was seriously wounded, but the tank was put out of action. Their replacement, Icanhopit III, saw them through the advance into Belgium and Holland with almost continual fighting, and they wintered within sight of the Rhine. In January 1945, home leave was allowed, for which they drew lots, but Burn’s lot was not until March. While he was home, Icanhopit III was knocked out by a Panther tank, killing the crew commander and badly shaking up the rest of the crew. “My brother, his nerves, I never saw him again, until later on, by that time he was in the Control Commission,” Burn said. He finished the war in IcanhopitIV as a corporal, the Germans signing the instrument of surrender on his 21st birthday.
As he had enlisted rather than been conscripted, he was not immediately demobilised, moving instead to the Harz Mountains, where 13/18H exchanged their tanks for armoured cars, and Burn gained his third stripe (promotion to sergeant). He was discharged in 1947 and returned briefly to Burton’s before becoming an insurance agent for the Cooperative Insurance Society, retiring at 65.
In 1952 he married Dorothy Grover. They met at Bar Methodist Church in Harrogate, where he became Sunday school superintendent, sang in the choir and worshipped for 65 years. Dorothy died in 2011. Three of their four daughters survive him: Jane and Elizabeth, both retired teachers; and Caroline, a retired HR director.
Besides chapel and family, Burn’s other interests were piano, philately and gardening, gentle pursuits in stark contrast to the gunnery skills with which he destroyed many a German tank from Normandy to the Baltic. He was the last veteran of the regiment that spearheaded the landings on Sword Beach, and to the end remained in awe of the organisation of D-Day: “Whoever worked it out, it was wonderfully, wonderfully done.”
Lawrence Burn, 13th/18th Royal Hussar and D-Day veteran, was born on May 4, 1924. He died on December 5, 2023, aged 99
———————————————————————————————————
19 January 2024
Openness and the ADF
Letter to the ‘Canberra Times’ …
“Sue Dyer (Letters, January 8) is right to call for more openness as far as decisions affecting the Australian Defence Force are concerned. The operational performance of Australian Bushmasters in Ukraine, however, warrants confidentiality. Presumably the ADF receives battle damage reports and introduces modifications accordingly. The success or otherwise of tactics employed against drones also comes into this category.
The article to which she refers (‘Army, navy risk being droned out’, December 30) suggests that a proliferation of drones has meant that there is no longer a role for armoured vehicles on the battlefield. If this is so, what is to replace them? Drones cannot capture objectives, nor hold ground, while robotic armies are still the stuff of science fiction. The astute deployment of combined arms (including their concealment) remains vital to successful ground force tactics.
Something which she is absolutely correct about are the major changes to the Army structure, announced by the Minister a few months ago. These came about as a result of the Defence Strategic Review, but various media reports have suggested that they will not be implemented in full. As Sue states, it should not be up to journalists and voters to push for some basic clarity about what’s happening.”
——————————————————————————————————-
12 January 2024
Future of 1 Armd Regt and the RAAC
From the latest 1AR Assn newsletter:
1. “… what of the Association if 1st Armoured Regiment ever disappeared from the orbat? Let me assure you that the Association will continue as long as personnel are willing.”
“The link with our unit 1st Armoured Regiment remains strong and we plan to keep it goingno matter what the outcome of the Army shuffle.
Looks like the 1AR Assn (like the RAAC Corporation) has no intention to highlight the adverse consequences of the reported ‘Army shuffle’ in an attempt to advocate and influence the decision makers not to scrap 1 Armd Regt in terms being the Army’s paramount tank regiment (even though the HoC does not support Army’s decision).
2. “REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CROSS OF GALLANTRY WITH PALM (RVCGWP) AND MINH DAM BATTLE STREAMER – the Secretary advised that Defence had approved the awarding of the RVCGWP Unit Citation to all who served in Vietnam with designated units. However, the issue of the Minh Dam Battle Streamer has not been resolved.”
What issue is this you might wonder?
When 8RAR were awarded the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation, that brought with it a Battle Streamer (named Minh Dam after the Battle in which it was earnt). The RAAC Corporation supported the awarding of the RVCGWP to all who served in Vietnam on an individual basis; now it is apparently seeking to have the Streamer awarded to units that supported 8RAR in Op Hammersley (without those units being awarded the Unit Citation).
When an appeal was made to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal to have to Unit Citation extended to supporting units involved with the battle of Minh Dam, 8RAR claimed that the Unit Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty. The Tribunal “accepts that the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for the entirety of that unit’s tour to the date of the award”.
It would seem that another appeal to the Tribunal is required.
Why can’t others advocate as per the following letter to the Canberra Times:
Your journalist Bradley Perrett lets himself down in his article ‘Army, navy risk being droned out’ (CT, Sat, Dec 30). He argues that the proliferation of drones on the battlefield, means that “heavy combined arms looks dead”, i.e. there is no longer a role for infantry and armoured vehicles operating together.
If this is so, what is to replace them? This is the crux of the matter. Drones cannot capture objectives, nor hold ground, while robotic armies are still the stuff of science fiction. The astute deployment of combined arms (including concealment) remains vital to successful ground force tactics.
Armoured vehicles provide both the direct firepower and protection necessary to support infantry in conducting offensive operations. It is their mobile combat power and strike capability on which shock action depends, ie. the rapid movement of forces designed to create circumstances beyond the enemy’s ability to cope, achieving advantage through confusion and an inability to respond.
Without armoured vehicles, Army’s offensive capability is constrained to an unacceptable degree;the cost of which is counted in infantry lives.
———————————————————————————————————
INDEX
1 Armoured Regiment Association
1 Jan 21: ‘Looking After Each Other II’
2 Jan 21: ‘Code of Conduct Versus Whistle-Blower Policy’
8 Jan 21: ‘1AR Assn Honour Roll (1 of 2)’
9 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (2 of 2)‘
10 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (Cont)’
3 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward’
5 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward: Part 2.’
13 Mar 21: ‘1 AR Assn : Anonymous Threat’
25 Mar 21: ‘ The Honorary Colonel/Patron Quandary ‘
26 Mar 21: ‘ The 1 AR Assn: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’
27 Mar 21: ‘ Operation Overlord/Battle of Long Khanh: 1AR Assn ‘
23 Jul 21: ‘Caring for Those Less Fortunate’
30 Jul 21: ‘For the Good of the RAAC?’
3 Dec 21: ‘1 AR Assn Awards’
21 Jan 21: ‘Continuing Problems With Culture.’
1 Apr 22: ‘Getting our History Right’
18 Nov 22: ‘1 Armd Regt Assn: Honour Roll’
3 Feb 23: ‘Welfare of Members: How Things Change’; ‘Spitting Chips’
17 Feb 23: ‘1 Armd Regt Assn: Constitution’
3 Mar 23: ‘Precious is, as Precious Does.’
2 Jun 23: ‘… as Seen by the 1AR Assn’
18 Aug 23: ‘A Step Backwards in Recognising Gallantry’
‘Armouredadvocates’
31 Mar 21: ‘Index’
27 Oct 23: ‘Access to DVA Grants’
Autobiography
3 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir)’
4 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir) II’
Australian Defence Force (ADF)
21 Jan 20: ‘One of the Greatest Challenges for the ADF’
17 Jan 21: ‘The Blog’
9 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 1) ‘
10 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 2) ‘
11 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 3) ‘
12 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 4)’
29 Apr 21: ‘ Army Recruitment in Times Past ‘
30 Apr 21: ‘ Getting History Right ‘
2 May 21: ‘ Getting History Right: Part 2 “
27 Aug 21: Weekly Musings Eight: How toShow Respect
25 Aug 23: ‘To What Extent is Commemoration Egalitarian?’
22 Sep 23: ‘Recognition of Those Who Die as a Result of Their Military Service, but Whose Death is Outside the Period of the War Prescribed by the AWM’
Defence Strategy
7 Jan 21: ‘The Fundamental Problem as Far as the Australian People Are Concerned’
14 Jan 21: ‘The Fundamental Problem as Far as the Australian People Are Concerned (Part II)’
18 Jan 21: ‘Rubbish Articles That Influence Public Opinion’
15 Feb 21: ‘Defence Preparedness’
16 Feb 21: ‘Defence Preparedness 2’
17 Feb 21: Defence Preparedness 3′
18 Mar 21: ‘The Echidna Strategy’
3 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality?
14 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality? Part 2
15 May 21: ‘Armed Neutrality: Part 3’
16 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality: Part 4 ‘
19 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality: A Myth’
20 May 21: ‘Armed Neutrality or Mutual Defence Agreements? ‘
26 May 21: ‘ The Army in a War With China ‘
6 Aug 21: ‘AFVs and Australia’s Defence Strategy ‘
This topic has been the focus of a number of blog posts. I considered the following necessary to ensure that the right issue was recognised in the debate. It was recently published in Pearls and Irritations: https://johnmenadue.com/will-jandamarra-have-a-place-in-the-new-awm/.
Earlier this month, Richard Llewellyn astutely pointed to the fundamental part that perception plays in the portrayal and understanding of history, ‘Depicting the Frontier Wars at the Australian War Memorial: perception is the critical factor’ (P&I, 8 Dec 22.)
There have been differing interpretations as to what was intended when Dr Brendan Nelson, the departing Chair of the AWM Council, stated that the AWM was to provide “a much broader, much deeper depiction and presentation of the violence committed against Aboriginal people, initially by British and by pastoralists, then by police and by an Aboriginal militia”. (Canberra Times, 29 Sep 22.)
Unsurprisingly, many believed that the AWM intended to focus on the acts of violence committed against Aboriginal people during the colonial period. Based on his experience as a senior member of the AWM staff, Richard Llewellyn considers that to charge the Memorial to adequately present the Frontier Wars story, is both “an impossible task and an unreasonable expectation”. Others have argued that to try to do so is outside the role of the AWM. A public petition has been initiated to oppose such a proposal.
A differing, but widespread perception, is that thepurpose of the Memorial is to commemorate the service and sacrifice of those who have fought in defence of their country, or, in Charles Bean’s words, “to guard the record that they themselves have made”. Rather than reflecting the history of the Frontier Wars as a whole, this view holds that the AWM should focus on the skill, determination, and courage of all those involved in defending their family, land and possessions … both male and female. Warriors such as Pemulwuy, Jandamarra, and Tarenorerer, to name a few, deserve to be commemorated at the AWM.
Heritage Guardians support this approach: “… the [Australian War] Memorial is about commemorating those who have died defending their country. Defence of country is the common history that belongs to all of us, whether it is Arrernte, Noongar, or Wiradjuri people defending their country or uniformed Australians (including Indigenous soldiers) defending the Australian nation”. (Letter, ‘Canberra Times’, 6 Oct22)
Henry Reynolds is another in favour, “If fairly presented we can expect Memorial visitors to empathise with the extraordinary story of First Nations heroic resistance to invasion, to the resourcefulness and courage as they struggled against impossible odds to defend their kin and country and their very survival as a people”. (‘P&I’, 5 Oct 22)
If the AWM Council share this thinking, then the completion of the Memorial redevelopment will facilitate indigenous and non-indigenous Australians being able to stand side by side to acknowledge and reflect on the bravery and sacrifices of ALL their ancestors. The reconciliation process will be all the better for this and “For we are one and free” will come to have real meaning.
It is time to embrace the courage of our nation’s warriors from both pre and post Federation … to celebrate and take inspiration from enduring skills, leadership and determination, no matter their ancestry.
A former Director of the Memorial stated that “visitors come to the AWM to learn what it is to be Australian”. This will come to be when John Shumann’s song, ‘I Was Only Nineteen’, and Paul Kelly’s ‘Jandamarra/Pigeon’ are both recognised as chronicles of our military history as depicted at the AWM.
—————————————————————————————————————–
20 January 2023
The RAAC Corporation’s Charitable Purpose
The RAAC Corporation’s Constitution states that it is “established to provide for the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families”. That seems clear enough, i.e. the Corporation exists to provide help to those who need it, especially if they do not have enough money. This is quite different to the multi-dimensional goal of ‘improving well-being’.
The Constitution emphasises this charitable purpose by stating that the Corporation “is prohibited from expending any moneys except on the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families”. The intent is underlined even more when expenditure by the Corporation is confined to things “encompassed by the Preamble to the Imperial Act 41 Elizabeth 1 c 4 – The Charitable Uses Act 1601”. This lists ten acceptable purposes:
“The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people.”
“The maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners.”
“The maintenance of schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universities.”
“The repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways.”
“The education and preferment of orphans.”
“The relief, stock, or maintenance for houses of correction.”
“Marriages of poor maids.”
“The supportation, aid, and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed.”
“The relief or redemption of prisoners or captives.”
“The aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes.”
So … the RAAC Corporation was established to help needy members and ex-members of the RAAC, irrespective of whether they belong to an association which is a member of the Corporation, and their families … within the scope outlined above.
The Register of the Australian Charities and Not for Profit Commission (ACNC) lists the purpose of the RAAC Corporation Ltd Charity as “advancing the security or safety of Australia or the Australian public”. [https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/charities/a8a3e29d-0be5-eb11-bacb-002248101fa4/history] How does this come about, surely it should refer to advancing the welfare of the serving and ex serving RAAC members and their families — the purpose for which the RAAC Corporation was established?
It turns out that this is one of twelve charitable purposes listed by the Charities Act 2013 :
advancing health
advancing education
advancing social or public welfare
advancing religion
advancing culture
promoting reconciliation, mutual respect and tolerance between groups of individuals that are in Australia
promoting or protecting human rights
advancing the security or safety of Australia or the Australian public
preventing or relieving the suffering of animals
advancing the natural environment
other similar purposes ‘beneficial to the general public’ (a general category), and
promoting or opposing a change to any matter established by law, policy or practice in the Commonwealth, a state, a territory or another country (where that change furthers or opposes one or more of the purposes above)
The ACNC differentiates between: (i) advancing the safety of the Australian public (e.g. providing surf-lifesaving services so that they can enjoy swimming at the beach safely); (ii) advancing the security and safety of the Australian public (e.g. running a neighbourhood watch program to ensure that members of the community feel safe and secure in their homes and on the streets); and (iii) advancing the security and safety of Australia (e.g. providing care packages to members of the defence force who are serving overseas, in order to increase their morale).
Trouble with the charitable purpose chosen by the RAAC Corporation Limited is that it is not a charitable purpose at all; it is a list of options. Is the Corporation advancing the safety of the Australian public, OR advancing the security of the Australian public, OR advancing the safety and security of the Australian public, OR advancing the security and safety of Australia itself?
The ACNC advises that organisations that “look after the welfare of the armed forces, including the dependants of injured or deceased veterans” are among those considered to come under the charitable purpose of “advance the safety or security of Australia or its public”. So … all is as it should be; or is it?
The Constitution of the RAAC Corporation sets out eleven purposes. Among them is: “To provide advice, guidance and welfare assistance to ordinary members”. The same Constitution includes the following definition:
“Ordinary Member” means:
any individual person who is a financial member of a Member Association as specified in Rule 4 of this Constitution;
any individual person who is a financial member of an Associate Member Association as specified in Rule 5 of this Constitution.
This seems clear: one of the purposes of the RAAC Corporation is to provide welfare assistance to those who are financial members of Associations that belong to the Corporation. When the Corporation decided to become a not-for-profit charity, however, Rule 36 was added to its Constitution: “CORPORATION ESTABLISHED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES”. This states that the Corporation was “established to provide for the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families”.
Another matter which requires clarification … the ACNC Register states that the RAAC Corporation Charity does not operate in either the ACT or the NT. What does this mean for needy members and ex-members of the RAAC and their families in these areas? [Stop Press: The ACNC Register now shows the Corporation as operating in the ACT.]
Conclusion.
The RAAC Corporation needs to do three things:
1. Amend the ACNC Charity Register to designate whether the Corporation is advancing the safety of the Australian public, OR advancing the security of the Australian public, OR advancing the safety and security of the Australian public, OR advancing the security and safety of Australia itself; and
2. Amend its Constitution to designate whether the Corporation is established to provide welfare assistance to (i) ordinary members as defined by the Constitution [Rule 3 (2) (iii)]; or (ii) members and ex-members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families (Rule 36)
3. Clarify how welfare is extended (if at all) to meet the needs of members and ex-members of the RAAC and their families who reside in the NT.
Note: The above was sent to the Chairman, RAAC Corporation Inc on 6 Jan 23. (No response as yet.)
————————————————————————————————————–
3 February 2023
[Note: There will be no Blog post on 10 Feb 23 …I’ll getting a new knee to match the other one; a double Blog follows.]
Welfare of Members: How Things Change.
Purposes of the 1AR Assn, as listed in its Constitution, include:
promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve; and
provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.
Despite this, the Assn produced a policy document in March 2019, entitled ‘Ex Service Organisations and Groups Providing Welfare, Health and Well Being for Veterans, Ex Service People and their Families’. This document stated that the Assn does “not have the expertise, experience, personnel, or financial resources or indeed the wherewithal to take on such a considerable and risk-filled role such as the provision of services related to welfare, health and well-being”.
During this period in the history of the 1AR Assn, providing any form of welfare support was rejected. Indeed, formal agreement was reached with the RAAC Corporation to the effect that the Assn (like other members of the Corporation) had insufficient resources to provide such support. It was generally accepted that, should the C’tee become aware of a member in need, they’d be referred to the RSL; leaving more time for ‘having a few beers and telling a few stories’ … which at least one member of the C’tee trumpeted, was all that the members of the Assn were interested in.
The June 2021 Newsletter asked: “Has the situation changed in the intervening years?”. The answer given was “No, the area of providing advice on financial, welfare and well-being for members of the ex-service community has become even more complex and should not be undertaken by well-meaning volunteers who are not qualified to provide advice in any of these areas”.
Funny how things change!
Despite not being prepared to embrace the risks associated with helping provide welfare assistance to members; the Assn was prepared to accept DVA funding ($1276) for “health and welfare purposes”. Not only that, minutes of the Management C’tee Meeting of 2 Dec 22 state: “some funds may be required in the short term to assist a member who may require some assistance for the installation of mobility devices at his home”. Furthermore, it seems that the C’tee has now decided to provide “services related to welfare, health and well-being”, with requests for assistance/contact with an Advocate to be directed to the Secretary.
There is no doubt that the change is for the better. Given that such things evolve over time, what gets me is the vitriol associated with past discussion. Why is it that people feel that they have to harangue and denigrate others, simply for putting forward a different point of view!
Interestingly, as covered in a recent post, the RAAC Corporation has overturned its former position regarding the provision of welfare services. The Corporation is now a Not-for-Profit Charity, devoted to the welfare of serving and former members of the RAAC and their families. Its Constitution states that no funds can be spent by the Corporation unless they are for the purpose of welfare.
——————————————————————————————————————–
Spitting Chips!
Hi Charlie,
I’ve copied my Blog post for 15 June 2021 below. Following the events described, you took steps to prevent me contacting you.
I wished to do so, having been unintentionally copied into emails which explained the background. This is probably all meaningless, but it’s never too late to apologise.
Bruce
“The C Sqn 1 Armd Regt 50th reunion (see below) was a great success. The 1AR Assn wanted nothing to do with it, however. The RAAC Corporation, for their part, promoted a parallel 3 Cav Regt get-together and invited members of C Sqn to attend. Neither group promoted C Sqn’s functions, despite all relevant information being shared with them. RAAC solidarity??
The background is interesting. Given the long lead time required to contact all C Sqn members (incl LAD), I gave myself a two-year lead time. The dinner and other activities were to be held in conjunction with a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord, to be conducted by DVA. Final approval for the Commemoration could not be given by DVA until 12 months out, however, as it was dependent on FY funding.
Both 1AR Assn and the RAAC Corporation took the view that they were not prepared to back any activity which didn’t have complete approval.
I therefore contacted the President of the 3 Cav Assn and asked if its members might like to join with C Sqn in the activities being planned. This was agreed and a 3 Cav person volunteered to act as a co-ordinator for them. Arrangements proceeded. These included booking a room which would be big enough, preparing relevant 3 Cav table signs, and developing a 3 Cav email list for Updates.
Come the final approval of DVA’s budget and the Operation Overlord Commemoration, what happens?
The Chairman of the RAAC Corporation (a former 3 Cav person) decides that3 Cav should have its own function. The person who volunteered to act as co-ordinator sends me an email, informing me. Disappointingly (though not surprisingly), he won’t answer his phone to me, nor return my calls.
It is clear that this had been their intention all along … keep stringing me along until the approval decision is made. One would have thought that common courtesy would have meant that I’d have been alerted to their thinking. There must have been a modicum of embarrassment … otherwise why not speak to me on the phone?
Hopefully those organising RAAC functions in the future might benefit from this experience. There will always be self-centred, gutless, bastards … I’d naively thought that they didn’t wear black berets.”
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
17 February 2023
1 Armd Regt Assn: Constitution
Recent advice to members of the 1 Armd Regt Assn states:
“As most of you would be aware, there is a constitutional requirement for at least 10 percent of the membership to be present, either physically or by proxy, at the AGM. Based on our current membership of 507, at least 51 members must be present.
At this stage, we have only received eleven (11) Proxy Forms and only nine (9) or so Association members have indicated their intention to attend the AGM at the Broadford RSL on Saturday 28 January. If the AGM is to proceed, we need at least another 35 or so people to indicate their actual attendance or submission of a proxy to one of those members definitely attending the AGM.”
It is worth considering the above, as the 10% rule is NOT a stipulation of Consumer Affairs Victoria. CAV give incorporated associations the choice of either adopting their Model Rules for their Constitution, or developing their Own Rules. The Assn opted for the Model Rules. It is these which include the requirement for 10% membership to form a quorum.
This should be quite alright; indeed, as one who spent considerable time going over every word of the Constitution, I believed it to be so. The 1 Armd Regt Assn is, however, a national, rather than state-based, association, ie. members reside in all states and territories. Gathering 10% of members to make a quorum, therefore, places particular importance on the preparedness of members to use proxies. This, in turn, relies on confidence in the manner in which proceedings are conducted, as well as confidence in the proxy delegates.
It might make sense for the percentage required for a quorum to be reduced. Of course, this would require a quorum under the present Rules in order for any decision to be valid.
Well done for the C’tee to be highlighting the issue in advance of the meeting.
PS. My operation was a success and I’m close to getting my appetite back after five nights in hospital.
24 February 2023
The RAAC Corporation Ltd’s Charity Status
Following on from 20 Jan 23 …
Not having had any response from the RAAC Corporation, I’ve raised the following concerns with the Australian Charities and Not for Profit Commission. They are self-explanatory.
“(i) The RAAC Corporation Limited states in its Constitution that it is established to provide for the welfare of members and ex-members of the RAAC and their families and that it is prohibited from spending any monies except to this end.
It is implied that all members and ex-members in-need are beneficiaries, no matter where they reside. The ACNC Register, however, omits the Northern Territory from the list of places in which the Charity operates. It would seem that the Charity cannot achieve its purpose as stated and this should be amended [or details provided as to how members and ex-members resident in the NT can be assisted].
(ii) The RAAC Corporation Ltd is shown as having two charity programs: the Hinton scholarship Fund and financial support to delegates at AGMs. Apart from a $500 donation, the latest Annual Information Statement (AIS) shows $10,165 (95.31%) being expended on “other expenses/payments”. Presumably this is money spent to cover the expenses of its own delegates at its last AGM.
The RAAC Corporation cannot fulfill its charitable purpose when it spends 95% of its income on its own costs. Can the ACNC investigate whether or not the present listing for the Charity in the Register, is misleading.”
The ACNC encourages feedback, but state that they are unable to advise what action was taken in respect to the matters raised (https://www.acnc.gov.au/raise-concern).
It will be interesting to see if any change is made to the ACNC Register … indeed, new financial information has been presented by the Corporation. While own costs amount to 96.5% of expenditure, this is now ‘only’ 83% of income (which resulted in a surplus for the FY). The Corporation is still described as not operating in the NT. Question: How is the welfare of members and ex-members of the RAAC and their families provided for by the RAAC Corporation, whose sole purpose it is?
————————————————————————————————————————————————
3 March 2023
Precious is, as Precious Does.’
The 1 Armd Regt Assn sent the following email to members on 14 Jan 23:
“Inappropriate Use of Assocation Badging
Greetings to All Association Members,The photo immediately [above] was recently spotted at the Memorial Park for the Cowra POW Camp. This place is regarded as a sensitive Cultural Heritage Site for both Australians and Japanese alike.Regardless of the actual location, the placement of Association stickers, or indeed any object that links back to the Regiment, should be very carefully considered! Placement on a rubbish bin is totally unacceptable and it is suggested that the person who placed the sticker in this location should return and remove it as soon as possible.We all have a duty of care to the Australian Army, the 1st Armoured Regiment and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association.”
Surely the C’tee is not saying that placing a sticker on a rubbish bin is implying that the Regiment is ‘rubbish’ (which is why such placement is “totally unacceptable”)?
Where is an appropriate location for an Assn sicker? I think it was an Assn newsletter in which a photo was featured showing a sticker on a sign at Cameron’s Corner.
If this indiscretion was as bad as we are asked to believe, why is the person responsible asked to go back (probably having to travel hundreds of kilometres) and remove it. Surely, if we take our duty of care seriously as encouraged, anyone in the vicinity would be asked to do this.
Maybe the C’tee has a sense of humour after all …
A Wreath on Behalf of the 1AR Assn
The 1AR Assn advised its members on 24 Feb 23, in relation to the 50th Commemoration of the end of the Vietnam war, that:
“Peter Rosemond CSC OAM is to lay a wreath on behalf of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association … public wreath laying is to occur at the invitation of the MC after the Catafalque Party has dismounted.”
One could be excused for expecting that Peter Rosemond would lay a wreath ‘in honour of all who served in and supported 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam, especially those who gave their lives and those who still carry wounds’. One wonders what the inscription on the 1st Armoured Regiment Association wreath will say … in honour of all members of 1st Armoured Regiment Association who served in Vietnam?
What about those veterans who served with the 1st Armoured Regiment, but are not members of the Association? Are they to be honoured by “public wreath laying”?
I expect that the wreath laid on behalf of the 1AR Assn, will, in fact, honour of all who served in and supported 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam, especially those who gave their lives and those who still carry wounds.
This should be stated to be so.
——————————————————————————————————————————————
10 March 2023
Don’t ditch the tank if you want real firepower
A completely different headline was used by the Australian newspaper’s foreign editor, Greg Sheridan, on 22 Nov 22: “Defence review to park tanks in history”; subtitle: “The good news is, it seems the tank is gone”. Sheridan has neither served in the military, nor undertaken defence studies. Despite this, he feels qualified to state categorically that:
“there is no plausible scenario in which tanks, or even IFVs, could be important to Australian security”.
It was pleasing, therefore, to see the article under the heading above, by Alan Dupont*, recently published in the Australian. It offers much, but what it delivers is a bit like the proverbial curate’s egg.
It starts off well and some paragraphs from the Introduction are copied below.
Don’t be fooled by Russia’s losses in Ukraine. Here are four reasons why the ADF still needs these so-called dinosaurs on the battlefield.
The Albanese government’s search for a more lethal and impactful Australian Defence Force is clearly being shaped by the Ukraine conflict. There are many worthwhile lessons to be learned about battlefield tactics and the use of advanced and improvised weaponry. But one false lesson that should be rejected is that tanks are now obsolete.
Critics have labelled tanks as behemoths, dinosaurs and of “no strategic value”. Their conclusion? Money set aside for the upgrade of our vestigial tank force, infantry fighting vehicles and Vietnam-era armoured personnel carriers should be reallocated to more useful capabilities.
If these misperceptions are left unchallenged, the ADF risks being stripped of an indispensable tool of trade. The critics make four errors of judgment.
The first reason is well stated …
First, tanks are still the mainstay of modern armies for good reason. Without them, an army risks becomes a constabulary force that lacks firepower and the ability to survive on tomorrow’s battlefields. Tanks are the equivalent of battleships and fighter jets. They are a game changer, as any soldier with combat experience will tell you.
But the others stand up less so …
Second, quantity has a quality all its own. We need more than a handful of tanks. And they should be best of class, otherwise you have a token capability. This is not a reason for the ADF needing tanks.
Third, the Australian Army typically has used tanks differently to other armies as part of a combined-arms team working closely with our infantry. We have never deployed large, armoured columns in sweeping manoeuvres across plains or deserts because our region is full of islands, jungles and cities. But we used them very effectively in the Pacific and Vietnam wars, as did our adversaries. This is relevant, but really belongs with #1, ie. the essential nature of combined arms teams in land warfare. It must also be remembered that the terrain for which tanks were (and are) designed, is not that of wide-open plains and deserts.
Fourth, critics assume that our maritime environment means that we need to dominate only the air and sea. Anthony Albanese seems to have ingested this skewed logic, quipping in a recent interview that our defence assets “need not be about fighting a land war defending western Queensland because that is highly unlikely”. This ignores the fact that our maritime neighbourhood comprises thousands of islands. This is a bit of ‘straw man’ argument, though the following information was well put: “Light tanks spearheaded the Japanese capture of Singapore in 1942 and we relied on tanks to destroy Vietcong bunker systems during the Vietnam War. A 2002 Defence Science and Technology Organisation study found that without tanks, operations against these bunkers succeeded in only 65 per cent of cases compared with 95 per cent with six times fewer Australian casualties when tanks were used.”
So, how do we simply describe why the ADF needs tanks?
Tanks are an essential component of combined arms teams which form the basis of ground force tactics. They provide both the direct firepower necessary to support infantry in capturing enemy objectives and the mobile combat power on which shock action depends, ie. the rapid movement of forces designed to create circumstances beyond the enemy’s ability to cope, achieving advantage through confusion and an inability to respond. Without tanks, Army’s offensive capability is constrained to an unacceptable degree; the cost of which is counted in infantry lives.
Military terminology used to refer to mobile warfare, then it was manoeuvre warfare; whichever way you look at it, the essential component of successful offense is ‘shock action’; the essential component of which is the tank.
*Alan Dupont is a Nonresident Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, and a professor of International Security at the University of New South Wales. He has worked on Australian defence and Asian security issues for more than thirty years as a strategist, diplomat, policy analyst and scholar and has published extensively academically and in the media.
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
17 March 2023
Vietnam RoH Casualties: Now 523
The following request was recently put to the Australian War Memorial:
“Hi Guys,
This AWM article https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/event/vietnam states that 523 Australian service personnel died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam during the prescribed period of the War.
Until now, the figure was 521 … the number of names listed on the AWM’s Roll of Honour.
Can you please advise the reason for the increase.”
The response is copied below:
“Thank you for your enquiry regarding the Australian War Memorial’s Roll of Honour for the Vietnam War.
The Roll of Honour records and commemorates the names of members of the Australian armed forces who have died during or as a result of warlike service or, for post-1945 conflicts, warlike service, non-warlike service and certain peacetime operations. The Roll of Honour takes the form of a series of bronze panels in the Memorial’s Commemorative Area and in a database accessible to the public on the Memorial’s website.
The Roll of Honour criteria for the Vietnam War requires that, to be eligible, an individual must:
have died during service as a member of the Australian armed forces, or as a result of that service; and
have died between the defined start and end dates of the conflict; or as a result of service in the conflict within two years of returning to Australia from deployment.
The names of a number of individuals who had died subsequent to their service in Vietnam were forwarded to the Memorial in recent years, for research into their possible eligibility for the Roll of Honour.
The number of individuals recorded on the Roll of Honour for Vietnam was revised last year, with the addition of Major Carlile Herbert Schneider and Lance Corporal Graham William Newstead. Major Schneider and Lance Corporal Newstead were approved for addition by the Memorial’s Council following careful and intensive research, which found definitive evidence that both men died as a result of their service shortly following their return from Vietnam. Major Schneider and Lance Corporal Newstead have accordingly been added to the Memorial’s Roll of Honour database and their names will be included on the bronze panels when they are next recast.
With the addition of Major Schneider and Lance Corporal Newstead, the Memorial has revised the well-known statistic of 521 and started using 523 as the official figure for Australian deaths during the Vietnam War. The Memorial advised numerous stakeholders of this change, including the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force, the RSL, the Vietnam Veterans Association of Australia and the Vietnam Veterans’ Federation of Australia in September 2022.
The eligibility of a further six individuals whose names have been referred to the Memorial remain under investigation for the Roll of Honour for Vietnam. Should the Memorial’s Council find these individuals eligible, the Roll of Honour statistic will increase further.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further questions”.
[Note: Both those added to the RoH died by their own hand (as have a number of others listed on the RoH.]
———————————————————————————————————-
24 March 2023
War Crimes Responsibility
In response to posts about the recent War Crimes prosecution on another site, I posted the following:
“I’m writing an article at the moment about ethics in the ADF. I refer to a number of case studies, one of which I’ve copied below. It may have been decided that it was not in the public interest to investigate.
Case Study 4
Undertaking research for a book he was writing, the author came across material that the Department of Veterans’ Affairs had provided for use by the education department (modern history curriculum). This stated that war crimes had been committed by Australian soldiers in Vietnam, including killing enemy who had surrendered or were wounded.
The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs was contacted. Assurance was sought that the incidents were not hearsay and had all been investigated (should this not be the case, it was requested that an investigation now be conducted). One might expect that this would be a key component of the ADF’s commitment to doing the right thing, i.e. all allegations of misconduct would be investigated and, if necessary, future training revised accordingly. Six months later, a response was received: although no assurance was given that the war crimes were not hearsay, the request for an investigation was denied.
Supposedly, the rule of law applies on the battlefield, just as much as it does everywhere else. It is this which enables participants to continue to view themselves as being civilized. Sometimes legal obligations seem to be viewed through a different lens, however. Despite this … if there is no legal requirement to ensure allegations of misconduct are investigated, surely there is an ethical requirement to do so; if there is no legal requirement to ensure Australian school children are not misled, surely there is an ethical requirement to do so; if there is no legal requirement to ensure that the reputation of the Australian Army is not tarnished, surely there is an ethical requirement to do so. Some theories distinguish between ethics in war and ethics in the workplace. Is there really any difference in terms of fundamental decision making?”
——————————————————————————————————————-
31 March 2023 [Sorry … last week’s post seems to have gone AWOL; added above.]
Military Ethics
Following on from last week … my article about ethics (a limit of 10,000 words has been set by the organisers of the competition) include the following:
“Ethical Decision Making in Years Past
The following case study outlines some of the challenges that have been faced by members of the ADF in making ethical decisions. There is a difference here with the recent ADF doctrinal publication ‘Military Ethics, Edition 1’. This is a theoretical analysis, based on “input from several ethical theories, and from these establishes the ADF’s approach to military ethics”. As important as ethical theory is, real life case studies bring a different dimension to the table.
Case Study 1
Defence Instructions specifically prohibit manufacturers of equipment being considered for acquisition by the ADF, making gifts to serving members or units associated with the capability. Such largesse could be perceived to create a conflict of interest, one favouring a particular materiel solution. This is totally at odds with an impartial selection process, one predicated solely on the acquisition of the most suitable equipment and independent of any outside influence.
Not long ago, one particular Army acquisition was very keenly contested by a number of different manufacturers. During this period of competitive assessment, it was revealed that cash handouts amounting to tens of thousands of dollars were being made to a unit by one of the manufacturers. (The unit was to be equipped with whatever weapon system was selected from the user trials underway at the time.) As payments direct to unit funds would show up in annual Commonwealth audits, the money was ‘masked’ by channelling it through the affiliated unit association (that entity having decided that it was not subject to the authority of Defence Instructions).
This is a perfect example of the CDF’s test of integrity. A number of senior figures considered that there was nothing inappropriate with what was being done. They were in favour of the benefit being gained by unit members and argued that the selection process was completely independent and not corrupted in any way. While this may have been so, one contender had undoubtedly gained a more favourable reputation compared to the others. Any such bias, even if an unconscious one, is contrary to an independent and transparent materiel acquisition process.
Numerous payments had been made under a long-standing arrangement; the practice only coming to light when a notation in the margin of the association’s annual financial statement, attracted attention. Despite being a clear breach of Defence Instructions, considerable resistance was met when the issue was raised officially. Only dogged persistence led to a grudging acceptance of the need to prohibit the practice.
Those raising concerns were retired and hence not subject to the pressures of career ‘pay back’. Could this have been why those serving had gone along with it for so long; or was it that they simply did not register that what was happening was unethical (as well as in breach of Defence Instructions)? For those who might have suspected that the wrong thing was being done, why not forget about regulations and enjoy the benefits (and, for some, the kudos) for as long as possible?
The manufacturer making the payments, turned out to be one awarded the subsequent procurement contract. Did the money influence the decision? Can there be confidence that the best equipment was selected? We will never know; the point being that the questions should never have arisen. The circumstances were raised by a number of people via official channels. Disappointingly, it ended up, for all intents and purposes, being swept under the carpet. By pretending that it never happened, the ADF missed a golden opportunity to create awareness and promote ethical judgement among members at all levels.”
—————————————————————————————————————————–
7 April 2023
Political Insults (Yet Again)
The following is a Facebook post from Peter Dutton (29 Mar 23):
“Today we honoured the 60,000 Australians who served in Vietnam in a presentation of a new commemorative medallion.
We paid tribute to the 15,000 Australians who were conscripted – those who went to war against their will – but without complaint.
We remember the 523 Australians who died and the more than 3,000 who were wounded.
In this most important commemorative year, we do more than express national regret for past behaviours. We express profound national gratitude to you.
Military defeat in Vietnam did not see the downfall of the values for which you bore arms. On the contrary, our region today would look very different had you not fought to defend those values in Vietnam.
You are revered equally among all those who have served and sacrificed for our country. Your place within Australia’s pantheon of war heroes is secure.”
We’ve had the ‘spin’ that all national servicemen who went to Vietnam were volunteers; now we’re told that they went “without complaint”. How easy it is to write a narrative if you don’t have to adhere to the facts.
The same old story is dragged out once again re the casualties. No mention that these were ONLY those who died within the prescribed period of the War. The hundreds of others who have died as a direct result of their wounds/injuries/illnesses are conveniently overlooked.
The worse insult in many ways, is the statement that Australian forces suffered a military defeat. This is simply not true. The decision to withdraw from Vietnam did not come about as a result of a military defeat. It was a political decision.
The service and sacrifice of Australian forces are cheapened by this misrepresentation.
The context of the above post suggests that all veterans present support the statement made. Wouldn’t it be good to see comments by them, rejecting this, on the Facebook page. Pigs may fly.
————————————————————————————————————————————————
14 April 2023
Defence Strategic Review (DSR)
The Government received the DSR in February 2023. How long will it be before the action to be taken is known by the public? Will AFVs, and with them Army’s offensive shock action capability, be cut back? (See Blog post 10 Mar 23).
One of the few credible articles that has appeared in this respect recently is copied below.
‘Defence capability and the ‘not used since Vietnam’ critique‘
29 Mar 2023, The Strategist, |Rodger Shanahan, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
One of the most used quotes in support of the argument that the Australia Defence Force has no need for tanks in future structures is that they’re surplus to requirements because, in part, they haven’t been deployed since the Vietnam War. This is an oft-repeated line run by commentators in two of our major newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian. It is also a factoid employed in articles hosted by SBS and a range of other media outlets.
At its heart though, it is a nonsensical argument. If we were to use the ‘hasn’t been employed since Vietnam’ as the metric for the utility of defence platforms, there are a whole raft of other ones whose continued relevance would be open to discussion.
An anniversary marked this week provides a particularly good example of why the Vietnam metric is so lacking in intellectual rigour. Seventy years ago, on 27 March 1953,was the last time an Australian military aircraft was involved in air-to-air combat. If the half-century since an Australian tank fired a shot in anger is considered Exhibit A in the case against them, what are we to make of the seven decades and billions of dollars that we’ve spent on an air-to-air combat capability that we’ve never had to use?
And taking the ‘use it or lose it’ argument to its logical conclusion, what should the general public think about the eye-watering cost of our new nuclear submarines come April when it will be 108 years since a Royal Australian Navy submarine last launched a torpedo in anger? Yes, you heard correctly—108 years.
Of course, I’m not questioning the utility of submarines or combat aircraft or tanks as part of a robust ADF. Rather, this is an appeal to those who seek to influence public debate to avoid the pitfalls inherent in declaring capabilities obsolete simply because they were last used in the Vietnam War. Australian artillery hasn’t fired a shot in anger since Vietnam (although Australian gunners served with UK gun batteries in Afghanistan), yet the US’s use of artillery to support the Syrian Democratic Forces in defeating Islamic State in Syria and the difficulties in keeping up the supply of ammunition to Ukraine shows how critical tubed artillery remains on the modern battlefield.
Time alone doesn’t consign a capability to the scrapheap. Technological advances may do so, or the nature of conflict itself. But often those facts are only known once a conflict has commenced and the adversaries’ capabilities become known. Which is why predicting the obsolescence of a capability is so difficult, and why the various sages who seek to do so would do well to buttress their arguments with a deeper level of analysis about scenarios in which capabilities are, or are not, likely to be used. Of all the arguments as to why a capability is no longer required, temporal distance from the last time it was used is often the weakest.
So, when the defence strategic review is published and the impact on the defence budget of the AUKUS submarine project is better understood, it would be good if the commentariat could discuss the pros and cons of various capabilities that the ADF may require in the future without referencing the Vietnam War. Some capabilities, after all, retain their utility regardless of when they were last used.
AUTHOR
Rodger Shanahan is a former Australian Army officer and Middle East analyst. Image: Australian War Memorial.
21 April 2023
Ethics: Introduction, Part 1
Recent posts have quoted two of the Case Studies that I’ve referred to in an article about military ethics that I’m writing. Part 1 of the Introduction is copied below.
Introduction
A live presentation provides opportunities to surprise and shock an audience; to shake them metaphorically until they are in no doubt about the critical importance of a subject. Can the same thing be done using the written word? Can text be made to leap from the page to do battle with readers’ complacency? How can the ignorant and apathetic be reached? If a paradigm shift is to be achieved, those who might act as change agents must be absolutely convinced of both its need and its urgency.
If you become aware of someone asleep at the wheel, it is your ethical responsibility to wake them. Sadly, for those in the ADF, the wreckage caused by failure in this space is omni-present. The miliary has been under the spell of an insidious malaise with respect to ethics for decades. Why? … because complacency is easy; it requires neither self-discipline nor courage. On the other hand, both these qualities are needed if someone is to stand up for what is right and not be cowered by a pervasive culture into going along with the mob.
What is to be gained by the ADF encouraging its members to take an ethical approach to matters they deal with on a day-to-day basis? In a word, the benefit is Trust … the result of a working environment in which human values are paramount: the dignity of the individual is respected; undertakings are honoured; those in need are helped; and decisions are taken which result in just outcomes. (It is unsurprising that these same values provide the very foundation of the laws that govern society as a whole.) There is no profession in which trust is more important, than the profession of arms.
An ethical road in deciding the right thing to do and acting accordingly, is far from easy. The military’s strict hierarchical structure dictates that an order from a senior officer be obeyed at all times; providing, of course, that it is lawful. What of this obligation, however, if the order is unethical? It might be assumed that responsibility is vested in individuals to ensure that their actions are ethical, but this is only partly correct.
According to ADF doctrine, should someone be concerned about the ethicality of an order, they must take this up with its originator, i.e. the chain of command. If this does not resolve the issue, the order is to be obeyed. There is something of a dilemma here … why bother to assert ethical standards, if the view of the senior person always holds sway? This is undoubtedly a challenge for an organisation for which mission success is often predicated on immediate and decisive action.
28 April 2023
Afghanistan etc Memorial?
I’ve raised this before. Time to get an answer …
The Hon Matt Keogh MP Minister for Veterans’ Affairs PO Box 6022 House of Representatives Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600
Dear Minister,
With Anzac Day nearly here, I wonder if you would be so kind as to answer the following question.
The Australian Army National Memorial was erected to honour the Army’s involvement in wars up to and including Vietnam: “Seven cylindrical pillars recall the seven major conflicts in which the Australian Army has been involved in the twentieth century”. What steps are being taken to honour members of the Australian Army who have deployed on active service subsequently (East Timor, Second Gulf War and Afghanistan) on Anzac Parade, Canberra?
Many thanks for your consideration,
Yours Sincerely, Bruce Cameron
5 May 2023
Posts should go up on Fridays, but I keep getting caught up in ‘other’ things ….
What’s Happening re the Tank Museum: Does Anyone Care?
The Tank Museum website states:
“The Australian Army Tank Museum will close its doors to the general public on the 14th at 4:00 pm December 2022. It will re-open late 2024 as the Combined Arms Heritage Learning Centre (CAHLC), which will encompass both the Armoured & Artillery Heritage Collections.”
The following extract from the Defence Strategic Review has received little publicity: “Program Cuts: Puckapunyal combined arms museum”
Does anyone know what the situation is? Has the new museum been cancelled or just delayed? Will it reopen for training/visitors in the interim? Is there a lobby group representing its interests and pushing for resolution or is it just being left to flounder by itself?
I asked the Army History Unit and the response from the Head is:
Thank you for your enquiry regarding the current status of the Australian Army Tank Museum.
The Defence Strategic Review is an important part of the Australian Government’s response to the significant and rapidly changing strategic circumstances across the world. There is a pressing need for the ADF to adapt to these changes to fulfil its purpose of deterring conflict and protecting Australia’s national interests. The ADF is prioritising the capabilities it needs to do this. As a result, some projects will be re-scoped, delayed or cancelled.
In response to your questions, the best information I can provide at this time is as follows:
(i) has the new museum been cancelled or just delayed? That decision has yet to be formalised.
(ii) if the latter, is there a new timetable? That decision has yet to be formalised.
(iii) will the ‘old’ museum reopen for training/visitors in the interim? The Australian Army History Unit plans to reopen the old museum to the public at a time yet to be determined. The Australian Army Tank Museum and co-located Royal Australian Artillery exhibit remains open to serving personnel for training purposes.
Defence understands that this is disappointing for the units, associations and communities connected with the Puckapunyal Military Area, the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, The Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery and The Australian Army History Unit. Army will work with these groups to manage the impact of this decision.
12 May 2023
Military Ethics: Introduction, Part 2
Recent posts have quoted two of the Case Studies that I’ve referred to in an article about military ethics that I’m writing. Part 1 of the Introduction was posted on 21 Apr 23; Part 2 (of 3) is copied below.
“The ADF places great store on loyalty, but where does this sit in the hierarchy of decision making? Could loyalty to one’s superior, necessitate turning a blind eye to doing the right thing? The consequences of perceived disloyalty could be considerable. It is quite possible, for example, that raising ethical concerns about an order could result in someone believing that their career prospects (and associated family well-being) might be placed in jeopardy. The ADF regards this as a ‘test of integrity’: while the right thing is known, there are matters that make doing it difficult.[1]
Now we get to the crux of the matter … on what basis is it decided what is and what is not, the right thing to do? General Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), puts it this way: “in the profession of arms, acting lawfully is obligatory; acting ethically requires your judgement”.[2]The latter, by definition, involves recognising and countering anything which is contrary to accepted social values, or, in other words, something which is improper or unfair according to community standards. This might sound straightforward, but it is often far from being the case.
Individual judgement is at the heart of deciding the right thing to do and herein lies the rub. Something that is ethical in one person’s judgement, may well be unethical in that of another. Given such variability, one might expect the ADF to promulgate some form of guidance to cover various situations, possibly even specifying ethical standards to be met. Is there a need for such reform, and, if so, how pressing is it?
Lack of trust placed in the ADF by the community has become a major issue in recent years … caused almost entirely by allegations of war crimes in Afghanistan and the associated publicity. Special forces, in particular, have been targeted. In one case, a judge presiding over a defamation action brought by a former SAS soldier, found that published articles implied that the plaintiff had “habitually and knowingly crossed the line of ethical conduct”.[3]
Further to these allegations, suggestions of cover-ups arose, turning the once iconic armed forces into something akin to a political pariah: “A culture of secrecy, fabrication and deceit has cast a heavy shadow over the legacy of the Australian special forces deployment in Afghanistan”.[4] Reflecting the views of the CDF, the Chief of Army (CA) responded quickly in an effort to re-establish the Army’s good name and reputation:
“In his first interview since the scathing Brereton inquiry report, Lieutenant-General Burr told The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and 60 Minutes of his determination to ‘hold ourselves to account and win back the trust of the Australian people’.”[5]
Letter published in The Canberra Times on 18 May 2023 …
“Bradley Perrett’s contribution to the ‘Canberra Times’ Defence Review (May 17) portrays a scenario in which an enemy force seizes a foreign island and uses it to threaten Australia’s interests. The Army, in turn, is “projected onto” the island with the task of “removing the threat”. Sounds easy, but the reality is very different.
Having taken the island by force, the enemy would undoubtedly set about defending it; making the possibility of an unopposed landing by the Army, such as at San Carlos (East Falklands), a remote one. Far more likely is it that available landing sites would be limited using obstacles and mines; while defences would be well concealed and protected against bombardment.
The task is made much more difficult with the Army’s combat power being significantly constrained by the Defence Strategic Review; specifically, the number of Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) to be acquired has been reduced by over 70%.
AFVs are an essential component of combined arms teams which form the basis of ground force tactics. They provide both the direct firepower necessary to support infantry in capturing enemy objectives and the mobile combat power on which shock action depends, ie. the rapid movement of forces designed to create circumstances beyond the enemy’s ability to cope, achieving advantage through confusion and an inability to respond. Without AFVs, Army’s capability options are constrained to an unacceptable degree; the cost of which is counted in infantry lives.“
26 May 2023
Afghanistan etc Memorial? II
My first letter to the Minister can be read at the post on 28 Apr 23. My follow up is copied below.
The Hon Matt Keogh MP Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600
cc. Chief of Army
Dear Minister,
Thank you for DVA’s response (9 May 2023) to my letter of 19 April 2023.
I wrote to you about the Australian Army National Memorial on Anzac Parade. My letter highlighted the fact, as stated on the Memorial’s plaque, that its seven very large cylindrical pillars represent the seven major conflicts in which the Australian Army has been involved in the twentieth century (Boer War; World War I; World War II; Korea; Malayan Emergency; Borneo Confrontation; and Vietnam).
Since Vietnam, therefore, there has been no National Memorial to the service and sacrifice of Australian Army personnel in subsequent conflicts (East Timor; Second Gulf War; and Afghanistan).
Given that DVA has responsibility for honouring ALL Australian service men and women involved in wars, conflicts and peace operations, I asked you: “What steps are being taken to honour them?”.
In response, I was informed that the National Capital Authority (NCA) manages memorials on Anzac Parade and advised to contact them.
I cannot believe that this advice is correct. The NCA has no responsibility for honouring Australian service personnel, this is the responsibility of DVA, as has been clearly pointed out. Furthermore, it is to be expected that DVA would have a plan to meet its on-going responsibilities in this respect. Presumably DVA intends that Australian Army personnel are to be honoured for their service and sacrifice post-Vietnam.
Should consultations with the Chief of Army and Army veterans lead to this being done by either modifying the existing Australian Army National Memorial or creating a new twenty-first century National Memorial, it is suggested that it would be appropriate for DVA to liaise with the NCA in this regard (if no such consultation has occurred already).
Can you please advise what steps are being taken to create a National Memorial to honour the service and sacrifice of Australian Army personnel in conflicts post-Vietnam.
Many thanks for your consideration,
Yours Sincerely,
——————————————————————–
2 June 2023
… as Seen by the 1AR Assn
The following info was part of that passed to members of the 1AR Assn by the Secretary …
“Relocation of Standard and Guidon toSt Peter’s Cathedral Adelaide – 8 July 2023
Greetings to all Association Members,On Saturday 8 July 2023, the Regiment is to relocate the first Standard and Guidon to St Peter’s Cathedral in North Adelaide, SA.All former veterans of the Regiment are invited to attend. The Regiment is to march from the Torrens Parade Ground to St Peters. A church parade is to follow within the Cathedral following the arrival of official guests and all other invited guests, etc “.
Why is it that “former veterans of the Regiment” are invited and not ‘former members of the Regiment’? [putting aside the fact that ‘former veterans’ is nonsensical … one is either a veteran or not.] Is it because numbers need to be restricted and so only veterans are invited? I can’t believe that this would be the case. My view is that it’s a ‘typo’.
The invite did remind me that a second Standard had been presented (2002, I think). This was 20 years after the first. As far as is known, there is no set interval for the replacement of the Standard. I wonder what prompted the need for a new Standard?
It’s noted that the C’tee of the 1AR Assn use a set of words when a former member of the Regiment dies, ie: “He was a respected member of the 1st Armoured Regiment and the Royal Australian Armoured Corps”. If the deceased was also a member of the Assn, the following is added: “and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association”. One can’t by wonder whether such a generic reference to the respect in which someone was (or was not) held, is the most appropriate form of words.
To finish off … isn’t it good the way the Assn is now helping former members of the Regiment who have fallen on hard times.
Part of the post from 3 February this year related to the change in policy [which Armouredadvopcates had been calling for for some time]:
“Despite not being prepared to embrace the risks associated with helping provide welfare assistance to members [policy from 2021]; the Assn was prepared to accept DVA funding ($1276) for “health and welfare purposes”. Not only that, minutes of the Management C’tee Meeting of 2 Dec 22 state: “some funds may be required in the short term to assist a member who may require some assistance for the installation of mobility devices at his home”. Furthermore, it seems that the C’tee has now decided to provide “services related to welfare, health and well-being”, with requests for assistance/contact with an Advocate to be directed to the Secretary.”
Back on track at last ….
9 June 2023
Drawing Attention to the Importance of National Security
The following is the start of my Introduction to a paper I wrote recently on Ethics:
“A live presentation provides opportunities to surprise and shock an audience; to shake them metaphorically until they are in no doubt about the critical importance of a subject. Can the same thing be done using the written word? Can text be made to leap from the page to do battle with readers’ complacency? How can the ignorant and apathetic be reached? If a paradigm shift is to be achieved, those who might act as change agents must be absolutely convinced of both its need and its urgency. Should they take up the challenge, they must be supported.
If you become aware of someone asleep at the wheel, it is your ethical responsibility to wake them. Sadly, for those in the ADF, the wreckage caused by failure in this space is omni-present. The military has been under the spell of an insidious malaise with respect to ethics for decades. Why? … because complacency is easy; it requires neither self-discipline nor courage. On the other hand, both these qualities are needed if someone is to stand up for what is right and not be cowered by a pervasive culture into simply going along with the mob.
What is to be gained by the ADF encouraging its members to take an ethical approach to matters they deal with on a day-to-day basis? In a word, the benefit is Trust … the result of a working environment in which human values are paramount: the dignity of the individual is respected; undertakings are honoured; those in need are helped; and decisions are taken which result in just outcomes. There is no profession in which trust is more important, than the profession of arms. “
I wanted to be alarmist, ie. to shock readers and get them to pay attention. I was interested, therefore, when I read another Introduction recently:
‘How should Australia defend itself in the 21st century? Silencing the drums and dogs of war.’
by Major General Michael G Smith AO (Ret’d); 29 May 2023.
“This paper addresses the most significant issue facing the Australian people since the Second World War, namely our future national security, our independence, our sovereignty, our prosperity and, ultimately, our survival.
Decisions taken by the former Coalition Government and the current Labor Government have and will shape and decide the destiny for future generations of Australians. The stakes are high. These decisions have been made and are being made behind closed doors and without acceptable public or parliamentary debate.
Indeed, the misguided predilection of our parliamentarians to adhere to a bipartisan approach on national security issues has proved counter-productive for the prospects of peace. Bipartisanship is not an end in itself. Our political system operates on the basis of an adversarial system pitting the Government of the day against the “Loyal Opposition”. Bipartisanship is the consequence of agreement on good policy. When pursued for its own sake, it becomes a fools’ journey delivering the lowest common denominator.
If national security is the most important responsibility of Government, and I believe this to be true, then my children and grandchildren, and yours, deserve much better.“
Seems to me there is some similarity in the approach taken … far be it for me to claim any other parallel. (I know Mike Smith and hold him in great respect, having worked with him.)
16 June 2023
Indigenous Defenders
The following letter was published in the Canberra Times on 14 June:
“The primary focus of the Australian War Memorial is to commemorate Australia’s war dead. The National President of the RSL, Greg Melick, is simply wrong is saying that they must have fought ‘in Australian uniforms’ (CT, June 12) to be commemorated. The AWM Act was passed 43 years ago and the will of the Australian people is different now, to what it was then.
The AWM must reflect the fact that it is a Memorial to ALL Australians who have fought to defend their people and country. Their bravery and skill as warriors must be rightfully honoured. The Chair of the AWM Council has demonstrated commendable leadership in acknowledging this.
It would come as no surprise if the AWM Act was in the process of being amended to revise the functions of the Memorial. It is to be hoped that legislation might keep pace with community attitudes, rather than lagging behind, but this would be wishful thinking.”
It’s not the first time that the president of the RSL has got it wrong (the proposed MOU with the Vietnamese communist party comes to mind).
Points to note:
AWM is not the place to recount the history of the Frontier Wars; it is, however, the place to honour the bravery and sacrifice of indigenous Australians in defending their country and people.
The current AWM Act states that those commemorated must be members of the Defence Force on active service. This is what Melick would have been referring to. Obviously, however, members of Z Force, coast watchers etc would not have been wearing uniforms when fighting. A technical point, but one worthy of being correct, nevertheless.
Kim Beazley, AWM Chair, is right to say that indigenous Australians have been “denied the dignity of resistance”.
———————————————————————————————————-
23 June 2003
Military Ethics: Introduction Part 3.
I’ve been reminded that I posted Parts 1 and 2 of the above on 21 April and 12 May respectively. The final part is copied below.
“Civilians were not the only ones impacted; a need also arose to rebuild trust within units and formations of the ADF itself. The significance of this cannot be overstated, as it is linked directly to one of the most important issues of all for armed forces … morale. This is a critical component of a formation’s combat power (i.e. overall battle strength), and, more so than anything else, is predicated on trust.
Apart from helping to establish a high-level war crimes investigation (the Brereton Inquiry, May 2016), General Campbell pressed ahead with the urgent development of military ethics doctrine; at the core of which is: The ADF Ethical Decision-making Framework. Published in September 2021, guidance as to how to think through ethical dilemmas was intended toreinforce “the trust that others place in us and our decisions as leaders”.[1]Importance for the ADF was underscored in a companion publication which described ethical leadership as “the single most important factor in ensuring the legitimacy of our operations and the support of the Australian people”.[2]
Two other complementary capstone manuals have since been published: ‘The Australian Joint Professional Military Education Continuum, Edition 2’ and ‘Character in the Profession of Arms, Edition 1’. The former provides the foundation for professional development within the ADF, making the point right at the ‘get go’ that “Society holds us [Defence personnel] to a higher standard than the wider community; and rightly so”.[3] The second publication emphasises that “character needs to be understood as a moral construct, reflecting your disposition to think, feel and behave in an ethical manner”. [4]
There has been little time for the effectiveness of ethics doctrine to be evaluated. Will it enable trust within and without the ADF to be rekindled? Can a philosophical doctrine stand alone or does it need to be part of a wider raft of supporting initiatives? Encouragingly, those who have produced ‘Military Ethics’, have asked readers to draw any shortcomings to their attention.
Before a start can be made on looking into how the ADF stacks up with respect to an ethics-based culture today, there is one more thing to consider … the significant consequences that can result from a poor ethics foundation. The CDF explains: “The risk of moral injury increases if you are not well prepared and practised in ethical decision-making.”[5] For those unfamiliar with it, moral injury can have a serious and long-lasting legacy:
“Recent research on [American] veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan provides convincing evidence of the significant and lasting impact of moral injury on the lives of those forced to commit or witness actions of violence inherent in warfare. Few veterans are unaffected by these experiences. Most are left with deeply seated conflicts regarding what was right and wrong, good and evil, necessary and unnecessary.”[6]
The core of the essay which follows is in two parts: firstly, background is provided in terms of ethics culture and guidance (or lack thereof) as it was in the recent past; this is then followed by an analysis of the options available to General Campbell to manage the challenges that the ADF’s ethical framework faces today.”
To cap it off, the Conclusion follows:
“As CDF, General Campbell has a very broad span of command. Instilling an ethics-based culture within the ADF might seem relatively low on the priority list, but is it? Ethics are directly linked to trust, trust is directly linked to morale, and morale is directly linked to combat power. Submarines and tanks contribute a great deal to combat power, provided they are operated by crews whose morale is high. It is plain that there is more to the ADF’s priorities, than materiel and proficiency alone.
Introducing a new culture requires a paradigm shift in attitudes; achieving this requires enthusiastic change agents to drive it. Inspirational role models who can bring case studies to life, are essential. They must be embedded into the training and promotion psyche and accepted as part of the mainstream, not something appended. A confidential reporting system which has everyone’s confidence, is a pre-requisite.
General Campbell is to be congratulated for his leadership across very difficult circumstances. There is still more to do, however, in the time remaining in his tenure. The ultimate legacy would be to have infused the ADF with a Code of Ethics and for this to have been embraced by members with genuine enthusiasm.“
The article ‘Vietnam villains become heroes 50 years on’ (Canberra Times, 4 July, p3) rightfully helps promote the coming commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. Unfortunately, it also promotes the myth that ‘523 [Australians] lost their lives’.
This is the number of those who died within the prescribed period of the war (which ended on 29 April 1975) or within two years of returning to Australia. Their names are inscribed on the Roll of Honour at the AWM. The figure does not include the many hundreds who have died as a result of their service, but outside the prescribed period.
As with other wars, the cost to the nation of involvement in Vietnam is masked in this way. School text books maintain this myth. The AWM is currently considering a proposal torecognise the continuing sacrifice of those who are otherwise unacknowledged.”
2. DVA
“Dear Director Ceremonial,
DVA are doing a great job in organising and keeping everyone informed about the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War.
The following is included in the latest update, however: “the 523 Australians who were tragically killed in action in the Vietnam War”. You will be aware that killed in action (KIA) is a term which refers to those killed while on active service, as a result of enemy action.
In the interests of historical accuracy, you should be aware that the 523 referred to above were actually killed as a result of a combination of injury, illness, accident (including car crash on R&R), murder, and their own hand; as well as the consequences of action by the enemy.
The things that they all had in common was that their death resulted from their service and was within the prescribed period of the War, or two years of returning to Australia.
It is to be regretted that the many hundreds of others who have died as a result of their service, but outside the prescribed period of the war, are not acknowledged by the nation they served. It is hoped that this situation will be corrected, at least by the AWM.”
———————————————————————————————————
14 July 2023
“Consequences May be Counted in Lives”
The above was the headline given to a letter I wrote to the Canberra Times and published on 16 February 2015. It was pointed out that a gap in ADF operational capability would result if the replacement for the ASLAV was not introduced into service by 2020. Consequences of this could well be counted in soldiers’ lives.
The article from Ironsides 2022 (below) makes it clear that a gap in ADF’s operational capability presently exists: “Like many aging fleets it is still suffering from long lead time item wait times and critical component obsolescence”. The Life of Type of ASLAV has had to be extended to align with the Australian build and intro into service of Boxer Block II (likely to be over 2024-2026).
Army has tried to minimise it by having the 25 Boxer Block I vehicles (13% of the fleet) delivered from Germany and issued to 2/14 LH (QMI) to provide an “interim deployable cavalry capability”.
There is no doubt that there has been a failure of command responsibility here. As always, it goes without any public attention being drawn to it. Maybe this is as it should be (given national security implications). Such a culture, however, is reminiscent of the Vietnam era … mistakes go unchallenged and become the ‘norm’. We have to do better
———————————————————————————————————-
21 July 2023
Afghan etc Memorial III
My second letter to the Minister for DVA re the lack of a national memorial to honour the soldiers who fought after Vietnam was posted on the Blog on 26 May 2023 (copy to the Chief of Army).
A new headline would read: “Persistence pays off with the ‘dinkum oil’ at last!!”
Re the Army Memorial: “It belongs to the Australian Army; its location, however, is managed by the National Capital Authority“.
Further from the response from Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters:
“I’m pleased to tell you work is underway to address your concerns. Army has initiated a project to examine options for contemporary inclusions, redesigns or updates. This endeavour is framed on the requirement to reflect the service of all Australians who have served in the Army, including those campaigns post-Vietnam.
Any future design must also allow for future expansion, and provide a suitable space for reflection and site accessibility. As the project progresses there will be opportunity for community consultation.”
I will follow up re opportunity for consultation/input by veterans and pass on accordingly.
———————————————————————————————————-
28 July 2023
Vietnam: The 50th Anniversary
DVA state that:
“On 11 January 2023, we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the then Governor-General Sir Paul Hasluck proclaiming an end to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War.
This milestone marks the beginning of recognising in 2023, the 50th anniversary of the end of Australia’s commitment to the war and to acknowledge Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War.”
“The 50th Anniversary being commemorated on 18 August [1973] is the end of Australia’s “combat role” in Vietnam. April 29, 1975 reflects the fall of Saigon and formal end to the overall Vietnam War rather than the end of Australia’s formal participation. Australian personnel continued to be involved on the humanitarian front, such as the RAAF involvement inOperation Babylift and evacuation of embassy staff in April of 1975.”
Specific dates, according to Google, were:
(i) evacuation of Australian embassy staff 25 April 1975; (ii) order by US Ambassador to evacuate Saigon 29 April 1975; and (iii) fall of Saigon 30 April 1975.
Seems to me that there is likely to have been another reason at the time, possibly hidden in the archives somewhere, for the AWM to choose 29 April 1975 specifically.
‘I recently heard someone submit that emphasis on character is all that is needed to meet the need of the ADF in terms of ethical standards. I believe that, in addition, a Code of Ethics is necessary. A short extract from a lengthy essay on the subject is provided below.
“If you become aware of someone asleep at the wheel, it is your ethical responsibility to wake them. Sadly, for those in the ADF, the wreckage caused by failure in this space is omni-present. The military has been under the spell of an insidious malaise with respect to ethics for decades. Why? … because complacency is easy; it requires neither self-discipline nor courage. On the other hand, both these qualities are needed if someone is to stand up for what is right and not be cowered by a pervasive culture into simply going along with the mob.
What is to be gained by the ADF encouraging its members to take an ethical approach to matters they deal with on a day-to-day basis? In a word, the benefit is Trust … the result of a working environment in which human values are paramount: the dignity of the individual is respected; undertakings are honoured; those in need are helped; and decisions are taken which result in just outcomes. There is no profession in which trust is more important, than the profession of arms.”
Examples of standards that would be part of an ADF Code of Ethics are:
‘I will never knowingly breach, nor condone the breach, of authorised regulations.
If I learn of breaches of authorised regulations or unethical behaviour, I will report this to my chain of command without delay and without fear or favour.
I will never place loyalty to my unit or to an individual, above the interests of the nation, the lives of my fellow service members, or the truth in all matters.’
Readers can readily envisage the other standards that would apply.’
—————————————————————————————————
11 August 2023
Not all Who Died Were Men.
It always deems a pity to me when this occurs, ie. those who hold up half the sky are not recognised for their contribution. The following letter has been sent to the Canberra Times:
Fellow Vietnam veteran and author, Greg Lockhart’s, article (‘The politicised history behind our Vietnam commemorations’, CT, Aug 3, p30) has an important message. While not wanting to distract from it, there is a need to correct one point.
Prime Ministers and Ministers for Veterans’ Affairs have in the past made the same mistake; ie. they have referred to servicemen who have been killed or have died as a result of their time in Vietnam.
In a similar vein, Greg refers to the loss of “a son, a husband, or a father in the Vietnam War”. His reference should have been to: ‘the loss a child, a spouse, or a parent’.
Not all those Australians who lost their lives serving their country in Vietnam were men.
———————————————————————————————————-
18 August 2023
A Step Backwards in Recognising Gallantry
I argued against the award of the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry (VCG) to all Australian units in the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal on the basis that it would diminish the significance of the individual awards previously for specific actions involving gallantry.
The recently announced award of the RoV CoG Unit Citation to all Australian units now diminishes the significance of the award previously made to specific units for actions involving gallantry (eg. 1 Tp, A Sqn, 4/19 PWLH and AATTV). This is a step backwards in terms of recognising and honouring gallantry.
An award extended to everyone, ceases to have any significance for specific actions undertaken by a few. Although the effort put in to have the VCG Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR, extended to A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt in terms of Op Hammersley, was not successful … it does not lessen the degree to which those units deserve, but were not granted, specific recognition.
Previously the DHAAT argued that the VCG Unit Citation “being an award made by a foreign Government which no longer exists … no latitude exists for anything other than a strict literal interpretation of the citations that were issued by that Government”. See https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Cameron.pdf
I had intended to appeal that decision, as obviously circumstances have changed; however, the authority on which the new award is made is the US Department of Army General Order No 8 (DAGO 8) which specified all units subordinate to MACV. See https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Ball.pdf
It will be seen in the above, that the initial application to the DHAAT by the President of the VVAA was to have the Unit Citation awarded to units involved in the Battles of FSBs Coral and Balmoral. Interestingly, the following email was sent to members of the 1 Armd Regt Assn following the award to ALL units:
“Greetings to all Association Members,
After a long drawn-out saga, and with the commitment of quite a few Veteran Associations, including Vietnam Veterans Association and the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation – especially Noel McLaughlin and Pedro Rosemond – the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal reversed previous decisions and recommended to the Government that the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm Citation (VCGPU) should be awarded to all Vietnam veterans subject to their service in designated units within particular timeframes…”.
The DHAAT report shows no assistance provided to the VVAA by the RAAC Corporation. It has to be supposed that the contribution of the Corporation was ‘behind the scene’. What’s this say about openness and transparency in such matters? Does it mean that the DHAAT has concealed what really brought about the recent decision to award the Citation to all units (which, I for one, totally disagree with)?
The President of the VVAA informs me that “in the five years that I have worked on this [the award of the Unit Citation] I have not seen any correspondence from any other ESO or veteran, incl the RAAC Corporation, nor have I contacted any of them”.
I sent the following email to the Secretary, 1 Armd Regt Assn (copy to Chairman, RAAC Corporation) on 13 Aug 23…
Dear Secretary,
Your latest email to members (above0 raises a number of questions.
It has to be supposed that the contribution of the RAAC Corporation referred to above, happened ‘behind the scenes’. What’s this say about openness and transparency in such matters? Does it mean that the DHAAT has concealed what really brought about their recent decision to award the Citation to all units?
The President of the VVAA informs me that (i) “my initiative was a personal one and followed the award of the unit Citation for Gallantry to those who served at Coral/Balmoral,” and (ii), “in the five years that I have worked on this [the award of the Unit Citation] I have not seen any correspondence from any other ESO or veteran, incl the RAAC Corporation, nor have I contacted any of them”.
Can you please explain how the RAAC Corporation influenced the DHAAT with respect to their decision, or is this something I must ask the Tribunal itself?
“Vivian Bullwinkel was extraordinary and deserves significant recognition (regardless of gender – that’s a different issue – which I agree with) but why is the AWM going down the path of selecting out individuals and honouring them with statues in the grounds of the Memorial? Do they have a list of who is worthy of individual recognition in this manner? I guess it started with Simpson and then Weary – and lately Monash and now Vivian (not to mention the once Poppies Cafe, and then the Terrace, is now Poppy’s after a service person who was killed in Afghanistan – but I guess we have the CEW Bean building). Wonder if the AWM has put any thought into the future of a program which recognises individuals by a statue in the (now very limited) grounds? Does individual recognition, especially in this manner, meet the original concept of egalitarian commemoration?”
Egalitarian commemoration is a nice ideal, but to what extent is it observed? Australia is often thought of as a land of equal opportunity, where everyone deserves a ‘fair go’, and mateship reigns supreme. The reality is that we are a nation in which wealth is the basis of a class divide.
There is no doubt that ideals such as the following (controversary re origins aside), would be supported by most:
“The ceremony concluded with a march past. The Regimental Sergeant Major of the Guard Regiment conducting the ceremony, faced with a gathering of highly decorated and high-ranking military men (including many Victoria Cross winners), all wearing rows of medals, decreed that all would salute the Cenotaph as they marched past by placing their hand over their medals, signifying that ‘No matter what honours we may have been awarded they are nothing compared with the honour due to those who paid the supreme sacrifice’.”
This is reflected by the fact that rank is not included on the Roll of Honour at the AWM. The AWM Act, however, does not stipulate any criteria by which commemoration of those who have died on active service is to be made.
I, for one, am opposed to the idea of creating specific criteria to determine who is to be honoured with a statue and who is not. Let the admiration and esteem in which a person (male or female, officer or other rank) is held by others … be the determinant.
——————————————————————————————————–
1 September 2023
The RAAC Corporation’s Welfare Assistance (?): Part 1
The Australian Charities and Not for Profit Commission’s (ACNC) website (https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/charities/a8a3e29d-0be5-eb11-bacb-002248101fa4/profile) lists the activities of the RAAC Corporation. First among them is the following: “Represent the interests by way of providing for the welfare of all serving and ex-serving ordinary members (together with their respective families) of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps”.
I’m an ‘ex-serving member of the RAAC’. Am I an ex-serving ordinary member?
The Constitution of the Corporation states that:
“Ordinary Member” means:
any individual person who is a financial member of a Member Association as specified in Rule 4 of this Constitution;
any individual person who is a financial member of an Associate Member Association as specified in Rule 5 of this Constitution.
So, as I’m not a member of any of the Corporation’s member associations, my welfare and that of my family is not provided for in any way by the RAAC Corporation.
[Background to my association membership ‘woes’. I withdrew my membership of the RAAC Assn (NSW Branch) when its C’tee declined to apply for a DVA grant on my behalf as a Reunion organiser, as suggested by DVA, to provide commemorative wreaths in honour of RAAC personnel who were died as a result of their service in Vietnam. (This was at DVA’s Operation Overlord 50th Anniversary commemoration; although only Associations could apply, the RAAC Assn C’tee considered it was not their responsibility to assist. Simply unbelievable!) The ACT TPI Assn stepped in, grant was funded and the wreaths were laid at the Vietnam Memorial and the AWM (Last Post ceremony).
I was informed by a C’tee member that my membership of the 3rd and 4th Cav Regts’ Assn was cancelled on “political grounds”. (I understand that this came at the instigation of the Chairman, RAAC Corporation.) The saga of my membership of the 1 Armd Regt Assn is described at the Intro at the start of the Blog … maybe it was this which was at the heart of it all. Whatever; at least one’s self-respect is intact.]
——————————————————————————————————-
8 September 2023
The RAAC Corporation’s Welfare Assistance Pledge (?): Part 2
Following on from last week …
The RAAC Corporation’s first priority is to: “Represent the interests by way of providing for the welfare of all serving and ex-serving ordinary members (together with their respective families) of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps”.
Having established last week that this welfare undertaking only applies to members of Associations who are members of the RAAC Corporation (eg. RAAC Assn, WA Branch), it was a surprise to see that the Corporation’s Constitution states that: “The Corporation is a Corporation established to provide for the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families”.
So, given that there is no reference to “ordinary members”, the Corporation’s charity function supposedly applies to the welfare of all members and ex-members of the RAAC, irrespective of whether or not they’re members of the Corporation’s member associations.
This interpretation is further supported by its constitution:
The Corporation as represented by the Council, is prohibited from expending any moneys except on the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families.
Does the RAAC Corporation exist to provide for the welfare of all members and ex-members of the RAAC, or only those who are ordinary members of the Corporation (ie. members of associations that are members of the RAAC Corporation)?
A relevant question one would think. Pity that no-one’s prepared to raise it. I can no longer ask the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation as he has blocked my emails. So much for open and transparent governance.
———————————————————————————————————-
15 September 2023
The RAAC Corporation’s Welfare Assistance Pledge (?): Part 3
The Constitution of the RAAC Corporation states:
‘The Corporation as represented by the Council, is prohibited from expending any moneys except on the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families.’
Presumably, this is not meant literally, ie. one imagines that costs associated with the functioning of the organisation such as postage and website fees, would be exempt. (But shouldn’t such an exemption be specified in the Constitution, rather than assumed?)
It’s to be expected that the annual financial statements would enable expenditure to be verified as per the above.
Spending on a few running costs are itemised, but then the shutters come down. By far the most expensive item relates to grants, the financial report stating:
‘Grants received $10,000’
‘Grants expended $10,000’
One has to assume (once again) that the monies were expended solely on the welfare of members and ex-members of the RAAC.
[As if it couldn’t get any more confusing, the Corporation’s 2022 Information Statement lists ‘grants expended’ as $500 and something referred to as ‘other expenses/payments’, as $13,830.]
———————————————————————————————————-
22 September 2023
Recognition of Those Who Die as a Result of Their Military Service, but Whose Death is Outside the Period of the War Prescribed by the AWM
Only the names of those who die as a result of their active service within the prescribed period of a war (or within two years of returning home) are included on the Roll of Honour at the AWM. All those whose wounds result in their death after 29 April 1975, are ineligible.
A number of us have been advocating for some means of recognising these sacrifices. For all intents and purposes, they are completely overlooked by the nation they served.
The recognition given to US service personnel in Washington (photo below) was brought to the attention of the AWM. Their response, however, was to advise that, after extensive consultation, the proposed Sufferings of War and Service project was intended to fulfill this role. This sculpture (artist’s impression above) has been described as “a work of art to recognise and commemorate the suffering caused by war and military service”.
Veterans that I’m in touch with re the Sufferings of War and Service Memorial, have no issues in terms of its previously published role, ie:
“This art work represents those affected by operations and during training; in war and on peacetime service.
A sculpture by artist Alex Seton will provide a place for people to contemplate the trauma of war.
… a work of art to recognise and commemorate the suffering caused by war and military service.
[It]will provide a place at the Memorial for those who have experienced and witnessed the ongoing trauma that can result from service.
The sculpture will provide a point of connection to all who have suffered as a consequence of service, whether their own, or someone close to them.
This sculpture will be an enduring recognition for those affected by military service and serve as a reminder to us all of the about impact of service on some of our personnel and their families, but importantly, provide them with hope and healing.
For Every Drop Shed in Anguish … will recognise the significant burdens carried by military personnel and their families and acknowledge those who have experienced loss as a result of military service.
None of these reflect the lives sacrificed on active service but not recorded on the Roll of Honour simply because of a specified date, ie. a service man or woman who died as a result of wounds suffered in Vietnam after the end of the prescribed period of the war (and more than two years after returning to Australia). The plaque in the AWM commemorative area which honours “Australian Defence personnel wounded in war and on operations in the service of their nation” does not serve this purpose either.
A sculpture honouring the physical and mental suffering of veterans and their families is one thing; it does not, however, provide a tangible link with someone who gave their life in the service of their country, in the same way that the enduring RoH does. If it had been suggested at any time that the Sufferings of War and Service memorial was to serve this purpose, the C’tee would have received many suggestions to this end. Veterans would have contacted the families of those who had died as a direct result of their wounds, but after the cut-off date. Their input as to the nature of the most suitable commemoration would have been sought. Discussion would have been facilitated and a submission made. As things stand, as one comment attests [in response to the revised purpose of the memorial]: “That so called sculpture is an insult.”
Is it possible that the AWM could issue a public statement re the intention of the sculpture being to also honour those who have died as a direct result of their active service, but outside the prescribed period of the war in which they served … so that all those who may wish to provide input may do so?
This follows a post from 27 Jan 21 (copied at end).
“There have been changes to the way gallantry is recognised in recent years. Some for the better, some not so. In the former category, awards can now be made posthumously, whereas previously only the VC and mid could be so awarded. Gallantry awards based rank was an anachronism and it is pleasing to see that this determinant has been removed.
The Australian honours system, however, has introduced an unfortunate practice. The order of precedence for the DCM (and possibly other now discontinued awards) no longer recognises the significance of the acts for which it was originally awarded. In this case, an award that was once second to the VC, now comes after the Public Service Medal (for outstanding service in an administrative capacity) in terms of relative importance.
One can only imagine that the policy resulted from someone thinking that there is no recipient alive to be offended (which is not the point!)”
———————————————————————————
27 January 2021
Sadly, John Carter, OAM, DCM passed away just recently. The 1AR Assn referred to him as John Carter, DCM, OAM. This might be thought to be correct, but it’s not.
The DCM was introduced in 1854 by Queen Victoria for extraordinary gallantry in action by other ranks. It was second only to the VC in this respect. The equivalent award for officers was the DSO for Gallantry (for which Major Harry Smith was recommended for Long Tan.)
The Australian Honours System was introduced in 1975. In terms of its order of precedence, the DCM ranks below the Medal of the Order of Australia (OAM) and the Public Service Medal (PSM). Supposedly for us, therefore, gallantry isn’t rated all that important in the scheme of things.
Of course, if you were an officer and were awarded the second level award for gallantry, you’d be way higher in our order of precedence. Is it right that gallantry is assessed on the basis of what rank you held? Of course not, and this has been rectified in the revised British award scheme. All ranks in the British Army are now eligible, for example, to be awarded the MC (and awards can now be made posthumously, whereas previously only the VC and mid could be so awarded).
In the British order of precedence, the DCM is way higher than the MC. This is only right as the DCM was the second level of award and the MC was the third (after the VC and DSO). Whereas in our system, the opposite is the case; the MC has precedence over the DCM (the officer thing again).
Seems to me that the Brits have got it right in terms of recognising what constitutes acts of gallantry … whereas we allocate more importance to administrative efficiency in the public service. How did this come about, and more importantly, how can it be fixed?
John Carter’s award needs to be seen in the context of the Imperial awards at the time it was made; ie, second only to the VC in terms of “DECORATIONS, MEDALS FOR GALLANTRY AND DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT”.
———————————————————————————————————-I
6 October 2023
The Intractable Problem with the Military
The Commissioner of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide addressed the National Press Club on 13 Sep 23. Among the points he made are the following:
“When it comes to protecting the mental health and wellbeing of servicemen and women, the evidence this Royal Commission has uncovered to date suggests there’s been far too much talk and not enough action.”
“Yet Defence’s approach to investigating and reporting on suicides has progressed at a snail’s pace; and we are yet to find sufficient evidence of urgency in responding to these complex issues holistically – even with this Royal Commission on foot!”
“All of this raises serious questions as to whether Defence is committed to making change in the best interests of its members – or whether they’re just going through the motions.”
This confirms my worst fears, as my submission to the Commission on 3 Jan 22 indicates …
Submission by Bruce Cameron to Royal Commission on Defence and Veteran Suicide.
“I and my fellow commissioners see this as a once-in-a-generation opportunity for lasting, fundamental change.”
All who read the testimonies of those appearing before the Royal Commission into Veterans’ Suicide will be appalled by the evidence given. Unsurprisingly, there have been many calls for a fundamental change to systemic military behaviour; a ‘roots and all’ clean out of an institutionalised culture.
It is one thing to call for this, but before anything can be fixed, the problem has to be clearly identified. Where exactly, does it lie? Answering this question is the real challenge for the Commissioners. While individual circumstances can be examined and relevant faults determined on a case-by case-basis, the systemic problem, the root cause at the heart of it all, might still not be revealed.
Background.
It is my belief that the circumstances associated with veteran suicides are the result of the same inherent failing on the part of the military which resulted in the unbelievable shortcomings in unit training prior to deployment to Vietnam. An infantry battalion commander put it well: “I was trained [in 1968] for a war of cordon and search, and bunkers weren’t mentioned. When we got there, all we did was fight bunkers. I was trained for totally the wrong war”.
The tank squadron underwent similar training throughout 1970. No mention of bunkers nor any related training, yet all major actions in 1971 involved attacking enemy bunker systems. Tank crews suffered casualties as a direct result of their inadequate training. One could understand this happening in 1968 when tanks encountered enemy bunkers for the first time, but surely not with the second, third and fourth squadrons.
How is it that training for war could be so poor? The answer lies in the fact that the ‘system’ that existed at the time had a fundamental weakness. It was assumed that the way things were done had successfully evolved over time and everyone could be confident that (i) those more senior knew what was best and (ii) all other options had been considered. In many cases, however, nothing could be further from the truth.
The Military Hierarchy.
The Australian Defence Force is an archetypal hierarchical organisation; mandates come from the top and are acted upon automatically; no-one questions them (publicly at least). This is understandable to some extent … the nature of military operations makes alternative ‘flat’ structures unsuited to the planning and delivery of decisive force at short notice with immediate effect. Some civilian companies employ a hierarchical structure, but offset its weaknesses by adopting a culture of continual improvement. In this model, performance feedback is central to decision making at all levels.
While the war-fighting culture of the military is intractable, change is not impossible. The solution to the training problem described above, is to be found in an Operational Analysis Unit (OAU). Such a body can independently examine operations as they occur and advise on, and oversee, change implementation where necessary.
The British Army deployed an OAU to the Falkland Islands. This resulted in reports concerning tactics and equipment being received in real time in the UK; allowing changes to be implemented immediately on the ground in the Falklands e.g. the improved siting pattern adopted when deploying Rapier surface to air missile launchers.
Whenever subject to the chain of command, however, any unit such as a OAU can turn out to be a ‘toothless’ appendage, one incapable of facilitating change.
Conclusion.
It is clear that a truly independent body, i.e. one outside the chain of command, is needed to oversee the mental health of both serving and separated members. While it will be for the Commission to prescribe requisite powers, one would expect that such a body must provide a conduit for confidential advice from and to those whose well-being is affected; together with the power to bring about changes to harmful practices and to ensure appropriate rehabilitation, without any possibility of reprisal.
13 October 2023
The Absence of Tanks at Nui Le. (An article requested by the RAR Corporation for their newsletter ‘Duty First’.)
“Another matter that played on his mind [that of the late Maj Gen Jim Hughes, AO, DSO, MC; CO at the time] for many years, from an operational perspective, was the absence of the Centurion battle tanks at the time of the battle. It took him many years to identify the person who had made the premature decision to withdraw the tanks from the order of battle in July 1971 for the wrong reasons.”
The article by Greg Shannon, OAM, in the Spring 2023 edition of ‘Duty First’, explains the significance of the Battle of Nui Le in September 1971. Additional information is provided below with respect to one of the most inexplicable decisions of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the absence of tanks during the withdrawal. I’m able to offer some measure of understanding in this regard, as a result of research for my book ‘Canister! On! FIRE! : Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’.
The opinion of General Westmoreland, the commander of US troops at the start of the Vietnam War, was that there was no place for tanks in the jungle. As a result, many tanks were left behind and some mechanised units were converted to ‘leg’ (i.e. dismounted) infantry prior to deployment. This was a mistake. By the second half of 1966, US field commanders were desperate for tanks to provide direct fire support. (A similar mistake had been made in 1942 when General MacArthur initially turned down a request from Australian ground commanders at Buna for tanks to help overcome Japanese defences.)
In February 1967, almost five years before Nui Le, an attack on an entrenched enemy position by 6RAR (Operation Bribie) underscored the urgent need for tanks to support 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) operations. A year later, a half squadron of tanks arrived (the thinking being: ‘If we’re going to make a mistake, let’s make half a one’.)
The effectiveness of the fire support provided during the battles of FSBs Coral and Balmoral in May 1968, led to the remaining tank troops being called forward from Australia.
During the next three years, support from Centurion tanks frequently proved indispensable, particularly when attacking enemy bases. These defensive positions comprised numerous bunkers (mutually supporting and built to withstand aerial bombs). Tanks were the only weapon system capable of effectively closing with and destroying them.
—————–
Military doctrine emphasises the important role of armour in the Withdrawal. In January 1971, the Commander 1ATF, Brigadier Bill Henderson, advised the Commander, Australian Force Vietnam that:
“In my view, the one argument for the withdrawal of the Centurions is the administrative burden of keeping them on the road. The [operational] requirement for their retention in theatre at this stage, far outweighs the administrative argument.”
He was overruled. From a political perspective, a phased withdrawal, mirroring that of the US in percentage terms, was desirable. There were many in Army, however, who considered that 1ATF would become overly vulnerable if subjected to a progressive reduction in strength. The answer they believed, was to withdraw the Task Force as a complete entity. It was a forlorn hope. When Brigadier Bruce McDonald took over as Task Force Commander, the withdrawal phasing had been decided and he had to make the best of it.
Another element of ‘fuzzy thinking’ also had an outing … the idea that M113A1 Fire Support Vehicles, mounting a Saladin turret, could effectively take the place of tanks. Brigadier Henderson considered the FSV an ‘up-gunned APC’ and warned of the danger of using it as a tank. Nevertheless, two batches of four FSVs were shipped from the Ordnance Factory Bendigo to Vietnam, the first arriving on 31 May 1971. (Saladins had not been used by the regular Army since 1963; so it was that gunnery training for the first turret crews had to be conducted in Vietnam.)
The strength of the tank squadron was reduced, one tank troop per month, commencing on 1 May. The last, 5 Troop, left the field on 30 August. It had until 7 September to finish preparing its tanks for transport to the dock at Vung Tau.
The enemy was obviously well aware of the draw down in Armoured fire support available to 1ATF. Any chance of surprise concerning the withdrawal was slim, but all hope was lost when the political catchcry ‘Home by Christmas’ was hoist to the masthead in August 1971
Paradoxically, it was the lack of protection available to the APCs during Operation Bribie (1967) which saw the Centurions dispatched to Vietnam. The wheel had turned full circle; the lesson now being the extent to which political imperative must acknowledge the soundness of military doctrine. Rather than withdrawing 1ATF as a single entity, it was left as an unbalanced formation, the cost counted in soldiers’ lives.
Lt Col Bruce Cameron, MC (Retd) commanded 5 Troop, C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam.
———————————————————————————————————-
20 October 2023
1 Armd Regt and the History of the RAAC
“Retasking of 1 Armoured Regiment will see it remain in Adelaide as an innovation and experimentation unit, focused on bringing into quick operation for the Army the newest technologies and innovative practices.”
The silence is deafening; just like it was when black berets were banned. Of course, the RAAC Corporation has clearly stated that it will not advocate with respect to any matter which is contrary to the position of the Head of Corps. (A former HoC made the point that this was a pity as he doesn’t have a ‘conscience vote’ and the Corporation could otherwise provide an independent voice.)
So much of the history of the RAAC is embodied in that of the 1st Armd Regt. It is tempting to suggest that the unit earnt its first battle honours fighting in the SWPA during the Second World War as part of the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC). The lineage of this early 1st Armoured Regiment, however, is linked with the history of 1 RNSWL. Today’s 1 Armd Regt owes its origins in 1949 to the 1st Armoured Car Squadron raised three years earlier for service in Japan.
Interestingly, although listing the three battle honours for Vietnam, this site states that “The unit [1 Armd Regt] is entitled to emblazon no more than two battle honours [for a single campaign].” This restriction no longer exists. Approval for Coral-Balmoral to be emblazoned was given following my letter to the Minister in 2017 (dates for the Vietnam Theatre Honour were also amended).
There are two matters of significance associated with the Standard carried by 1 Armd Regt. Firstly, it designates a heavy cavalry unit, referred to as dragoon guards in the British Army. These were units equipped to make a decisive impact on the battlefield, as distinct to light cavalry whose role is to conduct skirmishes and reconnaissance. Secondly, the Standard designates a unit which takes precedence over all others. In 1981 when the Standard was first presented to 1 Armd Regt, it was the Australian Army’s dragoon guard equivalent.
Here we come to the point. What is to happen to the Standard of 1Armd Regt now that it no longer has an operational role (and may be reduced to squadron strength)? Will another unit take its place on the right of line? How will the traditions and history of a regiment that has been an exemplar of mobile warfare and shock action for almost 75 years, be maintained?
BTW. We’re approaching the 75th Anniversary of the RAAC this year (2023) and 75th Anniversary of 1 Armd Regt next year (2024). I wonder how, if at all, they’ll be celebrated?
———————————————————————————————-
27 October 2023
Access to DVA Grants
Sadly, the philosophy of continual improvement in corporate affairs often takes a back seat to a maintenance of the status quo. Why upset things, when you can continue on with more of the same? The easy way, of course, is rarely the best way.
DVA recently sought input with a view to making grants more accessible:
“The Department of Veterans’ Affairs administers several grants programs with various objectives from helping to commemorate Australia’s wartime heritage, to supporting organisations deliver services and projects for veterans and their families, and helping students whose parent or grandparent is a veteran. This is your opportunity to provide the government feedback about the grants process.” (https://www.dva.gov.au/news/latest-stories/opportunity-help-re-design-commonwealth-grants)
My submission is copied below …
“Dear Sir/Madam,
‘Ensuring grant funding flows to a greater diversity of community service organisations’
I wish to comment re the above. In 2021, I, together with a small team, organised a reunion for an Army unit … in conjunction with a 50th Anniversary of a battle fought in Vietnam. The overall commemoration was to be conducted in Canberra by DVA. Reunion activities included unit representatives laying wreaths in honour of fallen comrades at both an Australian War Memorial Last Post ceremony and the DVA Commemoration itself.
Being aware of a grant available from DVA to purchase wreaths, I applied accordingly. Unfortunately, we were acting as an ad hoc group and were not affiliated with a specific ex-service organisation. This meant that we were ineligible for a grant.
DVA helpfully advised that we could circumvent this requirement by having a registered organisation act on our behalf. I contacted one of the associations to which I belonged, accordingly.
I was advised by the committee concerned that this was something outside the scope of their responsibility. [I immediately ceased to be a member of that association.] Another organisation took a completely different approach. They acted on my behalf, passing on my application and acquitting the grant received (which was used in its entirety to honour those who had made the ultimate sacrifice).
My point is that not every applicant will be an incorporated organisation and deserving cases will arise from time to time. This is particularly likely when a ‘one off’ situation arises, as per the example quoted.
Developing policies which cater for such circumstances and avoid overly bureaucratic practices, will enable grant funding to meet a greater diversity of community service needs. Your consideration is appreciated.”
———————————————————————————————
3 November 2023
After Beersheba: How Will the RAAC (ARA) be Structured?
Plan Beersheba and armoured cavalry regiments are now a thing of the past. What will the future look like?
A reminder re Plan Beersheba: “The armoured cavalry regiment is the name given to the new common structure for the 1st Armoured Regiment [Adelaide], 2nd Cavalry Regiment [Townsville] and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) [Brisbane]. Each regiment will consist of a cavalry squadron, an armoured personnel carrier squadron and a tank squadron. The units are not being renamed.”
Under the recently announced (2023) Army structure:
the 1st Brigade, based in Darwin, will be a light combat brigade.
the 3rd Brigade, based in Townsville, will be an armoured combat brigade.
the 7th Brigade, based in Brisbane, will be a motorised combat brigade.
the 10th Brigade, based in Adelaide, will be raised as a fires brigade.
The only armoured unit referred to in the announcement was 1 Armoured Regiment: “Re-tasking will see it remain in Adelaide as an innovation and experimentation unit”. The blog on 20 Oct 23 suggested (somewhat obliquely) that this might not come to pass in the scheme of things.
Is the brigade organisation workable with just two functional RAAC units … 2 Cav and 2/14 LHR (QMI)?
It would be if 7th Brigade didn’t require recon or PMV assets; or if PMVs were required, they were operated by RACT or RA Inf.
So, both 2 Cav and 2/14 located in T’ville; possibly 2 Cav recon and 2/14 tank.
Surely, however, the answer is for 1 Armd Regt to swap with 2/14 and return to being Army’s tank regiment, as it has for 72 of its 74 years, and maintain the history and traditions built up over that time.
The elephant in the room is, of course, 2/14 LHR (QMI)’s links with Brisbane. Possibly, an ARES squadron can be raised in Brisbane? If it’s deemed that recon is required for the motorised brigade (as you’d think it would be), then 2/14 stays in Brisbane, and another option is required for Adelaide … possibly an ARA sqn of 3/9 SAMR or a non-RAAC sub-unit?
Why is it that there is so little discussion about this, ie. about the RAAC of the future? It’s hardly a matter of national security, yet it seems to be in the realm of something regarded as being ‘on a need-to-know basis’, or even stricter classification.
What can morale be like in the families of the units concerned … the uncertainty must make everything so hard (not least schooling and husband’s/wife’s job security). It must be a comfort to know that the RAAC Corporation is there to safeguard family welfare.
[No matter which unit is Australia’s future tank regiment, at least the poor reliability exasperated by decentralised squadrons will be reduced.]
———————————————————————————————–
10 November 2023
Esprit de Corps and History
Soldiers from the 1st Armoured Regiment await the order to start the parade proceedings to mark the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Cambrai.
The post of 20 Oct 23 asked what would happen to 1 Armd Regt’s Standard when the unit was re-tasked as an ‘innovation and experimentation unit’ (having once beenthe Australian Army’s dragoon guard equivalent and presented with a Standard on that basis). Hopefully the history and traditions of the unit, built up over nearly 75 years, will be able to be preserved. [Last week’s post has more on this and what the future might hold for the RAAC.]
It is one thing to draw such matters to the attention of other parts of the Army, but it’s gut wrenching when one’s own guardians botch our history. The information below is provided on the cover of the 1 Armd Regt Assn’s newsletter, ‘Paratus’. https://www.paratus.org.au/_files/ugd/512260_b9e8ecaa5f684a649f68467673ea8964.pdf
1st ARMOURED REGIMENT
Theatres of Operation
Japan (1st Armd Car Sqn)
Vietnam
Theatre Honour
VIETNAM 1968-1971
Battle Honours
Coral – Balmoral
Hat Dich
Binh Ba
Rhodesia
Cambodia
East Timor
Iraq
Solomon Islands
Afghanistan
Originally simply ‘Japan’ was listed under Theatres of Operation. When it was pointed out that this was not one of 1 Armd Regt’s theatres of operations, ‘(1st Armd Car Sqn)’ was added after Japan. Another correction was made in the June 2023 issue. The Theatre Honour was previously shown as ‘STH VIETNAM 1968-1972’. It now appears as ‘VIETNAM 1968-1972. This is almost correct. Reference to the Standard itself will show: ‘VIETNAM 1968-72’.
Unfortunately, the major correction has still been overlooked, viz. 1 Armd Regt has been awarded three, not nine, battle honours. Coral-Balmoral, Hat Dich, and Binh Ba reflect battles fought in Vietnam (a war in which all three squadrons of the Regiment served, qualifying the unit for battle honours to be awarded).
The other countries listed are places where ADF troops have been deployed post-Vietnam (for some reason Somalia has been omitted). 1 Armd Regt was not involved as such, however, members and former members may have been posted on an individual/crew basis. These deployments must be shown separately to battle honours and the reason for listing made clear. The heritage of 1 Armd Regt will be enhanced if its recent history is highlighted, rather than let wilt (eg. I may be mistaken, but I believe that RHQ deployed to Afghanistan). A ‘Paratus’ masthead which reflected this and other personnel/sub-unit commitments to operations, would help maintain pride in unit history.
————————————————————————————————
17 November 2023
Justice for ALL
I received the following email (inter alia) from an association to which I belong:
“I write to bring to your attention the independent review of the National Legal Assistance Partnership Agreement (NLAP) currently under way, and to let you know how to contribute to this review via public submission, should you wish.
NLAP (which is administered by Attorney-General’s Department) is a national partnership agreement between the Australian Government and all states and territories for Australian Government funded legal assistance.
The Agreement is currently under independent review to evaluate the extent to which the objective, outcomes and outputs of the NLAP have been achieved, and the NLAP is efficient, effective and appropriate in achieving its policy intent.
The review, which is being undertaken by Dr Warren Mundy, has invited submissions from all Australians, and has also indicated that it is keen to hear from organisations which support vulnerable Australians regarding those peoples’ experiences of the legal assistance sector and how it might better service their needs.”
My submission is copied below.
———————————
Submission to the Review of the National Legal Assistance Partnership
Introduction. It may appear that the National Legal Assistance Partnership 2020-25 (NLAP) is designed specifically for those who are vulnerable and/or disadvantaged with limited means, education or opportunity (these categories not being mutually exclusive, eg. a wealthy person may still be vulnerable to abuse or exploitation). The full scope of beneficiaries under the NLAP is broader, however.
The common denominator can be described as: ‘those who, because of circumstances outside their control, including appropriate legal services being unknown or unavailable, are prevented from accessing assistance necessary for their legal needs to be met’. The maturity of a nation can be measured by the extent to which legal services are accessible to all citizens.
This submission relates to a case in which existing administrative and legal processes prevented the inherent rights and wrongs of a matter being considered and acted upon. These processes were outside the control of the applicant and, as a result, the rule of law failed him.
Outline of Matter. In 2020 the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) was asked to extend eligibility for an award made to an Army unit, to other Army units that provided the support which was essential to the success achieved on the battlefield. This had, in turn, resulted in the original award. The appeal was unsuccessful.
In its report (https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Cameron.pdf), DHAAT stated that the applicant expressed a particular opinion (para 49) … something he did not do (as confirmed by the tape recording of the proceedings). In fact, he had lodged a 57page formal submission in respect of the issue involved. The DHAAT report made no mention of this.
The applicant sought only to correct the public record (not challenge the outcome of the appeal). When raised with the DHAAT, the applicant was informed that the proceedings were ‘functus officio’, so no correction to the report could be considered. When asked under Section 13 of the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review (ADJR) Act 1977 for a statement of reasons as to why the applicant’s formal response and lengthy submission were not considered relevant evidence, the response was that the DHAAT decision was exempt from such a request and that an application to the Federal Court had to be lodged.
A request to the Federal Court for an Interrogatories Order [Rule 21] was commenced. As part of the process, the applicant had to demonstrate that he had taken steps to resolve the matter with the respondent. He provided this. He also had to show that he had sufficient funds to be able to meet the costs of the respondent if the outcome went against him. This required that the applicant ascertain what the estimated legal costs of the respondent would be. The amount advised was “$40,000 to $70,000, or above”.
Although not ordinarily considered a disadvantaged person, the applicant became one in these circumstances. Not being aware of any alternative, he withdrew his application to the Federal Court. A subsequent application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs was dismissed.
Conclusion. The record of proceedings of a lawfully constituted public body established to consider matters of importance, is wrong. There is no means available to challenge the record and amend it, without an enormous financial cost; one beyond the means of most applicants. The law would be well served if the NLAP corrected this to facilitate judicial review in such circumstances.
——————————————————————————————————
24 November 2023
Critical Thinking
“Critical thinking is a kind of thinking in which you question, analyse, interpret, evaluate and make a judgement about what you read, hear, say, or write.”
It’s amazing how many things we take for granted. Many of us don’t have enquiring minds and often come to appreciate the significance of things after the event. Creedence Clearwater Revival was a popular band on the American Forces Radio Network in Vietnam. When background music was being organised for the 50th C Sqn (1 Armd Regt) reunion in 2021, many of their tracks were requested. It was often thought that they were singing anti-war protest songs and many were featured in movies about the war.
A little bit of attention shows this to be totally untrue. Only one number had an anti-war message and this was a secondary one … ‘Fortunate Son’ was primarily about the class divide in society, senators’/millionaires’ sons etc getting their call up for military service in Vietnam waived. ‘Run Though the Jungle’ was a particular favourite with the lyric: two hundred million guns are loaded/Satan cries ‘take aim’. This was actually about gun proliferation in the US.
Neither ‘Who’ll stop the Rain?’ nor ‘Have you Ever Seen the Rain’ refers to agent orange/yellow rain. The former is about the endless rain at the Woodstock festival, while the latter is about depression in the sense of good things turning bad. ‘Bad Moon Rising’ is about a wider apocalypse, not in response to the Vietnam War.
Is the future of the RAAC being taken for granted? In the Blog on 24 Oct 23 it was argued that the reason that training for Vietnam was so poor was that the ‘system’ that existed at the time had a fundamental weakness. It was assumed that the way things were done had successfully evolved over time and everyone could be confident that (i) those more senior knew what was best and (ii) all other options had been considered. In many cases, however, nothing could have been further from the truth.
It had been hoped that ‘the powers that be’ might give some indication of Army’s thinking at the recent Cambrai/Beersheba Dinner in Sydney. This turns out to have been in vain, however. The planned resolution of the unworkable situation of an armoured combat brigade having only a single armoured unit (as per recent Army announcements) remains a mystery; as does the future of 1 Armd Regt. Hopes had been raised when the RSM of 2/14 LHR (QMI) who had stressed that the reorganisation is to go ahead exactly as announced, suddenly deleted his posts to this effect (without any explanation). The reason can be well imagined.
Finally … really good reports from those who attended re the 2023 Cambrai Parade at 1 Armd Regt. Feedback from one of the attendees was that the Regt is to deploy to T’ville over the next two years. Details were very confused. Will 1 Armd Regt comprise two sqns of tanks, one of recon? Will 2 Cav be redeployed south or remain in T’ville?
For the sake of the RAAC, one hopes to see some evidence of critical thinking before it’s too late and the Corps and those in it suffer!
——————————————————————————————————-
1 December 2023
RAAC ARES Light Cavalry Regiments
Last week’s Blog stated that “For the sake of the RAAC, one hopes to see some evidence of critical thinking before it’s too late and the Corps and those in it suffer!”. There have been some very questionable decisions affecting the Corps in recent times, none more so than that which consigned RAAC ARES units to a dismounted cavalry scout role.
A long-standing goal of Armouredadvocates has been that: “All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei*) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare”. It seems as if, finally, this is close to being realised.
The decision that ARES units would be assigned a light cavalry role was made some time ago. It has been apparent more recently (and significantly) that they would be employed in a mounted role.
Units have had light cavalry patrol vehicles (G-wagon surveillance and reconnaissance vehicles) for some time and more recently are receiving protected mobility vehicles-light (Hawkeis*). Light cavalry troops will comprise four vehicles, each with a four-person crew. The mix of vehicles may differ from troop to troop, depending on weapons configuration and other fit-outs. It seems unlikely that the Bushmaster PMV will be employed in the main light cavalry role.
Encouragingly, the concept of the RAAC ARES supporting and augmenting ARA RAAC units also seems to have some traction.
Soon: What is the role of a light cavalry regiment and how does this differ from that of a cavalry regiment?
*The vehicle is named after a highly venomous snake, the Barkly Death Adder – Acanthophis Hawkei – which is found in the Barkly Tablelands on the Northern Territory-Queensland border.
——————————————————————————————————-
8 December 2023
What’s Light Cavalry’s Role?
It’s to be expected that RAAC light cavalry regiments will have a similar role to that of the British Light Dragoons*, ie “The primary role is Formation Reconnaissance; a varied job that primarily involves operating ahead of the main fighting force, often in enemy or unknown territory in order to find key information on the local area and any enemy within it. With this information the Light Dragoons are expected to inform the main fighting force behind them, strike opportune targets or interact with the local population to build relations, gather more intelligence and aid local planning and development.”
At last, a real operational role for the ARES! It could also involve operating to the flanks of the main force, as well as ahead of it. Other tasks could well be: rear area security; vital point protection, and convoy escort. Deployed drones would provide of the major sources of intelligence. The only difference between cavalry and light cavalry units would be the level of protection, firepower and possibly cross-country performance
Some relevant info re light cav regiments: firepower includes remote weapon station 12.7mm on some vehicles and 40mm auto grenade launcher on others; four-man crew made up of crew commander, driver, gunner and mission system operator; and digital vehicle displays features instantaneous updates. (RWS provides a much greater measure of protection compared to the Light Dragoons Jackal 2 pictured above.)
29 December 2023 (Sorry for the break … a family emergency; all good now.)
The Story of Tanks in the Australian Army …
“The gunner, Trooper Michael Bidey, was thrown out of his seat by the explosion. The reason was soon apparent. The mine had gone off directly under the middle of the tank, rather than, as usual, under one of the tracks. The blast bowed the bottom of the hull upwards by about18cm, with devastating effects inside the vehicle.”
September 1968, six months after Centurion tanks had commenced operations in Vietnam. Bruce Cameron, ‘Canister! On! FIRE! : Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’
“The enemy bomb makers were adapting. Two anti-tank mines had been offset from the trigger device so that instead of exploding under the engine and wheel, the main force punched up through the centre of the vehicle. And there, manning a 50-calibre machine gun, stood signaller Sean McCarthy.”
July 2008, two years after Bushmasters started to be used by the Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan. Chris Masters, ‘No Front Line; Australia’s Special Forces at War in Afghanistan’, 2023.
The above extracts are hardly surprising. What was a surprise reading Master’s account, was how often vehicles used by Special Operations forces detonated IEDs, and particularly the extraordinary number of casualties that were caused. Surely operational experience over the thirteen-year period, would have seen the ADF adopt a different force structure and new tactics. Surely the ADF would not have kept doing the same thing over and over (despite the casualties). Or would it? [According to Masters, 31 Australian Bushmasters were damaged beyond repair in Afghanistan.]
Australian field commanders in New Guinea in 1944 called for tanks to provide direct fire support. Opposition by US commanders was overruled. Australian field commanders in Vietnam called for tanks to provide direct fire support. Opposition by US commanders was overruled. Canadian field commanders in Afghanistan called for tanks to provide direct fire support. They were supported by the Canadian Government.
“Embattled Canadian soldiers erupted in cheers on Dec. 2, 2006, when the squadron of Canadian Leopard tanks emerged from the early-morning mist and rain to provide welcome support to war-weary ground troops as they battled Taliban insurgents…”. [A similar response to that of Australian infantry when Centurion tanks arrived at FSBs Coral and Balmoral.] Additional armour was added to the Canadian tanks and their suspensions upgraded. They made a tremendous contribution to counter-insurgency operations and were in high demand throughout the Canadian AO; remaining until 2011.
“Equipped with a fire control system that allows our soldiers to acquire and engage targets with precision and discrimination, by day and by night, the Leopard tank has in many instances reduced the requirement for aerial bombardment and indirect fire, which have proven to be blunt instruments.”
“Leopard tank crews have used extensively the 105 mm High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round to eliminate insurgents attempting to attack dismounted soldiers. More importantly, tank rollers and ploughs have continued to mitigate risk to coalition soldiers by clearing routes of pressure-plate detonated IEDs, while providing intimate support and a breaching capability to dismounted infantry companies.”
The tanks employed by the Danish Army in Afghanistan (2007-2014) were equally successful. Unsurprisingly, their tanks provided mobility and firepower for the withdrawal. The Americans deployed a company of Abrams tanks to Afghanistan in 2010.
INDEX
1 Armoured Regiment Association
1 Jan 21: ‘Looking After Each Other II’
2 Jan 21: ‘Code of Conduct Versus Whistle-Blower Policy’
8 Jan 21: ‘1AR Assn Honour Roll (1 of 2)’
9 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (2 of 2)‘
10 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (Cont)’
3 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward’
5 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward: Part 2.’
13 Mar 21: ‘1 AR Assn : Anonymous Threat’
25 Mar 21: ‘ The Honorary Colonel/Patron Quandary ‘
26 Mar 21: ‘ The 1 AR Assn: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’
27 Mar 21: ‘ Operation Overlord/Battle of Long Khanh: 1AR Assn ‘
23 Jul 21: ‘Caring for Those Less Fortunate’
30 Jul 21: ‘For the Good of the RAAC?’
3 Dec 21: ‘1 AR Assn Awards’
21 Jan 21: ‘Continuing Problems With Culture.’
1 Apr 22: ‘Getting our History Right’
18 Nov 22: ‘1 Armd Regt Assn: Honour Roll’
3 Feb 23: ‘Welfare of Members: How Things Change’; ‘Spitting Chips’
17 Feb 23: ‘1 Armd Regt Assn: Constitution’
3 Mar 23: ‘Precious is, as Precious Does.’
2 Jun 23: ‘… as Seen by the 1AR Assn’
18 Aug 23: ‘A Step Backwards in Recognising Gallantry’
‘Armouredadvocates’
31 Mar 21: ‘Index’
27 Oct 23: ‘Access to DVA Grants’
Autobiography
3 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir)’
4 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir) II’
Australian Defence Force (ADF)
21 Jan 20: ‘One of the Greatest Challenges for the ADF’
17 Jan 21: ‘The Blog’
9 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 1) ‘
10 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 2) ‘
11 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 3) ‘
12 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 4)’
29 Apr 21: ‘ Army Recruitment in Times Past ‘
30 Apr 21: ‘ Getting History Right ‘
2 May 21: ‘ Getting History Right: Part 2 “
27 Aug 21: Weekly Musings Eight: How toShow Respect
25 Aug 23: ‘To What Extent is Commemoration Egalitarian?’
22 Sep 23: ‘Recognition of Those Who Die as a Result of Their Military Service, but Whose Death is Outside the Period of the War Prescribed by the AWM’
Defence Strategy
7 Jan 21: ‘The Fundamental Problem as Far as the Australian People Are Concerned’
14 Jan 21: ‘The Fundamental Problem as Far as the Australian People Are Concerned (Part II)’
18 Jan 21: ‘Rubbish Articles That Influence Public Opinion’
15 Feb 21: ‘Defence Preparedness’
16 Feb 21: ‘Defence Preparedness 2’
17 Feb 21: Defence Preparedness 3′
18 Mar 21: ‘The Echidna Strategy’
3 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality?
14 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality? Part 2
15 May 21: ‘Armed Neutrality: Part 3’
16 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality: Part 4 ‘
19 May 21: ‘ Armed Neutrality: A Myth’
20 May 21: ‘Armed Neutrality or Mutual Defence Agreements? ‘
26 May 21: ‘ The Army in a War With China ‘
6 Aug 21: ‘AFVs and Australia’s Defence Strategy ‘
“An AFV in combat is not some product of engineering, it is the beating heart of its crew.” Bruce Cameron, 14 April 2021
“Never be afraid to raise your voice for honesty and truth and compassion against injustice, lying and greed. If people all over the world…would do this, it would change the Earth.” William Faulkner, 1949 Nobel Prize in Literature.
If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together. ” (African saying)
————————————————————————–
A Story in Seven Parts. (This provides an introduction and background to the Blog, which follows below on a daily basis since February 2015, and a weekly basis since July 2021. Scroll down to the most recent date.)
Once upon a time there was a 1AR Assn Members’ Forum. This was a page on the Assn’s website and members used it to keep in touch and discuss matters relevant to the Assn. Suddenly the Forum was closed. It was explained that it was costing members too much to keep operating. When it was discovered that this was not the case (ie. there was no cost to the Assn), the Forum was reopened.
The topic which was being discussed on the Forum when it was closed was a request for information about the history of the Centurion held by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. This led to a discovery that all the log books for the Centurions at Puckapunyal had mysteriously disappeared from the Tank Museum.
After the Forum was reopened, discussion on the topic continued. Suddenly the Forum was closed again. A number of reasons were given for the closure, all of which turned out to be untrue. One of them was that a post or posts on the Forum had brought the Assn into discredit. No-one was prepared to say what the post was or who had posted it. Misconduct by members was publicly announced as the reason for the closure.
One member lodged a grievance as provided for under the Constitution. He felt that members should be informed as to what their misconduct was (supposedly) and the opportunity to defend themselves, provided. He also started a blog to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters.
While the grievance process was underway, members were informed that the Assn’s Constitution had to be changed. This was duly done, disciplinary provisions being extensively strengthened. The member who had submitted the grievance was now found to be guilty of misconduct under the new Constitution. He was expelled from the Assn and his grievance went unheard.
Part 2
Service in the military, no matter what capacity, inculcates a commitment to doing ‘the right thing’. This became obvious when a group of members banded together to lodge a grievance to protest at the lack of natural justice provided to the member who had been expelled. While preparing this they noticed that actions taken against the member were not in accord with the Assn’s Constitution.
Delving into this more deeply, they discovered that the process required to change the Constitution had not been followed. Furthermore, the reasons given to members for having to change it were not correct. The group sought advice from Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), the authority for associations incorporated in that State. The outcome was that the Constitution was declared to be invalid, as were actions taken on the basis of its provisions.
The group of members who had brought about this outcome, asked for an apology from those who had misled members as to the reasons for changing the Constitution. This was not forthcoming. Not long after, the President and other committee members resigned. The new President and Committee spent $960 of members’ funds to get an independent legal opinion re the Constitution.
The findings confirmed the view of CAV that the Constitution was invalid. Furthermore, any member adversely affected by it was entitled to take action against the Association. The member who had been expelled was reinstated, together with his Life Membership. He agreed not to seek an apology, so as to avoid causing any divisiveness in the association.
The new C’tee examined the original Constitution and found valid reasons for changing it, eg. the CAV’s default ‘Model Rules’ are ok for a State based association, but have limitations as far as a national organization is concerned. A proposed draft was sent to members. The group which had taken action against the now invalid constitution saw that the required process was still not being adopted (by oversight).
Bringing this to the attention of the C’tee stirred up something of a hornets’ nest among some members of the Assn. Social media went into a frenzy, accusing ‘constitutionalists’ of forcing younger members to leave the association because they had become fed up with “rules and BS” which mean nothing to them.
This is a recognized situation within many ex-service organizations. At least one PhD thesis is being compiled on the subject of maintaining the interest of younger members. The C’tee have been put in touch with the author. As one member of the ‘constitutionalists’ has stated, however, the Constitution is the members’ contract with their association. It must be got right, both for the members’ and Association’s sake. There is no other option. Those donating their time and energy to help the C’tee ensure the Constitution is a valid one, should be thanked, not persecuted, by the wider membership.
Part 3
The C’tee decided to withdraw what would’ve been an illegal constitution if the draft had been approved by members. A new draft constitution was prepared by the members group (who invested immense time and energy in the matter), incorporating the changes desired by the C’tee, but based on the CAV Model Rules. (It seems that the earlier draft may have been based on the NSW Department of Fair Trading Rules, which are different to those required of an association incorporated in Victoria).
The Assn AGM was held on 8 July 2017. It augured well for the Assn that there are a number of members who are prepared to stand for the vacant C’tee positions. There was hope that a valid and well thought through Constitution would soon be able to be presented to members for approval.
Part 4
A powerful ‘clique’ gathered at the AGM, intent on installing ‘their men’ in a number of C’tee positions. They addressed the AGM, venting their spleens … the person who had been expelled and reinstated, was described as a bully and a coward, “a bad apple who needs to be cut out”. The clique’s candidate for President referred to the need to clear out “disruptive” elements in his pre-election speech. Once a new Constitution was finalised, the findings of the original disciplinary hearing would simply be enforced again. The ‘clique’ didn’t attend the 1AR Birthday Dinner on the evening of the AGM … they gathered instead at a local hotel. The retiring Vice President expressed his disgust at this on social media
It has subsequently been discovered that considerable irregularities occurred in the conduct of the AGM: in particular, there were enormous discrepancies with proxy voting; the numbers of votes stated in the AGM Minutes were 30% more than figures given at the meeting to those attending; membership records were inaccurate and wrongly disallowed at least one member from voting; a person addressed the meeting, described as a “financial Affiliate Member”, but there is no provision for affiliate members in the Constitution; another ‘member’ addressed the meeting, but there is no mention of him in the list of those attending; and the financial statement was not only not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, but also it failed to encompass the whole FY and did not disclose reasons for the expenditure of funds.
All irregularities with respect to the Constitution were brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response was received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past 12 months.)
It is to be hoped that governance provisions as required by law can be enacted so that the Assn will be able to move ahead with its good work looking after former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt.
Part 5
Much of the new (2017) C’tee’s time was taken up with governance matters which had been long in the making. A firm of accountants were appointed to set up an accounting system to better enable the Assn to manage its financial transactions. Interestingly, as a part of this, advice was given to the C’tee that my donations of royalties from my book, made for the purpose of “assisting the Association’s endeavours” (stated publicly in the Author’s Note), had “created a constructive obligation in respect to the donated funds”.
Supposedly this meant that the funds could only be used as I stipulated. Of course, nothing was further from the truth … which was proven by the fact that I had no knowledge of the use of the funds to purchase either a TV set for D Squadron in South Australia, nor building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club. A firm of lawyers was employed to tell me not to make any further donations. I asked what I had to do to make an acceptable donation, but received no response.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM stated that “… any future donations would be accepted without conditions”. The present C’tee was asked to consider the question: “Could the C’tee please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement? No response has been received.
Despite all the above, the financial status of the Assn has been moved onto a sound basis with stringent controls. This is a major step forward. The fact that the Defence Fraud and Investigation Unit conducted an investigation might have been an additional spur to this end. The investigation related to $25,000 in donations being made to 1 Armd Regt from Rheinmetall. These payments were ‘masked’ by being transferred through the 1 AR Assn accounts. This ‘routing’ is possibly explained by the fact that such ‘donations’ were in complete breach of Defence regulations; Rheinmetall being a contender for a major Defence contract at the time. The 1AR Assn C’tee responded by saying that the Assn was bound by Victorian Law, not Defence regulations. [After submissions by members, the matter was investigated by the Defence Force Ombudsman and procedures within Defence amended as a result.]
The other step required was that of putting in place a valid and relevant Constitution. The hard work of a group of dedicated members, especially Ron Baikie and Geoff Stelmach, paid dividends. The draft Constitution prepared by them, with some amendments, was approved by members at the 2018 AGM.
One of the amendments inserted by the then C’tee was that which stated that just because you served in 1 Armd Regt, this no longer made you eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. Previously you were automatically eligible and would only cease to be a member if you were to be in breach of disciplinary provisions. Overnight, the C’tee has given itself the power of veto on their own terms. Now, if you apply to join (or renew your membership) and the C’tee does not consider you ‘suitable’, then your application is not approved. There is no definition as what “suitable” means in the eyes of the C’tee.
Part 6.
The story continues … The final Constitution approved by the then C’tee differed from that which the group of members had drafted. One point of difference was that a clause was inserted which gave the C’tee the right to refuse someone’s application for membership, without telling them why and without giving them any right of appeal. These are the sort of powers that back the governance of a totalitarian regime. A number of members raised objections to this, but their protests were ignored.
The C’tee with whom the group of members had been working to draft the new Constitution had included a provision in the Constitution for ‘existing’ Life Memberships to be continued. The draft sent to members made this very clear. (Background here is that when Life Memberships were originally awarded, there was no provision in the Constitution for this to be done. The revised Constitution included such provision.)
Although I was a Life Member, I received a request to pay membership fees. I did so, thinking that it would be somewhat arrogant of me to say that as a Life Member, I’m not required to do so. Next, I’m advised that as I was deemed to have criticised the C’tee (with my suggestions re continual improvement of due process), I was therefore deemed not to support the Purposes of the Assn as set out in the Constitution.
As a result, my membership would not be renewed. (The basis for and against the supposed criticisms are detailed in Blog posts for March 2019.) Furthermore, I was advised that I would not be entitled to appeal this decision (which, for a disciplinary offence by a member whose m’ship was current, would be granted and heard by a General Meeting of members.)
I said “but I’m a Life Member, I was only applying for membership renewal on a voluntary basis”. Surprisingly, I was told that all Life Memberships had been scrapped, (ie. the provision continuing Life Memberships mentioned above, was deleted from the Constitution by the C’tee, before a vote was taken for approval). I asked why the decision to continue Life Memberships was overturned and why weren’t members informed of this? I have not received a response to either question.
Nevertheless, as the Constitution provides for a Life Member to do, I’ve appealed the decision to revoke my membership. What will the next chapter bring, I wonder?
In a letter dated 2 August 2019, the President 1AR Assn advised me that the reason that the C’tee did not notice that the provision for existing Life Memberships to be continued had been removed from the draft of the Constitution considered at the AGM, was an “oversight” which the Association “failed to detect”. As a result, resolutions for the continuance of each former life member’s membership are to be considered at the AGM on 12 October 2019. Each resolution must be approved by three quarters of the members voting, whether in person or by proxy. I was not allowed to vote.
My Life Membership was not renewed. I asked to see both the proposal that was put to members with respect to me and the Minutes of the AGM … neither was allowed.
Part 7: The Ideal World
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have to draw attention to.
This would mean:
The memorial plaques provided by DVA for those who DOW would include reference to Mentioned in Dispatches (MiD) when this award had been received.
There would be two tank squadrons in the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade (to facilitate the formation of an adequate number of battlegroups).
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool.
No-one on RAAC or related personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to Defence’s ‘official’ position.
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense.
All information panels re RAAC exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery at the AWM and audio-visual narratives would be correct
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the First Australians who lost their lives defending their families, land and possessions, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
A system of Operational Analysis (OA) would be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience, which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise ”to assist the Association’s endeavours” (and not be rejected because a perceived obligation would be created).
1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by 1 AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
ADF and DVA medical procedures would take account of the unique stress factors associated with operating AFVs in combat (and in training) when assessing the mental health of serving and former RAAC personnel.
RAAC personnel would be able to wear an AFV crewman’s badge following initial qualification as an AFV crewman and until no longer qualified.
ADF personnel would be able to wear dress embellishments which indicated the number of times they had been WIA and deployed on active service in a particular conflict.
The Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) to to be introduced under LAND 400 Phase 3 would be operated by the RAAC.
Oral history interviews would be conducted with those who have crewed the different AFVs used by the Australian Army, so that their experience might be recorded before they all pass away (and only the AFVs are left).
The submission made by the RAAC Corporation (when asked by Defence if they supported my submission to Minister for the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard) would be made available to those who may seek to view it (given that the Corporation state that no prior submissions were looked at by them).
The reason that an application for membership of the 1AR Assn is denied by the C’tee must be made known to the applicant and members; the applicant must have the right of appeal.
Pending …
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
The RAAC tank fleet would be right sized’ from 59 to the 90+ that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons. (It has been reported that project LAND 907 Phase 2 incorporates an additional 29 Abrams, to bring the tank fleet to 88; with what seems to be a ‘trade-off’ in terms of two tanks for increased simulators, including one for troop tactical training.)
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool. (See above.)
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege. (The 1AR Assn C’tee is making available an ‘extract’ of the Minutes that is thought to be relevant to members.)
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour. (The need for appropriate training has been acknowledged, however, it is yet to be formalised via the SOA.)
The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)
The identity of the person who holds the logbooks for the Centurions at Puckapunyal would be known, as would the reason for the logbooks not being in Tank Museum where they belong. (It is now known that Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM, has or has had access to, at least one of the missing logbooks. Footnote 55, p121, Vol1 , ‘Canister1 On! FIRE!’ refers. (Mr Cecil initially issued a denial, however, subsequently admitted that he once transcribed info from the logbook. He hasn’t volunteered where the logbook was at the time.)
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’. (Acceptance of this is becoming much more widespread, however, it is still far from universal.)
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned. (Minutes of C’tee meetings are now made available to members, however, not all decisions are open and transparent.)
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which provided effective rapid and hard hitting firepower. (A carbine is now available for a tank crewman/commander to use should he have reason to leave the tank and are also provided for ASLAV crew members.)
RAAC related technology exhibits at the AWM would not focus entirely on the technical aspects of the vehicles/equipment, but also would incorporate the human dimension, ie. the roles of (and stress associated with) the crew operating AFVs in combat. (The Director of the AWM, Dr Nelson, advises that he has adopted this policy, ie. he “continually reminds AWM staff that it is the experiences of those operating the equipment, rather than the machines themselves, which are of most importance”.
Crossed off the List:
The RAAC Corporation has amended its website to correctly describe the vehicles operated by the RAAC.
The AWM has resolved the conflict between its different website references to the number of crew that operated its Japanese Ha Go tank.
The Ombudsman has undertaken a review of the perceived conflict of interest created when Rheinmetall ‘routed’ $25,000 through the 1AR Assn accounts to avoid scrutiny, at the same time as tendering for a $5b Defence contract. Procedures within Defence have been amended as a result
The 1AR Assn have had a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
Serving members of B Sqn 3/4 Cav are eligible to wear the UCG insignia for Coral-Balmoral.
Those former 1AR members who desire to do so, can use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
The 1AR Assn now has a valid Constitution approved by members
The 1AR Assn Constitution is now available to be viewed by members on the Assn’s website.
The history of 1 Armd Regt has been updated on the 1AR website to reflect its present role (what a pity the RAAC Corporation has not followed suit).
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provides suitable housing and schooling for families (as well as good access to training areas). There is to be no move to Central Queensland (… for now?)
Minutes of the last 1AR AGM were published without any defamatory material.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings are now being made available to members.
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral are now entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry (with Federation Star)..
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
The C-B Battlehonour has been emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard have been corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modeled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
The LAND 400 Phase 2 timetable is on track, despite the anticipated delays associated with a change in the Minister for Defence. (This means that the capability gap that would have resulted from a delay in the replacement of the ASLAV, has been avoided.)
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal advocated by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
DVA withdrew the lapel pin comprised of crossed Australian and Socialist Republic of Vietnam flags which the RAAC Corporation advocated be worn at the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
The Minister for Defence considered an account in a book by a Vietnam veteran, with a ‘glowing’ Foreword by a serving senior officer … if true, the incident amounted to premeditated murder. The investigation found that it was ’embellishment’ by the author. The Minister advised that Army training standards had been reviewed to ensure that such actions would be recognised for what they are and not be seemingly ‘condoned’ in the future.
Attention is now given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
The National Archives/AWM have acknowledged that a mistake made, for example in an After Action Report, CAN be brought to the attention of those who refer to the original documents in order to better understand what happened.
An RAAC veteran has received just and compassionate treatment from the Federal Court, overruling the Immigration Minister. (What a pity justice and compassion were not to be found more widely from within RAAC ESO ranks.)
DVA has advised aged care providers of the assistance that they can provide for the conduct of ANZAC Day Services for those who are mobility impaired.
————————————————–
The blog continues below, the story remains unfinished. ‘Doing the Right Thing VII’ lists daily Blog posts from 1 January 2021. Earlier day by day posts follow after that (through to February 2015).
IMPORTANT.
Should anyone see something which is incorrect in any Blog post, please inform me so that I can immediately correct the information and apologise to anyone inadvertently affected. (See example Corrections at the Blog posts for 3 June 2019 and 26 January 2019.)
NB 1. Advertisements. I’m sorry … I had no idea about the advertisements that have been incorporated into my posts (that some readers have experienced). I guess this is all about the number of readers … when the number increases, so there is commercial value in incorporating ads. Paradoxically, it seems this has also made it more difficult to access the Blog. (I wouldn’t dare think that a hacker had been tasked to ‘close me down’.)
Thank goodness! Just place armouredadvocates.wordpress.com in the top search bar of Google and it should all be ok. (Fingers crossed.) I should mention that I have no association whatsoever with the products advertised, indeed I can’t see the ads myself.
NB 2. Index. A lot of readers have said how good it would be to have an index of blog posts on a subject by subject basis. This was suggested to me right at the start of the Blog, but I foolishly thought that the Blog would have a very limited life and it wouldn’t be worth it. I’ve realised for some time, how useful it would be … and will do something accordingly. (Latest): The Index is being compiled daily. That from 16 March 2020 to 31 December 2020 can be found at the end of Doing the Right Thing VI. That from 1 January 2021 follows the last post of Doing the Right Thing VII.
NB 3. Email Contact. Should anyone wish to provide feedback by email, the address is cameronshome@bigpond.com
———————————————————————————————————-
13 January 2023
Overdue recognition for the Inventor of the Tank
Happy New year to all!
The article below appeared in the Blog last year. It was suggested to me that I should submit it to ‘Sabretache’, the journal of the Military History Society of Australia. Having finally gotten around to it, and, given that it’s a great story, I thought it deserved another run here. Sorry about the images. Because there are so many, I can’t show them in the text. The ‘gallery’ above is the best I can do.
———————————————————————————————-
Following the First World War, a Royal Commission on Inventions was set up in Britain to acknowledge and reward those who contributed to the development of the mobile protected weapons system which became known as the Tank. Paradoxically, although Britain was the first nation to field a tank in combat, the title ‘Inventor of the Tank’ belongs to an Australian.
Inventions don’t just happen. The starting point is usually the need for something to solve a problem, followed by ideas as to how this can be done. Finally, with more thought, a concept results. Work on this identifies the main issues involved and leads to the development of a prototype.
The Need. As the 19th Century came to an end, the conduct of warfare was being revolutionised by the invention of the machine gun. Trenches dictated tactics and the day of cavalry reigning supreme on the battlefield was almost over. The idea of an armoured vehicle which could break the foreseeable stalemate, was advanced by a number of people
In 1887, the French artist and illustrator, Albert Robida, published ‘War in the Twentieth Century’. Appreciating the need for some form of mechanised weapon system, one of his drawings featured moving fortresses[1]. Six years later, H G Wells published a story featuring ‘Land Ironclads’. Like their naval counterparts, these machines were protected by armour plate. The enemy were engaged in their trenches by riflemen who could fire from inside; mobility being provided by petrol engines which operated eight pairs of ‘pedrail’ wheels. This was the critical element: armour was heavy and to be successful, the weight of the ironclad had to be spread over a wide area. Each pedrail wheel comprised fourteen spring loaded pads which could adapt themselves to the contours on the ground. This was not Wells’ idea, but a recent invention he adopted to compensate for the weight of the vehicle[2].
Up until this time, all attempts to develop a mobile weapon system had been based on a wheeled chassis. One example was the Motor War Car produced by Frederick Simms in 1902[3]. This was the forerunner of the armoured car, something quickly adopted by many armies (first used in action by Italy in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911).
Unfortunately, military planners did not predict a future battlefield which involved attacking an entrenched enemy whilst being vulnerable to their fire and/or stopped by the ground conditions. The concept of a heavily armoured machine which could navigate the battlefield without becoming bogged, was something best left to the domain of science fiction. Armoured cars would certainly be able to meet any need for mobile weapons systems in the future (or so the thinking went).
The Development of the Tracked Vehicles. The name tractor did not come from a machine using tracks, but rather a machine driven by a steam powered traction engine. The usefulness of these engines in supplementing human labour was quickly realised. With the development of an internal combustion engine came the real break-through; horses could now be replaced. As the 20th Century approached and steam gave way to petrol, the mechanisation of agriculture was almost, but not quite, complete. Difficulty in negotiating ploughed land and soft ground meant that tractors were often limited in terms of where they could go. This shortcoming was finally solved with the adoption of the ‘continuous track’.
Although various prototypes had been developed during the 19th Century, it was not until 1905 that real success was achieved. A version of the Hornsby Chain Track Tractor was trialled for use by the British artillery in 1907, but not adopted[4]. This was not the first time that the value of the military application of an invention failed to be appreciated; nor would it be the last.
In 1911 an Australian, Lancelot Eldin de Mole[5], was involved with construction projects in WA. Frustrated with vehicles becoming bogged on sites, he set out to find a solution. As work progressed, he realised that his ‘chain-rail’ design had application on the battlefield: it could carry heavy loads, cross rough terrain and trenches, and was easily steered. De Mole submitted sketches to the British War Office, but they were returned in June 1913; reason … there was no perceived military need! [A working model constructed later is shown opposite.]
The Landships Committee. The First Battle of Marne was an all-out effort by the armies of Britain and France to halt the German advance on Paris. Fought during 5-12 September 1914, it was a major victory for the Allies with the Germans being forced to fall back and defend long lines of trenches. Huge losses resulted on both sides as the fighting stagnated into trench warfare, dominated by artillery and machine guns.
The need for an armoured weapon system able to close with and break through the enemy trenches was now not only necessary, but extremely urgent. While heresy in terms of conventional military thinking, this was the strongly held view of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill[6]. On his direction, a Landships Committee was formed in February 1915 to develop an armoured fighting vehicle for use on the Western Front.
Initially, the existence of the Committee was concealed from the War Office which was thought likely to have scrapped it. Come July 1915, however, things were different. The situation on the Western Front could no longer be ignored and when the Committee’s work became known, the project was taken over by the Army. It must have been a busy time. Having followed up by providing detailed drawings of his invention, de Mole was informed that all inventions had to be accompanied by a working model.
In December 1915, the importance of the project saw an emphasis being placed on secrecy. The story goes that, rather than landships, it was proposed to refer to the development of water carriers to supply troops on the front line. To avoid the initials ‘WC’, the word Tank was decided upon, with the committee becoming the Tank Supply Committee.
The Prototypes. In August 1915, ‘Little Willie’[7], a first prototype was produced (the name being a satirical reference to Crown Prince Wilhelm of Germany). Unfortunately, its manoeuvrability was not good; in particular its ability to meet the criteria of crossing a 2.4m (eight foot) trench. William Tritton and George Wilson, both engineers, were heavily involved. The second prototype was much more promising: a rhomboidal shape, the tracks going up and over the top of the hull. Known initially as His Majesty’s Land Ship (HMLS) Centipede and later Mother, it was in this form that tanks first saw action on 15 September 1916 at the Battle of Flers-Courelette[8].
When Lancelot de Mole saw photos of the Mark 1 tank, he knew that his design was superior. Having previously been rejected because of ill health, de Mole was passed as fit for the Army and embarked for England in September 1917, taking a working model with him (made with borrowed money). On arrival, he argued his case and a demonstration was recommended and approved. Before this could be arranged, however, he was sent to France as part of a contingent of reinforcements.
The Royal Commission on Inventions. ‘The Royal Commission found that the Tank built for war, by Britain, was in no part designed by Corporal de Mole, therefore he could not be awarded any compensation. They did however agree that his design was superior to that used.
The rewards for the Tank had been awarded to the individuals who had designed the model that Britain had manufactured and used in the war. One of whom was a Major Wilson who received £7,500 and was the same person who had rejected Corporal de Mole’s plan in 1912. The Royal Commission went on to state, that they [the Tank Supply Committee] had designed an inferior vehicle, unaware that a better design was within their keeping.’[9]
De Mole sought compensation for expenses incurred in the manufacture of his working model and was awarded £985[10]. In 1920, he was made a Commander of the British Empire (C.B.E.). [
Conclusion. Is it possible to credit a particular individual with being the inventor of the tank? It would have to be someone who both foresaw its role on the battlefield and had the inventive genius to provide a design solution (whether or not the need was accepted at the time). Without doubt, this honour belongs to Mr Lancelot de Mole, CBE.[11]
Finally … when war came in 1914, failure to anticipate the fundamental change in the nature of its conduct, most certainly resulted in a prolonged conflict costing millions of lives. Could such a lapse in forethought and planning happen today?
[10] Winston Churchill declined to accept any reward for his part in the development of the tank; it was all part of his service to the nation.
[11] After a long illness he died in N.S.W. on the 6th of May 1950.
———————————————————————————————————————————————–
23 December 2022
Charting Our Own Course (?)
Recent blog posts have looked at the importance of Army’s manoeuvre warfare capability and the effect that reducing IFV numbers would have on it. Of course, the elephant in the room is the importance of Army’s role in the defence of Australia and its interests. Is there a valid need for a sustained manoeuvre warfare capability in terms of the threat scenario?
Threats not involving conventional ground force responses include: terrorism and cyber-attacks; protection of communication links such as shipping and air routes; and safeguarding off-shore resources such fishing grounds and gas fields.
Possible scenarios involving ground force deployments include:
defence of continental Australia;
defence of off-shore Australian possessions, eg Christmas Island;
defence assistance to regional neighbours eg stabilisation operations; and
defence assistance under treaty agreements, eg. ANZUS, ASEAN.
It is well recognised that Australia is linked geographically and economically to Southeast-Asia and must be self-reliant in terms of its defence capability. While acknowledging the risks associated with escalating USA/China tensions, the most pressing role for the Army is undoubtedly that of providing military aid to regional neighbours. The growing effects of climate change increase this likelihood.
A convincing argument can be made that an effective manoeuvre warfare capability is essential for the Australian Army; one which is able to be sustained and simultaneously deployed to at least two areas of operation.
Happy Christmas to all. Next post Friday, 13th January, 2023.
—————————————————————————————————————————————
16 December 2022
Mobile Warfare or Manoeuvre Warfare? Does it Matter?
In the beginning we had attrition warfare and positional warfare. Warfare predicated on attrition, involves the sustained wearing down of an enemy through casualties and losses of resources until collapse becomes inevitable. Positional warfare comes about when the defences of both sides are unable to be breached and fronts become static (quite possibly leading to a campaign of attrition).
Mobile warfare is the rapid movement of forces to achieve tactical advantage such as concentration or surprise, which will result in a favourable decision.
Manoeuvre warfare also involves the rapid movement of forces, but the intention is different, ie. to create circumstances beyond the enemy’s ability to cope, achieving advantage through confusion and an inability to respond. This is similar to the German blitzkrieg of the Second World War, ie. “calculated to create psychological shock and resultant disorganization in enemy forces through the employment of surprise, speed, and superiority in matériel or firepower”.
I had long thought of the use of armour in terms of mobile warfare, but its characteristic ‘shock action’ is more akin to manoeuvre warfare. (Various arguments can be made for and against the definitions, however, I believe the fundamentals are encapsulated in the above.)
The US Marine Corps likens manoeuvre warfare to blitzkrieg: ie. “a state of mind bent on shattering the enemy morally and physically by paralysing and confounding him, by avoiding his strength, by quickly and aggressively exploiting his vulnerabilities, and by striking him in a way that will hurt him most.”
The posts of recent weeks have considered the consequences of reducing the number of IFVs to be procured in LAND 400 Ph 3. Maj Gen Shane Caughey, AM, CSC (Retd), formerdeputy chief of Joint Operations Command, was quoted: “… it’s worth noting that the core element of the army’s current combat fighting system, the M113 armoured personnel carrier, is based on a vehicle introduced into service in the mid-1960s. While the M113 has undergone through-life upgrades, its protection, mobility and firepower are essentially that of the initial platform”.
The IFV is the core element of Army’s combat fighting system. If the number of IFVs is reduced, the Army’s combat capability is reduced … ipso facto. Any decision to this must accept the lead times involved in acquiring vehicles, training crews and developing formation skills. It is an easy trap to fall into, that of failing to see the relationship between threat warning times and capability lead times. In times of geopolitical tension and uncertainty, the former is inevitably the shorter.
In order to ensure that IFV numbers are maintained, a clear outline of future ground force deployment scenarios must be articulated. Failure to do so will result in continuing uncertainty and have significant adverse consequences for our defence.
———————————————————————————————————–
9 December 2022
LAND 400 Phase 3 Decision: Impact on Manoeuvre Warfare Capability?
On 25 August 2022, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, AO, DSC, addressed the Indian Ocean Defence & Security Conference in Perth. The following points were among those he made:
In stark contrast to its enduring nature, the character of warfare is constantly changing and with ever increasing velocity.
Recently, the strategic shock reverberating from the latest episode of the war in Ukraine – a war that began in 2014 – has shown that deterrence can fail and that assumptions can be wrong. It has reinforced the enduring human nature of war and therefore the enduring requirement for joint land combat power in contemporary conflict.
As part of the ADF, your Army must be able to field and sustain relevant and credible land power options for our government.
To prevail in 21st century your Army must be better connected, protected, lethal and enabled.
… I’d like to come back and return to the only part of the ADF capable of fighting in the most lethal land environments. We call that the Combined Arms Fighting System.
Unfortunately, most commentary around land combat capabilities – especially armoured fighting vehicles – is not well informed. [A point ‘Armouredadvocates’ makes repeatedly.]
The fact is that just like a warship or combat aircraft, the land combat capability is a system.
To remove a component of the system is akin to letting a guided missile frigate sail without a Vertical Launching System, or a Joint Strike Fighter take to the skies without Electronic Warfare Self Protection.
The helmets, body armour and lightly protected vehicles with which we equip our soldiers today provides protection for their heads and their hearts from 7.62mm rounds. In relative terms, our soldiers are just as vulnerable today as their forebears on Gallipoli or the Western Front.
So we need to be very clear: We owe it to our soldiers and their families to ensure every component of the combined arms fighting system is fit for purpose, to enhance their survivability, their lethality and ultimately their probability of mission success.
The Combined Arms Fighting System that protects our soldiers today has at its core a 60-year-old Armoured Personnel Carrier.
We can and we must do better – and we have a plan to do so.
On current trajectory, in the middle of this decade (around 2025-26), we will have fielded a world class system that is relevant, credible and offers better protection for our soldiers to ensure mission success and the best chance of bringing them home.
He is referring to the 450 IFVs to be procured under LAND 400 Phase 3. It seems likely that the coming Defence Strategic Review will reduce this number to 300. What effect would such a reduction in vehicles have on Army’s ability to conduct sustained manoeuvre warfare?
To be continued next week.
————————————————————————————————————————
2 December 2022
The IFV Capability (LAND 400 Ph 3)
Continuing on from last week ….
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has very few competitors as far as the review of military fundamentals is concerned. As the recipient of government funding, it is beholden on it the Institute to take a balanced stance in terms of its publications. Its newsletter, ‘The Strategist’ (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/) has included a number of articles related to LAND 400 Ph 3.
Dr Albert Palazzo, a guest commentator whose book on the Vietnam War left a lot to be desired, does little more than state the obvious:
“While it is impossible to accurately predict the type of wars Australia will fight in the future, there is one common element that underpins all war; the next war will be about people and the land they live on. As military theorists know, war always comes down to the human level, which necessitates a nation’s possession of a robust and capable land force. If Australia wants to be secure, it will require an Army that’s fit for its national ambitions. How LAND 400 Phase 3 fits into that ambition is for the government to decide.”
Maj Gen Shane Caughey, AM, CSC (Retd), former deputy chief of Joint Operations Command, is a lot more direct:
“The relevance of the army’s combined-arms fighting system across the spectrum of conflict is clear, whether it be in support of our regional neighbours, through our contribution as a responsible member of the community of nations or in response to a major conflict in our region. While challenging, the deployment of land forces in our region is possible through the synchronisation and coordination of military effects across all domains.
With this understanding, it’s worth noting that the core element of the army’s current combat fighting system, the M113 armoured personnel carrier, is based on a vehicle introduced into service in the mid-1960s. While the M113 has undergone through-life upgrades, its protection, mobility and firepower are essentially that of the initial platform. As Chief of LTGEN Army Simon Stuart has said, ‘We can and we must do better.’
As a nation, we have a moral obligation to ensure that the men and women who will defend us are afforded modern, capable and survivable land combat capabilities.”
It is quite possible that the findings of the Defence Strategic Review have already been decided …IFVs or not? (ie. offensive combined arms capability or not?); if yes, 450 or 300?
Both tenderers have been instructed to provide costings for both numbers of vehicles. This must be taken as an indicator of intent. Is it a decision which is based on capability needs or is it a decision which results from cost pressures?
—————————————————————————————————————
25 November 2022
The 2022 Strategic Defence Review (LAND 400 Ph 3)
The press release stated:
“On Wednesday 3 August 2022, the Prime Minister, the Hon Anthony Albanese MP, and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Hon Richard Marles MP, announced an independently-led review that will consider Defence’s force posture and force structure.”
Force structure is relatively self-obvious, but what of force posture? In Sept 21, the then Opposition Leader (Albanese) stated that “Force posture refers to the future security and strategic environment, the importance of domestic and demographic issues and their impact on Defence facilities, and where the ADF is based. A Labor Defence Force Posture Review would ensure the Australian Government is considering both long-term strategic posture and whether Australian Defence units, assets, and facilities are prepared for the military to take action in a timely way.
It would seem that this is exactly what the 2016 Defence White Paper provided:
“The Defence White Paper sets out a comprehensive, responsible long-term plan for Australia’s defence. The Government is investing in defence to ensure that we have the armed forces we need to protect Australia and to secure our interests in the coming decades.
The plans in this Defence White Paper have been cost-assured and externally validated. Australia’s defence strategy and capability plans have been aligned with funding. These plans are affordable and achievable.
For the first time, all elements of the Government’s defence investment, including new weapons, platforms, systems, and the enabling equipment, facilities, workforce, information and communications technology, and science and technology are outlined in an Integrated Investment Program, published with the 2016 Defence White Paper.
Not so apparently. The terms of reference for the 2022 Strategic Review state: “An Australian Defence Force Posture Review was last undertaken in 2012”. Is this what is being done again?
Not quite; according to the TOR, the Strategic Review is primarily about the priority of investment:“The purpose of the Review is to consider the priority of investment in Defence capabilities…”. Having taken account of the future strategic challenges facing Australia, which may require an Australian Defence Force operational response:
The Review must identify and prioritise the estate, infrastructure, disposition, logistics and security investments required to provide Australia with the Defence force posture required by 2032-33.
The Review must consider all elements of the Integrated Investment Program and provide recommendations for the Program’s reprioritisation, particularly in light of recently announced large-scale projects, to provide Australia with the force structure required by 2032-33.
The Review must outline the investments required to support Defence preparedness, and mobilisation needs to 2032-33.
The Review must outline funding needs to 2032-33 to ensure longer-term strategic investments are progressed.
Rather than considering the importance of the need for a capability, for example, of providing armoured mobility for infantry, the focus is on priority of investment. Surely, it’s the capability priority which drives investment, rather than the other way around! It would seem almost inevitable that IFV numbers will be slashed to reduce expenditure.
In theory, the threat assessment leads to the capability requirement, which, in turn, leads to the force posture and force structure. Investment priorities become self-obvious. Budgetary limitations and trade-offs might result in force structure compromises, providing capability is maintained as much as possible. It will always be a matter of achieving the best defence capability a nation can afford. The driver, however, must always be the threat assessment; the budget must come second.
———————————————————————————————————-
18 November 2022
1 Armd Regt Assn: Honour Roll
The Assn’s Honour Roll was the subject of posts on 8-10 Jan 21. The 1AR Assn C’tee has decided to only list those names that are included on the AWM Roll of Honour. This means that anyone who died of wounds after 29 Apr 75 (the end of the prescribed period of the Vietnam War) is not listed. This is the case even if the death is officially accepted to be due to war service.
Noel Lowes served two full ours. The first with 1 APC Sqn/A Sqn 3 Cav Regt; and the second with A Sqn 1 Armd Regt. Unfortunately, his bravery at the Battle of Long Tan was not officially recognised. He was one of many who suffered psychologically as a result of his active service. He died as a consequence. Surely we have reached a maturity as a nation such that we accept that not all wounds are physical.
I had recommended that WO2 Noel Lowes should be included as having ‘died of wounds’: “Died of Wounds: WO2 N Lowes should be included. He did not die ‘post-Vietnam’, but within the prescribed period of the War. This is why he is listed on the ROH at the AWM”, but the C’tee decided to show him as “Died within the prescribed period WO2 Noel Lowes (6 July 1971)”.
“Died within the prescribed period”, what sort of casualty category is that? Apart from anything else, it is meaningless. To my mind, it’s a demeaning epitaph for a brave soldier; one who died of wounds.
———————————————————————————————————–
11 November 2022
How Defence and DVA Respond to Requests for Information
One of the recommendations of the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide was that the process by which information is sought from Defence and DVA should be examined with a view to improving it.
I took part in a two-hour workshop on Tuesday (8 Nov). I volunteered in order to relate my experiences in seeking information from both Departments (in the hope that some value may accrue from these accounts).
I prepared a submission, as I thought we’d be asked to draw on our experiences:
Firstly, I’d like to declare that I’m a beneficiary of DVA programs and I appreciate their efforts on my behalf. I’m reminded, however, of the person who contacted an organisation to report an error that he’d come across on their website. His action backfired. Although he was wanting to contribute to on-going improvement in the organisation, he was seen to be criticising it and was blacklisted accordingly. I hope my input today will be seen in terms of value adding, not criticism.
I would like to recount experiences that I’ve had in seeking information from both Defence and DVA.
DVA. Earlier this year, I was preparing a checklist to help my wife manage things when I die. I had become aware that DVA had made a number of changes to the processes to be followed by the spouse of a veteran on their death. Unfortunately, these changes weren’t identified as such on the Internet, meaning that an on-line query could well bring up out of date information. So I rang up and asked: ”How does the spouse of a veteran notify DVA of a death and what information does DVA require?”. It turned out that I wasn’t the only one confused; the person I spoke with kept me on the phone for an hour … checking whether or not DVA completed all necessary applications for a veteran’s widow/widower.
This is the last thing that a new widow/widower wants to experience immediately following their spouse’s demise. If I couldn’t make head or toe of things, how would a grieving NOK cope? Given that this is one of the most common reasons for contacting DVA, I suggested that they might like to produce a specific Checklist and advise callers accordingly. I believe this has been done.
The point of the story is that I believe that DVA may not be placing themselves in their customers’ position when they prepare and implement policy. I believe that it’s easy to lose touch with customers needs. I’m remined of a story told to me by a management consultant. He was hired to advise an industrial laundry, one which prided itself on the precision with which they starched their laundered uniforms. It turned out that the customers didn’t care a hoot about creases, what they valued most was the company’s ability to sow patches onto uniforms to distinguish different divisions. Once the laundry realised this, their whole operation was able to be transformed as a result of better understanding their customers..
Defence. I wrote a history of my Regiment’s service in Vietnam. While researching it I came across a publication which detailed the cold-blooded murder of a wounded enemy soldier. The action was allegedly sanctioned by a commander. The Foreword was written by a serving major general; he praised the book as being an excellent account of the Australian Army on operations. I knew that such conduct had to be investigated. The telephone directory gave me a number for a Defence Whistle Blower Hot Line. When I got onto them, they told me to contact the Federal Police. When I got onto the Police, they told me that it was a Defence matter. After various attempts at getting Defence interested, I contacted the Minister as a last resort.
The point of the story is to illustrate how difficult it is, even for someone who is well versed in the way Defence operates, to find a path through the labyrinth; to get someone to take responsibility to follow up a matter and be open and transparent in terms of the way in which it is handled.
I would like to see some means of allocating an identifier to matters, as happens with Ministerials, so that the status of the action taken, or being taken, is clearly evident and can be ascertained at any time. Many companies who deal with the public frequently, allocate reference numbers for this purpose.
[The matter was half-heartedly investigated. It was deemed that the incident had been sensationalised, though the book’s author, an eye witness, was not questioned. A record search was all that was conducted. I asked for the Minister’s assurance that training had been introduced to ensure that such things did not happen again. I was told that it had; but, as we know, the same conduct is alleged to have occurred in Afghanistan not many years later.]
The actual workshop was quite different to what I had expected:
It was an interesting (Skype) session, run by a private firm. Eight ex-service personnel were involved from around the country with three DVA personnel attending as observers. I had thought we would be relating our individual experiences, but the consultants wanted to get our feedback on their proposals resulting from the Royal Commission recommendations (numbers 9-14, I think). These were focused on the process for requesting personal information and the consent required for personal information to be released to a third party.
The idea of an identifier being allocated to each request for info was supported. It was appreciated that this would simplify matters for both the requester and DVA (ie. the full background story would not have to be gone through each time an update was sought). It was also accepted that Consent is a two-way street in which DVA clients were entitled to assurances that personal information would only be available to those who were authorised and cleared to access it. Points made included the need to provide an estimate of time needed to meet a request and justification for any redactions made (so that appeals could be lodged if necessary). It was also pointed out that there are two viewpoints that could be taken by DVA: (i) what information does the veteran need to know? (ii) what information do we want to make available? The former needs to be DVA’s default position, ie. putting themselves in the veteran’s/customer’s position, if the best outcome is to be achieved.
It was suggested that improved feedback would have been possible if the topics had been made known in advance. This was accepted.
—————————————————————————————————–
4 November 2022
Doing the Right Thing: A Thing of the Past?
Letter to the Canberra Times published on 22 Oct 22:
Is it only me, or is anyone else disturbed about the current wave of anti-social behaviour seemingly sweeping the country? I was astounded when my cousin in Alice Springs told me about the youth lawlessness there: things such as loaded passenger busses having windows broken with rocks; shops being ransacked in daylight; and parked cars being vandalised.
Then I heard about goods being looted from homes which had been devastated in the floods in Melbourne. This came after the Canberra Times reported on police being rammed by stolen cars; not to mention the daily stories about the offensive manner in which disabled people are treated.
Typing ‘anti-social behaviour 2022’ into a search-engine shows just how widespread the problem is. More than simply alcohol fuelled, it seems to be a form of deep-seated unrest.
Is it asking too much for a leader who can appeal to both the young and old and the disadvantaged and privileged, and unite all for the common good? Of course, with so many national issues demanding attention, prioritising them is a challenge in its own right.
Can we afford a charismatic role model for doing the right thing, when the sheer volume of fraud and corruption stories mean that they take prominence in the media. Could it be that the free-enterprise model is broken and we are in need of an alternative form of prosperity?
———————————————————————————————————-
28 October 2022
Recognition for ALL Those Who Have Defended Our Nation
The case for the AWM’s recognition of Aboriginal defenders fighting to safeguard their families, land and possessions has been made over many years. I received a letter from a well-known former soldier who is of the opposite opinion. My response is copied below (in two parts).
Dear …
You’ve given me a fair bit to respond to. Here’s my first offering ….
“I am often reminded of so many who on Active and General Service are accidentally killed. Where are their names to be seen? Perhaps there is a Pandora Box just begging to be opened unless common sense prevails.”
Those on Active Service (ie. on the posted strength of a unit on operations) who are accidently killed within the prescribed period of a War, are included on the AWM’s RoH. This includes those who take their own life, trip over a tent peg, and those who might die in a car accident while on R&R. (I have been pressing for some time for recognition of those who die, outside the prescribed period, of wounds received while on Active Service.)
There is currently no move to have those killed when not on Active Service to be included on the RoH, nor do I believe there ever will. But what if such an idea was raised? The AWM operates according to a Charter which sets the parameters for what it is required to commemorate. An Act of Parliament is involved, with the responsible Minister being that for Veterans’ Affairs. Given we live in a democracy, it is open to anyone to put a proposal to the Minister; as a consequence of which, the Minister may initiate an amendment to the Act. The manner in which those opposed express their disagreement, is a sign of the maturity of a nation.
Note. The current classification of casualties on Active Service reflects a transparency which has not always been present in the past. It is no longer possible, for example, to conceal failings in hygiene by including casualties from disease among those wounded in battle.
Dear ….
Part 2 of my response to your letter … and I have to say that I’m confused.
On the one hand you state that the “brightness of AWM’s beacon reaching out with a clear message of national pride and unity for all generations yet to be born, is fed by each generation’s enthusiasm and reverence for the past”.
On the other hand, you warn that should the AWM’s proposal “to recognise and include indigenous warriors involved in warfare with [early] settlers” succeed, “it will run the risk of dire consequences; particularly in providing more opportunity for radical groups seeking further change and dilution of our national unity; it could well dampen pride, enthusiasm and fracture long term national community support.
If the AWM’s representation of our ‘past’ is vitally important to our future, why are you so opposed to the AWM’s recognition of the fighting that occurred during the 18th to 20th Century settlement of what we now call Australia? You support the AWM strengthening “national unity, character and deeds … by depicting soldiers of varying race and religion [including those of Aboriginal descent]”, but only “from Federation”. Why is this?
You argue that “One of the richest veins to be discovered in such [AWM] development was the growing awareness of the origins, characteristics and potential value of the original inhabitants as soldiers who served”. Why should this richness be limited, in your opinion, to recognition of those who served their country from “WWI onwards”. In another example, why should those New South Welshmen, Queenslanders, South Australian, Tasmanians, Victorians, and West Australians who served their undeclared nation in the Boer War, not be honoured at the AWM so that their service and sacrifice may be valued and commemorated by their descendants? Why must Australia’s military history also be stopped from encompassing the period prior to this, during which our nation was developing?
The history of Australia from European discovery and settlement is longer than that of Australia since Federation. Why is the courage of Aboriginal warriors defending their family and property against forceful dispossession, not worthy of recognition by the AWM?
You wish that “If there is to be enhancement of our AWM then let it be a weapon to reinforce unity and good will and appropriate recognition of those who in times of war never wavered in duty”. Recognition by the AWM of the bravery displayed by Australia’s First Nations people in trying to preserve their property against overwhelming odds would achieve this, and in so doing, contribute greatly to reconciliation. Is it not time to embrace the courage of our nation’s warriors from BOTH pre and post Federation … to celebrate and take inspiration from enduring skills, leadership and determination?
You see the AWM as a beacon for unity: It would be a powerful proud room [in the AWM] where even the youngest of our visiting school children could readily capture the clear message that “We are indeed all as one.”; while decrying “bickering, discontent, racism, power grabbing disunity and political correctness”; and praising … [those] who in time helped create maturity and world recognition of our nation with one single purpose; and confirmed by a familiar shout “all for one and one for all.”
To this end, reconciliation is our nation’s greatest unification need. We do ourselves and our country a fundamental disservice if we fail to remember ALL our ancestors and the battles they fought on our behalf. The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs (the responsible Minister) and the Chairman and Council of the AWM, have decided not to place an arbitrary limitation on those forebears we deem worthy of our embrace and those we do not. I, for one, agree.
—————————————————————————————————–
21 October 2022
Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN) Submission
Sometime ago I thought it a worthwhile thing to make a submission to IPAN’s People’s Enquiry. Background information:
“IPAN is a network of organisations around Australia – community, faith and peace groups, trade unions and concerned individuals – aiming to build public dialogue and pressure for change to a truly independent foreign policy for Australia – one in which our government plays a positive role in solving international conflicts peacefully.”
“A People’s Inquiry: Exploring the Case for an Independent and Peaceful Australia What are the costs and consequences of Australia’s involvement in US-led wars and the US-alliance.”
My submission is copied below.
“Australia is too closely beholden to America with respect to its Defence and Foreign policies; there’s no need to refer to ‘apron strings’, everyone knows the topic. But why would such a view be so common?
The reason … everyone is expected to trust our politicians, intelligence agencies and senior defence officers. But we only see some of them some of the time and when we do, we don’t get to ask questions. Our ‘trust’ has seen Australia involved in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Will this be the same in the future? The structure of our society is flawed and unless the fundamental problem is addressed, things will continue as they always have.
There is a logic to decision making related to Defence strategy: intelligence staff identify the threat and estimate the warning time; military planners determine contingency plans and consequent force structure, readiness states, and need for the support of allied nations; defence staff determine manufacturing and stocking policies in accord with lead times. This is all done on trust as far as Australians are concerned. Should this be any different?
Intelligence briefings, warning times, contingency plans, lead times etc are all highly confidential (top secret even). Such information can’t be made public. But, a nation’s commitment to war requires the support of its people. How can ‘trust’ be improved to the extent necessary so that our military commitments have the confidence and backing of the nation as a whole? This is the fundamental question that has to be answered.
Traditional responses such as requiring greater oversight of decision making by Parliament, have not worked to date. It is hard to imagine a solution which fits within the democratic framework that currently exists and would be supported. What if it was to be suggested that a panel of eminent Australians be chosen to act as an interface between politicians and society … would this work? Undoubtedly not (just imagine the arguments related to the selections of panel members!).
This is interesting, I can nominate many Australians who I would trust completely in such a role. So, we have democracy on one hand, but are hampered by it on the other. Could a referendum on any proposed military commitment be the answer? How could it, given the national security implications associated with the arguments for and against? We could ask that the PM, Minister for Defence etc to brief the Australian people fully on the circumstances involved … more so than has happened in the past; but in the end, it’s the Government which has to be able to act decisively.
The fundamental issue remains … how to create a level of ‘trust’ in those who act on our behalf? I think it’s a task well above my pay scale.”
———————————————————————————————
14 October 2022
How Easy it is to Mislead the Unthinking
The following appeared on an Internet forum with a thread devoted to Centurions:
“In Australian use, the rear tank in Vietnam was not used for fuel, it was filled with sand for RPG protection for the engine compartment. If these (fuel) tanks in Canadian service were fitted during a European tour where Urban fighting might have been more expected that long range driving, then it could also have been sand-filled as additional protection.”
It took me a while to check that this was a serious post, then I had to try and understand how anyone could be so misguided. Am I being too harsh in thinking that we should not accept what we read at face value; expecting some degree of basic checking?
Another example occurred recently. The following was posted on the Centurion Tank Appreciation Society Forum:
“Contemporary anecdotes record that neither the North Koreans nor Chicoms liked the Cent’s canister nor its ability to place an HE round thru the slot of a bunker, nor its APDS against their armour…”.
Something nagged at me and my response was:
Interesting … was a 20 pdr canister round available for Cents in Korea? I know it was later. There should be some good anecdotes re its use against massed enemy assaults (to the extent that they occurred). If Australia had up-gunned to 105mm prior to Vietnam, we would’ve had to develop our own canister (as I don’t think a UK round was produced). Of course, when we retained the 20pdr, we had to manufacture our own ammo. [The L5 was developed to penetrate T54, but 20pdr APDS was later found to do the job, as it did against T34.]
If the canister round had not been available, the “contemporary anecdotes” regarding its supposed effectiveness (and the resulting ‘historical’ battle accounts) were all false.
Not long after, Simon Dunstan, a well-known British authority on Centurions, posted:
“The 20-pdr canister round was not used during the Korean War. It was first issued in 1954.”
—————————————————————————————————-
7 October 2022
Frontier Wars Recognised at Last
‘Armouredadvocates’ has long been advocating for the bravery and sacrifice of Aboriginal people involved in the defending their country against occupying forces, be commemorated at the AWM. (Most recently, 12 Aug 22 under.) It was announced on 30 Sep 22 that approval for this had been granted.
Sadly, the fundamental issue was missed in the reporting of this, as my letter to the Canberra Times (published on 3 Oct 22) explains ….
“Well done Minister Keogh in approving official recognition of the Frontier Wars at the Australian War Memorial. Somewhat surprisingly, the Canberra Times report (‘Memorial to expand frontier wars recognition’, 30 September) suggests that the primary purpose of this is to enable the history of violence committed against Aboriginal people to be depicted (a responsibility that the AWM shares with other cultural institutions).
The purpose of the Memorial, however, is to commemorate the sacrifice of those who have died in defence of their country, or, to paraphrase Charles Bean’s words, to enshrine the record that Aboriginal people themselves have made. There is a particular responsibility to focus on just one part of the overall history — the skill, determination, and courage of all involved in defending their family, land and possessions.
Hopefully the completion of the AWM redevelopment will see indigenous and non-indigenous Australians standing side by side to commemorate and reflect on the bravery and past sacrifices of their ancestors.”
Maybe there’s hope after all … an extract from an article published on 5 Oct 22:
“If fairly presented we can expect Memorial visitors to empathise with the extraordinary story of First Nations heroic resistance to invasion, to the resourcefulness and courage as they struggled against impossible odds to defend their kin and country and their very survival as a people.” https://johnmenadue.com/frontier-wars-at-the-war-memorial/
Just when I thought things were looking OK, I received a request to sign a petition:
Heaven help me! The argument is … it’s the Australian War Memorial and Australia didn’t exist until 1901, so anything earlier can’t be commemorated. What absolute garbage.
This is offset slightly by the letter in today’s paper (6 Oct) from Heritage Guardians: “As Cameron says, the Memorial is about commemorating those who have died defending their country. Defence of country is the common history that belongs to all of us, whether it is Arrernte, Noongar, or Wiradjuri people defending their country or uniformed Australians (including Indigenous soldiers) defending the Australian nation”.
—————————————————————————–
30 September 2022
Cloth Nappies or Disposables? : The Big Questions Posed by Australia’s Defence Analysts
What is with politicians and tanks and other armoured vehicles? This is the title of an article by Noel Turnbull. With a “40-year-plus career in public relations, politics, journalism and academia”, it seems that Noel is drawing on his time as a national serviceman during Vietnam to definitively analyse Australia’s defence needs. https://johnmenadue.com/what-is-it-with-pollies-tanks-and-defence-waste/
He argues that “the images of kilometres long queues of Russian tanks which were stalled and picked off on their way to Kyiv by Ukrainian troops and the odd villager” should make Defence officials realise that “tanks and other big boy toys” will be less than useful in defence of Australia. In his view, that “there is not only doubt about tank procurement but also other Australian Army massive procurement plans such as those to replace the Army’s armoured personnel carriers and other armoured vehicles”.
Turnbull draws on another for his justification:
As former defence official, Michael Shoebridge, told the ABC (30 August 2022): “It’s very hard to see anywhere in South-East Asia, or the South Pacific or even the wider Indo-Pacific (going from India to mainland China and Korea) where the Australian military needs to structure itself to do large scale land battles. The places where the ADF must fight in our own near region – when I look at that I don’t see a requirement for the army to use its 75 Abrams tanks, its 200 combat reconnaissance vehicles, its 1,000 bushmasters and its 1,000 Hawkeis and 450 infantry fighting vehicles.”
These views are countered in a recent speech by the CA…
In the Land Domain relevance and credibility require the means to prosecute land combat in the most lethal of environments and against the most lethal of opponents.
Unfortunately, most commentary around land combat capabilities – especially armoured fighting vehicles – is not well informed. [As has been argued by ‘Armouredadvocates’ for some time.]
For example, some confuse a wide range of vehicles generically as ‘tanks’.
The fact is that just like a warship or combat aircraft, the land combat capability is a system.
To remove a component of the system is akin to letting a guided missile frigate sail without a Vertical Launching System, or a Joint Strike Fighter take to the skies without Electronic Warfare Self Protection.
If we cannot predict when, where and how the next war might unfold, we must consider other frames of thinking.
And I think going back to the formula proposed by Professor Paul Dibb that threat equals intent times capability is a good starting point.
He noted recently that intent can change at any time; so it is best to focus on capability.
So when we apply that logic globally or even just regionally, we can see that most state and non-state actors have significantly more lethal capability than ever before.
The helmets, body armour and lightly protected vehicles with which we equip our soldiers today provides protection for their heads and their hearts from 7.62mm rounds.
In relative terms, our soldiers are just as vulnerable today as their forebears on Gallipoli or the Western Front.
Every regional actor has well in excess of this level of capability.
So, we need to be very clear: We owe it to our soldiers and their families to ensure every component of the combined arms fighting system is fit for purpose, to enhance their survivability, their lethality and ultimately their probability of mission success.
The Combined Arms Fighting System that protects our soldiers today has at its core a 60-year-old Armoured Personnel Carrier.
We can and we must do better – and we have a plan to do so.
On current trajectory, in the middle of this decade (around 2025-26), we will have fielded a world class system that is relevant, credible and offers better protection for our soldiers to ensure mission success and the best chance of bringing them home.
Fortunately for our defence strategy, others have supported this position. An article by a former Army officer was recently published in the ‘Strategist’:
“I disagree strongly with the argument that the number of IFVs should be reduced significantly from the planned 450 to allow the acquisition of other capabilities.”
He goes on to say:
Cutting the number of IFVs would be not only flawed but dangerous. To do so would undermine Australia’s declared defence policy by reducing its ability to engage with regional allies and partners and unbalance the execution of its military strategy. It is patently dangerous for Australia’s soldiers who would be condemned to fight a 21-century threat with 20-century means.
Recent discussion on another forum re the origin of the 3 Cav badge was very interesting. There are some relevant parallels with the 2 Cav badge. Recapping the background:
1 APC Sqn raised Jul 65; 1 Cav approved Jan 66, raised mid 66 (Tingley), disbanded Nov 66; 2 Cav approved Nov 66, 3 Cav approved Nov 66
According to the ‘web’ sources, soon after 1 Cav was raised, a competition was held to select a basis on which to model a unit badge. An eagle was chosen. A suitable mascot was obtained in Oct 67; by this time the unit had been redesignated 2 Cav. Trooper Glenn Darlington arrived at 2 Cav in November 1967 (recuperating from an injury at Canungra before going to Vietnam). While on light duties, he did a painting of the eagle carrying a lance (Glenn had been a graphic designer before being called up). Soon after, on departure for Vietnam, he gave the painting to the Orderly Room Clerk. Another competition was later held to design a badge; it was won by the Orderly Room Clerk
The Governor General wrote to the Queen (as a result of a request from Army) in November 1968 seeking approval for the design of a 2 Cav Regt badge (this letter is in the National Archives). In March 1969, when Army had not received approval for the design, a letter was written to the GG querying the delay. The response the following month advised that approval had previously been granted (but it seems that the letter had become lost within Defence). Army’s main concern at the time was to ensure that the badge would be available when 2 Cav was formed as a regiment (this turned out to be Nov 70).
Interestingly, it seems that 2 Cav’s badge had its origins in 1 Cav and 3 Cav’s badge had its origins in 1 APC Sqn.
In 2020 (the 50th Anniversary of 2 Cav) Glenn Darlington produced a retrospective version of the painting that he did in 1967. A photo of the work in progress is copied below.
Background.
The formation of 1 Cav Regt was announced in 1965; soon after this (according to ‘Digger History’) a competition was held to choose a basis on which to ‘model’ a unit badge; after an eagle was chosen,; in 1967 the badge was received by the (now renamed) 2 Cav Regt.
2 Cav Regt became a unit with Regimental HQ in November 1970.
Was Trooper Darlington’s Painting the Basis for the Design?
I can’t imagine that the badge would have issued before the Queen’s approval (Apr 69).
The timing, Nov 67 (the Darlington painting) and Nov 68 (design finalised) seem to confirm that the painting was likely to have been a major influence in the design concept. Added to this is the fact that a troop leader at 2 Cav during 1967/68 has stated that there was no design competition for a badge during his time.
—————————————————————————————-
16 September 2022
Notification to DVA of Veteran’s Death [Mk2]
I’ve copied the Blog post from 1 July 2022 below. I advised at the time that there was no form/specific advice available to notify DVA of a veteran’s death and that I had recommended to them that they might like to provide guidance to assist NOK with this.
On 4 August 2022, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation attended a funeral of a former RAAC member. He remarked to another attendee that he was going to email all member associations with regard to “notification to DVA and others of the death of a veteran”.
The subsequent Corporation email included the pro-forma at the end. DVA had obviously acknowledged the confusion that existed and decided to minimise this by producing a simple form with instructions for it to be completed and emailed to DVA as soon as possible after a veteran’s death.
What a co-incidence that the Corporation acted in this way, so soon after Armouredadvocates raised the issue. It’s good to know that we reach a wide audience (even though not always acknowledged).
Blog: 1 July2022 — DVA: Check List for Spouses
I recently became aware that DVA had made a number of changes to the processes to be followed by the spouse of a veteran on their death. Unfortunately, these changes weren’t identified as such, meaning that an Internet query could well bring up out of date information. I rang DVA with what I thought was a straight forward request: “How does the spouse of a veteran notify DVA of a death and what information does DVA require?”. It turned out that I wasn’t the only one confused by the conflicting information provided on-line. The person I spoke with at DVA kept me on the phone for an hour checking whether or not DVA completed all necessary applications for a veteran’s widow/widower.
This is the last thing that a new widow/widower wants to experience immediately following their spouse’s demise. If I couldn’t make head or toe of things, how would a grieving NOK cope? Given that this is one of the most common reasons for contacting DVA, I suggested that they might like to produce a specific Fact Sheet. Something else had changed. They no longer have Fact Sheets, all relevant info has been incorporated into a manual and is accessible on a topic by topic basis.
The first part of my personal DVA check list is copied below. I’ll post the remaining sections as I complete them. [An ESO told me that there was no need for this as “everyone knows just to ring 1800 VETERAN”.]
Notification to DVA of Veteran’s Death. Notify DVA by phone during business hours on 133 254 or 1800 838 372 (there is no form to do this despite advice on the Internet).
When the automated voice requests “State nature of call”, answer ‘bereavement’.
Provide the following information: details of deceased including DVA file number; date and place of death; details of person calling and contact info; plus, details of executor and funeral parlour director (if known).
———————————————————————————————————-
9 September 2022 [Sorry … forgot 2 September!!]
The Story Behind the Invention of the Tank : PART 2
The Landships Committee. The First Battle of Marne was an all-out effort by the armies of Britain and France to halt the German advance on Paris. Fought between 5-12 September 1914, it was a major victory for the Allies with the Germans being forced to fall back and defend long lines of trenches. Huge losses resulted on both sides as the fighting stagnated into trench warfare, dominated by artillery and machine guns.
The need for an armoured weapon system able to close with and break through the enemy trenches was now not only necessary, but extremely urgent. While heresy in terms of conventional military thinking, this was the strongly held view of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. On his direction, a Landships Committee was formed in February 1915 to develop an armoured fighting vehicle for use on the Western Front.
Initially, the existence of the Committee was concealed from the War Office which was thought likely to have scrapped it. Come July 1915, however, things were different. The situation on the Western Front could no longer be ignored and when the Committee’s work became known, the project was taken over by the Army. It must have been a busy time. Having followed up by providing detailed drawings of his invention, de Mole was informed that all inventions had to be accompanied by a working model.
In December 1915, the importance of the project saw an emphasis being placed on secrecy. The story goes that, rather than landships, it was proposed to refer to the development of water carriers to supply troops on the front line. To avoid the initials ‘WC’, the word Tank was decided upon, with the committee becoming the Tank Supply Committee.
The Prototypes. In August 1915, ‘Little Willie’, a first prototype was produced (the name being a satirical reference to Crown Prince Wilhelm of Germany). Unfortunately, its manoeuvrability was not good; in particular its ability to meet the criteria of crossing a 2.4m (eight foot) trench. William Tritton and George Wilson, both engineers, were primarily involved.
The second prototype was much more promising: a rhomboidal shape, the tracks going up and over the top of the hull. Known initially as His Majesty’s Land Ship (HMLS) Centipede and later ‘Mother’, it was in this form that tanks first saw action on 15 September 1916 at the Battle of Flers-Courelette.
When Lancelot de Mole saw photos of the Mark 1 tank, he knew that his design was superior. Having previously been rejected because of ill health, de Mole was passed as fit for the Army and embarked for England in September 1917, taking a working model with him (made with borrowed money). On arrival, he argued his case and a demonstration was recommended and approved. Before this could be arranged, however, he was sent to France as part of a contingent of reinforcements.
The Royal Commission on Inventions. ‘The Royal Commission found that the Tank built for war, by Britain, was in no part designed by Corporal de Mole, therefore he could not be awarded any compensation. They did however agree that his design was superior to that used.
The rewards for the Tank had been awarded to the individuals who had designed the model that Britain had manufactured and used in the war. One of whom was a Major Wilson who received £7,500 and was the same person who had rejected Corporal de Mole’s plan in 1912. The Royal Commission went on to state, that they [the Tank Supply Committee] had designed an inferior vehicle, unaware that a better design was within their keeping.’[1]
De Mole sought compensation for expenses incurred in the manufacture of his working model and was awarded £985. In 1920, he was made a Commander of the British Empire (C.B.E.) Winston Churchill declined to accept any reward for his part in the development of the tank; it was all part of his service to the nation.
Conclusion. Is it possible to credit a particular individual with being the inventor of the tank? It would have to be someone who both foresaw its role on the battlefield and had the inventive genius to provide a design solution (whether or not the need was accepted at the time). Without doubt, this honour belongs to Mr Lancelot de Mole, CBE (an Australian to boot).
Finally … when war came in 1914, failure to anticipate the fundamental change in the nature of its conduct, most certainly resulted in a prolonged conflict costing millions of lives. Could such a lapse in forethought and planning happen today?
The Story Behind the Invention of the Tank : PART 1
Following the First World War, a Royal Commission on Inventions was set up in Britain to acknowledge and reward those who contributed to the development of the mobile protected weapons system which became known as the Tank. Paradoxically, although Britain was the first nation to field a tank in combat, the title ‘Inventor of the Tank’ belongs elsewhere.
Inventions don’t just happen. The starting point is the need for something to solve a problem, followed by ideas as to how this can be done. Finally, with more thought, a concept results. Work on this identifies the main issues involved and leads to the development of a prototype.
The Need (or Not). As the 19th Century came to an end, the conduct of warfare was being revolutionised by the invention of the machine gun. Trenches dictated tactics and the day of cavalry reigning supreme on the battlefield was almost over. The idea of an armoured vehicle which could break the likely stalemate, was advanced by a number of people
In 1887, the French artist Albert Robida published ‘War in the Twentieth Century’. Foreseeing the need for some form of mechanised weapon system, one of his drawings featured ‘moving fortresses’ (top). Six years later, H G Wells published a story featuring ‘Land Ironclads’.
Like their naval counterparts, these machines were protected by armour plate. The enemy were engaged in their trenches by riflemen who could fire from inside, mobility being provided by petrol engines which operated eight pairs of ‘pedrail’ wheels. This was the critical element: armour was heavy and to be successful, the weight of the ironclad had to be spread over a wide area. Each pedrail wheel comprised 14 spring loaded pads which could adapt themselves to the contours on the ground. This was not Wells’ idea, but a recent invention he adopted to compensate for the weight of the vehicle.
Up until this time, all attempts to develop a mobile weapon system had been based on a wheeled chassis. One example was the Motor War Car produced by Frederick Simms in 1902 (one variant pictured above). This was the forerunner of the armoured car, something quickly adopted by many armies (first used in action by Italy in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911).
Unfortunately, military planners did not foresee a future battlefield which involved attacking an entrenched enemy without being vulnerable to their fire and/or stopped by the ground conditions. The concept of a heavily armoured machine which could navigate the battlefield without becoming bogged, was something best left to the domain of science fiction. Armoured cars would certainly be able to meet any need for mobile weapons systems in the future.
The Development of the Tracked Vehicles. The name tractor was not related to a machine using tracks, but rather a machine driven by a traction engine. Steam powered to start with, the usefulness of these engines in supplementing human labour was quickly realised. With the development of a self-propelled engine, came the real break-through; horses could now be replaced. As the 20th Century approached and steam gave way to petrol, the mechanisation of agriculture was almost, but not quite, complete. Difficulty in negotiating ploughed land and soft ground meant that tractors were often limited in terms of where they could go. This shortcoming was finally solved with the adoption of the ‘continuous track’.
Although various prototypes had been developed during the 19th Century, it was not until 1905 that real success was achieved. An enhanced version of the Hornsby Chain Tracked Tractor (above) was trialed as an artillery tractor by the British Army in 1907, but not adopted. This was not the first time that the value of the military application of an invention failed to be appreciated; nor would it be the last.
In 1911 an Australian, Lancelot Eldin de Mole, was involved with construction projects in WA. Frustrated with vehicles becoming bogged on sites, he set out to find a solution. As work progressed, he realised that his ‘chain-rail’ design had applications on the battlefield: it could carry heavy loads, cross rough terrain and trenches, and was easily steered. De Mole submitted sketches to the British War Office, but they were returned in June 1913. There was no perceived military need.
—————————————————————————————-
19 August 2022
Mobile Warfare
An article, entitled ‘Understanding armour and why the IFV matters to Australia’ was recently published in the Australian Defence Magazine by Leo Purdy, a former RAAC officer and current defence analyst based in Canberra.
‘Another great contribution to the debate Leo. As you say, unless such a debate is well informed, all sorts of false outcomes can result … with enormous harm to our defence preparedness. My only suggestion is that the importance of mobile warfare to Australia’s defence and the essential role of AFVs in this, needs to emphasized. In addition to close combat and close fire support, our tanks and armoured combined arms teams enable our forces to seize the initiative by shock action and surprise.
Many of those not versed in all aspects of the combat power afforded by bold employment of armour, sell our defence capability short. The importance of this in preparation of contingency plans, is a vital element unique to armour in dealing with our geographic circumstances and joint operations’.
‘With all due respect the Australian Army is in no way intending to engage in mobile warfare which means conducting offensive to secure strategic initiative.
mounted combined arms combat is tactical in nature, and does nothing to secure strategic initiative because there is no operational breaching.
Australian region is littoral, and so operational breaching must be executed in the littoral. There is neither doctrine nor lift assets to do that, and the vehicles in the Army fleet, now or projected, are unfit for that type of mission.’
My response follows:
‘Mobile warfare is not confined to strategic initiatives. The ability to achieve surprise and shock action is central to winning battles and saving lives at all levels of combat. The importance of this is often not appreciated. There are some, for example, who consider Bushmaster borne infantry can provide an equivalent capability to that of IFVs, allowing numbers of the latter to be reduced without consequence on the battlefield. Given ubiquitous RPVs, rapid force mobility is now more critical than ever before. The land force must possess the ability to avoid predictability. Of course, all this is predicated on the assessment of the threat and warning and lead times.’
From my perspective, the greater the numbers involved in the debate, the better. This space has traditionally been a wasteland, much to the detriment of our defence capability.
————————————————————————————————-
12 August 2022
Frontier Wars
The following letter was published in the Canberra Times on 23 July 2022.
It is pleasing to see the interest being taken in the need to amend the Australian War Memorial Act to allow representation of the Frontier Wars at the AWM. Eight years ago, I wrote that the best way to commemorate the Centenary of Gallipoli was one that truly united all Australians; one that saw indigenous and non-indigenous Australians standing side by side on the steps of the AWM to commemorate the past sacrifices of their forebears.
More recently I asked how those who visit the AWM to learn, in the words of the Director, “what it is to be Australian”, can do so without the bravery of indigenous warriors (both male and female) defending their families and land, being represented? I spoke about this at the public hearing into the expansion of the AWM. The argument that there is insufficient exhibition space is no longer relevant. It is time for the Government to do the right thing … Minister Keogh, it is your turn to stand up and fix this.
It was very pleasing to see that two days later the paper’s editorial was headed “Frontier wars should be back on the agenda”. That editorial is shown below.
———————————————————————————————————
5 August 2022
The Role of the ARES in Defence Emergency.
The introduction to a recent article in The Cove by an RAAC officer is: “Have you ever been sitting at home watching the war in Ukraine or listening to people at work talk about growing great power competition, the threat of large-scale combat, and wondered how might the Australian Army respond if we were faced with this challenge? If you have – good; if you haven’t – you’re probably like most others but might want to start considering it. [https://cove.army.gov.au/article/mobilisation-large-scale-combat-operations]
The article is well researched and written, but I was somewhat dismayed by the time I reached the end. There was no mention of the ARES. I commented as follows:
What part does the ARES have in mobilisation planning?
Late last year (2021) the RAAC Corps RSM explained that ECN 062 Cav Scout is to be discontinued.
He went on the state that a single ECN is to be introduced which will cover Cav Scout in both ARES and ARA, ie. Cav scouts in ARES units will be trained to the same standard as those in the ARA so as to enable direct reinforcements from ARES to ARA in time of Defence emergency.
Is it the role of the ARES to ’round out’ ARA units?
The article mentions Army’s Future Ready Training System, intended “to manage the transformation of its training system. This program strategy will identify the principles and objectives of training transformation, the roadmap to a future ready training system and the program methodology”. (https://cove.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/future_ready_training_system_strategy.pdf) This initiative goes into great detail re an improved training philosophy. Once again, however, the ARES is not mentioned. What on earth has happened to the whole Army concept?
Army has to state clearly and unambiguously, what role the ARES will fulfill in time of mobilisation, ie. what its ‘raison d’etre’ is.
I’ve copied my submission below. It may not, of course, be considered to a true ‘leadership’ lesson, depending on your definition of the term.
To me, however, what influences the way you lead in action is the most important leadership lesson there is. Man-management is something quite different.
“The most important lesson I learnt as a tank troop leader in Vietnam, was not to be predictable.
Four tank squadrons were deployed to Vietnam between 1968 and 1971. Each of them trained using exactly the same tactical drills (contact, defile and mine).
By the time our squadron deployed in 1971, the enemy knew these drills as well as, if not better than, we did.
If any operational analysis had been done, it would have been obvious that the enemy captitalised on our predictability.
Leaders must continually ask themselves: am I being predicable?
During training, exercise staff must highlight any such weakness.“
—————————————————————————————-
22 July 2022
Retrospective Awards
Following last week’s post, these questions were asked on the 3 Cav Forum:
How do you get a member recognized, for an award 50 odd years after he performed it?
Is it possible?
If so, what is required?
I answered as follows:
“It is possible for a member to be recognised 50 years after the event. Achieving this is the hard bit.
Defence are opposed to all retrospective awards unless a failure in admin/due process can be proven. Their position is contrary to the Letters Patent for awards, which allows them to be made retrospectively. This is where the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) comes in.
Any individual can provide a justification to Defence for someone to receive an award for, say, an act of bravery in the past. Unless it can be shown that a procedural mistake was made which prevented the member being recognised, Defence will knock it back. This is a necessary first step, however. It is the start of the ‘real’ process.
I have personal experience of this. A tank crew commander from my troop compiled a justification for me to be awarded the VC, based on events that he had witnessed. He received a knock back from Defence. This enabled him to take the next step, an appeal to the DHAAT. (This was also the process I followed in seeking the same recognition for supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley, as that received by 8RAR alone.) The Tribunal subsequently held a public Hearing at which all evidence for and against my proposed award was presented and considered.
The Tribunal is independent of Defence and quite often rules against them (eg. the Unit Citation for Gallantry awarded for Coral-Balmoral). In my case they flew the former crew commander to Canberra and paid for his accommodation. During the Hearing, Skype sessions were held with supporting witnesses interstate.
Usually decisions are announced quickly; in my case, however, the Minister had to agree. Ten months after the Hearing the former crew commander was informed that I was judged to have demonstrated insufficient self-sacrifice (the title of my forthcoming book).“
—————————————————————————————
15 July 2022
Operation Hammersley
The following post on the 3 Cav Forum (5 Jul 22) is self-explanatory …
“There are numerous posts below regarding my application to the Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal for the Cross of Gallantry With Palm Unit Citation to be awarded to RAAC and RAE units that supported 8RAR during Op Hammersley. Although the vital contribution of 1 Armd, 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn was acknowledged, the Tribunal agreed with Defence position that the award was intended to solely acknowledge the efforts of 8RAR. (I would’ve had to have been prepared to match Defence funding of $17,000 to appeal to the Federal Court.)
I was in the process of gaining support from the Vietnamese Community in America for an application to the US Secretary of Defence to extend provisions of the US Department of Army General Order (DAGO 8) which provided the authority for the Unit Citation to be awarded to all US units that served under MACV in Vietnam … to include 8RAR supporting units. It was my belief that extending the Unit Citation to all units (just for being there) would devalue the significance of the Crosses of Gallantry awarded to individual members of 1ATF for bravery.
I believe that this will provide authorisation for the insignia to be worn on the right breast. It will not be an authority to wear the medal itself (ie. the Cross of Gallantry). This will preserve the value of individual awards. For those interested, the link above provides an interesting ‘history’ of the matter. I imagine that members of 8RAR will be upset at this outcome.
I would rather have seen ALL forces involved in Op Hammersley deservedly recognised for their bravery and sacrifice. Maybe the 1AR Assn, 3 Cav Assn, RAR Assn, 1 Fd Sqn Assn could join forces for a submission for the Australian Unit Citation for Gallantry for Op Hammersely (the same as awarded for Coral Balmoral).”
—————————————————————————————–
8 July 2022
Transforming Land Power
Two of the points I made in my submission on Transforming Land Power (post 22 Apr 22) were that the pending reduction in Rapid Force Mobility (ie. reduction from 450 to 300 IFVs in LAND 400 Ph 3) will significantly reduce the combat power of the land force and the view that “The tank is dead” resulting from footage from Ukraine showing the effectiveness of missiles controlled by RPVs, is nonsense. I referred to the role of Active Protection systems (APS) in this respect.
Of particular note, the Federal Government will this year decide on a project at the core of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) ability to deploy and sustain a land force as part of a joint, integrated, team. With respect to Army’s future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), known as Project Land 400 Phase 3 (L400 Ph 3), the decision regarding the future of the ADF’s ability to generate a credible land combat system is I think comparable as an essential component to the Joint Force as the Royal Australian Air Force’s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the Royal Australian Navy’s future frigate. It will determine to a certain degree how government chooses to project military power, operate in high threat environments, prepare for all ranges of contingencies, achieve deterrence, balance its force structures and prepares for the type of future conflicts envisioned like those currently being witnessed in Ukraine.
This project aims to acquire up to 450 IFV, replacing the sixty-year old Armoured Personnel Carrier capability (APC) based on the current in-service model, the M113, which was introduced into the Army at a time when the Air Force was flying the Meteor fighter (first flown in 1943) and the Navy operated HMAS Vampire (commissioned into service in 1959). The future IFV appeals to the promise of unprecedented firepower, protection and mobility for the Army and can be employed in a variety of ways alongside a combination of tanks, infantry, and a range of other joint capabilities and emerging technologies that are concurrently being introduced in to service in the ADF. It is part of a system of joint force capabilities which essentially determines Australia’s future land force capability ‘upper limit’, or more simply expressed as at what point the ADF, in terms of ground combat capabilities, will culminate. Consequently, given the importance of this capability to Army and the ADF, its acquisition is proceeding via a demanding, thorough and evidence-based capability acquisition process, subject to internal reviews and external oversight.
While the future IFV does not represent the totality of Army’s land capabilities (as previously mentioned, this includes Combat Aviation, Land Combat, Protected Manoeuvre, Amphibious and Littoral Forces, Engineer, Ground Based Air Defence, Offensive Strike, Logistics, Health, Special Forces and Domestic Security Task Forces), this capability nonetheless is the core of the close combat team as it relates to the task of closing with and killing/capturing enemy forces and its existence in part acknowledges the myriad of threats that now exist on the battlefield, including the presence of Improvised Explosive Devices like those experienced in Afghanistan through to the prevalence of loitering munitions which, according to some, may pose an entirely new lethal threat to soldiers who lack the levels of protection, manoeuvre and firepower necessary to survive in modern warfare.
So, is Land 400 Ph 3 going to result in billions of dollars being spent on a capability that is at risk of defeat to a lightly armed adversary force armed with UAV’s and modern guided weapons? Should we abandon L400 and procure UAVs and missiles instead? The short answer is no. You could be forgiven for thinking that a UAV and missile mix pre-ordains the land force for success in combat. In the Ukraine we are observing yet another conflict in which military vehicles like these are being destroyed in numbers by what seem to be cheap and readily available anti-armour missiles (although such missiles akin to Javelin are nearly the price of a small suburban house, and are produced in small numbers) as well as armed drones. While it is thankfully true that the Ukrainians have destroyed Russian armour with drones and anti-armour weapons designed for this purpose, this does not in itself negate the utility of this capability.
It is important we see the conflict for what it really is. Observers should not be shocked at these losses when the scale and types of forces concerned are considered. Drones and anti-armour systems are contributing to this war, but so are the infantry, armour and artillery as well as the naval, air, space and informational power of both sides. Equally, it is hardly surprising that late model drones and the best anti-armour weapons that the Western World manufactures, designed with sophisticated target acquisition sensors, guidance systems and advanced warheads are defeating tanks and IFV developed four decades ago, if not earlier. The vast majority lack the survivability of modern armour, such as soft and hard kill Active Protection Systems (APS) and the benefits of integrated command, control and communications systems, which are vital for mobile forces to operate under an effective air defence umbrella.
Indeed, it is certainly the case that APS, especially from the anti-armour vector known as ‘top-attack’, represents the latest upgrade of armoured protection against anti-armour systems. This continual tension that has existed as armour and anti-armour capabilities compete for battlefield superiority is a phenomena that has been around since the invention of the tank in the First World War. With regards to the current conflict, to date, there has not been a single APS-active armoured vehicle destroyed in Ukraine. Moreover, vehicle tactics typically employed by Russian forces are conceived around ‘mass’ as a capability in itself where ‘quantity has a quality of its own’, with less regard to APS and the survival of a single or low number of IFV.
Additionally, Russian vehicles are so obviously poorly sustained, maintained and operated it is little wonder that they are presenting so many targets to Ukrainian forces who are being well equipped by the collective capacity of NATO and others to destroy these antiquated Soviet-era capabilities. It seems that the drone argument relevant to this conflict has been somewhat poorly framed in terms of ‘either/or’ when it ought to approach the matter as ‘both/and’. More simply put the argument should not be drones or armour at the exclusion of the other, but drones and armour complementing each other, as Army is doing with its recent acquisition of the Insititu ‘Integrator’ UAV. While there are legitimate issues to analyse and debate over the future of armoured warfare, especially as it applies to the threat of drones, as Eminent Professor Colin Gray contends that this debate should be conducted in full awareness of the complementarities of each respective capability, their roles, limitations and performance, rather than just a series of grainy YouTube clips.
————————————————————————————————
1 July 2022
DVA: Check List for Spouses
I recently became aware that DVA had made a number of changes to the processes to be followed by the spouse of a veteran on their death. Unfortunately, these changes weren’t identified as such, meaning that an Internet query could well bring up out of date information. I rang DVA with what I thought was a straight forward request: “How does the spouse of a veteran notify DVA of a death and what information does DVA require?”. It turned out that I wasn’t the only one confused by the conflicting information provided on-line. The person I spoke with at DVA kept me on the phone for an hour checking whether or not DVA completed all necessary applications for a veteran’s widow/widower.
This is the last thing that a new widow/widower wants to experience immediately following their spouse’s demise. If I couldn’t make head or toe of things, how would a grieving NOK cope? Given that this is one of the most common reasons for contacting DVA, I suggested that they might like to produce a specific Fact Sheet. Something else had changed. They no longer have Fact Sheets, all relevant info has been incorporated into a manual and is accessible on a topic by topic basis.
The first part of my personal DVA check list is copied below. I’ll post the remaining sections as I complete them. [An ESO told me that there was no need for this as “everyone knows just to ring 1800 VETERAN”.]
Notification to DVA of Veteran’s Death.Notify DVA by phone during business hours on 133 254 or 1800 838 372 (there is no form to do this despite advice on the Internet).
When the automated voice requests “State nature of call”, answer ‘bereavement’.
Provide the following information: details of deceased including DVA file number; date and place of death; details of person calling and contact info; plus, details of executor and funeral parlour director (if known).
——————————————————————————————–
24 June 2022 (Better late than never)
The Army Lessons Process
As I understand it, we used to have the Centre for Army Lessons, then Army Lessons, now we have Army Lessons On-Line. [The logo above is for the US Army equivalent.] The latter is part of the Army Knowledge Centre (AKC). An introduction to Army Lessons On-Line was recently provided on The Cove; see
After watching the video, I offered the following comments:
Congratulations on a great resource. I note that the video refers to the importance of lessons being recorded so that, should there be a second deployment to a theatre, earlier experience will not have been lost. True, but what about reinforcements going to the same theatre? The lack of any such system during Vietnam meant that everyone had to learn from their own experience. Lessons learnt were passed back to neither training establishments nor replacement units.
My next comment relates to responsibility. I saw no mention of this in the video, only reference to “ideally” and “perhaps”. Surely, we need someone to be designated as being responsible for ensuring that lessons learnt are recorded and doctrine and training revised accordingly. My tank driver in Vietnam should never have been wounded. Drivers in each of the preceding three squadrons had been wounded in exactly the same way, but we had no idea. There was a failure in command responsibility.
The British system of Operational Analysis (OA) has much to commend it. Sub-unit elements responsible for recording lessons learnt are imbedded in operational units. Their OA command headquarters receives reports from theatres and ensures that solutions are found and implemented both in-theatre and the home base. Responsibility is sheeted home to ensure that this happens. An optional system without anyone having direct responsibility (for which they are specifically held accountable), will not work.
Saying that responsibility is vested in all levels of command will not cut it either. The ADF is the archetypal hierarchical organisation; mandates come from the top and are acted upon automatically and without question. It is taken for granted that the way things are done has successfully evolved over time, as a result of the combined experience of those in charge; i.e. it is assumed that all options have been considered. In many cases, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Someone must be held specifically accountable if battles are to be won and lives saved.
BTW. At the end of the Video, did I see someone prodding for an IED with a metal bayonet? Surely that lesson has been learnt and fibreglass prodders are now used.
————————————————————————————————–
17 June 2022
National Memorial to the Australian Army
Letter to the Editor, Canberra Times; published on 13 Jun 22:
As intended, veterans who march along Anzac Parade during ceremonies of remembrance, pass memorials erected by the nation in their honour. On other occasions, descendants pause at the memorials to reflect on the service and sacrifice made on their behalf.
There is no doubt that one of the remaining two spaces on Anzac Parade will be the site of a memorial to those who served in Afghanistan. Or will it?
When the Australian War Memorial was opened in 1941, there was little sense of the conflicts soon to come. A similar situation existed in 1989 when the National Memorial to the Australian Army was dedicated. The statue of two soldiers is backed by seven gigantic pillars, representing the major conflicts the Army had been involved in up until that time. The bronze plaque on the Memorial explains the 20th Century symbolism.
The AWM is currently undergoing an overhaul of its exhibition space, but what can be done with the Army Memorial to enable service in East Timor, Iraq, and Afghanistan to be represented? The alternative of a second National Army Memorial would be inappropriate.
While design variations are limited, could it be that the existing seven pillars are to be knocked down and replaced by ten smaller ones (with space for more), so that soldiers who served in the wars of the 21st Century may be honoured?
———————————————————————————-
Apologies for missing the 3 June 2022 post … see below.
10 June 2022
Combat Pay
The following sequence is from a series of my posts on another Forum. I remain committed to investigate how it is that combat pay from Australian service personnel came to be and how the amount is determined.
First Post:Just reading ‘No Front Line’ about Afghanistan by Chris Masters. I thought it must have been a misprint when I read that Australian soldiers received combat pay of $200 per day. Checking Google I see that the pay was based on a risk assessment and the amount was right for 2007 for those who went outside the wire (those in supporting roles received a much lesser amount). I know pay in Vietnam was tax free (as is that for Afghanistan), but I can’t recall any combat allowance (?)
Response:
Bruce, I never could make sense of my pay-book entries, and I have only one pay-slip from VN. This records my gross pay as Pay 98.42 CMA 3.92 VIE 21.70 Total 124.04 [per fortnight]
Maybe the VIE was Vietnam Allowance. That would be $1.55 per day
Second Post: Working on Pete’s figures above …Vietnam allowance was approx 1/5 annual salary. How does that compare with $200 per day today? Approx salary for trooper today: $78,000, which is $3000 per fortnight. One fifth of $3000 is $600; this per day equals $44. So combat pay in 2007 in Afghanistan was approx five times that of us in Vietnam. Does that mean the risk was five times greater? I’m interested in how combat pay is determined. Separation allowance, CMA etc can all be related to the cost of living. Presumably combat pay is not subjective to the extent of a ‘feel good’/political amount, but is determined according to a transparent formula. Does anyone know what this is? (I’m intrigued as to exactly how a ‘just’ amount is calculated.)
Third Post: I see that $200 per day Afghanistan Allowance for serving in ‘Warlike Conditions’ was reduced to $150 per day from 1 Jan 2015 as a result of a risk assessment by the Defence Intelligence Organisation. One has to wonder what the risk of death or wounding is assessed to be and how an amount of money is considered sufficient to compensate.
Afghanistan support units serving in ‘Non-Warlike Conditions’ are paid $80 per day. If you don’t qualify for either of these, you may be eligible for Field Allowance which is paid for serving in arduous conditions … $56 per day.
Another aspect of compensation is the lump sum paid by some Armies when an injury such as the loss of a leg or an eye is suffered while serving. As far as I’m aware, the only option in Australia is a fortnightly payment. You would think that access to a lump sum would be quite useful in some cases.
———————————————————————————————————-
3 June 2022
“Size doesn’t matter, it’s how you use it.” :RAAC Manoeuvre Handbook
Following on from 13 May 2022 …
Hi Aidan,
I have a second comment. Size, of course, will always matter.
It can be argued that the combat power of a unit, ie. the impact the unit can have on the enemy, comprises its strength, firepower, mobility, communications, logistics, training and morale. How this combat power is used, depends entirely on the level of training received by its members. Once the unit is deployed, the only thing a commander can change or influence is morale.
You have quoted the ‘1994 Royal Australian Armoured Corps Manoeuvre Warfare Handbook’ which equates combat power to force; this being the equivalent of mass multiplied by acceleration. The Handbook states that acceleration is “a measure of the responsiveness of the unit”, which in turn, is a product of “battle procedure, efficiency of staff procedures, the use of standardised drills and formations, as well as the command philosophy of the unit”.
It is my view that using the equation F=ma in the context of assessing military force, is inappropriate. For example, it asserts that if the size (mass) of a unit is doubled, the combat power is doubled. This does not necessarily follow.
It might be that a unit’s training is particularly good, resulting in it being manoeuvred with elan. This might theoretically increase its combat power, but if communications are ineffective or morale poor, gains might not be realised.
In terms of doctrine, the RAAC Handbook is drawing a long bow indeed. Combat power is a multifaceted concept, one in which all elements are important.
—————————————————————————————————
27 May 2022
Combat Power Beyond 2022: Four New Principles of War
Following on from 22 April 2022, Defence has advised that:
“Your piece [for the AARC Competition] has been cleared for publication and will be online next Thursday 26 May”.
It will be interesting to see what comments it attracts.
Previously:
11 May:
Bruce. Many thanks for your feedback and photo suggestion. Greatly appreciated. I’ll incorporate your tweaks and push the piece up the CofC. I’ll keep you posted as we proceed.
10 May:
By way of introduction, I’m the managing editor for the AARC’s Land Power Forum and its series of Papers. To that end, I’ve received your Competition submission for review prior to its presentation to the CofC for consideration/clearance to publish.
My role is one of structural editing, meaning that I’m interested in working with you to optimise the narrative flow and supporting you to reach our readership, including during your paper’s transit through our Director and DG. My remit is to comment on ‘form’ not ‘substance’ and I don’t claim to be a subject matter expert. So, to the extent I stray into areas that may change your intended meaning, I’ve done so accidentally and may simply have misconstrued your intent.
With that as an intro, please accept my comments on your paper, for your consideration.
I look forward to hearing back from you, and thanks for your contribution.
—————————————————————————————
20 May 2022
Continual Effort to Get History Right.
Came across an AWM on-line article recently. My subsequent letter to the AWM is copied below.
“Hi Craig,
I’ve just read your article: ‘Operation Overlord and the Battle of Long Khanh’ (https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/blog/battle-long-khanh). Unfortunately, the part played by the tanks is not fully explained; in fact, the reader would be excused for not realising that this was one of the greatest examples of infantry-tank co-operation of the Vietnam War. The tanks’ immediate response and shock action prevented what could have been a very different outcome for 5 Platoon. The impression given by the following paragraph is quite wrong.
That the afternoon[7 June] tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) fought their way through enemy positions to link up with B Company. After a tense night holding a defensive perimeter, the battle of Long Khanh was over. The enemy had in fact quietly withdrawn during the afternoon.
By the afternoon, the fighting was all over. Following an artillery and mortar barrage at 6am, 5 Pl moved forward to investigate the enemy position. Surprisingly, it was still occupied and the platoon found itself confronting a much superior enemy force. Without waiting for orders or supporting infantry, 5 Troop [Centurion tanks] set off to support 5 Pl. About 10 minutes later (at 7.15am) the troop contacted the north west edge of the enemy position. See attached map (5 Pl were at the south east edge). 5 Tp (three tanks and an ARV) immediately launched an attack.
There were so many bunkers, the tanks didn’t have enough ammunition to fire into all of them. The tanks drove up onto the bunkers, but they wouldn’t collapse. The crews then resorted to dropping grenades into each one before driving past. Fortunately, a US helicopter gunship team came to their aid. The troop leader asked for all the ordnance they had to be fired 50m to the front of the tanks. The enemy were no longer able to concentrate against 5 Pl; the pressure was relieved and the Australians now had the upper hand.
At 8.15am a second tank troop joined up with 5 Tp and both troops continued the attack.
At 9.15am, the rest of B Coy got to 5 Pl and D Coy joined the tanks at 9.45am. Positions were consolidated. At 11am the helicopter mentioned was shot down during an ammo resupply task. At 3.15pm a sweep toward B Coy was commenced by D Coy and the tanks. The enemy had withdrawn beforehand.
There were two periods of intense fighting; one involving 5 Pl and the other involving 5 Tp. The men of both sub-units fought magnificently. A full account is provided in Vol 2, ‘Canister! On! FIRE! : Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’, 2012, Big Sky Publications. (Pages 274-292)
It would be good if the AWM Blog post could be added to, to reflect the above,
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron “
———————————————————————————-
The response from Craig Tibbitts at the AWM was:
Hi Bruce,
Many thanks for your email and for the advice on improving my article. I’ll amend it to incorporate what you’ve outlined below. I’ve got a few priority things to attend to first, but I should be able to get this amendment done within the next week or two.
I’ve always been a keen student of armoured warfare, but have only recently begun reading more about it during the Vietnam War, so I’m keen to learn more. To that end I’m wondering if you might know where copies of your Canister! On! Fire! might be available. I’ve been looking for a copy for my own personal library for a while now, but no joy.
Kind regards, and again, thank you.
Cheers, Craig
——————————————————————————————-
13 May 2022
The Fundamental Problem
Interesting article by a young soldier on what they call ’Manoeuvre Warfare’ at:
“Very thought-provoking Aiden. This rings particularly true: “The strength of our Army does not solely lie in our superior protection and equipment, but in the initiative and offensive spirit of our soldiers and commanders”. This is why morale is a component of combat power; but, as you point out, there is a wealth of value waiting to be tapped by encouraging, rather than shutting out, ideas and thoughts from all ranks. At the heart of this, lies a fundamental fault, one which has become ingrained in the culture of the Army.
The ADF is the archetypal hierarchical organisation; mandates come from the top and are acted upon automatically, no-one questions them (publicly at least). This is understandable to some extent … the nature of military operations makes alternative ‘flat’ structures unsuited to the planning and delivery of decisive force at short notice with immediate effect.
The weakness that follows is that it is taken for granted that the way things are done has successfully evolved over time, as a result of the combined experience of those in charge. It is assumed that all options have been considered. In many cases, however, nothing could be further from the truth. The answer is for aculture of continual improvement to be adopted. One in which members at all levels are encouraged to contribute and critique. When ‘Yes, Sir!’ pervades everything, new ideas and initiative wither and the Army is much less than it could be. If we are not mature enough as an organisation to value ‘No, Sir!’, then we have a long way to go.”
The response from the author was:
“As an enlisted soldier one of the biggest sources of low morale is being kept in the dark. To have combat role soldiers exposed and educated in manoeuvre warfare will lead to the enlisted soldiers understanding the bigger picture of the battlespace. A culture change as discussed will not be evolutionary, but a revolutionary change for our Army. The embracement of cognitive thinking soldiers is an untapped resource.”
—————————————————————————————————
6 May 2022
Their Name Liveth for Evermore.
I’ve posted it before, but it deserves another run.
Letter to the Editor, Canberra Times, 29 April 2022:
Mike Reddy’s thoughtful letter (“Our silent dead”, April 28) wonders at the regret that those who died while on active service may feel … not having been able to “marry, have children and enjoy a full life”. This raises an interesting question. Why does the inscription on the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM state “Their Name Liveth for Evermore” and not Their Names Liveth for Evermore?
The words come from Ecclesiasticus: “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”. The Old Testament book explains that there are those who have lived a full life, they married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
There are others, however, who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”. Their name, the one encompassing their reputation (which they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of the old) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. The place in the world that these young men and women could have earned, should they have had the opportunity to live a full life, will live on forever.
——————————————————————————————
29 April 2022
Recent Announcements You May Not be Aware of.
There appear to be problems with the Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) that were not identified in the trials. It’s hard to comment without knowing the full background. Nevertheless, how could things such as difficulty in operating the vehicle at night and vibration problems for passengers, not be picked up during the user trial?
As mentioned last week, cyber security is to be prioritised at the expense of Rapid Force Mobility, something that it is critical to land power. At first blush, it would seem totally out of kilter to increase ADF numbers (as recently announced) while cutting back on fire support and protected mobility. That is, until it realised that none of the increased number actually relate to Army’s land power capability. Unfortunately, there is very little informed debate about defence in Australia. Apathy reigns supreme.
Finally, the School of Armour is to come under the command of RMC, as part of a new Land Combat College. Apparently, the Combined Arms Training Centre was unable to effectively manage land combat education and training. Was this so, or is this simply bureaucratic rationalisation? Reference to a “scalable” capability is interesting. This infers the ability to expand in order to increase training output in time of defence emergency and is a very encouraging sign.
Announcement re LAND 400
“A major Defence project to build up to 450 new, armoured vehicles in Australia [LAND 400 Phase 3] could be dramatically scaled back as the government looks to prioritise military spending in other areas, such as cyber security.
“Military insiders claim Rheinmetall’s Boxer [LAND 400 Phase 2] is experiencing “carbon monoxide toxicity” inside the vehicle, vibration problems for passengers, difficulties operating the vehicle at night-time, delays with passing blast tests and no anti-tank missiles able to be fitted for two years.
Addendum: Canberra Times 2 May 2022: “There’s another massive project [LAND 400], ready to go, which has been caught up in political paralysis and infighting. …. the military’s recommendation [re Ph 3] is in to the national security committee of cabinet. And that’s where it’s stalled.”
Announcement re Land Combat College [School of Armour]
One new initiative I will announce today is the establishment of a Land Combat College.
The need for our training system to be agile and scalable in the generation of Army’s future warfighting capabilities is clear.
A wide-ranging review of Army’s Training Enterprise identified the opportunity to simplify the training system by reorganising its authorities and structures to enhance the focus of professional mastery for our people.
Army will take the first steps to establish a new Land Combat College, to provide a single authority for land combat education and training.
This will improve the simplicity, agility and capacity within our Army to build and strengthen our warfighting capability.
From today, the Combined Arms Training Centre and subordinate schools will be reorganised and grouped under the Royal Military College – Australia.
Underpinned by future-focused industry partnerships, coherence in our training centres will help us generate capability at a greater scale, focus tactical excellence and enhance personnel development and education to suit Army’s total workforce.
This is exactly what our training system must do to unlock the potential in our people and achieve professional mastery in what is an increasingly demanding profession.
Combat Power Beyond 2022: Four New Principles of War
The Principles of War (POW) we ascribe to, have long been studied and advocated in military institutions. Based on the work of the Major General J F C Fuller CB, CBE, DSO, following the First World War, their importance as a foundation for the conduct of warfare, has been reaffirmed over the years. Originally there were nine, with the 10th being added subsequently (referred to as ‘Administration’ at the time, it is now known as ‘Sustainability’).
The pace of technological advances over recent decades has been mirrored in terms of massive changes in the nature and conduct of war. It is technology which is the real driver of changes in our strategic environment and threats to our security, more so than shifts in the political landscape.
Planning for ‘Transforming Land Power’ is inevitable, bringing with it consideration of the need for new Principles of War to define how we come to grips with the evolving battlefield. The current ten Principles are fundamental to operations by the ADF and their continuing relevance is unchallenged. The paradigm shift in technology, however, calls for a revision of our core philosophy regarding the conduct of war. New principles for the guidance of commanders are discussed below.
At present, the biggest threat to national security is that posed by the inherent vulnerability of our computer and electronic systems. Attacks can not only disrupt them, but also manipulate them for ulterior purposes, while providing access to the most sensitive intelligence. This used to be known as electronic warfare, i.e. denying the enemy the ability to reduce our combat effectiveness through communications jamming and intercept. Our exposure today has increased one-hundred-fold. Not only can vital military networks be shut down, but so can those on which the nation’s civilian infrastructure depend.
Given that an aggressor can severely constrain our military capacity and damage our economy without firing a shot, it is not surprising that the Government has moved quickly to allocate $10b over the next decade to strengthen our cyber security (defensive) and countermeasure (offensive) capability. POW 11Cyber-Security: The safeguarding of military command and control networks and weapon systems against enemy disruption, while exploiting the capability to interfere with theirs.
Satellites and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have given military forces an unparalleled ability to conduct battlefield surveillance by day and night, unhindered by weather conditions. UAVs comprise both drones (autonomous control) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV). It is likely that preprogramed drones will be produced in massive numbers, making them expendable and capable of saturation coverage. Both thermal and electronic signatures are like fingerprints in terms of identifying targets, while the slightest change in the landscape can be quickly identified by computerised time-lapse imagery.
It must be assumed that satellites and UAVs will dominate the battlefield of the future. While it is now possible to hide the body heat of a soldier, such technology cannot be relied upon to ensure that the manoeuvre of forces will be able to be concealed in a quest to achieve surprise. A new mindset is required to deny the enemy early warning of deployments. Speed of response will be more and more critical, as will all other measures to compensate for the proliferation of airborne surveillance systems. POW 12 Battlefield Concealment: The ability to conceal the movement and location of manoeuvre forces from the enemy’s satellites and UAVs. As far as is known, there is no present DSTO research project related to this, nor any allocated training priority.
It is the same airborne platforms which can be used to guide missiles, with deadly accuracy, against targets on the ground. Active Protection Systems (APSs) can counter this threat by detecting incoming missiles and initiating explosive devices to defeat them. Such Hard Kill systems can also defend against kinetic energy projectiles. While a DSTO project is current, neither priority nor resources are known to have been allocated in accord with the imperative to transform land power in this respect.
Footage from Ukraine showing the effectiveness of missiles controlled by RPVs, has led to alarm in some commentators, e.g: “The tank is dead!”. Of course, this is nonsense; nevertheless, the battlefield has changed and the ADF must respond to the threat quickly and with conviction. POW 13 Protection Against RPV Controlled Missiles: The ability to protect AFVs and significant targets such as HQ, against precision guided missile attack on the battlefield.
Mobility was one of the original Principles of War, later replaced by Flexibility. It is the degree of mobility inherent in a force which facilitates Surprise, Concentration of Force, Offensive Action and Flexibility. This is the crux of mobile warfare; relying as it does on the ability to travel at speed, cross-country, to close with and engage the enemy. It is well known that any force whose deployment is confined to roads and which lacks protection, cannot succeed on the modern battlefield. Ukraine’s request for Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles is unsurprising in this respect. POW 14Rapid Force Mobility: The ability to maximise combat power though the rapid deployment of forces across all types of terrain, by day and night and in all weather conditions.
The provision of armoured mobility for infantry used to be a role of the RAAC. It is still to be seen whether or not infantry operating their own Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), is the best solution. Despite this, there is no doubting that maximising land force mobility has to be one of Army’s major goals. It was surprising, therefore, to see the following news report:
“A major Defence project to build up to 450 new, armoured vehicles in Australia [LAND 400 Phase 3] could be dramatically scaled back as the government looks to prioritise military spending in other areas, such as cyber security. [https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-04-06/multi-billion-dollar-army-vehicle-project-facing-cutbacks/100968910]
Cyber-Security prioritised at the expense of Rapid Force Mobility … are we serious? One explanation is that a Department of Finance advisor has simply attempted to balance the books without any consideration of the military implications. How can Land Power be transformed for the better, when Rapid Force Mobility is reduced? This is undoubtedly a question for the Australian Army Research Centre to address as a matter of importance.
In conclusion, the rate of technological change occurring necessitates a review of the fundamentals underpinning the conduct of war. The transformation of Land Power, in turn, brings with it new Principles of War for the guidance of commanders. It is clear that the pending reduction in Rapid Force Mobility will significantly reduce the combat power of the land force.
Lt Col Bruce Cameron MC, psc, qtc, aic, CGIA (retd), served in the Australian Regular Army for nineteen years. After commanding the last troop of tanks in action in Vietnam, he completed a number of command, staff and training assignments. His last appointment involved helping to develop Army’s future ground mobility requirements. He left the Army in 1987 to take up a position with the Office of Defence Production. He is the author of ‘Canister! On! FIRE! : Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’ (Big Sky, 2012).
——————————————————————————————-
8 April 2022
The Lack of Accurate Public Information
While I’ve mentioned this previously; it’s worth doing so again.
The information it provides includes: Representative Honorary Colonel [RAAC] is Maj Gen Roger Powell AM and Corps RSM is WO1 Derek Simpson. Neither is correct. The former is Maj Gen Craig Orme DSC AM CSC (Ret’d) and the latter, WO1 Tony Lynch.
The opening page of the website features badges of member associations. These include that of the School of Armour (SOA). This would seem to make sense, as one of the purposes of the Corporation is to “represent the interests of serving and ex-serving members of the RAAC”. But, as becomes clear on the Members’ page, there is no SOA unit association and it is not a member. How then, do members of the RAAC at the SOA make known their views to the RAAC Corporation? If there is no provision, how can the Corporation claim to represent them?
On a different tack … a question on another forum asked whether someone was still classified as being on active service while on R&R. Someone provided the reference to verify this.
I was aware that at least one of those on the AWM Honour Roll died in a car accident on R&R. I posted as follows:
I get annoyed whenever I see “501 Australian servicemen were killed in Vietnam” (as written in school textbooks). The number is that of those listed on the Honour Roll of the AWM.
Problems with the statement are (i) they weren’t all men: (ii) they weren’t all killed … some died of illness, wounds, suicide etc; (iii) deaths didn’t all take place in Vietnam, e.g. a car accident on R&R; (iv) the deaths are only those during the prescribed period of the war which ended on 29 April 1975, all those who died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam after this date are written out of history (DVA say they do not keep any such record).
Someone replied to my post to say: “Surely Bruce if you are going to change the numbers for Vietnam then you would have to look at all wars, starting with Boxer Rebellion where six Australians died of sickness and injury, and none were killed as a result of enemy action. As far as the school curriculum goes the number is not the issue. The cause and effect of the Australian’s involvement are the important factors. Senior history classes do more of a depth study of the war. This can include the aftereffects on both the general public and veterans”.
I responded:
I seek only to have accuracy in public statements made by the Government and its agencies. For it to be correct, the above would read: ‘501 Australian military personnel died, or are presumed to have died, as a consequence of their service in Vietnam during the prescribed period of the Vietnam War’.
———————————————————————————–
1 April 2022
Getting our History Right
In February 2017, I wrote to the Minister, asking for the battle honour [Coral-Balmoral] missing from 1 Armd Regt’s Standard to be emblazoned: “Why should those former members of 1st Armoured Regiment who fought and earned three battle honours for Vietnam, only be able to see two of them emblazoned on their Regiment’s Standard? Why should members of that Regiment today, not be able to fully appreciate the significance of all the battle honours their forebears were awarded? A few weeks later, the Minister replied to say that this would be done (while also correcting an error with the Vietnam theatre honour). The photo above shows Coral-Balmoral emblazoned, together with the amended theatre honour Vietnam 1968-71 [not 1972 as it had been].
The following listing is contained in each edition of ‘Paratus’, the 1st Armd Regt Association’s newsletter.
“1st ARMOURED REGIMENT
Theatres of Operation: Japan (1st Armd Car Sqn); Sth Vietnam
Theatre Honour: STH VIETNAM 1968-1971
Battle Honours: Coral – Balmoral; Hat Dich; Binh Ba
Rhodesia; Cambodia; East Timor; Iraq; Solomon Islands; Afghanistan.”
If this is correct, why aren’t all battle honours emblazoned on the Standard?
The only battle honours awarded to 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, were those for Vietnam. The Regiment has not deployed in sub-unit strength or greater on active service elsewhere. I believe the references to later campaigns is intended to indicate that individual members of 1 Armd Regt served there. A separate heading should be provided to make this clear.
Other corrections needed to ‘Paratus’:
(i) The theatre honour is not ‘STH VIETNAM 1968-1971’, it’s ‘VIETNAM 1968-71’ and
(ii) The heading ‘1st Armoured Regiment’ presupposes RAAC; however, when 1st Armd Car Sqn participated in BCOF in Japan in 1946-48, it was part of the AAC. The above should read: ‘Japan, 1st Armd Car Sqn, AAC)’.
(iii) As above, the heading ‘1st Armoured Regiment’ presupposes RAAC. As it stands, it fails to account for WWII theatres of operation and battle honours related to 1st Armoured Regiment, AAC. The heading needs to be amended to read: ‘1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC’.
[In an earlier Blog I mentioned that the link on the Assn’s website to its newsletters was to be found under the heading ‘Constitution’. The link has now been moved to ‘News’. Well done, the C’tee.]
—————————————————————————————-
25 March 2022
Lack of Understanding re the Need for AFVs
Recent Blog posts have lamented the lack of public justification for AFVs in the ADF and suggested a point-by-point explanation as to their critical importance. Given the lack of this, the media is flooded with criticism related to the purchase of tanks and CRVs/IFVs.
At least the Canberra Times is even-handed. Following a recent article criticising Australia’s intention to purchase IFVs, the paper published a letter to the editor under the headline: “$27 billion to replace the APCs is completely over the top”. The letter writer went on the state: “We have never needed to use IFVs to fight anyone in Australia”.
The following day my letter was published with the heading block: “It does not follow that Ukraine’s successful employment of drones against Russian tanks makes Australia’s intended purchase of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) redundant”
The full letter is copied below:
“Bradley Perrett’s article ‘War highlights army’s big mistake’ (CT, 12 Mar 22, p43) makes it evident on the one hand, that he is an experienced journalist, and on the other, that he has never served in the military. If he had, he would know that the weapon systems which are ideal when defending a locality, are very different to those which are ideal when attacking and securing an objective.
This being the case, it does not follow that Ukraine’s successful employment of drones against Russian tanks, makes Australia’s intended purchase of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) redundant. Drones, for example, are unable to capture an objective, nor hold ground.
It is not feasible for modern armies to equip their forces solely for either defensive or offensive operations. For good reason, flexibility is one of the Principles of War and units operating IFVs must be adaptable as circumstances change. It is not only tactics and force composition which will enable IFVs to counter the threat posed by drones in the future. When fitted with Active Protection Systems (APS), IFVs will have an ability to destroy missiles and projectiles fired at them.”
It was pleasing to see a letter in support of mine, the next day. The headline stated “When the bullets are flying you want some protective armour”. It was written by a former infantryman who had served in Vietnam. Part of it stated: “And that’s what these vehicles do: they provide protection for infantry to get up close, unexposed, plus providing a dirty great cannon at close quarters to encourage the enemy to keep their heads down. Their use stems from lessons learnt the hard way in previous conflicts.” It’s a pity the RAAC Corporation isn’t loud and proud at the forefront of issues such as this. As usual, they are MIA. Their infantry equivalent, the RAR Association, doesn’t hesitate to take the lead on such issues. https://www.rarnational.org.au/
—————————————————————————————-
18 March 2022
Fifty Years Later, the Professionalism is the Same
(CO, Paul Giles, Bruce Cameron, RSM)
It was to have taken place on Cambrai Day 2021, however, three days beforehand, South Australia closed its borders due to COVID. So it was that 3 March 2022 saw a number of us from C Squadron 1971, make presentations to C Squadron 2022. All is explained in the following (a copy of my speech).
“Commanding Officer, RSM, OC and members of C Squadron, ladies and gentlemen,
I want to start off by saying that there are TWO presentations, not one, to be made this morning. The first is for the CO to receive.
All will become clear as I read from a Deed of Transfer, entitled ‘Black Beret and Silver Badge’.
‘The Ballad of the Green Berets’ by Barry Sadler, a medic with US Special Forces in Vietnam, was very popular in 1968. At the time, Bill Burton and John Atkins were tank crew commanders with C Squadron and they adapted the words of Sadler’s ballad to reflect the spirit of their unit. It became a very popular ‘theme song’ among tank crews who were on active service for the first time since the Second World War.
Many years later, the lyrics of ‘Black Beret and a Silver Badge’ were rediscovered during one of Bill Burton’s removals. He saw this as an opportunity to recreate history and raise funds for wounded veterans.
John Atkins’ daughter Natalie, takes after her father in terms of musical talent. She is a very accomplished singer-songwriter and wrote the backing track in honour of her father and his operational service. Recently, however, she realised that that there were many more soldiers suffering in similar ways, following their involvement in recent conflicts. Natalie rededicated ‘What Does He See?’ to all of Australia’s soldiers.
Welcoming the opportunity to contribute in honour of Australia’s servicemen and women, some of Australia’s leading musicians came together voluntarily to produce the recording. The tracks proved very popular and have been highly acclaimed.
With fundraising efforts now complete, a number of cds remain.
Colonel Henderson, please accept this Deed of Transfer and gift of these recordings in the spirit of creating a bond across generations; linking the 1st Armoured Regiment of fifty years ago with 1st Armoured Regiment of today. It is our wish that you might sell or gift these cds for the benefit of 1st Armoured Regiment’s soldiers.
We now come to the second presentation and we should further introduce ourselves. We’re all former members of C Squadron from 1971. I was a troop leader and I’m joined by three gunner/sigs, all of whom are from South Australia: Kim Bayly; Paul Giles and Bo Janic.
The background to today involves a 50th Anniversary dinner that was held in June last year. Those present generously made donations to cover some unexpected costs. When a surplus resulted, it was unanimously agreed to use this to make a presentation to today’s C Squadron on behalf of those who went 50 years before. This reflects the enormous goodwill that former members have for those of you serving today.
It’s amazing to think that if the same presentation had been given to us in 1971, it would have been made by those not long back from the First World War. I don’t know what they might have said to us, but the following are some thoughts that our mob suggested were worthy of passing on today.
I’ll start with my favourite: ‘Everything is not always as it seems. After a while, we realized that the chopper we could see, was not the one we were giving directions to’.
Another one: ‘You can let yourself down; but not your crew.
[Kim Bayly]:
‘Your mates are worth more than anything else; the long-standing friendships with many of my mates, are priceless.
[Paul Giles]:
‘Cherish the friendships you have today; we all tread different paths as the years go by, but because of your shared experiences, you could end up with mates who are closer than family’.
[Bo Janic]:
‘Fifty years on means that I have many brothers who would support me ‘at the drop of a hat’; the camaraderie we have is comforting in many ways.
———————————————–
Finally, a word about the montage we’ve put together. Our aim was to reflect the differing aspects of our service 50 years ago. Background to all the images has been recorded and laminated as a way of preserving this aspect of our mutual history. Details as to how to order prints are included.
Major Joseph, we hope that there might be a suitable place for it, possibly somewhere like C Squadron Headquarters or the Mick Rainey MM Club.
I’ll now ask Bo Janic, who was closely involved in its making, to unveil our presentation.
Thank you.”
————————————————————————————-
11 March 2022
The Need for Tanks
The following is an extract from my article ‘The Tank Capability of the Future’. It highlights the essential role of the tank … providing fire support for infantry.
“The Abrams tank is adequate today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams tank capability look like?
The answer has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank capability, as part of a combined arms force underpinning land operations. The fact that the next ‘tank’ may not be anything like the Abrams, is without dispute.
What does such a direct fire capability need to provide? The answer is, as it has ‘always’ been: lethality, survivability, and mobility, under all extremes of climate and terrain.”
In recent blogs, I’ve been advocating the need for an RAAC media strategy to set out in succinct points, the need for tanks in the ADF.
A democracy means freedom of speech; freedom of speech means that some articles that appear in the media will be without foundation. It is to be hoped that these will be countered by others expressing the facts and setting the record straight. It is regrettable that the RAAC and related organisations, opt out of any such responsibility. The RAAC ‘Ambassador’ Group (Honorary Colonel, Head of Corps, the RAAC Corporation, and the RAAC Association) have no public voice (or more correctly, have no public voice that they’re prepared to, or able to, use).
Will the question asked below be answered? I doubt it, much to the detriment of the RAAC and the ADF.
Can someone in government explain why we are buying tanks? By Mike Scrafton, Feb 24, 2022
When did US generals become arbiters of Australia’s strategic policy like it’s some banana republic?
The grand theatre of the second world war, featuring the stunning blitzkrieg, the decisive role of tanks on the Eastern front, and General Patton’s legendary Normandy breakout, has generated a persistent mystique around tanks. Many generals would see a tankless Army as incomplete.
The European Plain, which runs along northern Europe, stretching from the Bay of Biscay to the Ural Mountains, and from the Black Sea to the Arctic Basin, was made for tank operations. There were vast spaces for manoeuvre, and military theatres were contiguous so that tanks could be deployed with relative ease by road and rail. In the twentieth century, and in the European environment, tanks were formidable weapon systems.
Not so much in the twenty-first century. This is despite US General Charles Flynn’s argument that “in the future for a peer, or near-peer fight, that the impact of combined arms manoeuvre, particularly in dense urban areas, you’re gonna want armour forces, you’re gonna need tanks”. Maybe the Americans have a military requirement for tanks. It hard to imagine the Australian need.
Does the ADF envisage a grand battle across the wide expanses of Northern Australia? It seems self-evident that any force capable of invading Australia is likely to be well-equipped with drones and stand-off weapons. Even if Australia’s tanks could get to where an invasion occurred in time, they would be subject to being outflanked by modern forces, or destroyed with precision missiles. Sitting ducks!
Surely the ADF is not planning on deploying tanks beyond Australia, which is the implication in General Flynn’s comments that tanks are required for “combined arms manoeuvre” in a land war against China or Russia in Eurasia. Because that’s what the Americans mean when they say a “a peer, or near-peer fight”.
And where would Australia need tanks for manoeuvre combat in “dense urban areas”; Sydney, Brisbane, or Darwin? Surely that’s not the justification for buying tanks.
If not in Australia, where would Australia deploy tanks; Guangzhou, Shanghai, or maybe, even more ridiculously, repelling the advancing peer powers on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok, or Surabaya? Or Kyiv? Or Bucharest? Or Tbilisi? Urban warfare is just not a reasonable argument for an Australian tank acquisition.
When did US generals become arbiters of Australia’s strategic policy like it’s some banana republic? Does the Army need the endorsement of the Pentagon? Why does the media simply uncritically report the nonsensical utterances of foreign military officers as though they are authoritative and objective?
And can someone in government explain why we are buying tanks.
Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
———————————————————————————–
4 March 2022
The Fifth Generation Tank
Some time ago, I wrote an article entitled ‘The Tank Capability of the Future’. It was published by Army’s professional education newsletter, ‘The Cove’. (I subsequently received a prize for the most read article during that period … very encouraging re interest in the subject.)
An extract is copied below (full article, Blog post 32 Jan 21), the point being efforts being made to lighten the weight of the next generation of tanks (the fifth) as per the article re the US Army which follows at the end.
“Many arguments have been advanced that, whether crewed or optionally crewed, the weight of a direct fire support capability has to be reduced to enable it to be deployable in all contingencies. This is especially so in terms of ADF planning. How can this be achieved, while maintaining requisite protection levels?
Volume under armour is the biggest impost on the weight of an AFV. Reducing the size of the crew by incorporating an autoloader was the answer at one time, but the lethality of anti-armour weapons is now so advanced, that this is no longer enough. The current Russian T-14 Armata MBT is one solution. The crew is within a ‘cocoon’ in the hull of vehicle, below the external gun and autoloader. Considerable weight is saved without having to protect crew members in their own turret.
As well as the provision of an Active Protection System (APS) for certain vehicles, the Strategic Update (above) also made reference to: “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks.”
Such a weapon is suggestive of a laser, but is unlikely in terms of defeating AFVs in the foreseeable future. Another possibility is a ‘rail gun’. Neither of these technological breakthroughs, however, will resolve the main challenge facing the replacement tank capability.
The APS, however, might be part of the solution. Such systems have been demonstrated to be capable of defeating attack by ATGM and RPGs. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be significantly reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this is feasible: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. If this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary.https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round (Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC.) BUT…what about attack from above? It’s been proposed that low-cost drones could be employed en mass to attack AFVs from above. Will an APS be able to counter this?
If protection is able to be increased and weight reduced … will this be sufficient for a direct fire capability to be deployed on the future battlefield? It has been suggested that a new grouping of complementary force capabilities will be needed in the future, i.e. traditional organisational structures will no longer be adequate.”
U.S. Army’s New Lightweight Tank (courtesy Ray Payne, 26 January 2022)
Picture: Russian 2S25 Sprut-SD air-transportable light tank
The US Army plans to build prototypes in the next several years of a new lightweight Mobile Protected Firepower armoured vehicle expected to change land war by outmatching Russian equivalents and bringing a new dimension to advancing infantry as it maneuvers toward enemy attack.
Long-range precision fire, coordinated air-ground assault, mechanized force-on-force armoured vehicle attacks and drone threats are all changing so quickly that maneuvering US Army infantry now needs improved firepower to advance on major adversaries in war, Army leaders explain
“Mobile Protected Firepower helps you because you can get off-road. Mobility can help with lethality and protection because you can hit the adversary before they can disrupt your ability to move,” Rickey Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9, TRADOC, told Warrior Maven in an interview earlier this year.
Smith did not elaborate on any precise weight but did stress that the effort intends to find the optimal blend of lethality, mobility and survivability. Senior Army leaders, however, do say that the new MPF will be more survivable and superior than its Russian equivalent.
The Russian 2S25 Sprut-SD air-transportable light tank, according to Russian news reports, weighs roughly 20 tons and fires a 125mm smoothbore gun. It is designed to attack tanks and support amphibious, air or ground operations. The vehicle has been in service since 2005. US Army weapons developers have said their MPF will likely be heavier to ensure a higher level of protection for US soldiers.
In light of these kinds of near-peer adversaries with longer-range sensors, more accurate precision fires and air support for a mechanized ground assault, the Army is acutely aware that its maneuvering infantry requires armoured, mobile firepower.
Current Abrams tanks, while armed with 120mm cannons and fortified by heavy armour, are challenged to support infantry in some scenarios due to weight and mobility constraints.
Accordingly, Smith explained that Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), expected to operate in a more expansive battlespace, will require deployable, fast-moving close-to-contact direct fire support. This fast-changing calculus, based on knowledge of emerging threats and enemy weapons, informs an Army need to close the threat gap by engineering the MPF vehicle.
While referred to by some as a “light tank,” Army officials specify that plans for the new platform seek to engineer a mobile combat platform able to deploy quickly. The MPF represents an Army push toward more expeditionary warfare and rapid deployability. Therefore, it is no surprise that two MPFs are being built to fit on an Air Force C-17 aircraft.
Rapid deployability is of particular significance in areas such as Europe, where Russian forces, for instance, might be in closer proximity to US or NATO forces.
———————————————————————————————–
25 February 2022
Politics Trumps Doing the Right Thing
A World Cup qualifying match took place in Melbourne on 27 January 2022 between the Socceroos and Vietnam. Members of the Australian Vietnamese community attended to support the Socceroos, some carrying flags of the former South Vietnam or wearing clothing bearing its image (eg. a tee-shirt with the words ‘Thank You Australia’ above the flag).
Those in possession of such items were denied entry to the stadium (their Australian flags were allowed). Police confiscated a scarf made in the design of the flag; when asked why, they declined to respond.
There is no basis to argue that a confrontation could have been triggered. Australian society is not divided in that way. The only plausible reason is that it was done to placate the Communist Party of Vietnam on political grounds. This has happened before. A statue commemorating the Vietnam War was to be unveiled in Melbourne. Vietnam asked the Victorian Government not to allow the former Vietnamese flag to be flown. This request was supported and the directive passed to the function organisers. It was ignored.
More recently, at the 50th Anniversary commemoration of Operation Overlord, DVA refused to recognise the President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia (the senior representative in Australia of those on whose behalf, and together with, we fought). No reason was provided.
Where does such discrimination stand vis a vis Australian democracy and human rights? Our country welcomed almost 200,000 refugees following the Vietnam War. Many of those who remained in Vietnam underwent compulsory ‘re-education’. Is the same being done here, albeit more subtly?
The Vietnamese diaspora have adopted the former South Vietnamese flag as a reminder of the appreciation they owe Australia and the hardships they were forced to endure in getting here. Is it right that they be denied their heritage, for the sake of political correctness?
—————————————————————————-
18 February 2022
The RAAC in the Public Eye
I’ve written about this before …
RAAC tank, cavalry, reconnaissance, and APC units haven’t existed for over five years. But nobody would know according to ‘official’ sources. It would seem that no-one wishes to tell the public about armoured cavalry regiments, or the fact that the RAAC no longer operates APCs. The examples are endless …
“Units of the RAAC include tank regiments, reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel carrier regiments.” RAAC Corporation website: http://www.raaccorpltd.org.au/
One might have thought that the RAAC Corporation, above all others, would keep the RAAC public info up to date.
“The main types of [ARA] Armoured Corps units are:
The tank regiment – The tank regiment operates the Abrams main battle tank. The Regiment’s manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. The role of the tank, in coordination with other arms, is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, manoeuvre and shock action.
The cavalry regiments – The cavalry regiments operate the ASLAV and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle. A cavalry unit’s personnel and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks. The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate, and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.
“Drive formidable armoured vehicles such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers or combat reconnaissance vehicles; operating their weapons and managing basic maintenance.”
Someone forgot to mention that an “Armoured Vehicle Crew Trooper (Armoured Cavalry)” no longer has anything to do with APCs. Defence Jobs website: ttps://www.defencejobs.gov.au/jobs/army/armoured-vehicle-crew
According to the RAAC Corporation, the Abram equips 1 Armd Regt and the ASLAV is used with 2 Cav and 2/14 QMI. This was correct, of course, before Armoured Cavalry Regiments were introduced.
The Rep Hon Col is stated to be Maj Gen Roger Powell AM (Ret’d); but it’s not. Maj Gen Craig Orme, DSC, AM, CSC (Ret’d), now fills this appointment.
The Corps RSM is stated to be WO1 Derek Simpson; but it’s not. WO1 Tony Lynch now fills this appointment.
“Although the RAAC has a common corps badge, each unit has its own badge, motto and individual traditions”. Given that School of Armour personnel wear the Corps badge, this should read: “Although the RAAC has a common corps badge, each regiment has its own badge, motto and individual traditions”.
“The Corps was formed on 9 July 1941 as the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) to provide personnel to use Armoured Fighting Vehicles. The Corps has its origins in the Australian Tank Corps (ATC) which was formed in 1928.“ July 1941 was the date of gazettal of the AAC; on this basis, 1927 should be given as the date of formation of the ATC.
“The main battle tanks that have seen service in the [1st Armoured] Regiment have been the Churchill, the Centurion Mk.5 … “. Wrong. Neither the Churchill nor Centurion were MBTs. The first MBT was the UK Chieftain. It was designed as a single tank to replace both the Centurion (medium gun tank) and the Conqueror (heavy gun tank).
“Various other vehicles including the Ferret Scout Car, the Saracen APC, M113A1 and the M548 Tracked Load Carrier have been utilised in the unit [1 Armd Regt] in surveillance, support and command roles.” It is a moot point as to whether ‘surveillance’ is correct in this context; however, ‘reconnaissance’ should definitely be included.
I could go on and on, but I think I’m speaking to those who don’t want to hear.
——————————————————————————
13 February 2022
I Couldn’t Let it go by …
From a C’tee letter to members of the 1AR Assn: “The Management Committee agreed that the Secretary should follow-up with other accounting professionals [because the cost of an auditor was thought to be excessive].. It was also agreed that the matter should be referred to the next AGM as it was felt that an audit/review be conducted each three (3) years to ensure that the Secretary and Treasurer were provided with a level of comfort and protection“.
It’s great that the Assn’s financial affairs now appear to be well managed, but I had always thought that an independent review was undertaken to protect the interests of members, rather than providing comfort and protection for C’tee members. Seems to me that whenever the C’tee’s interests are put ahead of those of members, there is something amiss.
—————————————————————————–
11 February 2022
Credit Where Credit’s Due
How tremendous it is when efforts by someone, doing the right thing on behalf of someone else, pay dividends. So it was recently. The emails copied below are my expression of appreciation, together with the responses I received. It was great to see that I was not the only one to appreciate the efforts of the person concerned. Part of the background to the matter is provided by the Blog post from 30 June 2022 (at end).
Dear[Official Secretary],
My tank was hit by an enemy anti-tank rocket in Vietnam in 1971. Although severely wounded, the driver, Trooper Peter Cadge, thought the tank was on fire and attempted to go to the rescue of those of us in the turret. He was Mentioned in Dispatches for his selflessness and bravery. Unfortunately, his mid certificate became badly faded over the passing years. Wanting it to be part of his estate, he contacted Defence to see if a replacement might be available. After numerous requests to no avail (the legacy of his wounds created difficulties for him communicating), he thought that it was a lost cause. When I became aware of the situation, I contacted the Honours Secretariat. (I had been an ADC to Sir Zelman Cowen in 1979.) When she became aware of the situation, Ms Kaye Browning showed enormous initiative; culminating in a replacement being provided from St James Palace. It was intended that the new certificate be presented at a reunion dinner in Canberra in June 2021. Ms Browning requested priority handling and the certificate arrived in time. Your Office facilitated what is possibly the only replacement of an mid certificate for an Australian recipient.
As it happened, Peter was unable to attend the function because of Covid restrictions. Although these have persisted in Melbourne, a surprise presentation was made at a Cadge family dinner at Greensborough RSL on 27 January 2022. Peter was overcome to know that someone at Government House in Canberra could go to so much trouble on his behalf. He asked me to pass on his appreciation to all involved.
——————————————————–
Dear Mr Cameron,
Thank you for your email and for taking the time to provide this valuable feedback. I remember this situation well, and am thrilled to hear that Peter has been presented with his replacement MID certificate.
At the Office, we are blessed to have such professional and dedicated staff who are committed to ensuring that we celebrate and recognise extraordinary achievement and service. Kaye is a tremendous example of that, and I know that she would not let this go until there had been a successful outcome. I will forward your kind words to her.
You must have some wonderful memories from your time as an ADC. Sir Zelman was a remarkable man. Again, thank you for writing.
Dear Bruce,
What a wonderful email to receive! Thank you so much for taking the time to provide this lovely feedback.
I am happy to say that the experience you have had with Kaye Browning is not out of character. Kaye is known for going above and beyond what is expected, whether it be to help a fellow colleague or the general public. I am happy to report that last week, Kaye was selected as one of four individual staff members at the Office to receive an Australia Day Achievement Medallion for her work. Kaye’s passion, dedication, empathy and resilience enhance the Office’s performance every day and are in inspiration to those around her.
I am glad that Peter Cadge was also able to benefit from Kaye’s kindness and dedication to helping those around her. Thanks again – and I will be sure to pass on your feedback to Kaye and her supervisor in the Honours and Awards Secretariat. Kind regards,
——————————————————————————————————–
30 June 2020: Thank You for Your Service: What a Joke!
My intended Blog post for today, has been delayed until tomorrow. That below is much more pressing. Our bureaucratic mind set is simply unbelievable. Australia is heading in the wrong direction if this philosophy gains traction! I sent the following email to Defence ‘Customer Support’ yesterday:
“Help Please
In 1971, Peter, my tank driver received very serious head wounds in Vietnam, resulting in him being Totally and Permanently Incapacitated. Because of the gallantry he displayed at the time, he was Mentioned in Dispatches. He wishes to leave his mid certificate to his daughter [in his Will], however, it is very badly faded and he would like to obtain a replacement.
Enquires were made and it was recommended that he apply to Defence Records. Peter did this in February 2021. As he hadn’t heard anything in response, I enquired on his behalf today.
I was advised that it was an Honours and Awards matter. I asked if Peter’s email request and the copy of his mid certificate (that he sent to Defence records) could be forwarded to Defence Honours and Awards. I was told that Defence records either can’t, or aren’t allowed to, communicate with Defence Honours and Awards.
I made a new enquiry to Defence Honours and Awards. I was told that I couldn’t make an inquiry on someone else’s behalf, because of privacy provisions. It was confirmed that Honours and Awards could not access the information held by Defence Records … an application had to be made by the person concerned. I explained that this was difficult for Peter, because of his wounds.
An alternative was found! My request could be considered on the basis of being a non-specific enquiry, ie. what is the process, as a general question, for obtaining a replacement mid certificate?
Hopefully you (ie. Defence Honours and Awards) will receive this general enquiry in due course. The above is sent in the hope that it might provide background to assist in responding to the request.
Many thanks ….”.
————————————————————————————-
4 February 2022
Getting Our History Right
The Media Release below contains a number of errors. Advice has been provided by another that Nui Lei should be spelt Nui Le and that there is no justification to refer to Ap My An in lieu of Operation Bribie (indeed to do so is very confusing to veterans).
For my part, I’ve informed the Minister’s Media Officer that:
“In the spirit of historical accuracy, I’d like to draw attention to another error.
The Minister states that: “Almost 60,000 Australians served in the Vietnam War, 521 lost their lives” and “I will be working closely with the Vietnam veteran community to ensure the funding announced today delivers a program of events that honours all Australians who served in the Vietnam conflict”.
The issue relates to whether or not the Minister is referring to all Australian service personnel or all Australians who served in Vietnam. Given that 521 Australian servicemen and women lost their lives, it would seem that the former is intended. References should clarify this by referring to ‘Australian service personnel’.
It means, of course, that there is no acknowledgment of the Australian journalists, entertainers, Red Cross members and civilian nurses (almost 200 alone) who served their nation during the Vietnam War. If, indeed, it is intended to honour ‘all Australians’, then the 60,000 figure will need to be increased and 521 will need to be amended to include civilian losses. It should be noted that DVA state that “approx. 61,000 people [Australians] served in Vietnam” (https://nominal-rolls.dva.gov.au/vietnamWar).
Another area of confusion is that the media release refers to 2023 as “the 50th anniversary of the end of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War”. According to the AWM’s public information, the “defined end date of the [Vietnam] conflict” and “the cut-off date for inclusion on the Roll of Honour”, is 29 April 1975.
I hope the above information may be of value,
Yours sincerely ….
Medianet Release
12 Jan 2022 9:11 AM AEST – MEDIA RELEASE – THE HON ANDREW GEE – COMMEMORATING THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR The Hon Andrew Gee MP Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Minister for Defence Personnel Federal Member for Calare MEDIA RELEASE 12 January 2022 COMMEMORATING THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF AUSTRALIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR Planning is underway for a range of significant events around the country to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War in 2023. Minister for Veterans’ Affairs and Defence Personnel, Andrew Gee, announced that the Australian Government has committed $6 million to ensure this important milestone is marked with appropriate respect and appreciation for all those who served and those who gave their lives in Vietnam. “Australia owes our Vietnam veterans an enormous debt of gratitude,” Minister Gee said. “Almost 60,000 Australians served in the Vietnam War, 521 lost their lives and more than 3,000 were wounded. We honour and remember the service and sacrifice of each and every one of them. “At places like Long Tan, Nui Lei, Binh Ba, Coral and Balmoral, Ap My An and many others, Australians served with distinction, in the finest traditions of our armed forces. Our country should be very proud of all they achieved. “Commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict will be an important opportunity for Australians to express the pride, gratitude and respect of the nation. “The Vietnam War and its aftermath exacted a heavy toll on all those who served and their families. The treatment of our diggers upon their return home by some of their fellow Australians remains a source of hurt and pain for many. The 50 year commemoration is another important step in helping to heal the wounds that were inflicted back in Australia. “I will be working closely with the Vietnam veteran community to ensure the funding announced today delivers a program of events that honours all Australians who served in the Vietnam conflict. “The centrepiece will be a national commemorative service at the Australian Vietnam Forces National Memorial on Anzac Parade in Canberra. “We owe the men and women who served in Vietnam nothing less than a commemorative program that reflects their extraordinary service and sacrifice. Our country will always be grateful for it and we will never, ever, forget it,” Minister Gee said. Further announcements on the details of specific commemorations and the consultation process will be made on the Department of Veterans’ Affairs website in due course. ENDS
——————————————————————————————
4 February 2022
The Power of the Media to Misinform.
(This image, used in the publication to illustrate the article below, is supposedly representative of an Abrams tank.)
A democracy means freedom of speech; freedom of speech means that some articles that appear in the media will be without foundation. It is to be hoped that these will be countered by others expressing the facts and setting the record straight. It is regrettable that the RAAC and related organisations, opt out of any such responsibility. The RAAC ‘Ambassador’ Group (Honorary Colonel, Head of Corps, the RAAC Corporation, and the RAAC Association) have no public voice (or more correctly, have no public voice that they’re prepared to, or able to, use). So it is that articles such as that below, go unchallenged (https://johnmenadue.com/treadmarks-on-the-taxpayer-australias-3-5-billion-tank-folly/)
Treadmarks on the taxpayer: Australia’s $3.5 billion tank folly by Binoy Kampmark
(Currently lecturing at the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Kampmark writes extensively for various publications, including CounterPunch, Dissident Voice, and Eureka Street. This article has been widely published in different forums.)
“On January 10, the minister announced that Australia will spend $3.5 billion on 120 tanks and an assortment of other armoured vehicles, including 29 assault breacher vehicles and 17 joint assault bridge vehicles. All will be purchased from the US military machine. This will also include 75 M1A2 main battle tanks, which will replace the 59 Abrams M1A1s, purchased in 2007 and kept in blissful quarantine, untouched by actual combat.
Dutton declared that, “[t]eamed with the Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Combat Engineering Vehicles, and self-propelled howitzers, the new Abrams will give our soldiers the best possibility of success and protection from harm.”
Chief of Army Lieutenant General Rick Burr was also of the view that, “The main battle tank is at the core of the ADF’s Combined Arms Fighting System, which includes infantry, artillery, communications, engineers, attack helicopters and logistics.” Tanks were versatile creatures, able to be “used in a wide range of scenarios, environments and levels of conflict in the region.”
So much for reporting the news; what follows is pure misinformation and vitriol in support of the author’s political views.
To dispel any notion that this purchase simply confirmed Australian deference and obedience to US military power, the Defence Minister also claimed that the new Abrams “will incorporate the latest development in Australian sovereign capabilities, including command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems, and benefit from the intended manufacture of tank ammunition in Australia.
“In other words, once Australia finishes with these cherished, dear imports, adjusted as they are bound to be for the ADF, they are more likely to be extortionately priced museum pieces rather than operable weapons of flexible deployment.”
This latest tank infatuation is yet another example of how parts of the Australian Defence Force and the public service can never be accused of being historically informed, at least in any meaningfully accurate way. The same goes for the current minister, hardly a bookworm of the history muse Cleo.
The last time Australia deployed tanks in combat was during the Vietnam War, that other grand failure of military adventurism. They were never used in Australia’s engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite being lauded as being a necessary vehicle in beating down insurgency movements.
The 2016 Defence White Paper left room for a range of scenarios that make little mention of tanks. It labours over the US-China relationship, “the enduring threat of terrorism” emanating from “ungoverned parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia”, notes the threats posed by “state fragility” and the “emergence of new complex, non-geographic threats, including cyber threats to the security of information and communications systems.” At best, it throws away a line without elaboration: that the ADF will need “tank upgrades and new combat engineering equipment”.
Critics of the purchase have included otherwise hawkish pundits such as Greg Sheridan of The Australian, who spent some of last year shaking his head at the proposed acquisition after it was announced by the US Defence Cooperation Agency. The decision, he opined unleashing his talons, was one of “sheer idiocy”, an “anachronistic frivolity”. Tanks and other heavy, tracked vehicles would “never be of the slightest military use to us.”
Sheridan poses a range of questions. In any confrontation with China, could a tank defend shipping in the South China Sea? Or “take out enemy submarines?” Or “deliver attack missiles over hundreds of kilometres?” His solutions: buy more jets, manufacture more drones, and address naval capabilities.
Others also argue that Dutton, were he to be genuinely interested in Australia’s security and safety, would be spending more time on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and coping with the threats posed by climate change, or investing in pandemic responses. Now that would be a big ask.
The tank fraternity, a gathering of near cultic loyalty, are swooning in triumph. As Peter J. Dean, director of the Defence and Security Institute at the University of Western Australia remarked last year, their membership has never proven shy. Cults tend to show that utility is secondary to the importance of steadfast faith.”
Need for Media Strategy. The errors above are readily apparent. Unchallenged, they are accepted: a $3.5 billion tank folly; Australia doesn’t need tanks; the money is wasted; history clearly shows that it’s a mistake, and so on. The opening para referred to the need to counter such nonsense with the facts. How should this be done? In essence, a co-ordinated response. If everyone expressed their own opinion, the effect would be diminished, compared to that which could be gained by repeating critical arguments in accord with a common strategy. The HOC has sponsored a very comprehensive paper in support of the need for tanks. It is unrealistic to think that the HOC can respond to each and every naysayer who is published, a situation which results in negative views holding sway. A simple framework, such as a list of ‘talking points’, is needed to draw together arguments in support of the need for tanks.
———————————————————————————————-
21 January 2022
1 Armoured Regiment Association: Continuing Problems With Culture.
It would help in understanding this post, for readers to refer to the Blog post for 3 December 2021. This copied the list of annual awards to soldiers of Armd Regt. There was no mention of 1AR Assn awards, and, as all but two were ‘named’ awards, I stated that “It would seem that the 1 Armd Regt Assn awards were those presented for Support Soldier and Tradesman of the Year. I would ask the 1AR Assn C’tee, but their publicly stated policy is not to respond to any correspondence from me.”
The awards were subsequently featured in the latest 1AR Assn Newsletter. See https://www.paratus.org.au/. Interestingly, to find the Newsletters, you have to click on ‘Constitution’. Given that the Assn C’tee obviously read this Blog (see below), maybe it’s something which will be corrected in due course.
Anyway … to the point. Included in the Newsletter’s listing was: “R.E Bird Cup for Soldier of the Year – LCPL C. Schwenke – A SQN (Association Award) Bradbury Trophy for JNCO of the Year – LCPL D. Joyce – SPT SQN (Association Award)”. A photo was captioned as: “Regimental Awards Table (Lighthorse statues are 1AR Assoc awards) for JNCO of the year and Soldier of the year”.
The above makes clear that winners of the R E Bird Cup and Bradbury Trophy not only have their names inscribed on the perpetual trophies, but also receive an individual award from the Assn. (and a very nice one too). The reasoning I used in the 3 December Blog post re Support Soldier and Tradesman of the Year, clearly led to the wrong conclusion. This said … it is here that the 1AR Assn C’tee reveal their pettiness. The Newsletter went on to say:
Famous Quotes Donald Rumsfeld once famously said: “There are known knowns, things we know that we know; and there are known unknowns, things that we know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns, things we do not know we don’t know.” An unidentified source also famously said: “Those people who assume are just making an ‘ass of U and Me”! Is there a difference between ‘seem’ and ‘assume’? Perhaps not! One cannot say ‘that it would seem’ unless one is in the full possession of all the facts, otherwise it is just a guess or an assumption.
The C’tee alleges that when I stated that “it would seem that the 1AR Assn awards were …”, I was simply assuming that this was so. Is this correct? No. Assume means to ‘accept something to be true without question or proof’; ‘seem’ means ‘to give the impression of being something’ or to be ‘judged to be something’.
PS. On 3 December I asked: “Does anyone know the origins of the Cupka Cup for the best troop corporal?” I assume that the 1 AR Assn C’tee doesn’t know (or it would have been explained).
———————————————————————————————————
14 January 2022
Anarchy Becoming More Common
There are a number of memorials in Lennox Gardens/Canberra Peace Park. Two are in honour of women who were killed in their homelands for speaking out about human rights. Both comprise rectangular brass plaques set onto marble bases. A third memorial has an identical marble base, but the brass plaque giving details of the person honoured and the reason that they were killed, has been prised off and removed. Presumably the perpetrator is not a supporter of the beliefs advocated by the deceased.
Can such action be condoned? Recent events such as the willful damage inflicted on Old Parliament House, suggest that a resort to anarchy is becoming the norm and the Rule of Law is no longer our mainstay. Of course, the rampage at the US Capitol provides a template here. Seems to me that one of the indicators that a Nation is a civilised one is that opposing political views are expressed and debated without recourse to violence. Desecration of memorials, like that of grave sites, disparages us as a Nation.
——————————————————————————————
May 2022 be everything that you and yours would wish for!
The Problem. All who read the testimonies of those appearing before the Royal Commission into Veterans’ Suicide will be appalled by the evidence given. Unsurprisingly, there have been many calls for a fundamental change to systemic military behaviour; a ‘roots and all’ clean out of an institutionalised culture.
It is one thing to call for this, but before anything can be fixed, the problem has to be clearly identified. Where exactly, does it lie? Answering this question is the real challenge for the Commissioners. While individual circumstances can be examined and relevant faults determined on a case-by case-basis, the systemic problem, the root cause at the heart of it all, might still not be revealed.
Background. It is my belief that the circumstances associated with veteran suicides are the result of the same inherent failing on the part of the military which resulted in the unbelievable shortcomings in unit training prior to deployment to Vietnam. An infantry battalion commander put it well: “I was trained [in 1968] for a war of cordon and search, and bunkers weren’t mentioned. When we got there, all we did was fight bunkers. I was trained for totally the wrong war”. The tank squadron underwent similar training throughout 1970. No mention of bunkers nor any related training, yet all major actions in 1971 involved attacking enemy bunker systems. Tank crews suffered casualties as a direct result of their inadequate training. One could understand this happening in 1968 when tanks encountered enemy bunkers for the first time, but surely not with the second, third and fourth squadrons. How is it that training for war could be so poor?
The answer lies in the fact that the ‘system’ that existed at the time had a fundamental weakness. It was assumed that the way things were done had successfully evolved over time and everyone could be confident that (i) those more senior knew what was best and (ii) all other options had been considered. In many cases, however, nothing could be further from the truth.
The Military Hierarchy. The Australian Defence Force is an archetypal hierarchical organisation; mandates come from the top and are acted upon automatically; no-one questions them (publicly at least). This is understandable to some extent … the nature of military operations makes alternative ‘flat’ structures unsuited to the planning and delivery of decisive force at short notice with immediate effect. Some civilian companies employ a hierarchical structure, but offset its weaknesses by adopting a culture of continual improvement. In this model, performance feedback is central to decision making at all levels.
While the war-fighting culture of the military is intractable, change is not impossible. The solution to the training problem described above, is to be found in an Operational Analysis Unit (OAU). Such a body can independently examine operations as they occur and advise on, and oversee, change implementation where necessary. The British Army deployed an OAU to the Falkland Islands. This resulted in reports concerning tactics and equipment being received in real time in the UK; allowing changes to be implemented immediately on the ground in the Falklands e.g. the improved siting pattern adopted when deploying Rapier surface to air missile launchers. Whenever subject to the chain of command, however, any unit such as a OAU can turn out to be a ‘toothless’ appendage, one incapable of facilitating change.
Conclusion. It is clear that a truly independent body, i.e. one outside the chain of command, is needed to oversee the mental health of both serving and separated members. While it will be for the Commission to prescribe requisite powers, one would expect that such a body must provide a conduit for confidential advice from and to those whose well-being is affected; together with the power to bring about changes to harmful practices and to ensure appropriate rehabilitation, without any possibility of reprisal.
—————————————————————————–
17 December 2021
Note: The blog will be taking a rest over Christmas. Next post 7 January 2022. Best wishes for Christmas and Happy New Year to all readers.
Weekly Musings 23:A Successful Reunion
The following article appeared in the most recent newsletter of the War Widows’ Association.
Fiftieth Anniversary
Dinner and Commemoration
Operation Overlord in Vietnam
I was pleased to be invited to a dinner to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of my late husband’s unit’s service in Vietnam. Harry was the commander of the Light Aid Detachment (LAD) supporting C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment. The dinner was held on 6 June, the evening before a National Commemoration organised by DVA for Operation Overlord in which the unit participated.
How good it was to be seated at a table with former soldiers who had worked with him and their wives. There were to be over 100 present, but Victoria’s sudden lockdown reduced this to about 80. Fifty years ago, 94% of the unit members present were in their 20s, and 80% were national servicemen. Sadly, 20% of their number in 1971, are now deceased.
A special message was read from the widow of the Squadron’s commander, which brought home the extent to which the memories and feelings resulting from active service, last through the years. A very sincere address was made by the President of the ACT Chapter of the Vietnamese Community in Australia which left no doubt about the appreciation felt for the service and sacrifice of the veterans present. Donations made on the night were used to provide the photographic montage above from 50 years ago, to those serving in the unit today. Information is provided for each photo to make known the historical background.
More than anything else, the occasion brought home the lasting camaraderie that exists between those who served together. On his return from Vietnam Harry went on to leading an evaluation team to Germany to conduct trials for a replacement MBT for the Army. He was then selected for Advanced Guided Weapons training in the United Kingdom, finishing his career at as Deputy Director Fleet Engineering Policy (Guided Weapons) for the Australian Defence Force. Harry died in 2001.
Shirley Percival
—————————————————————————————–
10 December 2021
Weekly Musings 23: The Pony Soldiers
The following is from the draft of a book that I am writing …
On 11 May 2015, the Governor-General approved the awarding of a Republic of Vietnam citation to Australian units under command of the United States 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam. The RAAC unit listed was ‘1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop’. This was wrong. It should have been 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment (4/19 PWLH) … nicknamed the ‘Pony Soldiers’ by the Americans.
I was concerned that those posted to Vietnam as members of 4/19 PWLH would be ineligible for the award. Defence advised, however, that eligibility would be based on nominal rolls, rather than unit titles. That was a relief, but what about RAAC history?”When contacted again, Defence proposed a compromise: ‘1 APC Troop (A Squadron 4th/19th PWLH)’. This was supported by the RAAC Corporation, adding that this “could be reasonably interpreted as now becoming Army policy“.
The ‘Official History’ (OH) is generally regarded as the authority when matters of fact have to be established. The first volume for the Vietnam War lists ‘1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop’ in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of the 1RAR Battalion Group. No other Armoured unit is listed. This was repeated by other publications, including one which deals specifically with ‘M113A1 APCs in Australian Service’; it refers to “the arrival of 1 APC Trp [sic] in South Vietnam”. How did this misconception come about?
It turns out that there was a mistake in the letter from Defence on which the Official Historian based the ORBAT. This led to a mistake in the Official History, which resulted in an error being perpetuated 50 years after the event. The 4th/19th PWLH Regiment Association believed that it was important that the first Australian Armoured unit to be deployed on active service since the Second World War, should be correctly acknowledged. In their words, “We do not ask to be ‘satisfied’ with another name [as suggested by Defence]. We just ask that the correct name be used when referring to the Troop and to the men that served in that unit”.
I contacted the Official Historian who acknowledged the mistake, advising that he would amend the ORBAT in the Official History to list 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH, as having been deployed to Vietnam from June 1965 to March 1966. One would think that would be the end to it, but the RAAC Corporation had strongly supported Defence’s compromise proposal. Persevering, I contacted the Army History Unit. It was their recommendation which carried the day: the designation to be adopted should be 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH. Defence amended their records accordingly. The 4/19 PWLH Association were pleased with the outcome, although disappointed that the RAAC Corporation claimed credit.
One might have thought that the fact that the place in history of the first Australian Armoured unit to be deployed on active service since the Second World War had been secured, would have been supported by all. Surprisingly, this was not the case. A former senior RAAC officer, who presumably believed that once history is ‘official’, it should never be changed, stated publicly:
“So much for Truth, so much for History, let it be on the consciences of those who have perpetrated this falsehood. How can we be Honourable and live a lie? Bruce, in the fullness of time and beyond this life, you will be judged”.
————————————————————————————–
3 December 2021
This posting is a couple of days late … quick trip to hospital following another seizure.
Weekly Musings 22: 1 AR Assn Awards
One of the Purposes of the 1AR Assn, as listed in its Constitution, is to:
“foster and sponsor awards for excellence in soldiering to current serving members of the Regiment”.
The following awards were presented on the Cambrai Day parade last month:
The Brad Robertson Awards:
Crew Commander of the Year – CPL S. Butler – C SQN
Gunner of the Year – TPR S. Richards – C SQN
Loader/Operator of the Year – TPR J. Orr – B SQN
Driver of the Year – TPR A. Bird – B SQN
Support Soldier of the Year – LCPL V. Schroder- HQ SQN
Tradesman of the Year – CFN M. Telford – C SQN
R.E Bird Cup for Soldier of the Year – LCPL C. Schwenke – A SQN
Bradbury Trophy for JNCO of the Year – LCPL D. Joyce – SPT SQN
Bob Murray Award for SNCO of the Year – SGT P. Walsh – A SQN
The Sword of Excellence – MAJ J. Bennett – Regimental 2IC
Cupka Cup for the best “Bravo”, as decided by their peers – CPL S. Butler – C SQN
The Lancer Trophy for most proficient AFV Gunnery crew – T21B
R E Bird and (Mark) Bradbury were former COs of the Regiment. Bob Murray was killed in a tragic accident in 1986.
It would seem that the 1 Armd Regt Assn awards were those presented for Support Soldier and Tradesman of the Year.
I would ask the 1AR Assn C’tee, but their publicly stated policy is not to respond to any correspondence from me.
Congratulations are also in order for Cpl Flynn, Pte Van Dissel and Tpr Wright from 1 Armd Regt (and other RAAC soldiers) for their award of the Soldiers’ Medallion for Exemplary Service.
PS. Does anyone know the origins of the Cupka Cup for the best troop corporal?
——————————————————————————————————-
26 November 2021
Weekly Musing 21: If we Can’t Get History Right, What Hope do we Have of Learning From it?
The obituary copied below was published 17 Nov 21, Telegraph Obituaries. It includes the following regarding Korea: “1st Troop C Squadron [Centurions], commanded by Taylor, led the way, but when his leading tank was knocked out, he took the lead himself. He came under heavy fire, and just before he reached his final objective his tank was hit on the turret and set ablaze. Having dismounted, he extinguished the fire and continued to engage targets until his mission was completed and the order was given to withdraw.”
His tank “was set ablaze”. Conjures up an image, doesn’t it? The right image? … no! What’s going to cause a fire following a hit which did not penetrate the turret of a Centurion? As there was no IR basket at the time, the canvas mantle cover is likely to be the only source of the blaze,as happened to my Centurion in Vietnam. (A camouflage net might be another possibility.)
Centurion fire drills required the crew to exit the tank ASAP. Presumably this is why Taylor (and his crew?) dismounted. Seeing that the fire was localised, the external fire extinguishers were used and the crew returned to their positions.
By no means is this intended to be disrespectful to Taylor. However, following on from last week’s Blog … unless every narrative is subject to critical review, there is no hope for valid lessons to be passed on. Future tank crews suffer as a consequence.
Interestingly, another account of that Regiment’s time in Korea states: “One of the Skins involved, LCpl Peter Williamson was replacing a sick loader/operator. During the battle he leapt out of his tank under a Chinese mortar barrage to extinguish an external fire caused by a close-range anti-tank rocket.” This is much better account.
Colonel Charles Taylor
Colonel Charles Taylor, who has died aged 92, was awarded a Military Cross in 1952 during the Korean War.
In December 1951, 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (5 RIDG) arrived in Korea. In June 1952, after a static period overlooking the Chinese positions, in an operation codenamed “Jehu”, the regiment carried out a raid with Centurion main battle tanks behind the enemy lines.
1st Troop C Squadron, commanded by Taylor, led the way, but when his leading tank was knocked out he took the lead himself. He came under heavy fire, and just before he reached his final objective his tank was hit on the turret and set ablaze.
Having dismounted, he extinguished the fire and continued to engage targets until his mission was completed and the order was given to withdraw. The citation for the award of an MC stated that his troop was the best in the regiment and that his organising ability, courage and leadership deserved the highest praise.
Charles Eyre Taylor was born in Leeds on November 18 1928 and educated at Stowe. He went on to Sandhurst, and in 1949 he was commissioned into 5 RIDG.
After two years in West Germany as a troop leader, he became assistant adjutant and intelligence officer. When the regiment returned from Korea it moved to Egypt and the Canal Zone and he became the technical adjutant.
Taylor, right, in Korea with his Dragoon Guards comrades Colin Cupper and Bill Barnett
After a stint as ADC to General Sir John Anderson, during the following 12 years he served with the regiment at Catterick, Sennelager in West Germany, and Aden. Further postings took him to RMA Sandhurst, Northern Ireland with 39 Infantry Brigade, and HQ 3rd Division at Tidworth, Wiltshire.
He was in command of C Squadron in Benghazi, Libya, in 1967, when there was unrest in the town as a result of the Six Day War. Demonstrations outside the British Consulate were threatening to become violent and his squadron was helping to evacuate the staff.
Taylor, who was controlling the operation from a Saracen armoured car, was hit on the jaw by a rock thrown by a demonstrator and the crowd set the vehicle on fire. Taylor, with a cracked jaw, and his crew were all badly burnt but managed to reach the local hospital.
He spent four months in hospital undergoing extensive treatment to his hands and face. Despite all the doctors did to help, he never fully recovered nor was free from pain. He subsequently taught at the Staff College before assuming command of 5 RIDG in 1970, when it moved to Munster in West Germany and converted from armoured cars to Chieftain tanks.
In 1972, when he left to take up a staff appointment at HQ Wales, Brecon, the Regiment was as well-trained and effective as the best of the armoured regiments in BAOR. After a final appointment as Colonel Collective Training at HQ UK Land Forces, in 1979 he retired from the Army.
Settled in Herefordshire, he enjoyed horse racing, stamp collecting and letter writing.
Charles Taylor married, in 1964, Elizabeth Gott, the elder daughter of Lieutenant-General William “Strafer” Gott. They divorced in 1973 and he is survived by their two daughters.
Charles Taylor, born November 18 1928, died October 4 2021
——————————————————————————–
19 November 2021
Weekly Musings 20: The RAAC Corporation Way and the Alternative.
The following quote is from a recent Australian National Audit Office report …
“The highest priority for Army is to replace the ASLAV fleet with a CRV [combat reconnaissance vehicle] due to obsolescence factors that constrain tactical employment and increase the cost of ownership. These obsolescence factors cannot be mitigated through upgrade and without replacement starting in 2020, a capability gap will result.”
It has recently been reported that the Boxer CRV fleet will not be fully operational until July 2027; an interim capability will be available from June 2022. The resulting capability gap is obvious. What does this mean … soldiers’ lives are at greater risk than they should be, if an operational deployment is required in the near future.
The RAAC Corporation exists, in part, ‘to represent the interests of serving members of the RAAC’. But … approval for its formation was predicated on it not advocating any matter contrary to the view expressed by the RAAC HOC (which must, of course, agree with that of the CA and CDF).
At the time the Australian Army was involved in Vietnam, there was also no scope to challenge the ‘status quo’. Australian troops were inadequately trained as a result. This should never ever have happened; but it did, and Australian soldiers suffered accordingly.
The RAAC Corporation serves a purpose; but there is another purpose which goes begging at the moment. Public debate on critical RAAC matters is non-existent. This is partly because of apathy and partly because of ignorance. There is a false perception that the RAAC Corporation represents the interests of serving members of the RAAC without fear or favour.
Judged by criticism of the issues that Armouredadvocates raises, the ‘status quo’ is not in danger of changing. The efforts of those in leadership positions are well intended and motivated, the problem is … there a fundamental fault in the manner in which the military functions. This cannot be appreciated from within.
There is a role for an ‘external’ source to provide informed opinion.
—————————————————————————–
12 November 2021
Weekly Musings 19: Remembrance Day(Their Name Liveth for Evermore)
Because of the AWM renovations, the Stone of Remembrance was moved to facilitate the Remembrance Day ceremony yesterday. Centurion 5 Bravo featured in the background of a number of media reports. This prompted me to copy a previous Blog post … below.
Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield.. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:
“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her”.
“Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore” does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world that these young men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
———————————————————————————————————-
5 November 2021
Weekly Musings 18: RAAC ARES
A long-standing goal of Armouredadvocates has been that: “All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare”.
Great news … I just listened to an update re RAAC matters from the Corps RSM. He explained that ECN 062 Cav Scout is to be discontinued. A single ECN is to be introduced which will cover Cav Scout in both ARES and ARA, ie. Cav scouts in ARES units will be trained to the same standard as those in the ARA so as to enable direct reinforcements from ARES to ARA in time of Defence emergency. The duties are those required of a cavalry scout/crewman in a mounted, not dismounted, role. The platform to develop mobile recon skills in the ARES is likely to be the Hawkei.
Finally … the role of the RAAC ARES has been defined!!!
An extract from a previous Blog post is copied below.
The RAAC ARES … there have been some good articles on Army’s Cove website re the situation. As has been well put here, unless they have a platform which enables them to develop and maintain mobile warfare skills, the capability gap in our defence preparedness will be unprecedented. The Hawkei would be a satisfactory vehicle [once the reliability/safety issues are resolved] … is there any connection here with regard to the report that 1 Armd Regt is involved in user trials (?).”
A response to my question threw new light on the capability gap which exists. Edited version below:
“1st Armd Regt are trialing a light cavalry squadron mounted in G-Wagon SRV [Special Reconnaissance Vehicle]. My hope is that it’s similar in structure to how British light cavalry are operating and I look forward to being part of it. A six-car troop with troop HQ mounted in two Hawkeis and the “gun cars” in SRV appears to be the option at the moment. 2CAV have also been using the SRV”.
—————————————————————————————
29 October 2021
Weekly Musings 17: On-Going Casualties of War
Australia’s Vietnam War is defined by the number 521, i.e. those who died as a result of their service within the prescribed period of the War (ending on 29 Apr 75). But hundreds of veterans have died from their wounds since then.
A long-standing goal listed on my Blog is: ‘Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day’
How good it was to see the article in the latest Army newspaper regarding the opening of the Afghanistan War Memorial Garden in Brisbane on 16 oct 21.
There are 42 plaques: ‘One for each of the 41 veterans who were killed in Afghanistan, with the 42nd representing the veterans we have lost and continue to lose to suicide, and those who have returned with injuries and mental illness.”
Wouldn’t it be great if this ‘protocol’ was to be adopted by the Nation … with Vietnam casualties being written into school books as ‘522’: 521 being those who died as a result of their service within the prescribed period and the 522nd, representing all those who have died from their wounds subsequently.
A former Minister for Veterans’ Affairs agreed that such recognition is needed, however, was not able to identify a suitable means of doing this. (I had suggested a set of words to be used when referring to cost of a war to the Nation, but this was not supported.) Hope springs eternal.
——————————————————————————————————
22 October 2021
Weekly Musings 16: My Forth Coming Book
I was helped with research for COF by a number of people. My appreciation was described in the ‘Acknowledgements’ section of the book. While never having served in the Army, one contributor had a particular interest regarding both Centurions and APCs and shared his research information with me, as I did in return. I also passed on my collection of historical small arms rounds, a collar stud in which a compass was concealed (issued to my uncle in WWII), as well as an ashtray which had been made for me from a 20 pdr shell-case by the LAD in 1971. I thought that these might have been of interest and was not worried that I did not receive receipts. When years later, I learnt that my gifts should have been acknowledged. I accept, however, that it might have been thought that I was offering gifts on a personal basis.
The real disappointment came when a book that he had been working on, was published in 2010. At the time, I was told that it was a secret project and he was not even allowed to tell anyone what he was doing. I believe that what happened was that he had been directed not to have anything to do with me; the inference being that his job could be on the line. This might not have mattered so much, other than the fact that there were numerous mistakes in the book which I could have corrected prior to publication.
I advised 110 matters to the publishers, should a reprint be considered (which it was not). I could not forgive my former ‘friend’ for misleading me, despite any direction he may have been given. It would not be the last time that I would be reminded that acts by individuals can trump a wider community good. If we cannot ensure that history is correctly recorded, we can have no hope that the lessons learnt from it will be the correct ones.
I have tried to communicate with the person concerned, however, he declines to speak with me. So be it.
———————————————————————————————————-
[Note: It had to happen … Doing the Right Thing VII became so big, I could no longer edit it. I had been meaning to do a new post, but I suddenly had no choice.]
15 October 2021
Weekly Musings 16: Postscript to the VC Hearing.
The DHAAT Hearing was held on 13 February 2019. The letter advising me of the outcome was dated 24 January 2020. It contained neither explanation nor apology for the almost twelve months that had elapsed. Everyone I knew considered that the on-going delay meant that the Tribunal’s decision must be in my favour (otherwise why delay a non-controversial decision?). As the months passed, I came to the same belief.
If this was to be the case, I was aware that there would be considerable media attention. To capitalise on this, I prepared a Press Release in order to make the most of the inevitably short exposure period. The idea was that immediately following an announcement (should there be one), the press release would be sent to media outlets. I addressed two topics, focussing on the latter: the value of tanks today; and the challenges faced by the community in helping veterans. I copied the draft to both the AWM and DVA to ensure that they would be on the ‘front foot’. It is copied below.
Press Statement
I’m deeply honoured and humbled by this award. In terms of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and its antecedents, there are five former VC recipients; four from the Boer War and one from Gallipoli. I am very proud to be numbered among them.
The award recognises not only my actions, but also those of both my crew and the other tank crews I fought beside. I am very proud to have served with members of the RAAC in Vietnam — as the late Reverend Alan Greenshields said: “You couldn’t wish to meet a better bunch of blokes”. Sadly, some did not return, and some who did, have since died of their wounds. Few people realise what ‘Black Hats’ experienced.
All armoured fighting vehicle crews are very close-knit groups. What one person does, reflects what everyone else is doing or would have done in their place. An award to a member of a tank crew is also an award to the rest of his crew and his troop as a whole. It reflects the dangers that all those in his squadron were subjected to. This encompasses not just other tank crews, but also members of forward repair teams, field engineers, and resupply personnel … who all provided the support essential to enabling the tanks to close with and engage the enemy, as part of a combined arms force.
Tanks were deployed to Vietnam later than they should’ve been and withdrawn earlier than they should’ve been. During the four years they were there, the support they provided to infantry saved lives and helped win battles. While the impact of tanks and armoured vehicles on the battlefield has been acknowledged throughout history, the sacrifices made by their crews have never been fully appreciated. I hope this award may go some way towards changing that.
Finally, it’s been said that bravery medals are peer awards; that is, they are dependent on the testimony of others who experienced the same circumstances as the recipient and can vouch for events from their own experience. I’m very grateful for one of my peers, former tank crew commander Stan Hanuszewicz, for initiating the Review conducted by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal and for the support provided by others involved in the action which led to this award.
Background Issues
The Value of Tanks Today
Paradoxically, the value of tanks in the Australian Army today is being questioned (once again). ‘They can only operate in open country … they can’t be transported to where they might be needed … they’re overkill for regional threats’, so say the media. My response is ‘just look at history, the victories that have been achieved, and the casualties that have been prevented!’.
More tanks are needed to enable the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) operational capability to be maintained, yet even the glowing tributes from countries that deployed them in support of their troops in Afghanistan, cannot convince the ‘naysayers’. Please look at the facts and take action to close the current capability gap.
The Australian Army is made up of excellent soldiers, well trained and with great morale. They’ll always serve our country bravely wherever they’re employed (even if asked to charge enemy machine guns as at the Nek in 1915). The ADF embodies a tradition and an ethos which has been built up over many generations. ‘Duty First’ (the infantry’s motto) goes without saying. ‘Paratus (Ready)’, the motto of tank crews, likewise. Anything else is unimaginable.
The Challenge Faced by the Community in Helping Veterans.
This award of the Victoria Cross for Australia comes at a time when there is widespread unease about society’s ability to assist veterans trying to deal with the aftermath of traumatic events experienced during their service (both on the battlefield and while training for it). This is not a matter for politics. There is, I believe, bi-partisan support for new initiatives. This is as it should be.
Ideally our grandchildren would inherit a world which is a harmonious blend of nation states; one without poverty and one whose future is assured. History has shown, however, that such goals are almost unattainable, and, furthermore, those that can be achieved, come at great cost. In an ideal future world, there would be no need for either active service medals or gallantry awards … but this is unlikely.
There is a fundamental relationship between military service and national identity, one which goes even beyond the incredibly selfless commitment continually demonstrated by our medical, police and emergency services personnel. I feel that there’s a need to make known what military service involves and the debt that our nation owes to those who have been, and are today, prepared to defend our national interests and values.
The Importance of Understanding the Sacrifices that our Servicemen and Women Make on our Behalf.
The key indicator of the level of the Nation’s support for the ADF is not the percentage of GDP allocated to the Defence Budget. I believe it to be the depth of our understanding that each and every one of our servicemen and women may have to face certain death in defending Australia’s national interests, and, even more importantly, why they would be prepared to do so. With greater understanding, comes greater gratitude.
We all have choices which determine our day-to-day priorities; but how do these compare with the choice faced by soldiers on the battlefield: to jeopardise their life or not? Bravery cannot be taught during training, however, ‘doing the right thing’ can (and is).
In my experience and understanding of history, Australian soldiers will always be prepared to risk their life to save their mate. But are we in danger of assuming that he or she will always be prepared to risk their life on behalf of our nation? If they decide to do so (and live), how do they feel when they return home?
They went, as in the prose of G. K. Chesterton, ‘not because they hate what is in front of them but because they love what is behind them’. Their families’ love for them is as it ever was, but what of their understanding of what the soldier returning to them has experienced?
Ways That This Understanding Might be Achieved.
Our Nation has been taking the dedication of our servicemen and women for granted for far too long. It is time for the whole community to ‘step up’ and support them. Compassion alone will not work. It must be coupled with positive action. We must ‘reach out’ in tangible ways.
How can we do this? I would suggest a couple of things…
Defence and DVA should jointly develop a communications package to increase community awareness of the demands that the Nation makes of those who serve in the ADF. This should be based on a comprehensive survey to establish the current level of understanding, across the nation as a whole, of the sacrifices made daily by members of the ADF. Greater understanding of the demands made on our service men and women will lead to greater understanding of the support measures that are not only ‘needed by them’, but also ‘owed to them’.
The Australian War Memorial (AWM) has started a major expansion project. The Act under which it operates includes the requirement for the Memorial to “use every endeavour to make the most advantageous use of the memorial collection in the national interest”.
If the deeper understanding I refer to was shared generally, there would be a different emphasis on the nature of exhibits at the AWM. Much greater focus would be placed on the soldiers who operated equipment such as tanks, and the demands placed on them, rather than on the technical specifications of the weaponry itself. Fittingly, such a change of emphasis is apparent in the recent Afghanistan Gallery.
I believe, and I know that the current Director agrees, that the new building should not just provide space for more exhibits, but more importantly, provide opportunity to increase the public’s awareness of the sacrifices made by all members of the ADF on their behalf. In doing this, the AWM must be part of the joint Defence/DVA Communication Strategy.
Conclusion
I am one of the very fortunate, to have been recognised for my service. There are so many others who deserve to be so … but, how can we honour them? The first step is to understand what traumas they’ve been through: what experiences and decisions they want to forget; but mainly, to understand what they hope for their future — what they want to live for!
The second step is to embrace them; to reach out and acknowledge their service. I pledge to use my award to this purpose.
The question I ask of us all, is: Do we have any idea of the sacrifices which the members of the Australian Defence Force make on our behalf every day (and are doing so right now); if so, how do we repay them?
———————————————————————————————————-
INDEX
1 Armoured Regiment Association
1 Jan 21: ‘Looking After Each Other II’
2 Jan 21: ‘Code of Conduct Versus Whistle-Blower Policy’
8 Jan 21: ‘1AR Assn Honour Roll (1 of 2)’
9 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (2 of 2)‘
10 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (Cont)’
3 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward’
5 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward: Part 2.’
13 Mar 21: ‘1 AR Assn : Anonymous Threat’
25 Mar 21: ‘ The Honorary Colonel/Patron Quandary ‘
26 Mar 21: ‘ The 1 AR Assn: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’
27 Mar 21: ‘ Operation Overlord/Battle of Long Khanh: 1AR Assn ‘
23 Jul 21: ‘Caring for Those Less Fortunate’
30 Jul 21: ‘For the Good of the RAAC?’
3 Dec 21: ‘1 AR Assn Awards’
21 Jan 21: ‘Continuing Problems With Culture.’
1 Apr 22: ‘Getting our History Right’
18 Nov 22: ‘1 Armd Regt Assn: Honour Roll’
‘Armouredadvocates’
31 Mar 21: ‘Index’
Autobiography
3 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir)’
4 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir) II’
Australian Defence Force (ADF)
21 Jan 20: ‘One of the Greatest Challenges for the ADF’
17 Jan 21: ‘The Blog’
9 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 1) ‘
10 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 2) ‘
11 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 3) ‘
12 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 4)’
29 Apr 21: ‘ Army Recruitment in Times Past ‘
30 Apr 21: ‘ Getting History Right ‘
2 May 21: ‘ Getting History Right: Part 2 “
27 Aug 21: Weekly Musings Eight: How toShow Respect
During the C Squadron Reunion in Canberra on 6-7 June 2021, the AWM took photos of the crew of ARN 169056 which is located outside the Memorial. The following story was drafted by an AWM journalist. Whether or not it’s to be published, I have no idea.
“When Bruce Cameron looks at the Centurion tank outside the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, the memories come flooding back.
To Bruce, it’s not just a piece of engineering; it’s the beating heart of its crew, a poignant reminder of events more than 50 years ago.
In 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron MC was a young Second Lieutenant, serving as a troop commander with C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, in Vietnam.
He was only 22 years old when he commanded the last troop of tanks in action in Vietnam and was awarded the Military Cross for his courage and leadership during the war.
During the battle of Long Khanh, he launched an attack against a heavily defended, cleverly concealed, bunker complex; the tanks forcing the enemy’s withdrawal from the forward bunkers and contributing greatly to the defeat of the entire enemy force.
He also risked his life to save his driver, who had been severely wounded, and was in danger of being killed, during Operation Hermit Park, a joint infantry/armoured clearance operation conducted in dense jungle near the De Courtenay Rubber Plantation in Phuoc Tuy Province.
The tank he commanded that day is the one that is on display outside the Memorial.
“It’s good to have the tank here,” he said.
“But it’s not about how heavy they are, or how fast they go, or how much ammunition they have: it’s the stories they serve to tell that matter.”
The son of a Second World War veteran, Bruce went on to serve in the Australian Regular Army for 19 years.
He was born in Melbourne in December 1948 and graduated from the Officer Cadet School at Portsea in June 1969.
“My father was a Second World War veteran, and a career soldier,” he said.
“When I was growing up, I didn’t think too much about what I wanted to do until I left school at 16.
“I had a scholarship to go to Duntroon, but when I got there, it wasn’t what I expected, so I went to England, where my father was posted at the time, and joined the Bank of New South Wales.
“While I was over there, I joined the Territorial Army Parachute Regiment and realised I quite enjoyed the Army, so I applied for Portsea and got in.”
Inspired by an armoured corps instructor at OCS, Bruce joined the Royal Australian Armoured Corps. He was posted to C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, in January 1970, and arrived in Vietnam the following year, on 21 January 1971.
“I flew in on a 707, and the heat and the humidity really struck you when we landed,” he said.
“We had tried to duplicate the conditions in Vietnam as much as possible during our training, but nothing can prepare you for the smells and the humidity and the dust and everything else.”
More than 50 years later, Bruce still remembers it as if it were yesterday.
“I remember going into a tent that I was sharing with a sergeant,” he said.
“I unpacked my bags, and I felt a need to go and look at my tank and check it out.
“I was really surprised when I saw it for the first time.
“There were grenades in the turret, and I thought, ‘Why have we got grenades? What use will we have for grenades?’
“I was soon to realise, of course, but in training you never occupied a fully bombed-up tank, which was ready to go at a moment’s notice with all its ammunition and weapons fully prepared so it was a big shock.”
Bruce remembers there was little or no handover when they arrived.
“In many cases, the people we were taking over from said goodbye to us as they got on the plane to fly out, so there was no handover of any sort,” he said.
“It was pretty much straight into things and getting to know the lie of the land, which is pretty important for a tank crew. With the experience of the troop, you sort of know you shouldn’t go over there because it will be boggy or whatever, and gradually you develop that knowledge and experience yourself.”
The 53-tonne Centurion tanks were not only involved in intense fighting with infantry and artillery to capture enemy defences and defeat attacks. They also fought their own battles against enemy mines, ambushes, and an unforgiving terrain and climate.
“They were late in sending tanks to Vietnam because they thought they wouldn’t be able to operate successfully,” Bruce said. “They thought they’d sink in the paddy fields and that they wouldn’t be able to get through the jungle … but they became an indispensable part of Australian combat operations, so much so, that their subsequent withdrawal was as controversial as their deployment.”
The 1st Armoured Regiment’s tanks worked closely with the Australian infantry and the APCs of 3rd Cavalry Regiment on operations throughout Phuoc Tuy and neighbouring provinces. They provided fire support for infantry operations, were used to directly attack enemy positions, and helped defend the Fire Support Bases.
“In our training in Australia, we learnt that tanks always operate with infantry, and that they’re very vulnerable if they didn’t have infantry with them, but we soon learnt that, in the circumstances at the time, we could also operate effectively by ourselves,” he said.
“We could operate as an independent entity quite safely, and dominate and control an area, and look for information and things like that.
“But we were particularly vulnerable at night, and we had to be very careful.
“I remember on one occasion, the sentry was looking through the night-viewing device, a very early generation night-vision device called a Starlight Scope.
“It’s very basic, first-generation equipment, and the sentry could see four legs.
“He couldn’t tell whether it was the enemy because he couldn’t them properly because of the vegetation and all the foliage higher up.
“It was after curfew, but it could have been farmers returning late, so we counted down, and when I said, ‘Three, two, one, now,’ we all turned on our searchlights.
“It was the biggest buck deer that anybody had ever seen. It had these antlers on it which were just incredible. And what the sentry had seen through the Starlight Scope was its four legs.
“The deer was as surprised as we were, but it made me realise that if the deer hadn’t picked up on the fact there was a tank troop there, then quite likely, the enemy wouldn’t either.
“You’d think with the tank smell, and the noise they make when theengine parts are cooling down and contracting, you wouldn’t be able to hide them. But we learnt how to ambush silently, and we developed our capability enough to ensure we weren’t making a lot of noise, and we weren’t giving the enemy any warning that we were there.
“You’ve also got fireflies buzzing around in front of you, which is one of the things that takes a bit of time to get used to.
“I hadn’t known about fireflies before, and sure enough you would see these lights, and think, ‘Are they torches? Or what are they?’
“And, of course, the Vietnamese used to gather these fireflies together and use them as illumination so sentries had this tremendous tension all the time.”
Fireflies were not the only insects the tank crews had to worry about.
“I remember one of my troop sergeants knocked a large wasps’ nest down from a tree, and it fell on top of him,” Bruce said.
“These wasps all swarmed around him, and he was stung so many times around the face and neck, he had to be ‘dusted off’ and medevacked out.
Ants would get knocked down too, and we also got the odd snake, and that sort of thing, which certainly makes life interesting.
“We had to carry large containers of calamine lotion with us for when we were going through the bamboo.
“Bamboo has these little flakes, which are like itching powder, and once it comes down on top of you, it’s so uncomfortable that you rip your skin off.
He also remembers the gunners, trying to survive the heat inside the turret, while identifying designated targets; the operators trying to maintain communications, while keeping the guns loaded; the drivers, trying to see their way forward, while keeping their heads down; and the commanders, trying to locate enemy positions, while directing their drivers and giving fire orders.The mechanics also had to overcome extraordinary challenges to maintain the 22-year-old tanks, and the field engineers risked their lives to protect the tanks and their crews against mines.
“Everyone was very alert to the possibility of mines and booby traps, and mines were always at the forefront of everyone’s minds,” he said.
“There was always the possibility of running over a mine; that was the greatest threat to us, I think, rather than being ambushed.
“Normally we were too big to be ambushed and the enemy would let us go by because they wanted a softer target.
“But the mine was a way they could deal with us without exposing themselves to our weapons.
“The mine incidents we had in Vietnam were phenomenal, just the amount of effort the enemy went to, to create mines that would knock out a tank, and crack or twist the hull.
“You’ve got to do a lot to knock out a 53-tonne tank.
“And that’s when they started offsetting the mines. They’d put the pressure plate under the track, and put the explosive in the centre, so that the mine would go up directly underneath the tank.
“And then they got even cleverer. They connected an anti-tank rocket warhead – and in some cases, more than one – to the pressure switch so that the warhead fired through the bottom of the tank.
“In the Centurion tank, the ammunition is laid horizontally on the floor, just above the hull armour, so when the warhead went through, it ignited the ammunition, and that was incredibly effective for them.
“I know of one particular engineer, who was particularly good, and one day he slammed the driver on the helmet and called out stop. He’d seen there was a wire poking out of a tank track ahead, and the driver had to back up to allow him to examine it.
“That’s how close the crew were to running over this switch. It had been set into previous tank tracks, which had then been remoulded into shape.
“The explosive which was uncovered was offset and directly under the tank, and it was enormous.
“It was amazing the engineer happened to notice it.”
Today, Bruce wears his black beret with pride.
“A tank is more than just an armoured vehicle,” he said.
“And in terms of the tanks, the crew is the crew, in both word and in deed, and you’re relying on each other.
“You could never really relax … and it wasn’t just one incident, it was every day.
“The tanks were constantly on call … and it’s not as if the tank crews were in some sort of cocoon in which they were protected.
“The opposite was the case, and they knew full well they were vulnerable.
“The only weapons the tanks were immune to were pistols and small arms; everything else – anti-tank rockets, recoilless rifles, mines, heavy machine guns– they could all penetrate the vehicle, while satchel charges and snipers were also threats to the crew. Tank optics provided limited visibility and crews had to expose themselves to see properly … so even small arms were a threat. And the bravery of the crew was in knowing this, they still went forward.”
——————————————————————————-
1 October 2021
Weekly Musings 14: Rifle Volleys
A few days ago, I found the cartridge case at above. It was buried about 10 cm down, close to the AWM (Ataturk Memorial/ANZAC Parade). I discovered it using a metal detector that I have recently acquired. The headstamp inscription was: ‘1942, MJ, LV’.
The MJ refers to the Arms Ammunition Factory at Hendon (near Adelaide). This facility made .303 rifle ammunition during the Second World War. What does LV mean, however?
I was puzzled because the diameter of the top of the case was about 6mm or .243 calibre. So, it wasn’t a 303 case. Yet the length was the same (and it was centrefire/rimmed).
A little bit of help from overseas resolved the matter. It was a blank round.
But what was it doing where I found it? Maybe it was fired during a three-round volley at a military funeral? I thought that it might have been a funeral for a senior commander that was conducted at the AWM. Couldn’t be, I quickly realized. Those of general rank and above don’t have volleys fired at their funerals. They have gun salutes. Maybe it was from a volley fired at some other ceremonial occasion?
I’ve done what research I could, and feu de joie is the only possibility I could find. This can be conducted on any special occasion (eg Queen’s Birthday Parade at RMC). I wonder if a feu de joie was fired during at parade at the AWM to mark the end of the Second World War.
Given that I’ve gone as far as I can, I’ve advised the AWM and informed them that I’ll donate the case to them … were it to have any historical significance.
Footnote: Why is a three round volley fired at military funerals? Does it relate to the holy trinity or does it have a more macabre origin? Interestingly, ceremonial protocol for funerals is something which has remained largely unchanged over time.
——————————————————————————————-
24 September 2021
Weekly MusingsThirteen : Changes (?) in Today’s Army
“On 03 September 2021, the Chief of Army distributed this letter to commanders which announced changes to Army’s command and control. In this vidcast, the Chief of Army directly addresses the different aspects of these changes and also answers the four key themes from all the questions that came from across Army.”
Before watching, it’s recommended that that the CA’s letter (above) be read.
It was compulsory viewing for SGT, WO, CAPT and MAJ.
The question I submitted was:
“In the 1970s, Electronic Warfare became an Army wide priority: vulnerabilities were highlighted and counter-measures, practised and tested. Given Army’s increasing dependence on digital technology within its systems and platforms, to what degree is cyber security a priority today? What measures are in place to reduce the vulnerability of Army’s command and control systems to cyberattack and are these continually tested?“
———————————————————————————————————-
18 September 2021
Weekly Musings Twelve: The Future of the Tank
Australia’s decision to replace its fleet of 59 M1A1 tanks with 75 M1A2 tanks, has been roundly criticised in the Defence media. It is argued that the replacement tank is too heavy.
Is it right that an emphasis should be placed on protection? As was found in Vietnam, the ability of lightweight handheld anti-tank weapons to penetrate armour is astonishing. With them becoming more and more prevalent on the battlefield, it is hardly surprising that protection is rated so highly. A tank which is immune to enemy handheld anti-tank weapons, is a game changer … as was proven in 1917.
It has been suggested that Australia should have opted for the US Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle (aka ‘light tank’) which is to be fielded in 2025. These journalists just don’t understand that Australia’s likely operational scenarios, require a high level of crew protection. Prior to Vietnam, it was argued by some that Australia needed a light tank to be able to operate in South East Asia. Thank heavens that sound minds prevailed and we didn’t operate 33 Tonne Comets from British stocks in HK (as had been proposed)
As has been mentioned previously, the proven development of active protection systems will revolutionise future AFVs. It is still very early days, however, the current weight penalty associated with protection could well be removed, allowing lighter faster tank designs, including unmanned vehicles.
Unfortunately, Australia does not have the luxury of waiting. Our M1A1 fleet is in urgent need of replacement. The small number purchased has resulted in them being overworked; a situation which it is to be hoped will be avoided with an increased number in the replacement fleet, combined with greater simulator support.
European countries are co-operating to develop a future land warfare system, including an MBT. The operational capability is forecast for 2040. It is likely that Australia’s new M1A2 fleet will continue our operational tank capability into the 2040s. Need I say more?
———————————————————————————–
10 September 2021
Weekly Musings 11 : Right Sizing the Tank Fleet
The following two goals are currently in the ‘pending’ category:
The RAAC tank fleet would be right sized’ from 59 to the 90+ that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons. (It has been reported that project LAND 907 Phase 2 incorporates an additional 29 Abrams, to bring the tank fleet to 88; with what seems to be a ‘trade-off’ in terms of two tanks for increased simulators, including one for troop tactical training.)
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SOA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool. (See above.)
The following article is from ADM, May2021:
“In late April, the US State Department approved the sale to Australia of 160 M1A1 tank hulls from stock.
Those frames will be used to produce the ADF’s next tank fleet: around 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks, plus 29 M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicles, 18 Joint Assault Bridges, six M88A2 Hercules Combat Recovery Vehicles, and 122 AGT1500 gas turbine engines.
Whilst the exact balance of vehicle types will be approved by the National Security Council (NSC) at Gate 2 approval, this represents a major upgrade to Australia’s heavy armour capability. It is being managed under Land 907 Phase 2 (the tank upgrade) and Land 8160 Phase 1 (the combat engineering vehicles).
“Land 8160 is re-introducing a range of capabilities that originally existed under the Leopard fleet but wasn’t followed on when we introduced Abrams,” Colonel Paul Graham, Director Land Combat Vehicle Program at Army HQ, said to ADM. “The combat engineering vehicles are all based on the M1 chassis. The programs were originally run separately but the decision was made to bring them together given that commonality.”
After Army’s combat engineering vehicle capability was removed following the retirement of the Leopard fleet, soldiers risk-managed those tasks in a coalition setting; but according to Brigadier Jeremy King, Director General Platforms at Army HQ, the operational justification for re-introducing the capability was clear.
“It’s been a relatively easy argument for the combat engineering vehicles,” BRIG King said. “People have in their mind a concerning image of a soldier prodding for IEDs. We’ve learnt the lesson that a mature armoured capability can do that more effectively without putting soldiers at risk.”
One of the problems with the current tank fleet is that its limited size has meant that the platforms have been overworked, resulting in a decrease in reliability. This is especially the case, with the limited repair pool stock available.
The pending introduction of enhanced simulator facilities has been referred to recently. Is it possible that the existing M1A1s can be used for driver training and that, together with the greater simulator capability, the tank fleet might be able to be regarded as both ‘upgraded’ and ‘right sized’? Of course, the other benefit to result, will be the continued interoperability with US forces. [It’s likely that retaining M1A1 driver training vehicles will be too difficult in terms of maintenance requirements.]
In September 2020, Contact magazine reported:
“A composite of ceramic, metal and other materials will form a bespoke armour fitted to either the M1A2 System Enhancement Package (SEP) V3 or an M1A2 Australian-specific custom variant.
“The custom variant can be equipped with different sub-systems to suit our needs,” Lieutenant Colonel Cowan said.
“If we select the SEP V3, we can upgrade to the V4 later down the track and it will allow us to maintain commonality with the US and follow its upgrade path.”
Rather than the four ammunition types currently used, the new tanks will carry just two main tank rounds, both using the Ammunition Data Link, which enables the crew to select the effect they want.
Army will acquire an anti-tank round and an anti-personnel round with airburst and point-detonation capability.
“They’re programmable, which means you can tell the round how far the target is so it will have the best effect,” Lieutenant Colonel Cowan said.
Already boasting better reliability, reduced running costs and lower maintenance requirements, the tanks will be complemented by a suite of simulators.”
Conclusion. The next tank fleet will comprise 75 Abram M1A2 SEPVs … an additional 16, compared to the current fleet. The big question is, how will they be distributed? With the current fleet, I understand that tanks have to be relocated from the last ‘ready’ brigade, to the next ‘readying’ brigade. It seems that each of these two ACRs currently hold 16 tanks (three troops of four tanks, plus two in SHQ).
Maybe the allocation will be: three ACRs, each 18 tanks; 8 at SOA; 4 at RTC and three repair pools, each with 3 tanks. Whatever … I think ‘pending’ is still the right category.
I was recently invited by the President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia to participate in an on-going series of zoom meetings with Bill Shorten who reached out to Vietnamese refugees and veterans to seek their advice as to what could be done re their Afghan counterparts.
Emil prior to second meeting:
I would like to put forward the following topic for consideration by the Hon Bill Shorten and Shayne Neumann. Possibly you could forward it to them in advance of the meeting.
“In June 2021 a National Commemoration to mark the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Khanh was held in Canberra. It was organised by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and attended by many Vietnam Veterans.
DVA ruled that the President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia could not be invited as an official guest, even though he is the senior representative of those for whom Australian soldiers fought together with, and for.
Obviously, political considerations were involved. The Australian Government did not want to upset the current Vietnamese authorities. Will the same thing happen in terms of Afghanistan? Will a future Australian Government turn its back on its Afghan community, so as not to offend the Taliban?
Maybe … but does it have to be one thing or another? Surely Australia is mature enough as a nation to recognise new international circumstances, while continuing to respect the cause for which our service personnel died.
Email from another member of the group:
“Just as an aside the same thing happened, in a sense at the Vietnam War Memorial of Victoria dedication, when the Vietnamese government INSTRUCTED us and the City of Dandenong that the red and yellow flag MUST not be flown – but the scary part is that DFAT agreed. We flew it.”
I responded as follows:
“Also at the National Commemoration of the Battle of Binh Ba. DFAT sent out lapel badges showing crossed Australian and Socialist Republic of Vietnam flags to be handed out to veterans for wearing on the day.
We explained how offensive this symbolism was and, after considerable lobbying, DFAT were forced to withdraw them. We also had the RSL proposing to enter into an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam. The position we took was that this could be considered if it was to result in the removal of the human rights abuses suffered by former ARVN members and their families. This was too much for the RSL and they withdrew the proposal. (There were some shameful episodes as far as the RSL leadership were concerned in this matter.)”
Some notes on the outcome of the second zoom meeting:
“It was a good meeting focusing on ways to help Afghan refugees and Australian veterans. I made the point that one way to help veterans would be ensure that they know that their country is proud of them. Education, not platitudes is required. It’s often said that ‘your country of grateful’, but these are hollow words when most Australians have no idea what veterans did in adding to the security of our nation and helping those people in the countries to which they were deployed. I suggested a TV program would be a good start.
Bill Shorten said that he would look into ways in which the points made could best be communicated, including the possibility of editing the recordings of the zoom meetings into a succinct ‘communique’.
I also made the point that if the Government turns its back on its Afghan community, it will be turning its back on its veterans. There have been a number of examples of this.”
————————————————————————————————————————
27 August 2021
Weekly Musings Nine: How to Show Respect
The Governor General’s Director of Communications circulated a message that the GG would have given if Covid had not forced the abandonment of the service at the Vietnam Memorial.
“Fifty years ago the majority of our Vietnam veterans had returned to Australia … some uncertain of what they had achieved … of how they should feel about their service … whether they were part of the Anzac legacy and whether anyone cared about what they had done and what they suffered in the service of our nation.
“I want to give a message to them – and to all Veterans of the ADF including those who served more recently in Afghanistan who may be wondering the same things – a message that they should have been told at the time.
You should be proud of your service.
“You fought for reasons that your Government determined to be important to Australia and you fought for your mates – our nation won’t forget your service.
“You inherited the Anzac legacy, built upon it and handed it to the next generation. And for that, we are grateful.
“We do care. You are not alone and we will support you.”
It’s a good message: veterans were informed that the nation won’t forget their service and that they are cared for and will be supported; the nation was grateful for their service. But, what didn’t it say?
It was stated that veterans should be proud of their service, but it didn’t say that’ the nation was proud of their service’.
It was stated that ‘we’, the nation, “will support you”. It didn’t say ‘we will continue to support you’. Presumably because of the failings by the nation to do so in the past.
It was stated that ‘we’, the nation, are grateful that veterans built on the ANZAC legacy and handed it on, but it didn’t say that ‘we thank you for the contribution your service made to our security and to the nations in which you were deployed’ … the real touchstones!
Another statement: “Some words from Secretary Liz Cosson to DVA staff that captures our appreciation for all those who served in Afghanistan:
Those who have served in the ADF know the difference they make to the lives of so many people, and nations. This includes specific actions with the people such as the Afghanis who were helped and more broadly with their role in nation building activities. Nothing will diminish the difference that this service made. Australia’s veterans did all that was asked of them and we are always grateful for their service. We remain a grateful nation.
It states that veterans know the difference their service made to the people in Afghanistan. Why don’t the Australian public know? There has been a failing on the part of Government in this regard. How can the nation be grateful when they don’t know the contribution made by Australian service personnel?
My message would be (in the hope that it was be true):
All Australians are proud of you and thank you for the contribution you made to our security and for the help given to those in the countries in which you served; we apologise for not providing better support on your return and pledge to do more in the future.
Finally, a couple of comments on a press release by the DVA Minister …
“The Australians eventually prevailed, but only after fighting in torrential rain for four hours. They were nearly overrun, but were saved by a timely ammunition resupply and reinforcements by an armoured personnel carrier.”
This should read ‘reinforcements brought by armoured personnel carriers’.
“Despite the Australians being outnumbered ten-to-one by the Viet Cong, our troops had a considerable advantage of their own – the fire support of three batteries of 1 Field Regiment sited at Nui Dat, as well as a battery of American medium artillery from 2/35th Artillery Battalion.
161 Bty RNZA was not an integral part of 1 Fd Regt RAA, in the same manner as 103 and 105 Btys. It was, however, under command of 1 Fd Regt RAA. The FO party attached to D Coy 6RAR were from 161 Bty. The contribution of the NZ gunners deserves to be mentioned; ie. it was not only Australian and American gunners providing support.
On that day in 1966, 17 Australians were killed in action and 25 more were wounded, with one of the wounded succumbing to his injuries nine days later.
Cpl Clements was wounded, not injured, during the battle, he later died of from his wounds (not his injuries).
——————————————————————————————————————–
20 August 20-21
Weekly Musings Eight: The RAAC Corporation: Established to Provide Welfare Assistance
The Blog on 30 December 2020 is copied below:
Looking After Each Other
One of the ‘Pending’ goals at Part 7 of the Intro (above) is:
“The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)”
The background?
During the ‘dark’ period in the history of the 1AR Assn, providing any form of welfare support was rejected. Indeed, formal agreement was reached with the RAAC Corporation to the effect that the Assn (like other members of the Corporation) had insufficient resources to provide such support.
It was stated that, should the C’tee become aware of a member in need, they’d be referred to the RSL. Added to this … it was made known that all that the members of the Assn were interested in was, ‘having a few beers and telling a few stories’.
Interestingly, Purposes four and five (out of ten) of the 1AR Assn, as set out in the Report to members included in yesterday’s Blog, are stated as:
promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve; and
provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.
Without any specific measures being introduced, I think ‘Pending’ is still the appropriate category for this Goal.
——————————————————————————-
An update re the 1AR Assn’s position re this matter was provided in the Blog on 23 July 2021.
In a different post, Armouredadvocates asked why it was that the RAR Corporation was registered with the Charities and Not for Profit Commission (CNPC), and the RAAC Corporation was not? [Note: The purposes of the RAAC Corporation are almost a direct copy of the purposes of the RAR Corporation.]
The article below (36) has been added to the end of the RAACC Constitution. Of course, the reason stated for the establishment of the RAACC is not the case at all. But why let the truth get in the way?
It has long been wondered why the RAR Corp publishes its annual reports and minutes of national council meetings on its website, but the RAACC does not. Well, now it will have to happen — the CNPC requires it. Openness and transparency … who’d have thought it possible?
36 CORPORATION ESTABLISHED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES
The Corporation is a Corporation established to provide for the welfare of Members and
The Corporation as represented by the Council, is prohibited from expending any moneys except on the welfare of Members and ex-Members of The Royal Australian Armoured Corps and their families.
NOTE: The RAACC Constitution includes the following under ‘Definitions’. It would seem that more work needs to be done to clarify Article 36, as at present it doesn’t make sense.
“Member” means a Regimental Association that is sponsored by an RAAC Unit of Squadron or Regimental size that is listed on the Australian Army Order of Battle at the time of application for membership and where the control of the association or organisation whose ordinary membership is representative of the sponsor RAAC Unit and is in the hands of ex-members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (including those who have served in an RAAC Regiment who were not themselves of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps), on the payment of the joining subscription is eligible to become a Member.
“Ordinary Member” means:
any individual person who is a financial member of a Member Association as specified in Rule 4 of this Constitution;
any individual person who is a financial member of an Associate Member Association as specified in Rule 5 of this Constitution.
————————————————————————————————————–
13 August 2021
Weekly Musings Seven : Honour Rolls
The following is one of the Goals set out in the introduction to the Blog:
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
Vietnam Wall. In the US, the name of anyone who died as a consequence of wounds they received in Vietnam is added to the Vietnam Wall memorial. The name of anyone whose death resulted from illness or injury sustained in Vietnam, is added to a list held withing the Wall itself.
The AWM. The Roll of Honour at the AWM only records the names of those on the operational roll of units that served in Vietnam who died within the prescribed period of the War, ie up until 29 April 1975. Anyone who dies after this date is not recorded as a casualty of the conflict. As far as Australians are concerned, it is believed that ‘only’ 521 died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam. Of course, we all know that hundreds have died of the wounds after the end of the prescribed period. (As did thousands of veterans after the prescribed period of the First and Second World Wars.)
The 1AR Assn. Armouredadvocates has been critical of the Assn’s Honour Roll as it listed some, but not all, who died of their wounds after the prescribed period for Vietnam. The C’tee took note and put a list of options to members. The outcome was they decided to adopt the AWM policy; meaning that anyone who died of their wounds after 29 April 1975 is not recognised.
The RMC Roll of Honour for Graduates. The criteria to list gradates of RMC, OCS or OTU is: Have been killed or died as a direct result of injury or illness sustained on active service in warlike or non-warlike operations, ie. peacekeeping, peace monitoring, or humanitarian operations or deployment.
Conclusion. The RMC Honour Roll takes the same approach as the AWM, ie lists anyone whose death is caused as a consequence of their active service whether illness or enemy action; but does not limit this to the ‘prescribed period’. As with the US Vietnam Wall, all those whose death resulted from the service are recognised (albeit differently in the US depending on whether or not death was due to enemy action).
Do both these memorials not reflect the true extent of sacrifice made on behalf of the nation? The 1AR Assn has taken the easy option once again. It goes without saying that soldiers whose death results from their active service, should be recognized in the same way as officers!
Of course, the challenge arises … how is it known that death was a consequence of active service? This was obviously a bridge too far for the Assn. There are a number of options. Obtaining medical certification from the NOK is one. This would provide the family the opportunity for their loved one to be appropriately recognised should they so wish. Not too hard … surely?
The following is relevant in terms of the different views as far as commemoration of sacrifices made of behalf of the nation are concerned.
National Vietnam Veterans Art Museum in Chicago.
When visitors first enter the museum, they will hear a sound like wind chimes coming from above them and their attention will be drawn upward 24 feet to the ceiling of the two-story high atrium.
Dog tags of the more than 58,000 servicemen and women who died in the Vietnam War hang from the ceiling of the National Vietnam Veterans Art Museum in Chicago on Veterans Day, November 11, 2010. The 10-by-40-foot sculpture, entitled Above and Beyond, was designed by Ned Broderick and Richard Stein.
The tens of thousands of metal dog tags are suspended 24 feet in the air, 1 inch apart, from fine lines that allow them to move and chime with shifting air currents. Museum employees using a kiosk and laser pointer help visitors locate the exact dog tag with the imprinted name of their lost friend or relative.
———————————————————————————————————————–
6 August 2021
Weekly Musings Six: AFVs and Australia’s Defence Strategy
Recently I wrote a letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times:
Bradley Perrett fails to understand vital strategic planning when he advocates that ‘We need to restructure the Army’ (Opinion, July 3, p24). He assets, on the one hand, that current Army equipment is unsuited for the most likely threat it has to face; and, therefore, existing modernisation programs should be scrapped. On the other hand, he acknowledges that the threat might change and that the Army could be required to fight a ‘sophisticated ground war’.
The missing link in his analysis is that of lead times. These are the periods required to acquire military equipment and train soldiers and units in its use and employment. Of course, in periods of defence emergency, supply lines could be cut. This contingency has to be factored into the ADF’s stockpiling policy.
The author suggests that armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) are not required for ground war because they can be knocked out from above by drones. This is a false premise. Active protection systems are being produced to protect AFVs from top attack, as well as from engagement by other weapon systems. AFVs, including tanks, form the basis of mobile operations; these, in turn, are vital for successful ground warfare.
The author of the article about which I wrote, was of the opinion that AFVs are not required by the ADF. This view was recently supported in an article in the Australian Security Policy Institute’s (ASPI) newsletter. An extract from which is:
But there’s no excuse for the massive (approximately $42 billion) investment in armoured fighting vehicles for the army. And, unless Defence expects an unlikely invasion of the Australian continent, the acquisition of 75 Abrams tanks defies a rationale. They are too heavy for most bridges in northern Australia, let alone in the Indo-Pacific. It’s hard to comprehend how main battle tanks could be deployed in almost any regional theatre, even ifthere were a strategic case for doing so.
Thanks goodness there are others who endeavour to correct the record as far as the role of AFVs is concerned. The extract below is from Senator Jim Molan’s response to the earlier ASPI article:
No one who has ever fought in a war would say we don’t need armoured vehicles. Wherever you have infantry, you need armoured vehicles to protect them.
If we had a comprehensive strategy directing all aspects of national security, including defence, we might understand what a cascading defence strategy should look like. Maybe we would find that we need a different form of ‘defence balance’ that might even involve armoured vehicles.
Postscript. Immediately after last week’s blog, the Secretary of the 1AR Assn contacted the former member of 1 Armd Regt who contacted me and whom I quoted. It was pointed out to him that the 1 AR Assn had responded as follows:
“The Association has a policy of not contacting Bruce Cameron on any matter and we are not at liberty, due to the Privacy Act, to pass on any contact information of either current or former members (Mr Cameron is a former member). However, he does have a blog – ArmouredAdvocates – which provides his email address as cameronshome@bigpond.com”.
I found it interesting to note that the 1AR Assn has a policy of not contacting me on any matter. Even for something of importance to the RAAC, I would not be contacted … even though I could contribute. ‘Cut off your nose to spite your face’? I stand by my Blog.
Next week I’ll revisit the 1AR Assn Honour Roll policy.
——————————————————————————————-
30 July 2021
Weekly Musings 5: For the Good of the RAAC?
I was contacted by a former member of 1 Armd Regt recently. This person was aware of an appeal from the family for information about a Vietnamese MIA resulting from the fighting at Binh Ba. He had been a tank crewman involved in the Battle and believed that he had information that could assist re this missing Vietnamese. This was new information that had not been reported in any recorded history. He thought I might be able to help him
Interestingly, he had difficulty in contacting me. He tried the 1AR Assn first, but: “The Association would not either provide your address or forward an email to you asking you to contact me”. Fortunately, another former member of 1 Armd Regt was willing to assist by providing my email address. He knew that I would not object to receiving a request for help in such circumstances. This was indeed the case and I hope that I might have able to subsequently provide some useful information/contacts.
But why in heavens name would the 1 AR Assn not be willing to help? Apart from the humanitarian aspects, the history of one of 1 Armd Regt’s most significant battles could be added to.
It’s no secret that the C’tee of the 1AR Assn don’t like me for having made known the circumstances documented in the Introduction to this Blog. But surely, they see the bigger picture? Surely, they would not stand in the way of adding to the operational history of 1 Armd Regt? But they did. Why?
It seems to me that what’s in the best interests of 1 Armd Regt and/or the RAAC, comes second to the interests of the C’tee of the 1AR Assn.
——————————————————————————————-
23 July 2021
Weekly Musings 4
Caring for Those Less Fortunate
One of the goals of Armouredadvocates listed in the pending category (ie. improvement has been made, but not fully achieved as yet) is:
The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)
It seems that the C’tee of the 1AR Assn must take note of the Blog as the Assn’s latest newsletter states: “For several years this Association has been regularly criticised, in the electronic environment, for failing to ‘articulate in practical terms how the Association addresses the issue of caring for those less fortunate’ and having articulated the means, would then enact the goal”. [https://www.paratus.org.au/newsletter]
The article goes on the explain (inter alia) that:
“Rule 2 Purposes, sub-rule (4) of the Association Constitution states, ‘promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members’, their dependents and next-of-kin, etc’ and Rule 2 (5) states, ‘provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity’.
In a policy document, ‘Ex Service Organisations and Groups Providing Welfare, Health and Well Being for Veterans, Ex Service People and their Families, published by the Association in March 2019’, it was stated that the Association did not have the expertise, experience, personnel, or financial resources or indeed the wherewithal to take on such a considerable and risk-filled role such as the provision of services related to welfare, health and well-being.
Has the situation changed in the intervening years? No, the area of providing advice on financial, welfare and well-being for members of the ex-service community has become even more complex and should not be undertaken by well-meaning volunteers who are not qualified to provide advice in any of these areas.”
Response from the ‘electronic environment’:
The Chairman of the RAAC Corporation posted the following on the 3 Cav (Vietnam) forum page a couple of weeks ago, under the heading: ‘Death of Phillip James REEVES, formerly 1 Armoured Regiment’
“Pedro Rosemond rang me last night about this – very sad indeed. The funeral will be a private family affair. A genuine legend and character of the Corps. May he sit at the right hand of God. Commissioner Don Spinks has been notified by me. Brian Hatfield is the 1AR Assn rep up there and we had a lengthy telecon last night about what needs to be done DVA/DFRDB-wise from here on including the possibility of assisting Marie Reeves with an application for ISS should Phil not have been in receipt of a Service Pension.”
Interestingly, three other former members of 1 Armd Regt died in the same period: Henry Polis, David Armstrong and Pat McAuliffe. What’s going on here? Why does the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation get involved in offering help and advice for the NOK of one of the deceased? Why isn’t the same assistance provided to the other NOK? If you’re a legend and a character, you get help; if you’re not, you miss out. How can this be? Where is the social justice?
The Chairman had a lengthy telecon with the 1AR Assn rep … why isn’t that advice documented and made available to all former members of 1 Armd Regt so that their NOK might be better prepared in such circumstances? There would be no insurance liability involved. (Presumably, the Chairman indemnified Brian Hatfield in terms of assistance to be provided by a ‘well meaning volunteer’.)
————————————————————————————————-
16 July 2021
Weekly Musings 3: ‘They Were All Volunteers in Vietnam’
The link below is to a newspaper article which states that all conscripts in Vietnam were volunteers. I’ve had to correct this ‘myth’ many times and felt compelled to do so again. My response and those subsequent, follow.
Hi, the Vietnam ‘all volunteers’ is a myth. Extract from my book:
“There were no restrictions on service outside Australia or its Territories, as there had been during earlier periods of conscription in the Second World War and later in the 1950s. Despite this legislation, it is often stated that those called up ‘had to specifically volunteer for overseas service’. If there was an obligation under the National Service Act to serve overseas if called upon to do so, how did the all-volunteer ‘myth’ come about? Commanders going to Vietnam would not have wanted members in their units who were there against their will; some, therefore, arranged for those who did not want to go, to be transferred. As the majority of recruits were allocated to infantry, there was some flexibility available to battalions to do this. Most other Corps, of which the RAAC was one, did not have the luxury of being able to ‘tailor’ their units in this way.
Footnote: One RAAC national serviceman stated: ‘I can tell you categorically … we were certainly not volunteers.’ Another former national serviceman (not RAAC) stated that: ‘At no time were we asked if we had any objections … I did not want to go and if I thought that I had a choice, then I would not have gone. I get quite wild when people tell me I had a choice, 40 years later.
PS. The “form” mentioned above, was a left-over from the earlier conscription period, it was not relevant at all to Vietnam.
My response was not posted, so I asked:
“If I was to say that the above article is true and correct, would my comment be posted? When I point out the factual inaccuracies and it is not posted, is this to shore up the credibility of the author? What about the credibility of the publication?”
This led to my response being posted, together with additional info …
Author of Article: There were no restrictions under the amended NS act on service outside Australian territory. Conscripts were offered the option of declining service in Vietnam, as also applied to UN or PNG postings. Peer pressure was often applied to indicate yes. When the withdrawal of combat forces was announced, I was instructing recruits at Singleton. They were concentrated in the area theatre on told by the Commandant on direction from Army Office it was unlikely any would serve in Vietnam. We were instructed to take them back to platoon lines and discuss the consequences and their reactions. The reaction was mixed, but most took the view that having been called up and indicated their willingness to serve there, they could no longer see the point of why they were there. Memory of that period seems to have become a selective thing. My cohort, who were professionally affected by the announcement, have similar recollections.
I pointed out that:
In February 1967, Malcolm Fraser, the Minister for the Army, directed that infantry battalions in Vietnam were not to comprise more than 50 per cent national servicemen. The adjustments that had to be made by battalions preparing for Vietnam, meant that nearly all Regular Army recruits during 1967 were posted to Infantry. Other corps, such as the RAAC, had to manage the increased turnover associated with a higher proportion of conscripts. Volunteering did not become a requirement until 1971. At that time, with troops being withdrawn, the Minister for Army announced that national servicemen would still be needed to go to Vietnam, but would no longer be compelled to do so.
The Author of Article had the last word:
The only individuals who can be “compelled” are those who have elected not to go. All the others are volunteers, so no compulsion is involved.
Can this be said to be a statement of the obvious …? What do they say: ‘You can take a horse to drink, but you can’t make it water!
———————————————————————————————
9 July 2021
Weekly Musings 2: Vietnam Today
Someone posted in another forum that: “I had a yarn recently with 2 blokes who were Cav soldiers over there [Afghanistan] and these blokes are right up there rank wise. We were talking about the difference between Vietnam and Afghanistan and they both said the same as one; Vietnam has recovered well, but The Afghans have no hope.”
I responded to say:
It’s an interesting view: “Vietnam has recovered well”.
This, of course, is the view that that the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) would support.
It’s not the view of those on whose behalf we fought; those who spent years in concentration camps with hard labour after 1975; those who can’t get an education or meaningful employment because a family member served with the ARVN or was considered to have helped the ‘Americans’; or those whose human rights under the CPV are non-existent.
One would hope that the Australian Government will ensure that those Afghans who assisted Australian forces, eg interpreters, don’t suffer the same fate.
Someone else followed up my post to say:
“I thought social engineering in Australia was a huge problem. About 22 months ago Jan and I spent three weeks in Vietnam from Saigon to Hanoi. We chose to do a private tour driven around in a private vehicle. It became very obvious from the driver and tour guide (VCP employees) that they had been brain washed about “the American” war. The propaganda is so thick you couldn’t cut it with a chain saw. The current generation has had history re-written, and that is all they understand is what they have been taught. I felt the intimidation and was not prepared to tell the truth. Had a feeling I might disappear.
I am certain the older southerners have the same fears.
In the north Uncle Ho is more like Ho God.
We had a delightful female guide in Hanoi who told us that the prisoners in the Hanoi Hilton were treated well. How anyone could believe this when displaying the cages they were contained in was beyond me. I began to say something and she gave me the Shhhh! sign. Outside she pointed out that there were ears everywhere inside, but I could now speak more freely. I suggested that she should Google and obtain others opinions. She pointed out that they can not Google in Vietnam all social media was censored. I choose not to say anything further.
As for “recovered well”, on face value the country appears affluent with high rise buildings etc. Apart from tourism income I could gain no picture on where the funding comes from. Outside the Cities there is still a lot of poverty. I could imagine a farmers taxable income would be a bowl of rice. “ —————————————————————————————————
2 July 2021
Weekly Musings: 1
Image: Lawsonlegal.com
Who knows how this format will work out … only one way to find out!
1. Apology? Have I heard from WO 1 Simpson? No. Did I expect to? No. Did I hope to? Yes.
2. The Rule of Law Part 1
Not long ago, an RAAC veteran was to be deported to NZ. He had come here aged 18mths, but his parents didn’t take out Aust citizenship. He was conscripted as a ‘British national’ and served in Vietnam. His service and its effects weren’t taken into account by the court. His unit association and its kin (and their principals who held high office) washed their hands of him … wouldn’t even provide certification re his army service. Individuals who believed that, right or wrong, justice must apply … argued on his behalf. Justice and compassion finally won the day, with the Federal Court overruling the Immigration Minister. BUT … he had no support at all during the long drawn out process, other than that offered by those who believed that the rule of law must apply equally to all. (One of the stories to be recounted in my new book.)
The above situation resonates with an RAAC veteran who was accused of war crimes related to an incident in Vietnam in August 1970. The allegation was made by a politician. The veteran received no support and had to deal with the ‘fallout’ on his own. Eventually, contemporary military records proved that there was no basis at all for the allegation
3. The Rule of Law Part 2
Does the above have any relevance as far as the Ben Roberts-Smith defamation trial is concerned?
Seems to me that the current defamation situation re BRS is different to a finding of ‘guilty’ or not. I’m aware of a situation in which a wine company used a portrait of an ALH VC recipient on their bottles. The artist had not given approval for this and sued for defamation. There was no doubt that that the company had acted wrongly, but a defamation action must demonstrate that the plaintive had suffered monetary loss. This was not able to be proven, therefore, the case was lost. In the BRS case, considerable attention has been given in the media to the financial loss that he’s suffered. So, it’s a question as to whether or not the media acted wrongly. It seems a long bow, but I think this is different to whether or not BRS is guilty in terms of legal statutes (which is why the defamation proceedings can take place separately to the ‘legal’ proceedings).
As far as is known, the SASR Assn has no position on the matter, but is providing support to the witnesses; if it comes to a criminal trial, they will continue to lobby and support serving and non-serving members to make sure they have due process under both military and commonwealth law. It’s great to think that the SASRA is there, not to pass judgement, but to ensure that ‘due process’ takes place. That’s all one could ask (but is not always provided).
Re the ‘truth defence’ being run by the media, I think that the difference between defamation and other court matters, is that relating to decisions about what might be implied by the statements made (ie. that which have an impact on reputation, earnings etc). I’m clutching at straws here … trying to make sense of a defamation trial proceeding while a legal enquiry is being conducted in parallel.
I don’t have any ‘expert’ knowledge, but it seems to me that if BRS loses the defamation action, he might not be found guilty in the latter; and vice versa. I just can’t believe that there could be no grounds for different results … how could the defamation action be allowed to proceed otherwise? I think the following is the answer:
The defamation case ONLY relates to what was published. The result of the defamation case will have no bearing on the criminal case; the two can run at the same time or before or after one another. Evidence given by defence and plaintiff witnesses in one case, can be used in the other.
—————————————————————————–
25 June 2021
Note: I should never have had to post RAAC Communications 1-8, but if nobody takes a stand … we all end up down the gurgler. (Of course, I should never have had to take a stand with respect to 1AR Assn either.) As mentioned on 15 June, my Blog posts will now revert to being weekly, the next on 2 July 2021.
PS. The CO 1 Armd Regt advises that he’s passed my letter re Mr Simpson’s allegation to the OC C Sqn (blog posts 17 and 19 June refer). I’ll post any response on the Blog, as well as any apology or other communication (within what I judge to be acceptable limits) I receive from WO1 Simpson; but I’m not holding my breath that you’ll see anything with respect to the latter next week.
RAAC Commemorations 8
In previous blogs, I’ve addressed five allegations made against me recently by WO1 Simpson. Today I deal with the last, copied below.
It is only by a “great deal of work by organisations, associations and corporations, which lead to veterans and their families being recognised by their nation”, ie. efforts on the part of individuals don’t count!
Why is it that we have to be subservient to group thinking? If an Association decides something and an individual disagrees, should that be the end of the matter?
Take, for example, the 1 Armd Regt Standard … not only was the Theatre Honour for Vietnam wrong, but also the Battle Honour for Coral-Balmoral was not emblazoned. You can’t do anything about this I was informed by all responsible parties, the Ceremonial Manual would have to be changed; those at the highest levels didn’t want to cause any fuss. So, I wrote to the Minister … lo and behold, both matters were corrected. Why subordinate everyone to the thinking of a particular group? Of course, others were quick to claim responsibility … but that’s a part of life which will never change.
When the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation was approved for award to units in 173rd Airborne Brigade, the RAAC Corporation supported the Defence position that the APC troop should be referred to as ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’. But this wasn’t correct. Bringing the error to the attention of the custodians of Army history, resulted in 1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH being correctly acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action.
When the Army Combat Badge was introduced, a decision was made not to award it to the NOK of those service personnel who were killed in action (so as to save money … the recipients wouldn’t be able to wear it). The ‘charter’ of the RAAC Corporation means that it cannot advocate a position which is not supported by the RAAC Head of Corps. The HOC is bound to support the position taken by Defence. Is that where things should be left … despite callous position being taken by Defence mandarins? Of course not. Once again, action by an individual brought about a change … NOK of those KIA now receive an ACB on behalf of their relative.
I could go on and on, but I think I’ve made my point … there is a place in this world for action by both representative groups and individuals.
———————————————————————————————————
25 June 2021
RAAC Commemorations 7
The fifth allegation made by WO1 Simpson is that I “leeched off the hard work of others to gain personal credit”. How insulting is this? It’s an interesting subject … why some people feel the need to insult others. I looked into it once for a Blog post, following a number of incidents in which a certain person insulted others (though “I was still in short pants when he was on his first tour of Vietnam”, so what would I know!). The Blog post below is that which seems to have got up Mr Simpson’s nose.
9 June 2021
C Sqn (1971) Reunion: Canberra 6/7 June 2021
Despite there being no backing from the 1AR Assn or RAAC Corporation, everyone was pleased with their visit to Canberra. The COVID 19 lockdown in Victoria meant that our dinner numbers were suddenly cut from 104 to 72. (It’s very likely that our Vic brothers will have their own get-together in Melbourne, when it’s possible to do so.)
Sunday 6 June. First activity was the Vietnam Requiem. This was a huge success and is now likely to tour to other cities. If you can get to it, you should. Normie Rowe was in great voice and John Schumann was as well. The rendition of the last song sung by Cathy Wayne, was heartfelt by many. The soloists, the choir and the orchestra were outstanding,
Immediately after, was the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM. Wreaths were laid in honour of Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick. Andy’s daughter laid his wreath, before joining us for Dinner. This was held at a nearby hotel, where many attendees stayed. It was a very successful evening, with a special message being read from the widow of C Sqn’s OC, Peter Bourke. The RAAC Head of Corps and President of the ACT Chapter of the Vietnamese Community in Australia both provided very informative after dinner speeches.
Monday 7 June. The National Commemoration for Operation Overlord commenced at 10.30am at the Vietnam Memorial. The weather was fine (albeit a little cold). The GG read the Commemorative Address and the ceremony was dignified and well conducted. On return to the Hotel we enjoyed a (not so) light Lunch, finishing the wines which had been provided for the dinner by one of our cohort. Finally, a visit to the AWM ‘warehouse’ was undertaken. This stores the many items of equipment which are being restored or waiting for space in the AWM. The visit was a special one, additional to the one or two ‘Open Days’ through the year.
—————————————————————————–
Exactly what hard work of 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation did I leech off?
The Vietnam Requiem. I spent several hours, with a number of others, advising the Director with respect to the Vietnam War; I attended a prelim performance to look for any ‘errors’ in the information presented, as well as an early ‘rehearsal’. The Director and General Manager were guests at the C Sqn dinner. I did not claim any credit for the concert. I know of no 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation involvement.
The 6 June AWM LPC. I arranged for wreaths to be laid in honour of two C Sqn members who DOW … these involved a family member directly and a message from a family unable to attend. (The wreaths were paid for by a DVA grant, submitted by me.) Those attending the Ceremony as part of the C Sqn Reunion were required to provide detailed information to allow tracing in terms of COVID 19. I provided this. I did not claim any credit for the ceremony. I know of no 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation involvement.
The C Sqn Reunion Dinner. I organised it, but did not and do not claim any credit. I know of no 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation involvement.
The Operation Overlord Commemoration. I was involved in planning meetings with DVA and providing info re those nominated as wreath layers and official guests; and numbers attending (who would also be at the C Sqn Reunion). The Chairman of the RAAC Corporation was also at the two planning meetings. I believe he might have provided advice re the former 3 Cav personnel attending. I did not claim any credit for the Commemoration and know of no 1AR Assn involvement.
The Post Commemoration C Sqn Lunch. I organised it, but did not and do not claim any credit. I know of no 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation involvement.
The AWM ‘Warehouse’ Visit. I was involved in organising and providing details of attendees, but did not and do not claim any credit. I know of no 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation involvement.
—————————————————————————————————————
23 June 2021
RAAC Commemorations 6
The fourth allegation by WO1 Simpson is that: I’ve taken credit “for hard work by the RAAC Corporation and 1 AR Assn over an extended period of time which led to a successful DVA event”.
At no time did I take credit for the organisation of DVA’s National Commemoration of Operation Overlord (Battle of Long Khanh). But was it the hard work by the RAAC Corporation and 1 AR Assn over an extended period of time that resulted in a successful event? In a word … No! Where then, should credit be placed?
The former CO 3RAR first advocated for a 50th Anniversary commemoration of the Battle of Long Khanh some years ago … planning on the basis of an event for which 3RAR would be responsible. Colonel Scott contacted me (as I was someone whose tank troop was involved in the action) and we met with DVA. His advocacy convinced DVA in terms of the significance of the Anniversary and DVA undertook to manage the commemoration. My letter to the OC C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt of July 19 refers (see post for 19 Jun 21). What happened next?
The 3RAR co-ordinator and I worked together to organise events across the days involved. I invited the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation to participate. They took the view, however, that false hopes could be built up in their members if the Commemoration was not to be approved. Although DVA staff were confident that the event would go ahead, it could not be regarded as an ‘approved’ event until DVA’s budget for the 20/21 FY had been agreed to. So, neither organisation would have anything to do with anything associated with it. Planning for the C Sqn Reunion went ahead on my part. The greatest challenge being that of contacting former members.
DVA’s budget is approved … what hard work is it that the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation then put in? (Simpson’s “long period of time” having been reduced from three years to one).
DVA held two meetings to consult with stakeholders. I attend, given my involvement with the C Sqn Reunion, as does the Chairman, RAAC Corporation. Noel is not acting ‘officially’ on behalf of 3 Cav Regt as they are not a member of the Corporation. He is, however, a former member of 3 Cav Regt, so undertakes ‘ex-officio’ responsibility for things such as contacting next of kin etc. For 1 Armd Regt’s part, I nominated (in consultation with sqn members) those who should lay the Sqn wreath and those who should be invited as ‘official guests’. There was also opportunity to comment on the suitability of different elements of the Commemoration, eg, those who should do the different ‘Readings’.
I am aware that the 1AR Assn informed its members that the DVA Commemoration was a ‘ticketed event’ and that anyone wanting to attend had to advise the Assn (Rosemond) of their details. This was incorrect and caused confusion. It was not a ticketed event. DVA only needed to know how many were likely to attend (for seating etc). I had numbers as far as 1 Armd Regt personnel attending the Reunion were concerned, and advised DVA accordingly. [Attendance at AWM Last Post Ceremonies were ticketed events and I provided the required info to the AWM for the LPC that was part of the C Sqn Reunion.]
What exactly was the “hard work by the RAAC Corporation and 1 AR Assn over an extended period of time that resulted in a successful event”?
———————————————————————————
22 June 2021
RAAC Commemorations 5
Following on in terms of the sequence, I respond here to the third allegation made against me by the immediate past RSM of the RAAC, WO1 Simpson. This was that:
I announced that neither the 1AR Assn nor RAAC Corporation had anything to do with the DVA National Commemoration.
I did nothing of the sort.
Mr Simpson was referring to my Blog post of 15 June 2021in which I stated that: “The 1AR Assn wanted nothing to do with it, however. The RAAC Corporation, for their part, promoted a parallel 3 Cav Regt get-together and invited members of C Sqn to attend. Neither group promoted C Sqn’s functions, despite all relevant information being shared with them.
Was I referring to the DVA National Commemoration? No! I was referring to C Sqn’s [50th Anniversary Reunion] functions.
Did 1 AR Assn or the RAAC Corporation support the C Sqn functions? No. Is there any evidence of this? WO1 Simpson suggests that Minutes of meetings suggest otherwise: “Evidence of both organisations supporting this commemoration is available to members via agenda items within the minutes of meetings”. Minutes of RAAC Corporation meeting aren’t published (something of which the author has long been critical). The report of 1 AR Assn to the last RAAC Corporation meeting makes no mention of the C Sqn Reunion (nor the Overlord Commemoration).
The following report by the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation was included in the Minutes of the last 1AR Assn AGM: “Informal arrangements for the Meet and Greet (a la carte dinner) for 6 June 2021 (the evening before the Commemorative Service for Overlord/Long Khanh) at the Ainslie Football Club. An O group is also to be held at the same location after the Commemorative Service on 7 June 2021. An open invitation is extended to all members of C Squadron 1st Armoured who may wish to attend an informal gathering on both dates, with 3rd Cavalry Regiment and elements of D&E Platoon. Charlie Dearling is the Dining Member and point of contact”.
I emailed the Chairman to say: “Hi Noel, I note your statement to the 1AR Assn AGM in January. Pity you couldn’t have mentioned that C Sqn 1 Armd Regt will be holding a 50th Anniversary Reunion dinner on 6 June (for the information of anyone who might be unaware)”.
One might have hoped that the 1AR Assn would be supportive of a function which would bring together veterans from the Regiment and their families for a 50th Anniversary Reunion, in conjunction with a National Commemoration. DVA have grants to assist with such activities, however, applicants must be incorporated bodies. DVA advised me that any such body could act on my behalf. I asked 1 AR Assn (explaining that I would prepare all the paperwork etc). I was not a member and was not particularly surprised when they refused; I then asked the RAACA (NSW) Branch. I was a member (but am no longer) and was surprised and disappointed when they refused. Both bodies are members of the RAAC Corporation. I then asked the ACT TPI Assn, they agreed … and the grant was applied for and provided.
—————————————————————————————–
21 June 2021
RAAC Commemorations 4
The second allegation against me by Mr Simpson, the immediate past RSM of the RAAC is that:
‘I precluded others from my planning in order to avoid situations which would not put me in my own spotlight.’
There are, of course, two allegations here; (i) that I did something, and (ii) why I did it. The latter is very offensive on a personal level. Rather than responding accordingly, I will simply show that the first (ie, that I precluded others from my planning) has no basis … meaning that the second is groundless.
Did I or did I not, consult with others re the planning for C Sqn (1971) Reunion activities?
The following three documents, are some of many, which are relevant in terms of involving others in the planning:
#1
Commanding Officer, 1st Armoured Regiment,
Chauvel Lines, Edinburgh Defence Precinct, EDINBURGH, SA, 0830
December 2020
Dear ….
I met you some years ago (2012?) when you were adjutant. Congratulations on your current appointment!
A National Commemoration is being held by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord. The main battle of this Operation was fought on 7 June 1971 and hence the Commemoration will be on 7 June 2021. I understand that the Standard will be paraded.
Tanks from my troop, 5 Troop/C Sqn/1 Armd Regt, played a pivotal role in the Battle of Long Khanh. There are some lessons for armoured warfare which I believe are as relevant today, as they were back then.
I believe strongly in the transfer of experience from one group to its successor and I would be prepared to give an ‘informal’ presentation on the role of the Centurion tanks in this battle. It might be that I could be joined by crewmen from the time, now resident in Adelaide. They might be more readily able to answer questions about their duties and ‘challenges’.
Best wishes,
[I had arranged with former crewmen, now resident in Adelaide, to join with me in making the presentation. This was the second offer in this regard, Blog 20 Jun 21 refers. The reply came some months later. The CO had thought I was offering to provide a briefing “on the sidelines of the National Commemoration itself”. By the time the offer was accepted, I was too busy with the arrangements for the Reunion itself, to prepare a presentation.]
#2
From: Bruce & Jasmine Cameron <cameronshome@bigpond.com> Sent: Sunday, 5 April 2020 12:32 PM To: RAAC Corporation, 1 AR Assn, 1 Armd Regt, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn. > Subject: C Sqn 1 Armd Regt Reunion (6/7 June 2021) : Update
Dear All,
The following advance arrangements are forwarded for information for any aspects which might have relevance for 1 Armd Regt, RAAC Corp, 1 AR Assn and 3 Cav Regt Assn
General.
The following edited extract is from the latest 3RAR newsletter. You’ll see that, like us, 3RAR are organising a reunion to commemorate all those who served with the unit during 1971. (It’s worth bearing in mind as far as Canberra venues are concerned, that there will probably be five times more of them present, compared to us.)
“The PROPOSED 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Khanh Commemoration was discussed by Col Peter Scott and me [3RAR organiser, Tony Cox] with members of the Commemorations Section of the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) in Canberra ACT on 19th December 2019. DVA provided a commitment that they will do something to Commemorate the anniversary on Monday 7th June 2021.
Working on a PROPOSED event is a little unusual but we have been assured that DVA will conduct an event on the 7th June 2021. That being the case, planning [is focussed] on the 5th, 6th and 7th June 2021 to dedicate and celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the 3rd Battalion RAR’s Active Service in Vietnam in 1971.
Battalion companies and groups will coordinate their individual activities as usual. The reunion weekend will be coordinated with other groups who have similar intentions and concurrent interests. 3rd Battalion reunion activities may overlap and be concurrent with other Corps groups from Vietnam 1971.”
Note: The Battle of Long Khanh is the name given by 3RAR to the action which took place primarily on 7 June 1971 during Operation Overlord (5-14 June 1971). Given that Overlord was one of the largest operations undertaken by 1ATF, the DVA commemoration may well relate to the Operation as a whole.
C Squadron Reunion Timetable.
6 June 2021 (Sunday).
2.00pm Vietnam Requiem Concert (hosted by the AWM’s Musical Artist in Residence, Chris Latham, at the Llewellyn Hall, ANU).
4.55pm. Last Post Ceremony commences at the AWM. (In honour of Cpl David John Dubber, RAAF; KIA 7th June 1971.)
5.25pm. Ceremony concludes
6.30pm. C Squadron Meet and Greet (bar/lounge area of the Mercure Hotel, Ainslie).
7.30pm. Dinner is served.
9.30pm. Dinner concludes (those who so desire, adjourn to the bar)
7 June 2021 (Monday)
10.30am. TBC National Commemoration commences (Vietnam Memorial, ANZAC Pde, Canberra
11.30am. Commemoration concludes.
Related Activities
Friday 4 June 2021
4.55pm. Last Post Ceremony, AWM (in honour of 2Lt David Paterson, KIA 20 March 1971)
TBC It is likely that the Ainslie Football Club could be a dinner venue used by 3RAR attendees.
Saturday 5 June 2021
TBC Grave Ceremony Lt John Wheeler, KIA 2 March 1971 (Norward Park. 65 Sandford Street, Mitchell ACT)
4.55pm. Last Post Ceremony, AWM (in honour of Pilot Officer Ronald Betts, RAAF; KIA, 20 March 1971).
6.00 pm. 3RAR Battalion Dinner AWM Aircraft Hall
Sunday 6 June 2021
Evening: 3RAR Company dinners at venues to be organised.
Monday 7 June 2021
4.55pm Last Post Ceremony, AWM (In honour of Flt Lt Everitt (Lofty) Lance DFC, RAAF KIA 7 June 19710.
Tuesday 8 June 2021
4.55pm Last Post Ceremony, AWM (In honour of a Second World War Bomber Command member). The Bomber Command Assn will be hosting a gathering in Canberra during this period.
NOK Participation
Advice from Tony Cox:
2Lt David Paterson. David’s daughter Mrs Sarah Hollier has authorised this event on behalf of her family.
Pilot Officer Ronald Betts. Ronald’s sister Mrs Judith Stanton and her extended family are delighted for this opportunity to commemorate her brother’s sacrifice with her extended family.
Cpl David Dubber. David’s sisters will attend this event dependant on health. There are other family members who are yet to be advised.
Flt Lt Everitt Lance. Lance’s 3 children will be attending the weekend and be hosted mainly by B Company, 3 RAR, but I think 9 Squadron RAAF will also enjoy their company. Two members of Flt Lt Everitt Lance’s extended family are current members of the RAAF and [Tony Cox] proposed that they may participate in some way during the Commemoration and/or Last Post, at the family’s request.
Follow Up Work
I’m investigating the possibility of wreaths being laid during the Last Post Ceremony on 6 June 2021 by/on behalf of NOK and mates of John McCarthy, Ken Boardman (3 Cav); Phil Barwick (C Sqn) and D&E Platoon members KIA during Op Overlord
Accommodation
As previously advised, provision has been made for 30 rooms at the Mercure Hotel, Ainslie. The concessional rate is $149/$168 per night for a superior King Room with b’fast for 1/2 people. Quote ‘C Squadron Reunion’.
For those with caravans, it is likely that some of the 3RAR attendees will be using the Alivio Tourist Park in O’Connor, ACT.
Costs
Dinner: “Two course alternate drop plated” $60pp (drinks at own expense)
Requiem Concert: Estimated to be $50.
Those Currently on the Mailing List:
… total 71/162 (44%)
Those Still to be Contacted:
Many thanks to those who are helping track them down.
The Veterans of the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces Day.
Taking a break from ‘RAAC Commemorations’ (below), I wish to mention a lunch that my wife and I were invited to yesterday by the South Vietnamese Veterans’ Association.
The Saigon Restaurant was booked out for the occasion. There was so much food. Beef stir fry was followed by spring rolls, prawn wontons and curry puffs. Then came the main course, seafood hot pot. Entertainment was provided by singers who were in remarkably good voice.
But the centrepiece of it all, were the veterans of the RVN armed forces. The commemoration has been celebrated annually since 1965 (when Ky and Thieu came to office). Some of those present, had spent 10 years or more in re-education camps (with hard labour) after 1975.
While I knew that the Communist Party of Vietnam sought to wipe out the soul of the South Vietnamese, I hadn’t realised the ‘three generation’ policy. Anyone whose father, grandfather or great-grandfather has family links to the RVN Government or Americans etc, can’t gain access to either university or secure employment.
The photos on the table by the incense jar are those of six RVN Armed Forces generals who committed suicide, rather than surrender. Such acts were common at the time.
There are about 5000 in the Vietnamese Community in Canberra. Their humility, compassion and bravery in the face of adversity, is an example to us all.
—————————————————————————————
19 June 2021
RAAC Commemorations 3
Following on …. I address the first allegation made against me, ie. that I failed to invite the OC and SSM C Sqn to the C Sqn 50th Anniversary dinner. The letter below was drafted for the senior officer of the 1971 C Squadron to the current OC of the squadron. It is self explanatory. The response from the CO invited John Scales to give a presentation to the Regiment. John’s health precluded him and I offered to speak in lieu. There was no response to this offer.
Moving closer to the event … I attended meetings held by DVA to discuss arrangements for the National Commemoration. The person responsible, asked the ex-service groups involved not to contact the ARA support parties that would be attending (presumably there had been problems/confusion in the past).
“DVA requested that association and corporations DO NOT reach out to units or Corps directly and leave Army to issue the relevant Task Orders to execute this task.”
I asked, therefore, that 1 Armd Regt be informed that the Standard Party would be welcome to attend our dinner (the night before). There was no response to this offer.
I have written to the OC C Sqn to express my disappointment that he might think that he and the SSM would have been unwelcome at our dinner and advise him that the opposite was the case.
From: Lieutenant Colonel John Scales RAAC (Ret’d)
To: Officer Commanding, C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment
I was the 2IC of C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam in 1971 (sadly the Squadron Commander is deceased).
I maintain an interest in on-going matters related to C Sqn and I was pleased to see recently that DVA have undertaken to hold a National Commemoration for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord. This is to be held at the Vietnam Memorial in Canberra on 7 June 2021. It will take the same form as that marking the 50th Anniversary of Binh Ba this year.
I’m writing so that this might be placed on 1 Armd Regt’s forward calendar as early as possible.
The Squadron will be interested to know rhat Australia Post will be issuing a pre-stamped envelope in conjunction with the Commemoration, the design likely to be an infantryman standing next to a Centurion tank with an Iroquois overhead. I believe that the Mint are also doing a commemorative coin.
You’ll no doubt be aware of the significance that Operation Overlord had in 1971 as far as 1 ATF was concerned. The success that the firepower of the tanks involved was able to bring about, ensured that infantry would always ask for tank support before dealing with an enemy defensive position, thereafter.
I know that some former members of C Sqn are contacting others to ascertain interest in holding a ‘mini-reunion’ of C Sqn 1971 on 6/7 June 2021. If you wish, I’ll be happy to keep you up to date with these arrangements. I’m certain that members of C sqn from 50 years ago would be delighted to meet some of those serving today.
Finally, a Last Post ceremony is to be held at the AWM in conjunction with the Commemoration. If you (or your successor) were able to be present, it would be very fitting if you and I were able, together, to lay a wreath at that time.
Yours sincerely, John Scales
————————————————————————————————————————
17 June 2021
RAAC Commemorations 2
As mentioned below, my next post was to be on 22 June. On 15 June (following the post under), however, I received some feedback from Derek Simpson, the Immediate Past RSM of the RAAC. I’ve copied only the salient points below. The allegations are so far from the truth, it’s not funny. It makes me realise how false impressions gain credibility when openness and transparency take a back seat. There can be many reasons for this, but none can justify it. Matters which I categorically deny and which I’ll provide evidence to refute are:
I failed to invite the OC and SSM C Sqn to the C Sqn 50th Anniversary dinner.
I precluded others from my planning in order to avoid situations which would not put me in my own spotlight.
I announced that neither the 1AR Assn nor RAAC Corporation had anything to do with the DVA National Commemoration.
I’ve taken credit “for hard work by the RAAC Corporation and 1 AR Assn over an extended period of time which led to a successful DVA event”.
I “leeched off the hard work of others to gain personal credit”.
It is only by a “great deal of work by organisations, associations and corporations, which lead to veterans and their families being recognised by their nation”, ie. efforts on the part of an individual don’t count!
“Mr Cameron, firstly, I am no longer the RSM RAAC. Secondly, your blog today (and most days) has been drafted as if it was you, and you alone, that put together the events in support of and including the service.
By announcing that that neither the RAAC Corporation or the 1AR Association backed anything to do with the events is very misleading, but thats how you seem to operate. You appear to take credit for a significant body of work conducted by both organisations over an extended period of time which led to a very successful DVA event. Evidence of both organisations supporting this commemoration available to members via agenda items witgin the minutes of meetings.
By precluding certain people in your planning you have perhaps missed some opportunities, but that would not put you in your own spotlight. The current OC and SSM of C Sqn were in attendance, a missed opportunity to have the serving custodians of the squadrons fine history speak with those who make up part of that history. They would have relished the opportunity, but alas, no invitation from the organiser.
You appear to have leeched off the hard work of many to gain personal credit, this is disappointing.
I have no doubt the reunion rekindled some lifelong relationships and created an opportunity to remember mates who could not attend for a variety of reasons.
Opportunities like this occur through a great deal of work and co-operation between organisations,associations and corporations which lead to veterans and their familes being recognised by the nation.”
——————————————————————————————–
15 June 2021
(Note: I suffered a seizure the night prior to the Reunion dinner. The previous one was caused by a brain haemorrhage in 1989, but this one was probably caused by stress associated with the organisation. My blog posts for the immediate future will be on a weekly basis. The next … 22 June 2021.)
RAAC Commemorations in the Future
Photograph taken by David Whittaker Order reference: AWM2021.4.50. Contact: esales@awm.gov.au
The C Sqn 1 Armd Regt 50th reunion (see below) was a great success. The 1AR Assn wanted nothing to do with it, however. The RAAC Corporation, for their part, promoted a parallel 3 Cav Regt get-together and invited members of C Sqn to attend. Neither group promoted C Sqn’s functions, despite all relevant information being shared with them. RAAC solidarity??
The background is interesting. Given the long lead time required to contact all C Sqn members (incl LAD), I gave myself a two-year lead time. The dinner and other activities were to be heldin conjunction with a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord, to be conducted by DVA. Final approval for the Commemoration could not be given by DVA until 12 months out, however, as it was dependent on FY funding.
Both 1AR Assn and the RAAC Corporation took the view that they were not prepared to back any activity which didn’t have complete approval.
I therefore contacted the President of the 3 Cav Assn and asked if its members might like to join with C Sqn in the activities being planned. This was agreed and a 3 Cav person volunteered to act as a co-ordinator for them. Arrangements proceeded. These included booking a room which would be big enough, preparing relevant 3 Cav table signs, and developing a 3 Cav email list for Updates.
Come the final approval of DVA’s budget and the Operation Overlord Commemoration, what happens?
The Chairman of the RAAC Corporation (a former 3 Cav person) decides that3 Cav should have its own function. The person who volunteered to act as co-ordinator sends me an email, informing me. Disappointingly (though not surprisingly), he won’t answer his phone to me, nor return my calls.
It is clear that this had been their intention all along … keep stringing me along until the approval decision is made. One would have thought that common courtesy would have meant that I’d have been alerted to their thinking. There must have been a modicum of embarrassment … otherwise why not speak to me on the phone?
Hopefully those organising RAAC functions in the future might benefit from this experience. There will always be self-centred, gutless, bastards … I’d naively thought that they didn’t wear black berets.
Note: Re the photo above, I was presented with a personally crafted plaque, by my crew, in front of our tank … I was humbled.
1 Armd Regt Hon Col
At the C Sqn 50th Anniversary dinner on 6 Jun 21, the RAAC HOC explained that he had been appointed to the position for a further two years. I would have like to have asked who has been/is to be, appointed as Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt (and Patron, 1AR Assn). I felt it inappropriate, however, to enquire about such a matter at such a time. (The Blog post for 27 May 21 refers.)
NOTE: I had forgotten … I think Brig Ted Accutt has been appointed Hon Col 1 Armd Regt.
————————————————————————————————————–
9 June 2021
C Sqn (1971) Reunion: Canberra 6/7 June 2021
Photograph taken by David Whittaker Order reference: AWM2021.4.50.01 Contact: esales@awm.gov.au
Despite there being no backing from the 1AR Assn or RAAC Corporation, everyone was pleased with their visit to Canberra. The COVID 19 lockdown in Victoria meant that our dinner numbers were suddenly cut from 104 to 72. (It’s very likely that our Vic brothers will have their own get-together in Melbourne, when it’s possible to do so.)
Sunday 6 June. First activity was the Vietnam Requiem. This was a huge success and is now likely to tour to other cities. If you can get to it, you should. Normie Rowe was in great voice and John Schumann was as well. The rendition of the last song sung by Cathy Wayne, was heartfelt by many. The soloists, the choir and the orchestra were outstanding,
Immediately after, was the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM. Wreaths were laid in honour of Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick. Andy’s daughter laid his wreath, before joining us for Dinner. This was held at a nearby hotel, where many attendees stayed. It was a very successful evening, with a special message being read from the widow of C Sqn’s OC, Peter Bourke. The RAAC Head of Corps and President of the ACT Chapter of the Vietnamese Community in Australia both provided very informative after dinner speeches.
Monday 7 June. The National Commemoration for Operation Overlord commenced at 10.30am at the Vietnam Memorial. The weather was fine (albeit a little cold). The GG read the Commemorative Address and the ceremony was dignified and well conducted. On return to the Hotel we enjoyed a (not so) light Lunch, finishing the wines which had been provided for the dinner by one of our cohort. Finally, a visit to the AWM ‘warehouse’ was undertaken. This stores the many items of equipment which are being restored or waiting for space in the AWM. The visit was a special one, additional to the one or two ‘Open Days’ through the year.
Note: I have considerable ‘wrapping up’ to do in connection with the above arrangements. Next Blog will be posted on 15 June. I may consider weekly editions thereafter.
——————————————————————————————————————-
30 May 2021
Ironsides News: Part 4
Finishing the sequence …
(i) Op Hammersley Command and Control. The article in Ironsides states that “The British radio sets fitted in the Centurion tanks were not compatible with the US radio sets fitted to the APCs” This is not correct (I don’t know how many times I’ve had to explain this). The radios in the tanks operated on ‘old’ squelsh. The radios in the APCs could select either ‘old’ or ‘new’ squelsh. If ‘old’ squelsh was selected, APCs could communicate with tanks. (This meant that the APC crew would have the squelsh sound in their headsets.)
(ii) Wheeled RAAC Vehicles. Ironsides refers to a 1988 proposal for 2 Cav Regt to be equipped with a wheeled AFV. The author was not to know of the entrenched attitudes that had to be overcome to get to this point. When I left the Army in 1987, I was SO1 Ground Mobility in Ops Branch. I well recall one particular meeting when a Colonel (non RAAC) stated emphatically that only tracked AFVs were suitable for Army’s roles. ‘Chancing my arm’, I pointed out many roles where the opposite was the case and argued strongly for a trial to be conducted to determine the advantages and disadvantages of wheeled AFVs.
(iii) Abrams Upgrade. Ironsides states that “two options are being considered, both variants of the M1A2” [M1A2 SEP V3 and M1A2 ‘A’].
The Blog on 5 May 2021 is relevant here, ie: “It has recently been announced that:
US State Department approved the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of Heavy Armored Combat Systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$1.685 billion.
Australia requested to buy 160 M1A1 tank structures/hulls provided from stock in order to produce the following end items and spares:
75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks;
29 M1150 assault breacher vehicles;
18 M1074 joint assault bridges;
6 M88A2 Hercules combat recovery vehicles; and,
122 AGT1500 gas turbine engines.
Also included is development of a unique armour package, common remotely operated weapon station low profile (CROWS-LP), driver’s vision enhancer, mission equipment, special tools and test equipment, ground support equipment, system and engine spare parts, technical data and publications, US government and contractor technical and logistics assistance, quality assurance teams, transportation services, program management, new-equipment training, and other related elements of logistic and program support.
The M1A2 SEPv3 will upgrade the current Australian fleet of M1A1 SA tanks with no changes to Royal Australian Armoured Corps force structure.”
Note: This will be the last Blog post until 8 June 2021. The COVID situation in Victoria has created some challenges for the C Sqn 50th Reunion during 6/7 June and attention needs to be focussed. The post on 8 June will explain how it all went.
———————————————————————————–
29 May 2021
Ironsides News: Part 3
Ironsides states that the “plan to re-establish 10th Light Horse Regiment as part of the Army Objective Force expansion of 13 Bde is significant. The wheels re in motion and there will be significant announcements for 10th Light Horse and 13 Brigade in 2021”.
Earlier in the article, it was stated that cavalry training had been conducted recently. One has to wonder what vehicles were used to do this … PMVs? It wasn’t so long ago that the RAAC was denying that PMVs were utilised by the RAAC. So, A Sqn 10 LH becomes a regiment … what vehicles will it be equipped with?
Could it be, as Armouredadvocates has long suggested, that Hawkeis will have a part to play?
Recent blog posts on this subject are copied below.
12 February 2021
10 LH Regiment
What’s happening? In an earlier Blog I referred to the following:
From 13 Bde Facebook Page (5 Jan 21):2021 is going to be a big year for 13th Brigade. Starting from February, the Brigade will commence its transformation journey.
A multi-year, multi-dimensional evolution, to become the backbone of a standing Joint Task Force made up of a hybrid workforce.
Think new partnerships, new capabilities, and new approaches.
The transformation train is starting its engine, so jump on board, follow our page, and join us on this exciting journey.
I emailed Derek Simpson [Corps RSM] to ask if he can help explain what the above means and whether or not it will be a model for the ARES as a whole?
This post on the 13 Bde FB would suggest changes are imminent:
“Western Australia’s most storied Military Unit, the 10th Light Horse Regiment, will be re-raised in the second half of 2021 for the first time since 1976. Its DNA has been kept alive inside A Squadron, 10th Light Horse.
Looking to the future, it will epitomise the very best of a hybrid workforce focused on blending traditional Cavalry skillsets with emerging platforms and sensors. Delivering new methods of networked intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to the Joint Force. Stay tuned for more updates…Commander 13th Brigade, Brigadier Brett Chaloner.”
As you may have already picked up, 2021 is all about transformation.
Transforming 13th Brigade from a reserve Brigade into a hybrid, joint, contemporary agile force.
At a Town Hall meeting in December, Commander 13th Brigade, Brigadier Brett Chaloner, issued a challenge to all members.
To have an evolving mindset, to contribute to a competition of ideas, and to explore ways to harness Western Australia’s potential.
Are you ready for 2021?
—————————————————————————————————————-
28 May 2021
Ironsides News: Part 2
Extracts from Ironsides include:
“In order to support the transition to Boxer CRV and to investigate potential complimentary capabilities, 1st Armoured Regiment recently took delivery of 16 Australian designed and made Hawkei vehicles, which will be trialled in A Squadron as a light combat reconnaissance capability.”
“1st Armoured Regiment has recently received — fresh off the production line — the Hawkei Protected Mobility Vehicle – Light. Equipped with a digitised communications suite, the Hawkei is a highly protected vehicle that we will test in a number of roles, including as a formation reconnaissance capability.
While the 1st Brigade is not scheduled to receive Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles for a number of years, the Hawkei will provide an interim capability that traverses the “Ready Now” and “Future Ready” paradigms.”
So, the Hawkei is not being trialled as a platform for the RAAC ARES (see below), but as an operational vehicle in its own right. The key word above is “interim”; ie. a capability to ‘plug’ the capability gap until the ASLAV is fully replaced. Recent Blog posts about this are copied below.
2 April 2021
RAAC ARES Platform to Maintain Skills?
The 1AR Assn advise that A Sqn 1 Armd Regt are currently operating a trials fleet of Hawkei Protected Mobility Vehicles – Light in conjunction with their ASLAV troops. (Is this because of ASLAV unavailability, one wonders; ie. it’s not a ‘trial’ per se, but a means of maintaining recon skills in 1 Armd Regt?) Surely the 211 Boxers to be procured (including 133 recon variants) will be sufficient to equip the six recon squadrons in the three ACRs.
Before delving into the topic … an interesting footnote: The vehicle is named after a highly venomous snake, the Barkly Death Adder – Acanthophis Hawkei – which is found in the Barkly Tablelands
The Hawkei is now in full production … 50 vehicles per month. One presumes that the persistent reliability issues which have been reported, have been resolved; also, the safety ‘incident’ in Dec 2020 which brought usage to a stop pending an investigation.
The G-Wagon SRV [Special Reconnaissance Vehicle] has been used in a reconnaissance role by Special Forces. Presumably the reconnaissance variant of the Hawkei will replace the SRV in this role.
Is it possible that the Hawkei trial being conducted by 1 Armd Regt is to evaluate its suitability as a means of maintaining mounted skills in RAAC ARES light cavalry regiments? Interestingly, Hawkei can carry cavalry scouts and can be fitted with weapon and observation ‘pods’. The following refers.
A remotely controlled weapon station (RCWS) is installed in the Hawkei vehicle. It is an automated control weapon station principally used for light and medium-calibre weapons. The RCWS can accommodate remote control weapons encompassing 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and 12.7mm machine guns, 40mm automatic grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and observation pods. https://www.army-technology.com/projects/hawkei/
3 April 2021
Capability Gap: ACR Reconnassiance
The following quotes are from a recent Australian National Audit Office report …
”On 9 August 2018, Defence established a contract, valued at $4.28 billion (including GST), with Rheinmetall Defence Australia (Rheinmetall) for the acquisition of 211 Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs), 12 mission modules and associated support systems. The vehicles are to be delivered in two blocks (tranches):
Block I — comprising 25 vehicles intended to provide an early deployable capability for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) by December 2020; and
Block II — comprising 186 vehicles to be delivered between February 2022 and January 2027.”
“The highest priority for Army is to replace the ASLAV fleet with a CRV [combat reconnaissance vehicle] due to obsolescence factors that constrain tactical employment and increase the cost of ownership. These obsolescence factors cannot be mitigated through upgrade and without replacement starting in 2020, a capability gap will result.”
The last of the 25 Boxers, supposedly to be delivered from Germany by December 2020, won’t be delivered before June 2021.
According to the ANAO report, the planned final withdrawal date for the ASLAV fleet is December 2021.
For how many years will the capability gap in Army reconnaissance exist? Replacement of the ASLAV is not scheduled to be completed before 2027. Seems like the Hawkeis will be fully employed maintaining skills in the ACR, let alone the RAAC ARES.
There has always been an issue with the fact that publication takes so long. Nevertheless, it is a good journal and deserves to be read. The accounts of unit activities show just how much commitment is involved in serving today. The next series of Blog posts will relate to what the latest issue makes known in other ways.
Page 3 advises that the new Representative Honorary Colonel of the RAAC “will be named shortly”. The Blog post for 25 May 2021 is relevant and copied below
“The Honorary Colonel/Patron Quandary
The following was included in the Minutes of the last 1AR Assn C’tee meeting:
The President advised the meeting the current patron (MAJGEN Craig Orme, DSC, AM, CSC [Retd]) had been appointed as the Honorary Colonel of the Corps as well as for B Squadron 3/4 Cavalry Regiment. As a result, he would be standing down as our Patron. The President asked for opinions as to whether the Association should continue with the tradition of inviting the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment to be the new Patron of the Association. There was general agreement that the tradition should be followed and that a letter of invitation be forwarded to the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment.
It used to be that Maj Gen Roger Powell, AM, was: Representative Hon Col of the RAAC; Hon Col 1 Armd Regt; and Patron 1 AR Assn. His 1 Armd Regt and 1AR Assn duties were subsequently taken over by Maj Gen Craig Orme DSC, AM, CSC. Craig has now assumed the position of Rep Hon Col of the RAAC, meaning that he can no longer remain as Hon Col 1 Armd Regt or Patron 1AR Assn.
The 1 AR Assn are going to forward a letter to the Hon Col 1 Armd Regt, asking that he become the Patron of the 1AR Assn. But, as far as is publicly known, the Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt is yet to be appointed … or has he/she?
Note. It’s interesting that the Rep Hon Col of the RAAC cannot also be the Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt, but CAN also be the Hon Col of B Sqn 3/4 Cav. One would have to assume that it’s about the ‘span of command’, ie. the work load associated with being both RAAC and Armd Regt Hon Cols. But Roger Powell did it.”
————————————————————————-
Following from the last para above … info from Ironsides is that the former Rep Hon Col of the RAAC was also “Colonel Commandant of the School of Armour & B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt”. According to the 2019 Ironsides, each RAAC unit had an Honorary Colonel. What is the difference between an honorary colonel and a colonel commandant? Interestingly, Wikipedia confuses things by describing Maj Gen Powell as the ‘Colonel of the Regiment’.
Surprisingly, the 1AR Assn website still refers to Maj Gen Orme as the Assn’s Patron. As expected, the Assn’s last two newsletters make no reference to a new Hon Col being appointed for 1 Armd Regt.
I wonder if I’m the only one who would appreciate some clarification?
—————————————————————————————————
26 May 2021
The Army in a War With China
The following is a letter to the editor of the Canberra Times, published today. [I’d thought that it might be a bit too ‘provocative’; will be interesting to see comments result.]
Bradley Perret makes some good points in his articles about war breaking out over Taiwan. In his second ‘How war could spill into Australian territory’ (Canberra Times, 24 May), he states that there would be no need for the Australian Army.
This is based on his assessment that there would be neither Chinese landings in Australia, nor Australian landings in China (or Taiwan). This is not the full story, however. Irrespective as to whether or not Australia places restrictions on Chinese Australians, the possibility of terrorism activities cannot be ruled out.
It must be expected that vital assets, which he has identified, need to be protected. Our airports, ports and fuel reserves would be primary targets, along with population centres. The panic caused by the release of a sarin gas canister in a CBD, for example, could cripple our infrastructure. In terms of other units, anti-missile defence systems need to manned and protected. Furthermore, military logistic capability would be stretched to the limit and would undoubtedly have to be augmented.
It is to be expected that current Defence contingency plans would specify very specific and important roles for the Army in any such situation.
————————————————————————–
25 May 2021
Vietnam : Background for Requiem Part 3
The second part of yesterday’s post …
So … the Vietnam War for Australians was unlike anything ever experienced. The scale and intensity could change in the blink of an eye … from dealing with local guerrillas setting mines and booby traps, to attacking extensive defensive positions occupied by regular battalions of the North Vietnamese Army. The constant tension that resulted from this, was significant in the experience of Australian soldiers. Training prior to deployment was not adequate preparation. The effect manifested itself in many ways, as seen by the number of mental health issues which were present in returning veterans. [Moving between the two different levels of warfare was also a factor in the experience of members of the AATTV, I think; but John Scales could elaborate.] Australian forces experienced isolated, but similar, situations in which Cathy Warnes was shot by an American soldier. The pervasive tension and stress was constant throughout.
As I’ve tried to describe, the major battles were one part of the experience only. Five battlehonours were awarded: Long Tan; Binh Ba, Bien Hoa (the Tet Offensive), Coral-Balmoral and Hat Dich. (These are all described on the Internet.) Other major actions were Operation Hammersley; Operation Bribie; the Battle Long Khanh (Operation Overlord) and the Battle of Nui Le.
The bravery and courage of Australian soldiers was also demonstrated time and time again on operations at the other end of the spectrum, ie. searching a village or a tunnel system, conducting an ambush, denying food supplies to local VC, helping protect villages etc. The dichotomy is such that the major battles were similar to those experienced in, say, New Guinea during the Second World War; while the counter-insurgency actions were not unlike those of the Malayan Emergency.
————————————————————————————————–
24 May 2021
Vietnam : Background for Requiem Part 2
Following on from yesterday, I’ve copied below the advice I provided to help inform those preparing the Requiem.
My view is that, unlike the First World War, the Vietnam War can’t be defined by individual battles.
The experience for service personnel (I’ll say ‘soldiers’ hence, as a generic for male and female service personnel) was one of long periods living in an alert situation, punctuated by brief periods of intense danger, during which conspicuous courage was frequently demonstrated. The major battles which did occur represented the difference between Vietnam and the counter-insurgency of the Malayan Emergency. In the latter, the first stage of revolutionary or guerrilla warfare (during which the enemy develop their infrastructure) was paramount throughout. It should have been realised following Long Tan in Aug 1966, that this had ended for Vietnam and the enemy had moved to the second stage, Preparation for the Counter Offensive (in which regular units of the North Vietnamese Army became involved, rather than just local guerrillas).
Unfortunately, this realisation of this didn’t occur until after Operation Bribie in Feb 1967. (Gordon Murphy can tell you all about this.) At this point Australia deployed a third infantry battalion and a squadron of tanks. (Prior to this time, the strong view was that there was no place for tanks in operations limited solely to counter-insurgency warfare.)
The second half tomorrow…
————————————————————————————
23 May 2021
Vietnam : Background for Requiem
I attended a preview of the second half of the Vietnam Requiem on Thursday evening. The first half comprises music from the time, sung by artists from the time. The second half is made up of orchestral movements, reflecting the different stages of the War … backed by projected photos from the War and information segments.
The reason for the preview was to seek advice re any mistakes re the images or the info presented. It was interesting to hear the comments from not only the Vietnamese community, but also the Lao and Cambodian viewpoints.
One of my points was that the dichotomy of the War should be made clear. Two relevant comments were:
The Role of Australians in Vietnam. There were many images of Australian patrolling etc, but I don’t recall any mention of what their purpose was. There are various answers here. Essentially the presence of Australians was to help the ARVN provide security for the South Vietnamese. This meant protecting villages from VC intimidation, ie securing villages, as well as searching for and attacking enemy base camps and defended positions.
The Nature of the War. Following on … operations comprised searching for enemy bases and destroying them when located. There were many photos of infantry patrolling (the ‘searching’), but few of tanks or artillery (fire support when enemy defensive positions were attacked). The 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Khanh/Operation Overlord is being commemorated on 7 June 2021. This was one of the greatest examples of infantry/tank co-operation of the War. The essential point is that all operations involved combined arms working together and supporting each other.
This dichotomy was raised in earlier advice, when I was asked to provide my view of the Vietnam War. I’ll copy this tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————
22 May 2021
Military Values 2
Military Values was the topic of the Blog post on 12 May 2021.
The following comments are relevant …
(1) It would be interesting to know who actually comes up with this crap Bruce, it seems “Community capacity building” is about promoting the ‘capacity’ of local communities to develop, implement and sustain their own solutions to problems in a way that helps them shape and exercise control over their physical, social, economic and cultural environments.
I have always been under the impression that the main job of a soldier was to seek out and destroy the enemy, assisting communities in times of trouble is a secondary role and shouldn’t involve getting entangled in community matters. Seems to me that any “community capacity building” is the responsibility of the community itself and local government.
(2) Speaking from the point of view of someone who has had the experience of having had to make the decision between taking the life of an enemy soldier and protecting the life of a comrade (please ask no details), it is similar to recognising that the veneer of civilisation is miniscule and no more substantial than understanding that the target is like a number 9 target on the range, except that it doesn’t go clang – it is a split-second decision and would probably be the same today. Interesting, isn’t it?
———————————————————————————————————
21 May 2021
The RAAC Corporation Limited: Glacial Speed
The Purposes for which The Corporation exist include:
To foster and protect the interests of The Corporation and The Royal Australian Armoured Corps, its Regiments and units, ordinary members and their families in any matter likely to affect them during or after their service in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps;
To provide advice, guidance and welfare assistance to ordinary members.
To perpetuate the close bonds of comradeship and esprit de corps created by military service in The Royal Australian Armoured Corps
To preserve the memory of those ordinary members of The Corps who have died on active and overseas service;
To represent the interests of the serving and ex-serving ordinary members of The Corps
To consider and provide advice where appropriate, on benefit services;
To develop, and represent, the Corporation’s view on matters of interest to appropriate persons
One has to ask how any of these services for ordinary members (serving or retired) of the RAAC can be achieved without any means of communication. Seems to me that the RAAC Corporation’s purposes need rewording; rather than “representing the interests of serving and ex-serving members of The Corps”, the words ‘serving and ex-service members of The Corps who are members of associations that the Corporation represents’.
The website (above) used to have a ‘News’ link, but following a query as to why there was no news being provided, this was changed to ‘Info’.
The info page has had a couple of new additions over the years. There is now more information re the RAAC Overwatch, following representations to this end. There is also an RAAC ESO contacts list. Interestingly, this states that 1 Armd Regt Assn’s “NSW Rep is temporarily acting as ACT Rep”. So … an ACT Branch of the Assn is planned.
Some years ago, the RAAC Corporation announced that it had been approached by the RAAC Hon Col to form an ACT RAAC body. The embryo organisation lasted for a couple of months and failed because of a lack of communication. No RAAC members resident in the ACT were asked what sort of association they might support. Unsurprisingly, there was little enthusiasm for the things dictated.
Finally, why does the RAAC Corporation website still refer to 1 Armd Regt operating Abrams tanks and 2 Cav and 2/14 LH (QMI) operating ASLAVs? Surely enough ice has melted for the ACR structure to be referred to?
The concept of ‘Deterrence’ is important. Extracts are copied below …
It’s clear that Scott Morison and his ministers understand that the region is facing a crisis brought on by an increasingly bellicose Chinese Communist Party. Taiwan is the immediate flashpoint and the level of risk will peak in perhaps four to five years’ time.
Hardly a day goes by without PLA aircraft, often in large numbers, encroaching Taiwanese airspace. CCP rhetoric about taking Taiwan by force if necessary is increasingly being used in speeches and editorials.
The [US] secretary of state stressed the Biden administration’s interest in ‘reaffirming and revitalizing America’s alliances and partnerships’ and, in the 70th year of the ANZUS Treaty, finding ways for the alliance ‘to evolve to meet the challenges we face’.
While these are positive steps [the Defence announcements in the recent Budget], the uncomfortable truth is that the bulk of the $270 billion allocated over the coming decade to build ships, submarines and other military equipment will only come into service well after the riskiest period for Taiwan.
A faster way to strengthen deterrence would be to re-open a discussion with the US about increasing the US Marine Corps presence in northern Australia and getting some US Navy ships operating out of our west coast base, HMAS Stirling
The only short-term way to strengthening deterrence is by lifting the defence readiness of democracies. If US President Joe Biden does visit Australia for the ANZUS anniversary, you can be assured this will be the number one item on his agenda.
————————————————————————————————–
19 May 2021
Armed Neutrality: A Myth
Following on from recent posts, the following is a letter sent to the Canberra Times:
“Nicholas Stuart in his article ‘Trying to learn from the past’ (OPINION, 17 May 2021) states that ‘We need to understand what armed force can, and can’t, achieve’. The implied point being, that Australia’s current defence posture needs to be examined. Stuart’s article is based on two recent books. The author of one, Dr Albert Palazzo, has recently advocated that Australia should embrace armed neutrality. [See: http://sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2018-12/cog_45.pdf%5D
The current ADF is neither structured nor equipped to be capable of defending Australia without support from allies. Mobilisation capacity is not nearly sufficient: standing forces would need to be strengthened considerably; and a much greater reserve capability would be required. Self-reliance comes at a cost.
In essence, current defence partnerships allow the ADF to be structured to defend Australia’s national interests, on a minimal budget; a situation which no Government is likely to change. Armed neutrality is a pipe-dream.”
What comes after the M1 Abrams, the Army’s massive Reagan-era main battle tank? “Everything is on the table at this point,” the service’s armor modernization director, Maj. Gen. Richard Ross Coffman, says.
Command Vehicles or Combat Vehicles?
Even Scharre, the most futuristic-minded expert we spoke to for this story, doesn’t see armored vehicles disappearing entirely. He just doesn’t see them as being the decisive weapon anymore, but a supporting arm.
“I suspect that tanks will not go away completely,” he told me, “but they are likely to go the way of the infantry — as a mopping up force for close-in engagements, rather than the central role tanks have played in ground combat since World War II.”
That central role will shift to ground robots, drones, and long-range missiles, Scharre believes, with the decisive clash often occurring before the humans on opposing sides ever lay eyes on one another. But armored vehicles will still be valuable, especially when humans have to survive maneuvering through a war zone.
Upgrade the M1 Or Replace It?
If a manned main battle tank remains necessary, can the M1 Abrams continue to fill that role, or does the Army need a new MBT?
The M1 Abrams could be the centerpiece of the future manned-unmanned armored force, said Bendett. Much as it’s been upgraded in the past multiple times since its introduction in 1980, it just needs to be upgraded again, with counter-drone defenses, electronic warfare, and a command system for the robots.
But there are only so many upgrades the old M1 can take, argued Guy Swan, a retired armor officer now with the Association of the US Army.
“One thing is for sure, we cannot continue to hang more on the M1 Abrams frame,” Swan told me. “The tank, while I believe it’s still the best in the world, is far too heavy to navigate regions of the world where ground forces may have to operate.”
——————————————————————————————————
17 May 2021
The ADF of the Future.
The ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update & 2020 Force Structure Plan’ (Land Fact Sheet) forecasts approx $10b for ‘replacement tank evaluation and design’ and a similar amount for ‘future autonomous vehicles’. See https://www1.defence.gov.au/strategy-policy/strategic-update-2020
Theoretically, the current tank upgrade project will see the tank capability maintained for the next 20 years. Surely this is not correct. Does anyone actually read these documents?
An extract from the Update is copied below.
LAND
• Throughout its history, Australia’s land forces have responded to a wide variety of tasks from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peacekeeping and, ultimately, to combat operations.
• To equip the land forces to meet these challenges into the future, new investments are being made in strike weapons, watercraft, helicopters, information effects, logistics resilience and emerging robotics and autonomous systems.
• These capabilities will increase the land force’s combat power, and give the Government more options to deploy the Australian Defence Force in the more competitive strategic environment Australia now faces.
CAPABILITY INVESTMENT –
Land Combat Vehicles: Australia will continue to procure the Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle, invest in an infantry fighting vehicle and upgrade the Abrams main battle tank.
Land Combat Support: New investment in enhanced artillery and strike capabilities, including Self-Propelled Howitzer Protected Mobile Fires, and new anti-armour systems such as a directed energy weapon system and smart anti-tank mines.
Land Combat Mobility Continued investment in the Hawkei protected mobility vehicle fleet, large landing craft and new investment in a watercraft base in Northern Australia, and a fleet, up to a brigade in size, of un-crewed ground vehicles
————————————————————————————————-
16 May 2021
Armed Neutrality: Part 4
Photo: ASPI
Armed neutrality is really just another way of saying ‘Defence of Australia’ without mutual defence pacts with other countries, ie. self-reliance.
The concept of ‘Continental Defence’ was one which was advocated (and embraced) some years ago. Concern about the vulnerability of northern Australia remains today.
Would we be prepared to deny our support to neighbouring nations such as PNG or Timor; or does the concept of ‘Armed Neutrality’ accept that Australia might enter into defence agreements with such nations?
What sort of force structure would be required for armed neutrality to be possible?
Rather than ‘coastal defence’, one would assume that the ADF would have to be based on a rapid deployment model (possibly backed by pre-positioned assets). Such a concept, of course, would have to be capable of defending our off-shore possessions such as Christmas Island … unless our sovereignty over these areas was to be foregone.
The current ADF is neither structured nor equipped to be capable of defending Australia (let alone helping defend our close neighbours). Mobilisation capability is not nearly fast enough. Standing forces would need to be strengthened considerably and a much greater reserve capability would be required.
In essence, the present defence partnership with the US, allows the ADF to operate with a minimal defence budget. No Government is likely to change this. Armed neutrality is a pipe-dream.
“In relation to Australia adopting armed neutrality as its defence policy, Dr Albert Palazzo (Director of War Studies in the Australian Army Research Centre) says: “There is no doubt that in order to adopt armed neutrality the ADF will have to undergo a major transformation. Platforms that are designed to operate within a US naval or air task group, for example, may no longer be practical or even suitable for armed neutrality. The Army’s perception of itself as an infantry-centric force may need to undergo a radical revision, with the status of the gunner moving to the fore as coastal defence again becomes the land force’s primary role.”
Coastal defence?? Surely not … is Dr Palazzo really advocating that Australia’s defence be based on similar strategies to that of pre-Federation and the Second World War? [Bias Alert: I have raised issues with one of the author’s published references previously.]
There is no doubt that Armed Neutrality would require a different ADF force structure. What would that look like, and what constraints would it impose on ADF deployment options?
The quest for answers continues ….
————————————————————————————————————-
14 May 2021
Armed Neutrality? Part 2
Following on from yesterday … more questions, what might the answers be?
“Would America be able to guarantee Australia’s security in a more contested Asia where the US-led security order no longer exists? This is the question that Australians should start asking themselves. And this question is not just about choosing between America and China. It is about preparing reasonable alternatives for Australia’s national defence in the Asian century without American preponderance.
As an alternative, some scholars suggest Australia to opt for armed neutrality. The policy of armed neutrality has not seriously been considered by successive Australian governments, but it has always been an unignorable topic in the Australian defence policy debate. Especially those who emphasise the country’s geostrategic advantages and are sceptical about its dependency on the great powers have consistently expressed their interest in this model. Indeed, Australia’s geographical position – a country forming a continent of its own, geographically unconnected to any great powers – certainly makes this model attractive and credible. It is also true that for many times Australia was dragged into difficult circumstances because of its heavy dependency on its powerful allies – first Britain and then the United States.
These contentions certainly have the point. But they only occupy one side of the debate over armed neutrality for Australia. And one can surely participate in and contribute to the debate by trying to answer the following three fundamental questions: First, what would Australia’s policy of armed neutrality look like in practice? Second, what are the pros and cons of taking such an approach? And last, is it really an achievable and suitable defence model for Australia’s security for decades to come?”
The following article, ‘Armed Neutrality: an alternative, principled defence policy to safeguard an independent Australia, keep us out of wars and promote peace- Part 1’ was published on 11 May 2021:
The ANZUS Treaty reinforced in the Australian political and military elite a belief that to ensure the United States would indeed “come to our rescue in time of need”, Australia should constantly ingratiate itself with the U.S, reflexively support its foreign policies and participate in its wars, irrespective of their morality or whether there was any real threat to Australia, as an ‘insurance premium’.
This slavish obedience to the U.S has resulted in Australian soldiers’ lives being sacrificed in U.S wars of aggression such as those in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, countries which posed no military threat to Australia or the U.S and were not in the ANZUS Treaty geographical commitment area of the Pacific. These wars did not have the sanction of the United Nations and were therefore illegal.
This is not a new proposal. It was advocated strongly during Vietnam. Is it a realistic option? It is obviously a position which will form part of the debate about Australia’s defence posture, but is it a credible one?
More to follow.
Note: Sorry about the confusion resulting from me saying that I would be away until 12 June … I meant 12 May!
ADF members need ‘not only the skills to “kill and capture” but also the skills to “care and nurture” and to help build community capacity.’
These two skill sets are totally at odds with each other. Trying to blend them together will create ambiguity, confusion and uncertainty. All of which are an anathema to the development of fighting spirit. The values required for which, include: proficiency, self-sacrifice, teamwork, honesty, respect for others, initiative, determination, self-discipline, and moral courage.
Successful military operations depend on forces with high morale; this comes, in part, from good leadership and strong fighting spirit.”
———————————————————————————————
NOTE: This will be the last post until 12 May 2021 … a short trip to Perth (fingers crossed) for family reasons.
5 May 2021
The Australian Tank Fleet
Part 7 of the Intro to the Blog (above) includes the following as goals which are now included in the ‘Pending’ category:
The RAAC tank fleet would be right sized’ from 59 to the 90+ that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons. (It has been reported that project LAND 907 Phase 2 incorporates an additional 29 Abrams, to bring the tank fleet to 88; with what seems to be a ‘trade-off’ in terms of two tanks for increased simulators, including one for troop tactical training.)
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool. (See above.)
It has recently been announced that:
“US State Department approved the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of Heavy Armored Combat Systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of US$1.685 billion.
Australia requested to buy 160 M1A1 tank structures/hulls provided from stock in order to produce the following end items and spares:
75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks;
29 M1150 assault breacher vehicles;
18 M1074 joint assault bridges;
6 M88A2 Hercules combat recovery vehicles; and,
122 AGT1500 gas turbine engines.
Also included is development of a unique armour package, common remotely operated weapon station low profile (CROWS-LP), driver’s vision enhancer, mission equipment, special tools and test equipment, ground support equipment, system and engine spare parts, technical data and publications, US government and contractor technical and logistics assistance, quality assurance teams, transportation services, program management, new-equipment training, and other related elements of logistic and program support.
“The M1A2 SEPv3 will upgrade the current Australian fleet of M1A1 SA tanks with no changes to Royal Australian Armoured Corps force structure.
“The M1150 assault breacher vehicles and M1074 joint assault bridges will be a new capability for the Royal Australian Engineers, bringing under-armor bridging and breaching capability, increasing the effectiveness and survivability of Australian combat engineers and providing increased mobility for the armoured fleet.”
One of the problems with the current tank fleet is that its limited size has meant that the platforms have been overworked, resulting in a decrease in reliability. This is especially the case, with the limited repair pool stock available.
The pending introduction of enhanced simulator facilities has been referred to recently. Is it possible that the existing M1A1s can be used for driver training and that, together with the greater simulator capability, the tank fleet might be able to be regarded as both ‘upgraded’ and ‘right sized’? (Of course, the other benefit to result, will be the continued interoperability with US forces.)
—————————————————————————————————-
4 May 2021
Black April Day Part 3
The following letter to the editor of the Canberra times has been sent. Will it be published, or is it too ‘political’?
A wreath laying ceremony was held at the Vietnam Memorial on 1 May 2021. It was to commemorate Black April Day, when South Vietnam was taken over on 30 April 1975.
The President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) referred to the hardships inflicted (even now), the ‘re-education’ camps, the grave sites demolished, and the harsh penalties imposed; all of which were intended to wipe out the ‘soul’ of the South Vietnamese people. It was patently obvious, however, that their passion for democracy and human rights lives on.
Interestingly, the President can’t be invited as an official guest to the coming National Commemoration for the 50th anniversary of a battle fought by Australians in Vietnam … even though he is the senior representative in Australia of the people on whose behalf we fought side by side. It would seem that our trade interests might be jeopardised.
Of course, ‘that’s politics’, but does it have to be one thing or the other? Surely, we are mature enough as a country to do better; to achieve an outcome which protects jobs, while also respecting the cause for which our service personnel died.
The Vietnamese are such gracious, polite and kind people … how they delighted in the presence of a 92 year old former Australian Army Training Team member who still spoke excellent Vietnamese.
Note: The letter was published in this morning’s paper under a bold headline: ‘Fall of Saigon Marked by ACT Wreath Laying Ceremony’. Now to see whether or not it prompts any change in Government policy.
————————————————————————–
3 May 2021
Black April Day Part 2
The Blog on 27 April 2021 provided background re Black April Day.
I attended the Black April wreath laying ceremony this morning.
One of the things that the President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) mentioned was what happened on 30 April 1975. They North Vietnamese didn’t just take the land area, nor did they seek to unify the country … they sought to take revenge on the people of the south! The hardships inflicted (even now), the ‘re-education (aka concentration) camps, the grave sites demolished, the harsh penalties imposed, were all intended to wipe out the ‘soul’ of the South Vietnamese. Which is partly why the VCA are so passionate about human rights. I
Interestingly, the President of the VCA can’t be invited to the National Commemoration of Operation Overlord as an official guest, even though he is the representative of the people on whose behalf we were fighting … that’s politics (we don’t want to offend our new trading partner).
Chris Hayes MP whose electorate is in southern Sydney (Liverpool area) also referred to human rights. He spoke about one of his constituents, a 72 yo retired baker, who returned to Vietnam a couple of years ago. The Vietnamese authorities discovered that he had served in the ARVN, charged him with terrorism and sentenced him to 12 years jail. Chris was very vocal about the Federal Government’s failure as far as such human rights abuses are concerned. Not surprisingly, he’s a Labor MP.
The Vietnamese are such gracious, polite and kind people … how they delighted in a 92 yo former AATTV member who still spoke excellent Vietnamese.
———————————————————————-
2 May2021
Getting History Right: Part2
Following on from yesterday …
Responses to my query are copied below. It would seem that the historian concerned is correct; which makes all the other references to Operation Hardihood that come up on a Google search, incorrect, ie. they refer to only part of Operation Hardihood. I think this has become such common practice, that it is entrenched. As always, you can’t believe everything you read.
“Thank you for your email and your enquiry. I address your points below:
The movement instructions for Army units from Australia to Vietnam was undertaken as part of Operation Hardihood by Headquarters Eastern Command under Operation Hardihood Movement Instruction E64/66dated 1 Apr 66 (AWM Unit Diaries).
I am sure what 5 RAR activities you are referring to in the date range of 24 May – 5 June. The 5 RAR Advanced Party had arrived in-country as early as 19 April under Operation Hardihood, with the Main Body arriving on 4 May. Securing of Nui Dat occurred over the period 1-24 May, with HQ 1 ATF in location on 5 June.
The Third Phase of Hardihood involved the flying of 6 RAR to Nui Dat with this task was completed by 14 June and Hardihood completed on 15 June. For the Phases of Hardihood see FRAG ORDER 1-1-66 (OP HARDIHOOD), HQ 1 ATF dated 23 May 66 (AWM Unit Dairies).
1 RAR was deployed to South Vietnam under Operational Plan Trimdon in May 65, not OperationHardihood, so the two should not be conflated. It is also useful to note that 1 RAR was reinforced under Plan Tanton in September 1965.
1 ATF was deployed to South Vietnam under Operation Hardihood, as the Hardihood Movement Instruction clearly indicated.
Should the ‘formal’ title (not necessarily the one used for publication) be Phase 3 or Phase 4?”
I would have a title something along the following lines:
Operation Hardihood: Securing Nui Dat
The problem with the proposed date range of 24 May – 4 June is that, while it may well accord with 5 RAR planning and execution for the securing of Nui Dat, it over laps Phase One and Two of Hardihood. Hence if you tie 24 May – 4 June into a definite operational phase of Hardihood you are misleading the reader.
I have read the original operational planning documents related to 5 RAR for the objective of securing Nui Dat. There is a lot going on and, as you would know, plans are being issued at the task force and unit level for at least six different units. However, 5 RAR unit orders for a specific activity with its own unit phasing should not be confused with the broader task force orders because often their dates and phases of how to achieve the objective do not always coincide – and with a devolved planning model you would expect this to happen.
Indeed initial US activity to secure Nui Dat commenced as early as 1 May.
My advice is to make it clear that only a 5 RAR operation be described and/or remove the proposed dates.
————————————————————————————————
It’s happened again!! Yesterdays post failed to ‘register’ on the Blog. Here it is (I hope).
30 April/1 May 2021
Getting History Right
An article in the 29 April 2021 edition of the Army Newspaper states that:
“OPERATION Hardihood was the name given to a complex three-phase plan to deploy 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF) to its future base at Nui Dat, Phuoc Tuy Province in April 1966 … the first deployment phase of Operation Hardihood, moving troops from Australia to Vung Tau, was largely completed by early May.”
Was this the case?
Most sources refer to Hardihood as the operation to clear and secure the Nui Dat area. No mention is made of the operation including the deployment of troops from Australia. References are quoted below:
Fundamental to the security of the new base was the removal of all the civilian residents from within a 4000 metre buffer zone to an imaginary line – Line Alpha. Together with the US 173rd Brigade and 1RAR, 5RAR conducted their first operation, Operation Hardihood, removing the villagers, their livestock and their possessions from Long Phuoc and Long Tan and relocating them at nearby Hoa Long, Dat Do and Long Dien
So, when did planning for deployment of Australian forces to Vietnam start?
On 28 November 1961, the Director of Military Operations and Plans at Army Headquarters (AHQ) was tasked to ‘produce a concept of operations and logistic support to meet a situation in South Vietnam where minimum acceptable scales of equipment and vehicles are required, based on close country, with short road L of C [Lines of Communication], supplemented by the use of air supply’. This was designated Plan Hammerhead.
I might be wrong in this, ie. Operation Hardihood may have involved earlier movement phases, followed by the securing of Nui Dat, and the above references should have referred to Operation Hardihood Phase 3. I would find this surprising, however, as large-scale movement of forces have always been classed as separate operations. I have written to the Army newspaper and asked that they consider whether or not clarification should be made in the next edition.
—————————————————————————–
29 April 2021
Army Recruitment in Times Past
The following post was placed on another site: “I just don’t know what to make of it; it just doesn’t seem to go anywhere”. This comment referred to:
I replied to say: “One Good Reason was a promotional film for the Australian Army produced by Film Australia in 1973. It featured Bill Hunter as Major Tom Archer who is facing a dilemma as to whether or not to resign to take a job in private enterprise, or continue in the Army.
I think that this was a time, with Vietnam having ended, when many Army officers were in two minds about continuing in the Army as a career. I don’t know for sure, but I think the film might have been subtle (?) propaganda in this respect.
I remember watching it in the seventies (a ‘short’ prior to a main feature maybe?). I think the RAAF took a different tack and offered a bonus to pilots who entered into a commitment to continue to serve.
I believe that it might have been made available on-line by the National Film and Sound Archive to honour Bill Hunter, following his death in 2011.
Interestingly, One Good Reason was filmed by Dean Semler who went on to win an Oscar for Dances With Wolves.”
—————————————————————————————-
28 April 2021
Black April Day 2021
The Vietnamese Community in Australia will be conducting wreath laying ceremonies in capital cities around Australia to mark Black April Day. Ceremonies are also conducted by the diaspora around the world, particularly in the US.
Background provided in the link below. Usually the date is 30 April (the fall of Saigon), but this year it will be held at Vietnam Memorial in Canberra on Saturday, 1 May.
Everyone is welcome. Last year the drill by the guard made up of former ARVN soldiers, was memorable. In Vietnam there is a holiday, known as Reunification Day.
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part VIII
The last in the ‘series’. It’s an unbelievable story, I hope that my next book will do it justice.
12 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga Part 7
Following on from yesterday and blog posts immediately preceding that, the second half of the submission sent to the Minister on 7 Feb 17 is copied below. The RAAC Corporation claims (see 10 Feb Blog) that it made a separate submission a month later and, as a result, a “legislative anomaly” was found which enabled its submission to be approved to have the Battlehonour emblazoned. Posts 1-5 on this topic have investigated why it is that the RAAC Corporation will not allow anyone to see their ‘submission’.
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. (Part 2)
Precedent for Re-evaluating Convention. A precedent has been set in which the Australian Army acted contrary to Imperial directions and authorised a battle honour to be emblazoned because of the extent of bravery displayed by Australian soldiers in the action concerned. Those soldiers, it was decided, had earned the right for their sacrifice and gallantry to be formally acknowledged. There is no doubt that gallant efforts of those who fought at FSBs Coral and Balmoral deserve no less.
Nature of Modern Warfare. As the Second World War was different to the First World War, so are modern conflicts different again. Why should the extent to which today’s soldiers can be honoured be based on circumstances from over 70 years ago?
Why should those former members of 1st Armoured Regiment who fought and earned three battle honours for Vietnam, only be able to see two of them emblazoned on their Regiment’s Standard? Why should members of that Regiment today, not be able to fully appreciate the significance of all the battle honours their forebears were awarded?
Wider Implications. What would be the implications of endorsing the existing provisions of DI (A) Admin 38-3? Three more battle honours would be able to be emblazoned on the Colours of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Guidon of 3rd Cavalry Regiment; one more battle honour would be able to be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment.
Timing. The emblazing should carried out as soon as possible. It will further boost unit morale, provide enhanced public profile of the gallantry of soldiers who fought during those iconic battles, and boost the public profile of Army’s heritage. Furthermore, for the ever decreasing numbers of veterans who participated in the battles and are still alive, it will be seen as public acknowledgement of their job well done before they all succumb to the ravages of time.
Conclusion.
Today’s Army fights different wars to those of 1914-18 and 1939-45. The basis on which the gallantry of today’s soldiers is honoured should be determined on current circumstances, not those of more than 70 years ago.
The existing provisions of DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions, which state that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned on colours etc, should be strongly endorsed, rather than any thought being given to reverting to benchmarks set last century. The Battle Honour, “Coral-Balmoral”, should be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment as soon as possible.
——————————–
Footnote: So ends this series of posts related to secrecy imposed by the RAAC Corporation on their ‘lobbying’ of Government and the public statements made about this. The Information Commissioner advises that the third party involved made at least three submissions to her Office claiming personal privacy provisions prevented disclosure (the initial reasons advanced by Defence having been discounted). I have no interest in any such personal information and have asked that I receive the document with personal info blacked out, even if it means receiving a totally blacked out page. If this request is denied, there are review mechanisms still be be employed.
———————————————————————————————————-
26 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part VII
Following on from the past seven days … the retelling of the story in all its ‘glory’ will be completed tomorrow.
11 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 6
Following on from yesterday and blog posts immediately preceding that, the first half of the submission sent to the Minister on 7 Feb 17 is copied below. The RAAC Corporation claims (see yesterday’s Blog) that it made a separate submission a month later and, as a result, a “legislative anomaly” was found which enabled its submission to be approved to have the Battlehonour emblazoned. Posts 1-5 on this topic have investigated why it is that the RAAC Corporation will not allow anyone to see their ‘submission’.
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the1st Armoured Regiment Standard. (Part 1)
Background.
Following the First World War, a British/Imperial Battle Honours Committee (BHC) decided that emblazoned battle honours should be limited to ten per regiment (because of constraints on the available space on colours etc). The same constraint was imposed following the Second World War.
Because of differences in scale, the limit set for Korean War battle honours was one theatre honour and one battle honour. This decision was initially accepted by the Australian Army. Twenty years later, however, it was considered that the Battleof Maryang Sanwas so important that the BHC edict would no longer be complied with — both Maryang Sanand KapyongBattle Honours would be emblazoned.
The limit of one theatre honour and two battle honours was maintained by the Vietnam BHC.
1st Armoured Regiment was awarded three battle honours for Vietnam, but only Hat Dichand Binh Baare emblazoned on its Standard. Despite Coral-Balmoral’s overwhelming importance in terms of the Australian Army’s military heritage, the battle honour is not able to be emblazoned.
Is it not time to question a policy founded in the days of Empire which denies an Australian unit the right to proudly proclaim all its battle honours?
Aim
This submission argues that the use of the First and Second World Wars as benchmarks on which to base the number of battle honours able to be emblazoned on the colours etc of today’s Army, is outdated and completely inappropriate in terms of acknowledging the service to the Nation selflessly given by Australian soldiers in modern conflicts.
Justification.
Authorisation Already Exits. It could be argued that there is no need for this submission. Current Army policy as set out in DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions, states that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned.
It has been suggested, however, that this is a ‘known error’. If so, it raises the question: why has no amendment been made? Presumably this is a matter that is already recognised as requiring further consideration in light of the very different circumstances in which today’s Army operates.
This is not the only reference at variance with a limit of two battle honours. Christopher Jobson spent thirty years in the Army. Prior to retirement, he was RSM Ceremony and Protocol and an acknowledged expert in the subject. In his 2009 book,‘Looking Forward, Looking Back : Customs and Traditions of the Australian Army’, he states that there is no limit on the number of battle honours that can be emblazoned on colours etc today.
———————————————————————————————–
25 April 2021
We Will Remember Them
There have been a number of articles published on the theme of ANZAC (as there always are at this time of year. A link to one follows, with my response below that. https://johnmenadue.com/ive-got-the-anzac-day-blues/
“In all conflicts between nations, we have conscientious objectors and opponents on one side; and volunteers, and supporters on the other. Sometimes we also have conscripts. Theoretically, in a democracy, the national will predominates. This determines the size and strength of a nation’s military forces, the members of which obey the orders of the government. Sometimes troops have returned from war and been abused by protesters. But the troops didn’t have any say as to whether or not the cause for which they had risked their lives was an ‘honourable’ one in the eyes of others. Those whose responsibility it is to honour their sacrifice, do so at the behest and direction of the Government.
Why is it that minorities so often seek to criticise those who obey the directions of the Government, but don’t seek instead to use their undoubted influence to change the decisions of Government itself?”
An old post that is relevant today.
Their Name Liveth for Evermore
Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her” and “Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore’ does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world, that these men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
———————————————————————-
Finally … according to military protocol, when flown at half mast, a flag is lowered by an amount equal to the height of the flag. Why? Its origins relate to an early naval custom, designed to show that another flag is being flown above it. Which flag is that? The only one given precedence to be flown above a national flag or an ensign … the invisible flag of death.
——————————————————————————————–
24 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part VI
Following on from the past six days … this and coming blog posts will repeat the story in all its ‘glory’. (We’ll take a break for ANZAC Day.)
10 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 5
Given the background explained in the previous posts, it’s understandable that I was surprised by the following announcement:
“On 10th March 2017 the Corporation lodged a submission on behalf 1AR through the Corps to have the BH Coral-Balmoral emblazoned on the 1Armd Regt Standard. A legislative anomaly was found and used to great effect. The submission was approved on 28/3/17 and action was commenced by AHQ to correct the error and make it consistent the relevant D-I(A).” Chairman, RAAC Corporation
The Freedom of Information Saga Parts 1-4 have dealt with the inexplicable case of the RAAC Corporation refusing to make public its submission.
The letter below from the Minister is relevant. Of course, it seems that I need not have written to him, as the RAAC Corporation had already ‘sorted’ the matter.
“Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Parliament House CANBERRA ACT 2600 Dear Lieutenant Colonel Cameron Thank you for your letters of 7 and 22 February 2017 seeking approval to display the Battle Honour for Coral-Balmoral and to amend the date of the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment’s Standard [letter of 22 Feb 17]. I am pleased to advise there is no administrative impediment to meeting both of your requests. I have been assured that Army Headquarters, in conjunction with the 1st Armoured Regiment and the Royal Australian Armoured Corp Cooperation, will endeavour to have the emblazing amended and completed by the 49th anniversary of Coral-Balmoral at the end of May 2017. Previous Army protocols limited the number of Theatre Honours, Battle Honours and Honour Distinctions that may be emblazoned on Unit and Corps Colours, Standards or Guidons to two Battle Honours against each Theatre Honour. As you may be aware, this restriction was reviewed and amended by the then Chief of Army on 1 February 2013. Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention and I trust this information is of assistance to you.” [Pity about the reference to the “Royal Australian Armoured Corp Cooperation”.]
My ‘superfluous’ submission of 7 Feb 17 tomorrow.
[A recent report in the media] “The Government has refused to release the Gaetjens report which purportedly exonerates the former Minister, Bridget McKenzie, and thereby the Government from charges of political bias in the distribution of the Community Sport Infrastructure grants. But why this refusal to release the report – the only obvious answer is because the report cannot stand-up to public scrutiny.”Another matter of failure to be open and transparent …
————————————————————————————————
23 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part V
Following on from the past three days … this and coming blog posts will repeat the story in all its ‘glory’.
[A reminder as to the reason for these posts … a member of the RAAC Advisory Board has asked me for specific info from my research into Op Hammersley. I replied to say, ‘of course’, provided I can be allowed to see the RAACC’s submissions, in support of mine, re the C-B battlehonour and Hammersley. The response was that this wasn’t possible as the Corporation had placed security gradings on them. I asked if the Advisory Board could consider the matter and, if appropriate, recommend that I be allowed to see what had been submitted to Defence ‘in support’ of my submissions to the Minister. Nothing’s been heard since.]
9 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 4
The background has been provided in the previous three Blog posts.
To summarise, the following reasons have been given ‘officially’ for NOT disclosing the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence, ‘supposedly supporting mine to the Minister’:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it;
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.
Disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
Disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
The following public interest factors were ‘officially’ regarded as being in favour of disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
What was the reasoning considered by the Information Commissioner in relation to the release of the RAAC Corporation’s submission (‘supposedly’ supporting mine?)
In Favour:
“I agree with the Department and the applicant that disclosure of the document would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that may have informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision making, and would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.”
Against:
“I am satisfied that the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation who signed the submission in the document at issue is the personal information of an individual … I am also satisfied that the specific content of the submission or representation by the third party ex-service organisation says something about the individual officer who signed the document in the circumstances of this case and constitutes their personal information.”
“…. it was found that: a. the specific personal information relating to the individuals is not well known to the greater public; b. the specific personal information is not readily available from publicly accessible sources; and c. the third party has objected to the release of the specific personal information.”
“… the third party has made submissions objecting to disclosure of the document at issue and explaining their particular personal circumstances relevant to their objection to disclosure of the specific personal information in the document at issue.
“… it is apparent that disclosure of the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation and the submission or representation made by the individual officer on behalf of the third party ex-service organisation would be an unreasonable disclosure of personal information, having regard to the personal circumstances of the third party individual.”
Conclusion. When I was called by the OAIC to be advised of the outcome, I reiterated that I had no interest at all in personal details of anyone involved in authoring, or associated with, the document. I was informed that if this information was ‘blacked out’ that there would be nothing left of the document, ie. as had been stated earlier” Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless”.
So, the personal information of an officer (or officers) of the RAAC Corporation, writing a submission to Defence, ‘supposedly’ in support of mine to the Minister, takes up so much space that anything left would be meaningless. I think that I can imagine what the RAAC Corporation submission to Defence might have involved. I ask again, why is there so much secrecy associated with actions by an organisation on behalf of its members? Why can’t there be openness and transparency?
Why can’t matters of relevance to the RAAC be put above individual interests? What is there that the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence ‘supposedly in support of mine to the Minister’, could possibly say “about the individual officer who signed the document” which meant that it couldn’t be released? More tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————–
22 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part IV
Following on from the past three days … this and coming blog posts will repeat the story in all its ‘glory’.
8 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 3
As previously stated, the end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation supposedly acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification … a review. The third part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below. Bear with me, the ending is sensational! All will be revealed tomorrow.
The Applicant’s Response
Defence, in conjunction with the RAAC Corporation, have provided twelve different reasons that supposedly justify not releasing the document in question. In a process of rejection, followed by provision of more time, after more time, for Defence to reconsider … OIAC have rejected nine of these reasons. Turning to what’s left:
Will Defence have difficulty in obtaining similar information in the future if the document is released? I wrote to the Minister; the Minister’s Office asked for Defence’s position; Defence asked the RAAC Corporation what their position was; the RAAC Corporation provided this information to Defence. The Minister approved my (two) requests. The RAAC Corporation refuses to allow anyone to see their submission (maybe it was positive, as the RAAC Corporation claim; maybe it was negative). If the document was to be released, would, say, the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation or the 1 Field Squadron RAE Association, withhold information that Defence requested from them because of it?
Of course NOT. Integrity is crucial to their membership. A document written by their Executive on behalf of their members, would be made available to their members so requested. How could it not be, if the association had any integrity? I can obtain statements to this effect from a range of ESOs if need be.
Will an individual or group of individuals be harmed by release of the document? Defence have previously stated that the “welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy”. This is a very definitive statement; not ‘may be placed in jeopardy’, but “will be placed in jeopardy’. Presumably it is the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who is being referred to. It was he who stated that he’d prepared a submission for Defence supporting mine to the Minister, but without “having read anybody else’s including yours!”. As advised earlier, I can’t imagine that anyone could author a supporting submission, without reading the submission that it was supporting. Of course, if the submission was opposed to, rather than ‘in support of’, this could explain why release of the document could affect the author’s welfare (if he’d stated the opposite). This would also be the case if the RAAC Corporation’s ‘submission’ was a copy of mine (when he’s stated he hadn’t seen it.)
But is this justification for not releasing the document? If I was being sentenced and stated that if I was sent to jail, I would kill myself … should the Judge take this into account? Of course, not … if His or Her Honour did, there wouldn’t be anyone in jail.
Will disclosure of the document prejudice the management function of an agency? The ‘agency’ in question is the Department of Defence. Defence has 65,000 employees. Is their management likely to be affected by the release of a document supporting an application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours and a correction to an error on a unit’s Standard? The opposite is much more likely. As the Case Officer has stated:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Conclusion. I ask that the OAIC consider the above.
NOTE: I’ve been asked to remove the RAAC Corporation logo as I’d have to have permission from the Army Branding Agency. Use of the logo in an article about the Corporation is permitted, however.
—————————————————————————————————————-
21 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part III
Following on from the past two days … this and coming blog posts will repeat the story in all its ‘glory’.
7 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 2
As stated below, the end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation supposedly acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification … a review. The second part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below. Bear with me, the ending is sensational!
“The OAIC Appeal
On appeal, Defence stated the primary reasons were:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
When OAIC asked Defence to provide further justification, Defence provided two NEW reasons for not releasing the document:
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it; and
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
OAIC informed Defence that this was not adequate justification. Defence responded to say:
“As stated, … in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
OAIC informed Defence that this had nothing whatsoever to do with the document under consideration. More time was allowed for Defence to consult a ‘third party’. Defence then contended that:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
The OAIC Case Officer’s Position
As the case officer, you believe that “disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the Department’s operations since:
disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
In the Case Officer’s opinion, arguments for and against release of the document are:
In Favour. In this case, the following public interest factors favour disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Against: In this case, the following public interest factors weigh against disclosure of the document:
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.”
—————————————————————————————
20 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All: Part II
Following on from yesterday … the blog posts in the coming days will tell the story again in all its ‘glory’.
6 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 1
The end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification, a review. The first part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below:
“The Blog on 11 Sep 19 stated that the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) advised the day before that: “This matter is awaiting a decision by the Information Commissioner under s 55K of the FOI Act to affirm, vary or set aside and substitute the internal review decision of the Department of 26 June 2017”.
After two years, it seemed as if the matter was finally going to be resolved. Background is copied below from an earlier post.
The Latest Development: On 13 Nov 19, the OAIC desk officer advised “I would be grateful for your further assistance in the resolution of this Information Commissioner review … In relation to the material that remains within scope of this IC review, I invite you to please confirm whether you seek access to the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue. I would be grateful for your response by 20 November 2019”
My response stated inter alia:
I have no interest in “the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue”. My only interest is with respect to information provided to the Minister which may have had the potential to influence his decision in relation to my submission to him … surely this the right of each and every Australian?.
I don’t mean any disrespect to the OAIC here … simply trying to express my purpose in pursuing this matter, ie. the principle that if a Minister is asked to decide on a matter, then submissions made to him about it by other parties should be available to all … otherwise how is public confidence to be maintained?
——————————————————————————————
Background. [Although the reasons given for not releasing the material sought, seem unbelievable … it is a true account!]
In 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. I had hoped that the 1AR Association, together with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation (RAACC), might take the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1Armd Regt approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the other units involved.)
After years of inaction, in February 2017 I personally wrote to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, asking that the current limitation imposed on emblazoning Vietnam battle honours on unit colours etc, be reviewed. (I also requested that he approve a correction being made to the Theatre Honour emblazoned on the Standard.) The RAACC subsequently posted messages on social media sites advising that it had made a supporting submission.
I thanked the RAACC Chairman and asked if the Corporation’s submission was any different to mine. The Chairman responded to say: “I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours!”.
I was surprised at this, as I had automatically assumed that anyone preparing a supporting submission, would refer to the content of the submission that they were supporting. (Additionally, my submission had been available publicly since it was posted off.)
I then asked if I could see the Corporation’s submission, so as to know how it compared with the information I provided to the Minister. Surprisingly, the RAACC Chairman refused to allow me to see the submission that the Corporation had made in support of mine (no reason was given).
I was concerned that, if my submission was not approved, it might be because of information presented by the RAACC. I therefore wrote to Defence to “seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the RAACC submission made in support of my request to Minister Tehan”.
The Defence Response.
Defence initially provided the following reasons for not disclosing the document:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.”
—————————————————————————————————————-
Apologies … as to why the Blog for yesterday failed to post, I have no idea. See below for the belated post. Gremlins at work!
19 April 2021
The RAAC Corporation and the Hypocrisy of it All
Recent events have to be made known, in the context of all that which has gone before. A few days ago, I was contacted by a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board, asking for information from my research in relation to my submission for the award of the SVN GCWP unit Citation made to 8RAR, to be extended to supporting arms.
I responded to say that I would be happy to do so … if the RAAC Corporation would provide information that had previously been denied to me, ie. copies of its submissions (supposedly in support of mine) regarding the emblazoning of the battle-honour Coral-Balmoral and the CGWP Citation for Hammersley.
The hypocrisy involved is unimaginable and deserves to be, and will be, highlighted in subsequent posts. To start … an earlier Blog post regarding the Coral-Balmoral battle-honour is copied below.
———————————————–
4 March 2021
The Freedom of Information Saga.
Theoretically, this long running saga (see summary across Blogs 6-12 February 2020) was a matter between Defence and myself.
But this was not the case. I reported the proceedings in an open and transparent manner on the Blog as they occurred. It transpired that the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation sought to influence the Information Commissioner’s consideration (not once, but four times). One can’t but wonder what was claimed (in secret) and why.
“On 10 October 2017, 11 October 2017, 14 August 2018 and 15 August 2018 the third party individual [ie. the Chairman] made submissions in a personal capacity and as an officer of the third party ex-service organisation [the RAAC Corporation] objecting to disclosure of the document.”
The Commissioner decided that “the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation who signed the submission in the document at issue is the personal information of an individual”.
Access to the document which the Chairman states was in support of my submission to the Minister (a submission that he states he hadn’t seen) was consequently denied.
No problems I said, simply delete all personal information. I even made the point that I would be happy with a blanked-out piece of paper.
No… this can’t happen, as: “having regard to the nature and contents of the document and the submissions of the parties relevant to the relationship between the individual officer and the ex-service organisation, I [the Commisioner] am also satisfied that the specific content of the submission or representation by the third party ex-service organisation says something about the individual officer who signed the document in the circumstances of this case and constitutes their personal information”.
What is it one has to wonder, that the content of the submission says about the Chairman, which means that it would be damaging to him if made public?
Open and transparent governance: an unattainable ideal.
————————————————————————————–
18 April 2021
RAAC ARES: Role and Resourcing
An article in the latest Army newspaper (see link below) is entitled STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 2021-22 and sets out the Chief of Army’s plan in this respect. A quote from NEW CAPABILITIES – ARMY OBJECTIVE FORCE is copied below:
“WE HAVE a good plan to deliver the government investment described in the 2020 Force Structure Plan. The Army Force Structure Implementation Plan is a long-term road map. It describes options to build a scalable Army that is part of an integrated ADF, industry and national system. The challenge, as ever, is to do this simply and sustainably. Over time, the Force Structure Plan investments will change the Army fundamentally. This is what government expects us to do to meet the evolving strategic context. The 2021-22 decisions that we must make or inform [include]:
Affirm the roles and tasks of 2 Div [ie. the ARES] are clear and resourced. Continue to evolve the organisation, equipping and training 2 Div and align its national footprint to tasks and recruiting opportunities.
At last! Armouredadvocates has been calling for years for the role of the RAAC ARES to be defined. Maybe at long last something will be done is this respect.
The most recent Blog post is copied below:
22 March 2021
The Role of the RAAC ARES.
A post from last month’s ADF ‘Our People’ Facebook page is copied below.
Previous Blog posts have lamented a clear role being defined for the RAAC ARES. Could this be a breakthrough, ie. the ‘Role of the RAAC ARES is to support and augment ARA RAAC units’.
“Pop smoke for the reveal of our latest armoured leaders, including our 4th/19th Prince of Wales’ Light Horse members LT Alakus and LT Arrowsmith!
Graduates shown here with two Light Armoured Vehicles at the end of the final part of their Royal Australian Armoured Corps, Regimental Officers Basic Course.
This course teaches trainees to lead soldiers in light cavalry units, increasing the capability of these trooper[s] and units to support [and] augment the Australian Regular Army [Armoured] Cavalry Regiments.
The trainees (left to right): LT Thomas Case 12/16 Hunter River Lancers, LT Danyal Alakus 4/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, CAPT Jaime Brownlie 1/15 Royal New South Wales Lancers, LT Oscar Arrowsmith 4/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, LT Kai Neagle 3/9 Light Horse, and LT Natalie McHugh 2/14 Light Horse Regiment”.
An Attempt at Virtual Reality at the AWM: Bushmaster
Following on from the recent posts …
“On Closer Inspection is a 360 degree immersive experiences developed by the Australian War Memorial.
Through the use of 360-degree digital video and virtual reality technology, users can view and explore a Bushmaster, Australia’s most successful and trusted Protected Mobility Vehicle.”
I’m not sure that I mastered the ‘controls’ all that well and I didn’t watch to the end, but it serves as an example of how technology can ‘give life’ to what would otherwise be a bucket of bolts.
Hopefully if the RAAC can build on my engagement with the AWM, the service and sacrifice of AFV crews can made known more widely. (Then again, maybe I’ll be left up to me to continue to push the ‘envelope’ whenever I can.)
“An AFV in combat is not some product of engineers, it is the beating heart of its crew.”
—————————————————————————————
16 April 2021
Meeting with the AWM Redevelopment Team: My Follow Up
Dear [Head, AWM Redevelopment],
Thanks for your time this morning. I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and Jen.
Thinking about it … it seems to me that Virtual Reality is a generational thing and older people might be put off by it. I realise also that it is expensive both up front and to maintain; and if it fails, visitors can form a poor view of the institution. Hopefully technology has evolved and it will have a place in the new gallery. Good luck in striking the ‘balance’ across the board. I can see it having a fantastic impact in specific areas, including AFVs.
In contrast, my suggestion re the outside AFV exhibits, uses ‘old technology’ and might help bridge the current divide between equipment and the people behind it, ie. an audio speaker from within playing at intervals (according to a shown schedule) providing the sound effects of engine, guns firing, orders being given etc, together with a spoken description of what it was like to fight the vehicle in combat. This idea could also be applied to internal exhibits, as per the current Huey helicopter sound and light effects.
Finally, the person that the Director communicated with regarding the crew functions being promoted in the Centurion exhibit, has produced an AV presentation on a USB stick to be played at our 50th Anniversary dinner of 6 June. Would you care for a copy?
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
“An AFV in combat is not some product of engineers, it is the beating heart of its crew.”
————————————————————————————————
15 Apr 21
AWM Redevelopment Team Meeting: How Did it Go?
In a word … really well. I met with the Director and Deputy Director of the AWM Redevelopment Project. While my ideas were listened to, I also learnt from them. The concept of Museums as community hubs has been around for a while, but I was unfamiliar with Virtual Reality and Augmented Reality
Virtual and Augmented Reality (AR) Museum Exhibitions provide an opportunity to add a third dimension to displays, bringing objects or scenes to life. 3D (digital) personas are then able to provide a narration.
I suggested that the outside AFV exhibits could be fitted with an audio speaker, playing from within, at intervals (according to a shown schedule) providing the sound effects of engine, guns firing, orders being given etc, together with a spoken description of what it was like to fight the vehicle in combat. This idea could also be applied to internal exhibits, as per the current Huey helicopter sound and light effects. This will be considered.
The Redevelopment Team are really keen to connect with veterans to gain their input and first-hand experiences as operators of the exhibits on display. I offered to act as a conduit where I could and they’ll also work through the Army History Unit.
The role of museums in society is changing. Once static institutions, museums are reinventing themselves to become more interactive, audience focused, community oriented, flexible, adaptable and mobile. They have become cultural hubs functioning as platforms where creativity combines with knowledge and where visitors can also co-create, share and interact.
Nils Pokel from the Aukland War Memorial Museum spoke about his experience with VR in a museum space. He talked about his hope that VR will continue to add value when used in conjunction with a curator’s existing tools. He pointed out that it has some unique traits, for example, the ability to create a true first-person perspective. This could be a huge draw when creating a new exhibit. Although he believes that VR is useful, he does concede there are some downsides. One of the most limiting factors currently is cost. [One of the other problems is that older people don’t embrace this technology as readily as the younger generation.]
My after-meeting response to the Director tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————
14 March 2021
Meeting: AWM Redevelopment Team (14 April 2021)Part 2
Points I’ve noted for discussion in advance of my meeting at 11am:
1. AWM Organisation. Last time I looked, Brian Dawson’s National Collections Branch had a Military Heraldry and Technology Team. I think the title says it all. It has been my experience that the function of this team has had an overwhelming focus on the technical aspects of their remit.
I would like to suggest that this should be offset by others whose focus is on the service personnel who operated the equipment.
2. What should be the focus of their work? I believe that a different set of skills is needed when considering crews, as distinct to engines. They should seek to investigate the challenges faced by the crews in performing their duties, the dangers they faced, and the fears that resulted from these.
3. How should this become part of the exhibits? Mannequins could be used in exhibits where visitors can see into an exhibit, otherwise photo showing crews in positions could be utilised. Audio recordings vide headphones could be made available to visitors with crew experiences either recorded first hand or by readings of texts. Sound effects are an essential element of operating AFVs: the engine noise, the guns firings, the radio transmissions, the crew commander’s orders and crew responses (and more).
4. The essential point. This is to demonstrate that the crews are never immune inside an armoured cocoon. The opposite is the case. They are the targets of concentrated enemy fire. Some have no awareness at all of what is happening outside their vehicle. The AFV in combat is not some product of engineers, it is the beating heart of its crew!
Tomorrow: What happened.
—————————————————————————————
13 April 2021
Meeting: AWM Redevelopment Team (14 April 2021)
Image: AWM, turret restoration
The following is an email to the AWM Redevelopment Team …
I drafted the following as a few opening words. When I finished, I thought why waste time … send in advance and simply respond to questions.
Hope the following might be useful …
Best wishes, Bruce
————————————————————————
There used to be a common question at job interviews along the lines of “How have you prepared for today’s meeting?”
If I was to be asked this today, I’d say that there were three main elements on which I base my advice with respect to AFV exhibits … research, consultation, and personal experience. As you know, it is my belief that there is too great an emphasis on technology as far as AWM exhibits are concerned. I believe this ‘depersonalises’ AFVs, replacing people with facts and figures: weights, speeds, number of rounds carried, engine power etc. I believe that my comments might also be applicable to other crew served equipment, including aircraft.
I’d like to use an example. I was interested to learn that the Milne Bay campaign is to be one of the aspects that the new exhibition space will highlight. Centrepieces of this are to be the Kittyhawk fighter and the Ha Go tank.
The Type 95 Ha Go has been, and still is, a subject of debate between those interested in AFVs and the Memorial’s historians. The following is an edited version of the AWM website report on the conservation of the Ha Go:
‘… the Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the right of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the left of the hull; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret. Also inside the turret was a 37-mm main gun, plus there was another 7.7-mm machine-gun facing rearward out the of the turret.Entry and exit through the turret hatch are very difficult. The interior is very cramped, especially with the guns protruding into the cabin’.
Other AWM references with respect to the tank state that:
While it is thought that the crew size on these tanks was typically three, contemporary evidence, including the interrogation report of a Marine captured at Milne Bay, indicated the two used in this battle had a crew of four.
This particular Type 95 tank had a crew of four (usually reported as three): commander, gunner, driver, and hull gunner.
Obviously, it’s confusing to the public having conflicting references from the same source, but surely if the crew size is usually known to be three, there is a need to explain why the AWM is convinced that its Ha Go tank had a crew of four.
Information that I’ve seen states that the AWM received information from an Australian posted to Japan who found a crew list related to the Japanese Naval Landing Force. Someone whose duties are to guide the tank, is not, however, regarded as being part of the crew.
The AWM is stating that the Ha Go had a two-man turret … commander and gunner. The starting point here is to ask if two men (even Japanese) could fit into the turret.
What is the relevance of the above?
It is my belief that it is the crew of an AFV that should come first, not the AFV itself. To this end, if there were two men in the turret of a Ha Go tank, the AWM should exclaim their bravery as part of this exhibit!! Those Japanese deserve everyone’s respect. Of course, if there were only three men, then they, like the rest of us, were just doing our job.
Image: AWM, turret restoration
The following is an email to the AWM Redevelopment Team …
“I drafted the following as a few opening words. When I finished, I thought why waste time … send in advance and simply respond to questions.
Hope the following might be useful …
Best wishes, Bruce
————————————————————————
There used to be a common question at job interviews along the lines of “How have you prepared for today’s meeting?”
If I was to be asked this today, I’d say that there were three main elements on which I base my advice with respect to AFV exhibits … research, consultation, and personal experience. As you know, it is my belief that there is too great an emphasis on technology as far as AWM exhibits are concerned. I believe this ‘depersonalises’ AFVs, replacing people with facts and figures: weights, speeds, number of rounds carried, engine power etc. I believe that my comments might also be applicable to other crew served equipment, including aircraft.
I’d like to use an example. I was interested to learn that the Milne Bay campaign is to be one of the aspects that the new exhibition space will highlight. Centrepieces of this are to be the Kittyhawk fighter and the Ha Go tank.
The Type 95 Ha Go has been, and still is, a subject of debate between those interested in AFVs and the Memorial’s historians. The following is an edited version of the AWM website report on the conservation of the Ha Go:
‘… the Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the right of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the left of the hull; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret. Also inside the turret was a 37-mm main gun, plus there was another 7.7-mm machine-gun facing rearward out the of the turret.Entry and exit through the turret hatch are very difficult. The interior is very cramped, especially with the guns protruding into the cabin’.
Other AWM references with respect to the tank state that:
While it is thought that the crew size on these tanks was typically three, contemporary evidence, including the interrogation report of a Marine captured at Milne Bay, indicated the two used in this battle had a crew of four.
This particular Type 95 tank had a crew of four (usually reported as three): commander, gunner, driver, and hull gunner.
Obviously, it’s confusing to the public having conflicting references from the same source, but surely if the crew size is usually known to be three, there is a need to explain why the AWM is convinced that its Ha Go tank had a crew of four.
Information that I’ve seen states that the AWM received information from an Australian posted to Japan who found a crew list related to the Japanese Naval Landing Force. Someone whose duties are to guide the tank, is not, however, regarded as being part of the crew.
The AWM is stating that the Ha Go had a two-man turret … commander and gunner. The starting point here is to ask if two men (even Japanese) could fit into the turret.
What is the relevance of the above?
It is my belief that it is the crew of an AFV that should come first, not the AFV itself. To this end, if there were two men in the turret of a Ha Go tank, the AWM should exclaim their bravery as part of this exhibit!! Those Japanese deserve everyone’s respect. Of course, if there were only three men, then they, like the rest of us, were just doing our job.”
——————————————————————————–
12 April 2021
The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 4)
Image: Army-Technology.com
Under Plan Beersheba, the ARA brigades (1, 3 and 7) became known as Combat Brigades, each with an armoured cavalry regiment.
The ACR from 1 Brigade was relocated to Adelaide in 2017. The following is an extract from the Blog on 30 March 2021 …
“1st Brigade’s Edinburgh Defence Precinct based 7th Battalion Mechanised Royal Australian Regiment (7RAR(Mech)) and 1st Armoured Cavalry Regiment (1AR – Armoured Cavalry Regiment) will form the foundation of a fourth combat brigade designated the 9th Brigade, rerolled as a heavy armoured combat manoeuvre element.”
So … 1 Armd Regt and 7RAR (Mech) will provide the manoeuvre elements for the new 9 Brigade. They will be supported by 9 Field Squadron, RAE, which will be raised as an Assault/Manoeuvre Support Squadron and will be equipped with the M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) and the M1074 Joint Assault Bridge (JAB) under acquisition under Project Land 8160 (Under Armour Breaching & Bridging).
So, we now have four combat brigades with seven brigades under Command of Field Force.
But 1 Brigade has no mounted reconnaissance capability, no armour and only one inf battalion. Will it remain a Comat Brigade or will its role be changed?
To complicate things, 9 Brigade has no artillery.
It will be interesting see where the on-going restructure goes next.
———————————————————————————-
11 April 2021
The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 3)
Given that in 2000, a parliamentary Report stated that Australia did not need and cannot afford a nine brigade Army. Yesterday I commented that we still have nine brigades. I was wrong … we have twelve! Six under command of Field Force and sic under command 2 Division.
Maybe the Defence Chiefs have got it right (or not)? More to follow.
————————————————————————
10 April 2021
The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 2)
Following on from yesterday … how is the Australian Army presently organised?
1 Brigade – a mechanised brigade, predominantly staffed by ARA at approximately 70 per cent of operational strength and based in Darwin;
3 Brigade – a light infantry brigade, predominantly staffed by ARA at approximately 85 per cent of operational strength and based in Townsville;
4 Brigade – based in Melbourne, staffed at approximately 40 per cent of operational strength with subordinate elements drawn from across the state of Victoria;
5 Brigade – based in Sydney, staffed at approximately 30 per cent of operational strength with subordinate elements drawn largely from the Sydney and southern NSW area;
7 Brigade – a motorised brigade, staffed by ARA and GRes at approximately 73 per cent of operational strength and based in Brisbane; and
8 Brigade – based in Newcastle, staffed at approximately 32 per cent of operational strength with subordinate elements drawn largely from the Newcastle and central NSW region;
9 Brigade – based in Adelaide, staffed at approximately 35 per cent of operational strength with subordinate elements drawn from South Australia and Tasmania;
11 Brigade – a light infantry brigade, predominantly staffed by GRes at approximately 30 per cent of operational strength with elements located in north and central Queensland 6.10 Australian Regular Army (ARA) pers; and
13 Brigade – based in Perth, staffed at approximately 30 per cent of operational strength with subordinate elements drawn from Western Australia.
Another quote, this time from the report’s conclusion:
“It is clear, based on the capability requirement specified in Chapter 4 and the funding limitations discussed in Chapter 5 that Australia neither needs, nor can it afford, a nine brigade Army. For the Army to be credible and efficient this structure needs to be reviewed. Rationalisation of the force structure could transform the Army from a having three useable brigades to four useable brigades. It could also free up resources to provide a true capability for force generation – something that does not exist now. How this can be done in terms of equipment and personnel is discussed in the next two Chapters.”
Seems to me that the apathy of the general public allows such things to come about.
I’ve just discovered that this report is from 2000. I’d thought it was 2020. But, we still have nine brigades (at what level of operational strength, one has to ask) … or do we? More to follow.
————————————————————————————————————
9 April 2021
The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 1)
The Armoured Brigade Combat Team (9 Brigade) was the subject of a recent blog. The following is taken from a 2019 Defence Connect article:
“Enter the concept of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) – established as part of a major restructuring of the US Army in order to take advantage of advancements in technology and platforms, while also responding to evolving geo-strategic and political realities in the post-Cold War era and the changing global responsibilities of the US.
Contemporary BCTs consist of an integrated combined arms manoeuvre brigade incorporating support and fire units. BCTs are typically made up of 4,500 soldiers, with specialised infantry, mechanised infantry and light armoured reconnaissance, armoured units, divisional artillery, air, medical, logistics and command support.
Further recognising the constantly evolving nature of modern warfare, BCTs can be highly specialised – being broken down into infantry, mechanised infantry (Stryker), armoured, airborne and air assault capabilities – leveraging capabilities of individual platforms, while combining the capabilities of individual units and platforms to form an integrated web of systems and platforms capable of responding to any number of contingencies, without limiting the overall combat strength of the Army, by deploying a proportional, tailored, brigade size ‘combined arms’ force to global hotspots within 96 hours, as opposed to a division-sized force at 120 hours.
This flexibility and ‘hard, fast and smart’ combination of capabilities enables the BCT organisational structure to serve as potent forward-deployed conventional, ground-based, power projection and deterrence forces in continental Europe. For Australia, with a long history of regional deployment, engagement and capability building, independently deployable and capable BCTs serve as the perfect forward deployed complement to the amphibious ‘Quick Reaction Force’ of the 2RAR.
So … will the Australian Army adopt the concept of specialised BCTs?
————————————————————————————
8 April 2021
I’ve done it again … missed yesterday’s post. I plead the approaching C Sqn Reunion and its organisation.
The RAAC Corporation2
The following goal is part of the RAAC Corporation’s Charter
“To represent the interests of the serving and ex-serving ordinary members of The Corps”.
So … the RAAC Corp represents the interests of not only those who are members of the Associations which comprise the Corporation, but also all former members of the RAAC.
[One has to assume that an ‘ordinary member’ of the RAAC (whether serving or ex-serving) is any soldier or officer.]
So how does an ex-serving ‘ordinary member’ of the RAAC, who is not a member of an association that is a member of the RAAC Corporation, contact the Corporation to advise matters that might be concerning him/her?
Answer. He/she can’t. There is no means by which someone who is not a member of an association that is part of the RAAC Corporation can make contact. [This also applies to any public organisation or body that might wish to seek the advice of the Corporation about RAAC matters.]
The Corporation Charter is clearly misleading and is long overdue for amendment.
———————————————————————————-
6 April 2021
Battlegroups and Combat Teams
In the draft Preface of my next book (autobiography), I refer to “failings in the nature of the Army’s structure and ability to learn and adapt (which mirror the shortcomings in society as a whole)”. It’s become evident to me that, rather than individuals being ‘asleep at the wheel’, structures and learnt behaviour patterns have failed once again. The organisation of the Australian Army is currently in a parlous state. I’ll explain why in coming posts.
Following on from yesterday … in the ‘olden days’ a battlegroup was a battalion sized unit comprising combinations of armour and infantry sub-units, eg. two tank squadrons and a mech inf company. A combat team was same at sub-unit level, eg. two tank troops and an inf platoon. That all seems simple enough, but terminology is becoming confusing.
The ‘armoured brigade combat team’ is a US Army organisation. The term has recently been used in the Australian context. The post on 30 Mar 21 included the following quote: “The future 2028 Army Objective Force 9th Brigade will constitute the Australian Army’s first truearmoured brigade combat team capacity raised since the 2nd World War”.
The Armoured Brigade Combat Team. The quotes below explain the nature of the US Army ABCT and make it clear how different this is to the new 9 Brigade organisation:
The Army is responsible for providing the bulk of U.S. ground combat forces. To that end, the service is organized primarily around brigade combat teams (BCTs)— large combined-arms formations that are designed to contain 4,400 to 4,700 soldiers apiece and include infantry, artillery, engineering, and other types of units.
In the current structure, BCTs are permanently organized for independent operations, and division headquarters exist to provide command and control for operations that involve multiple BCTs. [Usually four BCTs per division.] Divisions also include functional support brigades (FSBs).
An armored brigade combat team consists of seven battalions: three combined arms, one cavalry (RSTA), one artillery, one engineer and one brigade support battalion. Prior to 2012, the armored brigade combat team was named the heavy brigade combat team.[2]
An ABCT includes 60 Abrams tanks, 60 Bradley IFVs, and 112 M113 vehicles.
Following on from yesterday, the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is intended to replace the M2 Bradley IFV in the US Army. The project has been beset with problems. Past industry deadlines have not been met and companies have withdrawn, citing impossible criteria on which to make a bid.
“Most Infantry Fighting Vehicles on the global market look a lot like the Reagan-era M2 Bradley: They’re tracked machines with a driver in the hull, a commander and gunner in the turret, and five to nine infantry soldiers in the back, transported under armor protection until they jump out for the final assault.
In previous attempts to replace the Bradley, the Army gave industry rigid requirements, specifying everything from passenger capacity to gun calibre to maximum weight. But the new Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle will be different. While the Army has mandated a crew of two, both sitting in the hull with an unmanned turret, it will let industry’s design teams suggest all the other specs.
“We’ve got companies out there… that have come and said, hey listen, ‘we don’t want to have to six/eight/10 people in the back. We want to have two, and we want to make a very small vehicle,” said Coffman, the director of Next Generation Combat Vehicles at Army Future Command. “We may need 15 OMFVs to move [a platoon of] 30,” he said, instead of today’s platoon of four Bradleys – and the new RFP would allow that.
According to Maj Gen Coffman, it is being left to industry to define the operating concept. This is, indeed, challenging. If it is to be operated in the unmanned role, what point is there in providing internal seating for six infantrymen? What combination of AFVs is the answer to accompany the M1 tank replacement into battle? What is the structure of the future of the next ‘Armoured Brigade Combat Team’ to be … in the US or here?
(More on this to come.)
——————————————————————————————-
4 April 2021
The Future of AFVs.
There is an interesting article in the latest Defence Technology Review: ‘Armour to Play Key Role in Indo-Pacific’.
It relates to an interview with the Director of the US Army’s Next generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team [what a title!], Maj Gen Ross Coffman.
In contrast to doom and gloom coming out of the UK, he states argues that the following doctrine is set to continue: ‘The Army now controls land using combined arms manoeuvre – infantry, armour, field artillery and aviation assets – that provide units the speed, range and convergence to enable decision dominance”.
He mentions the US Army’s Amoured Multi-Purpose Fighting Vehicle (AMPFV). Upon checking this, it turns out to the US Army’s replacement for the M113. The US AFV system has the M1Abrams, supported by the M2 Bradley IFV; and the Bradley supported by the AMPFV. So, the Abrams and Bradley are at the forefront of the battle, with the AMPFV providing armoured mobility support. (The first AMPFV was manufactured by BAE Systems in September 2020).
I guess that this is what we have with some inf battalions equipped with the IFV and some with the Bushmaster PMV. It will be interesting to see how it pans out with the inf operating these vehicles over the long term.
—————————————————————————————————
3 April 2021
Capability Gap: ACR Reconnassiance
The following quotes are from a recent Australian National Audit Office report …
”On 9 August 2018, Defence established a contract, valued at $4.28 billion (including GST), with Rheinmetall Defence Australia (Rheinmetall) for the acquisition of 211 Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs), 12 mission modules and associated support systems. The vehicles are to be delivered in two blocks (tranches):
Block I — comprising 25 vehicles intended to provide an early deployable capability for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) by December 2020; and
Block II — comprising 186 vehicles to be delivered between February 2022 and January 2027.”
“The highest priority for Army is to replace the ASLAV fleet with a CRV [combat reconnaissance vehicle] due to obsolescence factors that constrain tactical employment and increase the cost of ownership. These obsolescence factors cannot be mitigated through upgrade and without replacement starting in 2020, a capability gap will result.”
Rheinmetall’ Military Vehicle Centre of Excellence (MILVEHCOE) in Redbank, Queensland, was opened in October 2020.
The last of the 25 Boxers, supposedly to be delivered from Germany by December 2020, won’t be delivered before June 2021.
According to the ANAO report, the planned final withdrawal date for the ASLAV fleet is December 2021.
For how many years will the capability gap in Army reconnaissance exist? Replacement of the ASLAV is not scheduled to be completed before 2027. Seems like the Hawkeis will be fully employed maintaining skills in the ACR, let alone the RAAC ARES.
————————————————————————————–
2 April 2021
RAAC ARES Platform to Maintain Skills?
The 1AR Assn advise that A Sqn 1 Armd Regt are currently operating a trials fleet of Hawkei Protected Mobility Vehicles – Light in conjunction with their ASLAV troops. (Is this because of ASLAV unavailability, one wonders; ie. it’s not a ‘trial’ per se, but a means of maintaining recon skills in 1 Armd Regt?) Surely the 211 Boxers to be procured (including 133 recon variants) will be sufficient to equip the six recon squadrons in the three ACRs.
Before delving into the topic … an interesting footnote: The vehicle is named after a highly venomous snake, the Barkly Death Adder – Acanthophis Hawkei – which is found in the Barkly Tablelands
The Hawkei is now in full production … 50 vehicles per month. One presumes that the persistent reliability issues which have been reported, have been resolved; also, the safety ‘incident’ in Dec 2020 which brought usage to a stop pending an investigation.
The G-Wagon SRV [Special Reconnaissance Vehicle] has been used in a reconnaissance role by Special Forces. Presumably the reconnaissance variant of the Hawkei will replace the SRV in this role.
Is it possible that the Hawkei trial being conducted by 1 Armd Regt is to evaluate its suitability as a means of maintaining mounted skills in RAAC ARES light cavalry regiments? Interestingly, Hawkei can carry cavalry scouts and can be fitted with weapon and observation ‘pods’. The following refers.
A remotely controlled weapon station (RCWS) is installed in the Hawkei vehicle. It is an automated control weapon station principally used for light and medium-calibre weapons. The RCWS can accommodate remote control weapons encompassing 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and 12.7mm machine guns, 40mm automatic grenade launchers, anti-tank missiles and observation pods. https://www.army-technology.com/projects/hawkei/
NOTE: I don’t think that I’ve forgotten to do a post before … sorry about 1 Apr (now below)
————————————————————————————
1 April 2021
ANZAC Day or Anzac Day?
I was upset recently when the Canberra Times amended a letter I wrote to the Editor to change ANZAC Day to Anzac Day. I expressed my annoyance/disappointment about this and was advised that the paper has to follow editorial guidelines. I now appreciate that what I had assumed was correct, ie. always use ANZAC because it is an acronym and its origins should always be acknowledged.
About four years ago the AWM adopted the usage ‘ANZAC’ = military formation; all other uses = ‘Anzac’. This is in accord with the ‘Protection of Anzac’ legislation; ie. the acronym ANZAC is used correctly only when referring to formations in the First and Second World Wars (the campaign in Greece re the latter). Prior to the AWM’s decision above, it had generally used ANZAC. The AWM and DVA are now in agreement as far as usage is concerned. The Australian and NZ Governments both take this position.
While the Australian writers’ Centre takes the view that: “The full caps ANZAC is used only to refer to the army formation itself (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) but not to describe the people and events associated with it”, it acknowledges that some organisations (such as the RSL) believe that ANZAC is correct.
This quote is relevant: “From this summary we can see that ‘ANZAC’ is the acronym for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps and ‘Anzac’ is the name the soldiers of the AIF gave themselves during and after the Gallipoli campaign. That is why the Anzac Memorial in Hyde Park, Sydney, chooses the mixed case spelling. It is a memorial to the men and women who called themselves Anzacs. It is not the ANZAC Memorial as it is not a memorial to the Australian & New Zealand Army Corps.” https://www.anzacmemorial.nsw.gov.au/our-stories/our-stories/anzac-acronym-or-proper-noun
I’m sitting on the fence on this one, but will continue to use ANZAC.
——————————————————————————————–
31 March 2021
‘Armouredadvocates’
The index for the Blog has been compiled since the beginning of ‘The Right Thing to Do VII’ at the start of 2021 (see it at the end of the post). Since then, 85 posts have been made. (How I wish I’d done it all along!)
I thought it might be of interest to summarise the number of posts in their various categories.
Results are copied below. There may, or may not, be something to reflect on here. I wonder what the grouping might be if this was done for all posts over the seven years that the Blog has been going.
1 Armoured Regiment Association 11
ADF 2
Autobiography 2
AWM 6
Defence Strategy 7
Ethics 7
LAND 400 3
RAAC 33
RAAC ARES 6
RAAC Corporation 2
War Crimes 6
————————————————————————————
30 March 2021
Restructure Affecting 1 Armd Regt and ARES: Part 2
One of Armouredadvocates’ goals (Part 7 Intro above) is:
‘There would be two tank squadrons in the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade (to facilitate the formation of an adequate number of battlegroups). ‘
Following on from yesterday …
“1st Brigade’s Edinburgh Defence Precinct based 7th Battalion Mechanised Royal Australian Regiment (7RAR(Mech)) and 1st Armoured Cavalry Regiment (1AR – Armoured Cavalry Regiment) will form the foundation of a fourth combat brigade designated the 9th Brigade, rerolled as a heavy armoured combat manoeuvre element.”
So … 1 Armd Regt and 7RAR (Mech) will provide the manoeuvre elements for the new 9 Brigade. They will be supported by 9 Field Squadron, RAE, which will be raised as an Assault/Manoeuvre Support Squadron and will be equipped with the M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) and the M1074 Joint Assault Bridge (JAB) under acquisition under Project Land 8160 (Under Armour Breaching & Bridging).
BUT … this still only allows the formation of a single battlegroup, ie. a tank squadron and two mech inf companies (with reconnaissance and armoured engineer support). Described as a “heavy armoured combat manoeuvre element”, a combat brigade, or whatever … 9 Brigade is still a battlegroup short because of the absence of a second tank squadron.
The following is a gigantic falsehood: “The future 2028 Army Objective Force 9th Brigade will constitute the Australian Army’s first true armoured brigade combat team capacity raised since the 2nd World War with the capacity to launch and sustain offensive operations through dense and sophisticated defences against both a peer or near peer opponent”.
The same number of armoured combat teams can be formed by the ACRs in 3 and 7 Brigades which also include single tank squadrons. It’s not possible that Army would be substituting reconnaissance vehicles or IFVs for tanks, as was done in Vietnam with FSVs… or is it?
When is the tank fleet to be ‘right sized’ to 90, as Army has called for?
———————————————————————————————–
29 March 2021
Restructure Affecting 1 Armd Regt and ARES
How long will it be before unmanned combat ground vehicles are part of the force structure?
The following about the 2028 Army Force Objective Plan, is part of an article posted on Veterans’ Web on 4 Dec 20:
“The Australian Army will undergo a massive reorganisation in the next eight years which will see additional combat brigades raised, a dedicated rocket artillery and missile brigade raised, an existing brigade refocused to digital warfare and the Army Reserve structure completely reconfigured with units equipped with next generation weapons and situational awareness capabilities.
The new expanded 21st Century Order of Battle is revealed in the Land Operational Concept Document which outlines Army’s plans for a 2028 Army Objective Force. Initial analysis reveals an augmented force that retains the vast bulk of existing combat manoeuvre elements, but with a new Joint Fires Brigade to control in the incoming NASAMS 2 Ground Based Air Defence entering service next year (Project Land 19 Phase 7B), the Long Range Fires Rocket Artillery and Long Range Missile capabilities to be acquired under Project Land 8113 and the Land Based (Anti Ship/Strike) Missile System to be acquired under Project Sea 4100. The three existing Combat Brigades will expand to four, with major rerolling of entire Brigades and the raising of a (fifth) high readiness Total Work Force (integrated Reserve) combat brigade with substantial combat power in Western Australia to finally redress the ground combat imbalance in the western third of the nation.
Major changes include the splitting of the Palmerston NT/Edinburgh SA based 1st Brigade into two separate Brigades with substantial rerolling of individual units. Under the proposed 2028 Army Objective Force, 1st Brigade will remain in Darwin and re role as an amphibious/littoral/light combat manoeuvre element with the existing 5th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), 8th/12th Regiment Royal Australian Artillery (8/12RAA), 1st Combat Engineer Regiment (1CER), 1st Combat Signals Regiment (1CSR) and 1st Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB), but be augmented with a re-raised 4th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment Amphibious (4RAR) in Pre Landing Force configuration. The Army’s 10th Force Support Battalion will re equip with new Littoral Manoeuvre – Light vessels to replace the inservice LCM8 and eventually field the Littoral Manoeuvre – Heavy amphibious platforms which will be concentrated at Larakeyah Barracks in Darwin with a detachment operating from the unit’s existing Ross Island Barracks in Townsville.
1st Brigade’s Edinburgh Defence Precinct based 7th Battalion Mechanised Royal Australian Regiment (7RAR(Mech)) and 1st Armoured Cavalry Regiment (1AR – Armoured Cavalry Regiment) will form the foundation of a fourth combat brigade designated the 9th Brigade, rerolled as a heavy armoured combat manoeuvre element. Augmenting 7RAR and 1AR at 9th Brigade will be 9th Regiment Royal Australian Artillery (RAA), the former warehouse for the Army Reserve’s 81mm mortar equipped Light Battery units which will become regular and re equip with the next generation 155/52L AS9 Self Propelled Howitzer and its supporting AS10 Armoured Ammunition Resupply Vehicle and 9th Field Squadron Royal Australian Engineers who will be equipped with the next generation Heavy Armoured Capability Systems (assault support).”
More information about the above will follow tomorrow.
————————————————————————————–
28 March 2021
Uniting Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Australians
I attended a public consultation session re the redevelopment of the AWM yesterday. I’ve copied below the email I sent to the Redevelopment Team immediately after.
Dear All,
Thank you again for the presentations made earlier.
I’ve copied below the ‘Question’ I asked.
Aaron commented that I should make known any ideas I had in terms of rectifying this situation. My suggestion is as follows:
Acknowledgement. I believe that if the AWM’s Acknowledgement of Country was amended as shown below, it would go a long way to allowing indigenous and non-indigenous people to truly come together on ANZAC Day and other occasions …
“I acknowledge the original custodians of the land on which we meet, the Ngunnawal people, pay my respect to Elders past and present, and welcome all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with us today.I also acknowledge the suffering that indigenous people experienced in defence of their family, land, and way of life, in the past.”
I’m sure that if the concept was to be approved by the AWM and indigenous councils, even more appropriate wording could be found.
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
“It seems to me that the redevelopment project provides a wonderful opportunity to make the War Memorial something more than it is at present. Rather than just more space and more exhibits … something unifying as far as our nation is concerned.
“For we are one and free”. But we’re not as far as the Memorial is concerned.
It stands only to honour those who have suffered in the defence of our country since around 1914 (with a small acknowledgement of colonial wars). Rather than unifying the nation, it reinforces the devisiveness that plagues us.
I can come here and reflect on the service and sacrifice of my earliest forebears, however, my indigenous neighbour cannot … despite the fact that we have a common bond in the service of our ancestors in defence of their land, family and way of life (for the First Nations peoples, since 1770) .
Can this shared bravery and commitment to our country not be acknowledged within the vast amount of additional space to be made available? Can the War Memorial Act not be amended to allow this?
I’m not talking about recounting the story of the Frontier Wars; I’m talking about indigenous and non-indigenous people being able to stand together on ANZAC Day in an officially sanctioned tribute to ALL their forebears and their common suffering on behalf of those of us fortunate to be able to call ourselves Australians today.”
—————————————————————————————–
27 March 2021
Operation Overlord/Battle of Long Khanh: 1AR Assn
A National Commemoration is to be held in Canberra for Operation Overlord/Battle of Long Khanh on 7 June 2021, 50 years to the day. How does the history of 1 Armd Regt, as set on the 1 AR Assn website, refer to the Battle?
“7 Jun 1971: At 0500hrs two tank troops advance onto bunker system. The enemy is defeated.”
Wow!! Talk about being underwhelmed by the significance of the tank action (apart from the fact that the reference is factually wrong. The other three battles deemed worthy of National Commemoration on their 50th Anniversary, are described in much greater detail by the 1AR Assn in the Regiment’s history; one has to wonder why of the Battle of Long Khanh is overlooked (and the tank crews disrespected in this way).
The following is a synopsis of what happened …
In late May 1971, signals intelligence picked up indications of significant enemy activity in Long Khanh province. A brigade operation was organised (one of the few to be conducted by the Australian Task Force). 3RAR was to be the attack force with tank support, while other units provided a cordon. Late on 6 June 2021, 5 Platoon B Company 3RAR came across signs of enemy activity and heard voices. The plan was for artillery to brought down next morning, whereupon 5 Platoon would investigate.
The enemy did not abandon their position following the artillery bombardment. The 3rd Battalion 33 NVA Regiment were determined to defend their position which had been strongly fortified. 5 Platoon suffered casualties and were pinned down by sustained and heavy enemy fire. Artillery and mortar fire was brought down in support.
5 Troop C Squadron were about 900m north west of 5 Platoon. The tank troop started up and headed towards the infantry. Not long after, an anti-tank rocket was fired at the lead tank. The tank troop launched an attack.
It then became apparent how big the enemy position was … 1000m east-west x 700m north-south. It included all sorts of training facilities, such as huts, a lecture area with lectern and seating for 30, an obstacle course, and kitchens. Most of the bunkers were so strong, they would not collapse under the 53tonne weight of a tank. Because of this and the fact that there were so many bunkers, tank crew commanders had to drop grenades into the entrances, as the tanks didn’t have sufficient ammunition to fire into every bunker to ensure that no enemy would attack them from behind. At least one RPG was fired within its minimum range and didn’t detonate when it struck the armour; some were fired into trees above the turrets to wound the crews.
A US helicopter gunship team came up on the tank radio frequency, describing the ordnance they were carrying. “Where do you want it?” they were asked: “Fifty meters directly in front” was the response. Fortunately, 5 Troop were joined by 3 Troop not long after. Helicopter gunship support was maintained throughout.
The enemy had many chances to withdraw, however, it seems that they had decided to use their defences to inflict maximum casualties, while keeping escape routes open for as long as possible. By this time, B Company had linked up with 5 Platoon and about 11am an attempt was made to repeat an ammunition resupply by 9 Sqn RAAF helicopter. The enemy had a heavy machine gun ready and shot it down. Finally, after a period of eight hours during which they had resolutely defended a position dominated by enemy fire, 5 Platoon were relieved by 6 Platoon.
CO 3RAR had earlier manoeuvred D Company, together with field engineers, to support 3 and 5 Troops in a clearance sweep through the position. Forty-six bunkers, fighting pits, first aid stations and extensive living areas, were found. The assault course included barbed wire obstacles.
The enemy’s ability to destabilise 1ATF’s withdrawal by mounting attacks against towns, villages and military posts, as well as against 1ATF itself, had been diminished. No tank crewmen were wounded; surprise and shock action acted in their favour.
————————————————————————————–
26 March 2021
The 1 AR Assn: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Minutes of the 1 AR Assn AGM and C’tee meetings are now posted on the 1AR Assn website (as well as being emailed to members). How good is this! It wasn’t so long ago that members had no idea what transpired at C’tee meetings and advocacy was adopted to change this. The present situation reflects an open and transparent culture and is to be applauded.
Two matters in the Minutes of January’s AGM are also to be welcomed:
Condolence cards to NOK of deceased former members of the Regiment
The Secretary had distributed a copy of the Annual Report, including Financial Statements, by email and postal mail to all Association Members on 22 December 2020. An email was sent to all emailable Association Members on 15 January 2021 advising that any questions should be submitted to either the Secretary or the Treasurer prior to the AGM.
Condolence cards are not just sent to the NOK of deceased members of the Assn, but also to the NOK of former members of the Regiment who were not members of the Assn. If this is the case (and not a misrepresentation) then the C’tee is to be applauded. One would hope that this undertaking is widely known by the Regimental family. Do the Assn and the Regiment work together in this regard, one wonders?
In respect to point two … the Financial Statement was sent to members in advance of the AGM. This was something else that had been lobbied for, ie. members now have the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the detail, rather than having to try and absorb it all in a few minutes at the AGM.
So why do we need to step back?
“BRIEFING ON COMMEMORATIONS IN CANBERRA for 2021 – Noel McLaughlin sought leave to address the AGM. Informal arrangements for the Meet and Greet (a la carte dinner) for 6 June 2021 (the evening before the Commemorative Service for Overlord/Long Khanh) at the Ainslie Football Club. An O group is also to be held at the same location after the Commemorative Service on 7 June 2021. An open invitation is extended to all members of C Squadron 1st Armoured who may wish to attend an informal gathering on both dates, with 3rd Cavalry Regiment and elements of D&E Platoon. Charlie Dearling is the Dining Member and point of contact.”
Omitted is any reference to the C Sqn 1 Armd Regt 50th Anniversary dinner to be held on 6 June 2021. The 1 AR Assn C’tee declined to assist with this and now decline to help create awareness. Currently 100 people have paid to attend the dinner and 50 for the lunch the following day. ‘After Dinner’ addresses are to made by the Head of Corps and President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia. One would have hoped that the 1 AR Assn might have supported a function such as a dinner to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of a 1 Armd Regt squadron’s active service. The mind set of those involved in this decision beggars belief …
Originally, the dinner was to include 3 Cav personnel, however, Charlie Dearling and Noel Mc Laughlin decided that a separate 3 Cav function would be held if the Commemoration was to go ahead. They declined to say anything to the dinner organiser, however, and arrangements went ahead for a joint function for over 12 months. Finally, Charlie said in an email (not meant to be shared): “I suppose that I’d better inform you know who”. He won’t now return my calls nor answer my emails.
“OPERATION OVERLORD/BATTLE OF LONG KHANH – Peter Rosemond sought leave to address the AGM. Peter indicated that the Commemoration was a ticketed event and those members wishing to attend must provide Peter, as the Association’s main point of contact, with names and address due to COVID-19 restrictions.” This is incorrect. No more need be said …
———————————————————————————————————-
25 March 2021
The Honorary Colonel/Patron Quandary
The following was included in the Minutes of the last 1AR Assn C’tee meeting:
The President advised the meeting the current patron (MAJGEN Craig Orme, DSC, AM, CSC [Retd]) had been appointed as the Honorary Colonel of the Corps as well as for B Squadron 3/4 Cavalry Regiment. As a result, he would be standing down as our Patron. The President asked for opinions as to whether the Association should continue with the tradition of inviting the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment to be the new Patron of the Association. There was general agreement that the tradition should be followed and that a letter of invitation be forwarded to the Honorary Colonel of the Regiment.
It used to be that Maj Gen Roger Powell, AM, was: Representative Hon Col of the RAAC; Hon Col 1 Armd Regt; and Patron 1 AR Assn. His 1 Armd Regt and 1AR Assn duties were subsequently taken over by Maj Gen Craig Orme DSC, AM, CSC. Craig has now assumed the position of Rep Hon Col of the RAAC, meaning that he can no longer remain as Hon Col 1 Armd Regt or Patron 1AR Assn.
The 1 AR Assn are going forward a letter to the Hon Col 1 Armd Regt, asking that he become the Patron of the 1AR Assn. But, as far as is publicly known, the Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt is yet to be appointed … or has he/she?
Note. It’s interesting that the Rep Hon Col of the RAAC cannot also be the Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt, but CAN also be the Hon Col of B Sqn 3/4 Cav. One would have to assume that it’s about the ‘span of command’, ie. the work load associated with being both RAAC and Armd Regt Hon Cols. But Roger Powell did it.
—————————————————————————————
24 March 2021
Roger Tingley MC: The Book
Everyone knows about the scorpions, but this is an interesting article posted on the 3 Cav FB page ….
Even more interesting is Roger’s post in relation to it:
“Greetings Blue. Although a gentle conservationist, I still found the article interesting, as my Grandad hunted leopard/panther/tiger etc in Vietnam in the 1920s. Incl what you & I once called 3 Corps and told tales to his sons of elephants towing carts/cats on leashes in the streets of Hanoi/Saigon/Vung Tau. Dad went back with him in the early 30s, boxing/hunting/carousing etc and then, very briefly, as one of Slims mob, in 45.”
I understand that the story of Roger’s forebears will be included in his forthcoming book which will recount his own amazing story.
———————————————————————————
23 March 2021
WO2 Tom Phillips, mid, RAAC
DA NANG, VIETNAM. 1965-12-25. INFORMAL GROUP PORTRAIT OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TRAINING TEAM VIETNAM (AATTV) CELEBRATING CHRISTMAS DAY AT AUSTRALIA HOUSE. LEFT TO RIGHT: BACK ROW: WARRANT OFFICER PHILLIPS (DIED OF WOUNDS 1966- 03-20), CAPTAIN BELLEVILLE (KILLED IN ACTION 1966-02-12), WARRANT OFFICERS WADE, STOCKLEY, WARRANT OFFICER LEES (KILLED IN ACTION 1966-01-13), MASTER SERGEANT EUGENE JORDAN (US ARMY); FRONT ROW: WARRANT OFFICERS MACPHERSON, DOWSETT, MAJOR MC NEILL, WARRANT OFFICER KENT, AUSTRALIAN CAPTAIN OF A MERCHANT VESSEL IN DA NANG HARBOUR, WARRANT OFFICER SUTHERLAND AND WARRANT OFFICER SELMES (WOUNDED IN ACTION 1966-03-19).
Following the background below is Tom’s citation. Clearly, at a minimum, he deserved to be awarded the DCM or MM. Why wasn’t he? Because he was killed. The only awards that could be made posthumously at the time were the mid or VC. Thankfully, that time has passed!
From the RAACA NSW Newsletter:
The late WO2 Tom Phillips, previously buried at Terendak, Malaysia, will be reinterred in the Military Section, Woden Cemetery, Canberra at 11am on Mon 6 June [2016]. A guard will be provided by RAAC members from the School of Armour. The Corps RSM will be in attendance, together with other serving and former members of the RAAC.
WO2 Phillips was born in Wales. He was the first member of the RAAC to be killed in Vietnam. Aged 38, he died of his wounds on 20 Mar 66 after being shot in a contact while attached to an ARVN Regional Forces company (as a member of AATTV). WO2 Phillips sacrificed his life on behalf of his fellow men, he was Mentioned in Dispatches posthumously.
His Citation:
Warrant Officer Thomas Dudley Phillips enlisted in the Australian Regular Army in June 1959 after previously serving for several years in the British Army. He then served continuously with the lst Armoured Regiment at Puckapunyal until posted to the Australian Army Training team in October 1965, and assigned as an adviser to Regional Force units in the central Vietnamese Province of Quang Ngai.
On 18 March 1966, Warrant Officer Phillips was the adviser with the 423rd Regional Force Company on an operation in an area approximately 15 kilometres south of Quang Ngai City. He was accompanied by Warrant Officer John Neville Selmes, who was advising another Regional Force Company, and three United States Army Lieutenants. At 0810 hours both forces were engaged by a significantly superior Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Regular Force and a vicious fire fight ensued at close range. After approximately fifteen minutes all the Regional Force troops, with the exception of their Company Commanders, abandoned the position leaving the advisers to oppose the enemy alone and personal weapons only available since requests for artillery and air support had been refused.
At this point, whilst the group of advisers was attempting to withdraw, one of the US Lieutenants was wounded and Warrant Officer Selmes went to his assistance. While Selmes assisted the wounded officer to a safer position, Warrant Officer Phillips continuously exposed himself to heavy enemy fire in order to engage the enemy effectively and cover his comrades’ movement. This enabled the wounded officer to be taken to a rear ward position from which support could again be called.
While Warrant Officer Phillips was providing covering fire and successfully impeding the enemy’s’ approach he was seriously wounded in the stomach by a burst of automatic fire. He was seen to stumble but nevertheless recovered and continued to give fire support until he could no longer stand. After his subsequent recovery by the remaining advisers and as a result of these wounds, he died in hospital on the morning of 20 March 1966.
During this engagement all the advisers were wounded. By his courageous action, both before and after being wounded, Warrant Officer Phillips enabled the remainder to reorganise their position and eventually arrange evacuation for the whole party, Warrant Officer Phillips sacrificed his life in this endeavour and his conduct was in the highest Australian tradition of courage and professional dedication.
—————————————————————————————–
22 March 2021
The Role of the RAAC ARES.
A post from last month’s ADF ‘Our People’ Facebook page is copied below.
Previous Blog posts have lamented a clear role being defined for the RAAC ARES. Could this be a breakthrough, ie. the ‘Role of the RAAC ARES is to support and augment ARA RAAC units’.
“Pop smoke for the reveal of our latest armoured leaders, including our 4th/19th Prince of Wales’ Light Horse members LT Alakus and LT Arrowsmith!
Graduates shown here with two Light Armoured Vehicles at the end of the final part of their Royal Australian Armoured Corps, Regimental Officers Basic Course.
This course teaches trainees to lead soldiers in light cavalry units, increasing the capability of these trooper[s] and units to support [and] augment the Australian Regular Army [Armoured] Cavalry Regiments.
The trainees (left to right): LT Thomas Case 12/16 Hunter River Lancers, LT Danyal Alakus 4/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, CAPT Jaime Brownlie 1/15 Royal New South Wales Lancers, LT Oscar Arrowsmith 4/19 Prince of Wales Light Horse Regiment, LT Kai Neagle 3/9 Light Horse, and LT Natalie McHugh 2/14 Light Horse Regiment”.
The Blog on 14 March referred to the public consultation sessions to be conducted by the AWM in relation to the redevelopment proposals and the submission that I’d made in this respect.
A consultation session was held by the AWM yesterday evening. I referred to my earlier submission pointing out that:
“Australian armoured experience should be represented not just by AFV technology, but also by a well-informed and engaging interpretation of what it was like for AFV crews fighting inside them; in other words, there is a need to “insert a human presence into objects relating to our military heritage”.
I had previously suggested that “One way to achieve this could be vide those headphones used in art galleries. The sound (and possibly visual) sequence depicts the cacophony of noise (engine, tracks, guns, radio, explosions etc) with individuals relating their experiences as an overlay”.
I was pleased that they were very supportive, explaining (as an example) that they had audio tapes from a Bushmaster that detonated an IED in Afghanistan and video footage taken by the mini-team travelling behind. There is still a lot more to do, however. The Japanese Ha-Go tank from Milne Bay will be featured in one of the new exhibitions. The significance of this will be lessened if they continue to maintain that it had a crew of four (rather than three).
In relation to the above, I emailed the AWM Team as follows:
“Many thanks for your presentations yesterday evening. One question if I may.
It was stated a couple of times that the AWM is seeking to consult with as many veterans as possible. Could you advise how this ‘reach out’ is being conducted.
I’ve not heard of any such thing and am able to pass on details to a number of veteran organisations.
Have you provided guidelines for the nature of the input that you’re seeking?
Their response will be interesting.
—————————————————————————–
20 March 2021
ANZAC Day
What contradictions this commemoration raises.
I wrote to the Canberra Times to say that I was disappointed that they had changed my reference to ‘ANZAC’ in a letter to the Editor, to ‘Anzac’. The response I received stated that there was no option available, as they had to follow the paper’s Style Guide. This is the same as that for the ABC.
DVA’s protocol, however, is a little different: “DVA only uses ‘ANZAC’ when referencing the Corps itself and uses ‘Anzac’ in all other circumstances; the Australian War Memorial (AWM) generally uses ‘ANZAC’, given its focus on historical records and memorabilia.”
Seems to me that if we can’t come to a consensus in this respect, we’ve no hope in terms of bigger issues, such as ….
I was asked if I’d be attending the ANZAC Day ceremony. My response was:
“I won’t be taking part, as I believe that ANZAC day should be a commemoration for ALL those who have put their lives on the line to defend ‘our’ Country. This includes our indigenous brothers and sisters whose forebears confronted the ‘occupying forces’ and who sort to defend their families, possessions, and lands.”
Why should they be commemorated? Because they stood for the same values as all Australians have done in the past and do so today! They could’ve turned and fled in the face of overwhelming force and weaponry. They could’ve succumbed and simply given up.
But they didn’t. They stood firm and defended their families and ‘human rights’. They displayed incredible bravery. The same bravery displayed by latter-day Australians in South Africa, at Gallipoli, at Tobruk, in Vietnam, in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Australians in these conflicts stood firm and defended the values embodied by their nation, just as our first nations people did when their country was threatened.
It is only just that we honour them and their bravery, in the same way that we honour all others who have done the same.
The AWM Charter might not allow it to honour the bravery of indigenous Australians who defended their country, their families, and their human rights … in the same manner as latter- day Australians.
But, is this significant? Does the AWM Charter really dictate how we as a nation honour our forebears? Of course not. But that is what is happening.
Instead of looking only at the ‘regulations’ which govern us, we should be looking at the values which bind us.
Our national anthem states that “We are one”. But is this really the case?
If we were really ‘one’, then we would stand together on ANZAC Day and honour ALL our forebears who had suffered in defence of their nation.
———————————————————————————————
19 March 2021
Charitable Act by 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn
The Blog post on 12 March 2021 concerned the ‘Tongala Centurion’. The information below provides some background and is taken from the latest 3 Cav (Vietnam) Sitrep newsletter. How good to see an ESO acting in this way … standing firm and setting an example in terms of upholding core values in today’s society.
“JOLLY CHRISTMAS AT THE AVENUE OF HONOUR
Early on Christmas morning, two juveniles were in the Avenue of Honour, climbing on the tank, and when off it, one continuously kicked the public safety warning signs erected around the tank, warning of the dangers of climbing upon the tank, and to keep off. The signs were significantly damaged, and will need replacing.
The two offenders were easily identified by the CCTV covering the area of the tank, and a report was made to the Tongala Police, along with the visual evidence of the vandalism. On interview, the elder of the two juveniles admitted the damage to the signs, and was Cautioned officially for the event. No offer was made by the offenders to restore the damaged signs. The event was placed on Facebook before Police action, and it was extremely heartening to see that this type of behaviour was totally abhorrent to all.
There have since been many offers received by us to pay for the replacement of the signs, and we sincerely thank everyone for their concern, and their generosity. However, our view is that the townspeople of Tongala should not be the ones to shoulder this burden, and the signs will be replaced by our Association. It is an unfortunate occurrence to damage property belonging to a War Memorial, dedicated to the memory of those young lives lost in action in Vietnam so many years ago. However, we believe that this is a “one off” event, and will not be repeated.
Again, we thank everyone in Tongala for their concern and messages of goodwill that have been forwarded to us. We look forward to making the Avenue a place of local pride, enhancing the town for local people and tourists alike. Our best wishes to all for a better new year ahead, Sincerely, Dallas Burrage 3rd Cavalry Regiment (Vietnam) Association.
(Editor’s note…this is a copy of the article sent to the Tongala Times newsletter. The signs have been replaced, $154.00)”
————————————————————————————————————–
18 March 2021
The Echidna Strategy
The following article was published in the Lowy Institute’s ‘The Interpreter’ earlier this month: ‘How Far Would Australia go in Defence of the Rules Based Order?’
There is much to commend it, but the matters it raises should all be able to be seen clearly in the statement of our [Australia’s] strategic interests
The 2020 Strategic Update states that the ADF is to be capable to deterring threats to Australia’s interests and responding with capable force if deterrence fails.
But what are Australia’s strategic interests? Why are they not specified? Presumably they include our offshore oil and gas fields, our freedom of navigation and aviation, our fishing zones, the sovereignty of our island territories. But how do they relate to military assistance to other countries in our region if they were to be threatened?
Until the strategic interests that we would seek to defend are defined, there is no basis for public assurance as far as the capability of the ADF is concerned.
——————————————————————-
17 March 2021
The RAAC in the Public Eye
I’ve written about this before …
RAAC tank, cavalry, reconnaissance, and APC units haven’t existed for over five years. But who would know according to ‘official’ public information. It would seem that no-one wishes to tell the public about armoured cavalry regiments, or the fact that the RAAC no longer operates APCs. The examples are endless …
“Units of the RAAC include tank regiments, reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel carrier regiments.”
One might have thought that the RAAC Corporation, above all others, would keep the RAAC public info up to date.
“The main types of [ARA] Armoured Corps units are:
The tank regiment – The tank regiment operates the Abrams main battle tank. The Regiment’s manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. The role of the tank, in coordination with other arms, is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, manoeuvre and shock action.
The cavalry regiments – The cavalry regiments operate the ASLAV and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle. A cavalry unit’s personnel and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks. The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate, and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.
“Drive formidable armoured vehicles such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers or combat reconnaissance vehicles; operating their weapons and managing basic maintenance.”
Someone forgot to mention that an “Armoured Vehicle Crew Trooper (Armoured Cavalry)” no longer has anything to do with APCs.
A public media ‘event’ for LAND 400 Phase 3 was held in Canberra last week. See:
But who’s primarily responsible for the final recommendation? (Although you’d have to say that it has to be the Lynx.)
The Head of the CASG’s Armoured Vehicle Division is Major General David Coghlan, an RAA officer. Maybe this is appropriate in terms of suggesting whether or not the IFV should be crewed by RA Inf or RAAC crews; but I suspect that this decision is to be made well apart from CASG. Maybe the next Head of the Armoured Vehicle Division should be someone who has personal experience in armoured vehicle operations (?).
But who has direct oversight of LAND 400? Brig Greg McGlone (an aviator) was the previous Director General AFV within CASG. But he left suddenly late last year and there doesn’t seem to be any public info as to his replacement. (Sarah Myers was acting in the position.)
—————————————————————————————–
15 March 2021
RAAC Members Doing What They Do Best.
Going under the radar … the latest 2/14 LHR (QMI) Assn newsletter contains an update from the CO which is the sort of information which I believe should be made more widely known. (I won’t comment as to how this should best be done.) We have much to be proud of in terms of those serving today!
I’ve advised the 2/14 QMI Assn that the DSO awarded to the CO for his service in the British Army, should take precedence before the CSC awarded to him by Australia.
The AWM is conducting consultation sessions re its redevelopment: Most of these sessions will be held online, however, two face-to-face sessions will be hosted at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra [on 18 and 27 march 2021].
I, and a number of others, have previously engaged with the AWM re the fact that AFV exhibits presently highlight technical characteristics of vehicles, but fail to represent the challenges confronting the crews operating them.
I will be attending (possibly RAAC Corporation reps will also be present) … if anyone would like to suggest questions that they’d like to have asked, please let me know. I’ve copied a submission I previously provided to the AWM below.
AWM Redevelopment
There is an opportunity to provide better understanding as the combat experience of AFV crews. Displaying a tank is one thing, making known what it was like to be a crew member fighting the vehicle during combat … is something else entirely.
There is a fallacy abroad that members of tank crews were protected from enemy fire and, therefore, their experience should not be portrayed as explicitly in closing with and engaging the enemy, as that of infantry. Of course, nothing is further from the truth.
Australian armoured experience should be represented not just by AFV technology, but also by a well-informed and engaging interpretation of what it was like for AFV crews fighting inside them. As has been concluded by expert studies (see below), there is a need to “insert a human presence into objects relating to our military heritage”.
Understanding the Bravery of AFV Crews
Some quotes to emphasis the extent of the misunderstanding of the vulnerability of AFVs, and therefore, the bravery of their crews, follow. That immediately below was one of many in response to the AWM’s request for feedback re the (then) new Vietnam Gallery:
“The caption accompanying a weapon display states that when the enemy acquired the RPG7, Australian tanks and APCs could be penetrated. This infers that the RPG2 could do neither. This is incorrect. The RPG2 could penetrate APCs and Centurion tanks; the latter, anywhere other than the front of the hull and [front of the] turret.”
I expanded on this in a later letter to the AWM Director (2008)
“Those responsible for the new galleries deserve much credit for all they have achieved. There is one aspect, however, that I would like to mention to you. In writing my book on the history of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, I frequently come across a myth that the Centurion tank was immune to enemy direct fire anti-armour weapons. The impression created by this myth is one of tanks pushing through the jungle, their crews ‘cocooned’ safely within their armour. Of course, the opposite is the case.
The armour thickness of the Centurion was: turret front, 152mm; turret side, 115mm; hull sides, 20-50mm. Enemy weapons were able to penetrate armour as follows: RPG7, 320mm; 75 RCL, 235mm; RPG2, 175mm; 57 RCL, 110mm. The result is that Centurions were vulnerable to all anti-armour direct fire weapons, particularly the RPG7 and 75mm RCL.
A quick check of my draft shows that Centurions were penetrated by RPGs through the front of the turret at least three times (five crew WIA); four times through the side of the turret (six WIA); and once through the side of the hull (three WIA). Of course, the enemy did not have to penetrate the armour to temporarily ‘knock out’ a tank. Inadequate optics and ventilation meant that crews could not ‘close down’ in the jungle. This led to another ten crewmen being WIA as a result of shrapnel.” [Of course, mines were an additional threat, with two KIA and ten WIA.]
An extract from the Epilogue to my book
“An information panel in the Australian War Memorial’s Vietnam Gallery refers to Centurions as ‘being nearly impervious to most enemy weapons’. This creates a false impression. Tank crewmen knew only too well that their vehicles could be penetrated by RPG2s, RPG7s, 57mm RCLs, 75mm RCLs, and even 12.7mm machine guns. Furthermore, because they were compelled to operate with open hatches, they were vulnerable to sniper fire, shrapnel, and satchel charges. Not always being able to travel off-road, tanks were susceptible to mine attack, something that the enemy exploited.
A tank is more than just an armoured vehicle, however. Having closed with the enemy, it is the crew who bring its guns to bear. It is their spirit and determination to achieve fire superiority at the point of battle, despite the risks, that is at the heart of armoured warfare. Rather than being immune to enemy fire, Centurions achieved success through the bravery and boldness of their crews and the shock action which resulted. The RAEME crews and RAE mini-teams who accompanied them displayed equal courage in putting themselves in harm’s way on behalf of their Country.
ANNEX A. Relevant Studies Elsewhere.
Interestingly, exhibits at the Imperial War Museum (London) have been described in similar terms:
“Much of the Imperial War Museum’s displays are technology-focused, especially in the museum’s Large Exhibits Gallery. Here, guns, tanks and aircraft are displayed clean and undamaged, presenting a sanitised version of war, which emphasises technology rather than the context in which the objects were used, the people who made and used them, and the effects they had on their intended targets. The artefacts’ captions concentrate on their technical details.”
Innovation in the British Army Museum shows that representing the experience of an AFV crewman is not completely out of the question.
“IED Alley is a corridor in the museum which has been artfully designed so as to replicate a village street in Iraq, complete with a few hidden IED spots. IED, of course, means Improvised Explosive Device, that dreaded modern incarnation of the booby trap which, perhaps more than any other weapon, has come to represent the nature of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. I doubt whether the general public is even aware of how profoundly unsettling this small, contrived space in the museum can be to soldiers who have encountered the actual thing in real life – upon stepping into that exhibit a veteran instantly finds himself recognizing the suspicious objects, the blind spots, and the dead ground that in another time and place would mean that something terrible and deadly was lying in wait, very close by. It was not an exhibit I lingered in for very long.”
One way to achieve this could be vide those headphones used in art galleries. The sound (and possibly visual) sequence depicts the cacophony of noise (engine, tracks, guns, radio, explosions etc) with individuals relating their experiences as an overlay
Another quote from the above article: “The cloister-like sterility of a museum can present a one-dimensional depiction of war, but most of the reality of the experience is necessarily lost in the distillation.”
It has been argued that by presenting weapons as pieces of technology, their original context is made less apparent. In other words, this masks the fact that they were devices used or at least designed to kill people. Raths (2013) described the exhibition of tanks at Germany’s Tank Museum, Munster. Large numbers of fully restored tanks were displayed in neat rows without a trace of their former fates in battle. Textual interpretation was offered only in terms of their technical details. Raths argued that this method of display allowed visitors to forget that the tanks were ‘built by human beings, were filled with human beings and were used against human beings’. He commented that this ‘sterile’ method was a way of masking the horrors of war with technical fascination and this made it difficult for visitors to see these objects from other perspectives.
Raths goes on to argue that efforts to display the tanks differently, to encourage multiple interpretations, is something that the visitors would have to have forced upon them, as many are happy to enjoy the technicality of the object without considering what it did. Winter (2013) also suggested that those who develop fascinations with weapons dislike the display of their violent effects, as this spoils their idealized view of these supposedly thrilling objects
Let us also return to some of the factors that influence how an object contributes to the creation of representations of war. One thing that was highlighted was the way that these objects are connected with people. If museums want to influence a visitor’s outlook on conflict by displaying material culture, then surely they should respect those people linked to the objects who actually experienced it. When displaying military objects it is very useful to consider who made it, who used it, who it was used upon or who it was taken from. Efforts should be made not only to insert a human presence into objects relating to our military heritage, but also to humanise the enemies that fought against our soldiers. …. Yet it could be said that the adoption of certain approaches to displaying military objects means that the personal element of the objects are lost or become less apparent. Wood (1987:65) made the important point that
Military history is about people… However sophisticated the weapon systems become, the service man and woman will always be there and it is their presence, their story, that lies at the root of military history.
ANNEX B: The Stress Experienced by AFV Crews on Active Service
Purpose.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to some of the factors which may have affected the mental health of Armoured Corps Vietnam veterans, in order to better anticipate the needs of future veterans separating from the Service.
Human Factors in General.
When considering the performance of an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its capability, such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
These factors are taken into account when choosing between two contenders for a particular combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident they feel, eg. whether or not they are likely to suffer anxiety in any of its forms when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that identifying these is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. To complicate matters, man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
Morale.
There are two main determinants of the degree to which AFV crewmen feel ‘comfortable’ in terms of their survivability. Foremost is their confidence in the overall superiority of the system in which they are a part (ie. their commanders at all levels, their battle grouping, and their equipment) … vis a vis the enemy. Following from this, is their confidence regarding the provisions which have been made for their individual protection.
What happens, however, when a loss or reversal in combat is suffered (eg. an AFV is penetrated, causing crew casualties). It is understandable that confidence in the superiority of the overall system is reduced, while provisions for individual survivability are also called into question.
Matters Affecting Confidence in Individual Survivability
All military training is conducted on the basis that it equips service personnel with skills superior to those of the enemy. This means that AFV crewmen are confident in meeting their responsibilities when under fire. They know that their fellow crew members are similarly trained and they will support each other.
When the enemy demonstrates that they possess an equivalent ability, AFV crew have to accept that their vehicle could be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon or severely damaged by an anti-tank mine, leading to a catastrophic ammunition fire. Apart from the obvious anxiety of being wounded or killed at any time, the following matters are some of those which become particularly important:
Being able to exit the AFV quickly if it is ‘knocked out’ or experiences a fire (particularly important for someone like a tank gunner who does not have direct access to the outside);
Knowing that the vehicle fire-fighting system will always operate immediately and effectively;
Being assured of the fire/flash retardant capability of crew combat clothing;
Being kept informed of what is happening beyond the AFV itself and not being forced to imagine the possibilities;
Being able to maintain contact with other crew members and not put in a situation of feeling isolated and alone (as can happen when the inter-communication system fails);
Knowing that medical support will ensure that all wounded will immediately receive life-saving treatment and evacuation;
Coming to terms with the nature of the wounds inflicted on the enemy by the enormous firepower of AFVs;
Overcoming a feeling of isolation by virtue of being in a different part of the AFV to the rest of the crew;
Having to obey Rules of Engagement which meant that the AFV had to be fired on before it could take action to defend itself; and
Being confined in an environment in which poisonous creatures such as scorpions, spiders, or snakes might be concealed.
Loss of confidence in any of these areas will significantly increase the anxiety and fear that comes with the stress of battle. Should information overload occur in this digital age, the situation will be exasperated.
Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
One definition of PTSD is a particular set of reactions that can develop in people who have been through a traumatic event which threatened their life or safety, or that of others around them. It is generally recognised that it is not only the experience of a single traumatic event which can generate these reactions, other stressful situations (especially if repeated over and over) can have the same effect.
Conclusion.
AFVs, by definition, operate at the forefront of operations against the enemy. Even if a crewman does not directly experience a traumatic event, being enclosed in a vehicle which could be penetrated by an enemy rocket or detonate an anti-tank mine at any time, gives rise to stressful feelings associated with being wounded or killed, being trapped inside an AFV and burnt to death; and/or being abandoned in a disabled vehicle on the battlefield. These thoughts are often made worse by a lack of communication with other crew members, feelings of isolation, and a constant uncertainty about what is happening around him.
There are unique factors which impact on the stress experienced by the crews of AFVs on active service. These must be taken into account when any assessment is made of their mental health.
—————————————————————————
13 March 2021
1 AR Assn : Anonymous Threat
I have received a letter from “Y Ivor Klew” {Dandenong Letter Centre 996-4, 12.36pm. 2 Mar 21}. There was no address. He/she included a photocopy of the 1AR Assn Constitution (despite the fact that, after considerable lobbying, it is now available on the Internet).
Ivor takes issue with the Introduction to my Blog in which I make the statements copied below. In particular, he/she states that no provision for life memberships was included in the draft. As one of those principally responsible for the draft I referred to, I beg to differ.
If I don’t apologise on the Blog, my “untruths [will] become public knowledge on at least one, if not more, face book pages”. What rocks do these people climb out from under?
Wow! Someone is going to criticise me on Facebook page that I am not permitted to access, should I wish to respond. How gutless is this? I don’t take kindly to threats. [I assume that the person concerned is a ‘she’, as they obviously don’t have the balls to sign their name to their letter.]
My response has been copied to both the President and Secretary of the 1AR Assn.
Extracts from the Blog …
“The story continues … The final Constitution approved by the then C’tee differed from that which our group of members had drafted. One point of difference was that a clause was inserted which gave the C’tee the right to refuse someone’s application for membership, without telling them why and without giving them any right of appeal. These are the sort of powers that back the governance of a totalitarian regime. A number of members raised objections to this, but their protests were ignored.
The C’tee with whom the group of members had been working to draft the new Constitution had included a provision in the Constitution for ‘existing’ Life Memberships to be continued. The draft sent to members made this very clear. (Background here is that when Life Memberships were originally awarded, there was no provision in the Constitution for this to be done. The revised Constitution included such provision.)
In a letter dated 2 August 2019, the President 1AR Assn advised me that the reason that the C’tee did not notice that the provision for existing Life Memberships to be continued had been removed from the draft of the Constitution considered at the AGM, was an “oversight” which the Association “failed to detect”. As a result, resolutions for the continuance of each former life member’s membership are to be considered at the AGM on 12 October 2019. Each resolution must be approved by three quarters of the members voting, whether in person or by proxy. I was not allowed to vote. [My Life Membership was not continued.”]
—————————————————————————————–
12 March 2021
Tongala Centurion
The info below was posted on the 3 Cav Forum:
“The Centurion in the Avenue of Honour down at Tongala has commenced to be sand blasted and spray painted. Greg Lyle of Kyabram started on Saturday last, and sandblasted it, before applying the first undercoat on Sunday. The undercoat was then covered with a red oxide (hence the pink tank), however, the final coat was not able to be placed on today (Monday 8th) as it rained early this morning. Greg will come back and finish the job at the end of this coming week, or the weekend.
All going well, we should have the complete installation of the tank completed a few days after the tank is sprayed. Already the explanatory plaque has been placed in front of the tank, and the seats concreted into position around the tank and Avenue itself. Traffic bollards have been installed along the side entranceway into the Avenue, to stop cars driving into and over the future footpath/pedestrian area.”
The tank concerned is ARN 169120. It wasn’t used in Vietnam; but a bit of background from one of my much earlier Blog posts is copied below. (I attended the 2004 ceremony.)
From Roger Tingley, MC: “Way back in 1964, I was a C Sqn Gunner (tp ldr Don Gazzard) on ARN 169120 during the Paratus Cup shoot and after seeing your reply on ‘Cromwell’, wonder where ‘120 ‘is now.
1 Tp Sgt’s crew was Poole/Green/Tingley/Prickett (3 made ossifer for their sins) & ‘twas the only tank in the troop ‘completely’ operational by the end of the shoot, despite a small turret fire: Whereat the ‘L’ riding on top in some panic, screamed a general bailout & whilst wielding a fire extinguisher, somehow hit the tank gunner (last out) on the head with said extinguisher, knocking him back onto the tank floor. Can’t recall 120’s given name … probably because I spent most of my time looking over my shoulder for the Tp Cpl …on whose ‘—-‘list I ever seemed to be.”
From RAACA (NSW) Armour newsletter 2006: “Tongala Project – Avenue of Honour Centurion Tank”
‘In 2001 the Australian Light Horse/Armoured Memorial Committee was formed with a total of 4 people to build a Australian Light Horse memorial to honour the Lighthorsemen from the district that went of to war. In 2003 the Light Horse Memorial was built and dedicated.
After this dedication the committee agreed on building Avenue of Honour to the Armoured Servicemen killed in the Vietnam War. This Avenue was unveiled in November 2004, by the Governor General of Australia, and the Chief of the Australian Army. Over 4000 people attended this event.
While the Avenue of Honour was in planning stages, John Whitehorn ex 1 Armoured Regiment soldier approached the committee on the idea of having a Centurion Tank placed in Tongala to be dedicated to his two mates, Jimmy Kerr and Mick Hannaford and to all those who served with the Centurion tanks. John at that time had throat cancer which was progressing, John knew he wouldn’t be around for the dedication (John passed away in June 2005) but did agree to leave funds aside for the project.
It was also John’s wish to have both Armoured and Cavalry represented together in the Avenue of Honour. The committee at present time is in the planning stages for the event with the unveiling set aside for November 2008. At present ARN 169120 Centurion Tank has been purchased by Michael Thompson and is in Tongala. Michael has put in $15,000 of his own money to purchase and transport it to Tongala.’
(Photo: The late Col Filtness).
One has to wonder why the 1AR Assn is not involved …
————————————————————————————–
11 March 2021
Leadership 2
Following on from 2 March, I found the following (posted on The Cove) worth watching …
This matter was raised on another Forum. I’ve copied my response below:
“A former troop sergeant, Jim de Turt, once said to me: “the next highest award after WIA, is KIA!“.
Re ‘injured’ [on active service]… this can either be Battle Casualty (BCAS) or Non-BCAS. Someone who is hit by a falling tree branch during an assault on an enemy position is a BCAS; someone who trips over a tent peg while drunk on active service, is a non-BCAS. Both were injured.
We had a prolonged debate with the AWM a few years back. Two RAAF pilots were flying an aircraft when it’s ‘windscreen’ was hit by ground fire. They received serious lacerations as a result of the shattered glass. The AWM had a report which said that they were injured and this is what the public information stated. Of course, they were wounded as a direct result of enemy action. I believe that the matter was finally resolved in favour of ‘wounded’.
I lobbied some years back for those who were wounded to have some form of recognition for each occasion this happened; also for recognition for each ‘rotation’ that someone was deployed to on active service. [Wound stripes used to be worn.]
If recognition was to be given for each time someone was injured during military service, we’d need another Army to process the paperwork.
Postscript: The Vietnam Wall in Washington shows the emphasis that should be afforded to those who were KIA or DOW. Only if it can be shown that death was directly attributed to enemy action, will a name be listed on the Wall. Those whose death resulted from illness, injury or other cause, have their names listed on a commemorative roll inside the Wall. It takes those managing the Memorial an enormous amount of time to process applications, but they believe that it’s worth it.”
—————————————————————————————————
9 March 2021
Vale: Kevin John Rowe, 21 July 1935- 5 February 2021
From Bill Burton …
He was a well-known and respected Troop Sergeant and member of the 1AR, ‘A’ Squadron, 4/19 PWLH and the Training WO at 3/9 SAMR. He also served with the Brits during the Malaysian Emergency, and was with WO2 JA ‘Chesty’ Bond, in Vietnam, when he was KIA on ANZAC Day 1969, after an NVA soldier lobbed a satchel charge into the cargo hatch of ‘Chesty’s’ M113. Kevin had only just debussed the M113 with his section of HQ Coy, South Vietnamese soldiers prior to the charge exploding.
I had the honour of serving with Kevin in ‘A’ Squadron, 4/19 PWLH from 1963-1966 and 3/9 SAMR from 1971-1974. He was an excellent soldier and a great character with an outrageous sense of humour as well. He also got up to some hilarious capers when he was a bit younger, it didn’t pay dividends to be too close to him when he was up to mischief, one could very easily be left holding the ‘can’, hence his nickname “Animal”.
On one such occasion a group of us (incl Rowie) after a few pay-night drinks, when into Liverpool NSW, buy hamburgers at the cafe opposite the railway station. On this particular occasion, assembled outside the cafe were the motorcycles belonging to a rough looking group of bikies. The bikies glared at Kevin Rowe as he walked through the gleaming machines inspecting them, and giving the odd-one a bit of an extra touch-up polish with the sleeve of his shirt. The group of bikies were impressed with ‘Animal’s great show of respect for their bikes, until one bikie fool, walked up to Rowie and asked him if he would like to kick it-over. The ‘Animal’ said thank you very much – and he did just that! With the deft touch of a champion soccer player, he kicked the stand from under the bike – and over it went! The group of bikies could not believe their eyes. I think I out-ran all starters back to Holsworthy.
He was a good bloke under all the rough and tumble exterior and a bloody good leader of men when the going got tough.
—————————————————————————————–
8 March 2021
In Simple Terms, How Does an APS Work?
Blogs on 31 January and 6 March referred to Active protection Systems (APS).
There are two broad types of APS Wikipedia explains:
Electronic countermeasures that alter the electromagnetic, acoustic or other signature(s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behaviour of an incoming threat (e.g., guided missile) are designated soft-kill measures.
Measures that physically counterattack an incoming threat thereby destroying/altering its payload/warhead in such a way that the intended effect on the target is severely impeded are designated hard-kill measures.
The Trophy and Elbit systems are both in the second category.
In TROPHY’s case, the system employs actively scanned radar to provide continuous 360-degree protection of the vehicle. Army requirements demand that an APS must be capable of protecting vehicles under all conditions, and the radar is effective in adverse combat conditions like smoke, sand, dust, mud, glare, and explosions.
Once the threat is detected, the onboard computer classifies the threat and, if a hit is probable, the countermeasure launcher slews into position and launches a tight pattern of explosively formed penetrators that neutralize the warhead before impact or detonation. The threat detection, fire control, and processing all take place in milliseconds.
The same sensors that track incoming shots at the vehicle also paint a target on the shooter, allowing an immediate response from the crew. They can return fire, maneuver out of contact, activate slew-to-cue weapons and sensors, or call for fire support. At the same time, Trophy automatically transmits the engagement data to the battle management network, giving friendly forces immediate enemy information.
Its good to see announcements such as those copied from Defence Media below. While they are a little contradictory, the overall picture is clear. Two things are certain: (i) our defence staff have been working steadily; and (ii) simulation is seen as the means to reduce training costs.
Almost $100 million will be spent to deliver a new three-storey Armoured Vehicle Simulation Centre in the School of Armour at Puckapunyal.
Works are scheduled to start in March this year and will include the modernisation of training support facilities in the wider School of Armour and nine additional workshop bays. Driver training facilities and tactical simulators for the Army’s Armoured Fleet will also be upgraded.
“About 85 per cent of the workforce for the School of Armour upgrade is going to be sourced locally,” Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price said. “The program will also deliver workshops and supporting infrastructure that is designed to be able to maintain the suite of Armoured Fighting Vehicle platforms both now and into the future.”
St Hilliers has been awarded the head contract to deliver the second package as part of the $235 million Fighting Vehicle Facilities Program Stage 1 works, following the announcement of a related package of works at Lavarack Barracks, Townsville.
“Our investment will support the upgraded M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank and incoming Land 400 and Land 8160 vehicle fleets,” Minister Price said. “Training for these next-generation vehicles includes networked, high-fidelity training simulators in new, future-ready training centres.
“This upgrade will modernise the Australian Army’s armoured warfighting capability and their associated training systems.”
Work on the project is expected to finish in late 2022.
The School of Armour at Puckapunyal will receive a new three-story Armoured Vehicle Simulation Centre as part of a $100 million package from the federal government.
Works are expected to begin in March and finish late 2022, and will also extend to the modernisation of facilities around the School of Armour including the driver training facilities and tactical simulators.
or Google: Armoured Fighting Vehicles Facilities Program
———————————————————————————————————————–
6 March 2021
Our Present Tank Capability
An Australian Abrams Main Battle Tank fires during a live-fire activity during Exercise Southern Jackaroo 17 in Mount Bundey Training Area on Saturday, the 27th of May.
Image: Contactairlandandsea
The Blog on 31 January 2021 was entitled ‘Our Future Tank Capability’. A quote from this is copied below:
“The [Active Protection System] APS, however, might be part of the solution. Such systems have been demonstrated to be capable of defeating attack by ATGM and RPGs. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be significantly reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this is feasible: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. If this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary.https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round (Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC.) BUT…what about attack from above? It’s been proposed that low-cost drones could be employed en mass to attack AFVs from above. Will an APS be able to counter this?”.
The APS produced by Rafael, the Trophy, is to be fitted to the US Army Abrams and a number to Germany’s Leopard 2s. Interestingly the Elbit ‘Iron Fist’ has a weight penalty of around 700kg, but it seems that there a lightweight version which is being considered for our CRV and IFV (Land 400 Phase 2 and 3).
But the BIG news …LAND 907 Phase 2 (Heavy Armoured Capability) is due for approval re numbers in Q4 2021. The project states that it is intended to upgrade the current M1A1 capability to M1A2 standard (which might well include APS). What does this mean?
Does it involve a fleet replacement; a vehicle upgrade; or the acquisition of additional M1A2 tanks to make up for the current 30 tank shortfall in fleet numbers (the M1A2s being used to equip the ready brigade, while the M1A1s are used for training)?
Note: The alternative form of words has also been used in media reports, ie. LAND 907 Phase 2 will replace the M1A1 capability with M1A2 tanks.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
5 March 2021
Caring for Those who have Served
An email was recently circulated which poured scorn on the President of the TPI Association for apparently not maintaining a traditional approach to the distinction between operational and non-operational service. I thought about this and propose the following …
Operational and Non-Operational Service from the Perspective of DVA
How should those harmed during military service be compensated? Should they be treated differently because they were on active service, compared to those who were not?
This is not a straight forward matter, ie, soldiers fighting in battle versus those undergoing training … it is more complicated.
To begin, consider the Roll of Honour at the AWM. This lists the names of those who were killed or died while posted to a unit on active service during the period of the war. Many consider that these are all battle casualties, but this is not the case. Someone posted to Vietnam, but killed on R&R in a traffic accident in HK, is eligible. Anyone who died as a result of illness or accident is eligible. Someone who returns home and takes his own life, is also eligible. The overriding criteria for the AWM is not the circumstances, but the prescribed period of the conflict.
So, should someone who is injured as a result of tripping over a tent peg while drunk, be compensated on different grounds, because he was on active service at the time; compared to someone who was injured as a result of a premature grenade explosion during training in Australia?
During the Boer War, a system of categorising casualties was introduced. Prior to this, casualties who were not wounded or killed in action, were not reported. This meant that failings in the medical services to combat disease went unrecognised. We now have Battle Casualties and Non-Battle Casualties; KIA; WIA; Died of Illness; Died of Wounds; etc, etc.
Should there not be a comprehensive categorisation of casualties that DVA can use for assessment, approved by all relevant ESOs … one which goes beyond just Operational or Non-Operational and takes account of all relevant circumstances associated with the nature of the casualty and the cause?
Why is it that the RAAC Corporation website is so ‘sparce’, with so little interactive content, compared to the equivalent organisation of our infantry brothers?
Everyone will answer “size”, ie, there are so many more former members of the RAR to help run its national corporation.
But is this explanation, really valid?
Apart from the vastly different websites and information provided, what are the fundamentals that distinguish the two?
1. The RARC has two Patrons, one a former CDF, the other a former CA. The RAACC either decided not to appoint a patron, or potential patrons decided not to make themselves available.
2. The RARC provides a means for those interested to became ‘digital members’, ie. it places emphasis on its communication with everyone; RAACC, does not.
3. The ‘members’ above become those of the RAR Corporation; irrespective of whether or not they are members of an RAR Association. The RAACC has no such provision.
4. The RARC provides a ‘Get Help’ link; the RACC does not.
5. The RARC advertises for volunteers to fill positions to expand its services; the RAACC does not.
5. The RARC promotes ‘Activities’; the RAACC does not.
There are obviously more differences, however, while the above might be sufficient to start a discussion … it’s unlikely to start an ‘uprising’.
————————————————————————————————————————–
3 March 2021
The Australian War Memorial Part 2
Following on from 1 March 2021 …
My letter was published yesterday. It was one of six related to Dr Wareham’s article objecting to the redevelopment of the AWM. Of course, it was not the redevelopment that was the subject of my letter, but the fact that she was also objecting to the AWM honouring those who have fought on active service, rather than ‘only’ those who have died.
None of the other letter writers referred to the subject I wrote about, they all agreed that the AWM redevelopment should not go ahead. What arguments did they present?
The AWM will become:
A glorification of war;
A Disneyland which glorifies war … [something] which would fill the pockets of the “war monger” imagery;
A memorial to war and militarism:
A celebration of war;
A parade … which amounts to more and more sophisticated machines for killing humans and other living species.
These remarks obviously reflect a particular viewpoint. Where does the rational assessment sit?
The AWM has had a very comprehensive and detailed Heritage Plan for many years; intended to ensure that nothing is done to which might compromise heritage values. I’ve put it to opponents of the redevelopment before … specify exactly how what is planned will compromise the Heritage Plan. There has been no response.
——————————————————————————————————————
2 March 2021
Leadership
Army’s Professional Military Education hub has called for articles related to leadership: The Cove <soldiercove@gmail.com>
My input is copied below, but I’m sure that there will much much better examples on which those going forward should base their outlook.
Understanding Yourself and Others as a Leader.
I’ve read all the prescribed texts on leadership (as well as a few others), but often found that theoretical analyses were ‘dry’ and failed to fully convey the things I wanted to learn. I hope that the following personal anecdotes might provide an alternative thesis. (I apologise for the ‘I’ words, but they’re hard to avoid in a personal account.)
1. Take Responsibility. “Whose work is this?”, the Director said loudly, as he came into the work area from his office,waving the document. I knew what it was … a submission that we’d been putting together for some time. I replied: “If it’s good then it’s the work of my team; if it’s not, then it’s my responsibility”.
There was a pause. “It’s very good”, he said. My team were pleased not only about the response to their work, but the fact that I was prepared to take responsibility on their behalf, if something had gone wrong.
2. Be Prepared to Explain. It was a barrack room inspection at 1st Armoured Regiment’s (then) Kapyong Barracks … usually the troopers just accepted the fact that it was an inspection. A national serviceman, however, decided to ask what the point of it all was.
I explained that he “was being trained to be a member of a tank crew soon to be deployed in action. If he was wounded, someone else would have to take his place. That person would expect to know exactly where to find things such as the ‘tool removing jammed cartridge case’. Instilling order into everyone in terms of layout was important to success in battle”. He understood completely. The explanation was appreciated and from then on, he took a supportive view in terms of the reasoning behind daily routines.
3. Don’t Take the Easy Way Out. Doing sentry on a tank in an ambush on active service requires everyone to follow drills exactly. I read an oral history interview recorded with a tank crewman after Vietnam. He said that he wanted to get to another troop because I was too strict. Any relaxation of standards, however, would have placed everyone at risk. We had to take responsibility for each other and this was appreciated, far and away, by the majority. The tenet of following procedures applied also as far as Rules of Engagement (ROE) were concerned.
We had to positively identify enemy before we engaged. In essence, this meant that they had to be carrying weapons. One night we were in an ambush. Using a first-generation night vision device, the sentry saw four legs … two followed by another two. Upper bodies were obscured. Whoever they were, they were breaking the curfew. There might have been some who would have engaged on this basis.
Breaking the curfew did not mean that they were enemy, however (possibly farmers returning late from their fields). After ‘standing to’, I counted down over the radio and all tanks switched on their searchlights. There was no need to give the order to fire. Illuminated was the biggest buck deer anyone had ever seen. The four legs were explained.
4. Be Honest with Those Below and Those Above. I was selected to be a candidate to be the ADC to the Governor-General. At the formal dinner with the other candidates, I was seated next to the GG. Soon after, I turned to him and said: “Your Excellency, I have a confession to make!”. The whole table went quiet. The GG: “and what’s that?”. I said that I had looked him up in Who’s Who so that I would have something to talk about. “And what did you find out?” he said. ‘That you had written a book entitled the Private Man’, this seems to be a paradox for someone in such a public position.” “Well … let me tell you about that!” (The others at the table went back to talking among themselves.) The GG must have welcomed those who were prepared to speak openly and honestly, as I got the job.
5. Maintain Your Self-Respect. I took leave without pay from the Army for a period and was employed by an insurance company as a District Sales Manager. I didn’t know about the ‘Baby Names’ (nor other things) that were wide-spread throughout the industry. To explain, some of those who worked within the Classified’s sections of newspapers were paid by insurance agencies to provide the names and addresses of the people placing advertisements. This allowed agents to call on those expecting babies or planning weddings and meet them when they were most vulnerable.
I later went before a promotion board and was asked why I came back into the Army. “To keep my self-respect!”, I said (and I got promoted!)
————————————–
The above are but a few of the principles on which future leaders can draw as they go forward. I suggest that everyone must think in terms of the principles that are relevant to them at their stage in their career … not all apply to everyone at all times (but most do).
Postscript: I’ve carefully side-stepped the lessons of poor leadership which I could so easily have included.
————————————————————————————————————————
1 March 2021
The Australian War Memorial
The following quotes were contained in an article in today’s Canberra Times by Dr Sue Wareham, President of the Medical Association for the Prevention of War.
“The AWM’s corporate plan for 2020-24 states that the institution’s purpose is “to commemorate the sacrifice of those Australians who have died in war or on operational service, and those who have served our nation in times of conflict”. The words in italics, to include all those who have fought, appear to have been unilaterally tacked on by the AWM Council, disregarding the significant distinction between dying and not dying. They are a stark departure from the relevant words in the 1980 Australian War Memorial Act, which refers to a national memorial to Australians “who have died on, or as a result of, active service”.
Where once we commemorated family members and others who died in Australia’s wars, we will now honour all those who fight and have fought: past and present, dead or alive, disabled by their service or fighting fit.”
I’ve responded in a letter to the Canberra Times:
“Dr Wareham criticises the AWM (Canberra Times, 27 Feb 21) for honouring not only those who have died fighting for their country, but also those who have returned from active service, quite possibly wounded. How can this be?
Is it not right that we as a Nation commemorate honour ALL those who have fought on our behalf, many of whom carry the scars (physical and mental) of their service. Surely, those prepared to sacrifice themselves on our behalf, deserve no less.
I can only imagine that Dr Wareham has no close associates who have been deployed on active service on her behalf and (thankfully) have returned. If she had, surely, she would want to honour them.”
Dr Wareham went on to say:
We will gaze in awe at the machinery of warfare, the tanks and fighter planes that will occupy most of the additional 24,000 square metres, and pretend that we understand war better for it.
It’s relevant that the AWM has undertaken to place greater emphasis on those who crewed tanks etc, highlighting the challenges that confronted them, than has been the case in the past
——————————————————————————————————-
28 February 2021
The RAAC Family
It shouldn’t just be the Salvos….
Isn’t this great to see:
“Rod Westgarth organized 22 Christmas hampers to be delivered to worthy recipients last December and will back up again this year. Rod Westgarth and David Finlayson organized a large number of gift vouchers that were distributed amongst our membership during the lockdown period. The rebirth of our website thanks to the sterling work of Secretary Peter Axton has been outstanding. It can be viewed at raacavic.weebly.com
One has to imagine that the RAACA (VIC) doesn’t support the motion passed by the RAAC Corporation a couple of years ago to the effect that the Corporation and its member associations didn’t have the resources to provide assistance to individuals in need and would refer any to the RSL. The approach above also differs from that of the 1AR Assn, a C’tee member of which stated to the effect that: ‘We’re only here to have a few beers and swap stories’.
Let’s hope that the RAAC Corporation sees worth in the example of the RAACA (VIC) and takes the lead in introducing a ‘care for those in need’ policy (and resourcing)!
——————————————————————————————-
27 February 2021
The Rule of Law?
“A small number of special forces soldiers who blew the whistle on alleged war crimes at an official inquiry have been issued termination notices against the advice of the military watchdog.”
What happened to the ‘rule of law’? Seems to me that there are massive claims for compensation pending if whistle-blowers and others are sacked without any recourse to the law.
What role does the Australian Defence Association play in this? I recall when it was established that it was to be the representative body which advocated on behalf of service personnel and their interests. It has moved well away from such a role, however.
What role does the Judge Advocate General play? Do its officers represent the interests of soldiers in such circumstances? As far as I can see … they do not. (The JAG Office certainly wasn’t proactive in such a representation when I sought their assistance on behalf of others some years ago.)
What role do unit associations play? When I asked another RAAC association in the past … the response was along the lines of “We’re not interested … only want to have a few beers and swap a few stories”. (Hopefully not all unit associations are like this.)
Is someone is going to stand up for the Rule of Law and ensure that it applies to all concerned (no matter their circumstances). Hopefully so, but who? I feel bad leaving this here.
It’s not publicity. Alan Jones isn’t going to present legal opinion in court. Who then? If I were a whistle-blower and/or one of those alleged to have done ‘something’, who had received a ‘please explain why you shouldn’t be dismissed‘ letter, I would seek ‘Legal Aid’ (because I wouldn’t be able to afford a private lawyer and even if I could, I shouldn’t have to).
You signed up to serve your nation… and what do you get? Maybe there are other avenues?
——————————————————————————————————————
26 February 2021
Feather in the Envelope Part 2
Responses to yesterday’s topic include the following:
I’ve never heard of anything similar; I’m not even sure about the significance or meaning of a cockatoo feather. The closest thing in my experience is the mailing of a white feather during the 2nd world war to indicate the sender thought someone was a coward because they were not overseas fighting the enemy – obviously had no idea of the number of people it took to keep one active duty soldier in the field. Whatever, tell ’em “sod ’em” and carry on with all your good work, mate.
Bruce the coward that sent you the feather will never have the guts to face you man to man ignore the sod.
Not sure about you Bruce but I have always found those who cannot stand and face you to be the most reprehensible of characters.
Leadership is about standards and if those standards are yours so be it. In my military careers I did not always like (subjective word) my superiors but I respected their rank and position. As a young soldier I some time thought the SSM was a pain for making us clean things that in our minds didn’t need cleaning for at least 100 years.
I remember one particular captain of one particular ship I served on for a short time. Never spoke to the crew, officers and sailors unless to give directions or orders and tended to be aloof from all. But there was not a man or women he did not know well. I nearly fell overboard when he asked me to dine with him in his mess deck. A very friendly fellow and was interested in all I was doing. I have to say I was not a member of his crew just attached for the operation.
I suppose you could always look at the feather as “as you put it, put a feather in you cap” for all the things you have done in research and your belief in all things armoured.
Wear it with pride and give the world the finger.
There is always that lunatic fringe of people and no I’ve never received one of those. Definitely report it to the cops. Who knows what a lunatic like that thinks. Either that or someone you trying to wind you up.
[My response to the last: There was no criminal offence involved, so no cause for the police action (unlike the previous incident). If the intent was to ‘wind me up’, then that has failed. It’s only caused me to double down on my resolve in terms of my principles. I wonder who such a gutless bastard might be?]
STOP PRESS!! Google tells me that finding a cockatoo feather means that: Happiness and laughter surround you. Your vision is clear and perfect and you are blessed, protected, loved and guided. Who could ask for more?
—————————————————————————-
25 February 2021
Feather in the Envelope
Is this a first, or has someone else received something similar?
Mail arrived today. One letter (no sender’s address) contained a cockatoo feather (ie, white and yellow). It was postmarked Northgate Mail Centre (north Brisbane) on 15 February 2021 (2319 hrs). I wonder who I might have upset. The Police might be able to get fingerprints or find something on CCTV if asked.
This is the second time I’ve (apparently) been threatened. The first was a DVA oral history interview with a tank crewman who claimed I was too strict (picquets etc). He was going to beat the crap out of me when he got a chance. The police on that occasion were able to locate the person and assure me that he was not a threat (just ‘big talk’).
He had also boasted during the interview that he had pissed on the OC’s ice cream when he was on Mess duty, because the OC made some crewmen wear flak jackets (after a number were wounded) … “he was a little Hitler!“. These remarks were combined with claims that we shot and killed everyone whether enemy or civilian: FINALLY, DVA were convinced to remove the interview from its archive. (It was a long road to get to this point!)
Does anyone else have a feather to wear in their cap?
What Should You Do When You Receive a White Feather?
One of the things that people do whenever they receive a white feather is to thank the angel or deceased loved one. Some people engage in a conversation with the angel messenger or directly with their deceased loved one. [But maybe a cockatoo’s feather is different?]
Following on from yesterday, my response to the Minister is copied below:
Dear Minister [for Veterans’ Affairs],
Many thanks for your letter of 7 February 2021 in response to my enquiry regarding the seniority list for RAAC regiments. As you mention, I had previously contacted Army about this matter. The response that I received was that Australian Military Regulations were rescinded in 2015, but their provisions remain the basis for the order of seniority for units in the Army today, ie “the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves”.
I was advised that when the 2/14 LHR (QMI) reverted from an ARES to an ARA unit, an appropriate change in the order of seniority could have been made. BUT … no-one asked that this be done. Hence my letter to you, asking that the order of seniority of 2/14 LHR (QMI) be amended to agree with current Army requirements.
You replied on 7 February 2021 to say that Army had decided not to make the change, as it would not help in reducing “the historical barriers between full time and part time service. Army’s position is that distinguishing between full-time and part-time units undermines the Australian Defence Force’s Total Workforce System”.
I can understand this policy, however, the following matters now arise.
Is it allowable for individual Corps to have differing arrangements as far as the seniority of their units are concerned? If this is NOT the case, what is the basis of the order of seniority to be … numerical sequence, date of formation, stand-alone regiments before merged regiments, etc? Finally, what is the authority of this to be?
Can you please advise.
Yours sincerely,
———————————————————————————————————————————
23 February 2021
The Seniority of RAAC UnitsPart 4
Following on from 21 February 2021, the comments below are relevant:
Bruce, I do not want you to take offence as you mean well but to most people the seniority list does not mean much. It more important to report on and correct when wrong the deeds and history of the various Australian units. I am glad the 10th Light horse went over the top at the Nek before the 9th Light Horse as my grandfather was in the Following on from … these comments are relevant:9th. Just imagine a crusty old major yelling at the 9th and 10th to get their order of their numerical succession correct as the bullets were wizzing past.
My response:
Hi, You may well be right … the matter might not be of any significance to members of the RAAC at all. Then again, if we can’t get the foundations of our heritage and traditions right … what’s left? There was considerable opposition to emblazoning the Coral Balmoral battle honour on the Standard and 3 Cav Guidon. The Ceremonial Manual wouldn’t allow it, so I was informed by those ‘on high’. Persistence proved the opposite. I think the result is of significance to those involved in the battles. Seems to me that there needs to be a valid reason for decisions by the ‘powers that be’. If this is not to be the case, then it’s all a sham and we’re responsible.
PS. Of course, it could well be argued that there is no need for an order of seniority of RAAC regiments at all. But if there is to be one, surely the order has to be based on valid grounds which are open to all.
The comments below followed:
Hi Bruce, to me the deeds and history of a unit are the foundations of our heritage and traditions and caring people like yourself are needed to balance out life’s hurdles such as the dusty Ceremonial manual non allowance that you struck. Good one for doing what you did and you can have my share of reading the book. I am on the same wave length as you as far as persistence is concerned and if it loses a person some friends and acquaintances, well that is fine.
Bruce, you know what I think, and you should keep doing what you are doing, for two reasons. The first is to make things right, and that will be appreciated by those who follow us. The second is that for those of us who were taught that the standard you are prepared to walk past is the standard you are prepared to accept (RSM Curly Tim’s), you need to pursue the ideals you hold close. More power to you.
Hi Bruce, Our History is more valuable than it ever was and I commend you for your work and ability to make things right. To many drongos out there are trying to scrub our History from the books in every subject to do with our country. The Education system refuses to even teach it to our children. If not for those who have the skills, and abilities to bring it together properly, where would those coming after us find the Truth? As John has said and I couldn’t put it any better. So Mote it Be. Make of it what you will.
———————————————————————————–
22 February 2021
War Crimes Revisited: Part 2
Following on from 19 February 2021 … a comment read as follows:
Hello Bruce Cameron,
Very young Australia has never had the internal conflict of many older nations, apart from the undeniable persecution of the original inhabitants during colonization.
There have historically been recriminations in many older countries of the world after conflicts, which generally fade as reconstruction and development progress.
Russia for example lost 28 million people in WW2 (and still counting), but today has around 300 plus McDonalds outlets, all of the world fashion houses, Irish pubs, etcetera. Younger generations speak better English than Australians, the boys have neat haircuts and the girls are nicely groomed.
Undoubtedly, the surviving older Vietnamese boat people have psychological baggage from the Vietnam War era; but much has since changed in their country of origin.
Vietnamese are very enterprising and their advancement over the past 50 years has been enormous. Have a peep at Google Earth and view the extensive development between Ho Chi Minh City and Vung Tau, including areas once within the 1ATF Tactical Area of Responsibility.
Also; go to ALDI and note the superior quality of packaging for their seafood products. A friend in the building industry comments similarly re their hardware.
Communism is just a system of government that has adapted well to a rapidly changing world, as evidenced by China Russia and Vietnam. But Australia in my view is following the Brits and Americans into decline, fostered by capitalistic greed.
If I were 40 years younger, I would seriously consider emigrating to China or Russia, but perhaps not Vietnam. Although I much like the people and their land, I would feel too guilty about what I did to many.
A response to this was provided by another reader:
I saw Communism in Poland and DDR in mid-80s. There were very good reasons for the Wall coming down. And that’s because essentially Communism imploded from its own lies and contradictions.
Back in Sydney, I found it very difficult to explain the constant, grey awfulness and depression of it all. That was until I met Vietnamese boat people. I write with no sense of self flattery of how a Vietnamese Catholic priest said that I was first to really understand why they’d fled. And I found he understood me.
I’m not surprised they’ve done well because they value freedom. We don’t.
The Russians who profit from Communism’s fall bring their dirty money to places like London and Vienna. They’re not nice people. Putin is a thug.
The Chinese are certainly different. Those coming to U.K. (where I am now) and Africa don’t want to stay and rule. They just want to strip out and go home. They are utterly ruthless in social control and squashing dissent. China has an appalling human rights record. For example, if you think that harvesting prisoners’ organs are the right thing to do, then China could be the place for you.
Seems to me that helping those who did want to be subjected to communist rule by force, was the right thing to do.
——————————————————————————————————
21 February 2021
Seniority of RAAC Units: Part 4
Following on from 29 October 2020 and 5 November 2020 …
I had to write to the Minister to get both the dates on the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1 Armd Regt Standard corrected and the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour emblazoned. It appears that I’ll have to do the same re the seniority listing of RAAC units.
The seniority of RAAC units is currently listed as:
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Cavalry Regiment
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI)
4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment
12th/16th Hunter River Lancers
B Sqn 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment
A Sqn 3rd/9th South Australian Mounted Rifles
A Sqn 10th Light Horse Regiment
I believe this is wrong as 2/14 LHR (QMI) has transitioned from being an ARES unit to an ARA unit.
The importance of this is that ARA units should take precedence before ARES units. The following refers (thanks to Bruce Scott): Australian Military Regulations, Part 3, Para 68 (2) of 2007:
“Units of the Army take precedence as follows:
(a) the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves;
(b) the units have precedence according to the order of their numerical succession;
(c) if units are not included in a numerical succession, the units have precedence according to the order in which the Commands to which they belong are specified in the instrument appointing Commands.”
The Corps RSM states that what is stipulated is “what it is” and the President of the 2/14 LHR (QMI) states he receives advice from those serving.
When I was trying to correct the error re the dates that 1 Armd Regt served in Vietnam on the Standard (I declare a vested interest, my tank troop was the last to serve on operations), it seemed to me that nobody wanted to cause a ‘fuss’, ie. they would not be looked on well if they were to do so (even if the historical facts were without doubt).
Why do we not place importance on historical accuracy? What if the Life Guards’ Queen’s Cavalry Standard showed the wrong dates for Waterloo? There would be outrage, and justly so. (I mentioned this in my submission to the Minister.) But not here in Australia … we don’t want to cause a ‘fuss’.
I’ve received a response from the Minister. Lo and behold there is a reason for the current seniority of RAAC units, ie. that of “reducing the historical barriers between fill and part time units. Army’s position is that distinguishing between full-time and part-time units undermines the ADF’s Total Workforce system, to which the CA is fully committed”.
So AMR 2007 (above) is no longer applicable. I wonder if it has been amended? Maybe, I’ll ask the Minister. More to follow.
———————————————————————————————
20 February 2021
The Tank Capability of the FuturePart 4
A comment re my above article; it is good to see that as well as being the most read article of the week, it has also sparked some discussion …
The triad of ‘lethality, mobility and protection’ is a useful idea for design, comparison and decision. However, what is missing is a deep appreciation that ‘lethality’ is the ‘first amongst equals’; given that the vehicles are there to ‘apply fire against a range of targets’, which might or might not support other systems. The core issue has always been – ‘how do we envisage our plan for the ‘application of fire’ against an adversary’, in a particular terrain, to achieve a particular effect (task-conditions-standard). That is we need to consider what the ‘lethality need’ means to mobility and protection, not the other way round. Since the best protected or mobile systems are nought if they can’t deal with the aerial, terrestrial and human targets they will face. As for engaging in discussions, I believe one of the significant reasons there is limited discussion about the use of our capabilities is because we lack a coherent idea of how we’ll mobilise, deploy and then fight to achieve what are too often unspecified strategic objectives. The result is the notion that the ADF exists to provide options to a militarily illiterate government, guided by egotistical services and groups. The result is the parochial acquisition of systems, not the development of robust ‘kill-action chains’ that can actually ensure the prosperity of our people and the sovereignty of our state.
My reply:
“I guess the critical challenge is that of being capable of disrupting and defeating the enemy’s ‘kill-action chains’. In terms of lethality, I was a little dismissive of directed energy weapons being capable of engaging the full spectrum of targets (as referred to in the 2020 Force Structure Review), but I see that such may well be feasible:
“… the laser weapon, not just the laser, the whole laser weapon, could now start being made small enough, powerful enough, to now be deployed on Army vehicles, Navy ships, and even on aircraft. So, that’s really what changed the game. And as you can see, there’s a lot of activity in this domain from our customers, all the services are now advancing capability in laser weapon systems for land, sea, and air.”
“The profound intelligence problem is that we don’t know our own history.”
I would add ‘because we don’t accept responsibility’.
One might further say that we ‘neither accept nor acknowledge’ responsibility. This has been the case since 1770.
The Government isn’t responsible, because it believed what it was told by the Chief of Defence; he isn’t responsible because he believed what he was told by the Chief of Army; he isn’t responsible because he believed what he was told by the Commander, Australian forces in Afghanistan; he isn’t responsible …
Obviously, there was a failure in training, ie. forces were deployed ill prepared for their operational task. Some will say that such things couldn’t have been foreseen.
Material provided to our school children by DVA states that Australian forces in Vietnam killed enemy who were wounded or otherwise unable to defence themselves. When I asked the Government in 2005, I was informed that these incidents had not been investigated. I then asked the Minister if he could assure the Australian people that appropriate training had been put in place so that such things could never happen again. He said it had.
Seems to me that responsibility is something that’s in the eye of the beholder.
Reading some of the comments below, makes me think of the appreciation expressed by the Vietnamese community in Australia (VCA) for the efforts that Australia made on their behalf. They did not want to live under communist rule and their families still there do not want to so either. The human rights situation is abysmal, but who cares? The VCA are truly grateful for the efforts made on their behalf. As far as the suggestion that we (Australians) shot everyone without regard to the Rules of Engagement (ROE), this is not so. The following personal example explains:
I was a tank troop leader in Vietnam. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that we had to positively identify enemy before we engaged. In essence, this meant that they had to be carrying weapons. One night we were in an ambush. Using a first-generation night vision device, the sentry saw four legs … two followed by another two. Upper bodies were obscured. Whoever they were, they were breaking the curfew. This did not mean they were enemy, however. After ‘standing to’, I counted down over the radio and all tanks switched on their searchlights. There was no need to give the order to fire. Illuminated was the biggest buck deer anyone had ever seen. The four legs were explained.
——————————————————————————————
18 February 2021
Laser Weapons
“So, if you look at that prism, there’s a white light beam that comes into the prism and it breaks up into the colors of the rainbow, you could run that in reverse, you could have a whole bunch of beams that cover the different spectrums, and if you put it through the prism, they all combine and output a single beam. We call it kinda the ‘reverse prism effect.’ So what all of a sudden we were able to do was to scale laser power in a modular way. Instead of just trying to build a bigger and bigger laser, we’re actually scaling by adding lasers up.”
That how Lockheed Martin describe the breakthrough in laser weapons technology. But as seen below, not all are convinced.
“Finally, the strangest proposal in the [2020 Australian Force Structure] plan must surely be for the development of laser guns able to be mounted on vehicles and “defeating” targets up to and including main battle tanks.
This sounds like an odd idea. Recently, no less than the head of Research and Engineering for the US Department of Defense stated he was sceptical that lasers – even ones large enough to be put on a 747 – could shoot down a missile. And rockets, of course, don’t have armour.
If that’s what you can get from a jumbo jet, how is a weapon on a Bushmaster meant to stop a 50-ton fighting vehicle? Of course, Defence may be thinking about much lower‑powered lasers to destroy enemy electro-optical systems, rendering them blind and thus “defeated”.
But perhaps the ADF knows something we don’t? Maybe Dr Evil has been busily at work shifting lasers from shark tanks to actual tanks. We live in interesting times.”
“What that meant was that the system demands, the platform demands were greatly reduced, and it meant that the laser weapon, not just the laser, the whole laser weapon, could now start being made small enough, powerful enough, to now be deployed on Army vehicles, Navy ships, and even on aircraft. So, that’s really what changed the game. And as you can see, there’s a lot of activity in this domain from our customers, all the services are now advancing capability in laser weapon systems for land, sea, and air. Lockheed Martin is a premier provider of this technology in all these domains, and we are working in all these domains.”
“I would like to congratulate you on having the most viewed article for the week of Jan 23-31 for your article titled ‘The Tank Capability of the Future’. As the winner of the article of the week, The Cove would like to send you a ‘Cove Coin’ to commemorate your achievement.”
It’s pleasing that the numbers of readers would suggest an active interest in the subject.
—————————————————————————————————-
17 February 2021
Defence Preparedness 3
Staying with the theme … a further comment is copied below:
“In my opinion (informed only by publicly available information) the risk of military invasion of Australia is minimal. What is to be gained by an invader that is not available to them by their already significant ownership of our agriculture, mineral and hydrocarbon resources, and vast holdings of real estate. Billions of dollars on defence spending is to what end? Against what threat? Strategic risk assessments have a half-life of a few months. The defence budget is necessarily spread thinly across many capabilities which may or may not have worth in defence of the country. Our defence spending should be focused on a serious deterrence capability. By which I mean, a nuclear capability, with delivery by submarine and/or long-range aircraft or missiles. A very simple defence posture: don’t poke the venomous snake. Less costly, more effective. We do not need land forces that can be deployed overseas, naval assets beyond what is required to patrol our sea border and near sea lanes, or ridiculously expensive air-to-air combat jets. We do need better intelligence services, cyber warfare capability and a defence force trained and organised to deal with major disasters.”
It is fair to say that there is a wide variance of views with respect to Defence. I believe that this due in part, to a lack of trust in those who govern us. This is, in turn, being due to a lack of leadership by them.
Defence is obviously an area in which complete openness and transparency is impossible. Without faith in those making the decisions, where do we go?
There is a woeful lack of informed discussion in the public arena. The Lowy Institute and ASPI are viewed as not being completely objective and unfortunately organisations like ADA and USI have a very low profile.
Vested interests undoubtedly lurk in the background. I don’t have the answers. I can only ring the warning bells. Seems to me that this is the same situation which led to Australian forces being deployed to Vietnam and Afghanistan ill prepared (and remained so throughout those conflicts).
——————————————————————————————————–
16 February 2021
Defence Preparedness 2
Another comment on my post on 14 February was (replying to another comment) was: “ … you are 100% spot on. We are under prepared, under manned and under equipped. As you said we would grind to a halt after 28 days. Probably less if our allies say we have got our own problems, you are on your own. Just think for a moment no fuel and no power, it is scary!
We may, just be able to hold off Fiji or NZ if they decided to attack.
As I have written on this site before, I do not believe that any future warfare/invasion will not follow any resemblance of attack as we recall them.
I see two BIG problems.All politicians of all political parties are totally obsessed with what they need to do to be re-elected. They are so keen to have the economy look good that they will sell their souls (including Darwin harbor) to balance the budget. They are also permitting and encouraging all other countries to purchase property across the length and breadth of this country. Once they have sufficient numbers, they will simply say it is ours now.If there is to be a more forceful take over there will be covert measures such as Corona Virus. Bruce where were the Spooks when this intelligence was circulating? It is a sad state of affairs.
My response ….
“If there is to be a more forceful take over there will be covert measures …”.
What are such covert measures likely to involve?
There will be agents here who report infrastructure and strategic target locations and do their part to destroy them; and there will be cyber attacks to disrupt all military command and control communications.
Targets that might be of particular value in being reported would be those related to intelligence gathering/analysing sites that are not commonly known (ie, without signs out in front of their buildings) … of course, the infrastructure targets are those which have the max impact on population functioning (eg, railways; bridges etc).
One has to wonder whether or not biological weapons might also be used in terms of water supplies and the like.
It is obvious that those who safeguard such information, take the view that it is too sensitive to be released and discussed publicly.————————————————————————————————
15 February 2021
Defence Preparedness
Image: ABC News
One of the comments on my post yesterday was:
“A serious question gentlemen. Does anybody really think 90 M1 tanks (along with the rest of the armed forces) would be sufficient to defend Australia if another country actually got antsy and actually attacked?
Airborne and seaborne attacks have occurred in the past and even with the advances in military hardware and personnel there is no way Australia could defend itself (not with our coastline) against an invader without an exponential growth in our armed forces, even then we’d be on a hiding to nothing.
It only needs our sea lanes blockaded and we are stuffed. Our fuel situation for one has us at a disadvantage. Currently 28 days and that’s for everything. Restrict fuel to military use only and how much longer would it last?
Answers? I have none but I’m really interested in what you gentlemen think. Only way I can see is going guerrilla. Hit hard and bugger off, but how long could that last?”.
My response:
“Good questions …The whole matter of Defence preparedness (ie. ADF force structure and size, readiness levels and contingency plans) is linked to Warning and Lead Times. The Warning Time is that which our intelligence services advise we have to alert us before a credible threat becomes an actual one; the Lead Time is that which involves the time to acquire necessary equipment and logistic stocks from countries of origin and train the ADF to the required standard. The latter connects directly with the necessary level of our Defence Self-Reliance. If we have faith in the ability of our intelligence services and those preparing the ADF contingency plans, then everything should be ok. Theoretically, the fact that the RAAC has a significant operational capability gap at present would be seen in the light of there being a very low threat level, leading to a low ADF preparedness state. But … if one has an average intelligence level, this might be questioned.” ———————————————————————–
14 February 2021
$235 million Armoured Fighting Vehicle Facilities Program
Following on from yesterday …
The RAAC have missed the boat with respect to: (i) ensuring that the RAAC ARES have a platform which is suitable to maintain the skills of mobile warfare (though Hawkei might be a game changer, if it’s reliability probs can be fixed); (ii) ‘right sizing’ the Abrams tank fleet to 90; and (iii) preventing an operational capability gap with respect to ACR reconnaissance squadrons.
BUT … leaving operational capability aside, it seems that RAAC training and logistic support systems are to be seriously upgraded. Google:
The parliamentary submission also includes an interesting map showing the geographical location (and numbers) of RAAC AFVs. From it, it will be seen that that an ACR tank squadron comprises 14 tanks (rather than 20 as previously). Is this, three troops of four tanks or four troops of three tanks? Of course, the two SHQ tanks are used as ‘replacements’ for the tank troops.
Unfortunately, what the current fleet number means is continued overuse of the tanks … which will result in the same loss of operational capability as presently exists with the ASLAVs.
——————————————————————————————————————–
13 February 2021
New AFV Simulation Centre.
Image: Defence Connect
A few days ago, the Minister for Defence Industry stated (inter alia) that:
The close combat warfighting capability of the Australian Army has been strengthened by a $31 million Morrison Government investment in the delivery of a new, three-storey Armoured Vehicle Simulation Centre in Townsville.
The facility will support the training of 3rd Brigade soldiers at Lavarack Barracks for the upgraded M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank [LAND 907, below] and incoming LAND 400 and LAND 8160 [below] armoured vehicle capabilities.
Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price today announced St Hilliers had been awarded the head contract to deliver the $31 million package as part of the $235 million Armoured Fighting Vehicle Facilities Program Stage 1 works.
“The LAND 400 Phase 2 Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles and the Phase 3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles will represent a generational leap in the Australian Army’s warfighting capability.
“Together with the upgraded M1 tank and its armoured engineering variants, these vehicles will deliver a world-class close combat capability for Australia.”
LAND 907 Phase 2 – Main Battle Tank Upgrade project – to upgrade the M1A1 Main Battle Tank, the M88A2 Armoured Recovery Vehicle and tank supporting systems.
LAND 8160 Phase 1 -Combat Engineering Vehicles project – to acquire a new armoured engineering capability with assault breaching, armoured bridge launching, armoured engineer and armoured recovery capabilities.
What’s happening? In an earlier Blog I referred to the following:
From 13 Bde Facebook Page (5 Jan 21):2021 is going to be a big year for 13th Brigade. Starting from February, the Brigade will commence its transformation journey.
A multi-year, multi-dimensional evolution, to become the backbone of a standing Joint Task Force made up of a hybrid workforce.
Think new partnerships, new capabilities, and new approaches.
The transformation train is starting its engine, so jump on board, follow our page, and join us on this exciting journey.
I emailed Derek Simpson [Corps RSM] to ask if he can you help explain what the above means and whether or not it will be a model for the ARES as a whole?
This post on the 13 Bde FB would suggest changes are imminent:
“Western Australia’s most storied Military Unit, the 10th Light Horse Regiment, will be re-raised in the second half of 2021 for the first time since 1976. Its DNA has been kept alive inside A Squadron, 10th Light Horse.
Looking to the future, it will epitomise the very best of a hybrid workforce focused on blending traditional Cavalry skillsets with emerging platforms and sensors. Delivering new methods of networked intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability to the Joint Force. Stay tuned for more updates…Commander 13th Brigade, Brigadier Brett Chaloner.”
As you may have already picked up, 2021 is all about transformation.
Transforming 13th Brigade from a reserve Brigade into a hybrid, joint, contemporary agile force.
At a Town Hall meeting in December, Commander 13th Brigade, Brigadier Brett Chaloner, issued a challenge to all members.
To have an evolving mindset, to contribute to a competition of ideas, and to explore ways to harness Western Australia’s potential.
Are you ready for 2021?
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
11 February 2021
RAAC ARES: Making us Proud: Part 2
Further quotes from the report (see yesterday) are provided below:
Late in February near the end of the fires we were able to cut away three of our LT’s to attend their last module of the ROBC at the School of Armour. All did very well on the ROBC and have made excellent additions to A Sqn.
We had only restabilised our unit and completed all of the backlog of administration when the first COVID-19 lockdown occurred. As a unit we were quite well prepared for remote parading. The 2018 reduction in Tuesday night parading, and the later use of remote on-line parading tools, had almost by chance prepared us for COVID-19. Our TP Leaders and Sqn Commanders have continued to develop online training mechanisms through the year. They have had guest speakers from the likes of the RSM Ceremonial and the Shrine speak to them via VTC. They have participated in Military Education presentations as well as using the new software developed by the Army to conduct tactical TEWT like activities. The Regiment’s ability to adapt to this environment is testament to their training and conditioning.
The Regt deployed approximately 15 people as part of the border protection operation in the North of Australia. They were a fantastic team who did a really good job.
Many of our people have been involved in OP COVID Assist …
I don’t think it’s mentioned, but the Assn has stated that the CO & RSM are taking the 4LH Guidon to Beersheba this year.
Seems to me to be a unit doing well!
———————————————————————————
10 February 2021
RAAC ARES: Making us Proud
Image: bpcmilitaria
The quotes below are from the 4/19 PWLH Assn report to the 2020 RAAC Corporation meeting …
“2020 arrived in a ball of fire and Operation Bushfire Assist started for the Regiment on New Year’s Eve. Within a day we were preparing the first PMV section of five vehicles to deploy to Gippsland (AO Coastal). Our first team was typical of those early days of the fires. They were a very obvious presence; they were a welcome boost to morale to regional communities and did all they could to help. They were a real credit to us all. An early task for that section was the transporting Metropolitan Fire staff through very difficult terrain to conduct damage assessments that would inform the majority of the planning for the state from that time on. That first section was soon relieved by a second section who continued to make sure that the entire capability offered by the PMV was understood by both civilian agencies and some of our military planners. The effectiveness of the PMV and the crews who manned them was a key capability in the burnt-out terrain. The first vehicles to reach Mallacoota were PMVs.
The Regiment also sent sections up North into AO Alpine, they got a far North as the Murray River and as far East as Omeo. The destruction in AO North was often overshadowed in the media by Gippsland, the devastation up North was also complete in its obliteration. Our people continued to provide protected lift right through to the end of February. They experienced destruction and grief in their own country but often reported that they felt proud to be of service in their own country. Those that did not serve in the fire zones contributed in the JTF HQ ensuring that vital operational and logistic planning was conducted. Others served in the State Control Centre working with the multiple agencies supporting the overall State effort. The CO stated it was impossible not to feel proud of their efforts, the entire Regiment turned out and those that did not serve in uniform were already busy serving in their civilian roles.
One event worth mentioning is the support offered by some of our PMV crew during the search and rescue operation for a four-year-old child. The section provided vital mobility in rugged terrain, CPL Sharma reported that he was proud to be involved in such an important search effort at Waterholes, a locality 240km from Melbourne. After an extensive search operation consisting of more than 200 police and emergency service his team played a key role in finding and reuniting the toddler with his parents after spending a night lost and alone in the burnt-out terrain.”
More to follow tomorrow ….
—————————————————————————————-
9 February 2021
Helping Others
The following letter has been sent to the Canberra Times. It’s not an Armouredadvocates matter per se, however, I think it an important one. I wonder what responses I’ll get.
“Dear Editor,
Recently I was in a Canberra shopping area. I had just taken out some money from an ATM and when I turned around, I noticed a middle-aged lady on the ground in distress. I got her up and helped her to a nearby seat. She told me that she had had a fall and that she would be all right.
At this time, I noticed that there were people seating just a couple of meters away. They must’ve seen or heard the actual fall. Somewhat bemused, I called into a nearby Chemist shop. I explained what happened in the hope that one of their staff might check on the lady and call a doctor if thought prudent. If I’d been hoping for assistance for a person in distress, I was wrong. It turned out that there was a doctor’s surgery not far away and I should go there to inform them of my concerns.
I report the above in the full knowledge of letters to the Canberra Times which have praised Canberrans for helping others. Why is it that there would appear to be stark exceptions to this aspect of human kindness?
Discussion related to the above event on another forum included the following:
“Let me tell you about the Gedong presentation in Brisbane with the Duke of Edinburgh. As you blokes all know we were presented with cards as to where we were to be corralled. Gold cards to white all different colours. My self and a couple of my veteran cobbers decided to go to the gold area. An RAAC Capt, whom when I was a soldier was a Sgt, informed us we could not enter and get back to where we belonged.. It got very heated I said to the Capt this will do your career no good having a brawl in front of the Duke of Edinburgh. The next thing Roger Kershaw marches up he was now a colonel and he says Capt let these men in. Maybe it helped I was Lt Kershaws Saladin Driver in 1 and 2 Cav.”
My response:
For a supposedly egalitarian society, we’re hugely class conscious. Take military awards, for example. Gallantry and distinguished service are exactly that. Recognition should not differ on the basis of whether not you’re an officer. This is now changing. But the distinction remains in other areas. Miniature Army Combat Badges are only provided to those of SNCO rank or higher. (Lower classes are not thought to have a need for formal evening wear.) We were able to overturn the policy of not presenting ACBs to the NOK of those KIA, but the class divide still exists as far as miniatures are concerned.
The Overlord Commemoration was the idea of the CO 3RAR from the time. Battalion and tank squadron personnel have been working on our associated reunions for years. RAAC representative organisations were not prepared to assist as the Commemoration was only a proposed one and they ‘did not want to raise members’ expectations’. (DVA could not confirm it until their funding for the FY involved was approved.) By investing time in contacting everyone early, it is possible to overcome “the difficulties and challenges [that] arise in obtaining firm numbers, particularly so far out from the major activity” [comment by Chairman, RAAC Corporation].
As a result, in 2019 we were able to make a booking for a dinner for 60 and secure discounted accommodation. Presently we have 64 attendees who have paid and another 20 whose payments are awaited. Because rooms sold so quickly, a second discount arrangement has had to be negotiated. Advance planning has also meant that we’ve been able to source photos/film etc and the AV presentation will be a real feature of the evening. Collaboration and input on the part of all has paid real dividends. I think that there is a lesson here for representative organisations and those involved in future commemorations (the next being that for the Battle of Nui Le later this year and then that for the end of the Vietnam War).
PS. Our last decision was to agree the menu, taking account of all dietary restrictions.
——————————————————————————————————————-
7 February 2021
Where Does Responsibility Lie?
I have written on this before. The following article has just been published …
“… when they are themselves symptomatic of a more serious and more dangerous systemic failure”.I agree entirely!
When writing a unit history related to Vietnam, I discovered that material provided by DVA to Australian schools stated (and still does) that Australian soldiers shot enemy wounded and those who were unable to defend themselves. I asked if these matters had been investigated. The answer was no. I asked the Minister at the time, if he could give an assurance to the Australian public that such things could never happen again. He did. A submission has been made to the Inquiry; happy to provide a copy to the Australia Institute.
Another comment caught my eye:
“Mr Behm: thank you, that is pretty convincing. in major transport system accidents (rail, air, ships) there is a similar issue – temptation, particularly in house or in industry to blame the driver/pilot / mechanic. in such transport there is (should be) a very clear chain of command. when things go wrong, proper investigations often – usually – ask ‘how was the driver put in that position’ i.e. training, state of mind, managerial oversight. if nobody noticed the bad apples in the barrel, there needs to be better ways of looking at apples, and that involves some sheeting of responsibility to those who were supposed to look. Regards”.
My response? Well said!
—————————————————————————————————————————————
6 February 2021
The Tank Capability of the FuturePart 3
The introduction to my article in The Cove referred to following quote:
“For just over a century, the tank has been the key symbol of land power. Today, tanks no longer enjoy the same level of battlefield supremacy that they used to. So, what’s next? Do they still have a role to play? If so, how do they need to evolve and what will the next generation look like in terms of features and capabilities?”. Nicholas Drummond, https://uklandpower.com/2020/04/05/where-does-the-tank-go-from-here/
Greg Chalik commented that:
“Nicholas Drummond and the Australian Army share something, a tactical mindset. However, the Australian Government knows the Australian Army is a strategic military service, and expect the operational delivery of strategic options when needed. The ‘tank’ is merely a small part of the tactical solution-set to the above, but by the virtue of the size and weight, creates operational reach constraints to the tactical mission aim success. The systems engineering design challenge is therefore very different to the ‘tank’ designers in Australia as opposed to most other countries. Nicholas Drummond fails to address this challenge.”
My response was as below:
“Thanks for your input, Greg.
Operational reach constraints imposed by size and weight, equates to the need for a capability that is readily deployable over long distances. I agree.
The tank is merely a small part of the tactical solution-set, equates to a need to structure future operational forces in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a deployable ‘all arms’ context. I agree.
As you point out … the Australian Army’s operational requirements are driven by different priorities to other countries. In this respect, developments of things like the APS might benefit Australia to a greater degree than other countries.”
There is a time lag re comments about Cove articles, nevertheless, I worry about the seeming lack of interest by those in this space today. In 1973, as a 24yo at the Royal Armoured Corps Centre at Bovington. I was tasked with leading a team to design a tank for use outside NW Europe. The task taught those involved so much about the tings that are important in AFVs.
I wonder if such critical thinking has a place today?
———————————————————————————————————————————-
5 February 2021.
(What happened to 4 February? … technology! Telstra were very helpful, but some things just do one’s mind in!)
The 1AR Assn Going Forward: Part 2.
Following on from yesterday …
The 1AR Assn President stated at the last AGM that:
“On a personal note, I do wish to address the continued attacks being made against the 1st Armoured Regiment Association and specifically some committee members. For all members, I as the President am disheartened and disgusted that people will continue to deride and accuse the committee of improprieties whilst knowing there is no ability to respond or challenge the allegation. The committee will continue to serve the members best interests, but will not react to bullying and inuendo”.
This is a worrying matter. What is the C’tee being accused of?
This brings to mind the situation of the 1AR Assn’s ‘dark period’. During this time, the C’tee were responsible for matters which were contrary to the regulatory requirements for an incorporated association. Members were misled in this respect. It was only when these things were brought into the open, that changes were made.
Is the same thing happening again? Surely if the C’tee is accused of an impropriety, then it has every right to respond openly. How can it be said that the C’tee has ‘no ability to respond or challenge the allegation’?
As the saying goes: “sunlight is the best disinfectant”. It is the worst possible thing to do, to sweep such allegations under the carpet. Address them head on. Then everyone knows that they are baseless; not to do so, results in doubt lingering.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
3 February 2021
The 1AR Assn Going Forward
Many of the shortcomings which have been highlighted previously, have been remedied; for example, financial management has been put on a sound footing and financial reports are prepared in accord with regulatory requirements; a Constitution has also properly developed and put in place in accord with these requirements (and has made available for members to view), minutes of C’tee meetings are now provided to members; AGMs are conducted in accord with regulatory requirements; and criteria for the Honour Roll has been investigated. Congratulations to the C’tee for these and other matters!
However, the Association doesn’t serve former members of the 1st Armoured Regiment per se; it only exists to serve those who are members of the Assn.
Many will say that this is self-evident, as proven by: “Certificates of Acknowledgement of their participation in Coral/Balmoral were sent to 34 Association members in late May/early June prior to the 52nd anniversary of those battles”. These certificates weren’t sent to other members of 1 Armd Regt who fought in the battles of Coral-Balmoral. This follows from the fact that the purposes of the Association apply only to members. https://www.paratus.org.au/constitution.
I thought that this ‘focus’ was changing; e,g. ‘Vale’ notices are now being posted on the 1AR Assn website for all members of 1 Armd Regt who have died, not just 1AR Assn members. This is as it should be; but shouldn’t acknowledgement also be given to ALL those who served with distinction (whether or not they are Assn members)? If it was, such action might well encourage greater membership.
Complete openness and transparency were also called for … more tomorrow.
The Russian military is testing its first batch of “Terminator” tank support fighting vehicles.
Built on the chassis of Russia’s T-72 tank, the heavily armored Ramka-99 BMPT-72 tank support combat vehicle — colloquially known as the “Terminator” — is equipped with a lethal suite of weapons capable of destroying tanks, armored fighting vehicles, infantry, helicopters, and some aircraft. It’s also designed to protect its five-man crew from radiation after a nuclear blast.
A video posted by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on both Facebook and Twitter on Monday shows several Terminators in a live-fire exercise alongside tanks from the 90th Tank Division in the Chelyabinsk region of the Urals. Under overcast skies, the armored formation advances across a snowy field while intermittently firing various weapons. Infantry are seen moving on foot behind the line of armor.
In my article on the ‘The Tank of the Future’, I referred to the “the need to structure future operational groupings in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a readily deployable ‘all arms’ context”. “One argument is that a new grouping of complementary force capabilities is needed to capitalise on future capabilities, rather than relying on traditional organisational structures.”
It looks like Russia’s development of a Tank Support Vehicle is well along this path.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
1 February 2021
The Tank Capability of the Future Part 2
Following on from yesterday…
The article was published on 27 Jan 21. One would’ve hoped that any comments would have been published by now. Quite disappointing really. On the other-hand … I posted the article to the RAAC Facebook page and encouraged quite a few comments. Some of which are copied below.
John Cottis: G’day Bruce, can we say that the T-14 is [shown above] evidence that moving the crew into the hull resulted in weight and size savings? The T-14 is larger in every dimension in any comparison I’ve seen. It’s guaranteed to be heavier by around 10000kg than an earlier T-Series.
Bruce Cameron: Hi John, I’ve seen estimates of Armata ranging from 48 to 55 tonnes (maybe some confusion between tons and tonnes). Given that Leopard 2 and M1A1 Abrams are about 62 tonnes … the question is, how much extra protection has been able to be achieved by placing the crew in a cocoon below the gun (rather than protecting them in their own turret)? The point is … if you maintain traditional concepts, there is no way protection could be increased and weight reduced without APS (which the T-14 has).
Leonardus Ben Groenendijk: Some valid points. Restraints in size have always been based on rail movement, size of tunnels and bridging ability. In regard to attack from above that has been a problem from WW2. The Germans added additional spaced armour on top of the turrets and engine compartments. Along with mobile AA guns mounted on full and half tracked vehicles … something which Australia has never done even though the Gepard was available during the Leopard era. As for weight in armour protection it is a matter of inventing new forms of armour. Australia during WW2 invented a new armour for the Sentinel series of vehicles so why not now? Like everything it about money and sometimes not having a jungle fighter (infantry) mentality. Something akin to turning the Bushmaster into a tank/gun truck even though it was intended to transport troops in a/c comfort a 1000km up to the FEBA. At some point we are going to be on our own (again) so invent it and build it in Australia. And yes, I am an inventor and manufacturer so I have put my money where my mouth is…
Bruce Cameron: Hi Leonardus, re your suggestion “As for weight in armour protection it is a matter of inventing new forms of armour” … the alternative is to invent new forms of protection, this is where the APS comes in. You may consider commenting on the post in ‘The Cove’, this will attract the attention of those who manage such things for the future.
Bruce Cameron: Thanks to you guys above for the comments above … interestingly there have been no responses from “The Home of the Australian Profession of Arms”. I wonder what this says about the state of affairs?
Shane Danau: See you all miss the main problem facing the army and that is we cannot deploy tracked AFV in number to most part off the country in time to be of any use. And if we did get them there. we do not have the resources to keep them in the field. So, do we need to look at a wheeled vehicle that can self-deploy or do we per deploy vehicle in most part off the country. Like we need some over here in the west. To deploy a track force to the N/W from the east coast would take a month or longer and them how to we seaport them
Russell Bird: We need to build 100s of thousands of drones with explosives. Deploy them all over the country. If Australia is invaded conventional weapons will be useless. We all know it.
“Armor has always been a determining factor since WWI. Drones and tech can only take the battle so far and in the end, it is the rifleman, his weapon, will to win, and a damn big tank to back him up, that always gets the job done. Semper Fidelis.”
“For just over a century, the tank has been the key symbol of land power. Today, tanks no longer enjoy the same level of battlefield supremacy that they used to. So, what’s next? Do they still have a role to play? If so, how do they need to evolve and what will the next generation look like in terms of features and capabilities?”. Nicholas Drummond, https://uklandpower.com/2020/04/05/where-does-the-tank-go-from-here/
The ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan’ stated that: “Defence will develop options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life. This new system will integrate with reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles to ensure the land force retains a decisive land combat capability into the future.” (https://www.defence.gov.au/strategicupdate-2020/)
The fact that Defence has committed to developing options to replace the Abrams, indicates that the tank capability is recognised in terms of its importance for the ADF (and its contingency plans). This is exactly the foresight that’s to be expected of our Defence staff. The US is examining the same circumstances (and has been for many years). The Abrams tank is adequate today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams tank capability look like?
The answer has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank capability, as part of a combined arms force underpinning land operations. The fact that the next ‘tank’ may not be anything like the Abrams, is without dispute.
What does such a direct fire capability need to provide? The answer is, as it has ‘always’ been: lethality, survivability, and mobility, under all extremes of climate and terrain. This is self-evident. What is unknown is the way in which advances in technology will influence the solution. There are developments in mobility such as hovercraft and hydrogen fuel cells, however, this is not the breakthrough science.
Direct fire support can be provided by a manned vehicle, a robotic vehicle, or an optionally manned vehicle. The US Army is considering the last concept. One imagines that this is because it is too soon to bank everything on robotics alone.
Many arguments have been advanced that, whether crewed or optionally crewed, the weight of a direct fire support capability has to be reduced to enable it to be deployable in all contingencies. This is especially so in terms of ADF planning. How can this be achieved, while maintaining requisite protection levels?
Volume under armour is the biggest impost on the weight of an AFV. Reducing the size of the crew by incorporating an autoloader was the answer at one time, but the lethality of anti-armour weapons is now so advanced, that this is no longer enough. The current Russian T-14 Armata MBT is one solution. The crew is within a ‘cocoon’ in the hull of vehicle, below the external gun and autoloader. Considerable weight is saved without having to protect crew members in their own turret.
As well as the provision of an Active Protection System (APS) for certain vehicles, the Strategic Update (above) also made reference to: “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks.”
Such a weapon is suggestive of a laser, but is unlikely in terms of defeating AFVs in the foreseeable future. Another possibility is a ‘rail gun’. Neither of these technological breakthroughs, however, will resolve the main challenge facing the replacement tank capability.
The APS, however, might be part of the solution. Such systems have been demonstrated to be capable of defeating attack by ATGM and RPGs. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be significantly reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this is feasible: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. If this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary.https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round (Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC.) BUT…what about attack from above? It’s been proposed that low-cost drones could be employed en mass to attack AFVs from above. Will an APS be able to counter this?
If protection is able to be increased and weight reduced … will this be sufficient for a direct fire capability to be deployed on the future battlefield? It has been suggested that a new grouping of complementary force capabilities will be needed in the future, i.e. traditional organisational structures will no longer be adequate.
Conclusion
The challenge is how to provide a future direct fire support capability which is lethal, survivable, and mobile. There are numerous options as far as mobility/engine power are concerned, as there are in terms of firepower. The crux of the design challenge is to decrease weight, while increasing protection against both ground and air attack. The role of APS (especially against `top attack) is crucial; as is the need to structure future operational groupings in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a readily deployable ‘all arms’ context.
RAAC support for bushfires and COVID 19; the Army Skill at Arms Meeting; training being conducted remotely by SoA; the 50th Commemoration of Operation Hammersley; the driver training being conducted by 2/14 LHR (QMI) on Boxer; the upgrade to the Abrams; the possibility that the RAAC ARES might be involved in operating new surveillance equipment; the new Service Category (SERCAT) groupings; and work being done on sustaining the force structure into the future.
What didn’t he mention:
1. The pressing need to right size the Abrams tank fleet (ie. acquire at least 30 more tanks);
2. The role of the RAAC ARES and the platform (if any) it might be equipped with;
3. Army’s operational capability gap brought about by the serviceability problems with the ASLAV and wait for the Boxer; and
4. The coming 50th Commemoration of Operation Overlord.
I’ve asked if he had any comment re these points. (I wonder if he was asked any questions about these matters at the AGM?)
PS. He also raised the question: Do we need to maintain separate tank and cavalry crewmen’s ECNs?
——————————————————————————————————————————-
29 January 2021
Role of the RAAC ARES
Image: Dutch Army
I’ve thought that there was complete apathy as far as the RAAC ARES was concerned. The following posts from the Black Beret Facebook page shows that this isn’t completely true:
Garry Wait: Sadly I suspect you are correct about the condition of the LAV’s but that hasn’t stopped giving Reserve units dated equipment previously. For better or worse Canadian reserve units had the 6 wheeled AVGP, Grizzly’s for the mech inf and Cougar’s (scorpion turret) for the “Lt Armoured” and later the 8 wheeled Bison which enabled them to at least to train in the matching rolls of their Regular equivalents with the advantge of not having hand me down vehicles.
In a similar vein bushmaster should have been slated as the Analog APC for all relative units especially after the debacle of the parent troop carriers. In the same way a wheeled AFV (successor to the Saladin?) would have been more appropriate for RAAC reserve units. Imagine being able to drive out the gate in a relevant wheeled vehicle do a route recce or 2hr road run to Pucka spend the weekend training then run home at the end. Not so easy in tracked vehicles
Matthew FrenchAnd what is their role now? I know do you? That’s the point you’ve missed, reserve units have to provide a certain capability now that is very different to what it might have been back in the 70’s and 80’s. Just because what it used to be, doesn’t mean is what it should have been, or what it can be…….
Terence O’Dowd: Tony [Geyer], I am pleased that someone else sees the solution, even it is one we were forced into using years ago. The Reserve Recon Regiments were indeed able to perform their tasks even with L/R, this was proven time and time again. The role was recon and that was not dependent on what veh you should have but what was on hand. Training could effectively be carried out from troop, squadron and Regimental level and a base for further detailed training was maintained.
Paratus Derek : Follow 13 Brigade as that brigade transitions. 9 Brigade will also go through some significant change over the coming years.
From 13 Bde Facebook Page (5 Jan 21): 2021 is going to be a big year for 13th Brigade. Starting from February, the Brigade will commence its transformation journey.
A multi-year, multi-dimensional evolution, to become the backbone of a standing Joint Task Force made up of a hybrid workforce.
Think new partnerships, new capabilities, and new approaches.
The transformation train is starting its engine, so jump on board, follow our page, and join us on this exciting journey.
I have emailed Derek Simpson to ask if he can you help explain what the above means and whether of not it will be a model for the ARES as a whole?
Summary: There is concern about the ARES ability to maintain complex vehicle platforms, especially if they’re outdated; there is also confusion as to the role for the ARES. Recon is one such role and there is a number of suitable platforms, but the provision of armoured mobility (using the PMV) is another valid role.
—————————————————————————————————————————————
28 January 2012
The Distinguished Conduct Medal Part 2.
Image: militaria.co
Everyone is entitled to their opinion and the right to express them. Interestingly, when I posted yesterday’s blog on the RAAC Facebook page, there were 56 ‘likes’ and 26 comments. Of those who commented there were three who thought that my post was inappropriate. See below.
(i) David PatersonAt a time of personal loss, not sure this sort of pedantic administrative focused post isn’t tone deaf? Thank you John Carter for your service, sympathy to your family for their loss.
Bruce Cameron Simply wanting to ensure that John Carter is recognised appropriately by our Nation. If you think that it’s a pedantic administrative matter, then I apologise.
David Paterson: Bruce, on RAAC pages that you don’t see, John Carter has been wonderfully remembered as a soldier, mentor and friend by those who he trained and those he served with. The order of awards didn’t seem as important to them as the quality of their relationships. This is not about order but the respect and honor for another who was loved.
Bruce Cameron: On Facebook pages that I see, John Carter has been wonderfully remembered as a soldier, mentor and friend by those who he trained and those he served with. My purpose was to highlight the bravery demonstrated by him (that might not be appreciated by all who knew him). It was not to do with the order of awards, per se.
Peter Purcell: Re the above: To be honest I found this very interesting. Pedantry appears to have been directed towards you Bruce
Bruce Cameron: Everyone has their own perception/motivation, I just wanted to highlight the bravery demonstrated by John Carter (that might not be appreciated by all)
(ii) Jays Short: Why does it matter? Are we really arguing over what is better, an instance of heroic galantry or a lifetime commitment to treating sick kids or furthering legal reform. Can’t we just recognise it all without having a pissing contest over which contribution matters more just because of the position of letters on a list?
Bruce Cameron: I don’t know about you … I’m just putting forward a case that Australians should understand what the criteria for the awards are, ie. whether it be for helping sick kids or displaying exceptional gallantry in action.
(iii) Simon Mason: Why bring this up? Well apart from the whole ‘ look at me I know more than you’.
Not worth the time responding!! But someone else did.
Anthony R Williams: Because some adults can have a discussion without being tools.
—————————————————————————————————————
27 January 2021
Distinguished Conduct Medal
Sadly, John Carter, OAM, DCM passed away just recently. The 1AR Assn referred to him as John Carter, DCM, OAM. This might be thought to be correct, but it’s not.
The DCM was introduced in 1854 by Queen Victoria for extraordinary gallantry in action by other ranks. It was second only to the VC in this respect. The equivalent award for officers was the DSO for Gallantry (for which Major Harry Smith was recommended for Long Tan.)
The Australian Honours System was introduced in 1975. In terms of its order of precedence, the DCM ranks below the Medal of the Order of Australia (OAM) and the Public Service Medal (PSM). Supposedly for us, therefore, gallantry isn’t rated all that important in the scheme of things.
Of course, if you were an officer and were awarded the second level award for gallantry, you’d be way higher in our order of precedence. Is it right that gallantry is assessed on the basis of what rank you held? Of course not, and this has been rectified in the revised British award scheme. All ranks in the British Army are now eligible, for example, to be awarded the MC (and awards can now be made posthumously, whereas previously only the VC and mid could be so awarded).
In the British order of precedence, the DCM is way higher than the MC. This is only right as the DCM was the second level of award and the MC was the third (after the VC and DSO). Whereas in our system, the opposite is the case; the MC has precedence over the DCM (the officer thing again).
Seems to me that the Brits have got it right in terms of recognising what constitutes acts of gallantry … whereas we allocate more importance to administrative efficiency in the public service. How did this come about, and more importantly, how can it be fixed?
John Carter’s award needs to be seen in the context of the Imperial awards at the time it was made; ie, second only to the VC in terms of “DECORATIONS, MEDALS FOR GALLANTRY AND DISTINGUISHED CONDUCT”.
PS. It’s been suggested that all Imperial awards are rated less that Australian awards as they are ‘foreign’, but this doesn’t hold true, as the MC is given higher precedence than the MG.
———————————————————————————————————————————
27 January 2021
RAAC Matters
A Google search for RAAC ARES brought up an article that I wrote for Contact magazine in 2018. I thought it worthy of copying below, as the ‘issues’ still exist. Two of the comments made are copied at the end.
Armour in the Australian Army: Is There Something Wrong? Part 3
How does a mechanised infantry battalion work?
Let’s start with a single IFV … three crew (driver, gunner and commander), plus eight dismounts. So this is an infantry section, three IFVs plus the platoon HQ IFV. It is assumed that the section commander is also the IFV commander, as is the platoon commander.
The concept of the IFV is that it is able to accompany Abrams tanks onto an enemy objective. What happens at this point? The tanks pursue the retreating enemy or defend against a counter-attack; the IFVs dismount their troops to secure the position.
Does the IFV commander dismount to command his section? If he does, presumably there is a spare IFV/section commander among the dismounts. If the section commander/IFV commander needs to remain in the IFV to control supporting fire, presumably the spare commander dismounts to command the infantry section on the ground.
One would imagine that a mechanised battalion has its own career progression, separate to a non-mechanised battalion, i.e. you start off as a dismount, promoted to dismount section commander, then become an IFV driver, gunner, crew commander; then platoon sergeant etc etc.
But wouldn’t it be much more effective, if the inf sections dismounted and came under command of their platoon commander …basic infantry tactics then occurred, with fire support from the AFVs being provided by AFV crews, i.e. RAAC personnel.
How do you integrate basic RAAC tank* skills, D&S, gunnery crew commanding etc, with infantry fieldcraft, to make them a single employment code? If this is not possible and it’s necessary to have two separate employment codes … why not have ECN Infantry and ECN Armour; allowing the two arms to specialise in and develop their respective strengths?
Is it possible that we are to see another failure in terms of planning, similar to that which allowed the RAAC ARES to be relegated to a dismounted role (as the new AFVs are too complex for them to operate)? How incredible is the thinking here? Turn ARA infantry into RAAC personnel and ARES RAAC personnel into infantry. Why not allocate relatively easy to operate vehicles such as HAWKEI to the RAAC ARES to enable them to develop reconnaissance skills and allow them to integrate with ARA cavalry squadrons (not only as ‘dismounts’).
*P.S. The IFV in the British Army is referred to as a ‘medium tank’.
Comments::
(i) “Some ARES Cav units ( i.e. 4/19 PWLH) currently operate the Bushmaster PMV already so your concept of giving them simpler vehicles such as the Hawkei is already occurring.
The mechanised battalion structure had the section 2IC or a PTE soldier commanding the section vehicle and a Mech CPL commanding the PL COMDs platform. Once a platoon is in the assault, the section and platoon commanders dismount to control the fight. The vehicles are coordinated by the Mech CPL under direction of the PL commander.
Career progression included normal infantry progression but members could specialise as driver/commander the same as you could specialise as a sniper, mortar number or reconnaissance patrolman. A mechanised specialist will still need to maintain rifleman skills so that they can transition as required by unit manning.
Armoured corps operates differently to infantry and integration in an infantry battalion has its challenges including command structures when mounted or dismounted. By maintaining infantry crew members, it negates those integration difficulties and command structures are clearly defined. Additionally, having 343 qualified crew aligns thought processes so they keep their “dismounted hat” on while operating vehicles. They know from experience what is happening on the ground from experience.
(ii) “Bruce Cameron makes a very relevant comment – but I think we are all missing the point of what the Army’s planners are trying to achieve – without stating it – they want Mechanized Infantry units with wheeled armoured vehicles operated by Infantry personnel, and the Armoured Cavalry Regiments with tracked armoured vehicles operated by RAAC personnel – not much has changed in that regard. Infantry will retain their Skills based ECN and Armour will retain their Skills based ECN. Bruce’s point about ARES Armoured units being issued with Hawkei – a very sensible suggestion – makes you wonder why it came from someone based in Canberra actually….”.
Note: I find the suggestion above interesting … ie. the pl comd dismounts to control the ground attack, while simultaneously controlling the direct fire support from the IFVs. Surely, these are two very different tasks, requiring the complete attention of whoever is responsible for either.
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
RAAC ARES: Something’s Going On (or is About to)!
Image: Army Technology
The following report is included on the RAAC NSW website. It relates to an address at the 2020 Cambrai dinner (https://raacansw.org.au/News.php):
“Those who gathered appreciated a briefing by Major General Krause [former member of the Corporation advisory board] on the Corps’ future. The possibility of 10LH regaining Regimental status and that the Hawkeye will be both a Regular and Reserve RAAC platform were welcome pieces of intelligence.”
The reference to 10LH is reflected in the unit’s presentation to the RAAC Corporation AGM. This is great news, but the reference to Hawkei being provided to the RAAC ARES is something even bigger; something that has long been awaited.
This has meant that the Armouredadvocates goal that: “All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare”, has been moved to ‘Pending’
The above site provides access to the reports of all RAAC units, as well as a video update by the Corps RSM.
—————————————————————————————————————————————
24 January 2021
Where does Responsibility Lie?’ Part 2
An earlier post ‘Where does Responsibility Lie?’ addressed failings in Government in relation to effectively training the ADF for the operations it was to be deployed on. The email below has been received from DVA; my response follows:
“Dear DVA,
Thank you for your response. Interestingly, I see the AFP mentioned below … when I rang them to report the alleged murder of an enemy soldier in Vietnam, they said “It’s nothing to do with us”. When I rang the Defence whistle-blower number, they said it’s a Department of Defence matter. When I contacted Defence, they said it’s a DVA matter.
Anyway, I see changes have been made. Whereas previously DVA’s educational material to Year 10 students stated that Australian soldiers in Vietnam were guilty of “killing the badly wounded, shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”; now the material adds that “these are isolated and not typical incidents”. What difference should this make? Should not EVERY murder be investigated and measures introduced into ADF training to stop such a thing happening again?
How does DVA know about the allegations above? No investigation was ever conducted (despite my requests that this be done). It seems to be just hearsay.
The worst part of it all, however, is that, despite knowing that these atrocities had allegedly been conducted … nothing was done to prevent the same thing happening in future wars, despite the fact that the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs stated that measures had been put in place to assure this.”
Email from DVA:
“The issue you raise (war crimes) sits outside the remit of the Commissions and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. The Department is supportive of Government’s efforts to address the issues raised by the Brereton report. As you may be aware, Government has recently announced the establishment of the Office of the Special Investigator in the Department of Home Affairs portfolio, to investigate matters arising from the report. I note from your correspondence that you have previously corresponded with a number of agencies and ministers, including the IGADF Inquiry, in relation to your concerns. I also note that you have contacted the Safe Zone Support number, I hope you found the service useful.
If you have not already done so, you may wish to raise your concerns with following agencies:
Thank you again for your email and taking the time to raise your concerns with the Department.”
——————————————————————————————————————————–
23 January 2021
Capability Gap: ARA Recon/RAAC ARES Part 4
Image: RAACA NSW
Finishing the series of posts reflecting the discussion on the Black Berets website … one contributor said:
“Not withstanding the lack of support, funding etc for our local reserve forces, pretty much every piece of equipment we have is or has been used by reserve/ territorial units elsewhere in the world.
It really depends on what the ADF wants from the GRES, including Navy and Airforce.
The CMF/GRES was formed back in 1948 to fulfill a defence requirement. For many years that has been to mirror the roles of their Regular counterparts. In the last 3-4 decades that requirement has obviously has changed due to changes internationally but more often simply funding constraints.
As eluded to by others more knowledgeable than myself, there seems to be a lack of insight or direction what to do with the almost 29,000 tri-services personnel “on the books”.
Should they be disbanded? How many are ineffective and more importantly why? I admit a tech bias having been around a RAAC ARES unit since the early 70’s (around 9yo).
There has been a lot of restructuring of the Regular ADF, the development of the ACR’s for Army, the LHD’s and AWDDG for Navy and F-35’s for Airforce.
Now that those are pretty much sorted maybe it’s time to deep dive into the GRES and come to terms with do we still need them and if so what roles can they fill and are there capability gaps they are particularly suited for.
Obviously, funding will be raised as an issue somewhere but, as was shown in the taxed pay and limited paid man-days of the 80s, people will still turn up for parade if they have a focus.
Anything like the current indifference by all levels of DoD and ad hoc short-term attempts to re-role personnel because “what else do we do?” isn’t really going to work in the end.”
I replied to say:
“The following is from my response to Eamon’s article on The Cove: “Well written Eamon. I have argued previously for vehicles (not necessarily AFVs) which could enable mobile warfare reconnaissance skills to be developed and maintained, to be allocated to the RAAC ARES. As you know it’s the skills that take the time to instill at all levels. Whether or not this is important, depends on the role of the ARES within the ADF. It’s hard to imagine that mobile warfare skills are not required at this time in terms of Defence contingency plans. This is evidenced by the funding granted to procure the Boxer CRV. BUT … no-one is prepared to state and justify the actual role of the ARES in time of defence emergency. Maybe it’s thought the such a time will not come again. Even the 2020 Defence Reserves Association conference completely side-stepped this fundamental issue. “
The response to which was:
“And there is the problem. No one in senior levels of authority (civilian or military) wants to do their job and designing what and where the reserve contingent fits into the defence structure overall. They can’t even sort out exactly what they want from the regular formations either. The on again / off again 155 SPG acquisition shows that as well as others.”
It is great to see such discussion taking place. If only the RAAC Corporation could take up the gauntlet (but this will never happen, given the fact that they cannot advocate a position which is not in line with that of the HOC. Interestingly, this is not the HOC policy. One might wonder where such direction came from.
———————————————————————————————————————————-
22 January 2021
Capability Gap: ARA Recon/RAAC ARES Part 3
Image: The Cove
Following on from earlier, other posts on the Facebook page were:
“Problem is the ASLAV is stuffed. One year on ops was the same as five years peace time training. These are actual figures based on kms driven. They are beyond useful life just like the M113.”
“1AR are trialling LRVs with Hawkei using both to see if it’s viable”.
My response:
“Thanks … the concern is why this has to happen. If Boxer had replaced the ASLAV on time, there would be no problem for the ACR recon sqns; but these have had to be reduced to less than half strength, so an interim option has had to be investigated. A gap in the ADF operational capability has been exposed which should never have happened (and won’t be admitted). It’s not the fault of one person or one area, but the system as a whole (including the Defence Minister). Those working in CASG have worked their butts off, but have been let down. Sadly, this is something which had been predicted.”
Hi Kyle, Well done in tackling what is probably one of the most important challenges in the ADF. If there is confusion and no opportunity to clarify, it’s likely that the objective won’t be achieved. Seems to me that the issue of consultation is critical.
I went for a job interview post the Army and one of the questions was: “Well you’ve been in the Army, so you wouldn’t know anything about industrial democracy (ID) … would you? I surprised the panel by informing them that the Army is one of the most ID experienced of all organisations: before planning a task, the participants are canvassed for their ideas; before commencing, the plan is fully explained to all involved; on completion, feedback is sought from participants.
I explained that effective two-way communication is seen as fundamental to success. (I got the job.)
PS. I had to Google ‘HOTO’.
Kyle Myers is a Warrant Officer Class Two in Royal Corps of Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME
Following on from yesterday … posts re the RAAC ARES included the following:
“I attended many RAAC Corps Conferences in the late 1990’s and had 1st hand exposure to the lack of support for the ARES RAAC units.”
“Always wondered about the commitment and support by SOME in high places and the RAAC to Reserve.”
“As the guy who got the job to introduce light cav I can tell you exactly why it happened. It was either re role to some interim platform or disband all of the Reserve RAAC units. There was very little support from ARA RAAC pers so in short the reserve units are lucky to still exist. Our thoughts in doing this was one day a new platform might come along. If it does it’s easier to convert from light cav than have to try and justify creating a unit from scratch. We were then able to sell the capability to Defence Force Renumeration Tribunal and achieve pay group 5.
One of the problems was the fixation some COs had on using bushmaster as a recon vehicle. They missed the whole point of light cav and the PMV which is only an armoured truck.
Also army just doesn’t have enough equipment to go around. Not enough radios not enough B veh and there will now never be enough A veh. Ares crews can operate LAV Abraham and their replacements. The problem is maintenance. The US use civilian tradesman to keep their reserve equivalent equipment going but this is never going to happen is Aust.”
There is no doubt, the RAAC has dropped the ball with respect to the ARES (as has been pointed out in past Blog posts)!
More to follow on this.
————————————————————————————————————————
19 January 2021
Capability Gap: ARA Recon/RAAC ARES Part 1
Image: ASPI
Following a discussion on the Black Berets Facebook page, I posted as follows:
“It’s been a fascinating discussion and great to see the interest. Firstly, the LAV situation … we have a serviceability situation which has reduced our recon sqns to two troops of four vehicles each. There is undoubtedly an Army capability gap and this will continue until sufficient vehicles are available to equip squadrons at their full entitlement (and then retrain their members accordingly). The Boxer was to have been in service and units deployable by the end of 2020. There is likely to be a three year lag here.
Secondly, the RAAC ARES … there have been some good articles on Army’s Cove website re the situation. As has been well put here, unless they have a platform which enables them to develop and maintain mobile warfare skills, the capability gap in our defence preparedness will be unprecedented. The Hawkei would be a satisfactory vehicle [once the reliability/safety issues are resolved]… is there any connection here with regard to the report that 1 Armd Regt is involved in user trials (?).”
A response to my question threw new light on the capability gap which exists. Edited version below:
“I Armd Regt are trialling a light cavalry squadron mounted in G-Wagon SRV [Special Reconnaissance Vehicle]. My hope is that it’s similar in structure to how British light cavalry are operating and I look forward to being part of it.
A six car troop with troop HQ mounted in two Hawkeis and the “gun cars” in SRV appears to be the option at the moment. 2CAV have also been using the SRV .
I’m of the opinion that the fundamentals of mounted manoeuvre don’t change, regardless of platform.
I’m also very much of the opinion that the British Army concept of reserve/Yeomanry in a light cavalry role is very workable in an Australian construct (while reserve units with A Vehicles is not something we can support).
————————————————————————————————————————–
18 January 2020
Rubbish Articles That Influence Public Opinion
Image: The Diplomat
The following articles appeared one after the other in my inbox. The worry is that the segments of the population being targeted … believe their content.
“If China invades Taiwan and succeeds in landing troops on the island country’s southwestern beaches, expect brutal tank battles to help decide the outcome.
The Taiwanese army on paper possesses around 1,200 main battle tanks—480 American-made M-60A3s plus 450 CM-11s and 250 CM-12s. The CM-11 pairs a modified M-48 turret with an M-60 chassis. The CM-12 is an M-48 with the same modified turret as the CM-11.
These tanks are old. The youngest, the M-60s, date from the 1970s. Taipei recently bought 108 new M-1s from the United States for $1.3 billion in order to begin replacing some of its oldest and weariest tanks. The first M-1 isn’t due to arrive until 2023.”
My response: how would China invade Taiwan? Leading with an amphibious landing … surely not. The preliminary moves would be orchestrated by ‘agents’ to sabotage Taiwanese infrastructure such as electricity generation; water supply; telecommunications; and roads by which Taiwanese forces would deploy to landing sites. Electronic hacking would be used to disrupt command and control centres, radars and anti-aircraft systems (all of which would have been pre-planned and tested). Commandos would come ashore during the night prior. Explosives are set against coastal defences adjacent to selected landing points.
The attack would likely be made via an assault landing at a Taiwanese airport, with a diversionary coastal attack. Airborne forces might also be employed. Missiles and drones would be used against political and military headquarters. ‘A thousand tanks’? … they are almost redundant.
No sooner had I drafted the above than another email lobs into my inbox (obviously written by a contemporary of the author above). It states much as I have above. Extracts copied below.
“I am increasingly concerned that a major crisis is coming,” said Ian Easton, senior director at the Project 2049 Institute who wrote “The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia.” “It is possible to envision this ending in an all-out invasion attempt and superpower war. The next five to 10 years are going to be dangerous ones. This flash point is fundamentally unstable.”
Beijing’s optimistic version of events goes something like this: Prior to an invasion, cyber and electronic warfare units would target Taiwan’s financial system and key infrastructure, as well as U.S. satellites to reduce notice of impending ballistic missiles. Chinese vessels could also harass ships around Taiwan, restricting vital supplies of fuel and food.
As Chinese ships speed across the strait, thousands of paratroopers would appear above Taiwan’s coastlines, looking to penetrate defences, capture strategic buildings and establish beachheads through which the PLA could bring in tens of thousands of soldiers who would secure a decisive victory.
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
17 January 2021
The Blog
“Never be afraid to raise your voice for honesty and truth and compassion against injustice, lying and greed. If people all over the world…would do this, it would change the Earth.” William Faulkner, 1949 Nobel Prize in Literature.
“If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together. ” (Old African saying)
It’s been six years, starting February 2015. A post every day, apart from a few days R&R.
I’ve just had cause to review the Blog as it appears to readers (which is something I hardly ever do).
The first postings were to a series of topics (such as Association News; People; History, Equipment, etc). Daily posts then would advise which topics had been updated. In some ways, I wish that I’d been able to stick with this concept.
It would have enabled better value to be accessed from the various topics. Unfortunately, it was somewhat confusing for the reader and unwieldly for the blogger. I appreciate that the solution was to do a daily blog with subjects being indexed. I’ve started, too late unfortunately, to do the indexing.
Nevertheless, when I look back over six years, there is a lot of RAAC history and social commentary that has been recorded if one scrolls through the Blog. Maybe it will be archived, maybe not.
I intend to finish the Blog and make the last post, following the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of Operation Overlord on 7 June 2021.
Hopefully, by then I will have finished my autobiography and will be free to devote some time to metal detecting. I’ve had about two day’s experience detecting on the south coast beaches, but I think the quest for buried treasure has got hold of me. ‘Pixie’ Webster’s book might have something to do with this.
If anyone would like to take over the Blog (under a different title possibly), I’d be happy to talk. It seems such a pity that there is no other forum to openly discuss RAAC issues on an informed basis.
Tank crews were sent to Vietnam inadequately trained because of a shortcoming in encouraging the open debate of ‘set’ ideas at the time. The more that such discussion is closed down, the more likely it is that the same thing will happen again.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
16 January 2021
Future Tank Planning in the UK
New Rheinmetall Tech Demo Tank with 130mm Smoothbore turret.
Rather than a new tank, they plan to upgrade the Challenger 2. The Challenger 3 is intended to serve until at least 2035.
Extracts from the article follow:
… the army plans to replace one of the 3rd Division’s armoured infantry brigades in 2024 with a strike brigade equipped with medium armoured vehicles. As a result, the UK tank fleet will then reduce by about one-third, cutting the number of tanks to around just 145 vehicles.
The army is believed to be particularly concerned about the potential threat from the yet-to-enter-service Russian T14 Armata tank, which has a 125mm gun that fires both kinetic-energy anti-tank rounds and a guided missile. The Russian MBT also has a remote turret and active protection.
Media reports and statements by Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) all indicate that the programme includes fitting a Rheinmetall 120mm smooth-bore gun, compatible with ammunition for the US and German tanks, and allowing further firepower improvements. The British also require a gun-launched anti-tank missile. RBSL has developed a new turret to accommodate this, displayed at the September 2019 Defence and Security Exhibition International in London. Survivability of the tanks is also to be improved with the fitting of a ’soft kill’ active protection system. [Soft-kill refers to electronic or laser like systems, as distinct to conventional munitions.]
The reference to a 120mm smoothbore is countered by another publication:
“Rheinmetall’s 130mm smoothbore technology for MBTs embodies a significant lethality leap in times of increasing threats. Combined with a state-of-the-art auto-loader, this system is the latest evolvement in Rheinmetall’s MBT Advanced Technologies competence.”
This would seem in keeping with a new tank concept, rather than an upgrade.
PS. Just heard that my article on the ‘Tank of the Future’ (an earlier blog post) is to be published on the Army’s ‘Cove’ later this month. It will be interesting to see what discussion it may generate.
————————————————————————————————————————————–
15 January 2021
The RAAC/RAEME Partnership
It will be seen from the email below to the RAEME National Assn that I had hoped that RAEME might be officially represented at the National Commemoration of Operation Overlord on 6 June 2021:
“This is the enquiry I made to DVA:
Just wondering what might have been decided re DVA’s position in relation to my suggestion that a RAEME rep be invited as an official guest to the Commemoration (my proposal explained that my tank troop which attacked the enemy position comprised three tanks and an ARV … the RAEME crew on ARV having exactly the same responsibilities as the tank crews).
This is the answer I received:
DVA would not normally extend an official invitation to each individual Corps that served within the units from Operation Overlord or the Battle of Long Khanh. However we would anticipate their attendance clearly at the service as a former members of that particular unit or sub unit.
Sorry that I couldn’t do more. I had hoped that the RAEME HOC might have been invited
PS. My mother is the WAAAF you feature in the Assn header.”
I thought to myself … at least I tried; but the surprise was on me. As seen in the last line, one of the images used by the RAEME Assn in their header, was of my mother. I never knew her in terms of my memory (she died when I was three), however, I was aware that “she had been chosen to be the face of WAAAF recruiting posters”.
.———————————————————————————————————————————————
14 January 2021
Defence Strategy: The Fundamental Problem as Far as the Australian People Are Concerned (Part II)
It raised similar issues to those I referred to on the Blog on 7 Jan 21.
My response was:
“We need leaders and institutions that make clear what they stand for on key values and principles which are then translated into policies and programs.” [Quote from Article]
‘I agree completely … but there is another facet to this. Australians today, distrust what their leaders and institutions tell them. A major challenge is to improve this level of trust so that commitments made attract the confidence and backing of the nation as a whole. How to successfully achieve this is well beyond my pay grade.’
Two other readers responded to my comment, one of whom said:’’
“Ask yourself why Jacinda Ardern became a leader with so much support from her people as revealed in the last NZ elections. And not only from her own country, but also world-wide over her compassionate reaction to the Christchurch terrorist attack.
It revolves around authenticity in my view, and showing the people you actually genuinely care about them.”
My response was: “I think we are pressing the same button. As Jack Waterford mentioned today … it’s about restoring faith in the people we vote for. I said ‘trust’; I think these are interchangeable. Jacinda achieved this, ie. the personal qualities that make her a leader, shone through. I believe we are in need of more leadership and less politicisation.”
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
13 January 2021
RAAC History: The Future
I just had reason to look into the circumstances of the death of one of those on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll. As a result, I emailed the Secretary to say:
“I’ve just been given cause to visit the circumstances involving one of those on the Honour Roll (Killed Accidently).
It occurred to me that it won’t be long before there is no-one who is aware of the nature of their deaths.
I would be prepared to help provide ‘official’ verification of these events; so that a short note could be ‘attached’ to the Roll”.
While I haven’t had a response from the Secretary, this made me wonder as to what the ‘transition process’ might be for website based RAAC ‘history’; given that those who served in Vietnam are nearing their use by dates.
There is an enormous amount of RAAC history tied up in these websites (as a result of the tremendous efforts of those involved over the years) … but should it just fade away?
I mentioned to the RAAC Historian (John Baines) that I believe that such websites can be preserved by the National Library for future historical reference.
John responded to say that he would appreciate this info as “sadly, I have observed the loss of many records over the years from both civil and military institutions as staff change over”.
Those interested might like to go to: pandora.nla.gov.au . It will be seen that under Defence, there is a sub-category: ‘Unit Associations’. Archives are being collected for Assns such as the Australian Army Band Corps, but absolutely nothing for any RAAC unit associations.
I like the following story from the 3 Cav Forum:
“The curator of the Light Horse Museum in Armidale received a letter from an old Light Horseman some years ago.
It turned out that this gentleman was the last man standing from his Sqn.
He had an amount of Sqn funds from his old unit and could not see any way of spending the money, so he asked the curator if he would it for the Museum.
The donor was thanked and the money used for the betterment of the museum.
There will always be a last man standing, but will it be the right man?”
——————————————————————————————————————————————
12 January 2021
LAND 400 Phase 2 Part II
Image: Defence
Yesterday’s post made me wonder where things were at in terms of the Boxer variants to be procured. We have 121 recon vehicles fitted with the Lance turret … what are the remaining 90 variants made up of?
It took a while and I was only able to ascertain that the 196 to be built here will comprise 121 recon, 10 recovery; 15 command; 29 joint fires and surveillance; and 11 repair. There is also an option for 11 ambulance variants. (As mentioned yesterday, the 25 being delivered from Germany comprise 12 recon and 13 ‘multi-purpose’ variants.)
I was surprised that there were no APC variants. Does this mean that the Phase 3 IFV will fulfill this role, or will recon troops operate without assault troopers (or as per the ARES role, ‘dismounted cavalry scouts’)?
It’s been mentioned in an earlier Blog that the current organisation (Plan Keogh) is for two recon troops per squadron and four ASLAVs per troop. The former CO 2 CAV refused to base troop training on four vehicle troops, insisting that six vehicles must be used (achieving this by reallocating vehicles for specific training periods). He is, of course, quite right, ie. false lessons would otherwise be learnt.
Why four vehicles per troop etc? One has to presume that this is related to ASLAV serviceability. The CRV capability was to have been in service and capable of deployment NLT end 2020. It would seem that the capability gap will extend for at least three years.
It makes you wonder why there is not more public debate regarding RAAC matters. I’ve heard what there is, being referred to as a ‘wasteland’. Pity that the RAAC Corporation will not entertain any such role.
Leaving this aside … it would appear that LAND 400 Phase 2 will provide sufficient recon vehicles to equip three troops per squadron with six vehicles per troop (plus repair pool, SOA, RTC etc). Pity about the capability gap (shuush!) This will be extended by the time taken to effectively retrain units to a level of proficiency using ‘real’ vehicle numbers.
Personnel. There is no information that I could find regarding the replacement of Brig Greg McGlone (successor to Ben James) as DG LAND 400. Readers will recall that he left the position suddenly last August (one defence magazine referring to him as having ‘been removed’, but there is no basis to assume this). He was reported to have been temporarily replaced by Sarah Myers, an asst sec in CASG. Who has been appointed (if anyone) seems a mystery.
Two RAAC officers currently hold important positions: Alan Hamley (Project Director) and John Holloway (Project Manager). John was CO 1 Armd Regt 2018-2020.
Delivery. Five of the 25 German built vehicles (12 turreted and 13 multi-purpose) have been delivered to 2/14 LHR (QMI) and crew training is underway. The project covers the procurement of 211 vehicles, 186 of which will be constructed here (commencing in 2022).
Configuration. The Lance 30mm two-man turret is to be fitted to the 133 reconnaissance variants. Electro Optics Systems have been selected to provide the Remote Weapons Station which will be fitted to the multi-purpose variants,
————————————————————————————————————————————
10 January 2021
1 AR Assn Honour Roll (Cont)
Continuing from the previous two posts … another email:
“Dear Secretary,
Following on from my earlier emails, the 1AR Honour Roll currently lists:
Killed In Action: WO2 J.A. Bond, WO2 J. Stone, TPR J. Kerr
Died of Wounds: TPR M. Hannaford, WO2 T. Phillips
DOW Post-Vietnam: WO1 L. S. Swarbrick, WO2 N. Lowes, TPR P G. Barwick, TPR R. S. Bellott
Killed Accidentally: LT A. J. Massey, SGT R. Morrison, SGT R. G. Murray, TPR A. M. Jordan, TPR A. Patterson, CFN B. Silver (LAD)
If the AGM decides to continue listing former members of 1 Armd Regt; those who DOW post-Vietnam; and those who were killed accidently, the following matters should be considered:
Title: The current title ‘Dedicated to those 1st Armoured Regiment Soldiers that made the ultimate sacrifice’ suggests that all those listed were serving in 1 Armd Regt at the time of their death. The following would be more correct: ‘Dedicated to former members of 1st Armoured Regiment who made the ultimate sacrifice [possibly include: ‘as a consequence of engaging the enemy’].
Died of Wounds: WO2 N Lowes should be included. He did not die ‘post-Vietnam’, but within the prescribed period of the War. This is why he is listed on the ROH at the AWM.
DOW Post-Vietnam:
(i) CPL A M Anderson, mid (1 Armd Regt) should be included. He was WIA at the same time as Tpr P G Barwick; his wounds were as extensive and contributed significantly to his death (as recognised by DVA); and
(ii) Sgt J Stones (3 Cav Regt) should also be included. He suffered very significant wounds in 1969 and these undoubtedly contributed to his death (as recognised by DVA).
Following on from yesterday, the second email to the Secretary, 1AR Asssn:
“You have written to members to advise that they will be required to select one of the following options at the AGM:
‘The three options including additional information in italics) are as follows: Option 1 – to include only those officially recognised as either KIA or DOW and those that were killed accidently, whilst serving with the 1st Armoured Regiment. The Honour Roll would include James Kerr (KIA), Mick Hannaford (DOW) and Noel Lowes (recognised by DVA and AWM as having died as a result of his service in Vietnam and within the two [2] year period. IN addition, the following six (6) members who were killed accidently whilst on military activity with the Regiment: Cfn B Silver (1961), Tpr AM Jordan (1962), Sgt R Morrison (1965), Lt AK Massey (1982), Tpr A Patterson (1984) and Sgt RG Murray (1986). Option 2 – as for Option 1 but also to include a separate listing for former members of the Regiment who were either KIA or DOW whilst serving with other units. This includes Cpl P Clements (KIA with 1 APC Sqn [1966]), WO2 TD Phillips (DOW with AATTV [1966]), Cfn D Borlace (KIA with 3 Cav Regt [1968]), Cpl P Malone [KIA with 3 Cav Regt ), WO2 JA Bond (KIA with AATTV [1969]0, Sgt J Stones (DOW with 3 Cav Regt [1971]) and Lcpl J McCarthy (KIA with 3 Cav Regt [1971). It is possible that there may be additional members who were either KIA or DOW with other units in Korea, Vietnam or any other conflict since that period in time. Option 3 – as for Option 2 but also to include a separate listing for all those who had been entitled to a DVAofficial commemoration. However, the inclusion of such members would be subject to the approval of their NOK. Known additions include WO1 L Swarbrick, Tpr R Barwick, Tpr R Bellott and Cpl A Anderson. However, there are many hundreds of Vietnam veterans, as well as veterans from other conflicts who have died from conditions such as cancer, etc that the DVA have acknowledged that their deaths may be attributed to their accepted conditions. DVA Official Commemoration does not mean that they died of their wounds. [Neither does listing on the AWM ROH, as discussed.]
A different ‘take’ on these three options is provided below for information:
Given that those members of 1 Armd Regt listed on the Honour Roll at the AWM are those who died either from any reason during their active service (enemy action, illness, accident) or from service-related consequences within the prescribed period, it makes sense for those who members who died as a result of an accident during training to be listed in the same way on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll.
Two questions remain. The first is whether or not members who died as a consequence of their active service, but after the prescribed period for the War in which they served, should also be listed. These people are recognised by DVA by virtue of an entitlement to an Official Commemoration. Given, the extent, it might be decided that listing all those who suffered from PTSD or cancer (for example) goes beyond the purpose of the Honour Roll. It might, therefore, be found that the Roll should only list those who sustained wounds while engaging the enemy which subsequently contributed to their death (like the US Vietnam Wall).
The final question is … should former members of 1 Armd Regt who died as a consequence of their active service with another unit, be listed on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll (as above being limited to death from enemy action)? The answer to this question might be considered in light of the fact that 1 Armd Regt has not been on active service since 1971. But former members have served with other units on active service. While the majority of the current membership is unlikely to know those who served with other units in Vietnam, they are likely to know their contemporaries who served in more recent conflicts.
You also advised members in the last newsletter that:
“The following members, listed on the Honour Roll were not serving with, or posted to, 1st Armoured Regiment at the time of their death: a. WO2 JA (Chesty) Bond (RAAC) – KIA whilst serving with AATTV b. WO2 TD (Tom) Phillips (RAAC) – DOW whilst serving with AATTV c. WO2 J Stone (RAINF) – DOW whilst serving with AATTV There also appears to be some confusion as to whether the listing for ‘Stone’ should actually be for Sgt J Stones RAAC who may have DOW after being Wounded in Action (WIA) whilst serving with B Sqn 3 Cav Regt. It should be noted, however, that the AWM Roll of Honour does not have a listing for Sgt Stones and therefore he was not either KIA or officially categorised as DOW. In fact, James Stones did not pass away until 1991, which is well outside the two (2) period used by the DVA”.
I’m sure if you were to ask for advice, the apparent confusion between WO2 Stone and Sgt J Stones could be explained. It is my understanding that the former Corps transferred to go to Vietnam with AATTV. The latter, who is referred to [at top] as having served with 3 Cav in 1971, was actually wounded on 22 October 1969 (and did not return to Vietnam).”
—————————————————————————————————————————————————
8 January 2021
1AR Assn Honour Roll (1 of 2)
I’ve been lobbying for the Honour Roll to be corrected for a long time. To their credit, the current C’tee is working to this end. Unfortunately, they’re not aware of all the facts. The following email is self-explanatory:
“Dear Secretary,
I was too quick re my earlier email as there are other factors involved. I will try to explain in this and the following email. You’ve advised members that:
‘It should also be noted that the Australian War Memorial Roll of Honour includes around 101,000 names of members who were either killed in action or formally recognised by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) as DOW. DVA have recognised over 300,000 members for official commemoration.‘
This is wrong. The names of the AWM Honour Roll are those of the soldiers whose death met the criteria determined by the AWM Council. It means that anyone who died while posted to a unit on active service, or subsequently died as a consequence of their service within the prescribed period of the conflict, is included on the ROH.
It also means that someone who is killed in a traffic accident while on R&R is listed, as are those who died of illness or accident during active service are listed. It is incorrect to suggest that KIA or DOW are the sole criteria for the AWM ROH.
DVA had nothing to do with the above criteria. Those who are entitled to official commemoration by DVA have (i) died subsequent to the prescribed period of the conflict in which they served and (ii) been assessed to have died either directly or indirectly as a consequence of their service.
The US Vietnam Memorial Wall takes a different approach. To be listed, you have had to have been KIA or DOW sustained in action. Anyone who dies of service-related illness or accident, is listed on a separate roll held within the Wall. I have spoken with those who administer the Memorial and it takes an enormous amount of time to verify that someone sustained wounds and these subsequently contributed to their death. They are committed to accurately recording the human consequences of the War, however, particularly those who gave their lives engaging the enemy.`
Finally … the AWM state that the ROH lists “Over 102,000” names.
Bruce
(Time spent here is more than justified … as I’ve stated previously, this is the one thing that the Assn must get right.)
———————————————————————————————————————————————–
7 January 2020
Defence Strategy: The Fundamental Problem as Far as the Australian People Are Concerned
Submissions are invited regarding the topic: “Continuing strategic dependence on the US or strategic independence for Australia?”.
I couldn’t resist a response:
“Australia is too closely beholden to America with respect to its Defence and Foreign policies. There’s no need to refer to ‘apron strings’ … everyone knows the topic. But why would such a view be so common?
The reason … everyone is expected to trust our politicians, intelligence agencies and senior defence officers. But we only see some of them some of the time and when we do, we don’t get to ask questions. Our ‘trust’ has seen Australia involved in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Will this be the same in the future?
The structure of our society is flawed and unless the fundamental problem is addressed, things will continue as they always have.
There is a logic to decision making related to Defence strategy: intelligence staff identify the threat and estimate the warning time; military planners determine contingency plans and consequent force structure, readiness states, and need for the support of allied nations; defence staff determine manufacturing and stocking policies in accord with lead times. This is all done on trust as far as Australians are concerned. Should this be any different?
Intelligence briefings, warning times, contingency plans, lead times etc are all highly confidential (top secret even). Such information can’t be made public. But, a nation’s commitment to war requires the support of its people.
How can ‘trust’ be improved to the extent necessary so that our military commitments have the confidence and backing of the nation as a whole? This is the fundamental question that has to be answered. Traditional responses such as requiring greater oversight of decision making by Parliament, have not worked to date. It is hard to imagine a solution which fits within the democratic framework that currently exists and would be supported.
What if it was to be suggested that a panel of eminent Australians be chosen to act as an interface between politicians and society … would this work? Undoubtedly not (just imagine the arguments related to the selections of panel members!). This is interesting, I can nominate many Australians who I would trust completely in such a role.
So, we have democracy on one hand, but are hampered by it on the other. Could a referendum on any proposed military commitment be the answer? How could it, given the national security implications associated with the arguments for and against?
We could ask that the PM, Minister for Defence etc to brief the Australian people fully on the circumstances involved … more so than has happened in the past; but in the end, it’s the Government which has to be able to act decisively. The fundamental issue remains … how to create a level of ‘trust’ in those who act on our behalf?
I think it’s a task well above my pay scale.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
6 January 2021
Government Responsibility for War Crimes II
Image: Canberra Times
It was reported on the ABC on 4 Jan 21 that:
“A former New South Wales magistrate who once served as a war crimes prosecutor at The Hague says those higher up the Army’s “chain of command” must be investigated over alleged unlawful killings in Afghanistan.
Graham Blewitt has told the ABC [that] securing convictions over the disturbing findings of last year’s Brereton inquiry would not be easy because Australian police did not currently have the appropriate expertise.”
They got it wrong before and they’re getting it wrong again. Talking about the difficulty of securing convictions is way off the mark. A focus on this will miss the point completely.
The following letter has been sent to the Canberra Times:
It was reported on 4 January 2021 that the Federal Government’s new Office of the Special Investigator has formally begun its work. References were also made to the difficulty of securing convictions.
It is my belief that a focus solely on convictions is wrong. Equally (probably more) important is identifying why the Government failed to introduce meaningful measures in Army units’ preparation for war in Afghanistan to ensure that what was known to have happened in Vietnam (as evidenced by the Government’s own information to our schoolchildren), was not able to occur again. In 2005, I received assurance from the Minister for Defence that this was the case. Will the Minister today give the same assurance?
—————————————————————————————————————————————————
5 January 2021
Government Responsibility for War Crimes
“God knows the truth, but waits” (Tolsoy) … ‘until honest men speak’ (Cameron)
An article by Graham Cornes was published in the Adelaide Advertiser/ SA Weekend on 4 Dec 20. It is copied at the end, as the Advertiser requires a subscription fee to read on-line. My response is as per that below:
When I queried this account, the ‘regimental brotherhood’ went into action and I was invited to meet. I pointed out that I was not trying to bring the battalion into disrepute, simply trying to get the Government to commit to revising training so that such things could never happen again. The Minister for Defence assured me that this had been done. I’ve provided all this to the current Inquiry.
DVA provides information to our children’s schools which states that these things happened in Vietnam. Without any doubt, the Government is culpable for not having acted responsibly once it was aware of the facts.
But there is an inherent weakness in the way our society functions. I first realised this while writing the history of Australian tank operations in Vietnam. We were sent to Vietnam inadequately trained because of failings in the nature of the Army’s structure and ability to learn and adapt.
The Rule of Law is paramount to a civilised society. One of its tenets is that an individual cannot be held accountable for failings of the State in which he belongs. I share the guilt referred to by Graham (ie. I feel that I should have done more to ensure action by Government), but there is only so much that an individual can do in a society such as ours. It has failed its citizens before and continues to do so today.”
Article:
An incident in Vietnam 50 years ago left Graham Cornes wracked with guilt, and he says soldiers accused of war crimes must be judged differently than civilians.
Inaugural Adelaide coach Graham Cornes has revealed he witnessed members of his platoon hatch a plan to kill an unarmed, elderly man who had inadvertently strayed into a free-fire zone in Vietnam. In a column for SA Weekend magazine, he uses the incident to explain why soldiers accused of breaking rules of engagement should not be judged by civilian laws. Here is his column:
‘Make sure you bury the ID card”. The words have stayed with me ever since, and will forever more. My platoon commander was a good man; an intelligent man, a full lieutenant and a graduate of the military academy at Duntroon. They selected only the best to lead infantry platoons in South Vietnam. The voice inside me screamed, “Noooo, you can’t do that.” But he was an officer, I was a private soldier, a minion in the system. You had no voice. I stayed silent.
It was late in the afternoon and our platoon was setting up its perimeter for a night harbour – inside an overgrown rubber plantation. We were operating just inside a free-fire zone, an area from which civilians were excluded and anyone encountered could be regarded as enemy. Unfortunately, there were no lines on the ground to mark the boundary. In the distance, across a clearing adjacent to the rubber plantation, was an old man and his water buffalo who had strayed into the free-fire zone. He clearly posed no threat but his presence excited our section commander, a career soldier who had progressed to the rank of corporal.
Somehow he convinced the platoon commander that the old man was indeed a threat and as he was technically inside the free-fire zone, we were within our rights to “dispatch” him. He hastily assembled a small squad and as he eagerly led them through the perimeter, the platoon commander gave that order: “Make sure you bury the ID card.” The absence of a weapon and the presence of an ID card would make it difficult to claim he was an enemy combatant. Now, this story did have a happy ending because the old man, perhaps sensing the danger, slipped away out of the free-fire zone and the squad, somewhat disappointedly, returned to our defensive position. I feel guilty now as my response at the time was internal only. The army bludgeoned you to blind obedience and compliance. I didn’t think to protest outwardly.
What makes good men do bad things? This barbaric underbelly of our character is never more evident than when soldiers go to war. The ADF inquiry into the allegations of atrocities committed by elements of our special forces in Afghanistan will rake over the scars that many combat veterans try hard to conceal. In some cases, the wounds have never healed and the waves of guilt have never subsided. If the same ethical microscope had been placed over our actions in Vietnam, or indeed any other conflict, how would we compare?
We knew right from wrong and understood the rules of engagement. Why then did the order filter down one day from our company commander that we were not to take prisoners? It followed that one of my closer army mates was leading a section in pursuit of an enemy group with which they had just engaged.
When he eventually radioed his sitrep (Situation Report) back to company headquarters he was stunned by the response: “We have one enemy KIA (Killed in Action) and two captured,” he reported. The company commander immediately grabbed the handset. “No you haven’t. You’ve got three KIA,” he barked. Fifty years later, how can any civilised person make sense of or rationalise that. “Take no prisoners,” we were ordered. It’s a great battle cry for a footy team but much more serious when it’s a real war and real lives are involved.
There was another disturbing incident, involving a platoon from our company which also resulted in an enemy soldier’s tragic demise. The forward scout, advancing stealthily and carefully, as was his special skill, came across a lone Vietcong soldier asleep under a tree, his AK47 weapon in his lap. Quietly, the section lined up, then called on the soldier to rouse him. As soon as the unfortunate wretch stirred the soldiers opened fire with full and gruesome effect. The M60 machine gun, M16 and SLR rifles of an infantry section can inflict deadly and withering fire. So it was: another dead enemy soldier for the battalion’s tally.
The difficulty facing any soldier in a conflict in which the enemy does not wear a uniform and can melt inconspicuously into the local populace, is identifying from where the danger will come. The rules of engagement are distorted and the lines of morality are blurred. Who to trust? Who, though seemingly innocent, presents a deadly threat? The tragedy of innocent victims and civilians caught in the crossfire of liberating forces and insurgent terrorists is played out every day in war-torn regions throughout the world.
It is to these regions that we send our Australian troops. These are elite forces, carefully selected through the process of rigorous testing and psychological analysis; warriors in the true sense of the word. Tough and hard, it is the system that has made them ruthless and, whether they operate at home or abroad, they make Australia safer. Australia has shaped and created these fighting machines. If they have transgressed the rules of war, as soldiers in all previous conflicts surely have, Australia must share their guilt.
The allegations of our soldiers’ actions in Afghanistan, before any defence has been mounted, have drawn widespread condemnation. Our leaders, both military and political, have been quick to wade in with damning and self-righteous accusations but some do so without fully understanding the pressures under which combat soldiers operate, and the mind-turning impact those pressures have.
It’s 24 hours of heightened alert and ever present danger, either real or imagined. There’s no relief except for those few days of respite at the end of an operation but even then there’s a dark cloud at the back their mind. Then, all too often, they lose a mate under violent circumstances or are severely wounded themselves.
We prepare soldiers for war with rigorous, sometimes tortuous training. They pass all the courses but can anything prepare them for real combat? You can’t replicate, or predict even, the real dangers or the constant pressures. Depending on the length of an operation, the combat soldier is always tired through sleep deprivation, always dirty and always hungry.
In summer, thirst is a constant; in winter it’s the cold or wet. Sometimes, it’s even worse than cold. Such privation adds to the stress and goes some way to explaining why poor decisions can be made.
He has had a stellar staff career, culminating in his promotion to General and appointment as Chief of the Defence Force. Even though East Timor was not the torrid deployment that those in the Middle East were, he should know the pressures under which soldiers operate.
The report by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security said: “None of these alleged crimes was committed in the heat of battle.” That is a trite comment which exacerbates the accusations. These soldiers don’t punch a clock and knock on and off. The term “fog of war” is a term often used to explain soldiers’ brutal behaviour towards their enemy or to explain the atmosphere that surrounds soldiers on operation in hostile environments. The Inspector-General may dismiss it but the fog of war is real and does not swirl only in times of battle. The fog of war never lifts.
Yes, good men do bad things and they will be punished, deservedly so, but who are we to judge if we haven’t been exposed to the same dangers? The escalating rate of veterans affected by post-traumatic stress and suicide is fast becoming a national emergency, and can be directly linked to their combat experience. It is a worthy, honourable profession of which any combat soldier should be justifiably proud, but soldiering comes at some psychological cost.
Further, revelations of their behaviour and the excoriation of those troops from Afghanistan will continue to assail the self-esteem of all veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs does a great job and has significant resources, but not every veteran has the acumen to access them.
I’ve read the redacted report and seen some of the vision, but, as confronting as that may be, I cannot yet bring myself to condemn those soldiers.
They will surely face a court martial, and very possibly be dismissed from the army. If they have already retired they may face criminal charges. However, it is far too simplistic for staff officers back in Canberra to assign blame, to pass judgment and deflect responsibility. If war crimes have been committed, the frontline troops who have committed them cannot be made solely responsible. The system that shaped them and then empowered them must share some of that responsibility.
A notorious soldier once said: “Soldiers at war are not to be judged by civilian rules.” His name? Harry “Breaker” Morant, who was executed by firing squad in 1902 after a British court martial convicted him of war crimes committed during the Boer War. Our Australian soldiers who stand accused of similar transgressions of the rules of engagement must not be treated with the same summary disdain.
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
4 January 2021
An Autobiography (Not a Memoir) II
True story typed on a vintage typewriter ** Note: Shallow depth of field
Image: Networlding.com
Following on from yesterday where I mentioned the sub-title of my autobiography (‘Time Spent Trying to do the Right Thing’) … what will the subjects of the final part of my book be; ie. the period of my retirement?
It was while writing the history of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, that I first realised the inherent weaknesses in the way our society functions. We were sent to Vietnam inadequately trained because of failings in the nature of the Army’s structure and ability to learn and adapt.
My driver should never have been wounded. Three squadrons had served before us and other drivers had been wounded in exactly the same manner. Yet those of us in C Sqn in 1971 weren’t aware of this. Nobody had taken the time to connect the dots … to identify weakness, highlight it and ensure training embraced it. We all had to learn from our own experience, without any benefit from that of others who had gone before.
So, some of the experiences I will recount will include:
Writing the history of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam and my dealings with the AWM (the good and the not-so good);
Getting the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour emblazoned and the error on the 1 Armd Regt Standard corrected;
Overturning the cold-hearted restriction which meant that the Army Combat Badge could not be presented to NOK of those KIA;
Campaigning for the withdrawal of the: RSL’s proposal for an MOU with the Vietnamese Communist Party; and DVA proposal for lapel badge with crossed Australian and Socialist Republic of Vietnam flags (unless, in both cases, Vietnam was to improve its inhuman treatment of our former allies who served in the ARVN and their families);
Lobbying to have a Centurion tank exhibited at the AWM;
Taking action with respect to the Conflict of Interest created when Rheinmetall ‘donated’ $25,000 to 1 Armd Regt (by masking the payments through the 1AR Assn) at the same time it was tendering for LAND 400 Phase 2 (vehicles which 1 Armd Regt would operate);
Helping with efforts to have failings of C’tee members and breaches of regulations governing the management of the 1AR Assn acknowledged and corrected; resulting in a new Constitution, revised annual reporting standards, and full advice to members re C’tee decisions (and my expulsion); and
Striving before the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal to have supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley included with 8RAR in terms of the South Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
—————————————————————————————————————————————
3 January 2020
An Autobiography (Not a Memoir)
Who are you typed on an old typewriter concept for self belief, positive attitude and identity
I’m not sure that it will be accepted by a publisher, but we’ll give it a go. An early draft pf my preface is copied below:
“Not Enough Self-Sacrifice for a VC!”:Time Spent Trying to do the Right Thing.
Preface
“Each person’s life is important, so why should I think that anyone would be interested in mine? Everyone’s experiences hold value for those going forward, but not all have the opportunity to record them. I consider myself lucky in this respect.
Those of us who do, must ensure that we are not writing to enhance our own egos, but because there is an essential benefit for others in making our story known.
Some of the narrative deals with my time as a tank troop leader in Vietnam and my later service in the Army (as the title suggests); but this is not the focus of the account. The sub-title probably expresses my intent more than anything else.
It was while writing the history of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, that I first realised the inherent weaknesses in the way our society functions. We were sent to Vietnam inadequately trained because of failings in the nature of the Army’s structure and ability to learn and adapt.
If I was not to record my experiences, I would not meet my personal expectations in terms of ‘doing the right thing’ (something which I believe is central to self-respect).
My tank driver should never have been wounded. Three squadrons had served before us and other drivers had been wounded in exactly the same manner. Yet those of us in C Sqn in 1971 weren’t aware of this. Nobody had taken the time to connect the dots … to identify weakness, highlight it and ensure training embraced it. We all had to learn from our own experience, without any benefit from that of others.
The Rule of Law is paramount to a civilised society. One of its tenets is that an individual cannot be held accountable for failings of the State in which he belongs. I feel guilt for not having done more to achieve social justice, however, there is only so much that an individual can do in a society such as ours. It has failed its citizens before and continues to do so today. Maybe this narrative will help change things for the better.
—————————————————-
In anticipation of research associated with the above, I’ve been doing an Index for each day’s post (found at the end of Doing the Right Thing VI and VII). Every post since 16 March 2020 is indexed by topic.
I hope that my memoir doesn’t provide too much justification for defamation action; but I have a lot of stories to tell and I intend to do so!
———————————————————————————————————————–
2 January 2020
Code of Conduct Versus Whistle-blower Policy
Image: Linkedin.com
What if we have an Association has a Constitution which states that any member who brings the Assn into disrepute will have his membership cancelled. The member becomes aware of Assn practices which are unlawful. The member raises the issues with the C’tee, but they decline to respond. The member reports the issues to the Regulator and the Assn is compelled to change its practices. The member’s life membership was not renewed..
I’ve been advised that I have grounds to take action, however, this would not fix the matter. The problem is that whistle-blower provisions are not required to be included in the Constitutions of associations incorporated in Australia.
Seems to me that this is something long overdue. Example of provisions which have been incorporated in company policies are copied below:
This Code of Conduct and Whistle-blower Policy aims to: • provide a framework of principles applicable to all officers, employees and agents for conducting business and fostering relations with other employees, shareholders, customers, the community and other stakeholders; • promote a consistent understanding of, and approach to, the standards of ethical behaviour, including the ethical approach to actual or apparent conflicts of interests between personal and professional relationships; • raise awareness of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and through this endeavour to avoid any real or perceived misconduct; • promote prompt internal reporting of violations and suspected violations; and • outline how the Company will deal with violations and suspected violations.
The following principles apply to Whistle-blowing: 1. The Company will provide employees and contractors with the infrastructure by which they can safely disclose reportable conduct 2. All employees and contractors making disclosures must act in good faith – acting honestly, ethically and in the best interest of the Company. 3. The Company encourages former employees, contractors and Auditors to make a disclosure under this policy if they chose but the protections under this policy will be limited to protecting identify only 4. The Company will ensure employees and contractors who disclose reportable conduct, as well as those assisting or participating in an investigation are not victimised or disadvantaged. 5. The Company will regularly review all disclosures to ensure that no adverse consequences have been applied as a result of making a disclosure. 6. All employees and contractors have the right to communicate with regulators at any time, in relation to any concern within the scope of this policy. 7. All investigations undertaken under this policy must be conducted in accordance with the principles of fairness and natural justice. 8. Investigations must be timely, conducted impartially and comprehensively documented. 9. Each disclosure will have a unique identifier which will be provided to the whistle-blower so they can liaise with the relevant WPO or seek feedback. 10. Where possible the outcomes of all disclosures will be provided to the whistle-blower.
————————————————————————————————————————
1 January 2021
Looking After Each Other II
Image: Daily Mail
Welcome to 2021!
What would be appropriate for the first post of Doing the Right Thing VII?
Following on from the Blog on 30 December 2020, I believe that there could be no better aspiration for the year ahead, than that of helping each other. There are many opportunities.
I’m organising a dinner for those in C Sqn 1 Armd Regt in 1971 (Vietnam) in June 2021. This corresponds with a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord, being organised by DVA.
Financial assistance for those organising functions such as mine is available from DVA. Recipients have to be members of Incorporated Associations. I asked DVA how an individual could qualify. No probs they said, just ask an Incorporated Assn to ‘sponsor’ you.
I asked the 1AR Assn. They said that a LAD Reunion had recently been proposed and they were sorry, but they felt that they could only help with one such application each year. (This, despite being assured that there would be no work needed on the part of any member of the C’tee.)
What funding was being sought? Four hundred dollars for two wreaths to be laid at the AWM in honour of Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick and some assistance with printing costs for menus, name tags etc. I asked the RAACA NSW, but they responded to say that ‘it’s not our responsibility!’. (I was a member up until this time.)
I then asked the TPI Assn. Too easy, they said … and the application was forwarded to DVA through them. It might not be approved, but at least we’ve had the opportunity to ask.
Why is it that some people can’t see their real responsibilities? There are probably plenty of RAAC personnel that hate my guts, but why refuse to offer assistance for a function intended to benefit 100 former RAAC veterans that they don’t even know? Is it too hard to distinguish between the two?
Hopefully 2021 will be a bit different.
—————————————————————————————————————–
INDEX
1 Armoured Regiment Association
1 Jan 21: ‘Looking After Each Other II’
2 Jan 21: ‘Code of Conduct Versus Whistle-Blower Policy’
8 Jan 21: ‘1AR Assn Honour Roll (1 of 2)’
9 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (2 of 2)‘
10 Jan 21: ‘1 AR Assn Honour Roll (Cont)’
3 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward’
5 Feb 21: ‘The 1AR Assn Going Forward: Part 2.’
13 Mar 21: ‘1 AR Assn : Anonymous Threat’
25 Mar 21: ‘ The Honorary Colonel/Patron Quandary ‘
26 Mar 21: ‘ The 1 AR Assn: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back’
27 Mar 21: ‘ Operation Overlord/Battle of Long Khanh: 1AR Assn ‘
23 Jul 21: ‘Caring for Those Less Fortunate’
30 Jul 21: ‘For the Good of the RAAC?’
‘Armouredadvocates’
31 Mar 21: ‘Index’
Autobiography
3 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir)’
4 Jan 21: ‘Autobiography (Not a Memoir) II’
Australian Defence Force (ADF)
21 Jan 20: ‘One of the Greatest Challenges for the ADF’
17 Jan 21: ‘The Blog’
9 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 1) ‘
10 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 2) ‘
11 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 3) ‘
12 Apr 21: ‘ The Australian Army: The Parlous State of its Organisation (Part 4)’
29 Apr 21: ‘ Army Recruitment in Times Past ‘
30 Apr 21: ‘ Getting History Right ‘
2 May 21: ‘ Getting History Right: Part 2 “
27 Aug 21: Weekly Musings Eight: How toShow Respect
LAND 400 would have to be one of the Australian Army’s most successful defence procurement projects. Well done to all those who contributed (and are still contributing) to it. The issue of conflict of interest was raised in 2017 when it was revealed that Rheinmetall had been masking payments to 1 Armd Regt by forwarding them through the 1AR Assn (see below). Twenty five thousand dollars was transferred in this way, completely contrary to Defence regulations governing conflict of interest involving a company tendering for a Defence contract. The 1AR Assn answered queries about this by stating that ‘we are not governed by Defence regulations, but by Consumer Affairs Victoria’.
The Defence Inspector General conducted an investigation and found loopholes in relevant regulations. These have since been amended. The point is that an offence has been committed if an act contributes to even the ‘perception’ of a conflict of interest. This was undoubtedly the case here.
There is no public information available as to the make up of ‘Rheinmettal Defence Australia’ management staff. If they included former members of the ADF who had recently left positions directly related to LAND 400, would this create a perception of a conflict of interest?
Some countries have particular laws designed to prevent such situation. A conflict of interest could arise, for example, if someone applied for employment at a company which he is assessing for the award of a tender. Another law prevents such a person taking up any such an appointment within a set time period after resigning from his ‘official’ position.
———————————————————————————————–
The Ethics of ‘Masking’ Payments through the 1AR Assn.
It was announced during my recent travels [2018] that Rheinmetall has been awarded the LAND 400 contract to provide the replacement for the ASLAV recon vehicle in the three ACRs. This raises the ethical issues highlighted in the previous blog posts copied below.
28 December 2017
Priorities; Urgency; and Importance
The telephone can be the enemy of effective time management. Time and all other resources are, of course, allocated to ensure that important matters are appropriately dealt with. When someone calls on the telephone, they expect their call to be (i) answered and furthermore, (ii) their concern addressed immediately. By default … this becomes an urgent matter. If dealt with straightaway, however, it might well absorb resources required to deal with an important matter. Of course, if something is both urgent and important, it must be allocated appropriate priority.
I referred yesterday to Assn Governance (urgent) and RAAC Issues (important). It is possible, of course, for either category to include matters which are both urgent and important.
The following has the potential to be included in this category.
The financial ledger sent to Assn members recently, included the information below:
“Misc – Donation made to association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd Regt Regimental Funds ….. $5,000.00”
One has to wonder if this is the first ‘donation’ which been channelled through the Assn to avoid (presumably) any suggestion of conflict of interest (ie. as might arise if the company was a defence contractor or potential contractor). The possibility arises that other payments have been made via the Assn and that other RAAC Units are also beneficiaries. Furthermore, if ‘secret’ payments are being made to units, it has to be assumed that other payments might have been made to individuals.
There is a major project in the pipeline which affects all ARA RAAC units. Companies are vying for selection. The overall cost is in the order of $5b.
It is both urgent and important that an assurance be given that any equipment to be operated by the RAAC is chosen on its merits and the decision is not, in any way, influenced by payments “masked by coming through” the Assn.
Donations?
Continuing on from 28 December …. the Assn’s 14/15 Financial Statement (included in the Minutes of the 2015 AGM) includes the following reference under the heading, Expenditure:
“Donations (to 1AR from Rheinmetall Sim) $10,000”
I believe that $5000 may also have been donated on this basis in FY13/14.
So it appears that Rheinmetall may have donated at least $20,000 to 1AR (regimental funds presumably) through the 1AR Assn
Why would any commercial company do this, ie. what benefit would it expect to gain? One has to assume that the funds are being paid to the Assn because to pay direct to 1AR
—————————————————————————————————————-
30 December 2020
Looking After Each Other
One of the ‘Pending’ goals at Part 7 of the Intro (above) is:
“The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)”
The background?
During the ‘dark’ period in the history of the 1AR Assn, providing any form of welfare support was rejected. Indeed, formal agreement was reached with the RAAC Corporation to the effect that the Assn (like other members of the Corporation) had insufficient resources to provide such support. It was stated that should the C’tee become aware of a member in need, they’d be referred to the RSL. Added to this … it was made known that all that the members of the Assn were interested in was, ‘having a few beers and telling a few stories’.
Interestingly, Purposes four and five (out of ten) of the 1AR Assn, as set out in the Report to members included in yesterday’s Blog, are stated as:
promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve; and
provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.
Without any specific measures being introduced, I think ‘Pending’ is still the appropriate category for this Goal.
———————————————————————————————————————–
29 December 2020
Accountability to Members
The following is an extract from the Blog Intro, Part 4 (above):
“It has subsequently been discovered that considerable irregularities occurred in the conduct of the AGM: in particular, there were enormous discrepancies with proxy voting; the numbers of votes stated in the AGM Minutes were 30% more than figures given at the meeting to those attending; membership records were inaccurate and wrongly disallowed at least one member from voting; a person addressed the meeting, described as a “financial Affiliate Member”, but there is no provision for affiliate members in the Constitution; another ‘member’ addressed the meeting, but there is no mention of him in the list of those attending; and the financial statement was not only not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, but also it failed to encompass the whole FY and did not disclose reasons for the expenditure of funds.
All irregularities with respect to the Constitution were brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response was received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past 12 months.)”
The circumstances above relate to the 1AR Assn’s dark period some years ago. Some members publicly demanded adherence to regulatory requirements and accountability on the part of the C’tee. While these members were widely lambasted by others for their supposed lack of loyalty to the Assn, it is pleasing to see that progress has been made.
A link to the current Financial Statement is provided below. Not only does it comply with Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) requirements, but also it’s provided to members in advance of the AGM so that members can examine it in good time (something that the ‘concerned’ members’ group had sought).
Interestingly, if they look closely, there are some matters of detail that members might like to raise with the C’tee.
——————————————————————————————————————
28 December 2020
Defence Challenges in 2021
An Australian Army M1 Abrams Tank moves into position before sunrise at Shoalwater Bay during Exercise Diamond Strike 2018.
Image: Defence
The following articles (extracts below) provide a snapshot of some of the issues to be confronted in the year ahead ….
If the tradition still holds, arriving on Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s desk this week will be a report setting out the Australian intelligence community’s best guesses (they will call them ‘judgements’) as to big strategic developments that could go horribly wrong in 2021.
We will probably never see that report, so in its place here are my best judgements (you can call them ‘guesses’) as to the likely prospects for peace, conflict and the in-between stage now called the ‘grey zone’, where aggressors advance their interests covertly.
As the document put it, this “new strategic policy framework to ensure Australia is able – and is understood as willing – to deploy military power to shape our environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with military force”.
This language of “willingness” is unprecedented in recent memory, uncertain in its application and raises the possibility of squandering the very defensive advantages the government wishes to achieve.
Overall, the narrative of the infographics we examined seems designed to strengthen the perception that Indonesia has international support for its sovereignty over West Papua and to quash hope of outside assistance with independence for the region. While the accounts we examined attracted only a relatively small amount of interaction, information campaigns on West Papuan issues have been persistent, and this is likely to be only a small part of operations designed to spread pro-Indonesia narratives.
I’ve been very critical about the errors in current Defence publications re the RAAC (as I have with some other sites which continue to depict the pre ACR Corps and superseded equipment); however, it seems to me that they’ve done a good job re the following recruiting videos.
I was once selected to join the 3MD army recruiting team, but ended up being posted elsewhere. I wonder if I would’ve been able to avoid the ‘other’ sides to life in the RAAC as depicted here.
“Is this really a “deceit” imposed on the Australian public by its Government?
Can someone take just one of the three strategic priorities set out on the 2020 Defence Strategic Update & 2020 Force Structure Plan, dissect it in terms of its apparent ‘failings’, and reach conclusions about overall defence policy?
The three designated priorities are to:
shape Australia’s strategic environment;
deter actions against Australia’s interests; and
respond with credible military force, when required.
It is, of course, the last which dictates the equipment allocation, force structure and readiness posture of the ADF …. this being a consequence of contingency plans which have been developed in response to the identified ‘threat’.
Seems to me that before we can criticise the components of a ‘credible military force’, we have to analyse the threat and its consequent force structure.”
Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
“Wonderful post Tony. My cousin’s husband grew up in a poor area of the UK, emigrated here, learnt to fly a helicopter and built a career resupplying the WA oil rigs. At Christmas he has a tin of tuna and a couple of biscuits.
He can’t reconcile the lavishness of Christmas lunches with the fact that so many go without a decent meal (let alone the excesses of Christmas). If you had a message to pass to him (now in a terminal aged care facility), it would be much appreciated. Many thanks. PS. I know the cartoon, but for the life of me … I haven’t been able to find it.”
I don’t think that more needs to be said on this day. Merry Christmas to all those who read this Blog … might it be that between us all, we can make a few things better next year, than they were in 2020.
—————————————————————————————————————–
24 December 2020
Where Does Responsibility Lie?
First Pass.
In 2007, as a result of research for a book, I made both Defence and the Government aware of alleged war crimes in Vietnam. They already knew, however, as the Government was providing educational material to schools which stated that Australian soldiers in Vietnam killed enemy soldiers who were wounded and unable to defend themselves. A book detailing one murder was endorsed by a senior Army officer as being a great narrative of Australian military exploits.
I asked for investigations to be conducted into these murders. The Government declined. I asked if training could be revised, so that the Australian people could be confident that no such things could happen again. I was assured by the Minister, that this would be done.
It is clear that those who took no action when these matters were brought to their attention are responsible for what might have happened later. They may have ensured appropriate training was prescribed, but if they did not ensure that this was regularly validated … they are still culpable.
What does this mean? It means that they did not fulfill their responsibilities. If you are aware of something that needs to be done and are about to vacate your position … what do you do? You set down procedures that must be followed and overseen by your successor. Is this asking too much? Not at all … if a Minister or staff member takes their responsibilities seriously. Of course, they might only occupy their positions for the salary and ‘perks’ that they provide and they might not give a ‘….’ about their responsibilities.
A submission detailing the above (with copies of letters to the Minister at the time) has been provided to the Afghanistan Inquiry.
Second Pass
Subsequent events have shown that no-one in either Defence of Government bears responsibility for what is alleged to have happened in Afghanistan. How can this be?
Who has responsibility for the training that troops undertook prior to deployment? The Government endorses the CDF, the CDF endorses the CA, the CA endorses GOCs Forces Command and Training Command.
The Minister accepts the word of the CDF; the CDF accepts the word of the CA; the CA accepts the word of his GOCs. So, on we go … the result being that no-one is responsible! Is this as it should be?
My former office manager (a retired Army colonel) once yelled out from his office in an angry voice to say: “Who’s responsible for THIS (which he was waving in his hand)?” I replied to say that if it was ‘good’ it was the work of my team; if it was ‘bad’ it was my responsibility. He said; “It’s great!”. (My team appreciated what is sometimes referred to as ‘leadership’.) So … where does this leave us?
There is something called ‘self-respect’. Some people think it to be of importance, others aren’t even aware of it. There is no line of responsibility from top to bottom, unless those involved believe in the concept of ‘self-respect’. If they don’t care about it … why accept any responsibility for the conduct of those for whose actions they’re responsible?
The answer seems clear.
—————————————————————————————————————–
10 December 2020
8/13 VMR Association News
I found the information in the newsletter below, very interesting.
(8/13 were disbanded some time ago; an ‘8/13th Squadron’ is part of 4/19 PWLH)
It is great to see that, despite everything, the Armoured Corps spirit lives on and those past and their deeds, are not forgotten. Positive notes to end on.
THIS WILL BE THE LAST BLOG POST UNTIL 24 DECEMBER —– FAMILY VISITS AWAIT.
——————————————————————————————————————
9 December 2020
RAAC Operational Capability
Image: Defence
The latest issue of The Defender magazine has two interesting articles:
“Army is planning on raising a heavy armoured brigade for intensity peer to peer warfare operations as part of the 2028 Order of Battle”; and
“1 Armd Regt has been issued a fleet of new Hawkei PMV-L to trial as Combat reconnaissance Vehicles”.
I haven’t read the articles and I don’t know the accuracy of the source, however, on the surface … this would seem to be great news!
It is in keeping with two of the ‘goals’ set out in Part 7 of the Intro above, ie.
There would be two tank squadrons in the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade (to facilitate the formation of an adequate number of battlegroups).
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
One can’t be sure why 1 Armd Regt is trialing Hawkei as a CRV, but with two CRV Boxer squadrons in the ACR … it’s unlikely to be their own use.
Of course, the reason for arguing for two tank squadrons in the ‘Ready’ Brigade is because of the need for sufficient tanks to form battle groups. The reasoning here has been presented in previous Blog posts.
It seems to me that Defence has two choices. The Reserve forces can either be an ADF supplement or an ADF backup.
A supplementary role would see Reserves fulfilling individual specialist support roles, as well civil support such as that provided for the Invictus Games. An example of the former is that of a doctor I know who has recently been deployed to Iraq.
A backup role would see the Reserves maintaining operational and tactical skills, in order to be able to reinforce the ADF on active service deployments. The point here is that these skills take a long time to develop and this can only happen if appropriate equipment is available.
Maybe there’s a hybrid answer; ie. operational skills are prioritised according to importance re ADF capability and the time required for training.
The problem is, unless a decision is made … the opportunity for the reserves to capable of providing an ADF backup role rapidly diminishes, as the capability gap increases.”
Dustin is an Army Reserve Captain within 9 Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. He is currently undertaking a Reserve Forces Foreign Exchange with the District of Columbia National Guard whilst posted to Washington DC in his civilian role with the Australian Public Service. As an Army Officer, Dustin has completed multiple periods of full time service, including deployments on border security operations and Defence Assistance to the Civil Community.
—————————————————————————————————————–
6 December 2020
50th Anniversary Reunion: C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt
A National Commemoration is being held by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord. The main battle of this Operation was fought on 7 June 1971 and hence the Commemoration will be on 7 June 2021. C Sqn is holding a 50th Reunion for all those who served during 1971 in conjunction with the DVA Ceremony, which will be at the Vietnam Memorial in Canberra. A dinner is to be held the night before and prior to that wreaths will be laid in honour of Phil Barwick and Andy Anderson (who were wounded in the Operation immediately after Overlord) at the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM.
There are currently about 100 registered to attend the dinner. Should any reader wish to attend, although not in C Sqn 1971 but with another connection, you’d be welcome to do so. Email me at cameronshome@bigpond.com. Info below.
Timetable
6 June 2021 (Sunday).
2.00pm Vietnam Requiem Concert (hosted by the AWM’s Musical Artist in Residence, Chris Latham, at the Llewellyn Hall, ANU).
4.55pm. Last Post Ceremony commences at the AWM. (In honour of Cpl David John Dubber, RAAF; KIA 7th June 1971.) Wreaths laid in honour of Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick
5.25pm. Ceremony concludes
6.30pm. C Squadron Meet and Greet (bar/lounge area of the Mercure Hotel, Ainslie).
7.30pm. Dinner is served. ($60pp)
9.30pm. Dinner concludes (those who so desire, adjourn to the bar)
7 June 2021 (Monday)
10.30am. National commemoration commences (Vietnam Memorial, ANZAC Pde, Canberra).
11.30am. Commemoration concludes.
12 noon. ‘Snacks’ at Mercure Hotel (drinks at own expense, food cost to be advised).
Note: DVA will provide a shuttle bus from the Mercure to the Ceremony and back
——————————————————————————————————————
5 December 2020
Vietnam Requiem
Flowers of War – Diggers’ Requiem: Image-City News Canberra.
Last night I attended a rehearsal performance of the Vietnam Requiem:
It was just incredible and the full concert should be simply amazing. It was to be performed only once on 6 June 2021, prior to the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord, but COVID has meant that the venue will be limited to 50% capacity and an earlier performance on will be held on 5 June.
John Shumann did a new rendition of ‘I was only 19‘ and Little Patti has lost none of her vocal talent. They are both simply delightful people.
Act 1 of the Requiem comprises twelve songs that were popular at the time of Vietnam; while ACT 2 is made up of twelve Movements which relate to specific phases/aspects of the War, ‘illustrated’ by a photographic backing. The three Movements performed during the Rehearsal were very compelling and wonderfully performed.
—————————————————————————————————————–
4 December 2020
The RAAC ARES
The following article is published in The Cove by Eamon Hale (below):
I have argued previously for vehicles (not necessarily AFVs) which could enable mobile warfare reconnaissance skills to be developed and maintained to be allocated to the RAAC ARES.
As you know it’s the skills that take the time to instil at all levels. Whether or not this is important, depends on the role of the ARES within the ADF. It’s hard to imagine that mobile warfare skills are not required at this time in terms of Defence contingency plans. This is evidenced by the funding granted to procure the Boxer CRV.
BUT … no-one is prepared to state and justify the actual role of the ARES in time of defence emergency. Maybe it’s thought the such a time will not come again. Even the 2020 Defence Reserves Association conference completely side-stepped this fundamental issue.
I hope that the fundamental role of the ARES will be defined, then the wisdom of your proposals will undoubtedly come into play!”
Eamon Hale joined the Army Reserve in 2004, as an M113A1 crewman. He transferred to the Regular Army in 2007, being posted to numerous units with the RAAC and Army. He has deployed on operation to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as exchange to Canada, and training officer cadets in PNG. In mid-2017, Eamon left the regular Army and returned to the Army reserve. In 2020, he commenced a continuous full-time service contract attached to 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with whom he deployed again to Afghanistan as a Force Protection Node Commander and PMV Section Commander.
—————————————————————————————————————-
3 December 2020
In the Shadows 3
Following on from 1 December … the following email sequence is self-explanatory”
1. Hi Charlie,
I see now that not only was your phone not ‘lost’, but also you have barred me from phoning you. You really don’t have to lie.
Is it not a travesty that we can’t be open about our communications and discussions with others?
I could, for example, publish the emails between you and me.
Maybe one or other of those cc’d will have the ‘balls’ to phone me and say why it was that the open and transparent arrangements that you and I had established, were simply ‘overturned’ without any notice to me (or considerations of those on whose behalf we were working).
Once again, I ask if you or Noel or Pedro could phone me (if any of you have the guts to do so).
Cheers, Bruce
2. G’day Bruce
What are you trying to do here. The matters between you and Charlie are not of my concern or interest. I have absolutely nothing to do with the social events you are all worked up about.
I was not involved in any of this and absolutely have no interest. I do not even know Charlie.
What is the purpose of me phoning you?
Are you calling me out as gutless, if so I believe we should sort that out face to face, not via email or phone.
Why am I even a CC addressee on this crap?
Pedro
3. G’day Pedro,
I like to be open and transparent in all matters I’m involved in.
The person who nominated himself to be a 3 Cav representative (with the backing of the 3 Cav Assn President) for a combined function on the eve of the Overlord Commemoration won’t explain why there was a sudden decision not to proceed according to our planning, but to conduct a separate 3 Cav function.
I simply ask why I wasn’t given the courtesy of being told when it was decided that ‘if the Commemoration goes ahead, we’ll have our own function’. This would have been very helpful to know in term of the organisation.
It’s my belief that Mr McLaughlin wanted to attend a social event, but not one with other groups; as a result, he contacted Mr Dearling and they agreed to proceed independently.
I know that Mr McLaughlin informed you of the arrangements and I presumed that you might have been part of the discussion between him and Mr Dearling. You have said that this was not the case.
Thank you … that’s all I was wanting to know.
PS. Don’t you think it ‘unusual’ that Mr Dearling won’t discuss the matter and has blocked my calls … if you’re working in partnership with someone, there’s an expectation that both are honest with each other. I guess if one is to get “worked up” about something, it’s as good a reason as any.
Bruce
—————————————————————————————————————–
2 December 2020
The Retrospective Victoria Cross.
The following letter to the Editor, ‘Canberra Times’ stands by itself:
“It was wonderful to see the gallantry of ‘Teddy’ Sheean recognised at last. But it’s been a longer road that it should ever have been.
There were a number of letters earlier this year about the Government’s decision to overturn the independent Tribunal’s decision that he should be awarded the VC. This decision was surprising, as no-one doubted the bravery and self-sacrifice demonstrated (which is why the independent Tribunal recommended that the award be made retrospectively).
It subsequently became known that the PM accepted the advice of our Chief of Defence Force that the Queen might be put in a difficult position if the award was to be recommended. Apparently, the NZ Government put forward an equivalent proposal some time ago, only for it to be rejected. It was also thought that a retrospective award would open the floodgates for other claims and that two classes of award would be created.
Many were of the view that courage and sacrifice on behalf of our nation was being ditched in favour of political nicety. Public opinion subsequently compelled the PM to appoint Dr Brendan Nelson to examine the matter; the outcome of which led to the recent award and ceremony at Government House. It seems that the Government’s decision to withdraw the Meritorious Unit Citation to the SASR might also be overturned by public opinion.
There’s undoubtedly a message here … let’s hope that it is recognised and acted upon.”
—————————————————————————————————————–
1 December 2020
In the Shadows 3
The following sequence of emails is self-explanatory (though the matters addressed are less so). It is all very tiresome, but apathy doesn’t appeal to everyone.
I’ve copied you some of the ‘Updates’ which detail the activities for the C Sqn Reunion. I note that you’ve opted not to copy me into associated matters that you’re involved with.
When you send the following [proposed] message to members of the Assn, maybe you’d like to say that the names of those attending the C Sqn reunion will be advised by myself when they ‘register’ early next year. But maybe that would be too late and those who are not members of the Assn would miss out ….
“Those members of C Squadron wishing to attend the National Service of Remembrance at the National Vietnam Memorial, or any formal ceremonies at the AWM should register with Pedro Rosemond as soon as possible as numbers at the AWM have been considerably restricted due to COVID-19.”
How do you think that we might resolve this matter for the benefit of ALL C Sqn veterans? I could, of course, provide the names of all those who have indicated their intention to attend the dinner. That would cover everyone, whether or not an Assn member.
PS. You’ll be interested to know that I’ve spoken to the AWM re the LPC and wreath laying and have initiated a request for a DVA grant for two wreaths (Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick).
I have no intent to become engaged in a competition of any kind, especially over this topic.
I have assisted the 1st Armoured Regiment Association and the RAAC Corporation with these Vietnam 50th Anniversary Events simply from an experience perspective. Along with many others who have also provided support and assistance to make sure the events are conducted to the highest standard possible and I compliment DVA Staff on their energy and competence in doing these things.
DVA initially conducted these 50th Anniversary Events within the budget of the Centenary of WW1. After the Bin Ba Commemoration there were not to be any more as there was no dedicated funding. This took a concerted effort and loads of work from us to bring about the remainder of the 50th Anniversary Events being commemorated by DVA. It was shocking to me that the DVA heads could not see that stopping 50th Anniversary Commemoration half way through the experiences of the Vietnam Veterans would be devastating to the Veteran who were involved in major Operations such as Hammersley 70, Overlord 71 and the end of War 72. They got the point, achieved the funding and so the events are unfolding as they should.
This is the work of the RAAC Corporation, of which I am simply a member of the Advisory Board and as such have no place to broadcast what we are doing, which I would not do in any case as I prefer t just contribute to the effort of the organisation of which I am a member.
Back to the issue of who is compiling lists. Bruce, if you have a list of confirmed attendees, please provide a numbers to me and DVA at the meeting you attend this week. That is all that is required. I do not need to know names of who is attending or what events they choose to participate in. DVA require the proposed attendance so that they can arrange appropriate resources to support the event.
Note of Caution: We are not clear of Covid 19 and if all the policy makers are paying attention to what is happening in the Norther Hemisphere, as Winter approaches and the climate cools, we may experience a similar challenge as Winter Approaches here in the Southern Hemisphere next year. God help us and we can all prey that is not the case.
3.From: Bruce Cameron To: ”Peter Rosemond’ Cc: ‘Noel McLaughlin’; ‘Secretary’; Peter Scott; Tony Cox; John Scales Subject: Consultation
G’day Pedro,
There are 108 ‘definite’ attendees for the C Sqn dinner on 6 June 2021 and 12 ‘probables’. So 120, however, I expect this number to fall as we enter 2021 by 25%.
Ninety C Sqn attendees, therefore. George Hulse advises that the mini-team guys will be attending the dinner also … but it is probably best for this number to be advised to DVA by the sappers themselves.
Good to know the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board has been so busy in terms of its “concerted efforts and loads of work”. You’ll appreciate that the Commemoration is the initiative of Peter Scott, CO 3 RAR in 1971. He and the battalion function organiser, Tony Cox, have met with DVA on a number of occasions. DVA have always been very supportive. They could not confirm the event until the FY budget was approved, but we knew that the intention was always there. Peter Scott has organised a commemorative coin and pre-paid envelope, which have been approved.
There were 254 from all Corps in the sqn, 25% of whom are deceased. Of the remainder, 90% have been able to be contacted and informed about the commemoration. We will consult with them before deciding on those to lay wreaths and to act as the designated Sqn VIP.
Interestingly, the cut-off date for DVA grant requests for the Commemoration has passed. DVA were very helpful in advising how a grant could be requested by a non-incorporated association/person. We have requested DVA funding for printing (dinner name tags, menu etc) as well as two wreaths for laying at the AWM Last Post Ceremony. These will be in honour of two sqn members who DOW. Those to lay the wreaths will be decided by their mates. The AWM advise 200 attendees now, but 2000 (I think) if COVID restrictions are lifted. Fingers crossed. We will be making a booking with the AWM for a small wreath laying party for 6 June 2021, just in case COVID is still with us.
——————————————————————————————————————
30 November 2020
In the Shadows II
The following a copy of a post of mine in response to a post on the 3 Cav Forum which alleged that I had appointed myself with respect to organisation of the Overlord Commemoration …. when I had no right to do so.
(This really is very tiresome!)
“I don’t regard myself as self-appointed. DVA invited me to provide advice and I’ve been doing this for some time. The whole commemoration was the idea of the former CO 3 RAR and I’ve been working with him to bring it to fruition. 3RAR activities, like those of C Sqn, are being organised by an individual, not the 3RAR Assn.
The former CO’s idea was to commemorate the Battle of Long Khanh. My tank troop and later that of the late Warren Hind were instrumental in the success of the Battle. Given this involvement, I felt that I had a responsibility to do what I could to assist. [DVA decided to expand the commemoration to the whole of Operation Overlord, though the Battle of Long Khanh will still appear in the official title of the Commemoration.]
I set about contacting all former sqn members about a year ago [actually 18 month ago]. It was decided to invite all those who served during 1971, not just during Operation Overlord. Ninety per cent of those still alive have been contacted. Of the 254, almost 20 per cent are deceased. The 254 include all corps who served with the sqn. I think all will be particularly pleased with the Commemorative coin being produced by the Mint (I just hope that they’ve got the driver’s beret pulled down on the right side). I have kept the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation informed of what I’ve been doing and the consequent planning. I can send you details if you wish.
In terms of others I invited to the coming planning meeting … they were the sqn 2IC at the time (now the most senior surviving member) and a representative of D&E platoon (which lost five KIA in the 84 Section incident). I established that 3 Cav would be represented by the RAAC Corporation (as will the 1AR Assn). I’ll report on the outcome of the meeting. You might be right … there might be too many cooks. (I had to join the AACC Facebook group to track down the C Sqn cooks.)
“I couldn’t let the 49th Anniversary of our attack on the base and training facility for 3 Battalion, 33 NVA Regt (and other units) to go past without saying how honoured I was to have served with you all. Although it was 3 and 5 Troop involved in name, as always, it was a Squadron effort. As you’re all aware, while the National Commemoration on this day next year will be for Operation Overlord, our reunion is for all those who served in, and in support of, C Sqn throughout 1971.”
At all times I’ve tried to do the right thing and to keep everyone informed. I don’t feel in any way, that I’m guilty of some foul deed or misrepresentation.
——————————————————————————————————————-
29 November 2020
In the Shadows
It’s great to take a break from the Brereton Report, but no less joyful (unfortunately).
I’ve been accused of trying to usurp the 3 Cav Assn in terms of a function to be held in conjunction with the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord.
The email below indicates how I went about checking with the 3 Cav Assn re any intentions for a function on 6 June 2021 and, if not, to extend an invite to 3 Cav members to attend our tank squadron dinner.
Hi Dallas,
I’m currently doing some pre-planning and your advice would be appreciated.
If DVA funding enables a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord to be conducted, will you be organising a 3 Cav get-together?
If not, would you be interested in inviting those who participated in Operation Overlord etc, to join C Sqn for our dinner on 6 June 2021?
There’s no commitment associated with your answer … it will simply help in my planning (I’m already aware of a number of 3 Cav pers who would be attending the Commemoration, should it be held). I don’t want to make this difficult, simply trying to anticipate arrangements with the function venue we’re dealing with (which can all be cancelled if DVA finding is not approved).
Many thanks, Bruce
Dallas (the President) indicated that it was unlikely that 3 Cav would organise a specific function, so I went ahead and extended the invite. Charlie Dearling offered to act as co-ordinator for 3 Cav, as he was one of those who accepted the invite. Discussion on this forum took place so that everyone knew what was planned, including re the right signs for the 3 Cav and 84 Section table signs (which have been pre-prepared).
Unbeknown to me, as this time, Charlie and Noel Mclaughlin (Chairman, RAAC Corporation) were planning to conduct a 3 Cav event. Days ago, Charlie advised me that: “The Association was waiting to see if the event was to go ahead, and now that it appears certain, are starting to look at preparations. We decided that an informal ‘meet and greet’ on Sunday 6 Jun will better suit our members ….”.
I’ve subsequently read (in an email forwarded to me) that “Charlie Dearling – in conjunction with Dallas Burrage of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association – is organising an informal dinner on the night of 6 June 2021 in the Ainslie area for 3 Cav veterans”.
It was interesting to see that Charlie commented that: “Suppose I better think about an email to a certain party…….”.
I wonder who that might have been and why he and Noel couldn’t have been open and transparent in the first place. I spent eight months trying to keep everyone informed. I sent copies of updates to the RAAC Corporation and Sec 1AR Assn. Why couldn’t someone have sent an email to me to say that if the National Commemoration goes ahead, we’re planning a 3 Cav function.
This would have meant that time wouldn’t have been wasted in preparing table signs, nor negotiating with the venue for additional space. Of course, I would also have been able to advise where the 3RAR companies have booked for their company dinners. I’ve left a message on Charlie’s phone … I hope, should he ring me, that the next post might explain how things came to this point.
The following email to the Secretary of the 1AR Assn is more of the same:
Dear Secretary,
I’ve copied you some of the ‘Updates’ which detail the activities for the C Sqn Reunion. I note that you’ve opted not to copy me into associated matters that you’re involved with.
When you send the following message to members of the Assn, maybe you’d like to say that the names of those attending the C Sqn reunion will be advised by myself when they ‘register’ early next year. But maybe that would be too late and those who are not members of the Assn would miss out.
“Those members of C Squadron wishing to attend the National Service of Remembrance at the National Vietnam Memorial, or any formal ceremonies at the AWM should register with Pedro Rosemond as soon as possible as numbers at the AWM have been considerably restricted due to COVID-19.”
How do you think that we might resolve this matter for the benefit of ALL C Sqn veterans? I could, of course, provide the names of all those who have indicated their intention to attend the dinner. That would cover everyone, whether or not an Assn member.
PS. You’ll be interested to know that I’ve spoken to the AWM re the LPC and wreath laying and have initiated a request for a DVA grant for two wreaths (Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick).
——————————————————————————————————————
28 November 2020
Brereton Report 11
letter to the Canberra Times ….
Dear Editor:
I agree with John Simmons (‘Many rotten apples’, Letters, 26 November), the problem predates Afghanistan. When allegations from Vietnam were brought to the Government’s attention, they shirked their responsibility and declined to investigate them; giving assurances that training had been revised and the same thing couldn’t happen again.
I drew the Minister’s attention to Government material provided for school children doing modern history which stated Australian soldiers were guilty of “killing the badly wounded [and] shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”. I also pointed to an interview published by DVA in which it was alleged that “the Geneva Convention was thrown out the window … if something moves, you shoot the bastard, irrespective of what it is, or who it is…”. My request for investigations fell on deaf ears.
I asked the Minister in 2008, “Do you agree that one of the fundamental tenets that Australian schoolchildren should be taught is that: Although the horror of the reality of war is worse than anything thot can be imagined, Australian people and their Government condemn the abuse of military power in any form whatsoever— proof of this is provided by the thoroughness by which each and every alleged atrocity is investigated”.
Rather than SAS officers letting down their men, I feel that the Government has let down the ADF. If investigations into the above allegations had been conducted, and training revised and validated, what is alleged to have happened in Afghanistan, might not have occurred.
“Great article. I agree … it is a Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that sends its nation’s soldiers to war. But, it is the same Government who is responsible for ensuring that training is appropriate, not only to confront the battlefield challenges, but also, the moral challenges that are to be faced. The Government was complicit in turning a ‘blind eye’ to matters associated with breaches of Rules of Engagement (ROE) in Vietnam. Advice was requested from the responsible Minister that military training had been structured to ensure that the moral failings which occurred in Vietnam could never happen again. This assurance was given. It proved ill-founded.
The following examples from Vietnam emphasise the differing perspectives that applied:
The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that we had to positively identify enemy before we engaged. In essence, this meant that they had to be carrying weapons. One night we were in an ambush. Using a first-generation night vision device, the sentry saw four legs … two followed by another two. Upper bodies were obscured. Whoever they were, they were breaking the curfew. This did not mean they were enemy, however. After ‘standing to’, I counted down over the radio and all tanks switched on their searchlights. There was no need to give the order to fire. Illuminated was the biggest buck deer anyone had ever seen. The four legs were explained.”
—————————————————————
One book I read was ‘Contact Wait Out!: A Vietnam Diary’ by Bruce Ravenscroft. The author describes an ambush he was involved in. A number of enemy were killed and one wounded (who could be heard to be in pain). The ambush commander radioed his HQ and explained the situation. He was told not to bring back any prisoners. All members of the ambush party stood up and “emptied their magazines into the enemy soldier”.
I couldn’t believe what I was reading. My surprise was compounded by the fact that the Foreword of the book, which described it as “a valuable addition to the documents about the war from an Australian’s perspective”, was written by a serving senior Army officer.”
Jon Blackwell has managed hospital and health services in the Pilbara and South Australia and was the CEO of the Central Coast Area Health Service from 1997-2003. He was subsequently CEO of Workcover NSW from 2003-2009.
——————————————————————————————————————
26 November 2020
Brereton Report 9
One of those to whom I sent a copy of my call for greater Government accountability was Andrew Hastie. The following is an SBS report from yesterday:
Mr Hastie, who chairs a parliamentary committee on intelligence and security, wants to create a committee with powers to compel defence chiefs and bureaucrats.
“If we are serious about increased accountability and transparency, then we need proper parliamentary scrutiny of the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force,” he said.
This goes some of the way, but it doesn’t acknowledge that the reason for oversight is that it is Government that is responsible. Government policy is that which determines the state of readiness of the ADF, as well as its structure, equipment, and nature of training.
Recently, Don Spinks (Repatriation Commissioner) circulated an Open Letter from the Minister and Secretary of DVA. I contacted him to say:
“Thanks for forwarding the Open Letter. After reading it, I rang the Safe Zone number. I was concerned that there did not seem to be anyone looking into the failure of the Government to investigate war crimes from Vietnam, the results of which might have prevented what’s now being investigated. I was advised to go the Defence Ombudsman.
I’ve copied below my submission the Afghanistan Inquiry.
Is there anyway, in which DVA can look at its own responsibility, having ignored matters brought to the Department’s attention re Vietnam, for what happened in Afghanistan?”
He, to his great credit and that of his Office, responded to say (in part):
I have forwarded your concern to DVA for review and comment, I will advise once I have RX feedback.
——————————————————————————————————————–
25 November 2020
Brereton Report 8
Image: Andrew Hastie
This matter has taken up much time recently. I’m annoyed with myself for not having more persistent regarding the Vietnam matters I alerted the Government to, but the Minister assured me that training had been revised and such things could never happen again.
“It can also be argued that Governments have failed the Australian Defence Force. Twelve years ago, our school children were being told in educational material provided by the then Government that Australian soldiers committed the very same war crimes in Vietnam, as are alleged to have occurred in Afghanistan.
It is a Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that sends its nation’s soldiers to war. It is the same Government who is responsible for ensuring that training is appropriate, not only to confront the battlefield challenges, but also, the moral challenges that are to be faced. The Government has turned a ‘blind eye’ to breaches of ROE in Vietnam. The responsible action would have been to investigate, identify systemic weaknesses and institute and validate training to ensure such things couldn’t occur again. I asked if the Minister could give such an assurance to the Australian people. This assurance was given. It proved ill-founded.
I’ve copied below a letter to the Minister of Veterans Affairs in April 2008 [see earlier blog].
The last question was: “Do you agree that one of the fundamental tenets that Australian schoolchildren should be taught is that: Although the horror of the reality of war is worse than anything that can be imagined, Australian people and their Government condemn the abuse of military power in any form whatsoever—proof of this is provided by the thoroughness by which each and every alleged atrocity is investigated”? I received no response to this or the earlier questions I asked.”
——————————————————————————————————————
24 November 2020
Brereton Report 7
Image: ABC
The following was included in the latest Army newspaper:
“Message from the Chief of Army
As individual, we demonstrate integrity by being accountable for our actions. We are also accountable to call out the behaviour of others when it is not in accordance with our values.
We report accurately and honestly. If something isn’t right, we say so.
As teams, we demonstrate the integrity of our actions by auditing, checking and testing. As an Army we demonstrate integrity by investigating when our actions and words are not aligned with what is right. We self-identify and self-correct.
Acting with integrity, every day, strengthens trust in our teams, with other organisations and with the Australian people.
We strive to be a trusted national institution where every member of its team always acts ethically and with integrity.
– CA Lt-Gen Rick Burr
INTEGRITY – is the consistency of character to align my thoughts, words and actions to do what is right.”
I’ve sent the following email to the CA …
Dear Sir,
I’ve copied below my submission to the Afghanistan inquiry [published on the Blog below]. I see that in the Army Newspaper, you say:
“As individual, we demonstrate integrity by being accountable for our actions. We are also accountable to call out the behaviour of others when it is not in accordance with our values.
We report accurately and honestly. If something isn’t right, we say so.”
BUT what happens when someone does the ‘right thing’ … and those that they’ve reported to, ignore their responsibilities and no change occurs?
The ‘ice age’ continues … that’s what happens! I can’t believe that reports made about incidents simply ‘go through to the keeper’. I’m very tempted to write a piece for the media to show how ‘corrupt’ the reporting system is.
Yours sincerely, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————————————–
23 November 2020
The Brereton Report 6
Following on ….
War Crimes and Government Inaction: A Conspiracy of Silence: Part 2
The Second Account (2007)
Still doing research for my book, I came across material that the Department of Veterans’ Affairs had provided for use by the education system, as part of schools’ modern history curriculum. The references stated that war crimes had been committed by Australian soldiers in Vietnam. I wrote to the Minister for Defence asking for assurance that the incidents referred to, had all been investigated. My letter was forwarded to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. More than six months later, I received a response from DVA to say that my request for an investigation “had been denied”.
I wrote back to the Minister, asking a number of questions regarding DVA’s statement to schoolchildren that war crimes were committed in Vietnam, for inclusion in my book. This letter is attached (G2). No such information was received.
The Third Account (2008)
My research took me to DVA’s oral history archive where I was able to listen to veterans recounting their experience. One interviewee, however, made allegations about war crimes which I knew to be untrue. I contacted DVA and advised that the allegations were false. I was informed that the interview had been recorded in good faith and couldn’t be removed as this would affect the integrity of the archive. I gathered evidence, sought legal opinion, and wrote to the Minister, asking that the interview be withdrawn as it was false, misleading and defamatory. (Letter attached, G3). Finally, the oral history was removed from the archive.
Conclusion
It is a Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that sends its nation’s soldiers to war. It is the same Government who is responsible for ensuring that training is appropriate, not only to confront the battlefield challenges, but also, the moral challenges that are to be faced. The accounts above demonstrate that Government has been complicit in turning a ‘blind eye’ to matters associated with breaches of ROE. Advice was requested that military training had been structured to ensure that moral challenges faced in Vietnam could be appropriately addressed in the future. This assurance was given. It proved ill-founded.
——————————————————————————————————————-
22 November 2020
Brereton Report 5
Following on …. the first part of my short ‘paper’ identifying Government culpability, is copied below.
War Crimes and Government Inaction: A Conspiracy of Silence: Part 1
I have just heard the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs say that there were obvious failings within the military and it has to lift its game (or words to that effect). He made no mention of any responsibility on the part of the Government. I believe that the Government has in the past, and continues today, to shirk its accountability for what has happened in Afghanistan.
The following narrative relates to three accounts of different incidents of unlawful killing by Australian soldiers in Vietnam. On each occasion, as soon as I became aware of the circumstances, I requested that an investigation be conducted. I further sought assurance that measures had been introduced so that Australians could have confidence that such things could not happen again. In the background to all this, DVA provided material for school children which stated that Australians committed war crimes in Vietnam. Government knew about war crimes, but had it investigated them?
Background.
I was a tank troop leader in Vietnam in 1971. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that we had to positively identify enemy before we engaged. In essence, this meant that they had to be carrying weapons. One night we were in an ambush. Using a first-generation night vision device, the sentry saw four legs … two followed by another two. Upper bodies were obscured. Whoever they were, they were breaking the curfew. This did not mean they were enemy, however. After ‘standing to’, I counted down over the radio and all tanks switched on their searchlights. There was no need to give the order to fire. Illuminated was the biggest buck deer anyone had ever seen. The four legs were explained.
During research for my book, I tried to read as widely as possible. One book I read was ‘Contact Wait Out!: A Vietnam Diary’ by Bruce Ravenscroft. (https://regimental-books.com.au/product/contact-wait-out-a-vietnam-diary/) The author describes an ambush he was involved in. A number of enemy were killed and one wounded (who could be heard to be in pain). The ambush commander radioed his HQ and explained the situation. He was told not to bring back any prisoners. All members of the ambush party stood up and “emptied their magazines into the enemy soldier”.
I couldn’t believe what I was reading. My surprise was compounded by the fact that the Foreword of the book, which described it as “a valuable addition to the documents about the war from an Australian’s perspective”, was written by a serving Army brigadier (who went on to be a major general).
What to do? Being aware that there is no statute of limitations as far as murder is concerned, I rang the Defence whistle-blower telephone number. This isn’t something for ‘us’ I was told, go to the police. This isn’t something for ‘us’ I was told, go to Defence. I wrote to the Minister of Defence. The Army History Unit conducted a search of records and concluded that the incident had never happened. As far as I’m aware, the author of the book was never interviewed. Once the incident became known to be a fabrication, he rang me and stated emphatically that every word was completely true “right down to the last copper jacketed bullet!”.
I was still concerned that the account had been ‘endorsed’ by a senior officer (and, therefore, seemingly part of a wider culture within Army). I wrote the Minister again and asked if he could guarantee that appropriate training was in place to ensure any such breach of ROE would never be accepted again. The Minister responded to say that this was the case.
—————————————————————————————————————–
21 November 2020
Brereton Report 4
In earlier posts, I’ve copied information I’ve sent to the media about the Afghanistan report. I haven’t had any responses … so time to go for the jugular! The email below is the cover to my submission to the leader of the Opposition.
I’ve been advised it’s been copied to the Shadow Minister for Defence, as well as Mr Albanese’s policy working group.
We can only hope that lessons from the past are acknowledged.
Dear Mr Albanese,
I believe that the attached material shows partial culpability on the part of the Government which has not been acknowledged.
I further believe that, unless there is such acknowledgement, that the status quo won’t change.
I offer the attached for your consideration.
I don’t seek any personal publicity; however, if there is a need for someone to stand behind this issue, then I’m prepared to do so.
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
—————————————————–
The above is the Blog post as I drafted it. I wrote to Mr Albanese because I thought that he could ask questions in Parliament which would force the Government to recognise their culpability and responsibility (rather than simply hanging the Army out to dry) … BUT, I’ve just realised that Alan Griffin (the Minister to whom I wrote to in 2007/8) was Labor. So Albo is unlikely to light much a fire under the current Govt. Hence, I’ve copied the material to Andrew Hastie and Jacqui Lambie; but I think it’ll take an investigative journalist to really make the case for principled and lasting change.
I’ll post the short ‘paper’ I sent, tomorrow
——————————————————————————————————————–
20 November 2020
The Seniority of Regiments in the RAAC
Following on from 5 November …. the seniority for the first four RAAC regiments is currently listed as:
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Cavalry Regiment
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI)
This was correct when 2/14 LHR (QMI) was an ARES unit, but it is now ARA.
The basis for seniority is set out in Australian Military Regulations AMR):
“Units of the Army take precedence as follows:
(a) the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves;
(b) the units have precedence according to the order of their numerical succession;
(c) if units are not included in a numerical succession, the units have precedence according to the order in which the Commands to which they belong are specified in the instrument appointing Commands.”
(i) AMR “were cancelled in April 2015; however, the precedence originated from these regulations still stand …”;
(ii) 2/14 LHR (QMI) fully transitioned to an ARA regiment in 2005, however, “there is no evidence that the RAAC Corps Council requested a change to the order [of seniority] of the RAAC units to the Chief of Army”.
(iii) “The Corp could have made an adjustment to the accepted order. It did not do this at the time nor was it requested”.
(iv) “The HOC RAAC has no intention in requesting the order change …”.
The conclusion … the order is wrong, but the RAAC has not bothered to ask for it to be changed.
——————————————————————————————————————-
19 November 2020
The Brereton Report III
Image: ABC
Following on from the earlier posts, I have given the following response to two media articles which have widespread readership (see below). I have deliberately not stated what the reply was that I received from the Minister. I hope that this ‘drip feed’ might draw attention to the deliberate policy of Governments past, ie. to ignore all such matters and refuse to investigate and respond as needed. It can well be argued that if the Government had responded as it should have in the past, what is being reported on now might well have never happened.
“The Government has continually shirked its responsibility and must be held to account.
I can prove this, for example … sometime ago, I wrote to the then Minister of Defence. I pointed out that educational material, provided by DVA to Australian schoolchildren, includes reference to an unspecified number of incidents of Australian soldiers: “killing the badly wounded [and] shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”. I also drew attention to an interview published by DVA in which it is alleged that “the Geneva Convention was thrown out the window [by Australian soldiers in Vietnam] … if something moves , you shoot the bastard, irrespective of what it is, or who it is…whether innocents were killed, maimed, whatever, we just didn’t give a xxxx”.
I expressed the view that the material raised a number of questions: (i) were the alleged incidents investigated; if not, why not?; (ii) if found to be true, what action was taken to bring those responsible to justice and to ensure that the same thing could not happen again? I highlighted the fact that, without this information, schoolchildren may believe that such actions were condoned by the Australian Government. I asked the Minister if he would ensure that all allegations had been investigated and amend the educational material to reflect this.
I look forward to all relevant matters leading up to this situation, being made known (to which I will contribute)”.
Following on from 16 November, I’ve copied another letter below, to show how responsibility must be accepted on the part of Government and those in command for not acting prior the circumstances which have arisen recently.. I look forward to all relevant matters leading up to this situation, being made known (to which I will contribute).
————————————————————————————
The Hon Alan Griffin, MP
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
House of Representatives,
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
cc. Maj Gen David Morrison, AM,
Chairman, Army History Committee.
Dear Minister,
ALLEGATIONS OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY AUSTRALIANS IN VIETNAM
On 6 October 2007 I wrote to the then Minister of Defence. I pointed out that educational material, provided by DVA to Australian schoolchildren, includes reference to an unspecified number of incidents of Australian soldiers: “killing the badly wounded [and]shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”. I also drew attention to an interview published by DVA in which it is alleged that “the Geneva Convention was thrown out the window [by Australian soldiers in Vietnam]…if something moves , you shoot the bastard, irrespective of what it is, or who it is…whether innocents were killed, maimed, whatever, we just didn’t give a xxxx”.
I expressed the view that the material raised a number of questions: (i) were the alleged incidents investigated; if not, why not?; (ii) if found to be true, what action was taken to bring those responsible to justice and to ensure that the same thing could not happen again? I highlighted the fact that, without this information, schoolchildren may believe that such actions were condoned by the Australian Government. I asked the Minister if he would ensure that all allegations had been investigated and amend the educational material to reflect this.
My letter was forwarded to the then Minister of Veterans’ Affairs on 15 November 2007 (responsibility for the matter having been judged to lie within your portfolio). Today, more than six months after the date of my letter, I received a response from the Director, Advising and Public Law Legal Services, DVA.
In informing me that my request to have these allegations investigated had been denied, Mr Harrison stated that “Information for teachers on the Australian Defence Force protocols and procedures in wartime is not included [in DVA’s educational resource material] as this is not part of the curriculum”. I take this to mean that DVA considers that Australia’s education curriculum in some way prevents schoolchildren being informed that while atrocities sometimes occur in war, those alleged to have been committed by Australian soldiers in Vietnam have been thoroughly investigated by the Australian Government.
I will ask the Minister for Education to consider DVA’s position on this matter; for the moment, however…I am currently writing a book about Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. I would like to ask you the following questions (so that the responses of the Australian Government may be included in the book for the benefit of all Australians):
How many incidents (please state if an estimate) form the basis of advice to Australian schoolchildren that Australian soldiers in Vietnam killed badly wounded enemy soldiers?
How many incidents (please state if an estimate) form the basis of advice to Australian schoolchildren that Australian soldiers in Vietnam shot enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat?
Do any of the incidents at paras 1 and 2 include that described in ‘Contact : Wait Out’? The alleged murder of a wounded enemy soldier contained in this book was investigated by the Minister of Defence in 2005. The incident was found to have been a complete fabrication by the author. (Material has been provided to DVA separately which shows conclusively that the interview referred to in the opening paragraph is another fake memoir.)
Apart from the incident in ‘Contact ; Wait Out’, how many atrocities, among those which form the basis of DVA’s advice to schoolchildren, have been investigated, as far as DVA is aware?
Apart from the incident in ‘Contact : Wait Out’…of those allegations which have been investigated, how many have been found to be true, as far as DVA is aware?
If DVA is aware of alleged atrocities which have not been investigated, has DVA brought those matters to the attention of the relevant authorities?
Do you agree that one of the fundamental tenets that Australian schoolchildren should be taught is that: Although the horror of the reality of war is worse than anything that can be imagined, Australian people and their Government condemn the abuse of military power in any form whatsoever—proof of this is provided by the thoroughness by which each and every alleged atrocity is investigated.
Yours sincerely,
——————————————————————————————————————–
17 November 2020
The RAAC Looking Good!
A recent Blog post bemoaned the lack of ‘accurate’ public relations material re the RAAC.
With the 50th Anniversary of 2 Cav Regt coming up on Cambrai Day, I went looking for information as to what might be happening.
I struck Gold!
The above Association website includes a recent address by the CO 2 Cav Regt. He is to be congratulated as a truly great ambassador, not only for 2 Cav Regt, but the Army as a whole.
Seems to me that the RAAC is in good shape.
What a pity it is that more information such as that provided here, is not readily available.
I encourage everyone to watch this video. It is 12 mins long and can be found at the following website (under CO 2 Cav Regt). Copy and paste in the top https address bar.
—————————————————————————————————————–
16 November 2020
The Tank Capability of the Future
The following is an article submitted for publication in the Army’s ‘The Cove’.
“For just over a century, the tank has been the key symbol of land power. Today, tanks no longer enjoy the same level of battlefield supremacy that they used to. So, what’s next? Do they still have a role to play? If so, how do they need to evolve and what will the next generation look like in terms of features and capabilities?”. Nicholas Drummond, https://uklandpower.com/2020/04/05/where-does-the-tank-go-from-here/
————————————–
The ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan’ stated that: “Defence will develop options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life. This new system will integrate with reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles to ensure the land force retains a decisive land combat capability into the future.” (https://www.defence.gov.au/strategicupdate-2020/)
The fact that Defence has committed to developing options to replace the Abrams, indicates that the tank capability is recognised in terms of its importance for the ADF (and its contingency plans). This is exactly the foresight that’s to be expected of our Defence staff. The US is examining the same circumstances (and has been for many years). The Abrams tank is adequate today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams tank capability look like?
The answer has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank capability, as part of a combined arms force underpinning land operations. The fact that the next ‘tank’ may not be anything like the Abrams, is without dispute.
What does such a direct fire capability need to provide? The answer is, as it has ‘always’ been: lethality, survivability, and mobility, under all extremes of climate and terrain. This is self-evident. What is unknown is the way in which advances in technology will influence the solution. There are developments in mobility such as hovercraft and hydrogen fuel cells, however, this is not the breakthrough science.
Direct fire support can be provided by a manned vehicle, a robotic vehicle, or an optionally manned vehicle. The US Army is considering the last concept. One imagines that this is because it is too soon to bank everything on robotics alone.
Many arguments have been advanced that, whether crewed or optionally crewed, the weight of a direct fire support capability has to be reduced to enable it to be deployable in all contingencies. This is especially so in terms of ADF planning. How can this be achieved, while maintaining requisite protection levels?
Volume under armour is the biggest impost on the weight of an AFV. Reducing the size of the crew by incorporating an autoloader was the answer at one time, but the lethality of anti-armour weapons is now so advanced, that this is no longer enough. The current Russian T-14 Armata MBT is one solution. The crew is within a ‘cocoon’ in the hull of vehicle, below the external gun and autoloader. Considerable weight is saved without having to protect crew members in their own turret.
As well as the provision of an Active Protection System (APS) for certain vehicles, the Strategic Update (above) also made reference to: “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks.”
Such a weapon is suggestive of a laser, but is unlikely in terms of defeating AFVs in the foreseeable future. Another possibility is a ‘rail gun’. Neither of these technological breakthroughs, however, will resolve the main challenge facing the replacement tank capability.
The APS, however, might be part of the solution. Such systems have been demonstrated to be capable of defeating attack by ATGM and RPGs. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be significantly reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this is feasible: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. If this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary.https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round (Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC.) BUT…what about attack from above? It’s been proposed that low cost drones could be employed en mass to attack AFVs from above. Will an APS be able to counter this?
If protection is able to be increased and weight reduced … will this be sufficient for a direct fire capability to be deployed on the future battlefield? It has been suggested that a new grouping of complementary force capabilities will be needed in the future, i.e. traditional organisational structures will no longer be adequate.
Conclusion
The challenge is how to provide a future direct fire support capability which is lethal, survivable, and mobile. There are numerous options as far as mobility/engine power are concerned, as there are in terms of firepower. The crux of the design challenge is to decrease weight, while increasing protection against both ground and air attack. The role of APS (especially against `top attack) is crucial; as is the need to structure future operational groupings in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a readily deployable ‘all arms’ context.
——————————————————————————————————————
5 November 2020
The Coming Brereton Report
The following letter is more than twelve years old. I have been striving to correct false allegations for much longer than that and hope to be able to present material to the on-going process to (i) show how some veterans seek to sensationalise their experiences; and (ii) how the Government has endeavoured to ‘minimise’ their responsibility in terms of addressing such matters.
BTW. The interview referred to below (re an RAAC unit) was withdrawn from DVA’s website
——————————————————————————————————————- April 2008
The Hon Alan Griffin, MP
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Dear Minister,
Notice of a False, Misleading and Defamatory DVA Publication
It is understood that 12,000 people per month, access DVA’s Australians at War Film Archive. The majority of these are students, teachers, historians and researchers from both Australia and overseas.
The transcript of interview number XXXX is published on DVA’s website. It alleges that the Army unit the interviewee served with in Vietnam was responsible for appalling abuses of human rights and breaches of the Geneva Convention. The attached statements demonstrate conclusively, that the allegations are false.
It is apparent that the interviewee is not only sensationalising his experiences in a self-serving manner (eg. he falsely claims to have been wounded in action), but is also acting maliciously (eg. he insults the bravery and sacrifices of those who served in the unit and defames a number of people). DVA were asked to amend the interview to remove such false, misleading and defamatory remarks, but the Department advised that this was possible only to a limited extent (which turned out to represent the worse examples of defamatory material) because of the effect that this would have on the integrity of the Archive.
The interview is also used a means of conveying a threat of assault against an individual. Emphasising the seriousness of the threat, the interviewee details a plan to murder the person concerned while both were in Vietnam. He also boasts of the grievous bodily harm he inflicted on his next door neighbour. The ACT Attorney-General had to intervene to ensure the safety of the person threatened, an ACT citizen, and his family.
Would you please consider that attached material with a view to instructing DVA to withdraw the interview from publication. The Department have previously declined to do this, citing the fact that it was published in ‘good faith’. There is now overwhelming evidence to show that there has been an abuse of trust. Part of a legal opinion as to DVA’s obligations in regard to this matter is attached.
It concludes that: “It is one thing to publish the truth even where that truth is less than complimentary. It is an entirely different thing to publish lies. Despite Mr Harrison’s [Principal Legal Officer, DVA] assertions, there can be no integrity in an archive where lies and misinformation are permitted to flourish. This interview is so contaminated by lies, misinformation and defamatory material that it could not be redeemed by ‘cutting and pasting’. It is singularly without merit and should be removed from publication”.
It has been suggested to DVA that guidelines should be developed to set out what constitutes acceptable material for publication; the idea being that if a user of the Archive came across something which contravenes these guidelines, then it could be brought to DVA’s attention. The Department have stated that this is not possible, as it might inhibit an interviewee’s freedom of speech. In effect, the DVA are saying that the publication of false, misleading and defamatory material is acceptable and that the ‘disclaimer’ attached to interviews, absolves the Government of any responsibility in these matters. As a Minister looking at this matter ‘afresh’, your further consideration of this suggestion is requested.
I should also point out that the attachments below [statements providing evidence refuting the claims made] were made available to DVA, with a draft of this letter, almost three months ago. (This followed three months correspondence with the Department prior to that.) It was hoped that the matter might be able to be addressed without the need for publicity which could damage the credibility of the Australians at War Film Archive as a whole. It appears, however, that resolution in this way is not possible. Quick attention on the part of your Office would be appreciated, so that the time limitations for appeal to the Commonwealth Ombudsman will not be exceeded (should this course have to be adopted).
The following are some of the comments ADM readers made:
“If the M1 tank is to have credible role in future warfare, they should have an active protection system made standard. I have seen videos on how easy it is these days to disable an M1 with a portable missile launcher.”
The US Army seems to recognise the benefit of APS.
I am not disagreeing that the M-1 should be fitted with APS but as with all Vehicles, Ships & Aircraft the best Defence is to kill the Launch Platform before it fires and that is the importance of combined Arms.
Only thing I would add to this excellent piece is that the loss of tanks in Iraq and Syria at the hands of ISIL (particularly Turkish Leopard 2 and Iraqi M1s) was due to poor doctrine with respect to the use of the tank, a complete absence of situational awareness, and a lack of infantry support. Tank opponents sometimes point to these losses as proof that tanks are no longer relevant but like anything, it comes down to how they are used.
A cynic like me would say that too much of the ADF equipment program is built on the maxim of ‘we have, therefore we replace’. I think that the changes we are seeing now means that Plan Beersheba is already obsolete and the ADF could be well served by a good look at what we need and what are nice to have’s. I do not mean ANOTHER white paper!
To suggest we get rid of Tanks because we will struggle to land them on a Beach is absolute rubbish.
If the army really want to stay with the mbt concept but at a usable weight, something like the new Type 10 from Japan. It varies between 40t minimum to 48t with bolt on added modular armour. The reason Japan developed the Type 10 was because the previous Type 90 was too heavy to use in most of Japan.
—————————————————————-
There are a number of points here which relate to previous Blog posts: the role of APS (especially re top attack); the weight of the Abrams and the need for a lighter direct fire weapons system to facilitate its deployability in the future; and the need to structure our operational units in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a deployable ‘all arms’ context.
I believe the above to be the crucial issues, how they’re achieved is not really relevant. There are numerous options as far as mobility/power are concerned (eg. hovercraft/hydrogen fuel cell); as there are for firepower (eg. rail gun). The crux of the design challenge is to decrease the weight, while increasing the protection.
This is the sort of thing that I scan out of interest. Suddenly, my hair stood on end: the author was stating that Australian soldiers had no moral courage. This was just too much, a ‘cheap shot’; on Remembrance Day of all times. My response was going to be very forceful. I found a good quote re moral courage by Michael Josephson.
“But there’s another form of courage [to physical courage] that’s just as important; it’s called moral courage. It’s the kind of courage C. S. Lewis referred to when he said, “courage is not simply one of the virtues but the form of every virtue at the testing point.” The testing point is the place where living our lives according to moral principles may require us to put our comfort, possessions, relationships, and careers at risk.
For most of us, the need for physical courage is rare. But our moral courage is tested almost every day. Being honest at the risk of disapproval, lost income or a maimed career; being accountable when owning up to a mistake can get us in trouble, making tough decisions and demands with our kids at the cost of their affection, being fair when we have the power to be otherwise, and following the rules while others get away with whatever they can – these things take moral courage, the inner strength to do what’s right even when it costs more than we want to pay.
The sad fact is that people with moral courage rarely get medals. Instead, they risk ridicule, rejection and retaliation. Yet this sort of courage is the best marker of true character and a life your children can be proud of.”
How dare anyone accuse Australian soldiers of lacking moral courage! My head of steam was just building up when I noticed something in the article.
The comment I sent to the author explains:
“Douglas, Thank you for your piece. The following might give you a laugh. I almost made myself look a fool (some will say not for the first time). Instead of correctly reading “… if the moral courage of the governments equalled the immortal military courage of their soldiers.’ True then; true now”; I read: ‘if the moral courage of the governments equalled the immoral military courage of their soldiers.’ True then; true now.”
I got part way through an earnest response, when I realised my mistake …”.
——————————————————————————————————————-
12 November 2020
How We Lose Sight of How Things Were.
A Dutch Army Centurion Mk5/2 with its driver’s hood protection which is used in cold climate condition, mostly during training drill in winter.
[This is a great site; run here in Australia by Adrian Clayton, a dedicated Centurion owner and enthusiast.]
Some of the comments were:
“The most useless bit of kit ever. Used to mist up, leak like a sieve, obstruct side vision, and as Lawson says, very claustrophobic. Oh, and it limited the turret traverse or got wiped out by it.”
“they were a part of CES, but were never issued (sat unused in Troop Stores, under the grotty cam nets).”
My post in response was:
“I think the name is ‘Drivers’ Long March Hood’. I guess the tank designers appreciated that in action drivers would be closed down, but there might be occasions in which they could be faced with a long approach ‘march’ to the battlefront. If this was in inclement conditions, the health and welfare of the driver might become important (not that it wasn’t on all other occasions). I’m constantly amazed at how much thought those responsible at the time, put into every nook and cranny of the design. I know I found the grenade holders in the turret useful in Vietnam (though I would not have anticipated this beforehand).”
Following on from 4 November, the following was the response from Major Thomas Basan to my comments:
Image: Motoring
“Bruce, that’s a great question about the provision of HAWKEI to the reserves. I’ve served as BM 13 Bde and so have a good understanding of your concern. I think ARES RAAC are prime candidates for ‘fighting’ versions of HAWKEI.
I think we must couple HAWKEI with BUSHMASTER and to a lesser degree the armoured trucks to create a combat system. Together the vehicles can easily cope with domestic security, rear area security and stability tasks, which are the core tasks that shape the ADF. However, I’m of a view that everything must be driven by operational plans.
Up to now, we’ve been guided by what are essentially ‘good ideas’, ‘parochial views’ and ‘what we’ve got’; not what we need. As the ADF shifts to a more integrated force and the ‘drums of war’ grow louder I think you’ll see more modern equipment provided to the reserves. However, without solid operational plans it’s difficult to use logic and reason to inform capability choices and to ‘train as we’ll fight’.
I read the training article above (a very long one) and responded to the above as follows:
Thomas, I read your training article above and noted that in the Conclusion you stated: “Significantly, collective training is not an end in itself, but a means of meeting the needs of an operational plan…”. It seems to me that this is self-obvious. What is more relevant is that there appears to be a need to improve the direction and guidance being provided from top-down which links operational (contingency) plans and training objectives at unit level. There does not have to be an existing direct threat to train and prepare for participation in a contingency plan. Certain skills, such as armoured reconnaissance, are relevant to many contingencies and are unable to be developed at short notice.
As mentioned in the earlier post, the UAV is set to play a major part on the future battlefield.
Previous posts have looked at how the weight of a future direct fire support vehicle can be reduced. This is achievable using vehicle design and active protection systems (APSs) from the ground threat, but how feasible is it in terms of top attack? It would seem that this is the crucial ‘next step’, as regards the battleground of the future, ie. to protect the AFV from attack by multiple low-cost UAVs
An extract from the above article is copied below:
“What’s most important is that the decision should reflect a land-warfare vision that includes large-scale use of armed autonomous systems in the air and on land. Adversaries will be taking advantage of the military power of such systems to complement—or even replace—crewed systems, and if our own defence organisation doesn’t, Australia will be at a disadvantage.
Such a system will demand investment in battlespace command and control that is resistant to countermeasures such as electronic warfare, cyberattack and kinetic attack. Such a capability needs to embrace the ‘small, cheap and many’ approach of ‘command clouds’ operating in the air, over land and even from space, using low-cost, small and easily deployable components. Very high altitude, long-endurance UAVs operating in near space can complement locally developed and launched small satellites and constellations of smart cubesats to provide tactical communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to swarms of lethal autonomous weapons. In such a scenario, an attack helicopter would hang back, managing the swarms via the command cloud, and avoid needlessly putting itself at risk over what will be an intensely contested battlespace.
Factoring in the role of autonomous systems is crucial to thinking about the future of army capability …”.
——————————————————————————————————————-
9 November 2020
Cavalry Memorial (Tongala) Beersheba Day Ceremony 2020
Full credit to the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn for taking the initiative, applying for a DVA grant, and working with the Tongala community to create this Memorial. Congratulations to them for maintaining contact and developing such dedication, commitment, and support on the part of all those involved across all ages. The red and yellow roses look fantastic!
I was one of those who attended the opening of the Avenue of Honour to Armoured servicemen killed in the Vietnam War. (Background to this below.) Well done to the 3 Cav Assn to taking the concept further. It’s sad that the 1AR Assn did not do likewise. The late John Whitehorn would have been pleased if an Armoured Corps Memorial was to have resulted.
For 1AR Assn C’tee: a story about John Whitehorn (see below) and his commitment to 1 Armd Regt would be great to see in a future addition of ‘Paratus’.
——————————————————————————————
From RAACA (NSW) Armour newsletter 2006:
“Tongala Project – Avenue of Honour Centurion Tank”
REPORT THIS AD
‘In 2001 the Australian Light Horse/Armoured Memorial Committee was formed with a total of 4 people to build a Australian Light Horse memorial to honour the Lighthorsemen from the district that went off to war. In 2003 the Light Horse Memorial was built and dedicated.
After this dedication the committee agreed on building Avenue of Honour to the Armoured Servicemen killed in the Vietnam War. This Avenue was unveiled in November 2004, by the Governor General of Australia, and the Chief of the Australian Army. Over 4000 people attended this event.
While the Avenue of Honour was in planning stages, John Whitehorn ex 1 Armoured Regiment soldier approached the committee on the idea of having a Centurion Tank placed in Tongala to be dedicated to his two mates, Jimmy Kerr and Mick Hannaford and to all those who served with the Centurion tanks. John at that present time had throat cancer which was progressing, John knew he wouldn’t be around for the dedication (John passed away in June 2005) but did agree to leave funds aside for the project.
It was also John’s wish to have both Armoured and Cavalry represented together in the Avenue of Honour. The committee at present time is in the planning stages for the event with the unveiling set aside for November 2008. At present ARN 169120 Centurion Tank has been purchased by Michael Thompson and is in Tongala. Michael has put in $15,000 of his own money to purchase and transport it to Tongala.’
——————————————————————————————————————-
8 November 2020
The Future of the Battlefield and its AFVs
Image: ADM
The following article is from the ASPI publication ‘The Strategist’
In my view, this footage has to be one of the most profound influences on the future battlefield.
“[It] has generated debate on whether expensive and technologically sophisticated armored vehicles can survive in future battles against masses of cheap ‘suicide drones’. Is the tank, which first emerged on the battlefields of the Western Front in 1917, now approaching the twilight years of its military utility?”
“With Australia’s purchase of new armoured vehicles under the LAND 400 program underway, the likelihood of large numbers of low-cost drones operating over the future battlespace should be a concern for defence planners.
The article also updated the costs re LAND 400 Phase 3:
In Phase 2 of LAND 400, the Defence Department is acquiring 211 Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles to replace the army’s light armoured vehicles (the ASLAVs). In Phase 3, it will buy 450 infantry fighting vehicles and up to 17 manoeuvre support vehicles to replace the obsolete M113 armoured personnel carriers.
South Korea’s Hanwha Defense Australia’s AS-21 ‘Redback’ and Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s ‘Lynx’ are competing in Phase 3. A decision is due by 2022. The budget range is now $18.1 billion to $27.1 billion for 450 vehicles, or about $50 million each.
——————————————————————————————————————
7 November 2020
RAAC Matters: Free and Open Discussion
One of the goals at Part 7 (above) is:
No-one on RAAC or related personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
Following on from 5 November 2020, in which I queried the current order of seniority of RAAC regiments, the comments below (albeit only a very few of the 73 made) have appeared on the RAAC Facebook page:
Oh what a can of worms, are we going to suffer casualties from all this crap, all black hats so as long as we can look back at our forebears and remain proud, if you ain’t a black hat you ain’t pardon the pun.
Bruce just let go!!!! It doesn’t matter any more, we are now a CORP that works in a Combat TEAM. Doesn’t matter who what where or with we are BLACK HATS and proudly do our job regardless of our unit origins.
I’m not sure if this post in response to yours above is classed in your terms as “shit” or not, but can you explain what opposition you have to the history and contribution of our RAAC forebears being clearly defined?
That led to the following:
none whatsoever but why dwell on ancient history as we as a Corp have to move forwardto develop our fighting skill in a new way of conducting warfare. I am proud of my past units history, 1AR, 2Cav, 4Cav, 3/4Cav, 1/15 RNSWL, SOA, 1 Topo Svy Sqn, 6ESR to name a few, forgot OBG4 all served as a Black Hat.
I am a bit lost that today’s Army choose an accepted order of its choosing and because our former members don’t accept it, they demand the current keepers accept what former members think is correct or want.
Fact is … I’m NOT demanding anything. I’m simply asking if the change to the order of seniority was something which was forgotten when 2/14 QMI became an ARA unit.
Question is … does it matter if the order of seniority of RAAC regiments is correct or not?
If it doesn’t, where does this lead?
——————————————————————————————————————
6 November 2020
RAAC Operational History: One Mystery Solved
The photo above has created lots of interest. I came across by accident among those I’d been sent for my book and posted it on the 3 Cav Vietnam Assn website … just for info.
The photo below was then posted.
Incredibly, no detail was available about the incident in which it was penetrated by the RPG (nor what happened to the crew). The Assn is very motivated regarding matters associated with their history, however, and many members contributed.
It turns out that the APC was one of those hit by RPGs in Baria during the Tet Offensive. Amazingly, it seems to have been repaired and returned to operations in just 10 days. How was this done?
I’m aware of the techniques used to weld ‘plug’ RPG holes in Centurion turrets, but what about aluminium armour. Is it possible that a panel could have been cut out and replaced? How long would it take to do this?
I’ve asked the Bluebells.
—————————————————————————————————————–
5 November 2020
Seniority of RAAC Units
Following on from 29 October 2020 …
I had to write to the Minister to get both the dates on the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1 Armd Regt Standard corrected and the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour emblazoned. It appears that I’ll have to do the same re the seniority listing of RAAC units.
The seniority of RAAC units is currently listed as:
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Cavalry Regiment
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI)
4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment
12th/16th Hunter River Lancers
B Sqn 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment
A Sqn 3rd/9th South Australian Mounted Rifles
A Sqn 10th Light Horse Regiment
I believe this is wrong as 2/14 LHR (QMI) has transitioned from being an ARES unit to an ARA unit.
The importance of this is that ARA units should take precedence before ARES units. The following refers (thanks to Bruce Scott): Australian Military Regulations, Part 3, Para 68 (2) of 2007:
“Units of the Army take precedence as follows:
(a) the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves;
(b) the units have precedence according to the order of their numerical succession;
(c) if units are not included in a numerical succession, the units have precedence according to the order in which the Commands to which they belong are specified in the instrument appointing Commands.”
The Corps RSM states that what is stipulated is what it is and the President of the 2/14 LHR (QMI) states they receive advice from those serving. Discussion on the RAAC Facebook has revealed the basis of seniority above, but is unlikely to lead to any change.
When I was trying to correct the error re the dates that 1 Armd Regt served in Vietnam on the Standard (I declare a vested interest, my tank troop was the last to serve on operations), it seemed to me that nobody wanted to cause a ‘fuss’, ie. they would not be looked on well if they were to do so (even if the historical facts were without doubt).
Why do we not place importance on historical accuracy? What if the Life Guards’ Queen’s Cavalry Standard showed the wrong dates for Waterloo? There would be outrage, and justly so. (I mentioned this in my submission to the Minister.) But not here in Australia … we don’t want to cause a ‘fuss’.
“Well written Thomas … a very comprehensive analysis of capability and technology!
I have only one comment, intended to add value, not detract in any way from what you’ve said.
One of the roles, as you’ve said, that the Hawkei was developed for was reconnaissance. You’ve pointed out that it is not suited for combat reconnaissance unless “sensor and targeting pods are fitted to an armed and jammer protected Hawkei”. In which case “it would be a significant combat multiplier”.
You’ve further pointed out that “if the capability manager (Chief of Army) exploits the protection and mobility of Hawkei, coupled with the offensive use of the weapons on a RWS; we can create a light armoured fighting vehicle”.
The importance of battlefield reconnaissance is demonstrated with two reconnaissance squadrons in each armoured cavalry regiment and the commitment to the combat reconnaissance vehicle project (LAND 400 Phase 2).
Unfortunately, the Boxer has been deemed too expensive and sophisticated for allocation to RAAC ARES units. As a consequence, they have been condemned to a dismounted cavalry scout role.
Successful reconnaissance depends as much on tactics skills, as it does on the capability of the vehicles/aircraft/UAVs involved. These skills take ‘eons’ to perfect. What great benefit could be obtained by allocating Hawkei to RAAC ARES units; to allow reconnaissance tactics to be developed. Without any such initiative, the ARES will be unable to provide any ‘surge’ capacity for reconnaissance squadrons in time of Defence emergency.”
Major Thomas BASAN enlisted in January 1980. As a soldier and NCO, MAJ BASAN served in 2/4 RAR and SASR. On commissioning, MAJ BASAN commanded paratroopers in 3 RAR at platoon, specialist platoon and company. MAJ BASAN is a graduate of ACSC and ATSOC and has a master’s in systems engineering. In later years, MAJ BASAN served in Future Land Warfare, AHQ; Land Development Branch and the Australian Defence Test and Evaluation Organisation, CDG; Brigade Major, 13 Brigade and Preparedness, AHQ. He is currently employed within Land Capability Development, AHQ.
——————————————————————————————————————
3 November 2020
1AR Assn Newsletter: RAAC Communications
The last edition of ‘Paratus’ can be found here:
In it, the editor, Peter Lukeis, stated that:
“This edition of the Newsletter (No. 85) now named ‘Paratus’ will be number 16 for me or (4 years) along with the upkeep of our Website, as well as setting standards for Communications, which includes badging, letter heads, certificates, presentations etc., but it is now time for me to move on and hand over to the new broom, hopefully next generation.”
Being responsible for the production and publication of sixteen editions is an enormous contribution to the Association and its members. I wonder how the Assn will acknowledge his commitment to this end?
The notice of departure from the position (above) was in the May 2020 edition. Presumably no-one has been found to replace him, as August and November editions have not been published.
One has to wonder about the importance that organisations today place on their public image.
As mentioned in a recent Blog post, the information provided by Defence re the RAAC is woefully out of date and totally misleading for anyone searching for relevant info.
The same seems to apply to public Facebook pages, both at Brigade and unit level. It seems that all ‘current’ info is confined to private Facebook pages.
Why was there no public recognition afforded to the significance of Beersheba Day? Will Cambrai Day simply go unnoticed?
This to me, is a travesty. At a time when there is the greatest need to debate Defence policy and preparedness, public media outlets seem to be collapsing. I used to work in marketing … I know what I’d do. But who would listen to me?
—————————————————————————————————————–
2 November 2020
What’s to Become of the AWM Redevelopment? II
Following yesterday’s Blog, the following comment was made in relation to what I had said:
“Hi Bruce – it’s not an either/or argument – we can have both – a magnificent site (which as you say is much more than the iconic building) and an expansion to enable expanded galleries. But it must be done properly and not put at risk the core commemorative strengths of the place – the iconic building and site. I know this can be done.
With regard to your question on how do you define heritage value – I realise you allude to this as being something esoteric, and perhaps suggest heritage means nothing should change – this is not the case – the National Heritage List and the AWM’s own Heritage Management Plan, Heritage Strategy and Heritage Register all describe the significant and irreplaceable attributes of the site – you can find all these key documents online – they were all done to ensure we recognise and retain what is so special about the place and to guide future development. They are well thought out documents – which consider the full range of issues associated with the place – developed with input from not only heritage professionals, but key stakeholders like you (and me) – they are worth a look.”
My response was as follows:
“Hi Stewart, The AWM Heritage Management Plan (HMP) is very comprehensive. Presumably a listing has been compiled showing where the proposed redevelopment does not accord with the Plan’s recommendations. It would be a pity for such a rationale to be lost sight of, because of ‘other’ issues. For example, the extent or otherwise of public support. If I wished, I could lobby veterans and have a petition signed in support of the project. But all this is ‘smoke and mirrors’.
Seems to me that the following provision of the HMP is the central issue (which is why images were included in the article above):
“Ensure that the ability to perceive the AWM main building ‘in the round’ within its landscape setting is not comprised by any new surrounding development or impact on significant views to the building”.
The image of the current proposal would suggest an impact on a significant view of the building. The HMP allows such variations if there is no alternative. But the real issue would seem to be whether or not the impact is an adverse one. The HMP is silent on this aspect and seems to seek to enshrine all significant views in perpetuity. Surely this was not the intent?”
“It is really no surprise that opposing positions have become so entrenched, the AWM being such an iconic institution. I was almost going to say ‘iconic building’, but the AWM is much more than the its building … or is it? My father was an army engineer involved in preparations for its opening on 11 November 1941. There is no doubt that at that time, the focus was on the building itself and the human values that it represented in an architectural sense. But the AWM has evolved.
It is no longer ‘just’ a Memorial. Visitors leave with a much greater understanding of the conflicts in which Australians have been involved, than if they were only to reflect on the sacrifices made while they were in the Hall of Memory.
Understanding of conflicts is important if we are to learn from them. This is why it is no surprise that many of us argue for the AWM to provide a canvas for the Frontier Wars and the bravery of indigenous Australians in defending their people and land.
What are the main arguments? There are two: (i) the money for the redevelopment could be put to better use in other ways; and (ii) the planned redevelopment will jeopardise the heritage value of the AWM.
Opportunity cost will always be an issue with any new project. What is the best use of the money? Everyone’s answer will depend on their personal values. Being a democracy, however, we’re ‘burdened’ with the fact that everyone has the right to express their views. It is a matter for our elected Government to adjudicate.
Heritage value? How do you define this? Are we referring to the vista or ‘ambience’ created by the building, the building itself, or all three? If the original building is not to be changed, then ‘heritage’ must relate to ambience and/or vista.
It would help the case of those arguing against the redevelopment, to explain their opposition in these terms.”
—————————————————————————————————————
31 October 2020
The Future for the Tank: Is Now the Time for the Funeral?
The following article suggests that the ‘spirit’ of tank crews will live on: ‘Semper Tanks’: Marines hold on to tanker spirit as 100-year legacy ends
It’s interesting that these underscore previous posts about the future of the tank, ie. the availability of protected direct fire support is vital and a lighter more agile force is needed.
The question is: how to achieve these opposing goals?
A veteran of the Iraq war who spent over six months fighting in Fallujah, he said “tanks were an absolute necessity” there during Operation Phantom Fury and subsequent operations. Many Marine infantrymen would not have made it home without them, he and others say.
“When you need a tank, nothing else will suffice,” Valasek said. “I don’t know what direct fire asset is going to replace [tanks].”
The commandant envisions a lighter, more agile Marine Corps, largely designed to counter China, and has said the Army would continue to provide tanks and other heavy ground systems.
“I really fear the day that a future Marine finds himself in a bind and looks around because he needs a tank and there isn’t one there to help him,” he said.
Marines have voiced what Valasek calls “tanker optimism” that the service may one day backtrack — and that it’ll need Marines like them again when it does.
“Just because our equipment’s going away, our brotherhood’s not. It will never die,”
—————————————————————————————————————-
30 October 2020
‘Formulating Defence Strategy’ II
Image: ASPI
Following on from 28 Oct 21:
“The Minister’s commitment to the existing and planned force structure suggests the government has failed to recognise this critical point. Indeed, one of the more incongruous elements in its wafer thin Force Structure Plan was an upgrade to the Army’s 60-tonne main battle tanks, a like-for-like replacement whose strategic purpose was always in doubt – at least until one Prime Minister proposed that they spearhead an Australian invasion of Ukraine.” https://johnmenadue.com/part-2-australias-defence-strategy-built-in-resistance-to-change/
My response was:
“Please … in the interest of honest public commentary, explain the basis for the following statements:
(i) Plans for an upgrade to the Abrams tanks which involve a like-for-like replacement;
(ii) The fact that the strategic purpose of the Abrams tanks “was always in doubt”; and
(iii) Proposals that Abrams tanks spearhead an Australian invasion of Ukraine.
Unless you do so, the entire credibility of Part 2 (and the article as a whole) is called into question.”
Another comment was made by Cameron Leckie (bionote below):
Yesterday’s article suggested that “Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942.” Today’s article states that “the military threat to Australia is now greater than at any time since 1942.” It is concerning how the language is changed/twisted without actually explaining what the threat is.
What is the threat to our independence? What sort of military threat do we face? Is it a long range missile threat, conflict in the South China Sea, an invasion of Australia? These general ‘threats’ seem to be used as a tool to generate fear rather than an analytical assessment of the actual threat that China poses to Australia.
The military defines a threat as a capability plus intent. [My emphasis] Clearly China has, and increasingly so, the capability to militarily threaten Australia. It seems far from clear however that China has the intent to harm Australia, other than if we involve ourselves in actions that are seen by China to harm its national interest. Yesterday’s article listed a whole bunch of examples of ‘Chinese aggression,’ most of which were no threat at all to Australia.
China’s rise to the world’s largest/second largest economy has occurred without recourse to military conflict. This is not surprising from the home of Sun Tzu. Why, when it is clear that China is or will soon become the world’s largest economy, would it resort to military conflict now? That seems illogical.
Is the China threat actually just a case of projection?
Cameron Leckie served 24 years in the Australian Army retiring with the rank of Major. As member of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals he served in a number of regimental and training appointments, concluding his service as the Executive Officer of the 1st Signal Regiment. He deployed to East Timor (Operation WARDEN), the Solomon Islands (Operation ANODE) and Sumatra (Operation SUMATRA ASSIST). He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Southern Queensland.
—————————————————————————————————————
29 October 2020
The RAAC, as Portrayed by ‘Official’ Public Sources.
Just imagine that you (or someone you knew) had heard about the RAAC and were interested in finding out more … possibly with an interest in enlisting. You go onto “Google’ and enter RAAC. The info copied below is what the Defence website tells you. ‘Why oh why’ can’t Defence update their websites? We all know that tank regiments and cavalry regiments no longer exist.
But what about the seniority of RAAC units … it is my understanding that ARA units take precedence before ARES units. It might be that regiments come before squadrons (which would explain the position of B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt) … but why isn’t 2/14 LH Regt (QMI) listed after 2 Cav Regt? Some years ago, I pointed out to DPR that their published info was out of date. I was assured that it would be corrected. I’ve copied this to the Corps RSM.
——————————————————————————————————-
Royal Australian Armoured Corps
The role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps is to locate, identify, destroy or capture the enemy, by day or night, in combination with other arms, using fire and manoeuvre.
The Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) is a combat arm with a range of capabilities that can be employed by the Army. RAAC units are able to participate in a range of operations including direct attack, reconnaissance and armoured mobility to infantry. Units of the RAAC are equipped with the Abrams M1A1 main battle tank (MBT) family of vehicles or the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle (PMV).
The main types of Armoured Corps units are:
The tank regiment – The tank regiment operates the Abrams main battle tank. The Regiment’s manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. The role of the tank, in coordination with other arms, is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, manoeuvre and shock action.
The cavalry regiments – The cavalry regiments operate the ASLAV and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle. A cavalry unit’s personnel and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks. The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate, and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.
The light cavalry regiments – The light cavalry regiments/units are Army Reserve units that can operate either in a mounted or dismounted role. The units are equipped with either the light cavalry patrol vehicle (LCPV) and the interim infantry mobility vehicle (IIMV) or the Bushmaster (PMV). Light cavalry conducts stability and enabling activities and augments cavalry regiments. Light cavalry tactics comprise security, stability and enabling activities including the operations of protection, counter-insurgency, evacuation and strategic response options and RFSU operations.
Within the Royal Australian Armoured Corps the following is the accepted order of precedence of regiments:
“The government’s recent Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. This demands a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, the development of a sound military strategy to deter an attack by a great power and careful analysis of how to design the right force structure to deliver it. This first article of three looks at the issues around diplomacy.”
At last! The logical sequence of consideration has been ‘nailed’ in public commentary. We start with the threat analysis. This, in turn, provides an assessment of the warning times available. Diplomatic and military strategy are developed in parallel. Finally, the development of the relevant force structure, incorporating the assessment of lead times for the acquisition of equipment and training of personnel. The end result of all this, is a determination of the level of preparedness needed by standing and reserve force components, the levels of stockpiling needed, and the development of contingency plans.
Why this is so difficult to understand is beyond me. We have commentators criticising decisions regarding equipment, without any reference to the threat assessment which led to the force structure decision(s). I saw one influential person recently state that preparedness has to come first and strategy follows. How can this be? The threat is assessed, the strategy developed and the level of preparedness adjusted accordingly. This is a continual process; not one confined to the publication of Defence White Papers.”
In a former life, Jon Stanford was a Division Head in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Currently, as a Director of Insight Economics, he is undertaking significant research on Australia’s future submarine project, generously supported by Gary Johnston, owner of the Submarines for Australia website.
————————————————————————————————————–
27 October 2020
Operation Overlord: 50th Commemoration
Image: AWM
I have been invited to attend an initial planning meeting for the 50th Anniversary National Commemoration of Operation Overlord (the Battle of Long Khanh).
My response to DVA is copied below:
“Many thanks for your email. I can confirm that I will attend. I will be accompanied by Lt Col John Scales (Retd). John was the 2IC C Sqn during Operation Overlord. As the Sqn OC is deceased, John will be the senior representative of the tank squadron at the National Commemoration.
I have organised a dinner on the evening of 6 June for members of C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt and supporting units who served together during 1971. So far, we have bookings for over 80 attendees and I expect at least 100. Apart from the dinner, the ‘itinerary’ for the preceding day will include the Vietnam Requiem at the School of Music and the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM.
In relation to the dinner and Last Post Ceremony, I would like to apply for DVA grant funding (as per the entitlement below) to cover the cost of printing menus and name tags ($200) as well as wreaths ($300). I am not a member of an incorporated association, however. Is it possible for a grant application to be made in conjunction with the National Commemoration arrangements? (I believe, Tony Cox, the 3RAR organiser would like to make a similar application.)
On another matter, when my tank troop assaulted the enemy position during the Battle of Long Khanh, it comprised three tanks and an armoured recovery vehicle. The ARV was crewed by RAEME personnel. We were without infantry support and when contact was made with the enemy, our drill was to form a square and engage our respective arcs of responsibility. The RAEME crew had exactly the same responsibilities as the tank crews. It is acknowledged that RAEME members were part of the units to which they were attached, nevertheless, I wonder if it might be possible to ‘officially’ acknowledge RAEME participation in the Battle of Long Khanh (ie. in terms of overcoming the enemy, rather than ‘just’ providing repair support)? Could the HOC RAEME have advice to offer here?
“Those who signed the petition are undoubtedly ‘prominent Australians’. How many had actually faced the enemy, however? Only one … Mr Gower. His book, ‘Rounds Complete’ details his role as an arty forward observer and is worth reading in this respect. Maybe his signature should have influence, maybe not. So how is it that 69 people who have not put their lives on the line for their country, consider that they have the right to dictate the manner in which the AWM depicts the history of those who have served their nation in War?
Of course, many of the signatories could be aware of the feelings of forebears, ie family members who have served their nation in War.
On what basis does the AWM credit the importance of the petition? If it is only on self-professed ‘prominence’ … does it have any credence? What if another petition was to be organised seeking the views of those who have been prepared to give their lives on behalf of their nation.
If media and publicity is to be used to influence Government decisions re the commemorations of our nation’s history, is it too much to ask that the views of those who were actually involved in creating the history … be requested.”
Another comment was published as below:
Dear Bruce With respect, as one who signed the petition, and, like most Australians, has strong family connections to war, this is about protecting that extraordinary site and building which does so much for commemoration. We all have a responsibility for that place. As the letter said “The Memorial must be supported to achieve its core functions, but this should (and can) occur without damage to its core commemorative strength – the iconic heritage building and site”.
My Response: “It is to be expected that there will always be a range of differing viewpoints associated with a project like this. I’m not arguing against the position expressed in the letter, just trying to relate it to ‘due process’, ie. one in which the Prime Minister’s counsel acknowledges the importance of all stakeholders, even the ‘unprominent’.
The response to this …
Thanks Bruce I agree. We are all stakeholders in what happens at that place. In the 20 years I worked there I never saw anything like the controversy this project has caused. That is such a shame. It should never have gone that way. The process and design is so flawed. I only wish the much referenced veterans (and others), especially the ones who understand the extraordinary tangible and intangible qualities of the site, and know what we risk losing through this development, were more vocal.
—————————————————————————————————————-
25 October 2020
RAAC Corporation: 3/4 Cav Regts Assn
The Blog on 22 October included the following:
“The RAACA NSW simply said ‘No’ … no reason given by the President. Seems to me that my efforts to hold the RAAC Corporation to account, have once again been a factor. If I was to press for an explanation, I wouldn’t be surprised if the President’s response was simply “it’s political”. This was the reason given by the 3/4 Cav Regts Assn for withdrawing my membership.”
I’ve been asked what happened re the 3/4 Cav Assn. There is a long story, one which has been detailed in earlier Blog posts. The following is a short version.
1st Armd Regt was awarded three battlehonours for Vietnam, but were only permitted to emblazon two on the Standard. I had hoped that the RAAC Corporation might advocate in support of a submission that I had prepared to have the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour emblazoned. The Chairman said that he wasn’t interested, so I wrote to the Minister myself.
The Minister responded to say that a review had been conducted and the restriction no longer applied. (I had also asked that an error on the Standard be corrected and this was also approved.)
The new regulations meant that all the battlehonours awarded to 3 Cav Regt would now be able to be emblazoned on their Guidon. I suggested on the 3/4 Cav Regts Facebook page that the Assn might like to advise the OC, B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt (at the SOA) of this, so that the history of the ‘new’ battlehonours could be made known in advance (possibly vide troop projects).
The RAAC Corporation Chairman considered that I had impinged on what were the responsibilities of the Corporation.
He spoke with the President, 3/4 Cav Regts Assn … my post was deleted and my membership cancelled.
When I asked why, I was advised that the President had said that “it was political”.
Note. The badge above was that of 3 Cav Regt. It is that which the RAAC Corporation links on its website with the 3 and 4 Cav Regts Assn. I assume that this is because it is the badge worn by B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt.
—————————————————————————————————————
24 October 2020
RAAC ARES: RAAC Corporation
The following post is on 1/15RNSWL Facebook page:
“Some great work from 1/15 RNSWL’s paired Armoured Cavalry Regiment (ACR) – 2/14 LHR (QMI) as they start driver training on the new Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV). Discussions continue on the employment of Cavalry Scouts within a Boxer Troop.”https://www.facebook.com/115Lancers/
For one incredulous moment, I thought that 1/15th personnel were participating in the training on Boxer.
I quickly realised, however, that it was only 2/14th who were training and 1/15th were left wondering if they might be considered for even a dismounted cavalry scout role. (Please Sir … can I have some more?)
How great it is to see the acknowledgement being given to their role during the pandemic.
However, as per this Blog’s previous post regarding the Minister’s press release on Reserve Forces Day … it’s one thing for community assistance to be respected, but what about the Reserve’s role in terms of defending our Nation? If it has one …
As stated at Part 5 in the Intro above, one of Armouredadvocates’ goals is to ensure that:
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
How sad it is the RAAC Corporation has become what it is.
There has to be a balance … one which can only be achieved by consensus. On the one hand the Corporation needs to represent the interests of its member associations which align with the view of Defence; on the other, it needs to represent the interests of its member associations which do not align with the Defence view.
Sadly, ‘official’ agreement for the formation of the Corporation was premised on the fact that it would not advocate with respect to the latter. (The driving force behind the creation of the Corporation passed away before this rule was enshrined. It would never have been allowed, otherwise.)
Makes one wonder about the motto: ‘In Unity is Strength’. It’s hard to imagine any circumstances in which the strength provided by mass support, would ever be needed … if the positions to be advocated are only those which are already approved!
Interestingly, it was first published in the UK Journal ‘Popular Mechanics’ and has simply been reprinted in ‘Armour’. (I wonder why the original publication was not credited?)
Readers of the Blog will know the examination which has been given in this publication, to the future of the tank and its design. I wonder where the RAACA NSW C’tee will go to from here in terms of informing their members and encouraging discussion. I would provide some draft pieces for consideration. That is, if I hadn’t recently resigned my membership.
Why was this? I asked if the Assn could forward an application for a DVA grant ($300, for a wreath and printing costs) associated with the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord next year. C Sqn 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Regt will be holding a reunion for those involved. The purpose of the expenditure is specifically provided for by DVA, but the application has to be made by an Incorporated Assn.
The RAACA NSW simply said ‘No’ … no reason given by the President. Seems to me that my efforts to hold the RAAC Corporation to account, have once again been a factor. If I was to press for an explanation, I wouldn’t be surprised if the President’s response was simply “it’s political”. This was the reason given by the 3/4 Cav Regts Assn for withdrawing my membership.
There will be many things which will become clear when my story is published.
“Never be afraid to raise your voice for honesty and truth and compassion against injustice, lying and greed. If people all over the world…would do this, it would change the Earth.” William Faulkner, 1949 Nobel Prize in Literature.
—————————————————————————————————————
22 October 2020
The Tank of the Future: Protected, but Lighter
Image: Defence Update.com
There is wide agreement that a direct fire weapons system is required, but it must be lighter than current MBTs. One way of achieving this is to reduce the size of the crew and place them in the hull, with an auto-loaded weapons system above. But this will never be the complete answer. Active protection systems (APSs) have been touted as the solution.
The Hensoldt Multi-Function Self Protection System for Vehicles (MUSS) has been in the news recently. This is designed to defeat attack by ATGM and RPGs. The operating principles are copied below. There is no revolutionary scientific breakthrough here. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this had been done: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. Now if this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary. Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round
——————————————————-
The MUSS is designed to counter threats caused by ATGM (anti-tank guided-missiles) and laser guided ammunition in six steps:
1. The scenario is continuously monitored by the MUSS passive sensor heads. It recognizes threats with their emitting radiations through the warning sensors.
2. Based on the threat messages which include direction of attack and other parameters, this is then displayed to the vehicle crew.
3. The movement information of the vehicle and the head sensors is collected by the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and provided to the MUSS Central Electronics (MCE).
4. The appropriate type of countermeasures will be automatically selected. The countermeasures are initiated automatically or semi-automatically as selected by the vehicle crew.
5. The Jammer is able to disrupt the guidance of most of the jammable ATGMs which are currently in service. This function influences the missile in such a way that it does not reach its target, either hitting the ground or flying away.
6. A further countermeasure is the deployment of a special smoke grenade activated by the turnable smoke screen dispenser.
The bio notes for Jon Hawkes are copied at the end. The authors address the topic under three main headings. Quotes from each of these areas are copied below.
Totality of the Battlefield
“What does this mean for the British Army and its tanks? Put very simply, a discussion around the enduring value of the tank for the British Army in any scenario neglects, or refuses, to address the fact that success in a conflict is the result of the totality of the battlefield. This means that the British Army, and the armed forces as a whole, must work together to ensure that they are able to present a cohesive and organized force that can influence the outcome. A myopic focus on the tank seems to ignore inconvenient truths, and usually rests rather heavily on the tiresome adage that begins “a tank is like a dinner jacket…”.
This aspect has been covered in previous blog posts, ie. oganisational flexibility is crucial for future combat scenarios.
Totality of Technology
“The purpose of a tank is to utilise its unique technologically enabled strengths of protection, firepower and mobility to deliver aggressive, mobile, shock action to exploit the enemy’s loss of initiative in response to the tank’s effects. Of these strengths, firepower has continued to improve and may see the adoption of 130 mm guns and integrated ATGMs, however mobility and protection are falling behind, leaving the tank vulnerable.”
“Active Protection Systems (APS) have been hailed as a partial solution to this problem – they offer a credible and operationally proven hard counter to missiles and rockets, defeating them away from the vehicle and creating the option to either reduce the volume of armour or repurpose it to specifically face the threat of APFSDS projectiles.”
“Establishing ways to increase protection at reduced weight, whether physical or with disruptive technologies in the outer layers of the survivability onion, are critical to returning the tank to the apex position in the battlefield.”
How to increase protection at reduced weight is the critical issue addressed in previous blogs.
Totality of Society
“At present, the UK has a tank fleet that is too expensive to buy or maintain in sufficient quantities to make a difference against a peer/peer+ opponent such as Russia, is difficult to deploy anywhere quickly, and still fairly vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the cost-efficiency of the tank within the UK’s limited budget, recruitment figures, and range of realistic or likely combat missions.” This is a bit outside the scope of the Blog, ie. if the tank can be shown to needed to provide
Do the findings differ from those in previous posts on this Forum? No. The main issues are that tanks will still be needed and the ability to deploy to differing conflicts can be achieved through the right organisation.
What are tanks for? The core purpose of the tank is simple, and has remained essentially unchanged since they first “operat[ed]…in the van of the battle” one hundred years ago. Tanks combine firepower, mobility, and survivability to dominate the close land battle.
“Despite the claims of the defence commentariat, the British Army still requires tanks if it is to be a force capable of fighting the majority of modern adversaries”
“While there may be merit in re-apportioning the defence budget to invest more heavily in areas such as cyber, eliminating key land capabilities entirely to buy more supporting technology would be akin to someone selling the engine from their car so they can afford better tyres”.
“… it is worth noting that [an] armoured brigade could be extremely potent if complemented by one or two Strike brigades of more mobile medium-armoured vehicles. A medium-weight brigade would mitigate the major flaws of a heavy armoured formation (ie. strategic and operational level mobility) and give the UK a range of forces to deploy if the situation doesn’t demand heavy firepower. Even so, Strike isn’t usable in all circumstances meaning an armoured brigade remains critical. “
Interestingly, it was proposed the Britain could hold tanks overseas to provide training rotations. Sadly, Australia wasn’t mentioned. Maybe this is something the RAAC Corporation will take up (?).
“With only two armoured regiments in the brigade and a sizeable stock of mothballed Challenger 2, Britain could store fleets of vehicles overseas in, for example, Canada, Germany, and Oman. This would allow frequent training rotations in different conditions to keep crews and units trained. If the armoured brigade were well funded, with enough ammunition and track miles to allow frequent training, then it should be simple to maintain readiness at a sufficient level for the brigade to be sent into combat with only a minimal pre-deployment work up.”
Major Giles Moon is a cavalry officer who has served in a variety of single service and joint roles. In 2018-19 he completed a full time MA at King’s College London as part of the British Army’s Academic External Placements programme. Having just completed ICSC(L), he is now serving on the staff in MOD main building.
As mentioned, there were many comments. It was interesting to the extent of knowledge about AFV design and development, compared to the almost zero interest here (ie. Australia).
There were a number of areas about which comments were made:
1. Deployability. If forces were located in proximity to the threat nation, then ‘heavy’ tanks were seen to be relevant; if forces needed to be deployed to differing geographical locations, then the weight of tanks is a worry.
2. Russian T14 Amara. Concern was expressed about the apparent weakness in the T-14 created by crew escape hatches in the floor. Obviously, this could weaken the hull in terms of mine attack, but there are many alternative ways to providing for crew exit without sacrificing the integrity of armour protection.
3. Calibre of Coax Weapons. Interestingly, many comments related to the concept of increasing the calibre of a coax weapon in order to reduce the number of main armament rounds (and therefore save weight). This is an age-old argument and doesn’t really impact future design concepts.
4. Vulnerability to Frontal Penetration. This was interesting. Should it be accepted that future anti-armour weapons will be unable to penetrate the frontal armour of future tanks? If so, should there be a focus on tactics aimed at attacking the enemy from the flank?
5. Battle Group Organisation. It was argued that complementary grouping of differing AFV capabilities was needed, rather than relying on, say, a heavy armoured brigade.
6. Crew Size. Could it be that only a single crewman is needed? Or, rather than thinking of three (as per earlier posts) … could two suffice? Thereby reducing weight considerably.
Conclusion. Seems to me that a commander, gunner, and driver, in a protected shell within the hull, might be the way of the future. Possibly a commander/gunner and driver could be viable, but a tactical commander for the tank troop would still be needed. This could be met by having a three man command variant. Obviously, decisions re calibre of main and secondary armaments are relevant; as are those relating to the structure and grouping of combat organisations.
—————————————————————————————————————
18 October 2020
LAND 400 Phase 3
LAND 400 Phase 3 is a $10-15 billion Army program which will recapitalise Army’s Vietnam-era M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) force, with a combination of a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and tracked APC.
“Rheinmetall Defence’s KF41 Lynx Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and Hanwha Defense’s AS21 Redback IFV have been shortlisted to compete against each other for the opportunity to provide Army with up to 450 tracked IFVs and 17 manoeuvre support vehicles.”
“LAND 400 Phase 3 – Mounted Close Combat Capability – acquisition of up to 450 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier replacement) and up to 17 Manoeuvre Support Vehicles.”
The Australian Defence Magazine has reprinted Defence’s position that LAND 400 Phase 3 is intended to provide up to 450 IFVs; BUT Defence Connect (top) has stated very recently that a mix of IFVs and APCs is to be acquired.
Which is correct? Has the basis of the project changed? Rather than a mechanised infantry platoon comprising four IFVs, possibly it’s now to comprise two IFVs and two APCs. This is a game changer if correct.
I’ve left a message with Defence Connect asking them to verify their article.
We’ve decided that some form of direct fire support will be needed for the foreseeable future. This can be provided for a manned vehicle, a robotic vehicle, or an optionally manned vehicle. The US Army is considering the latter concept. One imagines that this is because it is too soon to bank everything on robotics at this time.
As argued in the previous post, whether crewed or optionally crewed, the AFV’s weight has to be reduced. How can this be achieved, while maintaining necessary protection levels?
Volume under armour is the biggest impost on the weight of an AFV (Armour School 101). Reducing the size of the crew by incorporating an autoloader was the answer at one time, but the lethality of anti-armour weapons is now so advanced, that this is not enough.
One answer has already been fielded … by Russia.
“The Russian T-14 Armata MBT places the [reduced size] crew within an armoured cocoon in the hull of vehicle. This allows for a more compact and lighter turret served by an autoloader. This configuration saves 10-tonnes of weight as well as isolating the crew from the main gun ammunition.” Clever.
The article has attracted many comments. These will be examined next to see if there are any startling revelations.
The book above recounts the story of the murder of a wounded Viet Cong soldier. It has a Foreword by a serving senior officer stating how truthful an account it was and how proud Australians can be of those who serve on their behalf. The circumstances were that an ambush has been initiated, an enemy soldier was wounded and calling out for help … the ambush commander reported this to his HQ and was told not to bring back any prisoners! Those in the ambush then fired into the body of the wounded soldier.
Given that there is no ‘statute of limitations’ …
I rang the Defence ‘whistle-blower’ line and was informed that this was a police matter. I rang the police and they were unable to investigate. I wrote to the Minister. An enquiry was conducted; it was a white wash and I said so. Another was conducted. The result was that the account given did not happen (although the author remained steadfast that it had, having been one of those involved!)
I wrote to the Minister again to ask if he could assure the Australian people that training was currently provided to the ADF to ensure that the obeyance of the Rules of Engagement in a conflict were understood by all military members. I was told that this was the case.
————————————————————————————————————–
15 October 2020
‘Where does the tank go from here?’
Artist’s impression of the KNDS Main Combat Ground System (MCGS) being co-developed by Nexter and Krauss Maffei Wegmann (Image: Marcel Adam)
“For just over a century, the tank has been the key symbol of land power. Today, tanks no longer enjoy the same level of battlefield supremacy that they used to. So, what’s next? Do they still have a role to play? If so, how do they need to evolve and what will the next generation look like in terms of features and capabilities?”.
Do we still need tanks? Previous blog posts have made the point that as long as we still have infantry, there will be a need for a direct fire capability to support the. Drummond agrees:
“For as long as we continue to conduct ground operations with the purpose of physically seizing and holding ground, it is reasonable to assume that we will need protected mobility to transport troops from A to B and protected firepower to support infantry in achieving their objectives and to neutralise other armoured vehicles.”
Moving on, the author considers the current state of the art as far as AFVs are concerned. The role of the US in Kosovo is mentioned:
“It was too difficult to deploy M1 Abrams MBTS and M2 Bradley IFVs by air while HMMWV-equipped infantry units were too lightly protected and armed to counter the expected opposition. The mission underlined the need for a new kind of potent but rapidly deployable armoured force and precipitated the development of medium weight expeditionary brigades. The same expeditionary focus has now caused the US Marine Corps to question the validity of heavy tanks for use in the Pacific.”
How is it that the weight of an MBT can be reduced, while maintaining necessary protection levels?
It’s relevant that a matter in the news today relates to a possible payment being made to an entity in breach of regulations, by channelling it though another entity so as to disguise the source.
There is evidence that, at least one company tendering for a multi-billion military contract, has done this. In the incident that I’m aware of, supposedly there was a ‘loophole’. The Inspector General of the ADF advises that Defence policy has been amended to ensure that it doesn’t happen again. An FOI application might provide info about this.
What is the significance here? Military evaluations of future equipment options must be based solely on assessments of what is best for those using the equipment. Of course, Government decisions might differ based on economic factors and the like. This is the democratic process.
So … manufacturers (or their representatives) seeking to influence decisions re military procurement can target either the military personnel, or the Government officials (or both).
What is the consequence of any such ‘lobbying’? Clearly, it is that Australian soldiers might not receive the equipment most suited for the operations in which they are likely to be engaged.
Such practices have consequences for the lives of those deployed on behalf of our nation. Can there be any greater reason to ensure openness and transparency? Sadly, it seems that not all of us share this view.”
————————————————————————————————————–
13 October 2020
‘CANADIAN ARMED FORCES: A NEW VISION FOR THE RESERVES | CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL‘
“Wouldn’t this have been a great media release on 30 June 2020 ….
TO OUR RESERVE FORCES – AUSTRALIA SAYS THANK YOU
“Tomorrow is Reserve Forces Day. I ask all Australians to join with me in applauding the selfless sacrifice of reservists, both former and present, in helping to ensure the defence of our nation. The role of the Reserves is vital to our national security. The dedication and professionalism with which they undertake their part-time service is an example to us all.
The Government is committed to ensuring that the Defence budget is adequate to meet their needs now and in the future. In this way, the force structure of the ADF is able to be clearly defined. Rather than a large standing army with Reserves limited to specialist civilian and simple military skills, we have a smaller regular army, with Reserves encompassing both specialist civilian and complex military skills. It is our Reserve forces that provide, as they have in the past, the surge capacity in time of defence emergency (whether it be a military threat or natural disaster).”
The actual media release was very different; it solely referenced the recent bushfire and COVID-19 responses. Of course, appreciation for this effort must be made; but is this the ‘only’ acknowledgement that should be made. That suggested above clearly articulates the essential role of the Reserve as part of our national security, both now and in the future. If it was to have one.
By comparison … this is what Canada’s Defence policy has clearly set out, ie. their intention to “fundamentally change the way the Reserve Force has been recruited, trained, equipped, and employed”.
The following quote suggests the conviction behind this policy: “In the CAF, it can be said that ‘…we share our men and women with their families’; it can also be said that ‘…we share our Reservists with their families and employers’. It is vital to our success that we communicate with these stakeholders”.
Furthermore, Canada sets out a practical means of achieving this goal: “Reserve integration may eventually lead to an ‘adaptive’ or ‘alternative’ career path, with all CAF members able to have ‘portable’ terms of service to encompass the levels of commitment and time that they can provide to the institution”.
Canada’s goal is one that Australia must adopt:
“In particular, the development, support, and retention of a ready-capable, motivated, and relevant Reserve Force as a strategic and operational resource for Canada and the CAF is required, both now and well into the future.” (Replace Canada and CAF with Australian and ADF.)
—————————————————————————————————————–
12 October 2020
Tank of the Future IV
Image: UK Landpower.com
“Tanks are like dinner jackets. You don’t need them very often, but when you do, nothing else will do.”
The quote above stopped me dead. How very sensible! How well put!
Who said this?
It turns out to have been Major General Kathryn Toohey, AM CSC.
She was giving an address at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London last year.
Who is Maj Gen Toohey?
She graduated from RMC as a signals officer in 1990 and in June 2019 was appointed Head Force Integration, within the office of the Vice Chief of Defence Force. Her bio notes can be found here: https://www.defence.gov.au/VCDF/FID/
In a previous appointment, she was responsible for “proposing to government the best options for Australia’s future defence capability”.
Wait a minute … the quote above, “You don’t need them very often …”. Of course, frequency of need relates to the types of operations likely to be conducted. If these were to involve attacking enemy defensive positions or conducting mobile warfare, then tanks will be needed and needed constantly. In other types of operation, their need will not be so great … “but when needed, nothing else will do!”
Conclusion. It’s a good line, but could be better expressed. My version:
Tanks are like dinner jackets. You don’t need them for every occasion, but when you do, nothing else will do”.
————————————————————————————————————–
11 October 2020
What Lessons Does Vietnam Hold for the Abrams Replacement?
Image: twitter.com
I was interviewed (for the second time) yesterday by a Masters student at UNSW-ADFA. His thesis is: ‘Centurions with 1ATF in South Vietnam’.
I suggested that there will be little doubt about the contribution that tank direct fire support made in Vietnam. Which is why the Centurions were replaced by the Leopards and they were replaced by the Abrams.
Will the successful employment of tanks by other nations in Afghanistan be sufficient to justify the replacement of the Abrams?
Will the thesis ‘only’ serve to underscore history, or will it have a role in influencing the future force structure of the Australian Army.
Of course, there is every reason to add to history so that future decisions can draw on the lessons of the past. But wouldn’t it be great if studies of past events could directly link with future decision making.
All the above boils down to: ‘What place will direct fire support have in military operations post 2035?’.
I was asked some interesting questions, eg:
What degree of operational feedback took place … from those in Vietnam, to those training to replace them?
Why was the tank telephone removed, rather than waterproofing it and lengthening the cable?
Was inf-tank training in Australia good preparation for Vietnam?
It is good to have such issues addressed, but will the paper inform those considering the replacement for the Abrams? I guess it’s too long a bow to draw; BUT, as said in an earlier post, there is no doubt that infantry will still exist post 2035; this means that there will continue to be the requirement for direct fire support.
—————————————————————————————————————
10 October 2020
Tank of the Future III
The Blog post on 3 Aug 20 (Doing the Right Thing IV) was titled ‘Tank of the Future (or Not)?’. It’s copied below.
The RAAC operated both the Centurion and then the Leopard for 30 years (give or take a couple). The Abrams has been in service since 2007. It has nearly reached its half-life point (if its predecessors are to provide any guide). Of course, unless the Government procures the 30 tanks needed to ‘right size’ the Abrams fleet, its Life of Type might be less than 30 years.
This idea is responded to in an article in the UK Defence Journal; the conclusion to which is copied below:
“Tanks are certainly no longer the most important part of an army that they once were, nor can they resolve every issue. However, just as a good builder has multiple tools for multiple jobs, the military must be able to respond to any threat and have the tools to do so. Therefore, if the British Army wants to remain relevant on the wide spectrum of the modern battlefield it is crucial it maintains as many conventional assets as possible, for whatever the future brings. This includes heavy armoured forces and tanks.”
3 August 2020
The recent Government announcement re future defence planning included reference to “Options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life” and “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks”. (See Blog post for 8 July 2020 and subsequent.)
This is exactly the foresight that’s to be expected of our Defence staff. The US is looking at exactly the same thing (and have been for many years). The Abrams tank is great today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams look like?
The answer to that has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank.
——————————————————————————————————————
9 October 2020
LAND 400 Management II
Image: ADM
In the Blog on 20 Sep 20 (‘LAND 400 Management’) I referred to the report that the DG Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch, in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group (CASG), has suddenly been replaced. The report stated that it was not known why Brig Greg McGlone (an Army Aviator) had departed. He had been replaced on an acting basis by the Assist Sec, Land Vehicle Systems Branch, Ms Sarah Myers.
Both these Branches come within the command of the Head, Armoured Vehicle Division, Maj Gen David Coghlan (a gunner). The title of the Division might be about to change, however, as it would seem the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch is now called the ‘Combined Arms Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch’. Of course, AFV is a term which applies to a type of vehicle, not to the Corps which operates it.
Nevertheless, it would seem that political correctness associates anything ‘armoured’ with the RAAC. This can’t be allowed to happen with the IFV (LAND 400 Phase 3) to be operated by the RA Inf. (It would be much more cost effective if it was to be crewed by RAAC personnel.)
There is still an RAAC presence within the Project, however. Colonel Allan Hamley is the Project Director for LAND 400 Phase 2, Mounted Combat Reconnaissance Capability (ie. the replacement for the ASLAV). One has to wonder what Corps the new Head, Combined Arms Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch, will have gained his/her operational experience in. (Of course, it’s not a pre-requisite that they have any … they have others to offer advice.)
–——————————————————————————————————————-–
8 October 2020
Why We Do What We Do II
I’ve been asked about the incident I referred to in the Blog on 6 Oct 20.
It was contained in: ‘Captain Bullen’s War: The Vietnam War Diary of Captain John Bullen’. Captain Bullen was a Royal Australian Survey Corps officer. He recounted an incident regarding Capt Don Campbell, RAAC.
Background is: Don was on his way back to Oz from being with AATTV in I Corps (I think) and was staging through Nui Dat. This coincided with the departure of C Sqn to Coral, leaving the Sqn area quite vulnerable. The OC, Peter Badman, asked Don to do what he could to improve defences.
Peter Badman explained later that “in a short time the base camp was surrounded by a network of Claymores and interlocking arcs of fire”.
Back to Bullen’s book. To help with the task, Don Campbell went to the Survey Troop to get a base defence map. Bullen handed over the map, but Don didn’t immediately know how to orientate it. He wasn’t familiar with Nui Dat, having only just arrived. This led Bullen to make belittling comments about professionalism etc.
Bullen wasn’t to know that Don was not a member of one of the 1ATF units, but couldn’t pass up the opportunity to show his supposed superiority.
In another part of the book he made a gratuitous personal comment about a since deceased tank crew member. While he didn’t mention any names, he was obviously not aware that a tank is like a ship, ie. it’s location at any time can always be pinpointed. The member’s widow rang me to ask if what he had said in the book was true. I was pleased to be able to say that it wasn’t.
We have to be just keep going … despite people such as this.
PS. The book was edited by Paul Ham. I had reason to write to Mr Ham about 300 or so matters in his book ‘Vietnam’. Another who read this book at the same time was the late Maj Gen Jim Hughes AO, DSO, MC (CO 4RAR/NZ in 1971). His comment to me was that ‘he didn’t know whether to laugh or cry’.
If Afghanistan was Australia’s second-longest foreign military deployment, what was the longest?
Good question, but how do you find the answer?
Ross is an experienced journalist and so is unlikely to make an error in such a fundamental matter. As always, the answer lies in the wording used. He’s not referring to a war, armed conflict, or active service. He’s referring to a foreign military deployment by Australian forces.
This lists the prescribed periods for “operations/conflicts” that Australian forces have been involved in, including the following, which lasted over 28 years:
Papua and New Guinea: 1 July 1947 16 September 1975.
I served in the Australian Defence Cooperation Group PNG, but after Independence (ie. after 16 Sep 75). I hadn’t realised operational significance of the deployment prior to that time. All fascinating stuff ….
FOOTNOTE: The following advice has been received:
“In response to a question about his article Ross Eastgate has said that Australia’s longest deployment has been to UNTSO, which he says has been ongoing since 1954. Elsewhere it’s stated that our involvement began in 1956 (see links below) making it a 64 year deployment to date.
Australians also served in UNMOGIP from 1948 to 1985 (37 years) and, as per your post, PNG from 1947 to 1975 (28 years). At 19 years Afghanistan would only be Australia’s fourth longest deployment.”
I’ve just finished reading a book written by a Vietnam veteran. It reminded me of another book that I’d read some years previously. Both were written by officers, one of whom went on the become a major general.
Why is it that some people wish to denigrate others and make it appear that they are superior beings? This was the sense of similarity I had when reading these personal accounts of the authors’ time in Vietnam.
For me, there is no place for a personal failing on the part of someone else (in the opinion of an author), to be described in such a way that the author is made to appear superior in his thinking and actions, ie. to ‘big note’ himself.
I was once described by someone who was wanting to belittle me, as an “unctuous little officer”. When I checked the dictionary, I found that I was being accused of being overly moralistic (among other things). Of course, being called a “little officer” was designed to cut to the quick as well. I’m being moralistic here, so should I apologise? In my view, if society was more moralistic and less self-centred, we’d all be better off.
In one of the books, the discrediting of an RAAC officer (it could easily have been me, but it wasn’t) was based on a totally false premise. There was no military lesson to be learnt from the incident, it was simply an opportunity for one person to demonstrate his supposed intellectual superiority over another.
What is the value in writing such accounts? There is no doubt that personal experiences are valuable and should be made known at every level. One of the most important reasons to value these accounts, is for the contribution they can make to changes in the way the Army operates; ie. the ways in which training and operational procedures can be improved. Focusing on the perceived shortcomings of our colleagues, however, doesn’t benefit those going forward.
————————————————————————————————————–
5 October 2020
The History of the Main Battle Tank (MBT)
The following post of mine on the Centurion Tank Appreciation Society Facebook related to the reference in the name plate above to the Centurion as a ‘MBT’.
“Of course, the Cent was never an MBT. It was a medium gun tank. The term MBT did not come about until the Chieftain was produced to replace both the medium gun tank and the heavy gun tank (the Conqueror).”
If the Centurion was never an MBT then you can come and collect my collection of over 200 model tanks. It was the primary British MBT of the post WW2 period until the advent of the Chieftain. The only reason that the Conqueror Heavy Tank No 1 was not really considered as an MBT was due to the relatively small number produced.
Hi Bruce, I would argue that as the Conqueror had been mothballed in the 60’s and the Chieftain wasn’t in service until the 70’s then the Centurion was the Main Battle tank of that period.
Bob Potts
As I understood it, upgunning Cent. to 105mm made Conq redundant
Bruce Cameron
It was good to see the discussion taking place as this is the only way to advance the accuracy of history. It is my belief that these views are wrong, however, and responded as follows:
“It’s my understanding that prior to the Centurion, tanks had been designed and built according to their role, ie. infantry tank/cruiser tank. The Cent was referred to as the ‘universal’ tank as it fulfilled both these roles. Its formal designation, however, was ‘Medium Gun tank’. Rather than maintaining both a medium gun tank and a heavy gun gun (Conqueror), it was decided to produce the Chieftain. This was termed a Main Battle Tank, ie, one to fulfill both roles.”
Please tell us where you have garnered the information that Ajax is a Light Tank? It seems to be touted as a light (medium in some articles) tracked armoured vehicle…… not as a tank of any sort! Intrigued. Then I can get back to Centurions! Here’s an ‘official’ link:https://www.forces.net/…/all-gen-ajax-military-vehicle
————————————————————————————————————–
4 October 2020
RAAC: Strategic Mobility
Image: AWM
The following Letter to the Editor is self-explanatory:
“In “Strikes? What Strikes” (Letters, October 2) A Chaplin states that the wharfies’ union “opposed the Vietnam War, but they never refused to load shipping”. This would suggest that all those working on the waterfront were loyal to their fellow Australians fighting on behalf of their nation. Sadly, this was not so. Members of the Seamen’s Union refused to operate a vessel if it was to be used to transport weapons and ammunition to Vietnam.
Initially chartered and operated with RAN personnel replacing union members, the ‘MV Jeparit’ was later commissioned as ‘HMAS Jeparit’ as a result of continuing industrial action.
Unfortunately, when Centurion tanks were unloaded from the Jeparit in 1968, many tools used for maintaining the vehicles, were found to have been stolen. This was reminder of the equipment stolen from Stuart tanks of the 2/6 Aust Armoured Regiment when off-loaded at Port Morseby in 1942.”
——————————————————————————————————-
3 October 2020
Australia and VC Awards
The article entitled, ‘ Australia and VC Awards’ by Noel Turnbull, can be accessed here:
I, too, served in Vietnam, albeit after you, and I know of what you write.
You refer to the stats re VCs that have been awarded to Australians. You might not be aware that different criteria apply to the Imperial VC and the VC of Australia.
The criteria for the former, is that there has to be at least a 90 per cent chance of the person being recommended, being killed in doing what he did. I don’t believe that this is the same for the VC of Australia. That is not to say that recipients of the VC of Australia are in any way less entitled to their recognition than their predecessors.
I was astonished when one of the arguments put up by Defence against awarding ‘Teddy’ Sheean a retrospective VC, was that it would create two classes of award. (The other argument was that the Queen would be put in a difficult position.) Seems to me, as it is in law, that there must always be the right to appeal. For Defence to have blanket ‘no retrospective awards unless proven administrative error’ policy, is as heartless as it was to not allow the NOK of those who were killed in combat to receive the Army Combat Badge. (A policy which was only overturned after it became public and embarrassment mounted.)
The finding of the Tribunal which considered the submission made for me to be awarded the VC (under the criteria at the time of Vietnam, i.e. the Imperial VC) was that, as I had neither been wounded nor killed, I had not demonstrated sufficient self-sacrifice. It was absolutely their right to decide accordingly.
The book I am currently writing is entitled: ‘Not Enough Self Sacrifice for a VC’.
2 October 2020
Sorry … the Host for this site has introduced new procedures and I’ve been compelled to adopt them. The post for the 2nd was lost accordingly. I fear that the problems aren’t over yet!Jetpack
Preview what this will look like on social networks and Google search.
Business or eCommerce plan required.Learn more
Likes and Sharing
Show likes.Show sharing buttons.Open publish panel
Document
Much of the new (2017) C’tee’s time was taken up with governance matters which had been long in the making. A firm of accountants were appointed to set up an accounting system to better enable the Assn to manage its financial transactions. Interestingly, as a part of this, advice was given to the C’tee that my donations of royalties from my book, made for the purpose of “assisting the Association’s endeavours” (stated publicly in the Author’s Note), had “created a constructive obligation in respect to the donated funds”.
Supposedly this meant that the funds could only be used as I stipulated. Of course, nothing was further from the truth … which was proven by the fact that I had no knowledge of the use of the funds to purchase either a TV set for D Squadron in South Australia, nor building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club. Both purposes I fully supported. Nevertheless, a firm of lawyers was employed to tell me not to make any further donations. I asked what I had to do to make an acceptable donation, but received no response.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM stated that “… any future donations would be accepted without conditions”. The present C’tee was asked to consider the question: “Could the C’tee please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement? No response has been received.
Despite all the above, the financial status of the Assn has been moved onto a sound basis with stringent controls. This is a major step forward. The fact that the Defence Fraud and Investigation Unit conducted an investigation might have been an additional spur to this end. [The investigation related to $25,000 in donations being made to 1 Armd Regt from Rheinmetall. These payments were ‘masked’ by being transferred through the 1 AR Assn accounts. This ‘routing’ is possibly explained by the fact that such ‘donations’ were in complete breach of Defence regulations; Rheinmetall being a contender for a major Defence contract at the time. The 1AR Assn C’tee responded by saying that the Assn was bound by Victorian Law, not Defence regulations. [After submissions by members, the matter was investigated by the Defence Force Ombudsman and procedures within Defence amended as a result.]
The other step required was that of putting in place a valid and relevant Constitution. The hard work of a group of dedicated members, especially Ron Baikie and Geoff Stelmach, paid dividends. The draft Constitution prepared by them, with some amendments, was approved by members at the 2018 AGM.
One of the amendments inserted by the then C’tee was that which stated that just because you served in 1 Armd Regt, this no longer made you eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. Previously you were automatically eligible and would only cease to be a member if you were to be in breach of disciplinary provisions. Overnight, the C’tee has given itself the power of veto on their own terms. Now, if you apply to join (or renew your membership) and the C’tee does not consider you ‘suitable’, then your application is not approved. There is no definition as what “suitable” means in the eyes of the C’tee.
Interestingly, I was not able to attend the AGM for health reasons. I explained this to those who demanded on-line, that I attend. Immediately following the AWM, a series of photos appeared on the 1AR Past & Present FB page of a placemat with my name on it at various places within the AGM venue, coupled with the question: “Where is he?”. I complained to the new C’tee. The President responded to say that the C’tee could not do anything with respect to inappropriate behaviour on the FB page outside their control.
At its second C’tee meeting the following policy was adopted: “Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog or a face book page with privacy settings, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, may result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary SubCommittee to examine and report on the behaviour.
I assume that the behaviour described above would be considered to be ‘inappropriate’. So it seems that the two 1AR Assn members behind the post, escape a review by a Disciplinary Sub-Committee (and I miss out on receiving an apology). Was it not ever thus?
Part 6.
The story continues … The final Constitution approved by the then C’tee differed from that which the group of members had drafted. One point of difference was that a clause was inserted which gave the C’tee the right to refuse someone’s application for membership, without telling them why and without giving them any right of appeal. These are the sort of powers that back the governance of a totalitarian regime. A number of members raised objections to this, but their protests were ignored.
The C’tee with whom the group of members had been working to draft the new Constitution had included a provision in the Constitution for ‘existing’ Life Memberships to be continued. The draft sent to members made this very clear. (Background here is that when Life Memberships were originally awarded, there was no provision in the Constitution for this to be done. The revised Constitution included such provision.)
Although I was a Life Member, I received a request to pay membership fees. I did so, thinking that it would be somewhat arrogant of me to say that as a Life Member, I’m not required to do so. Next, I’m advised that as I was deemed to have criticised the C’tee (with my suggestions re continual improvement of due process), I was therefore deemed not to support the Purposes of the Assn as set out in the Constitution.
As a result, my membership would not be renewed. (The basis for and against the supposed criticisms are detailed in Blog posts for March 2019.) Furthermore, I was advised that I would not be entitled to appeal this decision (which, for a disciplinary offence by a member whose m’ship was current, would be granted and heard by a General Meeting of members.)
I said “but I’m a Life Member, I was only applying for membership renewal on a voluntary basis”. Surprisingly, I was told that all Life Memberships had been scrapped, (ie. the provision continuing Life Memberships mentioned above, was deleted from the Constitution by the C’tee, before a vote was taken for approval). I asked why the decision to continue Life Memberships was overturned and why weren’t members informed of this? I have not received a response to either question.
Nevertheless, as the Constitution provides for a Life Member to do, I’ve appealed the decision to revoke my membership. What will the next chapter bring, I wonder?
In a letter dated 2 August 2019, the President 1AR Assn advised me that the reason that the C’tee did not notice that the provision for existing Life Memberships to be continued had been removed from the draft of the Constitution considered at the AGM, was an “oversight” which the Association “failed to detect”. As a result, resolutions for the continuance of each former life member’s membership are to be considered at the AGM on 12 October 2019. Each resolution must be approved by three quarters of the members voting, whether in person or by proxy. I was not allowed to vote.
My Life Membership was not renewed. I asked to see the proposal that was put to members with respect to me and the Minutes of the AGM … neither was allowed.
Part 7: The Ideal World
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have to draw attention to.
This would mean:
The memorial plaques provided by DVA for those who DOW would include reference to Mentioned in Dispatches (MiD) when this award had been received.
There would be two tank squadrons in the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade (to facilitate the formation of an adequate number of battlegroups).
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool.
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
No-one on RAAC or related personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to Defence’s ‘official’ position.
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense.
All information panels re RAAC exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery at the AWM and audio-visual narratives would be correct
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the First Australians who lost their lives defending their families, land and possessions, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
A system of Operational Analysis (OA) would be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience, which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise ”to assist the Association’s endeavours” (and not be rejected because a perceived obligation would be created).
1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by 1 AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
ADF and DVA medical procedures would take account of the unique stress factors associated with operating AFVs in combat (and in training) when assessing the mental health of serving and former RAAC personnel.
RAAC personnel would be able to wear an AFV crewman’s badge following initial qualification as an AFV crewman and until no longer qualified.
ADF personnel would be able to wear dress embellishments which indicated the number of times they had been WIA and deployed on active service in a particular conflict.
The Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) to to be introduced under LAND 400 Phase 3 would be operated by the RAAC.
Oral history interviews would be conducted with those who have crewed the different AFVs used by the Australian Army, so that their experience might be recorded before they all pass away (and only the AFVs are left).
The submission made by the RAAC Corporation (when asked by Defence if they supported my submission to Minister for the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard) would be made available to those who may seek to view it (given that the Corporation state that no prior submissions were looked at by them).
The reason that an application for membership of the 1AR Assn is denied by the C’tee must be made known to the applicant and members; the applicant must have the right of appeal.
Pending …
The RAAC tank fleet would be right sized’ from 59 to the 90+ that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons. (It has been reported that project LAND 907 Phase 2 incorporates an additional 29 Abrams, to bring the tank fleet to 88; with what seems to be a ‘trade-off’ in terms of two tanks for increased simulators, including one for troop tactical training.)
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool. (See above.)
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege. (The 1AR Assn C’tee is making available an ‘extract’ of the Minutes that is thought to be relevant to members.)
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour. (The need for appropriate training has been acknowledged, however, it is yet to be formalised via the SOA.)
The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)
The identity of the person who holds the logbooks for the Centurions at Puckapunyal would be known, as would the reason for the logbooks not being in Tank Museum where they belong. (It is now known that Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM, has or has had access to, at least one of the missing logbooks. Footnote 55, p121, Vol1 , ‘Canister1 On! FIRE!’ refers. (Mr Cecil initially issued a denial, however, subsequently admitted that he once transcribed info from the logbook. He hasn’t volunteered where the logbook was at the time.)
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’. (Acceptance of this is becoming much more widespread, however, it is still far from universal.)
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned. (Minutes of C’tee meetings are now made available to members, however, not all decisions are open and transparent.)
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which provided effective rapid and hard hitting firepower. (A carbine is now available for a tank crewman/commander to use should he have reason to leave the tank and are also provided for ASLAV crew members.)
RAAC related technology exhibits at the AWM would not focus entirely on the technical aspects of the vehicles/equipment, but also would incorporate the human dimension, ie. the roles of (and stress associated with) the crew operating AFVs in combat. (The Director of the AWM, Dr Nelson, advises that he has adopted this policy, ie. he “continually reminds AWM staff that it is the experiences of those operating the equipment, rather than the machines themselves, which are of most importance”.
Crossed off the List:
The RAAC Corporation has amended its website to correctly describe the vehicles operated by the RAAC.
The AWM has resolved the conflict between its different website references to the number of crew that operated its Japanese Ha Go tank.
The Ombudsman has undertaken a review of the perceived conflict of interest created when Rheinmetall ‘routed’ $25,000 through the 1AR Assn accounts to avoid scrutiny, at the same time as tendering for a $5b Defence contract. Procedures within Defence have been amended as a result
The 1AR Assn have had a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
Serving members of B Sqn 3/4 Cav are eligible to wear the UCG insignia for Coral-Balmoral.
Those former 1AR members who desire to do so, can use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
The 1AR Assn now has a valid Constitution approved by members
The 1AR Assn Constitution is now available to be viewed by members on the Assn’s website.
The history of 1 Armd Regt has been updated on the 1AR website to reflect its present role (what a pity the RAAC Corporation has not followed suit).
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provides suitable housing and schooling for families (as well as good access to training areas). There is to be no move to Central Queensland (… for now?)
Minutes of the last 1AR AGM were published without any defamatory material.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings are now being made available to members.
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral are now entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry (with Federation Star)..
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
The C-B Battlehonour has been emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard have been corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modeled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
The LAND 400 Phase 2 timetable is on track, despite the anticipated delays associated with a change in the Minister for Defence. (This means that the capability gap that would have resulted from a delay in the replacement of the ASLAV, has been avoided.)
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal advocated by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
DVA withdrew the lapel pin comprised of crossed Australian and Socialist Republic of Vietnam flags which the RAAC Corporation advocated be worn at the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
The Minister for Defence considered an account in a book by a Vietnam veteran, with a ‘glowing’ Foreword by a serving senior officer … if true, the incident amounted to premeditated murder. The investigation found that it was ’embellishment’ by the author. The Minister advised that Army training standards had been reviewed to ensure that such actions would be recognised for what they are and not be seemingly ‘condoned’ in the future.
Attention is now given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
The National Archives/AWM have acknowledged that a mistake made, for example in an After Action Report, CAN be brought to the attention of those who refer to the original documents in order to better understand what happened.
An RAAC veteran has received just and compassionate treatment from the Federal Court, overruling the Immigration Minister. (What a pity justice and compassion were not to be found more widely from within RAAC ESO ranks.)
DVA has advised aged care providers of the assistance that they can provide for the conduct of Anzac Day Services for those who are mobility impaired.
————————————————–
The blog continues below, the story remains unfinished. ‘Doing the Right Thing V’ ( below) lists daily Blog posts from 12 August 2020. Earlier day by day posts follow after that.
To comment, move the cursor to a point level with the ‘date circle’, on the RH side of the post. This should illuminate a red rectangle which will enable a comment to be posted. The comment won’t remain verbatim’, as each Blog Post is a separate publication (with the earlier one being removed). Comments which contribute to to the issue at hand will, however, be acknowledged and very likely quoted in the next day’s Post (which will remain in the running archive).
IMPORTANT.
Should anyone see something which is incorrect in any Blog post, please inform me so that I can immediately correct the information and apologise to anyone inadvertently affected. (See example Corrections at the Blog posts for 3 June 2019 and 26 January 2019.)
NB 1. Advertisements. I’m sorry … I had no idea about the advertisements that have been incorporated into my posts (that some readers have experienced). I guess this is all about the number of readers … when the number increases, so there is commercial value in incorporating ads. Paradoxically, it seems this has also made it more difficult to access the Blog. (I wouldn’t dare think that a hacker had been tasked to ‘close me down’.)
Thank goodness! Just place armouredadvocates.wordpress.com in the top search bar of Google and it should all be ok. (Fingers crossed.) I should mention that I have no association whatsoever with the products advertised, indeed I can’t see the ads myself.
NB 2. Index. A lot of readers have said how good it would be to have an index of blog posts on a subject by subject basis. This was suggested to me right at the start of the Blog, but I foolishly thought that the Blog would have a very limited life and it wouldn’t be worth it. I’ve realised for some time, how useful it would be … and will do something accordingly. LATEST: The Index is being developed and the work in progress can be found here: …… SORRY, I’m working to fix this! If anyone would like an email copy of the Index, let me know.
NB 3. Email Contact. Should anyone wish to provide feedback by email, the address is cameronshome@bigpond.com
—————————————————————————————————————–
LAND 400 and Conflict of Interest
Image: ADM
LAND 400 would have to be one of the Australian Army’s most successful defence procurement projects. Well done to all those who contributed (and are still contributing) to it. The issue of conflict of interest was raised in 2017 when it was revealed that Rheinmetall had been masking payments to 1 Armd Regt by forwarding them through the 1AR Assn (see below). Twenty five thousand dollars was transferred in this way, completely contrary to Defence regulations governing conflict of interest involving a company tendering for a Defence contract. The 1AR Assn answered queries about this by stating that ‘we are not governed by Defence regulations, but by Consumer Affairs Victoria’.
The Defence Inspector General conducted an investigation and found loopholes in relevant regulations. These have since been amended. The point is that an offence has been committed if an act contributes to even the ‘perception’ of a conflict of interest. This was undoubtedly the case here.
There is no public information available as to the make up of ‘Rheinmettal Defence Australia’ management staff. If they included former members of the ADF who had recently left positions directly related to LAND 400, would this create a perception of a conflict of interest?
Some countries have particular laws designed to prevent such situation. A conflict of interest could arise, for example, if someone applied for employment at a company which he is assessing for the award of a tender. Another law prevents such a person taking up any such an appointment within a set time period after resigning from his ‘official’ position.
———————————————————————————————–
The Ethics of ‘Masking’ Payments through the 1AR Assn.
It was announced during my recent travels [2018] that Rheinmetall has been awarded the LAND 400 contract to provide the replacement for the ASLAV recon vehicle in the three ACRs. This raises the ethical issues highlighted in the previous blog posts copied below.
28 December 2017
Priorities; Urgency; and Importance
The telephone can be the enemy of effective time management. Time and all other resources are, of course, allocated to ensure that important matters are appropriately dealt with. When someone calls on the telephone, they expect their call to be (i) answered and furthermore, (ii) their concern addressed immediately. By default … this becomes an urgent matter. If dealt with straightaway, however, it might well absorb resources required to deal with an important matter. Of course, if something is both urgent and important, it must be allocated appropriate priority.
I referred yesterday to Assn Governance (urgent) and RAAC Issues (important). It is possible, of course, for either category to include matters which are both urgent and important.
The following has the potential to be included in this category.
The financial ledger sent to Assn members recently, included the information below:
“Misc – Donation made to association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd Regt Regimental Funds ….. $5,000.00”
One has to wonder if this is the first ‘donation’ which been channelled through the Assn to avoid (presumably) any suggestion of conflict of interest (ie. as might arise if the company was a defence contractor or potential contractor). The possibility arises that other payments have been made via the Assn and that other RAAC Units are also beneficiaries. Furthermore, if ‘secret’ payments are being made to units, it has to be assumed that other payments might have been made to individuals.
There is a major project in the pipeline which affects all ARA RAAC units. Companies are vying for selection. The overall cost is in the order of $5b.
It is both urgent and important that an assurance be given that any equipment to be operated by the RAAC is chosen on its merits and the decision is not, in any way, influenced by payments “masked by coming through” the Assn.
Donations?
Continuing on from 28 December …. the Assn’s 14/15 Financial Statement (included in the Minutes of the 2015 AGM) includes the following reference under the heading, Expenditure:
“Donations (to 1AR from Rheinmetall Sim) $10,000”
I believe that $5000 may also have been donated on this basis in FY13/14.
So it appears that Rheinmetall may have donated at least $20,000 to 1AR (regimental funds presumably) through the 1AR Assn
Why would any commercial company do this, ie. what benefit would it expect to gain? One has to assume that the funds are being paid to the Assn because to pay direct to 1AR
—————————————————————————————————————-
30 December 2020
Looking After Each Other
One of the ‘Pending’ goals at Part 7 of the Intro (above) is:
“The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be articulated in practical terms.)”
The background?
During the ‘dark’ period in the history of the 1AR Assn, providing any form of welfare support was rejected. Indeed, formal agreement was reached with the RAAC Corporation to the effect that the Assn (like other members of the Corporation) had insufficient resources to provide such support. It was stated that should the C’tee become aware of a member in need, they’d be referred to the RSL. Added to this … it was made known that all that the members of the Assn were interested in was, ‘having a few beers and telling a few stories’.
Interestingly, Purposes four and five (out of ten) of the 1AR Assn, as set out in the Report to members included in yesterday’s Blog, are stated as:
promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve; and
provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.
Without any specific measures being introduced, I think ‘Pending’ is still the appropriate category for this Goal.
———————————————————————————————————————–
29 December 2020
Accountability to Members
The following is an extract from the Blog Intro, Part 4 (above):
“It has subsequently been discovered that considerable irregularities occurred in the conduct of the AGM: in particular, there were enormous discrepancies with proxy voting; the numbers of votes stated in the AGM Minutes were 30% more than figures given at the meeting to those attending; membership records were inaccurate and wrongly disallowed at least one member from voting; a person addressed the meeting, described as a “financial Affiliate Member”, but there is no provision for affiliate members in the Constitution; another ‘member’ addressed the meeting, but there is no mention of him in the list of those attending; and the financial statement was not only not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, but also it failed to encompass the whole FY and did not disclose reasons for the expenditure of funds.
All irregularities with respect to the Constitution were brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response was received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past 12 months.)”
The circumstances above relate to the 1AR Assn’s dark period some years ago. Some members publicly demanded adherence to regulatory requirements and accountability on the part of the C’tee. While these members were widely lambasted by others for their supposed lack of loyalty to the Assn, it is pleasing to see that progress has been made.
A link to the current Financial Statement is provided below. Not only does it comply with Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) requirements, but also it’s provided to members in advance of the AGM so that members can examine it in good time (something that the ‘concerned’ members’ group had sought).
Interestingly, if they look closely, there are some matters of detail that members might like to raise with the C’tee.
——————————————————————————————————————
28 December 2020
Defence Challenges in 2021
An Australian Army M1 Abrams Tank moves into position before sunrise at Shoalwater Bay during Exercise Diamond Strike 2018.
Image: Defence
The following articles (extracts below) provide a snapshot of some of the issues to be confronted in the year ahead ….
If the tradition still holds, arriving on Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s desk this week will be a report setting out the Australian intelligence community’s best guesses (they will call them ‘judgements’) as to big strategic developments that could go horribly wrong in 2021.
We will probably never see that report, so in its place here are my best judgements (you can call them ‘guesses’) as to the likely prospects for peace, conflict and the in-between stage now called the ‘grey zone’, where aggressors advance their interests covertly.
As the document put it, this “new strategic policy framework to ensure Australia is able – and is understood as willing – to deploy military power to shape our environment, deter actions against our interests and, when required, respond with military force”.
This language of “willingness” is unprecedented in recent memory, uncertain in its application and raises the possibility of squandering the very defensive advantages the government wishes to achieve.
Overall, the narrative of the infographics we examined seems designed to strengthen the perception that Indonesia has international support for its sovereignty over West Papua and to quash hope of outside assistance with independence for the region. While the accounts we examined attracted only a relatively small amount of interaction, information campaigns on West Papuan issues have been persistent, and this is likely to be only a small part of operations designed to spread pro-Indonesia narratives.
I’ve been very critical about the errors in current Defence publications re the RAAC (as I have with some other sites which continue to depict the pre ACR Corps and superseded equipment); however, it seems to me that they’ve done a good job re the following recruiting videos.
I was once selected to join the 3MD army recruiting team, but ended up being posted elsewhere. I wonder if I would’ve been able to avoid the ‘other’ sides to life in the RAAC as depicted here.
“Is this really a “deceit” imposed on the Australian public by its Government?
Can someone take just one of the three strategic priorities set out on the 2020 Defence Strategic Update & 2020 Force Structure Plan, dissect it in terms of its apparent ‘failings’, and reach conclusions about overall defence policy?
The three designated priorities are to:
shape Australia’s strategic environment;
deter actions against Australia’s interests; and
respond with credible military force, when required.
It is, of course, the last which dictates the equipment allocation, force structure and readiness posture of the ADF …. this being a consequence of contingency plans which have been developed in response to the identified ‘threat’.
Seems to me that before we can criticise the components of a ‘credible military force’, we have to analyse the threat and its consequent force structure.”
Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
“Wonderful post Tony. My cousin’s husband grew up in a poor area of the UK, emigrated here, learnt to fly a helicopter and built a career resupplying the WA oil rigs. At Christmas he has a tin of tuna and a couple of biscuits.
He can’t reconcile the lavishness of Christmas lunches with the fact that so many go without a decent meal (let alone the excesses of Christmas). If you had a message to pass to him (now in a terminal aged care facility), it would be much appreciated. Many thanks. PS. I know the cartoon, but for the life of me … I haven’t been able to find it.”
I don’t think that more needs to be said on this day. Merry Christmas to all those who read this Blog … might it be that between us all, we can make a few things better next year, than they were in 2020.
—————————————————————————————————————–
24 December 2020
Where Does Responsibility Lie?
First Pass.
In 2007, as a result of research for a book, I made both Defence and the Government aware of alleged war crimes in Vietnam. They already knew, however, as the Government was providing educational material to schools which stated that Australian soldiers in Vietnam killed enemy soldiers who were wounded and unable to defend themselves. A book detailing one murder was endorsed by a senior Army officer as being a great narrative of Australian military exploits.
I asked for investigations to be conducted into these murders. The Government declined. I asked if training could be revised, so that the Australian people could be confident that no such things could happen again. I was assured by the Minister, that this would be done.
It is clear that those who took no action when these matters were brought to their attention are responsible for what might have happened later. They may have ensured appropriate training was prescribed, but if they did not ensure that this was regularly validated … they are still culpable.
What does this mean? It means that they did not fulfill their responsibilities. If you are aware of something that needs to be done and are about to vacate your position … what do you do? You set down procedures that must be followed and overseen by your successor. Is this asking too much? Not at all … if a Minister or staff member takes their responsibilities seriously. Of course, they might only occupy their positions for the salary and ‘perks’ that they provide and they might not give a ‘….’ about their responsibilities.
A submission detailing the above (with copies of letters to the Minister at the time) has been provided to the Afghanistan Inquiry.
Second Pass
Subsequent events have shown that no-one in either Defence of Government bears responsibility for what is alleged to have happened in Afghanistan. How can this be?
Who has responsibility for the training that troops undertook prior to deployment? The Government endorses the CDF, the CDF endorses the CA, the CA endorses GOCs Forces Command and Training Command.
The Minister accepts the word of the CDF; the CDF accepts the word of the CA; the CA accepts the word of his GOCs. So, on we go … the result being that no-one is responsible! Is this as it should be?
My former office manager (a retired Army colonel) once yelled out from his office in an angry voice to say: “Who’s responsible for THIS (which he was waving in his hand)?” I replied to say that if it was ‘good’ it was the work of my team; if it was ‘bad’ it was my responsibility. He said; “It’s great!”. (My team appreciated what is sometimes referred to as ‘leadership’.) So … where does this leave us?
There is something called ‘self-respect’. Some people think it to be of importance, others aren’t even aware of it. There is no line of responsibility from top to bottom, unless those involved believe in the concept of ‘self-respect’. If they don’t care about it … why accept any responsibility for the conduct of those for whose actions they’re responsible?
The answer seems clear.
—————————————————————————————————————–
10 December 2020
8/13 VMR Association News
I found the information in the newsletter below, very interesting.
(8/13 were disbanded some time ago; an ‘8/13th Squadron’ is part of 4/19 PWLH)
It is great to see that, despite everything, the Armoured Corps spirit lives on and those past and their deeds, are not forgotten. Positive notes to end on.
THIS WILL BE THE LAST BLOG POST UNTIL 24 DECEMBER —– FAMILY VISITS AWAIT.
——————————————————————————————————————
9 December 2020
RAAC Operational Capability
Image: Defence
The latest issue of The Defender magazine has two interesting articles:
“Army is planning on raising a heavy armoured brigade for intensity peer to peer warfare operations as part of the 2028 Order of Battle”; and
“1 Armd Regt has been issued a fleet of new Hawkei PMV-L to trial as Combat reconnaissance Vehicles”.
I haven’t read the articles and I don’t know the accuracy of the source, however, on the surface … this would seem to be great news!
It is in keeping with two of the ‘goals’ set out in Part 7 of the Intro above, ie.
There would be two tank squadrons in the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade (to facilitate the formation of an adequate number of battlegroups).
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
One can’t be sure why 1 Armd Regt is trialing Hawkei as a CRV, but with two CRV Boxer squadrons in the ACR … it’s unlikely to be their own use.
Of course, the reason for arguing for two tank squadrons in the ‘Ready’ Brigade is because of the need for sufficient tanks to form battle groups. The reasoning here has been presented in previous Blog posts.
It seems to me that Defence has two choices. The Reserve forces can either be an ADF supplement or an ADF backup.
A supplementary role would see Reserves fulfilling individual specialist support roles, as well civil support such as that provided for the Invictus Games. An example of the former is that of a doctor I know who has recently been deployed to Iraq.
A backup role would see the Reserves maintaining operational and tactical skills, in order to be able to reinforce the ADF on active service deployments. The point here is that these skills take a long time to develop and this can only happen if appropriate equipment is available.
Maybe there’s a hybrid answer; ie. operational skills are prioritised according to importance re ADF capability and the time required for training.
The problem is, unless a decision is made … the opportunity for the reserves to capable of providing an ADF backup role rapidly diminishes, as the capability gap increases.”
Dustin is an Army Reserve Captain within 9 Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. He is currently undertaking a Reserve Forces Foreign Exchange with the District of Columbia National Guard whilst posted to Washington DC in his civilian role with the Australian Public Service. As an Army Officer, Dustin has completed multiple periods of full time service, including deployments on border security operations and Defence Assistance to the Civil Community.
—————————————————————————————————————–
6 December 2020
50th Anniversary Reunion: C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt
A National Commemoration is being held by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord. The main battle of this Operation was fought on 7 June 1971 and hence the Commemoration will be on 7 June 2021. C Sqn is holding a 50th Reunion for all those who served during 1971 in conjunction with the DVA Ceremony, which will be at the Vietnam Memorial in Canberra. A dinner is to be held the night before and prior to that wreaths will be laid in honour of Phil Barwick and Andy Anderson (who were wounded in the Operation immediately after Overlord) at the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM.
There are currently about 100 registered to attend the dinner. Should any reader wish to attend, although not in C Sqn 1971 but with another connection, you’d be welcome to do so. Email me at cameronshome@bigpond.com. Info below.
Timetable
6 June 2021 (Sunday).
2.00pm Vietnam Requiem Concert (hosted by the AWM’s Musical Artist in Residence, Chris Latham, at the Llewellyn Hall, ANU).
4.55pm. Last Post Ceremony commences at the AWM. (In honour of Cpl David John Dubber, RAAF; KIA 7th June 1971.) Wreaths laid in honour of Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick
5.25pm. Ceremony concludes
6.30pm. C Squadron Meet and Greet (bar/lounge area of the Mercure Hotel, Ainslie).
7.30pm. Dinner is served. ($60pp)
9.30pm. Dinner concludes (those who so desire, adjourn to the bar)
7 June 2021 (Monday)
10.30am. National commemoration commences (Vietnam Memorial, ANZAC Pde, Canberra).
11.30am. Commemoration concludes.
12 noon. ‘Snacks’ at Mercure Hotel (drinks at own expense, food cost to be advised).
Note: DVA will provide a shuttle bus from the Mercure to the Ceremony and back
——————————————————————————————————————
5 December 2020
Vietnam Requiem
Flowers of War – Diggers’ Requiem: Image-City News Canberra.
Last night I attended a rehearsal performance of the Vietnam Requiem:
It was just incredible and the full concert should be simply amazing. It was to be performed only once on 6 June 2021, prior to the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord, but COVID has meant that the venue will be limited to 50% capacity and an earlier performance on will be held on 5 June.
John Shumann did a new rendition of ‘I was only 19‘ and Little Patti has lost none of her vocal talent. They are both simply delightful people.
Act 1 of the Requiem comprises twelve songs that were popular at the time of Vietnam; while ACT 2 is made up of twelve Movements which relate to specific phases/aspects of the War, ‘illustrated’ by a photographic backing. The three Movements performed during the Rehearsal were very compelling and wonderfully performed.
—————————————————————————————————————–
4 December 2020
The RAAC ARES
The following article is published in The Cove by Eamon Hale (below):
I have argued previously for vehicles (not necessarily AFVs) which could enable mobile warfare reconnaissance skills to be developed and maintained to be allocated to the RAAC ARES.
As you know it’s the skills that take the time to instil at all levels. Whether or not this is important, depends on the role of the ARES within the ADF. It’s hard to imagine that mobile warfare skills are not required at this time in terms of Defence contingency plans. This is evidenced by the funding granted to procure the Boxer CRV.
BUT … no-one is prepared to state and justify the actual role of the ARES in time of defence emergency. Maybe it’s thought the such a time will not come again. Even the 2020 Defence Reserves Association conference completely side-stepped this fundamental issue.
I hope that the fundamental role of the ARES will be defined, then the wisdom of your proposals will undoubtedly come into play!”
Eamon Hale joined the Army Reserve in 2004, as an M113A1 crewman. He transferred to the Regular Army in 2007, being posted to numerous units with the RAAC and Army. He has deployed on operation to Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as exchange to Canada, and training officer cadets in PNG. In mid-2017, Eamon left the regular Army and returned to the Army reserve. In 2020, he commenced a continuous full-time service contract attached to 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, with whom he deployed again to Afghanistan as a Force Protection Node Commander and PMV Section Commander.
—————————————————————————————————————-
3 December 2020
In the Shadows 3
Following on from 1 December … the following email sequence is self-explanatory”
1. Hi Charlie,
I see now that not only was your phone not ‘lost’, but also you have barred me from phoning you. You really don’t have to lie.
Is it not a travesty that we can’t be open about our communications and discussions with others?
I could, for example, publish the emails between you and me.
Maybe one or other of those cc’d will have the ‘balls’ to phone me and say why it was that the open and transparent arrangements that you and I had established, were simply ‘overturned’ without any notice to me (or considerations of those on whose behalf we were working).
Once again, I ask if you or Noel or Pedro could phone me (if any of you have the guts to do so).
Cheers, Bruce
2. G’day Bruce
What are you trying to do here. The matters between you and Charlie are not of my concern or interest. I have absolutely nothing to do with the social events you are all worked up about.
I was not involved in any of this and absolutely have no interest. I do not even know Charlie.
What is the purpose of me phoning you?
Are you calling me out as gutless, if so I believe we should sort that out face to face, not via email or phone.
Why am I even a CC addressee on this crap?
Pedro
3. G’day Pedro,
I like to be open and transparent in all matters I’m involved in.
The person who nominated himself to be a 3 Cav representative (with the backing of the 3 Cav Assn President) for a combined function on the eve of the Overlord Commemoration won’t explain why there was a sudden decision not to proceed according to our planning, but to conduct a separate 3 Cav function.
I simply ask why I wasn’t given the courtesy of being told when it was decided that ‘if the Commemoration goes ahead, we’ll have our own function’. This would have been very helpful to know in term of the organisation.
It’s my belief that Mr McLaughlin wanted to attend a social event, but not one with other groups; as a result, he contacted Mr Dearling and they agreed to proceed independently.
I know that Mr McLaughlin informed you of the arrangements and I presumed that you might have been part of the discussion between him and Mr Dearling. You have said that this was not the case.
Thank you … that’s all I was wanting to know.
PS. Don’t you think it ‘unusual’ that Mr Dearling won’t discuss the matter and has blocked my calls … if you’re working in partnership with someone, there’s an expectation that both are honest with each other. I guess if one is to get “worked up” about something, it’s as good a reason as any.
Bruce
—————————————————————————————————————–
2 December 2020
The Retrospective Victoria Cross.
The following letter to the Editor, ‘Canberra Times’ stands by itself:
“It was wonderful to see the gallantry of ‘Teddy’ Sheean recognised at last. But it’s been a longer road that it should ever have been.
There were a number of letters earlier this year about the Government’s decision to overturn the independent Tribunal’s decision that he should be awarded the VC. This decision was surprising, as no-one doubted the bravery and self-sacrifice demonstrated (which is why the independent Tribunal recommended that the award be made retrospectively).
It subsequently became known that the PM accepted the advice of our Chief of Defence Force that the Queen might be put in a difficult position if the award was to be recommended. Apparently, the NZ Government put forward an equivalent proposal some time ago, only for it to be rejected. It was also thought that a retrospective award would open the floodgates for other claims and that two classes of award would be created.
Many were of the view that courage and sacrifice on behalf of our nation was being ditched in favour of political nicety. Public opinion subsequently compelled the PM to appoint Dr Brendan Nelson to examine the matter; the outcome of which led to the recent award and ceremony at Government House. It seems that the Government’s decision to withdraw the Meritorious Unit Citation to the SASR might also be overturned by public opinion.
There’s undoubtedly a message here … let’s hope that it is recognised and acted upon.”
—————————————————————————————————————–
1 December 2020
In the Shadows 3
The following sequence of emails is self-explanatory (though the matters addressed are less so). It is all very tiresome, but apathy doesn’t appeal to everyone.
I’ve copied you some of the ‘Updates’ which detail the activities for the C Sqn Reunion. I note that you’ve opted not to copy me into associated matters that you’re involved with.
When you send the following [proposed] message to members of the Assn, maybe you’d like to say that the names of those attending the C Sqn reunion will be advised by myself when they ‘register’ early next year. But maybe that would be too late and those who are not members of the Assn would miss out ….
“Those members of C Squadron wishing to attend the National Service of Remembrance at the National Vietnam Memorial, or any formal ceremonies at the AWM should register with Pedro Rosemond as soon as possible as numbers at the AWM have been considerably restricted due to COVID-19.”
How do you think that we might resolve this matter for the benefit of ALL C Sqn veterans? I could, of course, provide the names of all those who have indicated their intention to attend the dinner. That would cover everyone, whether or not an Assn member.
PS. You’ll be interested to know that I’ve spoken to the AWM re the LPC and wreath laying and have initiated a request for a DVA grant for two wreaths (Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick).
I have no intent to become engaged in a competition of any kind, especially over this topic.
I have assisted the 1st Armoured Regiment Association and the RAAC Corporation with these Vietnam 50th Anniversary Events simply from an experience perspective. Along with many others who have also provided support and assistance to make sure the events are conducted to the highest standard possible and I compliment DVA Staff on their energy and competence in doing these things.
DVA initially conducted these 50th Anniversary Events within the budget of the Centenary of WW1. After the Bin Ba Commemoration there were not to be any more as there was no dedicated funding. This took a concerted effort and loads of work from us to bring about the remainder of the 50th Anniversary Events being commemorated by DVA. It was shocking to me that the DVA heads could not see that stopping 50th Anniversary Commemoration half way through the experiences of the Vietnam Veterans would be devastating to the Veteran who were involved in major Operations such as Hammersley 70, Overlord 71 and the end of War 72. They got the point, achieved the funding and so the events are unfolding as they should.
This is the work of the RAAC Corporation, of which I am simply a member of the Advisory Board and as such have no place to broadcast what we are doing, which I would not do in any case as I prefer t just contribute to the effort of the organisation of which I am a member.
Back to the issue of who is compiling lists. Bruce, if you have a list of confirmed attendees, please provide a numbers to me and DVA at the meeting you attend this week. That is all that is required. I do not need to know names of who is attending or what events they choose to participate in. DVA require the proposed attendance so that they can arrange appropriate resources to support the event.
Note of Caution: We are not clear of Covid 19 and if all the policy makers are paying attention to what is happening in the Norther Hemisphere, as Winter approaches and the climate cools, we may experience a similar challenge as Winter Approaches here in the Southern Hemisphere next year. God help us and we can all prey that is not the case.
3.From: Bruce Cameron To: ”Peter Rosemond’ Cc: ‘Noel McLaughlin’; ‘Secretary’; Peter Scott; Tony Cox; John Scales Subject: Consultation
G’day Pedro,
There are 108 ‘definite’ attendees for the C Sqn dinner on 6 June 2021 and 12 ‘probables’. So 120, however, I expect this number to fall as we enter 2021 by 25%.
Ninety C Sqn attendees, therefore. George Hulse advises that the mini-team guys will be attending the dinner also … but it is probably best for this number to be advised to DVA by the sappers themselves.
Good to know the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board has been so busy in terms of its “concerted efforts and loads of work”. You’ll appreciate that the Commemoration is the initiative of Peter Scott, CO 3 RAR in 1971. He and the battalion function organiser, Tony Cox, have met with DVA on a number of occasions. DVA have always been very supportive. They could not confirm the event until the FY budget was approved, but we knew that the intention was always there. Peter Scott has organised a commemorative coin and pre-paid envelope, which have been approved.
There were 254 from all Corps in the sqn, 25% of whom are deceased. Of the remainder, 90% have been able to be contacted and informed about the commemoration. We will consult with them before deciding on those to lay wreaths and to act as the designated Sqn VIP.
Interestingly, the cut-off date for DVA grant requests for the Commemoration has passed. DVA were very helpful in advising how a grant could be requested by a non-incorporated association/person. We have requested DVA funding for printing (dinner name tags, menu etc) as well as two wreaths for laying at the AWM Last Post Ceremony. These will be in honour of two sqn members who DOW. Those to lay the wreaths will be decided by their mates. The AWM advise 200 attendees now, but 2000 (I think) if COVID restrictions are lifted. Fingers crossed. We will be making a booking with the AWM for a small wreath laying party for 6 June 2021, just in case COVID is still with us.
——————————————————————————————————————
30 November 2020
In the Shadows II
The following a copy of a post of mine in response to a post on the 3 Cav Forum which alleged that I had appointed myself with respect to organisation of the Overlord Commemoration …. when I had no right to do so.
(This really is very tiresome!)
“I don’t regard myself as self-appointed. DVA invited me to provide advice and I’ve been doing this for some time. The whole commemoration was the idea of the former CO 3 RAR and I’ve been working with him to bring it to fruition. 3RAR activities, like those of C Sqn, are being organised by an individual, not the 3RAR Assn.
The former CO’s idea was to commemorate the Battle of Long Khanh. My tank troop and later that of the late Warren Hind were instrumental in the success of the Battle. Given this involvement, I felt that I had a responsibility to do what I could to assist. [DVA decided to expand the commemoration to the whole of Operation Overlord, though the Battle of Long Khanh will still appear in the official title of the Commemoration.]
I set about contacting all former sqn members about a year ago [actually 18 month ago]. It was decided to invite all those who served during 1971, not just during Operation Overlord. Ninety per cent of those still alive have been contacted. Of the 254, almost 20 per cent are deceased. The 254 include all corps who served with the sqn. I think all will be particularly pleased with the Commemorative coin being produced by the Mint (I just hope that they’ve got the driver’s beret pulled down on the right side). I have kept the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation informed of what I’ve been doing and the consequent planning. I can send you details if you wish.
In terms of others I invited to the coming planning meeting … they were the sqn 2IC at the time (now the most senior surviving member) and a representative of D&E platoon (which lost five KIA in the 84 Section incident). I established that 3 Cav would be represented by the RAAC Corporation (as will the 1AR Assn). I’ll report on the outcome of the meeting. You might be right … there might be too many cooks. (I had to join the AACC Facebook group to track down the C Sqn cooks.)
“I couldn’t let the 49th Anniversary of our attack on the base and training facility for 3 Battalion, 33 NVA Regt (and other units) to go past without saying how honoured I was to have served with you all. Although it was 3 and 5 Troop involved in name, as always, it was a Squadron effort. As you’re all aware, while the National Commemoration on this day next year will be for Operation Overlord, our reunion is for all those who served in, and in support of, C Sqn throughout 1971.”
At all times I’ve tried to do the right thing and to keep everyone informed. I don’t feel in any way, that I’m guilty of some foul deed or misrepresentation.
——————————————————————————————————————-
29 November 2020
In the Shadows
It’s great to take a break from the Brereton Report, but no less joyful (unfortunately).
I’ve been accused of trying to usurp the 3 Cav Assn in terms of a function to be held in conjunction with the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord.
The email below indicates how I went about checking with the 3 Cav Assn re any intentions for a function on 6 June 2021 and, if not, to extend an invite to 3 Cav members to attend our tank squadron dinner.
Hi Dallas,
I’m currently doing some pre-planning and your advice would be appreciated.
If DVA funding enables a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord to be conducted, will you be organising a 3 Cav get-together?
If not, would you be interested in inviting those who participated in Operation Overlord etc, to join C Sqn for our dinner on 6 June 2021?
There’s no commitment associated with your answer … it will simply help in my planning (I’m already aware of a number of 3 Cav pers who would be attending the Commemoration, should it be held). I don’t want to make this difficult, simply trying to anticipate arrangements with the function venue we’re dealing with (which can all be cancelled if DVA finding is not approved).
Many thanks, Bruce
Dallas (the President) indicated that it was unlikely that 3 Cav would organise a specific function, so I went ahead and extended the invite. Charlie Dearling offered to act as co-ordinator for 3 Cav, as he was one of those who accepted the invite. Discussion on this forum took place so that everyone knew what was planned, including re the right signs for the 3 Cav and 84 Section table signs (which have been pre-prepared).
Unbeknown to me, as this time, Charlie and Noel Mclaughlin (Chairman, RAAC Corporation) were planning to conduct a 3 Cav event. Days ago, Charlie advised me that: “The Association was waiting to see if the event was to go ahead, and now that it appears certain, are starting to look at preparations. We decided that an informal ‘meet and greet’ on Sunday 6 Jun will better suit our members ….”.
I’ve subsequently read (in an email forwarded to me) that “Charlie Dearling – in conjunction with Dallas Burrage of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association – is organising an informal dinner on the night of 6 June 2021 in the Ainslie area for 3 Cav veterans”.
It was interesting to see that Charlie commented that: “Suppose I better think about an email to a certain party…….”.
I wonder who that might have been and why he and Noel couldn’t have been open and transparent in the first place. I spent eight months trying to keep everyone informed. I sent copies of updates to the RAAC Corporation and Sec 1AR Assn. Why couldn’t someone have sent an email to me to say that if the National Commemoration goes ahead, we’re planning a 3 Cav function.
This would have meant that time wouldn’t have been wasted in preparing table signs, nor negotiating with the venue for additional space. Of course, I would also have been able to advise where the 3RAR companies have booked for their company dinners. I’ve left a message on Charlie’s phone … I hope, should he ring me, that the next post might explain how things came to this point.
The following email to the Secretary of the 1AR Assn is more of the same:
Dear Secretary,
I’ve copied you some of the ‘Updates’ which detail the activities for the C Sqn Reunion. I note that you’ve opted not to copy me into associated matters that you’re involved with.
When you send the following message to members of the Assn, maybe you’d like to say that the names of those attending the C Sqn reunion will be advised by myself when they ‘register’ early next year. But maybe that would be too late and those who are not members of the Assn would miss out.
“Those members of C Squadron wishing to attend the National Service of Remembrance at the National Vietnam Memorial, or any formal ceremonies at the AWM should register with Pedro Rosemond as soon as possible as numbers at the AWM have been considerably restricted due to COVID-19.”
How do you think that we might resolve this matter for the benefit of ALL C Sqn veterans? I could, of course, provide the names of all those who have indicated their intention to attend the dinner. That would cover everyone, whether or not an Assn member.
PS. You’ll be interested to know that I’ve spoken to the AWM re the LPC and wreath laying and have initiated a request for a DVA grant for two wreaths (Andy Anderson and Phil Barwick).
——————————————————————————————————————
28 November 2020
Brereton Report 11
letter to the Canberra Times ….
Dear Editor:
I agree with John Simmons (‘Many rotten apples’, Letters, 26 November), the problem predates Afghanistan. When allegations from Vietnam were brought to the Government’s attention, they shirked their responsibility and declined to investigate them; giving assurances that training had been revised and the same thing couldn’t happen again.
I drew the Minister’s attention to Government material provided for school children doing modern history which stated Australian soldiers were guilty of “killing the badly wounded [and] shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”. I also pointed to an interview published by DVA in which it was alleged that “the Geneva Convention was thrown out the window … if something moves, you shoot the bastard, irrespective of what it is, or who it is…”. My request for investigations fell on deaf ears.
I asked the Minister in 2008, “Do you agree that one of the fundamental tenets that Australian schoolchildren should be taught is that: Although the horror of the reality of war is worse than anything thot can be imagined, Australian people and their Government condemn the abuse of military power in any form whatsoever— proof of this is provided by the thoroughness by which each and every alleged atrocity is investigated”.
Rather than SAS officers letting down their men, I feel that the Government has let down the ADF. If investigations into the above allegations had been conducted, and training revised and validated, what is alleged to have happened in Afghanistan, might not have occurred.
“Great article. I agree … it is a Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that sends its nation’s soldiers to war. But, it is the same Government who is responsible for ensuring that training is appropriate, not only to confront the battlefield challenges, but also, the moral challenges that are to be faced. The Government was complicit in turning a ‘blind eye’ to matters associated with breaches of Rules of Engagement (ROE) in Vietnam. Advice was requested from the responsible Minister that military training had been structured to ensure that the moral failings which occurred in Vietnam could never happen again. This assurance was given. It proved ill-founded.
The following examples from Vietnam emphasise the differing perspectives that applied:
The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that we had to positively identify enemy before we engaged. In essence, this meant that they had to be carrying weapons. One night we were in an ambush. Using a first-generation night vision device, the sentry saw four legs … two followed by another two. Upper bodies were obscured. Whoever they were, they were breaking the curfew. This did not mean they were enemy, however. After ‘standing to’, I counted down over the radio and all tanks switched on their searchlights. There was no need to give the order to fire. Illuminated was the biggest buck deer anyone had ever seen. The four legs were explained.”
—————————————————————
One book I read was ‘Contact Wait Out!: A Vietnam Diary’ by Bruce Ravenscroft. The author describes an ambush he was involved in. A number of enemy were killed and one wounded (who could be heard to be in pain). The ambush commander radioed his HQ and explained the situation. He was told not to bring back any prisoners. All members of the ambush party stood up and “emptied their magazines into the enemy soldier”.
I couldn’t believe what I was reading. My surprise was compounded by the fact that the Foreword of the book, which described it as “a valuable addition to the documents about the war from an Australian’s perspective”, was written by a serving senior Army officer.”
Jon Blackwell has managed hospital and health services in the Pilbara and South Australia and was the CEO of the Central Coast Area Health Service from 1997-2003. He was subsequently CEO of Workcover NSW from 2003-2009.
——————————————————————————————————————
26 November 2020
Brereton Report 9
One of those to whom I sent a copy of my call for greater Government accountability was Andrew Hastie. The following is an SBS report from yesterday:
Mr Hastie, who chairs a parliamentary committee on intelligence and security, wants to create a committee with powers to compel defence chiefs and bureaucrats.
“If we are serious about increased accountability and transparency, then we need proper parliamentary scrutiny of the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force,” he said.
This goes some of the way, but it doesn’t acknowledge that the reason for oversight is that it is Government that is responsible. Government policy is that which determines the state of readiness of the ADF, as well as its structure, equipment, and nature of training.
Recently, Don Spinks (Repatriation Commissioner) circulated an Open Letter from the Minister and Secretary of DVA. I contacted him to say:
“Thanks for forwarding the Open Letter. After reading it, I rang the Safe Zone number. I was concerned that there did not seem to be anyone looking into the failure of the Government to investigate war crimes from Vietnam, the results of which might have prevented what’s now being investigated. I was advised to go the Defence Ombudsman.
I’ve copied below my submission the Afghanistan Inquiry.
Is there anyway, in which DVA can look at its own responsibility, having ignored matters brought to the Department’s attention re Vietnam, for what happened in Afghanistan?”
He, to his great credit and that of his Office, responded to say (in part):
I have forwarded your concern to DVA for review and comment, I will advise once I have RX feedback.
——————————————————————————————————————–
25 November 2020
Brereton Report 8
Image: Andrew Hastie
This matter has taken up much time recently. I’m annoyed with myself for not having more persistent regarding the Vietnam matters I alerted the Government to, but the Minister assured me that training had been revised and such things could never happen again.
“It can also be argued that Governments have failed the Australian Defence Force. Twelve years ago, our school children were being told in educational material provided by the then Government that Australian soldiers committed the very same war crimes in Vietnam, as are alleged to have occurred in Afghanistan.
It is a Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that sends its nation’s soldiers to war. It is the same Government who is responsible for ensuring that training is appropriate, not only to confront the battlefield challenges, but also, the moral challenges that are to be faced. The Government has turned a ‘blind eye’ to breaches of ROE in Vietnam. The responsible action would have been to investigate, identify systemic weaknesses and institute and validate training to ensure such things couldn’t occur again. I asked if the Minister could give such an assurance to the Australian people. This assurance was given. It proved ill-founded.
I’ve copied below a letter to the Minister of Veterans Affairs in April 2008 [see earlier blog].
The last question was: “Do you agree that one of the fundamental tenets that Australian schoolchildren should be taught is that: Although the horror of the reality of war is worse than anything that can be imagined, Australian people and their Government condemn the abuse of military power in any form whatsoever—proof of this is provided by the thoroughness by which each and every alleged atrocity is investigated”? I received no response to this or the earlier questions I asked.”
——————————————————————————————————————
24 November 2020
Brereton Report 7
Image: ABC
The following was included in the latest Army newspaper:
“Message from the Chief of Army
As individual, we demonstrate integrity by being accountable for our actions. We are also accountable to call out the behaviour of others when it is not in accordance with our values.
We report accurately and honestly. If something isn’t right, we say so.
As teams, we demonstrate the integrity of our actions by auditing, checking and testing. As an Army we demonstrate integrity by investigating when our actions and words are not aligned with what is right. We self-identify and self-correct.
Acting with integrity, every day, strengthens trust in our teams, with other organisations and with the Australian people.
We strive to be a trusted national institution where every member of its team always acts ethically and with integrity.
– CA Lt-Gen Rick Burr
INTEGRITY – is the consistency of character to align my thoughts, words and actions to do what is right.”
I’ve sent the following email to the CA …
Dear Sir,
I’ve copied below my submission to the Afghanistan inquiry [published on the Blog below]. I see that in the Army Newspaper, you say:
“As individual, we demonstrate integrity by being accountable for our actions. We are also accountable to call out the behaviour of others when it is not in accordance with our values.
We report accurately and honestly. If something isn’t right, we say so.”
BUT what happens when someone does the ‘right thing’ … and those that they’ve reported to, ignore their responsibilities and no change occurs?
The ‘ice age’ continues … that’s what happens! I can’t believe that reports made about incidents simply ‘go through to the keeper’. I’m very tempted to write a piece for the media to show how ‘corrupt’ the reporting system is.
Yours sincerely, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————————————–
23 November 2020
The Brereton Report 6
Following on ….
War Crimes and Government Inaction: A Conspiracy of Silence: Part 2
The Second Account (2007)
Still doing research for my book, I came across material that the Department of Veterans’ Affairs had provided for use by the education system, as part of schools’ modern history curriculum. The references stated that war crimes had been committed by Australian soldiers in Vietnam. I wrote to the Minister for Defence asking for assurance that the incidents referred to, had all been investigated. My letter was forwarded to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. More than six months later, I received a response from DVA to say that my request for an investigation “had been denied”.
I wrote back to the Minister, asking a number of questions regarding DVA’s statement to schoolchildren that war crimes were committed in Vietnam, for inclusion in my book. This letter is attached (G2). No such information was received.
The Third Account (2008)
My research took me to DVA’s oral history archive where I was able to listen to veterans recounting their experience. One interviewee, however, made allegations about war crimes which I knew to be untrue. I contacted DVA and advised that the allegations were false. I was informed that the interview had been recorded in good faith and couldn’t be removed as this would affect the integrity of the archive. I gathered evidence, sought legal opinion, and wrote to the Minister, asking that the interview be withdrawn as it was false, misleading and defamatory. (Letter attached, G3). Finally, the oral history was removed from the archive.
Conclusion
It is a Government, on behalf of the Australian people, that sends its nation’s soldiers to war. It is the same Government who is responsible for ensuring that training is appropriate, not only to confront the battlefield challenges, but also, the moral challenges that are to be faced. The accounts above demonstrate that Government has been complicit in turning a ‘blind eye’ to matters associated with breaches of ROE. Advice was requested that military training had been structured to ensure that moral challenges faced in Vietnam could be appropriately addressed in the future. This assurance was given. It proved ill-founded.
——————————————————————————————————————-
22 November 2020
Brereton Report 5
Following on …. the first part of my short ‘paper’ identifying Government culpability, is copied below.
War Crimes and Government Inaction: A Conspiracy of Silence: Part 1
I have just heard the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs say that there were obvious failings within the military and it has to lift its game (or words to that effect). He made no mention of any responsibility on the part of the Government. I believe that the Government has in the past, and continues today, to shirk its accountability for what has happened in Afghanistan.
The following narrative relates to three accounts of different incidents of unlawful killing by Australian soldiers in Vietnam. On each occasion, as soon as I became aware of the circumstances, I requested that an investigation be conducted. I further sought assurance that measures had been introduced so that Australians could have confidence that such things could not happen again. In the background to all this, DVA provided material for school children which stated that Australians committed war crimes in Vietnam. Government knew about war crimes, but had it investigated them?
Background.
I was a tank troop leader in Vietnam in 1971. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were that we had to positively identify enemy before we engaged. In essence, this meant that they had to be carrying weapons. One night we were in an ambush. Using a first-generation night vision device, the sentry saw four legs … two followed by another two. Upper bodies were obscured. Whoever they were, they were breaking the curfew. This did not mean they were enemy, however. After ‘standing to’, I counted down over the radio and all tanks switched on their searchlights. There was no need to give the order to fire. Illuminated was the biggest buck deer anyone had ever seen. The four legs were explained.
During research for my book, I tried to read as widely as possible. One book I read was ‘Contact Wait Out!: A Vietnam Diary’ by Bruce Ravenscroft. (https://regimental-books.com.au/product/contact-wait-out-a-vietnam-diary/) The author describes an ambush he was involved in. A number of enemy were killed and one wounded (who could be heard to be in pain). The ambush commander radioed his HQ and explained the situation. He was told not to bring back any prisoners. All members of the ambush party stood up and “emptied their magazines into the enemy soldier”.
I couldn’t believe what I was reading. My surprise was compounded by the fact that the Foreword of the book, which described it as “a valuable addition to the documents about the war from an Australian’s perspective”, was written by a serving Army brigadier (who went on to be a major general).
What to do? Being aware that there is no statute of limitations as far as murder is concerned, I rang the Defence whistle-blower telephone number. This isn’t something for ‘us’ I was told, go to the police. This isn’t something for ‘us’ I was told, go to Defence. I wrote to the Minister of Defence. The Army History Unit conducted a search of records and concluded that the incident had never happened. As far as I’m aware, the author of the book was never interviewed. Once the incident became known to be a fabrication, he rang me and stated emphatically that every word was completely true “right down to the last copper jacketed bullet!”.
I was still concerned that the account had been ‘endorsed’ by a senior officer (and, therefore, seemingly part of a wider culture within Army). I wrote the Minister again and asked if he could guarantee that appropriate training was in place to ensure any such breach of ROE would never be accepted again. The Minister responded to say that this was the case.
—————————————————————————————————————–
21 November 2020
Brereton Report 4
In earlier posts, I’ve copied information I’ve sent to the media about the Afghanistan report. I haven’t had any responses … so time to go for the jugular! The email below is the cover to my submission to the leader of the Opposition.
I’ve been advised it’s been copied to the Shadow Minister for Defence, as well as Mr Albanese’s policy working group.
We can only hope that lessons from the past are acknowledged.
Dear Mr Albanese,
I believe that the attached material shows partial culpability on the part of the Government which has not been acknowledged.
I further believe that, unless there is such acknowledgement, that the status quo won’t change.
I offer the attached for your consideration.
I don’t seek any personal publicity; however, if there is a need for someone to stand behind this issue, then I’m prepared to do so.
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
—————————————————–
The above is the Blog post as I drafted it. I wrote to Mr Albanese because I thought that he could ask questions in Parliament which would force the Government to recognise their culpability and responsibility (rather than simply hanging the Army out to dry) … BUT, I’ve just realised that Alan Griffin (the Minister to whom I wrote to in 2007/8) was Labor. So Albo is unlikely to light much a fire under the current Govt. Hence, I’ve copied the material to Andrew Hastie and Jacqui Lambie; but I think it’ll take an investigative journalist to really make the case for principled and lasting change.
I’ll post the short ‘paper’ I sent, tomorrow
——————————————————————————————————————–
20 November 2020
The Seniority of Regiments in the RAAC
Following on from 5 November …. the seniority for the first four RAAC regiments is currently listed as:
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Cavalry Regiment
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI)
This was correct when 2/14 LHR (QMI) was an ARES unit, but it is now ARA.
The basis for seniority is set out in Australian Military Regulations AMR):
“Units of the Army take precedence as follows:
(a) the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves;
(b) the units have precedence according to the order of their numerical succession;
(c) if units are not included in a numerical succession, the units have precedence according to the order in which the Commands to which they belong are specified in the instrument appointing Commands.”
(i) AMR “were cancelled in April 2015; however, the precedence originated from these regulations still stand …”;
(ii) 2/14 LHR (QMI) fully transitioned to an ARA regiment in 2005, however, “there is no evidence that the RAAC Corps Council requested a change to the order [of seniority] of the RAAC units to the Chief of Army”.
(iii) “The Corp could have made an adjustment to the accepted order. It did not do this at the time nor was it requested”.
(iv) “The HOC RAAC has no intention in requesting the order change …”.
The conclusion … the order is wrong, but the RAAC has not bothered to ask for it to be changed.
——————————————————————————————————————-
19 November 2020
The Brereton Report III
Image: ABC
Following on from the earlier posts, I have given the following response to two media articles which have widespread readership (see below). I have deliberately not stated what the reply was that I received from the Minister. I hope that this ‘drip feed’ might draw attention to the deliberate policy of Governments past, ie. to ignore all such matters and refuse to investigate and respond as needed. It can well be argued that if the Government had responded as it should have in the past, what is being reported on now might well have never happened.
“The Government has continually shirked its responsibility and must be held to account.
I can prove this, for example … sometime ago, I wrote to the then Minister of Defence. I pointed out that educational material, provided by DVA to Australian schoolchildren, includes reference to an unspecified number of incidents of Australian soldiers: “killing the badly wounded [and] shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”. I also drew attention to an interview published by DVA in which it is alleged that “the Geneva Convention was thrown out the window [by Australian soldiers in Vietnam] … if something moves , you shoot the bastard, irrespective of what it is, or who it is…whether innocents were killed, maimed, whatever, we just didn’t give a xxxx”.
I expressed the view that the material raised a number of questions: (i) were the alleged incidents investigated; if not, why not?; (ii) if found to be true, what action was taken to bring those responsible to justice and to ensure that the same thing could not happen again? I highlighted the fact that, without this information, schoolchildren may believe that such actions were condoned by the Australian Government. I asked the Minister if he would ensure that all allegations had been investigated and amend the educational material to reflect this.
I look forward to all relevant matters leading up to this situation, being made known (to which I will contribute)”.
Following on from 16 November, I’ve copied another letter below, to show how responsibility must be accepted on the part of Government and those in command for not acting prior the circumstances which have arisen recently.. I look forward to all relevant matters leading up to this situation, being made known (to which I will contribute).
————————————————————————————
The Hon Alan Griffin, MP
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
House of Representatives,
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
cc. Maj Gen David Morrison, AM,
Chairman, Army History Committee.
Dear Minister,
ALLEGATIONS OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY AUSTRALIANS IN VIETNAM
On 6 October 2007 I wrote to the then Minister of Defence. I pointed out that educational material, provided by DVA to Australian schoolchildren, includes reference to an unspecified number of incidents of Australian soldiers: “killing the badly wounded [and]shooting enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat”. I also drew attention to an interview published by DVA in which it is alleged that “the Geneva Convention was thrown out the window [by Australian soldiers in Vietnam]…if something moves , you shoot the bastard, irrespective of what it is, or who it is…whether innocents were killed, maimed, whatever, we just didn’t give a xxxx”.
I expressed the view that the material raised a number of questions: (i) were the alleged incidents investigated; if not, why not?; (ii) if found to be true, what action was taken to bring those responsible to justice and to ensure that the same thing could not happen again? I highlighted the fact that, without this information, schoolchildren may believe that such actions were condoned by the Australian Government. I asked the Minister if he would ensure that all allegations had been investigated and amend the educational material to reflect this.
My letter was forwarded to the then Minister of Veterans’ Affairs on 15 November 2007 (responsibility for the matter having been judged to lie within your portfolio). Today, more than six months after the date of my letter, I received a response from the Director, Advising and Public Law Legal Services, DVA.
In informing me that my request to have these allegations investigated had been denied, Mr Harrison stated that “Information for teachers on the Australian Defence Force protocols and procedures in wartime is not included [in DVA’s educational resource material] as this is not part of the curriculum”. I take this to mean that DVA considers that Australia’s education curriculum in some way prevents schoolchildren being informed that while atrocities sometimes occur in war, those alleged to have been committed by Australian soldiers in Vietnam have been thoroughly investigated by the Australian Government.
I will ask the Minister for Education to consider DVA’s position on this matter; for the moment, however…I am currently writing a book about Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. I would like to ask you the following questions (so that the responses of the Australian Government may be included in the book for the benefit of all Australians):
How many incidents (please state if an estimate) form the basis of advice to Australian schoolchildren that Australian soldiers in Vietnam killed badly wounded enemy soldiers?
How many incidents (please state if an estimate) form the basis of advice to Australian schoolchildren that Australian soldiers in Vietnam shot enemy who had surrendered or who were clearly no threat?
Do any of the incidents at paras 1 and 2 include that described in ‘Contact : Wait Out’? The alleged murder of a wounded enemy soldier contained in this book was investigated by the Minister of Defence in 2005. The incident was found to have been a complete fabrication by the author. (Material has been provided to DVA separately which shows conclusively that the interview referred to in the opening paragraph is another fake memoir.)
Apart from the incident in ‘Contact ; Wait Out’, how many atrocities, among those which form the basis of DVA’s advice to schoolchildren, have been investigated, as far as DVA is aware?
Apart from the incident in ‘Contact : Wait Out’…of those allegations which have been investigated, how many have been found to be true, as far as DVA is aware?
If DVA is aware of alleged atrocities which have not been investigated, has DVA brought those matters to the attention of the relevant authorities?
Do you agree that one of the fundamental tenets that Australian schoolchildren should be taught is that: Although the horror of the reality of war is worse than anything that can be imagined, Australian people and their Government condemn the abuse of military power in any form whatsoever—proof of this is provided by the thoroughness by which each and every alleged atrocity is investigated.
Yours sincerely,
——————————————————————————————————————–
17 November 2020
The RAAC Looking Good!
A recent Blog post bemoaned the lack of ‘accurate’ public relations material re the RAAC.
With the 50th Anniversary of 2 Cav Regt coming up on Cambrai Day, I went looking for information as to what might be happening.
I struck Gold!
The above Association website includes a recent address by the CO 2 Cav Regt. He is to be congratulated as a truly great ambassador, not only for 2 Cav Regt, but the Army as a whole.
Seems to me that the RAAC is in good shape.
What a pity it is that more information such as that provided here, is not readily available.
I encourage everyone to watch this video. It is 12 mins long and can be found at the following website (under CO 2 Cav Regt). Copy and paste in the top https address bar.
—————————————————————————————————————–
16 November 2020
The Tank Capability of the Future
The following is an article submitted for publication in the Army’s ‘The Cove’.
“For just over a century, the tank has been the key symbol of land power. Today, tanks no longer enjoy the same level of battlefield supremacy that they used to. So, what’s next? Do they still have a role to play? If so, how do they need to evolve and what will the next generation look like in terms of features and capabilities?”. Nicholas Drummond, https://uklandpower.com/2020/04/05/where-does-the-tank-go-from-here/
————————————–
The ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan’ stated that: “Defence will develop options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life. This new system will integrate with reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles to ensure the land force retains a decisive land combat capability into the future.” (https://www.defence.gov.au/strategicupdate-2020/)
The fact that Defence has committed to developing options to replace the Abrams, indicates that the tank capability is recognised in terms of its importance for the ADF (and its contingency plans). This is exactly the foresight that’s to be expected of our Defence staff. The US is examining the same circumstances (and has been for many years). The Abrams tank is adequate today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams tank capability look like?
The answer has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank capability, as part of a combined arms force underpinning land operations. The fact that the next ‘tank’ may not be anything like the Abrams, is without dispute.
What does such a direct fire capability need to provide? The answer is, as it has ‘always’ been: lethality, survivability, and mobility, under all extremes of climate and terrain. This is self-evident. What is unknown is the way in which advances in technology will influence the solution. There are developments in mobility such as hovercraft and hydrogen fuel cells, however, this is not the breakthrough science.
Direct fire support can be provided by a manned vehicle, a robotic vehicle, or an optionally manned vehicle. The US Army is considering the last concept. One imagines that this is because it is too soon to bank everything on robotics alone.
Many arguments have been advanced that, whether crewed or optionally crewed, the weight of a direct fire support capability has to be reduced to enable it to be deployable in all contingencies. This is especially so in terms of ADF planning. How can this be achieved, while maintaining requisite protection levels?
Volume under armour is the biggest impost on the weight of an AFV. Reducing the size of the crew by incorporating an autoloader was the answer at one time, but the lethality of anti-armour weapons is now so advanced, that this is no longer enough. The current Russian T-14 Armata MBT is one solution. The crew is within a ‘cocoon’ in the hull of vehicle, below the external gun and autoloader. Considerable weight is saved without having to protect crew members in their own turret.
As well as the provision of an Active Protection System (APS) for certain vehicles, the Strategic Update (above) also made reference to: “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks.”
Such a weapon is suggestive of a laser, but is unlikely in terms of defeating AFVs in the foreseeable future. Another possibility is a ‘rail gun’. Neither of these technological breakthroughs, however, will resolve the main challenge facing the replacement tank capability.
The APS, however, might be part of the solution. Such systems have been demonstrated to be capable of defeating attack by ATGM and RPGs. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be significantly reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this is feasible: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. If this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary.https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round (Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC.) BUT…what about attack from above? It’s been proposed that low cost drones could be employed en mass to attack AFVs from above. Will an APS be able to counter this?
If protection is able to be increased and weight reduced … will this be sufficient for a direct fire capability to be deployed on the future battlefield? It has been suggested that a new grouping of complementary force capabilities will be needed in the future, i.e. traditional organisational structures will no longer be adequate.
Conclusion
The challenge is how to provide a future direct fire support capability which is lethal, survivable, and mobile. There are numerous options as far as mobility/engine power are concerned, as there are in terms of firepower. The crux of the design challenge is to decrease weight, while increasing protection against both ground and air attack. The role of APS (especially against `top attack) is crucial; as is the need to structure future operational groupings in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a readily deployable ‘all arms’ context.
——————————————————————————————————————
5 November 2020
The Coming Brereton Report
The following letter is more than twelve years old. I have been striving to correct false allegations for much longer than that and hope to be able to present material to the on-going process to (i) show how some veterans seek to sensationalise their experiences; and (ii) how the Government has endeavoured to ‘minimise’ their responsibility in terms of addressing such matters.
BTW. The interview referred to below (re an RAAC unit) was withdrawn from DVA’s website
——————————————————————————————————————- April 2008
The Hon Alan Griffin, MP
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Dear Minister,
Notice of a False, Misleading and Defamatory DVA Publication
It is understood that 12,000 people per month, access DVA’s Australians at War Film Archive. The majority of these are students, teachers, historians and researchers from both Australia and overseas.
The transcript of interview number XXXX is published on DVA’s website. It alleges that the Army unit the interviewee served with in Vietnam was responsible for appalling abuses of human rights and breaches of the Geneva Convention. The attached statements demonstrate conclusively, that the allegations are false.
It is apparent that the interviewee is not only sensationalising his experiences in a self-serving manner (eg. he falsely claims to have been wounded in action), but is also acting maliciously (eg. he insults the bravery and sacrifices of those who served in the unit and defames a number of people). DVA were asked to amend the interview to remove such false, misleading and defamatory remarks, but the Department advised that this was possible only to a limited extent (which turned out to represent the worse examples of defamatory material) because of the effect that this would have on the integrity of the Archive.
The interview is also used a means of conveying a threat of assault against an individual. Emphasising the seriousness of the threat, the interviewee details a plan to murder the person concerned while both were in Vietnam. He also boasts of the grievous bodily harm he inflicted on his next door neighbour. The ACT Attorney-General had to intervene to ensure the safety of the person threatened, an ACT citizen, and his family.
Would you please consider that attached material with a view to instructing DVA to withdraw the interview from publication. The Department have previously declined to do this, citing the fact that it was published in ‘good faith’. There is now overwhelming evidence to show that there has been an abuse of trust. Part of a legal opinion as to DVA’s obligations in regard to this matter is attached.
It concludes that: “It is one thing to publish the truth even where that truth is less than complimentary. It is an entirely different thing to publish lies. Despite Mr Harrison’s [Principal Legal Officer, DVA] assertions, there can be no integrity in an archive where lies and misinformation are permitted to flourish. This interview is so contaminated by lies, misinformation and defamatory material that it could not be redeemed by ‘cutting and pasting’. It is singularly without merit and should be removed from publication”.
It has been suggested to DVA that guidelines should be developed to set out what constitutes acceptable material for publication; the idea being that if a user of the Archive came across something which contravenes these guidelines, then it could be brought to DVA’s attention. The Department have stated that this is not possible, as it might inhibit an interviewee’s freedom of speech. In effect, the DVA are saying that the publication of false, misleading and defamatory material is acceptable and that the ‘disclaimer’ attached to interviews, absolves the Government of any responsibility in these matters. As a Minister looking at this matter ‘afresh’, your further consideration of this suggestion is requested.
I should also point out that the attachments below [statements providing evidence refuting the claims made] were made available to DVA, with a draft of this letter, almost three months ago. (This followed three months correspondence with the Department prior to that.) It was hoped that the matter might be able to be addressed without the need for publicity which could damage the credibility of the Australians at War Film Archive as a whole. It appears, however, that resolution in this way is not possible. Quick attention on the part of your Office would be appreciated, so that the time limitations for appeal to the Commonwealth Ombudsman will not be exceeded (should this course have to be adopted).
The following are some of the comments ADM readers made:
“If the M1 tank is to have credible role in future warfare, they should have an active protection system made standard. I have seen videos on how easy it is these days to disable an M1 with a portable missile launcher.”
The US Army seems to recognise the benefit of APS.
I am not disagreeing that the M-1 should be fitted with APS but as with all Vehicles, Ships & Aircraft the best Defence is to kill the Launch Platform before it fires and that is the importance of combined Arms.
Only thing I would add to this excellent piece is that the loss of tanks in Iraq and Syria at the hands of ISIL (particularly Turkish Leopard 2 and Iraqi M1s) was due to poor doctrine with respect to the use of the tank, a complete absence of situational awareness, and a lack of infantry support. Tank opponents sometimes point to these losses as proof that tanks are no longer relevant but like anything, it comes down to how they are used.
A cynic like me would say that too much of the ADF equipment program is built on the maxim of ‘we have, therefore we replace’. I think that the changes we are seeing now means that Plan Beersheba is already obsolete and the ADF could be well served by a good look at what we need and what are nice to have’s. I do not mean ANOTHER white paper!
To suggest we get rid of Tanks because we will struggle to land them on a Beach is absolute rubbish.
If the army really want to stay with the mbt concept but at a usable weight, something like the new Type 10 from Japan. It varies between 40t minimum to 48t with bolt on added modular armour. The reason Japan developed the Type 10 was because the previous Type 90 was too heavy to use in most of Japan.
—————————————————————-
There are a number of points here which relate to previous Blog posts: the role of APS (especially re top attack); the weight of the Abrams and the need for a lighter direct fire weapons system to facilitate its deployability in the future; and the need to structure our operational units in such a way that direct fire support can be provided in a deployable ‘all arms’ context.
I believe the above to be the crucial issues, how they’re achieved is not really relevant. There are numerous options as far as mobility/power are concerned (eg. hovercraft/hydrogen fuel cell); as there are for firepower (eg. rail gun). The crux of the design challenge is to decrease the weight, while increasing the protection.
This is the sort of thing that I scan out of interest. Suddenly, my hair stood on end: the author was stating that Australian soldiers had no moral courage. This was just too much, a ‘cheap shot’; on Remembrance Day of all times. My response was going to be very forceful. I found a good quote re moral courage by Michael Josephson.
“But there’s another form of courage [to physical courage] that’s just as important; it’s called moral courage. It’s the kind of courage C. S. Lewis referred to when he said, “courage is not simply one of the virtues but the form of every virtue at the testing point.” The testing point is the place where living our lives according to moral principles may require us to put our comfort, possessions, relationships, and careers at risk.
For most of us, the need for physical courage is rare. But our moral courage is tested almost every day. Being honest at the risk of disapproval, lost income or a maimed career; being accountable when owning up to a mistake can get us in trouble, making tough decisions and demands with our kids at the cost of their affection, being fair when we have the power to be otherwise, and following the rules while others get away with whatever they can – these things take moral courage, the inner strength to do what’s right even when it costs more than we want to pay.
The sad fact is that people with moral courage rarely get medals. Instead, they risk ridicule, rejection and retaliation. Yet this sort of courage is the best marker of true character and a life your children can be proud of.”
How dare anyone accuse Australian soldiers of lacking moral courage! My head of steam was just building up when I noticed something in the article.
The comment I sent to the author explains:
“Douglas, Thank you for your piece. The following might give you a laugh. I almost made myself look a fool (some will say not for the first time). Instead of correctly reading “… if the moral courage of the governments equalled the immortal military courage of their soldiers.’ True then; true now”; I read: ‘if the moral courage of the governments equalled the immoral military courage of their soldiers.’ True then; true now.”
I got part way through an earnest response, when I realised my mistake …”.
——————————————————————————————————————-
12 November 2020
How We Lose Sight of How Things Were.
A Dutch Army Centurion Mk5/2 with its driver’s hood protection which is used in cold climate condition, mostly during training drill in winter.
[This is a great site; run here in Australia by Adrian Clayton, a dedicated Centurion owner and enthusiast.]
Some of the comments were:
“The most useless bit of kit ever. Used to mist up, leak like a sieve, obstruct side vision, and as Lawson says, very claustrophobic. Oh, and it limited the turret traverse or got wiped out by it.”
“they were a part of CES, but were never issued (sat unused in Troop Stores, under the grotty cam nets).”
My post in response was:
“I think the name is ‘Drivers’ Long March Hood’. I guess the tank designers appreciated that in action drivers would be closed down, but there might be occasions in which they could be faced with a long approach ‘march’ to the battlefront. If this was in inclement conditions, the health and welfare of the driver might become important (not that it wasn’t on all other occasions). I’m constantly amazed at how much thought those responsible at the time, put into every nook and cranny of the design. I know I found the grenade holders in the turret useful in Vietnam (though I would not have anticipated this beforehand).”
Following on from 4 November, the following was the response from Major Thomas Basan to my comments:
Image: Motoring
“Bruce, that’s a great question about the provision of HAWKEI to the reserves. I’ve served as BM 13 Bde and so have a good understanding of your concern. I think ARES RAAC are prime candidates for ‘fighting’ versions of HAWKEI.
I think we must couple HAWKEI with BUSHMASTER and to a lesser degree the armoured trucks to create a combat system. Together the vehicles can easily cope with domestic security, rear area security and stability tasks, which are the core tasks that shape the ADF. However, I’m of a view that everything must be driven by operational plans.
Up to now, we’ve been guided by what are essentially ‘good ideas’, ‘parochial views’ and ‘what we’ve got’; not what we need. As the ADF shifts to a more integrated force and the ‘drums of war’ grow louder I think you’ll see more modern equipment provided to the reserves. However, without solid operational plans it’s difficult to use logic and reason to inform capability choices and to ‘train as we’ll fight’.
I read the training article above (a very long one) and responded to the above as follows:
Thomas, I read your training article above and noted that in the Conclusion you stated: “Significantly, collective training is not an end in itself, but a means of meeting the needs of an operational plan…”. It seems to me that this is self-obvious. What is more relevant is that there appears to be a need to improve the direction and guidance being provided from top-down which links operational (contingency) plans and training objectives at unit level. There does not have to be an existing direct threat to train and prepare for participation in a contingency plan. Certain skills, such as armoured reconnaissance, are relevant to many contingencies and are unable to be developed at short notice.
As mentioned in the earlier post, the UAV is set to play a major part on the future battlefield.
Previous posts have looked at how the weight of a future direct fire support vehicle can be reduced. This is achievable using vehicle design and active protection systems (APSs) from the ground threat, but how feasible is it in terms of top attack? It would seem that this is the crucial ‘next step’, as regards the battleground of the future, ie. to protect the AFV from attack by multiple low-cost UAVs
An extract from the above article is copied below:
“What’s most important is that the decision should reflect a land-warfare vision that includes large-scale use of armed autonomous systems in the air and on land. Adversaries will be taking advantage of the military power of such systems to complement—or even replace—crewed systems, and if our own defence organisation doesn’t, Australia will be at a disadvantage.
Such a system will demand investment in battlespace command and control that is resistant to countermeasures such as electronic warfare, cyberattack and kinetic attack. Such a capability needs to embrace the ‘small, cheap and many’ approach of ‘command clouds’ operating in the air, over land and even from space, using low-cost, small and easily deployable components. Very high altitude, long-endurance UAVs operating in near space can complement locally developed and launched small satellites and constellations of smart cubesats to provide tactical communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support to swarms of lethal autonomous weapons. In such a scenario, an attack helicopter would hang back, managing the swarms via the command cloud, and avoid needlessly putting itself at risk over what will be an intensely contested battlespace.
Factoring in the role of autonomous systems is crucial to thinking about the future of army capability …”.
——————————————————————————————————————-
9 November 2020
Cavalry Memorial (Tongala) Beersheba Day Ceremony 2020
Full credit to the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn for taking the initiative, applying for a DVA grant, and working with the Tongala community to create this Memorial. Congratulations to them for maintaining contact and developing such dedication, commitment, and support on the part of all those involved across all ages. The red and yellow roses look fantastic!
I was one of those who attended the opening of the Avenue of Honour to Armoured servicemen killed in the Vietnam War. (Background to this below.) Well done to the 3 Cav Assn to taking the concept further. It’s sad that the 1AR Assn did not do likewise. The late John Whitehorn would have been pleased if an Armoured Corps Memorial was to have resulted.
For 1AR Assn C’tee: a story about John Whitehorn (see below) and his commitment to 1 Armd Regt would be great to see in a future addition of ‘Paratus’.
——————————————————————————————
From RAACA (NSW) Armour newsletter 2006:
“Tongala Project – Avenue of Honour Centurion Tank”
REPORT THIS AD
‘In 2001 the Australian Light Horse/Armoured Memorial Committee was formed with a total of 4 people to build a Australian Light Horse memorial to honour the Lighthorsemen from the district that went off to war. In 2003 the Light Horse Memorial was built and dedicated.
After this dedication the committee agreed on building Avenue of Honour to the Armoured Servicemen killed in the Vietnam War. This Avenue was unveiled in November 2004, by the Governor General of Australia, and the Chief of the Australian Army. Over 4000 people attended this event.
While the Avenue of Honour was in planning stages, John Whitehorn ex 1 Armoured Regiment soldier approached the committee on the idea of having a Centurion Tank placed in Tongala to be dedicated to his two mates, Jimmy Kerr and Mick Hannaford and to all those who served with the Centurion tanks. John at that present time had throat cancer which was progressing, John knew he wouldn’t be around for the dedication (John passed away in June 2005) but did agree to leave funds aside for the project.
It was also John’s wish to have both Armoured and Cavalry represented together in the Avenue of Honour. The committee at present time is in the planning stages for the event with the unveiling set aside for November 2008. At present ARN 169120 Centurion Tank has been purchased by Michael Thompson and is in Tongala. Michael has put in $15,000 of his own money to purchase and transport it to Tongala.’
——————————————————————————————————————-
8 November 2020
The Future of the Battlefield and its AFVs
Image: ADM
The following article is from the ASPI publication ‘The Strategist’
In my view, this footage has to be one of the most profound influences on the future battlefield.
“[It] has generated debate on whether expensive and technologically sophisticated armored vehicles can survive in future battles against masses of cheap ‘suicide drones’. Is the tank, which first emerged on the battlefields of the Western Front in 1917, now approaching the twilight years of its military utility?”
“With Australia’s purchase of new armoured vehicles under the LAND 400 program underway, the likelihood of large numbers of low-cost drones operating over the future battlespace should be a concern for defence planners.
The article also updated the costs re LAND 400 Phase 3:
In Phase 2 of LAND 400, the Defence Department is acquiring 211 Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles to replace the army’s light armoured vehicles (the ASLAVs). In Phase 3, it will buy 450 infantry fighting vehicles and up to 17 manoeuvre support vehicles to replace the obsolete M113 armoured personnel carriers.
South Korea’s Hanwha Defense Australia’s AS-21 ‘Redback’ and Rheinmetall Defence Australia’s ‘Lynx’ are competing in Phase 3. A decision is due by 2022. The budget range is now $18.1 billion to $27.1 billion for 450 vehicles, or about $50 million each.
——————————————————————————————————————
7 November 2020
RAAC Matters: Free and Open Discussion
One of the goals at Part 7 (above) is:
No-one on RAAC or related personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
Following on from 5 November 2020, in which I queried the current order of seniority of RAAC regiments, the comments below (albeit only a very few of the 73 made) have appeared on the RAAC Facebook page:
Oh what a can of worms, are we going to suffer casualties from all this crap, all black hats so as long as we can look back at our forebears and remain proud, if you ain’t a black hat you ain’t pardon the pun.
Bruce just let go!!!! It doesn’t matter any more, we are now a CORP that works in a Combat TEAM. Doesn’t matter who what where or with we are BLACK HATS and proudly do our job regardless of our unit origins.
I’m not sure if this post in response to yours above is classed in your terms as “shit” or not, but can you explain what opposition you have to the history and contribution of our RAAC forebears being clearly defined?
That led to the following:
none whatsoever but why dwell on ancient history as we as a Corp have to move forwardto develop our fighting skill in a new way of conducting warfare. I am proud of my past units history, 1AR, 2Cav, 4Cav, 3/4Cav, 1/15 RNSWL, SOA, 1 Topo Svy Sqn, 6ESR to name a few, forgot OBG4 all served as a Black Hat.
I am a bit lost that today’s Army choose an accepted order of its choosing and because our former members don’t accept it, they demand the current keepers accept what former members think is correct or want.
Fact is … I’m NOT demanding anything. I’m simply asking if the change to the order of seniority was something which was forgotten when 2/14 QMI became an ARA unit.
Question is … does it matter if the order of seniority of RAAC regiments is correct or not?
If it doesn’t, where does this lead?
——————————————————————————————————————
6 November 2020
RAAC Operational History: One Mystery Solved
The photo above has created lots of interest. I came across by accident among those I’d been sent for my book and posted it on the 3 Cav Vietnam Assn website … just for info.
The photo below was then posted.
Incredibly, no detail was available about the incident in which it was penetrated by the RPG (nor what happened to the crew). The Assn is very motivated regarding matters associated with their history, however, and many members contributed.
It turns out that the APC was one of those hit by RPGs in Baria during the Tet Offensive. Amazingly, it seems to have been repaired and returned to operations in just 10 days. How was this done?
I’m aware of the techniques used to weld ‘plug’ RPG holes in Centurion turrets, but what about aluminium armour. Is it possible that a panel could have been cut out and replaced? How long would it take to do this?
I’ve asked the Bluebells.
—————————————————————————————————————–
5 November 2020
Seniority of RAAC Units
Following on from 29 October 2020 …
I had to write to the Minister to get both the dates on the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1 Armd Regt Standard corrected and the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour emblazoned. It appears that I’ll have to do the same re the seniority listing of RAAC units.
The seniority of RAAC units is currently listed as:
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Cavalry Regiment
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI)
4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment
12th/16th Hunter River Lancers
B Sqn 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment
A Sqn 3rd/9th South Australian Mounted Rifles
A Sqn 10th Light Horse Regiment
I believe this is wrong as 2/14 LHR (QMI) has transitioned from being an ARES unit to an ARA unit.
The importance of this is that ARA units should take precedence before ARES units. The following refers (thanks to Bruce Scott): Australian Military Regulations, Part 3, Para 68 (2) of 2007:
“Units of the Army take precedence as follows:
(a) the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves;
(b) the units have precedence according to the order of their numerical succession;
(c) if units are not included in a numerical succession, the units have precedence according to the order in which the Commands to which they belong are specified in the instrument appointing Commands.”
The Corps RSM states that what is stipulated is what it is and the President of the 2/14 LHR (QMI) states they receive advice from those serving. Discussion on the RAAC Facebook has revealed the basis of seniority above, but is unlikely to lead to any change.
When I was trying to correct the error re the dates that 1 Armd Regt served in Vietnam on the Standard (I declare a vested interest, my tank troop was the last to serve on operations), it seemed to me that nobody wanted to cause a ‘fuss’, ie. they would not be looked on well if they were to do so (even if the historical facts were without doubt).
Why do we not place importance on historical accuracy? What if the Life Guards’ Queen’s Cavalry Standard showed the wrong dates for Waterloo? There would be outrage, and justly so. (I mentioned this in my submission to the Minister.) But not here in Australia … we don’t want to cause a ‘fuss’.
“Well written Thomas … a very comprehensive analysis of capability and technology!
I have only one comment, intended to add value, not detract in any way from what you’ve said.
One of the roles, as you’ve said, that the Hawkei was developed for was reconnaissance. You’ve pointed out that it is not suited for combat reconnaissance unless “sensor and targeting pods are fitted to an armed and jammer protected Hawkei”. In which case “it would be a significant combat multiplier”.
You’ve further pointed out that “if the capability manager (Chief of Army) exploits the protection and mobility of Hawkei, coupled with the offensive use of the weapons on a RWS; we can create a light armoured fighting vehicle”.
The importance of battlefield reconnaissance is demonstrated with two reconnaissance squadrons in each armoured cavalry regiment and the commitment to the combat reconnaissance vehicle project (LAND 400 Phase 2).
Unfortunately, the Boxer has been deemed too expensive and sophisticated for allocation to RAAC ARES units. As a consequence, they have been condemned to a dismounted cavalry scout role.
Successful reconnaissance depends as much on tactics skills, as it does on the capability of the vehicles/aircraft/UAVs involved. These skills take ‘eons’ to perfect. What great benefit could be obtained by allocating Hawkei to RAAC ARES units; to allow reconnaissance tactics to be developed. Without any such initiative, the ARES will be unable to provide any ‘surge’ capacity for reconnaissance squadrons in time of Defence emergency.”
Major Thomas BASAN enlisted in January 1980. As a soldier and NCO, MAJ BASAN served in 2/4 RAR and SASR. On commissioning, MAJ BASAN commanded paratroopers in 3 RAR at platoon, specialist platoon and company. MAJ BASAN is a graduate of ACSC and ATSOC and has a master’s in systems engineering. In later years, MAJ BASAN served in Future Land Warfare, AHQ; Land Development Branch and the Australian Defence Test and Evaluation Organisation, CDG; Brigade Major, 13 Brigade and Preparedness, AHQ. He is currently employed within Land Capability Development, AHQ.
——————————————————————————————————————
3 November 2020
1AR Assn Newsletter: RAAC Communications
The last edition of ‘Paratus’ can be found here:
In it, the editor, Peter Lukeis, stated that:
“This edition of the Newsletter (No. 85) now named ‘Paratus’ will be number 16 for me or (4 years) along with the upkeep of our Website, as well as setting standards for Communications, which includes badging, letter heads, certificates, presentations etc., but it is now time for me to move on and hand over to the new broom, hopefully next generation.”
Being responsible for the production and publication of sixteen editions is an enormous contribution to the Association and its members. I wonder how the Assn will acknowledge his commitment to this end?
The notice of departure from the position (above) was in the May 2020 edition. Presumably no-one has been found to replace him, as August and November editions have not been published.
One has to wonder about the importance that organisations today place on their public image.
As mentioned in a recent Blog post, the information provided by Defence re the RAAC is woefully out of date and totally misleading for anyone searching for relevant info.
The same seems to apply to public Facebook pages, both at Brigade and unit level. It seems that all ‘current’ info is confined to private Facebook pages.
Why was there no public recognition afforded to the significance of Beersheba Day? Will Cambrai Day simply go unnoticed?
This to me, is a travesty. At a time when there is the greatest need to debate Defence policy and preparedness, public media outlets seem to be collapsing. I used to work in marketing … I know what I’d do. But who would listen to me?
—————————————————————————————————————–
2 November 2020
What’s to Become of the AWM Redevelopment? II
Following yesterday’s Blog, the following comment was made in relation to what I had said:
“Hi Bruce – it’s not an either/or argument – we can have both – a magnificent site (which as you say is much more than the iconic building) and an expansion to enable expanded galleries. But it must be done properly and not put at risk the core commemorative strengths of the place – the iconic building and site. I know this can be done.
With regard to your question on how do you define heritage value – I realise you allude to this as being something esoteric, and perhaps suggest heritage means nothing should change – this is not the case – the National Heritage List and the AWM’s own Heritage Management Plan, Heritage Strategy and Heritage Register all describe the significant and irreplaceable attributes of the site – you can find all these key documents online – they were all done to ensure we recognise and retain what is so special about the place and to guide future development. They are well thought out documents – which consider the full range of issues associated with the place – developed with input from not only heritage professionals, but key stakeholders like you (and me) – they are worth a look.”
My response was as follows:
“Hi Stewart, The AWM Heritage Management Plan (HMP) is very comprehensive. Presumably a listing has been compiled showing where the proposed redevelopment does not accord with the Plan’s recommendations. It would be a pity for such a rationale to be lost sight of, because of ‘other’ issues. For example, the extent or otherwise of public support. If I wished, I could lobby veterans and have a petition signed in support of the project. But all this is ‘smoke and mirrors’.
Seems to me that the following provision of the HMP is the central issue (which is why images were included in the article above):
“Ensure that the ability to perceive the AWM main building ‘in the round’ within its landscape setting is not comprised by any new surrounding development or impact on significant views to the building”.
The image of the current proposal would suggest an impact on a significant view of the building. The HMP allows such variations if there is no alternative. But the real issue would seem to be whether or not the impact is an adverse one. The HMP is silent on this aspect and seems to seek to enshrine all significant views in perpetuity. Surely this was not the intent?”
“It is really no surprise that opposing positions have become so entrenched, the AWM being such an iconic institution. I was almost going to say ‘iconic building’, but the AWM is much more than the its building … or is it? My father was an army engineer involved in preparations for its opening on 11 November 1941. There is no doubt that at that time, the focus was on the building itself and the human values that it represented in an architectural sense. But the AWM has evolved.
It is no longer ‘just’ a Memorial. Visitors leave with a much greater understanding of the conflicts in which Australians have been involved, than if they were only to reflect on the sacrifices made while they were in the Hall of Memory.
Understanding of conflicts is important if we are to learn from them. This is why it is no surprise that many of us argue for the AWM to provide a canvas for the Frontier Wars and the bravery of indigenous Australians in defending their people and land.
What are the main arguments? There are two: (i) the money for the redevelopment could be put to better use in other ways; and (ii) the planned redevelopment will jeopardise the heritage value of the AWM.
Opportunity cost will always be an issue with any new project. What is the best use of the money? Everyone’s answer will depend on their personal values. Being a democracy, however, we’re ‘burdened’ with the fact that everyone has the right to express their views. It is a matter for our elected Government to adjudicate.
Heritage value? How do you define this? Are we referring to the vista or ‘ambience’ created by the building, the building itself, or all three? If the original building is not to be changed, then ‘heritage’ must relate to ambience and/or vista.
It would help the case of those arguing against the redevelopment, to explain their opposition in these terms.”
—————————————————————————————————————
31 October 2020
The Future for the Tank: Is Now the Time for the Funeral?
The following article suggests that the ‘spirit’ of tank crews will live on: ‘Semper Tanks’: Marines hold on to tanker spirit as 100-year legacy ends
It’s interesting that these underscore previous posts about the future of the tank, ie. the availability of protected direct fire support is vital and a lighter more agile force is needed.
The question is: how to achieve these opposing goals?
A veteran of the Iraq war who spent over six months fighting in Fallujah, he said “tanks were an absolute necessity” there during Operation Phantom Fury and subsequent operations. Many Marine infantrymen would not have made it home without them, he and others say.
“When you need a tank, nothing else will suffice,” Valasek said. “I don’t know what direct fire asset is going to replace [tanks].”
The commandant envisions a lighter, more agile Marine Corps, largely designed to counter China, and has said the Army would continue to provide tanks and other heavy ground systems.
“I really fear the day that a future Marine finds himself in a bind and looks around because he needs a tank and there isn’t one there to help him,” he said.
Marines have voiced what Valasek calls “tanker optimism” that the service may one day backtrack — and that it’ll need Marines like them again when it does.
“Just because our equipment’s going away, our brotherhood’s not. It will never die,”
—————————————————————————————————————-
30 October 2020
‘Formulating Defence Strategy’ II
Image: ASPI
Following on from 28 Oct 21:
“The Minister’s commitment to the existing and planned force structure suggests the government has failed to recognise this critical point. Indeed, one of the more incongruous elements in its wafer thin Force Structure Plan was an upgrade to the Army’s 60-tonne main battle tanks, a like-for-like replacement whose strategic purpose was always in doubt – at least until one Prime Minister proposed that they spearhead an Australian invasion of Ukraine.” https://johnmenadue.com/part-2-australias-defence-strategy-built-in-resistance-to-change/
My response was:
“Please … in the interest of honest public commentary, explain the basis for the following statements:
(i) Plans for an upgrade to the Abrams tanks which involve a like-for-like replacement;
(ii) The fact that the strategic purpose of the Abrams tanks “was always in doubt”; and
(iii) Proposals that Abrams tanks spearhead an Australian invasion of Ukraine.
Unless you do so, the entire credibility of Part 2 (and the article as a whole) is called into question.”
Another comment was made by Cameron Leckie (bionote below):
Yesterday’s article suggested that “Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942.” Today’s article states that “the military threat to Australia is now greater than at any time since 1942.” It is concerning how the language is changed/twisted without actually explaining what the threat is.
What is the threat to our independence? What sort of military threat do we face? Is it a long range missile threat, conflict in the South China Sea, an invasion of Australia? These general ‘threats’ seem to be used as a tool to generate fear rather than an analytical assessment of the actual threat that China poses to Australia.
The military defines a threat as a capability plus intent. [My emphasis] Clearly China has, and increasingly so, the capability to militarily threaten Australia. It seems far from clear however that China has the intent to harm Australia, other than if we involve ourselves in actions that are seen by China to harm its national interest. Yesterday’s article listed a whole bunch of examples of ‘Chinese aggression,’ most of which were no threat at all to Australia.
China’s rise to the world’s largest/second largest economy has occurred without recourse to military conflict. This is not surprising from the home of Sun Tzu. Why, when it is clear that China is or will soon become the world’s largest economy, would it resort to military conflict now? That seems illogical.
Is the China threat actually just a case of projection?
Cameron Leckie served 24 years in the Australian Army retiring with the rank of Major. As member of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals he served in a number of regimental and training appointments, concluding his service as the Executive Officer of the 1st Signal Regiment. He deployed to East Timor (Operation WARDEN), the Solomon Islands (Operation ANODE) and Sumatra (Operation SUMATRA ASSIST). He is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Southern Queensland.
—————————————————————————————————————
29 October 2020
The RAAC, as Portrayed by ‘Official’ Public Sources.
Just imagine that you (or someone you knew) had heard about the RAAC and were interested in finding out more … possibly with an interest in enlisting. You go onto “Google’ and enter RAAC. The info copied below is what the Defence website tells you. ‘Why oh why’ can’t Defence update their websites? We all know that tank regiments and cavalry regiments no longer exist.
But what about the seniority of RAAC units … it is my understanding that ARA units take precedence before ARES units. It might be that regiments come before squadrons (which would explain the position of B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt) … but why isn’t 2/14 LH Regt (QMI) listed after 2 Cav Regt? Some years ago, I pointed out to DPR that their published info was out of date. I was assured that it would be corrected. I’ve copied this to the Corps RSM.
——————————————————————————————————-
Royal Australian Armoured Corps
The role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps is to locate, identify, destroy or capture the enemy, by day or night, in combination with other arms, using fire and manoeuvre.
The Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) is a combat arm with a range of capabilities that can be employed by the Army. RAAC units are able to participate in a range of operations including direct attack, reconnaissance and armoured mobility to infantry. Units of the RAAC are equipped with the Abrams M1A1 main battle tank (MBT) family of vehicles or the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle (PMV).
The main types of Armoured Corps units are:
The tank regiment – The tank regiment operates the Abrams main battle tank. The Regiment’s manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. The role of the tank, in coordination with other arms, is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, manoeuvre and shock action.
The cavalry regiments – The cavalry regiments operate the ASLAV and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle. A cavalry unit’s personnel and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks. The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate, and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.
The light cavalry regiments – The light cavalry regiments/units are Army Reserve units that can operate either in a mounted or dismounted role. The units are equipped with either the light cavalry patrol vehicle (LCPV) and the interim infantry mobility vehicle (IIMV) or the Bushmaster (PMV). Light cavalry conducts stability and enabling activities and augments cavalry regiments. Light cavalry tactics comprise security, stability and enabling activities including the operations of protection, counter-insurgency, evacuation and strategic response options and RFSU operations.
Within the Royal Australian Armoured Corps the following is the accepted order of precedence of regiments:
“The government’s recent Defence Strategic Update suggests Australia faces the greatest threat to our independence since 1942. This demands a sophisticated diplomatic strategy, the development of a sound military strategy to deter an attack by a great power and careful analysis of how to design the right force structure to deliver it. This first article of three looks at the issues around diplomacy.”
At last! The logical sequence of consideration has been ‘nailed’ in public commentary. We start with the threat analysis. This, in turn, provides an assessment of the warning times available. Diplomatic and military strategy are developed in parallel. Finally, the development of the relevant force structure, incorporating the assessment of lead times for the acquisition of equipment and training of personnel. The end result of all this, is a determination of the level of preparedness needed by standing and reserve force components, the levels of stockpiling needed, and the development of contingency plans.
Why this is so difficult to understand is beyond me. We have commentators criticising decisions regarding equipment, without any reference to the threat assessment which led to the force structure decision(s). I saw one influential person recently state that preparedness has to come first and strategy follows. How can this be? The threat is assessed, the strategy developed and the level of preparedness adjusted accordingly. This is a continual process; not one confined to the publication of Defence White Papers.”
In a former life, Jon Stanford was a Division Head in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Currently, as a Director of Insight Economics, he is undertaking significant research on Australia’s future submarine project, generously supported by Gary Johnston, owner of the Submarines for Australia website.
————————————————————————————————————–
27 October 2020
Operation Overlord: 50th Commemoration
Image: AWM
I have been invited to attend an initial planning meeting for the 50th Anniversary National Commemoration of Operation Overlord (the Battle of Long Khanh).
My response to DVA is copied below:
“Many thanks for your email. I can confirm that I will attend. I will be accompanied by Lt Col John Scales (Retd). John was the 2IC C Sqn during Operation Overlord. As the Sqn OC is deceased, John will be the senior representative of the tank squadron at the National Commemoration.
I have organised a dinner on the evening of 6 June for members of C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt and supporting units who served together during 1971. So far, we have bookings for over 80 attendees and I expect at least 100. Apart from the dinner, the ‘itinerary’ for the preceding day will include the Vietnam Requiem at the School of Music and the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM.
In relation to the dinner and Last Post Ceremony, I would like to apply for DVA grant funding (as per the entitlement below) to cover the cost of printing menus and name tags ($200) as well as wreaths ($300). I am not a member of an incorporated association, however. Is it possible for a grant application to be made in conjunction with the National Commemoration arrangements? (I believe, Tony Cox, the 3RAR organiser would like to make a similar application.)
On another matter, when my tank troop assaulted the enemy position during the Battle of Long Khanh, it comprised three tanks and an armoured recovery vehicle. The ARV was crewed by RAEME personnel. We were without infantry support and when contact was made with the enemy, our drill was to form a square and engage our respective arcs of responsibility. The RAEME crew had exactly the same responsibilities as the tank crews. It is acknowledged that RAEME members were part of the units to which they were attached, nevertheless, I wonder if it might be possible to ‘officially’ acknowledge RAEME participation in the Battle of Long Khanh (ie. in terms of overcoming the enemy, rather than ‘just’ providing repair support)? Could the HOC RAEME have advice to offer here?
“Those who signed the petition are undoubtedly ‘prominent Australians’. How many had actually faced the enemy, however? Only one … Mr Gower. His book, ‘Rounds Complete’ details his role as an arty forward observer and is worth reading in this respect. Maybe his signature should have influence, maybe not. So how is it that 69 people who have not put their lives on the line for their country, consider that they have the right to dictate the manner in which the AWM depicts the history of those who have served their nation in War?
Of course, many of the signatories could be aware of the feelings of forebears, ie family members who have served their nation in War.
On what basis does the AWM credit the importance of the petition? If it is only on self-professed ‘prominence’ … does it have any credence? What if another petition was to be organised seeking the views of those who have been prepared to give their lives on behalf of their nation.
If media and publicity is to be used to influence Government decisions re the commemorations of our nation’s history, is it too much to ask that the views of those who were actually involved in creating the history … be requested.”
Another comment was published as below:
Dear Bruce With respect, as one who signed the petition, and, like most Australians, has strong family connections to war, this is about protecting that extraordinary site and building which does so much for commemoration. We all have a responsibility for that place. As the letter said “The Memorial must be supported to achieve its core functions, but this should (and can) occur without damage to its core commemorative strength – the iconic heritage building and site”.
My Response: “It is to be expected that there will always be a range of differing viewpoints associated with a project like this. I’m not arguing against the position expressed in the letter, just trying to relate it to ‘due process’, ie. one in which the Prime Minister’s counsel acknowledges the importance of all stakeholders, even the ‘unprominent’.
The response to this …
Thanks Bruce I agree. We are all stakeholders in what happens at that place. In the 20 years I worked there I never saw anything like the controversy this project has caused. That is such a shame. It should never have gone that way. The process and design is so flawed. I only wish the much referenced veterans (and others), especially the ones who understand the extraordinary tangible and intangible qualities of the site, and know what we risk losing through this development, were more vocal.
—————————————————————————————————————-
25 October 2020
RAAC Corporation: 3/4 Cav Regts Assn
The Blog on 22 October included the following:
“The RAACA NSW simply said ‘No’ … no reason given by the President. Seems to me that my efforts to hold the RAAC Corporation to account, have once again been a factor. If I was to press for an explanation, I wouldn’t be surprised if the President’s response was simply “it’s political”. This was the reason given by the 3/4 Cav Regts Assn for withdrawing my membership.”
I’ve been asked what happened re the 3/4 Cav Assn. There is a long story, one which has been detailed in earlier Blog posts. The following is a short version.
1st Armd Regt was awarded three battlehonours for Vietnam, but were only permitted to emblazon two on the Standard. I had hoped that the RAAC Corporation might advocate in support of a submission that I had prepared to have the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour emblazoned. The Chairman said that he wasn’t interested, so I wrote to the Minister myself.
The Minister responded to say that a review had been conducted and the restriction no longer applied. (I had also asked that an error on the Standard be corrected and this was also approved.)
The new regulations meant that all the battlehonours awarded to 3 Cav Regt would now be able to be emblazoned on their Guidon. I suggested on the 3/4 Cav Regts Facebook page that the Assn might like to advise the OC, B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt (at the SOA) of this, so that the history of the ‘new’ battlehonours could be made known in advance (possibly vide troop projects).
The RAAC Corporation Chairman considered that I had impinged on what were the responsibilities of the Corporation.
He spoke with the President, 3/4 Cav Regts Assn … my post was deleted and my membership cancelled.
When I asked why, I was advised that the President had said that “it was political”.
Note. The badge above was that of 3 Cav Regt. It is that which the RAAC Corporation links on its website with the 3 and 4 Cav Regts Assn. I assume that this is because it is the badge worn by B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt.
—————————————————————————————————————
24 October 2020
RAAC ARES: RAAC Corporation
The following post is on 1/15RNSWL Facebook page:
“Some great work from 1/15 RNSWL’s paired Armoured Cavalry Regiment (ACR) – 2/14 LHR (QMI) as they start driver training on the new Boxer Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV). Discussions continue on the employment of Cavalry Scouts within a Boxer Troop.”https://www.facebook.com/115Lancers/
For one incredulous moment, I thought that 1/15th personnel were participating in the training on Boxer.
I quickly realised, however, that it was only 2/14th who were training and 1/15th were left wondering if they might be considered for even a dismounted cavalry scout role. (Please Sir … can I have some more?)
How great it is to see the acknowledgement being given to their role during the pandemic.
However, as per this Blog’s previous post regarding the Minister’s press release on Reserve Forces Day … it’s one thing for community assistance to be respected, but what about the Reserve’s role in terms of defending our Nation? If it has one …
As stated at Part 5 in the Intro above, one of Armouredadvocates’ goals is to ensure that:
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
How sad it is the RAAC Corporation has become what it is.
There has to be a balance … one which can only be achieved by consensus. On the one hand the Corporation needs to represent the interests of its member associations which align with the view of Defence; on the other, it needs to represent the interests of its member associations which do not align with the Defence view.
Sadly, ‘official’ agreement for the formation of the Corporation was premised on the fact that it would not advocate with respect to the latter. (The driving force behind the creation of the Corporation passed away before this rule was enshrined. It would never have been allowed, otherwise.)
Makes one wonder about the motto: ‘In Unity is Strength’. It’s hard to imagine any circumstances in which the strength provided by mass support, would ever be needed … if the positions to be advocated are only those which are already approved!
Interestingly, it was first published in the UK Journal ‘Popular Mechanics’ and has simply been reprinted in ‘Armour’. (I wonder why the original publication was not credited?)
Readers of the Blog will know the examination which has been given in this publication, to the future of the tank and its design. I wonder where the RAACA NSW C’tee will go to from here in terms of informing their members and encouraging discussion. I would provide some draft pieces for consideration. That is, if I hadn’t recently resigned my membership.
Why was this? I asked if the Assn could forward an application for a DVA grant ($300, for a wreath and printing costs) associated with the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord next year. C Sqn 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Regt will be holding a reunion for those involved. The purpose of the expenditure is specifically provided for by DVA, but the application has to be made by an Incorporated Assn.
The RAACA NSW simply said ‘No’ … no reason given by the President. Seems to me that my efforts to hold the RAAC Corporation to account, have once again been a factor. If I was to press for an explanation, I wouldn’t be surprised if the President’s response was simply “it’s political”. This was the reason given by the 3/4 Cav Regts Assn for withdrawing my membership.
There will be many things which will become clear when my story is published.
“Never be afraid to raise your voice for honesty and truth and compassion against injustice, lying and greed. If people all over the world…would do this, it would change the Earth.” William Faulkner, 1949 Nobel Prize in Literature.
—————————————————————————————————————
22 October 2020
The Tank of the Future: Protected, but Lighter
Image: Defence Update.com
There is wide agreement that a direct fire weapons system is required, but it must be lighter than current MBTs. One way of achieving this is to reduce the size of the crew and place them in the hull, with an auto-loaded weapons system above. But this will never be the complete answer. Active protection systems (APSs) have been touted as the solution.
The Hensoldt Multi-Function Self Protection System for Vehicles (MUSS) has been in the news recently. This is designed to defeat attack by ATGM and RPGs. The operating principles are copied below. There is no revolutionary scientific breakthrough here. But what about kinetic energy penetrators? Can an APS counter these, thereby enabling the weight of armour to be reduced?
A recent press release suggested that this had been done: “Elbit Systems’ Iron Fist active protection system (APS) has successfully engaged a 120 mm armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) projectile under test conditions”. Now if this was to be substantiated, it would really be revolutionary. Elbit is an Israeli company with links to the RAAC. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/iav-2020-elbits-iron-fist-engages-kinetic-energy-round
——————————————————-
The MUSS is designed to counter threats caused by ATGM (anti-tank guided-missiles) and laser guided ammunition in six steps:
1. The scenario is continuously monitored by the MUSS passive sensor heads. It recognizes threats with their emitting radiations through the warning sensors.
2. Based on the threat messages which include direction of attack and other parameters, this is then displayed to the vehicle crew.
3. The movement information of the vehicle and the head sensors is collected by the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and provided to the MUSS Central Electronics (MCE).
4. The appropriate type of countermeasures will be automatically selected. The countermeasures are initiated automatically or semi-automatically as selected by the vehicle crew.
5. The Jammer is able to disrupt the guidance of most of the jammable ATGMs which are currently in service. This function influences the missile in such a way that it does not reach its target, either hitting the ground or flying away.
6. A further countermeasure is the deployment of a special smoke grenade activated by the turnable smoke screen dispenser.
The bio notes for Jon Hawkes are copied at the end. The authors address the topic under three main headings. Quotes from each of these areas are copied below.
Totality of the Battlefield
“What does this mean for the British Army and its tanks? Put very simply, a discussion around the enduring value of the tank for the British Army in any scenario neglects, or refuses, to address the fact that success in a conflict is the result of the totality of the battlefield. This means that the British Army, and the armed forces as a whole, must work together to ensure that they are able to present a cohesive and organized force that can influence the outcome. A myopic focus on the tank seems to ignore inconvenient truths, and usually rests rather heavily on the tiresome adage that begins “a tank is like a dinner jacket…”.
This aspect has been covered in previous blog posts, ie. oganisational flexibility is crucial for future combat scenarios.
Totality of Technology
“The purpose of a tank is to utilise its unique technologically enabled strengths of protection, firepower and mobility to deliver aggressive, mobile, shock action to exploit the enemy’s loss of initiative in response to the tank’s effects. Of these strengths, firepower has continued to improve and may see the adoption of 130 mm guns and integrated ATGMs, however mobility and protection are falling behind, leaving the tank vulnerable.”
“Active Protection Systems (APS) have been hailed as a partial solution to this problem – they offer a credible and operationally proven hard counter to missiles and rockets, defeating them away from the vehicle and creating the option to either reduce the volume of armour or repurpose it to specifically face the threat of APFSDS projectiles.”
“Establishing ways to increase protection at reduced weight, whether physical or with disruptive technologies in the outer layers of the survivability onion, are critical to returning the tank to the apex position in the battlefield.”
How to increase protection at reduced weight is the critical issue addressed in previous blogs.
Totality of Society
“At present, the UK has a tank fleet that is too expensive to buy or maintain in sufficient quantities to make a difference against a peer/peer+ opponent such as Russia, is difficult to deploy anywhere quickly, and still fairly vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the cost-efficiency of the tank within the UK’s limited budget, recruitment figures, and range of realistic or likely combat missions.” This is a bit outside the scope of the Blog, ie. if the tank can be shown to needed to provide
Do the findings differ from those in previous posts on this Forum? No. The main issues are that tanks will still be needed and the ability to deploy to differing conflicts can be achieved through the right organisation.
What are tanks for? The core purpose of the tank is simple, and has remained essentially unchanged since they first “operat[ed]…in the van of the battle” one hundred years ago. Tanks combine firepower, mobility, and survivability to dominate the close land battle.
“Despite the claims of the defence commentariat, the British Army still requires tanks if it is to be a force capable of fighting the majority of modern adversaries”
“While there may be merit in re-apportioning the defence budget to invest more heavily in areas such as cyber, eliminating key land capabilities entirely to buy more supporting technology would be akin to someone selling the engine from their car so they can afford better tyres”.
“… it is worth noting that [an] armoured brigade could be extremely potent if complemented by one or two Strike brigades of more mobile medium-armoured vehicles. A medium-weight brigade would mitigate the major flaws of a heavy armoured formation (ie. strategic and operational level mobility) and give the UK a range of forces to deploy if the situation doesn’t demand heavy firepower. Even so, Strike isn’t usable in all circumstances meaning an armoured brigade remains critical. “
Interestingly, it was proposed the Britain could hold tanks overseas to provide training rotations. Sadly, Australia wasn’t mentioned. Maybe this is something the RAAC Corporation will take up (?).
“With only two armoured regiments in the brigade and a sizeable stock of mothballed Challenger 2, Britain could store fleets of vehicles overseas in, for example, Canada, Germany, and Oman. This would allow frequent training rotations in different conditions to keep crews and units trained. If the armoured brigade were well funded, with enough ammunition and track miles to allow frequent training, then it should be simple to maintain readiness at a sufficient level for the brigade to be sent into combat with only a minimal pre-deployment work up.”
Major Giles Moon is a cavalry officer who has served in a variety of single service and joint roles. In 2018-19 he completed a full time MA at King’s College London as part of the British Army’s Academic External Placements programme. Having just completed ICSC(L), he is now serving on the staff in MOD main building.
As mentioned, there were many comments. It was interesting to the extent of knowledge about AFV design and development, compared to the almost zero interest here (ie. Australia).
There were a number of areas about which comments were made:
1. Deployability. If forces were located in proximity to the threat nation, then ‘heavy’ tanks were seen to be relevant; if forces needed to be deployed to differing geographical locations, then the weight of tanks is a worry.
2. Russian T14 Amara. Concern was expressed about the apparent weakness in the T-14 created by crew escape hatches in the floor. Obviously, this could weaken the hull in terms of mine attack, but there are many alternative ways to providing for crew exit without sacrificing the integrity of armour protection.
3. Calibre of Coax Weapons. Interestingly, many comments related to the concept of increasing the calibre of a coax weapon in order to reduce the number of main armament rounds (and therefore save weight). This is an age-old argument and doesn’t really impact future design concepts.
4. Vulnerability to Frontal Penetration. This was interesting. Should it be accepted that future anti-armour weapons will be unable to penetrate the frontal armour of future tanks? If so, should there be a focus on tactics aimed at attacking the enemy from the flank?
5. Battle Group Organisation. It was argued that complementary grouping of differing AFV capabilities was needed, rather than relying on, say, a heavy armoured brigade.
6. Crew Size. Could it be that only a single crewman is needed? Or, rather than thinking of three (as per earlier posts) … could two suffice? Thereby reducing weight considerably.
Conclusion. Seems to me that a commander, gunner, and driver, in a protected shell within the hull, might be the way of the future. Possibly a commander/gunner and driver could be viable, but a tactical commander for the tank troop would still be needed. This could be met by having a three man command variant. Obviously, decisions re calibre of main and secondary armaments are relevant; as are those relating to the structure and grouping of combat organisations.
—————————————————————————————————————
18 October 2020
LAND 400 Phase 3
LAND 400 Phase 3 is a $10-15 billion Army program which will recapitalise Army’s Vietnam-era M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) force, with a combination of a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and tracked APC.
“Rheinmetall Defence’s KF41 Lynx Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) and Hanwha Defense’s AS21 Redback IFV have been shortlisted to compete against each other for the opportunity to provide Army with up to 450 tracked IFVs and 17 manoeuvre support vehicles.”
“LAND 400 Phase 3 – Mounted Close Combat Capability – acquisition of up to 450 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (the M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier replacement) and up to 17 Manoeuvre Support Vehicles.”
The Australian Defence Magazine has reprinted Defence’s position that LAND 400 Phase 3 is intended to provide up to 450 IFVs; BUT Defence Connect (top) has stated very recently that a mix of IFVs and APCs is to be acquired.
Which is correct? Has the basis of the project changed? Rather than a mechanised infantry platoon comprising four IFVs, possibly it’s now to comprise two IFVs and two APCs. This is a game changer if correct.
I’ve left a message with Defence Connect asking them to verify their article.
We’ve decided that some form of direct fire support will be needed for the foreseeable future. This can be provided for a manned vehicle, a robotic vehicle, or an optionally manned vehicle. The US Army is considering the latter concept. One imagines that this is because it is too soon to bank everything on robotics at this time.
As argued in the previous post, whether crewed or optionally crewed, the AFV’s weight has to be reduced. How can this be achieved, while maintaining necessary protection levels?
Volume under armour is the biggest impost on the weight of an AFV (Armour School 101). Reducing the size of the crew by incorporating an autoloader was the answer at one time, but the lethality of anti-armour weapons is now so advanced, that this is not enough.
One answer has already been fielded … by Russia.
“The Russian T-14 Armata MBT places the [reduced size] crew within an armoured cocoon in the hull of vehicle. This allows for a more compact and lighter turret served by an autoloader. This configuration saves 10-tonnes of weight as well as isolating the crew from the main gun ammunition.” Clever.
The article has attracted many comments. These will be examined next to see if there are any startling revelations.
The book above recounts the story of the murder of a wounded Viet Cong soldier. It has a Foreword by a serving senior officer stating how truthful an account it was and how proud Australians can be of those who serve on their behalf. The circumstances were that an ambush has been initiated, an enemy soldier was wounded and calling out for help … the ambush commander reported this to his HQ and was told not to bring back any prisoners! Those in the ambush then fired into the body of the wounded soldier.
Given that there is no ‘statute of limitations’ …
I rang the Defence ‘whistle-blower’ line and was informed that this was a police matter. I rang the police and they were unable to investigate. I wrote to the Minister. An enquiry was conducted; it was a white wash and I said so. Another was conducted. The result was that the account given did not happen (although the author remained steadfast that it had, having been one of those involved!)
I wrote to the Minister again to ask if he could assure the Australian people that training was currently provided to the ADF to ensure that the obeyance of the Rules of Engagement in a conflict were understood by all military members. I was told that this was the case.
————————————————————————————————————–
15 October 2020
‘Where does the tank go from here?’
Artist’s impression of the KNDS Main Combat Ground System (MCGS) being co-developed by Nexter and Krauss Maffei Wegmann (Image: Marcel Adam)
“For just over a century, the tank has been the key symbol of land power. Today, tanks no longer enjoy the same level of battlefield supremacy that they used to. So, what’s next? Do they still have a role to play? If so, how do they need to evolve and what will the next generation look like in terms of features and capabilities?”.
Do we still need tanks? Previous blog posts have made the point that as long as we still have infantry, there will be a need for a direct fire capability to support the. Drummond agrees:
“For as long as we continue to conduct ground operations with the purpose of physically seizing and holding ground, it is reasonable to assume that we will need protected mobility to transport troops from A to B and protected firepower to support infantry in achieving their objectives and to neutralise other armoured vehicles.”
Moving on, the author considers the current state of the art as far as AFVs are concerned. The role of the US in Kosovo is mentioned:
“It was too difficult to deploy M1 Abrams MBTS and M2 Bradley IFVs by air while HMMWV-equipped infantry units were too lightly protected and armed to counter the expected opposition. The mission underlined the need for a new kind of potent but rapidly deployable armoured force and precipitated the development of medium weight expeditionary brigades. The same expeditionary focus has now caused the US Marine Corps to question the validity of heavy tanks for use in the Pacific.”
How is it that the weight of an MBT can be reduced, while maintaining necessary protection levels?
It’s relevant that a matter in the news today relates to a possible payment being made to an entity in breach of regulations, by channelling it though another entity so as to disguise the source.
There is evidence that, at least one company tendering for a multi-billion military contract, has done this. In the incident that I’m aware of, supposedly there was a ‘loophole’. The Inspector General of the ADF advises that Defence policy has been amended to ensure that it doesn’t happen again. An FOI application might provide info about this.
What is the significance here? Military evaluations of future equipment options must be based solely on assessments of what is best for those using the equipment. Of course, Government decisions might differ based on economic factors and the like. This is the democratic process.
So … manufacturers (or their representatives) seeking to influence decisions re military procurement can target either the military personnel, or the Government officials (or both).
What is the consequence of any such ‘lobbying’? Clearly, it is that Australian soldiers might not receive the equipment most suited for the operations in which they are likely to be engaged.
Such practices have consequences for the lives of those deployed on behalf of our nation. Can there be any greater reason to ensure openness and transparency? Sadly, it seems that not all of us share this view.”
————————————————————————————————————–
13 October 2020
‘CANADIAN ARMED FORCES: A NEW VISION FOR THE RESERVES | CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL‘
“Wouldn’t this have been a great media release on 30 June 2020 ….
TO OUR RESERVE FORCES – AUSTRALIA SAYS THANK YOU
“Tomorrow is Reserve Forces Day. I ask all Australians to join with me in applauding the selfless sacrifice of reservists, both former and present, in helping to ensure the defence of our nation. The role of the Reserves is vital to our national security. The dedication and professionalism with which they undertake their part-time service is an example to us all.
The Government is committed to ensuring that the Defence budget is adequate to meet their needs now and in the future. In this way, the force structure of the ADF is able to be clearly defined. Rather than a large standing army with Reserves limited to specialist civilian and simple military skills, we have a smaller regular army, with Reserves encompassing both specialist civilian and complex military skills. It is our Reserve forces that provide, as they have in the past, the surge capacity in time of defence emergency (whether it be a military threat or natural disaster).”
The actual media release was very different; it solely referenced the recent bushfire and COVID-19 responses. Of course, appreciation for this effort must be made; but is this the ‘only’ acknowledgement that should be made. That suggested above clearly articulates the essential role of the Reserve as part of our national security, both now and in the future. If it was to have one.
By comparison … this is what Canada’s Defence policy has clearly set out, ie. their intention to “fundamentally change the way the Reserve Force has been recruited, trained, equipped, and employed”.
The following quote suggests the conviction behind this policy: “In the CAF, it can be said that ‘…we share our men and women with their families’; it can also be said that ‘…we share our Reservists with their families and employers’. It is vital to our success that we communicate with these stakeholders”.
Furthermore, Canada sets out a practical means of achieving this goal: “Reserve integration may eventually lead to an ‘adaptive’ or ‘alternative’ career path, with all CAF members able to have ‘portable’ terms of service to encompass the levels of commitment and time that they can provide to the institution”.
Canada’s goal is one that Australia must adopt:
“In particular, the development, support, and retention of a ready-capable, motivated, and relevant Reserve Force as a strategic and operational resource for Canada and the CAF is required, both now and well into the future.” (Replace Canada and CAF with Australian and ADF.)
—————————————————————————————————————–
12 October 2020
Tank of the Future IV
Image: UK Landpower.com
“Tanks are like dinner jackets. You don’t need them very often, but when you do, nothing else will do.”
The quote above stopped me dead. How very sensible! How well put!
Who said this?
It turns out to have been Major General Kathryn Toohey, AM CSC.
She was giving an address at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference in London last year.
Who is Maj Gen Toohey?
She graduated from RMC as a signals officer in 1990 and in June 2019 was appointed Head Force Integration, within the office of the Vice Chief of Defence Force. Her bio notes can be found here: https://www.defence.gov.au/VCDF/FID/
In a previous appointment, she was responsible for “proposing to government the best options for Australia’s future defence capability”.
Wait a minute … the quote above, “You don’t need them very often …”. Of course, frequency of need relates to the types of operations likely to be conducted. If these were to involve attacking enemy defensive positions or conducting mobile warfare, then tanks will be needed and needed constantly. In other types of operation, their need will not be so great … “but when needed, nothing else will do!”
Conclusion. It’s a good line, but could be better expressed. My version:
Tanks are like dinner jackets. You don’t need them for every occasion, but when you do, nothing else will do”.
————————————————————————————————————–
11 October 2020
What Lessons Does Vietnam Hold for the Abrams Replacement?
Image: twitter.com
I was interviewed (for the second time) yesterday by a Masters student at UNSW-ADFA. His thesis is: ‘Centurions with 1ATF in South Vietnam’.
I suggested that there will be little doubt about the contribution that tank direct fire support made in Vietnam. Which is why the Centurions were replaced by the Leopards and they were replaced by the Abrams.
Will the successful employment of tanks by other nations in Afghanistan be sufficient to justify the replacement of the Abrams?
Will the thesis ‘only’ serve to underscore history, or will it have a role in influencing the future force structure of the Australian Army.
Of course, there is every reason to add to history so that future decisions can draw on the lessons of the past. But wouldn’t it be great if studies of past events could directly link with future decision making.
All the above boils down to: ‘What place will direct fire support have in military operations post 2035?’.
I was asked some interesting questions, eg:
What degree of operational feedback took place … from those in Vietnam, to those training to replace them?
Why was the tank telephone removed, rather than waterproofing it and lengthening the cable?
Was inf-tank training in Australia good preparation for Vietnam?
It is good to have such issues addressed, but will the paper inform those considering the replacement for the Abrams? I guess it’s too long a bow to draw; BUT, as said in an earlier post, there is no doubt that infantry will still exist post 2035; this means that there will continue to be the requirement for direct fire support.
—————————————————————————————————————
10 October 2020
Tank of the Future III
The Blog post on 3 Aug 20 (Doing the Right Thing IV) was titled ‘Tank of the Future (or Not)?’. It’s copied below.
The RAAC operated both the Centurion and then the Leopard for 30 years (give or take a couple). The Abrams has been in service since 2007. It has nearly reached its half-life point (if its predecessors are to provide any guide). Of course, unless the Government procures the 30 tanks needed to ‘right size’ the Abrams fleet, its Life of Type might be less than 30 years.
This idea is responded to in an article in the UK Defence Journal; the conclusion to which is copied below:
“Tanks are certainly no longer the most important part of an army that they once were, nor can they resolve every issue. However, just as a good builder has multiple tools for multiple jobs, the military must be able to respond to any threat and have the tools to do so. Therefore, if the British Army wants to remain relevant on the wide spectrum of the modern battlefield it is crucial it maintains as many conventional assets as possible, for whatever the future brings. This includes heavy armoured forces and tanks.”
3 August 2020
The recent Government announcement re future defence planning included reference to “Options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life” and “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks”. (See Blog post for 8 July 2020 and subsequent.)
This is exactly the foresight that’s to be expected of our Defence staff. The US is looking at exactly the same thing (and have been for many years). The Abrams tank is great today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams look like?
The answer to that has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank.
——————————————————————————————————————
9 October 2020
LAND 400 Management II
Image: ADM
In the Blog on 20 Sep 20 (‘LAND 400 Management’) I referred to the report that the DG Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch, in the Capability Acquisition and Sustainability Group (CASG), has suddenly been replaced. The report stated that it was not known why Brig Greg McGlone (an Army Aviator) had departed. He had been replaced on an acting basis by the Assist Sec, Land Vehicle Systems Branch, Ms Sarah Myers.
Both these Branches come within the command of the Head, Armoured Vehicle Division, Maj Gen David Coghlan (a gunner). The title of the Division might be about to change, however, as it would seem the Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch is now called the ‘Combined Arms Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch’. Of course, AFV is a term which applies to a type of vehicle, not to the Corps which operates it.
Nevertheless, it would seem that political correctness associates anything ‘armoured’ with the RAAC. This can’t be allowed to happen with the IFV (LAND 400 Phase 3) to be operated by the RA Inf. (It would be much more cost effective if it was to be crewed by RAAC personnel.)
There is still an RAAC presence within the Project, however. Colonel Allan Hamley is the Project Director for LAND 400 Phase 2, Mounted Combat Reconnaissance Capability (ie. the replacement for the ASLAV). One has to wonder what Corps the new Head, Combined Arms Fighting Vehicles Systems Branch, will have gained his/her operational experience in. (Of course, it’s not a pre-requisite that they have any … they have others to offer advice.)
–——————————————————————————————————————-–
8 October 2020
Why We Do What We Do II
I’ve been asked about the incident I referred to in the Blog on 6 Oct 20.
It was contained in: ‘Captain Bullen’s War: The Vietnam War Diary of Captain John Bullen’. Captain Bullen was a Royal Australian Survey Corps officer. He recounted an incident regarding Capt Don Campbell, RAAC.
Background is: Don was on his way back to Oz from being with AATTV in I Corps (I think) and was staging through Nui Dat. This coincided with the departure of C Sqn to Coral, leaving the Sqn area quite vulnerable. The OC, Peter Badman, asked Don to do what he could to improve defences.
Peter Badman explained later that “in a short time the base camp was surrounded by a network of Claymores and interlocking arcs of fire”.
Back to Bullen’s book. To help with the task, Don Campbell went to the Survey Troop to get a base defence map. Bullen handed over the map, but Don didn’t immediately know how to orientate it. He wasn’t familiar with Nui Dat, having only just arrived. This led Bullen to make belittling comments about professionalism etc.
Bullen wasn’t to know that Don was not a member of one of the 1ATF units, but couldn’t pass up the opportunity to show his supposed superiority.
In another part of the book he made a gratuitous personal comment about a since deceased tank crew member. While he didn’t mention any names, he was obviously not aware that a tank is like a ship, ie. it’s location at any time can always be pinpointed. The member’s widow rang me to ask if what he had said in the book was true. I was pleased to be able to say that it wasn’t.
We have to be just keep going … despite people such as this.
PS. The book was edited by Paul Ham. I had reason to write to Mr Ham about 300 or so matters in his book ‘Vietnam’. Another who read this book at the same time was the late Maj Gen Jim Hughes AO, DSO, MC (CO 4RAR/NZ in 1971). His comment to me was that ‘he didn’t know whether to laugh or cry’.
If Afghanistan was Australia’s second-longest foreign military deployment, what was the longest?
Good question, but how do you find the answer?
Ross is an experienced journalist and so is unlikely to make an error in such a fundamental matter. As always, the answer lies in the wording used. He’s not referring to a war, armed conflict, or active service. He’s referring to a foreign military deployment by Australian forces.
This lists the prescribed periods for “operations/conflicts” that Australian forces have been involved in, including the following, which lasted over 28 years:
Papua and New Guinea: 1 July 1947 16 September 1975.
I served in the Australian Defence Cooperation Group PNG, but after Independence (ie. after 16 Sep 75). I hadn’t realised operational significance of the deployment prior to that time. All fascinating stuff ….
FOOTNOTE: The following advice has been received:
“In response to a question about his article Ross Eastgate has said that Australia’s longest deployment has been to UNTSO, which he says has been ongoing since 1954. Elsewhere it’s stated that our involvement began in 1956 (see links below) making it a 64 year deployment to date.
Australians also served in UNMOGIP from 1948 to 1985 (37 years) and, as per your post, PNG from 1947 to 1975 (28 years). At 19 years Afghanistan would only be Australia’s fourth longest deployment.”
I’ve just finished reading a book written by a Vietnam veteran. It reminded me of another book that I’d read some years previously. Both were written by officers, one of whom went on the become a major general.
Why is it that some people wish to denigrate others and make it appear that they are superior beings? This was the sense of similarity I had when reading these personal accounts of the authors’ time in Vietnam.
For me, there is no place for a personal failing on the part of someone else (in the opinion of an author), to be described in such a way that the author is made to appear superior in his thinking and actions, ie. to ‘big note’ himself.
I was once described by someone who was wanting to belittle me, as an “unctuous little officer”. When I checked the dictionary, I found that I was being accused of being overly moralistic (among other things). Of course, being called a “little officer” was designed to cut to the quick as well. I’m being moralistic here, so should I apologise? In my view, if society was more moralistic and less self-centred, we’d all be better off.
In one of the books, the discrediting of an RAAC officer (it could easily have been me, but it wasn’t) was based on a totally false premise. There was no military lesson to be learnt from the incident, it was simply an opportunity for one person to demonstrate his supposed intellectual superiority over another.
What is the value in writing such accounts? There is no doubt that personal experiences are valuable and should be made known at every level. One of the most important reasons to value these accounts, is for the contribution they can make to changes in the way the Army operates; ie. the ways in which training and operational procedures can be improved. Focusing on the perceived shortcomings of our colleagues, however, doesn’t benefit those going forward.
————————————————————————————————————–
5 October 2020
The History of the Main Battle Tank (MBT)
The following post of mine on the Centurion Tank Appreciation Society Facebook related to the reference in the name plate above to the Centurion as a ‘MBT’.
“Of course, the Cent was never an MBT. It was a medium gun tank. The term MBT did not come about until the Chieftain was produced to replace both the medium gun tank and the heavy gun tank (the Conqueror).”
If the Centurion was never an MBT then you can come and collect my collection of over 200 model tanks. It was the primary British MBT of the post WW2 period until the advent of the Chieftain. The only reason that the Conqueror Heavy Tank No 1 was not really considered as an MBT was due to the relatively small number produced.
Hi Bruce, I would argue that as the Conqueror had been mothballed in the 60’s and the Chieftain wasn’t in service until the 70’s then the Centurion was the Main Battle tank of that period.
Bob Potts
As I understood it, upgunning Cent. to 105mm made Conq redundant
Bruce Cameron
It was good to see the discussion taking place as this is the only way to advance the accuracy of history. It is my belief that these views are wrong, however, and responded as follows:
“It’s my understanding that prior to the Centurion, tanks had been designed and built according to their role, ie. infantry tank/cruiser tank. The Cent was referred to as the ‘universal’ tank as it fulfilled both these roles. Its formal designation, however, was ‘Medium Gun tank’. Rather than maintaining both a medium gun tank and a heavy gun gun (Conqueror), it was decided to produce the Chieftain. This was termed a Main Battle Tank, ie, one to fulfill both roles.”
Please tell us where you have garnered the information that Ajax is a Light Tank? It seems to be touted as a light (medium in some articles) tracked armoured vehicle…… not as a tank of any sort! Intrigued. Then I can get back to Centurions! Here’s an ‘official’ link:https://www.forces.net/…/all-gen-ajax-military-vehicle
————————————————————————————————————–
4 October 2020
RAAC: Strategic Mobility
Image: AWM
The following Letter to the Editor is self-explanatory:
“In “Strikes? What Strikes” (Letters, October 2) A Chaplin states that the wharfies’ union “opposed the Vietnam War, but they never refused to load shipping”. This would suggest that all those working on the waterfront were loyal to their fellow Australians fighting on behalf of their nation. Sadly, this was not so. Members of the Seamen’s Union refused to operate a vessel if it was to be used to transport weapons and ammunition to Vietnam.
Initially chartered and operated with RAN personnel replacing union members, the ‘MV Jeparit’ was later commissioned as ‘HMAS Jeparit’ as a result of continuing industrial action.
Unfortunately, when Centurion tanks were unloaded from the Jeparit in 1968, many tools used for maintaining the vehicles, were found to have been stolen. This was reminder of the equipment stolen from Stuart tanks of the 2/6 Aust Armoured Regiment when off-loaded at Port Morseby in 1942.”
——————————————————————————————————-
3 October 2020
Australia and VC Awards
The article entitled, ‘ Australia and VC Awards’ by Noel Turnbull, can be accessed here:
I, too, served in Vietnam, albeit after you, and I know of what you write.
You refer to the stats re VCs that have been awarded to Australians. You might not be aware that different criteria apply to the Imperial VC and the VC of Australia.
The criteria for the former, is that there has to be at least a 90 per cent chance of the person being recommended, being killed in doing what he did. I don’t believe that this is the same for the VC of Australia. That is not to say that recipients of the VC of Australia are in any way less entitled to their recognition than their predecessors.
I was astonished when one of the arguments put up by Defence against awarding ‘Teddy’ Sheean a retrospective VC, was that it would create two classes of award. (The other argument was that the Queen would be put in a difficult position.) Seems to me, as it is in law, that there must always be the right to appeal. For Defence to have blanket ‘no retrospective awards unless proven administrative error’ policy, is as heartless as it was to not allow the NOK of those who were killed in combat to receive the Army Combat Badge. (A policy which was only overturned after it became public and embarrassment mounted.)
The finding of the Tribunal which considered the submission made for me to be awarded the VC (under the criteria at the time of Vietnam, i.e. the Imperial VC) was that, as I had neither been wounded nor killed, I had not demonstrated sufficient self-sacrifice. It was absolutely their right to decide accordingly.
The book I am currently writing is entitled: ‘Not Enough Self Sacrifice for a VC’.
2 October 2020
Sorry … the Host for this site has introduced new procedures and I’ve been compelled to adopt them. The post for the 2nd was lost accordingly. I fear that the problems aren’t over yet!
—————————————————————————————————————————-
INDEX: 16 March 2020 – 31 December 2020
1 Armd Regt History
2 Feb 68: ‘The First Round Fired in Action by 1 Armd Regt, RAAC’
16 Mar 20: ‘The First Centurion to Detonate an Anti-Tank Mine in Vietnam’
17 Mar 20: ‘First 20pdr Round to be Fired in Action in Vietnam’
18 Mar 20: ‘Our History (And How it Becomes Distorted)’
31 Mar 20: ‘Centurions in Vietnam’.
1 Apr 20: ‘The First Centurion to Detonate an RPG Mine’.
7 Apr 20: ‘The First Round Fired in Action by a Centurion in Vietnam’
11 Apr 20: ‘Postscript: The First Round Fired in Action by a Centurion in Vietnam’
19 Apr 20: ‘The Centurion Which Detonated the Most A/T Mines in Vietnam’
3 May 20: ‘The Centurion Which Served the Shortest Time in Vietnam’.
7 May 20: ‘The Centurion (Gun Tank) Which Spent Most Time in Vietnam’
19 May 20: ‘RPG Strikes on Centurions in Vietnam’
22 May 20: ‘The Centurion Which Was Hit by the Most RPGs in Vietnam’
13 Jun 20: ‘Hammersley Recognition: What’s Right for the Goose …’.
16 Jun 20: ‘Ensuring the Accuracy of Our History (Binh Ba)’
30 Jun 20: ‘Thank You for Your Service: What a Joke!’
12 Jul 20: ‘Our Centurion Heritage’.
13 Jul 20: ‘What Odds, the Importance of Our Heritage?’
14 Jul 20: ‘What Odds, the Importance of Our Heritage? Part 2’
26 Jul 20: ‘Seeing the Funny Side’
28 Jul 20: ‘Centurion ARN 169001’
24 Aug 20: ‘The Atomic Tank’ [169041]
26 Aug 20: ‘1 Armd Regt Heritage (Vietnam)’
17 Sep 20: ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’
12 Nov 20: ‘How We Lose Sight of How Things Were.’
6 Dec 20: ‘50th Anniversary Reunion: C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt’
1 Armd Regt Assn
28 Mar 20: ‘Maintaining Our History ‘
29 Mar 20: ‘Maintaining Our History II’.
30 Mar 20: ‘Maintaining Our History III …’.
4 Apr 20: ‘Maintaining Our History (Cont …)
16 Apr 20: ‘A Photo Too Far’
28 Apr 20: ‘Things That Should be Corrected: 1AR Assn Publications’
24 May 20: ‘Honouring Our Deceased’
25 May 20: ‘Honouring Our Deceased 2’
26 May 20: ‘Honouring Our Deceased 3’
27 May 20: ‘1AR Assn: Then and Now’
17 Jun 20: ‘1 AR Assn: Fostering and Perpetuating Ties of Comradeship?’
26 Jun 20: ‘Honouring Our Deceased 4: What’s Going On?’
30 Aug 20: ‘Honesty and Integrity: 1AR Assn’
1 Sep 20: ‘Honesty and Integrity: 1AR Assn (Part 2)’
10 Sep 20: ‘Honouring Our Deceased V’
26 Sep 20: ‘Honesty and Integrity: 1AR Assn (Part 3)’
28 Sep 20: ‘The Way We Support Veterans’
1 Oct 20: ‘Honouring Our Deceased VII’
29 Sep 20:‘Honouring Our Deceased VI’
3 Nov 20: ‘1AR Assn Newsletter: RAAC Communications’
30 Dec 20: ‘Helping Each Other’
ADF Heritage
19 Mar 20: ‘Vietnam Requiem: Something ‘Big’ is in the Offing’
21 Mar 20: ‘Vietnam Requiem’
25 Mar 20: ‘Some ‘Facts’ About Australia’s Involvement in the Vietnam War’
23 Mar 20: ‘Vietnam Requiem: Australian Nurses and Surgeons’
24 Apr 20: ‘The world can be a much better place, but who is listening?’
25 Apr 20: ‘ANZAC Day 2020’
26 Apr 20: ‘ANZAC Day 2020 II’
27 Apr 20: ‘ANZAC Day 2020 III’
30 Apr 20: ‘ANZAC or Anzac?’
1 May 20: ‘ANZAC or Anzac? II’
17 May 20: ‘The Victoria Cross for Australia’
31 May 20: ‘The Victoria Cross for Australia II’
12 Jun 20: ‘The Victoria Cross for Australia III: Two Classes and Floodgates (or Not?)’
22 Jun 20; ‘The Vietnam Requiem: our war abroad and at home’
20 Aug 20: ‘Mentioned in Despatches’
3 Sep 20: ‘Victoria Cross’
9 Sep 20: ‘The Political Deceit Surrounding Australia’s Entry into WWI’
13 Sep 20: ‘National Service and Volunteering for Vietnam’
3 Oct 20: ‘Australia and VC Awards’
7 Oct 20: ‘Australia’s Longest Foreign Military Deployment’
2 Dec 20: ‘The Retrospective Victoria Cross’
ADF Today
20 May 20: ‘Weapon Handling in the ADF’
2 Jun 20: ‘ADF Readiness: Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Explosive (CBRNE) Warfare’
3 Jun 20: ‘Everlasting Leadership’
6 Jun 20: ‘ADF Culture and Learning’
11 Jun 20: ‘The ADF Today: Operational Analysis?’
23 Jun 20: ‘The Importance of Surprise’
25 Jun 20: ‘Ethical Conduct’
3 Jul 20: ‘Ethical Conduct in the ADF’
15 Jul 20: ‘Military Ethics’
27 Aug 20: ‘How Are We Affected by Moral Injuries That We May Have Experienced?’
8 Sep 20: ‘Generating Force to Meet the Demands of Accelerated Warfare’
22 Sep 20: ‘Blaming Soldiers (Again)’
25 Sep 20 ‘Blaming Soldiers (Again)’ II
27 Sep 20: ‘Doing the Right Thing’
3 Oct 20: ‘Australia and VC Awards’
19 Nov 20: ‘The Brereton Report III’
21 Nov20: ‘Brereton Report 4’
22 Nov 20: ‘Brereton Report 5’
23 Nov 20: ‘Brereton Report 6’
24 Nov 20: ‘Brereton Report 7’
25 Nov 20: ‘Brereton Report 8’
26 Nov20: ‘Brereton Report 9’
27 Nov 20: ‘Brereton Report 10’
28 Nov 20: ‘Brereton Report 11”
24 Dec 20: ‘Where Does Responsibility Lie?’
ARES: The Future
13 Oct 20: ‘The Future for Australia’s Reserves’
Australia’s Defence Strategy
27 Mar 20: ‘Defence Capability and What it Means’
13 Apr 20: ‘Australian Strategy and the Gathering Storm in Asia: The Remote Likelihood of Greater Public Engagement’
21 Apr 20: ‘Australia’s Defence Strategy’
22 Apr 20: ‘Australian Defence Strategy II’
23 Apr 20: ‘Australian Defence Strategy III’
4 May 20: ‘The Importance of Self-Reliance’
10 May 20: ‘Defence Self-Reliance II’
21 May 20: ‘Australian Defence Strategy IV (Wargaming)’
1 Jun 20: ‘Wargaming II’
4 Jun 20: Australia Under No Military Threat?
5 Jun 20: National Defence Strategy: Safeguarding the Sea Routes
24 Jun 20: ‘Operational Research: Operational Analysis’
8 Jul 20: ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan’
24 Jul 20: ‘The Army of the Future’.
27 Jul 20: ‘The On-Going Tank Capability’
14 Aug 20: ‘Terror Cells Actively Recruiting’
19 Aug 20: ‘Defence Preparedness’
25 Aug 20: ‘Australia’s Defence Strategy’
4 Sep 20: ‘An Intel Truth and Honesty Commission?’
6 Sep 20: ‘Defence Settings – Have we got it Right?’’
28 Oct 20: ‘Formulating Defence Strategy’
26 Dec 20: ‘Defence Strategy’
28 Dec 20: ‘Defence Challenges in 2021’
Australian War Memorial (AWM)
3 Apr 20: “The Ha Go Tank Saga’
8 Apr 20: ‘The Cost to the Nation of the Vietnam War’
23 May 20: ‘Centurion Tank ARN 169056’
19 Jun 20: ‘The Ha Go Tank Saga (Cont)’
21 Jun 20: ‘Centurion Tank ARN 169056 (Cont)’
26 Jun 20: ‘Centurion Tank ARN 169056 (Cont 2)’
5 Jul 20: ‘The AWM Redevelopment’
16 Jul 20: ‘AWM Redevelopment’
17 Jul 20: ‘AWM Redevelopment II’.
22 Jul 20: ‘Next ANZAC Day (25 April 2021)’
13 Aug 20: ‘The AWM Expansion’
5 Sep 20: ‘The AWM Debate: Playing the Ball or the Man?’
14 Sep 20; ‘AWM Redevelopment VII’
30 Sep 20: ‘AWM Photographic Collection’
26 Oct 20: ‘The AWM Redevelopment VIII’
1 Nov 20: ‘What’s to Become of the AWM Redevelopment?’
2 Nov 20: ‘What’s to Become of the AWM Redevelopment? II’
5 Nov 20: ‘The Vietnam Requiem’
DVA
7 Jul 20: ‘How we Consult the Ex-Service Community’: or Not
25 Jul 20’ ‘The Vision’
Ethics
23 Jul 20: ‘The Ethics and Moral Values of Our Society’
19 Sep 20: ‘Australian Values’
21 Sep 20: ‘Ethics: A Caring Society?’
6 Oct 20: ‘Why We Do What We Do’
8 Oct 20: ‘Why We Do What We Do II’
14 Oct 20: ‘Ethics in Military Procurement’
16 Oct 20: ‘ADF Ethics’
13 Nov20: ‘Half Cocked at the Keyboard’
15 Nov 20: ‘The Coming Brereton Report’
25 Dec 20: ‘What’s Important’
Ex-Service Organisations (ESOs)
22 Mar 20: ‘Changing Times for ESOs’
24 Mar 20: ‘Grand Strategy for the Long-Term Future of Australian ESOs’
17 Apr 20: ‘ESOs: Open and Transparent?’
24 Sep 20: ‘The Future of ESOs as we Know Them’
LAND 400
20 Sep 20: ‘LAND 400 Management’
9 Oct 20: ‘LAND 400 Management II’
18 Oct 20: ‘LAND 400 Phase 3’
8 Nov 20: ‘The Future of the Battlefield and its AFVs’
31 Dec 20: ‘LAND 400 and Conflict of Interest’
Operational Analysis (Its Need During both Peace and War)
15 Apr 20: Lessons Learnt on The Job (Again)
Operation Hammersley: Recognition for Supporting Arms
26 Mar 20: ‘Operation Hammersley: The Story Goes On!’
29 Apr 20: ‘Hammersley Final Fling’
31 Dec 20: ‘LAND 400 and Conflict of Interest’
RAAC ARES
13 May 20: ‘RAAC ARES Stranded?
15 May 20:‘RAAC ARES Stranded? II’
2 Jul 20: ‘Does the RAAC ARES Have a Role?’
23 Sep 20: ‘The Future of the RAAC ARES’
24 Oct 20: ‘RAAC ARES: RAAC Corporation’
4 Nov 20: ‘RAAC ARES: Mounted Capability/Tactics Development’
Following on from the post for 29 Sep 20, the letter below was published in the Canberra Times soon after ANZAC Day 2020 …
“Dear Editor,
The Prime Minister in his ANZAC Day Address (CT, 25 April 2020, p8) stated that “… along the walls of the Australian War Memorial are the names of 102,000 men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice for our country”.
There are two things wrong with this statement. Firstly, the number of names on the walls of the AWM number 102,888. How can anyone ‘round up (or down)’ the number of Australians whose lives have been lost in the service of our nation? Each and every life is equally important.
Secondly, Mr Morrison should have said “some of the men and women” who made the ultimate sacrifice. The names on the walls of the AWM are of those service personnel who died within the prescribed periods of the Wars in which they were involved. Anyone who died as a consequence of their wounds after the ‘cut off’ dates is not listed on the Roll of Honour at the AWM. The cost to the nation of the Wars in which we have been involved is much greater than 102,888.”
The 1AR Assn is considering adopting the same policy as the Government/AWM, ie. only those who are KIA or DOW within the prescribed period of a conflict will be listed on the Assn’s Honour Roll.
When will we as a nation learn that the casualties don’t stop when a conflict ends? Many will have expected, like me, that an Assn including veterans in their ranks, would be at the forefront of efforts to acknowledge the ever on-going cost of war.
————————————————————————————-
30 September 2020
AWM Photographic Collection
Image; AWM P02222.020
The AWM has a vast collection of photos, movies and sound recordings. Those of Centurions in Vietnam can be accessed vide this link: https://www.awm.gov.au/advanced-search ; then searching under Centurion Vietnam
I have spent some time correcting errors in captions associated with photos of the Cents (as a result of the research that I did for my book). Some of the mistakes picked up are copied below. These are the last, I think, that the AWM have to correct. The 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn has been advising errors re M113A1/3Cav photos. The AWM would be happy to receive input from anyone who can add value or who notices an error in a caption (a different position from some years ago). The contact is: joanne.smedley@awm.gov.au
————————————————————————
THU/68/0567/VN
Description: Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam. 1968-05. General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command (left), speaks with the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), Lieutenant Colonel Jim Shelton of Inverbrackie, SA, during operations in Bien Hoa Province. General Westmoreland was making a farewell visit to members of the Australian Task Force, who, only a few hours earlier, had been attacked by the Viet Cong at Fire Support Base (FSB) Coral and FSB Balmoral. Behind them is a Centurion tank of the 1st Armoured Regiment, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC), which is supporting the Task Force.
Comment: This photo was taken at FSB Balmoral on 28 May 1968.
Suggested Change: Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam. 1968-05-28. General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command (left), speaks with the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), Lieutenant Colonel Jim Shelton of Inverbrackie, SA, during operations in Bien Hoa Province. General Westmoreland was making a farewell visit to members of the Australian Task Force, who, only a few hours earlier, had been attacked by the Viet Cong at Fire Support Base Balmoral. Behind them is a Centurion tank of the 1st Armoured Regiment, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC), which is supporting the Task Force. Two crewmen identified are: Trooper Alan Jervis (left) and Lance Corporal Ted Powers (sitting).
—————————————————————————————————
P03806.002
Description: “A group of M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carriers from B Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC), advance towards the village of Binh Ba (background) after it had been occupied by a strong force of Viet Cong (VC) fighters. Along with Centurion MkV/1 tanks from B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, overhead helicopter gun ship support and Infantry from 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), it took two days to clear the town and surrounding area. Australian casualties amounted to one dead and four wounded while the VC losses exceeded 100.”
Comment: Australian casualties actually amounted to one dead and eleven wounded (eight of whom were tank crewmen). The enemy occupying Binh Ba were not VC guerrillas, but North Vietnamese Army soldiers.
Suggested Change: ‘A group of M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carriers from B Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC), advance towards the village of Binh Ba (background) after it had been occupied by a strong enemy force (a reinforced company of 1 Battalion, 33 North Vietnamese Army Regiment). Along with Centurion Mk 5/1 tanks from B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, overhead helicopter gun ship support and Infantry from 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), it took two days to clear the town and surrounding area. Australian casualties amounted to one dead and eleven wounded (eight of whom were tank crewmen) while the VC losses exceeded 100.’
—————————————————————————————————
P04409.009
As previously mentioned for P04409.004, reference to “an M577A1 armoured communications vehicle” should be amended to ‘an M577A1 armoured command vehicle’
—————————————————————————————————
P02116.007
Description: “Soldiers from 7 Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (7RAR), relax at Fire Support Base (FSB) Lion during Operation Santa Fe, a multi-brigade search and destroy operation aimed at clearing the enemy out of their base and logistics areas in the Thua Tich and May Tao regions. Included in the group are the following 7RAR personnel: George Turner, 3411857 Private (Pte) Peter Kingsley Gates of 9 Platoon, C Company, Terry Bryson and 378803 Pte Noel Arthur Biggins. Behind them (right) is a Centurion Bridgelayer tank of 1 Armoured Regiment.”
Comment: The date made is given as “c November 1967”; the photographer RTA’d on 12 December 1967, but the Centurion bridgelayers didn’t arrive in Vietnam until February 1968. Rather than a centurion bridgelayer, it is an M48A2 AVLB (Armoured vehicle Launched Bridge) from 11 ACR (US)
Suggested Change: ‘Soldiers from 7 Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (7RAR), relax at Fire Support Base (FSB) Lion during Operation Santa Fe, a multi-brigade search and destroy operation aimed at clearing the enemy out of their base and logistics areas in the Thua Tich and May Tao regions. Included in the group are the following 7RAR personnel: George Turner, 3411857 Private (Pte) Peter Kingsley Gates of 9 Platoon, C Company, Terry Bryson and 378803 Pte Noel Arthur Biggins. Behind them (right) is a an M48A2 AVLB (Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridge) from 11 Armoured Cavalry Regiment (US).
—————————————————————————————————
ERR/68/0706/VN
Description: “At 1 Armoured Squadron Workshop at Nui Dat, members of C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC), reading a newspaper from Australia, the Smith’s Weekly, during a break in operations. Seated on a Centurion tank are, left to right: Corporal Trevor Lowe of Kellerberrin, WA, Craftsman Bob Watts of Kalgoorlie, WA, 2786048 Craftsman Peter Vanny of Maroubra, NSW, and Trooper Barry Diwell of Bacchus Marsh, Vic.”
Comment: Trooper Diwell is incorrectly identified. The tank is callsign 32 Charlie (ARN 169072), named ‘Snoopy’.
Suggested Change: At 1 Armoured Squadron Workshop at Nui Dat, members of C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC), reading a newspaper from Australia, the Smith’s Weekly, during a break in operations. Seated on Centurion tank are, left to right: Corporal Trevor Lowe of Kellerberrin, WA, Craftsman Bob Watts of Kalgoorlie, WA, Trooper Barry Diwell of Bacchus Marsh, Vic, and 2786048 Craftsman Peter Vanny of Maroubra, NSW. The tank is callsign 32Charlie (ARN 169072). It has been named ‘Snoopy’ by the crew.
—————————————————————————————————
WAR/70/0053/VN
Description: South Vietnam. 1970-01. An armoured personnel carrier (APC) nicknamed Cara-Lyn, call sign 31A, from Matilda Force advances rapidly through open country. Forty four armoured vehicles, comprising Centurion tanks, APCs, plus load and recovery vehicles mounted the eleven day, 150 mile, sweep of Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh Provinces. The armoured units involved were, B Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, with infantry support from B Company, 6RAR /NZ (ANZAC) (The ANZAC Battalion comprising 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and a component from the 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment).
Comment: Op Matilda was conducted by A Squadron, 1st Armd Regt (not B Squadron).
Suggested Change: South Vietnam. 1970-01. An armoured personnel carrier (APC) nicknamed Cara-Lyn, call sign 31A, from Matilda Force advances rapidly through open country. Forty four armoured vehicles, comprising Centurion tanks, APCs, plus load and recovery vehicles mounted the eleven day, 150 mile, sweep of Phuoc Tuy, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh Provinces. The armoured units involved were, A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment and B Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, with infantry support from B Company, 6RAR /NZ (ANZAC) (The ANZAC Battalion comprising 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and a component from the 1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment).
—————————————————————————————————
ERR/68/0849/VN (and ERR/68/0850/VN)
Description: “South Vietnam. 1968-09. Lieutenant Gerry McCormack of North Ryde, NSW, keeps a watchful eye on Denton the Dynamic Duckling, the mascot of the 1st Troop of C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, as it waddles gingerly towards the muzzle of a 52 ton Centurion tank’s gun. Members of the troop found Denton in a house which had been destroyed by a Viet Cong rocket during fighting in Long Dien. The men took the duckling into their care and since then it has travelled like a veteran on the Centurion tanks as they move about Phuoc Tuy Province.”
Comment: The duckling was ‘acquired’ on 23 August 1968. It had been crossing the road directly in front of McCormack;s tank, nor “found in a house”.
Suggested Change: “South Vietnam. 1968-09. Lieutenant Gerry McCormack of North Ryde, NSW, keeps a watchful eye on Denton the Dynamic Duckling, the mascot of the 1 Troop, C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, as it waddles gingerly towards the muzzle of a 52 ton Centurion tank’s gun. The duckling had crossed the road in front of the Troop Leader’s tank on 23 August 1968, after the fighting in Long Dien. The crew took the duckling into their care and since then it has travelled like a veteran on the Centurion tanks as they move about Phuoc Tuy Province.”
—————————————————————————————————-
P04698.001
Description: “Five craftsmen (Cfn) from A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment Light Aid Detachment (LAD), stand beside a large crate that contains a final drive unit that is to be fitted to the Centurion tank at left. The tank has been damaged by a mine and has had its tracks blown off its wheels. Partly in view at right is an M113A1 Repair Fitters Vehicle, with call sign 8E (not in view), which is about to lift the final drive unit off the ground and into the tank. The hook from the vehicle’s crane jib is hanging down at top (centre). Among the craftsmen, position unknown, is 18931 Cfn Ian George Puet. (See image P05539.012)”
Comment: Not all those featured are RAEME craftsmen. Cpl Bill Aulton (crew commander of 1Bravo) is at left, while Cpl ‘Pedro’ Rosemond (crew commander of 1Charlie) is facing the camera. As mentioned for P05539.012, the tank being repaired is callsign 1Bravo and there are no reports of mine incidents at this time.
Suggested Change: ‘Tank crewmen and craftsmen (Cfn) from A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment stand beside a large crate that contains a final drive unit that is to be fitted to the Centurion tank (callsign 1Bravo) at left. Partly in view at right is an M113A1 Repair Fitters Vehicle, with callsign 8E, which is about to lift the final drive unit off the ground for fitting to the the tank. On the left is 44269 Cpl Bill Aulton (crew commander 1Bravo), Cpl ‘Pedro’ Rosemond (crew commander 1 Charlie) is facing the camera, while 18931 Cfn Ian Puet is centre rear to the right of the sky hook. (See image P05539.012)’
———————————————————————————————————
EKN/69/0009/VN
Description: “Repair work being carried out in the field by a mobile repair team of the 106th Field Workshops, Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) south of Nui Dat. The Centurion tank (right) is being repaired after hitting a mine. The repair team replaced a suspension assembly, idler wheel, and repaired the track in an operation that took about eight hours to complete. The mobile workshop team travels in an adapted M113A1 tracked carrier (left) known as a Repair Fitters Vehicle (note the crane), which carries spare parts, tools and the five man team.”
Comment: The date made is given as 8 May 69. This means that the tank being repaired is callsign 24Bravo (Corporal Joe Dziedzic, crew commander). The tank had detonated a mine the previous day. The driver Trooper Rick Priest was wounded.
Suggested Change: ‘Repair work being carried out in the field by a mobile repair team of the 106th Field Workshops, Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) south of Nui Dat. The Centurion tank (Corporal Joe Dziedzic, ARN 169104) is being repaired after detonating a mine the previous day. The tank’s driver, 4719786 Troop Rick Priest, was wounded. The repair team replaced a suspension assembly, idler wheel, and repaired the track in an operation that took about eight hours to complete. The mobile workshop team travels in an adapted M113A1 tracked carrier (left) known as a Repair Fitters Vehicle (note the crane), which carries spare parts, tools and the five man team.’
———————————————————————————————
P05539.012.
Description: M113A1 Repair Fitters Vehicle of B Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment Light Aid Detachment (LAD) RAEME and with call sign 8E (not in view), is about to use its crane jib to lift a final drive unit to be fitted to the Centurion tank partly in view at extreme right. The tank has been damaged by a mine. On top of the Repair Fitters Vehicle, an image of the Disney cartoon character “Goofy” has been painted on the armoured protective shield around its heavy calibre machine gun. Two RAEME craftsmen are standing between the Fitters Vehicle and the damaged tank, while another undamaged Centurion stands at rear. (See image P04998.001.)
Comment: The ‘Date Made’ is given as “August 1970”. A Squadron, not B Squadron, served in Vietnam in 1970. The callsigns of the two tanks are 1Bravo and 1Charlie. There are no reports of mine incidents at this time. P04698.001 seems to refer to this incident, whereas P04998.001 shows “No result”.
Suggested Change: ‘M113A1 Repair Fitters Vehicle of A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment Light Aid Detachment (LAD) RAEME and with call sign 8E (not in view), is about to use its crane jib to lift a final drive unit to be fitted to a Centurion tank (callsign 1Bravo) (partly in view at extreme right). On top of the Repair Fitters Vehicle, an image of the Disney cartoon character “Goofy” has been painted on the armoured protective shield around its heavy calibre machine gun. 44269 Cpl Bill Aulton (crew commander of 1Bravo) and RAEME craftsmen are standing between the Fitters Vehicle and the damaged tank, while another undamaged Centurion (callsign 1Charlie) stands at rear. (See image P04698.001.)
—————————————————————————————————————-
P04665.970 (and P04665.989P)
Description: “The rear of a badly damaged M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), with call sign one three alpha (13A) and ARN 134305, from B Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment, rests on the back of a Centurion Dozer tank with call sign 92A of A Squadron, 1 Armoured Regiment. Shortly before, on the first day of Operation Massey Harris, the APC had run over and detonated a large enemy anti-tank mine. The explosion lifted the APC some 2.5 metres off the ground and dropped it onto the rear of the tank, killing one South Vietnamese bushman scout and wounding fourteen Australians and one New Zealand soldier. (This image was published in Michael K. Cecil, ‘Mud and Dust: Australian Army Vehicles and Artillery in Vietnam’, page 116.)”
Comment: The fact that the APC ‘backed over’ the mine (rather than “ran over” it, helps explain what happened. There were a total of 14 WIA (eight from D&E Pl, three from 1 Armd Regt and three from B/3 Cav, incl the Kiwi). Commander of the APC was Cpl Dave Chalk, that of the tank was Cpl ‘Tubby’ Brooker. The tank ARN was 169071. ‘Mud & Dust’ incorrectly refers to “11 wounded”.
Suggested Change: The rear of a badly damaged M113A1 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), with call sign one three alpha (13A) and ARN 134305 (Corporal Dave Chalk) , from B Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment, rests on the back of a Centurion Dozer tank with call sign 92A (ARN 169071, Corporal ‘Tubby Brooker’) of A Squadron, 1 Armoured Regiment. Shortly before, on the first day of Operation Massey Harris, the APC had backed over and detonated a large enemy anti-tank mine near the rear of the Centurion. The explosion lifted the APC some 2.5 metres off the ground and dropped it onto the back of the tank, killing one South Vietnamese bushman scout and wounding thirteen Australians and one New Zealand soldier. (This image was published in Michael K. Cecil, ‘Mud and Dust: Australian Army Vehicles and Artillery in Vietnam’, page 116. The book incorrectly refers to “11 Wounded”.)
—————————————————————————————————
P03856.007
Description: “A Centurion Mk V/1 tank in a hull down position being used as a guard vehicle to cover the perimeter of an unknown Fire Support Base. The vehicle is attached to One Troop, Three Squadron, Royal Australian Armoured Corps, as denoted by the umbrella and kangaroo over the 1 logo, stenciled onto the turret side between the two stowage bins.”
Comment: Tank squadron numbers were designated by letters, not numbers. The tank would have been ‘part of’, not “attached to” 1 Troop.
Suggested Change: ‘A Centurion Mk 5/1 tank in a hull down position being used as a guard vehicle to cover the perimeter of an unknown Fire Support Base. The vehicle is part of 1 Troop, C Squadron, Royal Australian Armoured Corps, as denoted by the umbrella and kangaroo over the 1 logo, stenciled onto the turret side between the two stowage bins’.
29 September 2020
‘Honouring Our Deceased VI’
Image: Pinterest.com
There have been five previous Blog posts recently with respect to the 1AR Assn Honour Roll and its accuracy. The current Honour Roll is copied below:
TPR J. K. Kerr – KIA
WO2 T .Phillips – DOW
WO1 L. S. Swarbrick – DOW
WO2 N. Lowes – DOW
WO2 John Stone DOW
TPR P. G. Barwick – DOW
TPR R. S. Bellott – DOW
TPR M. J. Hannaford – DOW
LT A .J Massey – Killed Accidently
SGT R. Morrison – Killed Accidently
SGT R. G. Murray – Killed Accidently
TPR A. M. Jordan – Killed Accidently
TPR A. K. Paterson – Killed Accidently
CFN B. Silver (LAD) Killed Accidently
A relevant extract from the Minutes of the recent 1AR Assn C’tee meeting follows:
“Item 62/20 – The Association’s Honour Roll and Died of Wounds (DOW)-
The President (Mel Meloncelli) asked Committee members if they had read the draft document distributed by the Secretary regarding the current Honour Rolls, the information relating to both the Australian War Memorial (AWM) and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA), and the circumstances of the deceased members currently listed on the Association Nominal Rolls on the Association Website and in the Association Newsletter.
The Secretary advised that after much research it would appear that previous Management Committees had acted in good faith in developing the current Honour Roll, but that some advice provided was not consistent with the policies and/or procedures of the either the AWM, DVA or Australian Military conventions.
After considerable discussion and input from most Management Committee members, it was agreed that:
(a) The DOW principles applied by the AWM and the Australian Military should be used in determining whether deceased members should be listed as DOW,
(b) The Honour Roll should only include those members who were KIA whilst on the posted strength or serving with the Regiment at the time of action resulting in their death.
(c) The Honour Roll should also include those members of the Regiment who were ‘killed accidently’ whilst on duty at the time of their death.
(d) The DVA policy of extending ‘official commemoration’ to deceased members on the basis that their death had been attributed to accepted medical conditions, under either the Repatriation Commission or the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission did not mean that such deceased members could be classified as DOW.
(e) The DVA had formally extended ‘official commemoration’ to over 300,000 veterans and these were neither classified as DOW or listed on the Roll of Honour at the AWM.
Before a final decision was reached on this subject, the President (Mel Meloncelli) asked the Secretary to prepare a number of options for various listing on the Association’s Honour Roll that could be considered by the Management Committee prior to the next meeting.”
If the above decisions are maintained, the only Vietnam casualties to be listed would be
TPR J. K. Kerr – KIA
WO2 N. Lowes – DOW
TPR M. J. Hannaford – DOW
Many years ago, following some enquiries, I ascertained that Assns are able to list personnel on their Honour Rolls according to their own criteria, ie. they were not constrained to only list those who died during the prescribed period of the War, as the AWM is.
The Australian Government policy is that those who DOW after the end of the prescribed period of a conflict, eg WWII POWs, are not recognised as casualties of the conflict. How sad it is to see this cold-heartedness being supported by an assn supposedly representing veterans. More to follow on this.
—————————————————————————————————————-
28 September 2020
The Way We Support Veterans.
The post at the end is that published on 31 July 2020. Given that I’d been expelled from the 1AR Assn, I asked those attending the National Commemoration of Operation Overlord in June 2021, if they were members of the Assn, if they could forward a request to the 1AR Assn to on-forward to DVA. I copied this request to the 1AR Assn for their information.
A relevant extract from the Minutes of the 1AR Assn C’tee Meeting on 28 Aug 20, is copied below:
Item 54/20 – Request for Support from President (Robert Bail) of 1st Armd Regt LAD Vietnam Association – the Secretary (Russ James) advised that Robert Bail had requested that the Association submit an application to the DVA for funding of the LAD (Vietnam) reunion planned for October 2021. After some discussion, it was agreed that the Association (Secretary) should submit a formal request to the DVA on behalf of the LAD members.
Item 55/20 – Implied Request for Support from Bruce Cameron – the Secretary (Russ James) indicated that Bruce Cameron had indicated through an email, with the association only as an info addressee, that the Association submit an application to DVA for some funding of the C Sqn Reunion planned for Canberra in June 2021. As a formal request for support had been received from the LAD first, and no direct request from Minutes of Management Committee Meeting 28 August 2020 V1.2 15 September 2020 Page 3 of 7 Bruce Cameron, it would not be actioned. Additionally, the Association was advised that the DVA will only consider one request from an Association in a given year and the one formal request from the 1st Armd Regt LAD has the association support.
Of course, only one request per year from the Assn. If this was ‘per calendar year’ then both requests could be made; if it was per ‘financial year’ then both requests could also be made. The following email has been sent to the President:
Dear President,
I note, re Item 55/20 of the C’tee Meeting Minutes for 28 Aug 20, that “the Association was advised that the DVA will only consider one request from an Association in a given year and the one formal request from the 1st Armd Regt LAD has the association support”. If this advice related to ‘per calendar year’ then both requests could be made; if it was per ‘financial year’ then both requests could also be made.
Please consider forwarding a submission to DVA on behalf of the 120 or so veterans of 1 Armd Regt who will attend the National Commemoration of Operation Overlord on 7 June 2021. There is absolutely no risk of any untoward mismanagement; the usage would be specified in the application and payment only made against receipts for the items so specified. I would prepare the application for consideration by yourself and others involved in approval. Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
———————————————————————————-
31 July 2020:
I’ve been a member of the RAACA (NSW Branch) for many years … never asked for anything, often contributed articles for the newsletter. The following email [to those attending the National Commemoration] explains why I’ve now resigned:
“I’m looking at a couple of expenses associated with DVA’s National Commemoration (50th Anniversary) of Operation Overlord next year: a wreath for the Last Post Ceremony on 6 June 2021 ($200) and printing of name tags and menus for the dinner ($200). These costs are specifically provided for in terms of reimbursement by DVA (see below). Catch is … only an incorporated association can apply.
I’m a member of the RAACA (NSW) and asked if I could apply through them. Sadly, they declined (‘Not approved!’ … no reason why, no offer of alternative support).
Would it be possible for you to ask if … would be happy to ‘sponsor’ an application to this end? There is absolutely no risk of any untoward mismanagement; the usage would be specified in the application and payment only made against receipts for the items so specified. I would prepare the application for consideration by yourself and others involved in approval.”
Saluting Their Service Commemorative Grants Program: Grant Opportunity Guidelines (1 April 2020)
Commemorative events for significant anniversaries of wars, conflicts or peace operations (a significant anniversary is defined as ending in a 5 or 0).
5.2 Eligible expenditure
Publishing, printing and/or editing costs (e.g. advertising, printing of commemorative booklets or orders of service and copying fees)
Purchase of eligible materials (e.g. CCTV, wreaths, unit banners, solar audio posts and lighting) Note: Maximum cost of wreaths must not exceed $500
——————————————————————————————————————-
27 September 2020
Doing the Right Thing
I referred to my posts ‘Blaming Soldiers (Again)’ on another Forum and was reminded of Kipling’s ‘Tommy’.
I responded as follows:
“Well mentioned. Not enough is known of the motives that underscore Kipling’s works and suggestions, such as “Their name liveth for evermore“.
I was reminded of this as I opened the response from DVA to my suggestion to the Minister that mid be recorded on the plaques of those who were KIA or DOW who were awarded this honour. Once again, the bureaucratic nonsense prevails … it’s not an award, it’s a ‘mention’, ie. a person is not awarded an mid, he/she is mentioned in despatches.
I had argued that a person who was KIA might have been mid, because that was the only option, other than the VC. I suggested that it would be the right thing to do to reflect the bravery displayed by including ‘mid’ on the plaques provided by the Office of Australian War Graves in such cases.
If we can’t set a precedent … how will we ever progress as a nation?
Why can’t we inspire a representative organisation with the balls to do the right thing on behalf of service personnel?
I’m reminded of the Army Combat Badge … to save money, it was decided that the NOK of those who were KIA would not receive the insignia because the actual recipient wasn’t alive to wear it. We embarrassed those responsible into reversing this cold-hearted policy. A postscript to this … I’ve subsequently learnt that, following discussion with the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn as to eligibility for the ACB (which was distributed vide ESOs), the names they submitted to Army included those who had been KIA or DOW (the insignias for which were forwarded to NOK). The result was that this apparently “stuffed up our [ie. Army’s] entire ACB distribution!”
Finally … I’ve decided to write another book; it won’t be a ‘history’ this time and it won’t pull punches! I started on the project a couple of weeks ago. It’s amazing how much easier it is to write about things which relate to you directly, without having to double check every ‘fact’ before accepting it as true.
26 September 2020
‘Honesty and Integrity: 1AR Assn (Part 3)’
The following email to the 1AR Assn is self explanatory….
“Dear President,
I raised concerns with a previous President of the 1AR Assn about members being lied to and misled by the C’tee. I thought that in bringing ‘sunlight’ to the matter, that it would not happen again. It seems that my confidence has been misplaced.
The Assn has advised members that, with respect to the August 2020 Newsletter: “The article on page 2 has been removed due to a misunderstanding between the original author and the Association concerning permissions.”
What might the nature of any such ‘misunderstanding’ be?
I provided permission for the Assn to use extracts from my book in the Assn’s publications. In doing so, it was my belief that the Assn would recognise the universal code of acknowledging the author when using his work (not to do so is referred to as plagiarism).
You’ve now advised members, in effect, that the Assn was under the impression that there was no need to acknowledge me as the author of extracts from my book; ie, I had given permission to this end. Is this believable? Obviously not, as shown by the fact that the C’tee seems to believe in their right to create their own version as far as ‘permissions’ are concerned. As previously advised:
When I was writing my book, I transcribed every entry from the Commanders’ Diaries by hand (there was no digital version at that time). I modified the entries into a ‘readable’ format, ie. replaced grid references with place names, replaced shorthand with understandable text, deleted extraneous material etc etc. I then typed the entries sent to the 1AR Assn where they were posted on the Website: https://www.paratus.org.au/commander-s-diaries
I asked the 1AR Assn to acknowledge that the Commanders’ Diaries are not exact copies of the actual Diaries in the AWM, but rather, my interpretation of them. The C’tee declined, even though I’d mentioned that “You’ll realise the problems that could arise if someone thinks that they are the actual Diaries and proceeds to, say, publish quotes on that basis”.
Where to from here? I remain happy for the Assn to make use of extracts from my book and my interpretation of the Commanders’ Diaries, for the benefit of members of the Assn. However, I would like acknowledgement of the author to be made in both cases.
Bruce Cameron”
PS. I asked the Assn to simply acknowledge the author before publishing the newsletter on the Assn website. Rather than doing this, the Assn deleted the article; thereby denying members what would’ve been very interesting information (which is why the Editor had included it in the first place). Makes one wonder about all sorts of things …
—————————————————————————————————-
Blaming Soldiers (Again) II
The following article ‘ADF and government stage-managing release of war crimes report’ by Jack Waterford (below) was published at:
“Jack, you once said in one of your articles that ‘the best disinfectant is sunlight’. I hadn’t been aware of the expression before and had it above my desk for ages. I think the lack of sunlight is at the heart of the situation you describe.
In all conflicts, there is both a political and a military dimension. The reasons for engaging in the conflict are part of the former; the degree to which soldiers did what they were asked to do, relates to the latter. Too often the two become entwined, with soldiers being blamed for participating … as happened with Vietnam and now Afghanistan. I acknowledge that you mention the need for the two to be kept separate, but it would be a sad day if, in fifty years’ time, the dedication and sacrifice of Australian service personnel in recent conflicts, were not fully recognised.
Army’s Professional Military Education (PME) agency recently called for input in 100 words as to what Army’s program to prepare its forces for future operations should comprise. My response was as follows:
“An Army Force Generation Cycle must identify fundamental responsibilities of the individual (personal fitness and skill levels), team member (co-operation, adaptability and mutual support) and leader (personnel management and morale). These must be supported by efficient planning, logistic and administrative systems; coupled with effective communications and two-way feedback at all levels. Underpinning this, has to be a code of values based on integrity, dedication and commitment. Finally, the Cycle must employ rigorous open and transparent audit to ensure continual improvement. Failure in any of the fundamental elements identified above will prevent the Army being fully prepared to meet contingency plans.”
All the aspects above are critical to successful military operations. If there is neither a clear set of values, nor an open and transparent audit process, however, we are relegated to the Dark Ages. If proven, will war crimes allegations damage the ADF’s reputation? Inevitably. If there are problems with the ADF’s culture, should Australians be surprised?
What sort of culture exists within the ranks of politicians, bankers and business leaders (to name just a few representative groups within Australian society)? The answer has been made clear over and over again. Let’s look to improve the values and ethical standards of society as a whole. It is these which influence the culture of the groups within it.”
John Waterford AM, better known as Jack Waterford, is an Australian journalist and commentator.
24 September 2020
The Future of ESOs as we Know Them
Some time ago I wrote a piece about the future as far as ESOs were concerned. In it, I advocated a strategy as follows:
The ESO ‘pie’ is made up of DFWA, RSL , ADSO, ADA, and DRA.
“The issues are: ADF welfare (serving and retired), individual advocacy, heritage, commemoration, national defence and reserve forces.
I believe there is a requirement for an overarching consensus (the form of which I’m sure can be ‘nutted out’) which allocates prime responsibility as follows:
ADF Welfare (DFWA); Individual advocacy and commemoration (RSL); national defence (ADA); and reserves (DRA). ADSO would contribute to all.
I know that this is ‘pie in the sky’ as far as the parochial interest of the various ESOs are concerned. However, I believe it most worthwhile to ‘float’ the concept, so as focus attention on the need to differentiate between ESOs (as happens in industry whenever there are a number of ‘players’ in the same marketplace).”
The NSW RSL has just published a strategy for the future. Interestingly, they introduce the term ‘Veterans’ Support Organisation’ (VSO). Part of the strategy document states:
“A long period of introspection and isolation in sub-Branches, a lack of trust in strategic leadership after a very public inquiry, combined with the void in relevance to the younger generations, has probably helped create the proliferation of alternative smaller ex-service organisations (ESOs) and veteran service organisations (VSOs). The data indicates these organisations are providing the support and ‘online’ camaraderie younger veterans are searching for. These new ESOs are also influencing government policy makers given a clearer link directly to the ‘modern day veteran’.
Increasingly, these new organisations are not asking for membership, but rather just focusing on the delivery of key services. Data indicates that very few exiting or retiring ADF personnel are joining an ESO, as they either only want to access certain services or have the opportunity to support fellow veterans. There is an argument, however, that they are missing what the RSL can provide, which is the opportunity for genuine face-to-face camaraderie and enrichment through volunteering – something the RSL in NSW needs to consider.
There is a clear place for a lead ESO. This is noted in the 2019 Productivity Commission report. While specialist ESOs can play a part in the transition of veterans to civilian life, and provide services for other veterans who may experience issues, surely the RSL nationally needs to consider what differentiates it from the myriad of ESOs and other charities helping veterans. It is the opportunity that continuous and welcoming connections provide, as opposed to a momentary relationship with a specialist service.”
My proposal was for a lead ESO with respect to each of the differing functions that ESOs deal with. The RSL suggestion is for a lead ESO overall.
I hope between them that they get it right. Calling for discussion, as they have, is a good first step.
I provided a lengthy comment to one of the references you quote. When revisiting it, I see the author refers to himself as a “Colonel in the part time ADF’. Seems to me that this drives at the fundamental problem. ‘Colonel’ should be sufficient, why is there a need to make a distinction between ARA and ARES? Is there really a ‘one Army’ culture?
Part of my response was that: “Army roles which involve the operation of complex equipment, eg. AFVs, are considered beyond the capability of the ARES. (The Army saves money by not having to procure materiel to equip them.)” I asked: “Where to from here?”.
The author of your second reference also refers to complexity: “This may sound heretical but given the complexity of operations, the challenge of remaining current in role and the sheer time commitment needed to be effective, perhaps the most difficult question of all to ask is – is it time to stop recruiting part time volunteers?”.
One of those who commented on this article, a Canadian, said: “In my humble opinion the author and perhaps your Army, like ours, is asking the wrong question … perhaps the real question is: why keep a large and ever more expensive full-time force?”.
Seems to me that you’ve correctly identified the fact that the complexity exists at different levels. In terms of the RAAC, there is complexity in operating the AFV and complexity in deploying it tactically. One solution is to equip the RAAC ARES with a vehicle such as the Hawkei on which to develop tactical skills. ARES members can be concurrently trained in the skills needed for the more complex AFV. Such courses would be manageable within Army resources and provide an incentive for progression within the unit.
If the Army decides that maintaining both technical and tactical ARES skills is too much of a challenge, then it would seem to be “time to stop recruiting part time volunteers’.”
————————————————————————————————
22 September 2020
Blaming Soldiers (Again)
Image: WSWS.org
Australia’s participation in the Afghanistan War “did great harm, probably lasting, to the reputation of Australia and its military beyond any honour we must necessarily accord to those who went and did what they were told”.
This a quote from an article, ‘Time to admit defeat in Afghanistan war’ in The Canberra Times of 19 September 2020.
How can Australia’s participation have harmed the reputation of our military forces? Did they fail in the tasks they were allotted? No. It has been said that the Australian military were defeated in Vietnam. Is this true? No. The Australian forces successfully completed every operation they conducted.
Surprisingly, the Chief of the Defence Force some years ago, General Cosgrove, was reported as saying that we should not have gone to Vietnam. He was still serving in the ADF and could only have been referring to Australia’s armed forces. I wrote a letter to the Editor of The Canberra Times saying that he must’ve been misquoted … the military doesn’t decide where it serves and where it doesn’t, that is a decision for the Australian Government, as elected by the Australian people. [Apparently the General was very upset by my letter … he hadn’t been misquoted! Maybe he was anticipating his appointment as Governor General.]
Jack Waterford goes on in his article to refer to war crimes allegations in Afghanistan. Will these damage the ADF’s reputation? Possibly. The report is not yet public, so Waterford’s comments amount to speculation. He suggests that there are problems with culture within the Army. If his views are found to be justified, should Australians be surprised? What sort of culture exists within the ranks of politicians, bankers and business leaders (to name just a few representative groups within Australian society)?
Let’s look to improve the values and ethical standards of society as a whole. It is these which influence, to some extent or other, the groups within it.
21 September 2020
Ethics: A Caring Society?
Image: ABC News
The following letter has been sent to the Editor of the Canberra Times. (The ACT Government elections are coming up next month.)
“I’ve asked both major parties what their position is with respect to begging on the street (commonly outside supermarkets). The practice is legal only in NSW, ACT and WA (the last reconsidering the law).
Beggars are common in the ACT. Presumably, these are people who have slipped through the social security net. Because it’s legal, there is no opportunity for Government agencies to seek details of the individuals and thereby check on their circumstances with a view to determining how they may have ended up in this position. Anyone who asks … can be told to get lost!
Candidates have told me these are not people who just don’t want to work. There are victims of society’s failures. But neither party seems to feel that we (society) have a responsibility to be concerned about these people … to try to connect them with welfare services. Walking past is ok!
Would it not be a better law, if there was a requirement on those who choose to beg in the street, to have to provide their personal details to Government representatives when asked … thereby allowing society to do what it can to assist them?”
20 September 2020
LAND 400 Management
Image: ADM
The following article was published in Defence Connect on 6 August 2020
Some recent developments in Land 400, Army’s most expensive acquisition program ever, have hardly raised eyebrows but nonetheless are worth noting.
Firstly, Brigadier Greg McGlone, leader of the multi-billion dollar project for the past five years, was recently unexpectedly and abruptly replaced.
Sources said the Land 400 Phase 3 contenders, Rheinmetall Defence Australia and Hanwha Defense Australia, each received an advisory telephone call from the head of CASG’s Armoured Vehicle Division, Major-General David Coghlan, less than 24 hours prior to BRIG McGlone’s 22 July replacement on an acting basis by Sarah Myers, Assistant Secretary in CASG’s Land Vehicle Systems branch.
In the absence of any official statement and responding to ADM questions, a Defence spokesperson said that Defence “could confirm that BRIG McGlone is no longer in the role of Director-General Armoured Fighting Vehicles and thanks him for his contribution to the program over a number of years.
“Any announcement of a replacement will be officially communicated with other Defence senior appointments at an appropriate time. A key consideration for any replacement will be to ensure long term continuity in the leadership of the Armoured Vehicle program in the years ahead.”
Missing was any explanation for the move, its method, or its timing, which came five years to the month since BRIG McGlone was appointed Director-General Armoured Fighting Vehicles, and eight months into the crucial Risk Mitigation Activity phase for what is officially titled the Mounted Close Combat Capability, aka Land 400 Phase 3.”
The Corps to operate the IFV, rather than the vehicle itself, is the primary issue confronting Army. Career management, cost, and the combined arms team concept, favour the RAAC; it’s easy to see this being unacceptable to the RA Inf, however. I believe that Brig McGlone was an RAA officer. The Corps in which his replacement gained his operational experience, may provide an indicator as to which Corps will operate the AFVs. Interestingly, Greg McGlone’s predecessor (Brig Ben James) was RA Inf and he recently resigned to join a Queensland based defence manufacturing company. Maybe Brig McGlone has also been ‘poached’.
——————————————————————————————————–
19 September 2020
Australian Values
Image: Clearias.com
The following extract is from an article entitled ‘Australian values: what are they and what has Covid done to them?’, by Ian Cunliffe (see below).
In March this year, the Australian Department of Home Affairs published the latest version of an “Australian Values Statement” which it said summarises “the values that underpin our society”. Applicants for permanent visas are required to subscribe to the Values Statement. It includes the following:
“Australian society values respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual, freedom of religion, commitment to the rule of law, Parliamentary democracy, equality of men and women and a spirit of egalitarianism that embraces mutual respect, tolerance, fair play and compassion for those in need and pursuit of the public good.”
“Australian society values equality of opportunity for individuals, regardless of their race, religion or ethnic background.”
“The responsibilities of Australian citizenship include obeying Australian laws, including those relating to voting at elections and serving on a jury.”
My comment was as follows:
“This is great … our equivalent of a Charter of Rights, but what is not said?
What about ‘doing the right thing’, is this the same as “fair play”?
What about ‘common courtesy’, is this the same as “mutual respect”?
What about ‘honesty’, is this the same as “commitment to the rule of law”?
One explanation as to the difference between values and ethics (from the Internet) is: “Ethics is a moral stance that helps society decide what is right and wrong. On the other hand, value is a perspective by which someone assesses the importance of everything”.
Seems to me that a ‘requirement to behave ethically’ is missing not only from the undertaking given by visa applicants, but also those wishing to hold public office.”
——————————————————————————————————————-
18 September 2020
80th Anniversary of the RAAC II
The DVA announcement below relates to the ever-important task of planning ahead:
“Grant applications: Planning to mark the 80th Anniversary of the Siege of Tobruk next April? We have Saluting Their Service commemorative grants of up to $10,000 for local community projects and $150,000 for larger projects.”
Have we, as part of the RAAC ex-service community, considered this for our 80th?
Who should have responsibility for organising a commemoration for the 80th Anniversary of the RAAC in July 2021 and submit an application for a grant accordingly?
I understand that the Head of Corps Cell supports the Commemoration, but how do we know what they might (or might not) be doing? It seems to me that, as it was while serving, communication is everything.
Why is there not some sort of communication channel between the RAAC today and former RAAC personnel?
We have the privately managed RAAC Facebook page, but this is not used for any official information about RAAC matters. There is the RAAC Corporation website, but that isn’t used to pass on relevant information either.
I don’t believe that I’m the only former RAAC member who’s interested in what the Corps is doing today and what commemorative ‘events’ might be in the pipeline. We have an annual RAAC journal, ‘Ironsides’, but this is hardly real time information.
The answer we’re told is to join an RAAC unit association and raise concerns with them. It was ever thus …. join the union: too bad if you don’t agree with their principles! You don’t qualify for a pay rise if you’re not in the union!
17 September 2020
Canister! On! FIRE!
The following posts are taken from the RAAC Facebook page a week or so ago (thanks to all):
Paul Alderson: I just borrowed this two volume set from our local public library. Very detailed account so far and interesting to a Nu Dat shiny bum who didn’t have to face what front line troops did. Did the author Bruce Cameron win an MC in Vietnam? I hope I can get a loan extension, it’s going to take me ages to get through this.
Haydn Neal: Bought a copy at the Vietnam Vets Museum – comprehensive read. “When the Scorpion Stings’ is the Cav equivalent book.
Able Charlie: I bought a copy from the tank museum at Pucka a couple of years ago, brilliant read.
Glenn Darlington: I showed the two volume set to an SAS buddy of mine. He said the SAS had nothing on SVN like BC’s book.
Jason Miller: Yes there are many other SAS histories but he states nothing as detailed or specific for SVN. BC’s two volume set is a remarkable history.
Barry J Diwell: Quite a few blokes whose names appear on this Facebook page from time to time get a mention or two in this book.
Interesting comment Shane … when the then RSM of 1 Armd Regt (2012) read the book he remarked, “nothing’s changed!”.
16 September 2020
Ethics (Again)
Sometime ago someone posted a photo of a tank that I had commanded on a Facebook page. The photo had been taken soon after the tank had been hit by an RPG and my driver very seriously wounded. The caption read: “Centurion: Battle Damage Vietnam”. I complained to the author asked for an apology. I explained about the PTSD effect that such images can have; also that the AWM had used a photo of a battle damaged AFV for ‘atmosphere’ in its journal and that I had pointed out that to be respectful of the crew, information should be provided as to what they were tasked to do at the time (ie. why they were putting their lives on the line); what had happened and what casualties had resulted. The AWM had undertook to do this future photos. The author of the FB post called me a liar and said that the AWM would never do any such time. No apology was offered for posting the photo of our tank.
This same person is now posting photos on the Centurion Tank Appreciation Society Facebook page.
Two posts that I commented on regarding the source of the images, were deleted by him.
I’ve now put up the following as a stand-alone post:
“Copyright and Ethics. The photo above, and many others, have been taken from the Flickr.com website.
“Flickr photos are copyrighted and require written permission and consent from the photographer. It is illegal to use someone else’s work without permission. Public credit does not provide copyright permission nor are Flickr photos public domain.”
Anyone can access them by going to Flickr, then searching for ‘1st Armoured Regiment Vietnam’. Stan Middleton has a big album of Cent posts … for all of which, he acknowledges the actual photographer. I’m sure permission can be obtained for copying the photos to this site. This would prevent legal action against the site managers and be respectful to the originator of the work.”
With respect to the photo above which was posted on the Centurion FB page without any attribution, I advised that:
Stan Middleton credits this photo (from his Flickr site) as follows “Photo by Gary Willits. Gary was a National Serviceman with the Australian Army. He served with C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment based at Nui Dat in South Vietnam from 18/6/1968 until 11/2/1969. “
The Blog posts on 30 Aug and 1 Sep related to the 1AR Assn plagiarising my book in their newsletter. No apology received. Seems that giving credit to originators of work is not a commonly held ethic.
Well, did I get a serve on the FB page from the person who had been copying the Flickr photos! Seems that I’m a ‘miserable old fart’ or some such. (My reputation will be skyrocketing.) Interestingly the manager of the site (who was the one who would’ve faced a financial demand should Flickr find out) sent his thanks and took the originator to task (which made feel a little less ‘fractured’ after the public serve from the originator, giving his view of all my past supposed ‘indiscretions’).
———————————————————————————————————
15 September 2020
80th Anniversary of the RAAC
Image: Wikipedia
The following sequence of posts is from the RAAC Facebook page a few days ago:
“Might be of interest” is an understatement Darren. That article and photos reflect the history of the Corps. One doesn’t see or hear much these days about the “Father” of the Corps. Colonel R.N.L Hopkins. What a great GET (in my opinion) you have there.…
Bruce Cameron replied:
Cabinet had decided to form an armoured division in late 1940. The Army AFV School was established at Balcombe, moving to Puckapunyal in early 1941. The article makes the point that recruitment for the Armoured Corps would not start until July 1941. This was when the AAC was to be ‘gazetted’. Prior to the AAC coming into being those operating AFVs were members of the AASC. So, 9 July 2021 will be the 80th Anniversary of the AAC (and its successor, the RAAC). Will there be a commemoration? I’ve raised this with the Corps Historian and he’s told me that it has the support of the HOC. It would be great if contemporary material such as that above, could be found and widely copied.
Darren Jones: Sadly, I only have the one page. I will have a good look around to see if there is anything else.
Bruce Cameron: Hi Darren, The National Library’s ‘Trove’ project which digitises old newspapers has lots of articles. I’ve passed this site to the Corps Historian, suggesting that he might like to forward it to the HOC Cell, either as the basis of an Ironsides article or a stand-alone commemorative publication:
“Our fallen gifted us their sacrifice. We owe it to them to protect their legacy.”
Image: AWM
Blogs about the AWM Redevelopment were posted on: 5, 16, 17, 22 Jul 20; 13 Aug; and 5 Sep 20. The main groups in the debate are (i) the AWM states it needs more space to honour those involved in recent conflicts; (ii) some people don’t accept this and say ‘live within your means’; (iii) those opposed to the proposed demolition of the existing ANZAC Hall to provide the space required; and (iv) those who opposed to the Government funding the redevelopment cost.
“The AWM has now again outgrown the collection so a major project will be undertaken to expand Anzac Hall’s public spaces along with administrative and research space at Campbell.
There are those who feel the estimated $500 million estimated cost excessive, with the money being better spent on veterans’ welfare.
That is a narrow view given the AWM belongs to all Australians past, present and future who leave better informed from its confines.
Like Legacy, which cares for veterans’ widows and children, the AWM is the legacy of those who have served and their legacy to the nation.
We are all in their debt and should return their sacrifice with all the generosity we can muster.”
Note: The image above is a representation of the proposed redevelopment.
————————————————————————————————————–
13 September 2020
National Service and Volunteering for Vietnam
The article ‘The myth and the veterans’ problems that will not die’
“Well argued Noel. I addressed this issue in my book (Canister! On! FIRE!: Australian tank Operations in Vietnam) and have copied an extract below:
If there was an obligation under the National Service Act to serve overseas if called upon to do so, how did the all-volunteer ‘myth’ come about? Commanders going to Vietnam would not have wanted members in their units who were there against their will; some, therefore, arranged for those who did not want to go, to be transferred. As the majority of recruits were allocated to infantry, there was some flexibility available to battalions to do this. Most other Corps, of which the RAAC was one, did not have the luxury of being able to ‘tailor’ their units in this way. Postings within infantry were also influenced in another way.
In February 1967, Malcolm Fraser, the Minister for the Army, directed that infantry battalions in Vietnam were not to comprise more than 50 per cent national servicemen. The adjustments that had to be made by battalions preparing for Vietnam, meant that nearly all Regular Army recruits during 1967 were posted to Infantry. Other corps, such as the RAAC, had to manage the increased turnover associated with a higher proportion of conscripts. Apart from crew commanders, it was common for at least two of the three crewmen on tanks to be national servicemen. The length of training and experience required for a crew commander initially precluded national servicemen. This situation changed as the war progressed.
Footnote: “One RAAC national serviceman stated: ‘I can tell you categorically … we were certainly not volunteers.’ Another former national serviceman (not RAAC) stated that: ‘At no time were we asked if we had any objections … I did not want to go and if I thought that I had a choice, then I would not have gone. I get quite wild when people tell me I had a choice, 40 years later’.”
There is another issue here: why weren’t the CMF (now Army Reserve) called up for service as happened during the bushfire and COVID-19 crises recently? Another extract:
Having risen to the position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, following his command of 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) in Vietnam in 1967, Major General Stuart Graham, considered it a great pity that the CMF were not involved. In his view, ‘this was one of the bad aspects of this insidious [i.e. undeclared] type of war – no Government wants to be able to present other than a business as usual approach and it’s hard to win wars that way’.”
——————————————————————————————————-
12 September 2020
Representing the RAAC
The link below states that the RAAC Corporation represents “the interests of 3000 former RAAC members and 2000 serving members of the RAAC”.
The Constitution of the RAAC Corporation is based on that of the RAR Corporation, ie. the Corporation exists to provide a single voice to represent the interests of the RAAC ex-service unit associations that are the Corporation’s members. This explains the reference to “3000 former RAAC members” above.
It is clear that if a former RAAC member is not a member of an ex-service RAAC unit association, then their needs and interests are of no relevance as far as the RAAC Corporation is concerned. This is a common tenet within society … ie. if you want your interests represented, join up and pay your membership fees (e.g. union or association). If you don’t wish to become a member (or can’t afford to do so) there is no place for you or your needs and interests.
Interestingly, the RAAC Corporation website states that one of the Corporation’s purposes is to: “represent the interests of the serving and ex-serving ordinary members of The Corps. Of course, this should have stated ‘ex-serving ordinary members of the Corps who are members of an ex-service association of a unit that is currently part of the RAAC’. To explain… an association for a unit that no longer exists within the RAAC cannot be a member of the RAAC Corporation, eg. 3 Cav Regt is no longer an RAAC unit, therefore, members of the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn are not eligible to be represented by the RAAC Corporation.
But what about the claim to represent the interests of the 2000 currently serving in the RAAC? How do they express their needs and interests? They are not members of RAAC ex-service unit associations … they can’t attend AGMs and voice their opinions. Even if they could, the RAAC Corporation is bound by the requirement that it does not advocate anything which is not supported by the Head of Corps. The HoC, of course, is bound by Army policy.
So, if a serving member of an RAAC unit wishes his/her need or interest to be represented by the RAAC Corporation, how is this possible? It isn’t … so why does the RAAC Corporation claim to represent them?
The RAAC Corporation represents the interests of 3000 former RAAC personnel who are members of ex-service associations of units that are currently part of the RAAC. Nothing more. This is sad, as it could be so much more.
The Chairman of the RAAC Corporation has publicly referred to me as a “whinging cretin” (probably also a lot of other things that I’m not aware of). Despite the fact that I don’t believe in personal denigration, I guess I should expect more of the same.
Footnote. The Constitution of the 1AR Assn allows serving members to join, however, none are listed on the current roll. The above point stands, ie. the Corporation should not claim to represent all serving members of the RAAC.
———————————————————————————————————-
11 September 2020
The Last Cavalry Charge II
The post on 2 Sep 20 was entitled: ‘The Last Cavalry Charge’. It addressed the differing claims for this title … or so I thought. Ron Baikie, saw the post and forwarded the info below. Whether or not it also qualifies as The last cavalry charge, is open for debate
“We took the slow road back from Subic in July across Bataan Peninsula and noticed this wonderful old church in the town of Morong. It was built around 1606 and is one of Philippines’ oldest. It’s an interesting little town, quite remote and free of all the usual tourist facilities – no fast food, not even a 7/11.
Anyway, I searched its history and one claim to fame is that it witnessed the last US cavalry charge. Might need confirmation but this is the Wikipedia report:
On 16 January 1942, Imperial Japanese Army and an Allied coalition of Filipino-American forces both raced to capture Morong. Although both had arrived at approximately the same time, the allies were the first to notice the other party (the Japanese). To therefore commit a surprise attack, Lieutenant Edwin P. Ramsey of the 26th Cavalry Regiment ordered his troops to charge; the 27 heavily outnumbered Filipino and American cavalrymen charged and scattered the surprised Japanese. It was the last charge of American cavalry”.
10 September 2020
Honouring Our Deceased V
Three blogs entitled ‘Honouring Our Deceased I, II, and III’ were posted on 24-26 May 2019 (Doing the Right Thing IV).
I’ve expressed the following view to the 1 AR Assn …
“If there’s one thing that an Association must get right, above all else, is its Honour Roll. The 1AR Assn’s Honour Roll is published in two places: on its website and in each issue of its newsletter. To repeat previous advice, these mistakes currently exist:
Website:
(i) WO2 J M Stone was KIA; the current entry is: “WO2 John Stone, DOW’ (he is correctly shown as KIA in the Newsletter);
(ii) Cpl A M Anderson, MID is not shown; in fact, he DOW (info from DVA regarding this has previously been passed to the Secretary); and
(iii) WO2 T D Phillips, MID is currently shown as ‘WO2 T Phillips’.
Newsletter
(i) WO2 N Lowes is currently shown as “DOW Post Vietnam”. His death was not ‘post Vietnam’. He died within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War (which is why his name in included on the RoH at the AWM);
(ii) As above, Cpl A M Anderson, MID is not shown; and
(ii) As above, WO2 T D Phillips, MID is currently shown as ‘WO2 T Phillips’.”
9 September 2020
The Political Deceit Surrounding Australia’s Entry Into WWI
C.E.W. Bean’s account of Australia’s entry into World War I is misleading. It has a deliberate imperial bias. It was propaganda.
What apparently happened was that the British in 1911, aware of the likely war with Germany, manipulated the Australian Government into massively increasing its defence spending. The possibility of war with Germany was kept quiet, however, as it was known that there would be political opposition to an ‘Imperial’ war in Australia. Rather, an existing fear of Japan was promoted:
“They told the colonies that Japan was likely to become a problem in 1915 when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was due for renewal. The Japanese were upset with Australia’s White Australia policy, they said, and were building warships in anticipation ‘of the alliance coming to an end in 1915’. Japan also had an army of over one million men ‘available for overseas service’. This filled the Australians with fear; it was palpable. Immediately, they were eager to engage in imperial plans, plans that were based on a contrived policy of military cooperation as enticement”.
Australia entered agreed to expand its defence forces and their preparedness, assuming that this would ensure that Britain would come to its aid in any war with Japan. This manipulation meant that “The speed with which the first contingent of the AIF was raised and equipped – 6 weeks – was only possible because such an outcome had been in planning and preparation since 1911”.
John Mordike graduated from RMC in 1966 and served for 17 years, before resigning to take up an appointment as a historian at AHQ. He is the author of a number of books.
9 September 2020
Generating Force to Meet the Demands of Accelerated Warfare
In essence, respondents are asked to outline in 100 words “what Army’s force generation might look like in 2022 and beyond?”. Force generation is the term used to describe the process of preparingfor the range of tasks the Army may be called upon to undertake.
My response is copied below:
“An Army Force Generation Cycle must identify fundamental responsibilities of the individual (personal fitness and skill levels), team member (co-operation, adaptability and mutual support) and leader (personnel management and morale). These must be supported by efficient planning, logistic and administrative systems; coupled with effective communications and two-way feedback at all levels. Underpinning this, has to be a code of values based on integrity, dedication and commitment. Finally, the Cycle must employ rigorous open and transparent audit to ensure continual improvement. Failure in any of the fundamental elements identified above will prevent the Army being fully prepared to meet contingency plans.”
Sometimes motherhood works best; but I’m sure that others wiser and more learned than me … could improve on it.
7 September 2020
RAAC Heritage: Black Berets
Image: vwma.org
The following letter is self-explanatory:
The Hon Darren Chester, Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Dear Minister,
Recognition of Those Who Lost Their Lives at Long Tan
In the middle of the ‘hats’ shown above is one bearing plumes. This represents the Late Corporal Peter Clements who was a member of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC).
In previous years, all the ‘hats’ were the same, i.e. they represented the deaths suffered by D Company 6RAR. It is pleasing to see that there is now acknowledgement of the death one of those from a supporting arm.
At the time of action, and throughout the Vietnam War, Cpl Clements and all those who served with him in the RAAC, wore black berets. They continue to do so today, as they have since the Second World War.
Is it not possible for this to be acknowledged in future Long Tan Day ceremonies, with a Black Beret (rather than a slouch hat with plumes which was introduced post-Vietnam)?
Yours sincerely …
Endnote: It has to be accepted that despite all our associations with the RAAC (and Peter) … in the end, it’s a matter as to what his family want. I’ve suggested to someone who is also writing to the Minister about this, that they ask him if the family’s wishes can be taken into account with respect to the symbolism conveyed during the ceremony.
“Colonel Burns questioned why we use guarded terms, like ‘Defence Ministry’, when we really mean ‘Ministry of War’. He raised the controversial idea of a ‘Ministry of Peace’, mandated to focus first upon non-combative solutions to global problems.”
Do we really have a ‘Minister for War’, rather than a Minister for Defence?
Do we really have an ‘Australian War Force’, rather than an Australian Defence Force?
If all nations were able to declare that they held no expansionist ambitions and they were to be believed, there would be no need to maintain a means of defending ourselves.
Colonialism is dead and some nation states prosper … and prosper … and prosper (while others fall behind). Where does prosperity lead … to greater aid to other nations? Is colonialism really dead?
Maybe Australia could become a ‘neutral’ country like Switzerland … but that doesn’t mean doing away with a defensive capability (far from it in Switzerland’s case).”
Another reader’s comment is as follows:
“Pacifism vs “realism” is admittedly difficult question.
I would like to point out however that “realism” can create self-fulfilling prophecies. It’s not hard to see that if one country starts to arm itself, others feel they need to do the same.
This is compounded by ultimate attribution bias – i.e., the tendency to attribute bad faith to other people’s failures, while attributing circumstances to our own failures. This bias is the basis for much misunderstanding between peoples.
It is also compounded by our tendency to minimise moral dissonance by adjusting our own perspectives to suit our actions, while maximising moral blame on others by judging other people’s actions based on our self-serving values.
I would argue that we need to strengthen interdependence & engagement between nations, and strive to look at the world (including ourselves) from multiple positions, especially from the position of our perceived rivals.”
Bruce served as a Senior Trade Commissioner, with postings in India, Germany, Switzerland, China and Hong Kong. On his return to Australia, he served as Chairman of the Royal Automobile Club of Australia, President of the Australia-China China Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Chair of the Mitchell Business Network, Dep Chair of Norcen Financial Services, on the boards of the Port of Melbourne and Goulburn Valley Water corporations and as a Trustee of the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA).
Since retiring to his beef and sheep holding in Victoria, Bruce has published four books, chaired the Liberal Party’s trade and investment policy forum, and hosts quarterly public policy debates, the ‘Quaffers’ debates, in Melbourne.
5 September 2020
The AWM Debate: Playing the Ball or the Man?
Some years ago, Major General Gower, then the Director of the AWM, told me: “I’m looking forward to retiring, then I can really tell people what I think of them.” [What made him assume that the opposite didn’t apply?]
Why was this?
I had made a number of suggestions to the AWM re the need to correct the captions for their exhibits, photos, and website references. I thought of this as ‘value adding’; the AWM’s Director, however, thought of it as ‘criticism’. He limited me to a set number of suggestions per week.
I was writing a book about Vietnam … as I conducted my research, I came across matters which conflicted with information presented by the AWM. I decided that I would provide this information to the AWM as I became aware of it. I wasn’t working as an unpaid ‘proof reader’ after all. I was ‘blacklisted’ as a result of my temerity.
Why do some people feel the need to tell others what they think of them? Presumably they feel that those in receipt of their views, will find them of some import. This, of course, means that some people believe that their own status is of such significance that they are entitled to this expectation.
In it, he refers to “Brendan Nelson’s latest diatribe” and his “apparent lack of respect, and his colourful denigration of alternative views in the community”. He goes on to say: “perhaps the former member for Wentworth [Malcolm Turnbull] did us all a favour when he took Dr Nelson’s place [as leader of the Liberal party] some years ago”. Maj Gen Gower was advocating with respect to his view that the proposed AWM expansion should not go ahead. Seems to me that it is those whose arguments are wanting, who take to denigrating those who hold different views … or maybe it’s just arrogance?
How many of us are lied to and misled by those we thought we could trust?
Our once ’friends’ have their own reasons for the deceit … personal aggrandisement, need to demonstrate support for others, revenge for some interpreted ‘slight’, or even to benefit financially.
As an author, I’ve found that those I’ve interviewed could be grouped into the following categories: those telling the truth; those who thought they were telling the truth; and those who knew that they were not telling the truth. These same personality types are spread throughout society, including within the intelligence service. How can we be assured of unbiased and honest intelligence assessment? As the saying goes: ‘Who checks the checkers?’.
I have great faith in the rule of law and all that that means; but is this sufficient to guarantee the impartiality of the intelligence advice, upon which national defence contingency plans are based?
I believe the oversight for which you are calling is more than justified.”
Comments from others included:
“Talking of Five Eyes and their complaints concerning China – as if it is the only country that has spies – I always remember the complete optic fibre bugging of the Chinese Embassy when it was built in Canberra in 1995, replete with a line that went all the way to the British High Commission.”
The circumstances of my VC nomination have been posted previously. In essence, Stan Hanuszewicz came across my MC citation and realised that it didn’t completely cover something that he had witnessed. He rang me and said “I’m nominating you and that’s all there is to it!”.
The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal heard his submission, but decided against the award. Part of the reason was that for the Imperial VC, which I would’ve had to have been awarded at the time, there has to be a 90% chance of the recipient being killed.
Apart from the RPG which was fired at me and hit the muzzle of Stan’s tank barrel, I couldn’t give evidence that I had bullets whizzing all around me (like you see in the movies) because I was totally focussed on preventing my badly wounded driver from further exposing himself to the enemy (in order to come to the rescue of those of us in the turret). I didn’t even know about the RPG until much later.
As the Tribunal stated: “… as he was not killed or wounded, he could not be considered to have carried out an act of self-sacrifice”.
Anyway … the email below turned up a few days ago:
Hey Bruce, did you get Hanuszewicz to try and get you a Victoria Cross?
Don Tate
————————————
My email address is easy enough to find, so I’ve simply blocked Mr Tate from sending me any more emails.
Why would he want to do so? Google the name plus ‘Vietnam’ and you’ll quickly discover the sort of person he is.
It’s sad that there are such people among us … but that’s a fact of life. If they prove that they’re incapable of understanding and beyond our help, I believe they should just be ignored.
The issue as to when the last cavalry charge occurred is a matter of definition. Examples are given below … copied straight from Google.
“THE CHARGE at Huj in Palestine in November 1917, carried out by soldiers of the Warwickshire Yeomanry and Worcestershire Yeomanry, was the last classic cavalry charge in the history of the British Army.”
“The British army’s last cavalry charge by a complete regiment was executed in Turkey during the 1920 Chanak Crisis, when the 20th Hussars successfully charged a body of Turkish infantry.”
“There is an old myth that the charge of the 21st Lancers against the Mahdists at the Battle of Omdurman, fought in Sudan on 2 September 1898, was the last full-scale British cavalry charge in history.”
“The charge of the 4th Australian Light Horse at Beersheba late in the afternoon of 31 October 1917, is remembered as the last great cavalry charge.”
The terms that have to be defined are: ‘British’ (eg. was the ALH considered British?); the size of the unit(s) involved (does the definition apply only to a charge by a complete regiment; what does ‘full-scale’ or ‘great’ mean?); and the nature of the action involved (ie. what was the size and intent of the enemy being charged?).
Any of the above ‘claims’ can be shown to be true if the terms used to describe them are defined accordingly.
1 September 2020
Honesty and Integrity: The 1AR Assn (Part 2)
Following on from 30 August 2020 … the story becomes even MORE bizarre!
To recap: I asked why there was no acknowledgement of the extract from my book in the latest 1AR Assn Newsletter. The response stated that I was “incorrect” and that I must have received a “pirated” copy. I assumed, therefore, that an attribution had been included in the ‘official’ version of the Newsletter, but this had been deleted in the ‘pirated’ version.
It now transpires that there was no ‘pirated’ version … the C’tee advises that the reference to this had been “a joke”.
I pointed out that Attribution ‘in copyright law, is acknowledgement as credit to the copyright holder or author of a work. … In cases when the copyright holder is the author themselves, this behaviour is often moralized as a sign of decency and respect to acknowledge the creator by giving them credit for the work’.
The 1AR C’tee, however, consider that there is no need for any attribution. While I had given permission for extracts from my book to be used in by the Assn, I expected that common courtesy would apply and attribution would be made.
Now …this is the best part: “The article we are talking about is one that you copied from ‘The Australian Armoured Heritage’.”
Of course, I didn’t copy anything (if I had, I’d have included appropriate attribution). ‘The Australian Armoured Heritage’ was title I gave to an introductory section of my book. I wanted to encapsulate the Armoured Corps’ heritage to set the scene for the story of service and sacrifice of AFV crews and those supporting them, in Vietnam. I conducted considerable research and crafted each and every word to try and create a concise ‘history’ … only for it to be alleged that I’d plagiarised it all from somewhere else. Of course, the opposite is the case, the C’tee has plagiarised my work. [Plagiarise: ‘take the work of someone else and pass it off as one’s own.]
I was also informed that the C’tee did not expect reference to the matter above to appear “on the back of your dunny door (AA)”.
What’s left to say? My interaction with the C’tee of the 1AR Assn first came about as a result of Assn members being lied to by the C’tee. I thought that there had recently been a shift towards openness and transparency in matters decided by the C’tee. Sadly, it would seem that this is not the case at all.
I have asked the President 1AR Assn to include attribution in the copy of the newsletter that is to be posted on the 1AR Assn webpage. (I’m not taking bets, but it would be a nice gesture on their part.)
——————————————————————————————-
31 August 2020
The RAAC and the Next 80 Years
Image: AWM
As mentioned on 29 August, the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC, later RAAC) dates from 9 July 1941. The 80th anniversary will mark an incredible period of service by both men and women of the Armoured Corps, on behalf of the nation. Service which has seen the introduction of revolutionary new equipment for the time and the development of new tactics to employ it; both of which have changed the conduct of battle. During this period, mobile warfare came into being. Change of similar magnitude is continuing today and will do so into the future.
The Armoured Corps has been at the forefront of Australia’s military history for four generations. During this time, armoured vehicles and their crews have closed with and engaged the enemy on numerous occasions … and suffered casualties in doing so.
Apparently, the address to be given at the RAAC Assn NSW’s Cambrai Dinner this year is to be about ‘The Replacement of the M113AS4’. This will focus on the immediate future and be of particular interest to many as it refers to AFVs which, together with the Boxer, will equip the ADF for possibly the next 30 years. (Of course, it is the intention that the IFV be crewed by infantry … I’ve advocated in previous Blog posts and elsewhere, that it would be a much better option, given the nature of the armament and the training required, for it to be crewed by RAAC personnel.)
The nature of warfare in 30 years’ time is likely to be very different again. What role will the RAAC (or its successor) have in it? More to follow on this in coming Blog posts.
————————————————————————————————–
30 August 2021
Honesty and Integrity: 1AR Assn
The following link is that to the latest 1 AR Assn newsletter. It was sent to members by the Secretary:
The content on Page 2 is entirely taken from my book, apart from the last paragraph. I emailed the Editor to say: “Page 2 [content comprises] copies from my book of pages xii and xiii. Just wondering why there is no acknowledgement? PS. It seems that the last para is an ‘external filler’ (?)”.
I received a response to say: “Bruce, your assumption is incorrect, however, upon checking the mailing list for the Newsletter I am unable to see your name. You may have received a pirated version. Please advise me as to where you obtained this information and I will be able to address your concerns.”
I responded that the version I read was that connected to the link sent out by the Secretary (above). Despite three follow up emails, I haven’t had any explanation as to why this might have been ‘pirated’ or why the acknowledgment was missing. Surely it couldn’t be a matter of because I wasn’t on the mailing list, that it was thought that there was no need to acknowledge me as the author of the article? But this isn’t the first time …
When I was writing my book, I transcribed every entry from the Commanders’ Diaries by hand (there was no digital version at that time). I modified the entries into a ‘readable’ format, ie. replaced grid references with place names, replaced shorthand with understandable text, deleted extraneous material etc etc. I then typed the entries sent to the 1AR Assn where they were posted on the Website: https://www.paratus.org.au/commander-s-diaries
I asked the 1AR Assn to acknowledge that the Commanders’ Diaries are not exact copies of the actual Diaries in the AWM, but rather, my interpretation of them. The C’tee declined, even though I’d mentioned that “You’ll realise the problems that could arise if someone thinks that they are the actual Diaries and proceeds to, say, publish quotes on that basis”.
Why is it that there are those among us who are so devious? Why is it that openness and transparency when dealing with others, is a bridge too far for some people? Has the 1AR Assn C’tee gone back to the culture of the past, ie. lies and misleading statements? It would seem that I’ve been lied to (again) … go to Parts 1 and 2 of the Intro above. I’m no longer a member of the Assn, but does that make this right, ie it’s just ‘accepted’ that Incorporated Assns lie about the things their C’tees do? Heaven help us!
————————————————————————————————————-
29 August 2020
80th Anniversary of the Australian Armoured Corps
The AAC was gazetted on 9 July 1941. How will the Anniversary be commemorated? Will it be commemorated at all?
Prior to the Centenary, I suggested that past COs and RSMs might like to contribute to a perpetual trophy or prize of some sort. This wasn’t supported (one former RSM even saying that he didn’t need anyone telling him how to spend his money). Of course, it was only a suggestion … something to spur on a few ideas.
It was the same when I suggested that the 1AR Assn might like to use some of the royalties that I’d donated from my book, to help fund a deserving soldier from the Regiment and a member of the C’tee to attend the Commemoration in France … the expectation being that on their return, they’d give presentations on what happened and what it meant to them to be present. How dare anyone tell us what to do! Of course, in the end, nothing was done.
Here I go again …you’d have thought that I’d have learnt by now; but what do they say about a tiger changing its spots?
So, what should happen on 9 July 2021? Armoured regiments of the AAC fought in New Guinea during WWII. Is it possible that there might be some AAC veterans still alive?
1st Armoured Regiment AAC was raised during WWII. Equipped with Matildas, the Regt saw action at Balikpapan in 1945. The unit was disbanded in 1948, at the same time that the 1st Armd Regt (RNSWL) was raised as part of the CMF.
The Title ‘Royal’ was granted to the AAC on 14 December 1948. Six months later, on 7 July 1949, 1st Armoured Regiment was re-raised with personnel from 1st Armd Car Sqn returning from Japan. (The historical title of 1st RNSWL was adopted by the CMF unit to avoid confusion with the titles.)
So, 1/15 RNSWL, rather than the current 1 Armd Regt, is linked with 1 Armd Regt, AAC. Nevertheless, the AAC is the direct predecessor of the RAAC. Should the RAAC not commemorate the Anniversary?
Postscript. Having put this proposal to the Corps Historian, he’s responded to say that the HOC Cell sees merit in the idea and will take action to develop it further. Hopefully surviving members of the AAC would be invited and the HOC might present a paper entitled: ‘The Next Eighty Years in the RAAC’.
—————————————————————————————————————
28 August 2020
MOVING FORWARD – THE FUTURE OF CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE
What a well-researched and written article … congratulations! You have made the case for flexibility in reconnaissance options very convincingly. Of course, going forward these include drones and the like.
With respect to the Boxer, what we don’t know is the tactical scenario and terrain characteristics which set the design priorities for its required characteristics. If it suffers a software failure, what will this mean? The same question must be asked of all military platforms entering service. As you suggest, however, this can’t be taken for granted.
I’ve been advocating recently in terms of the lead time needed to develop tactical skills. There are some commentators who suggest that ‘lead times’ are solely those related to the acquisition of equipment.
The culture that existed during the Vietnam War resulted in a subservience which accepted (and not raise issues with) everything that was ‘decreed’.
RAAC ARES units have almost been written out of operational significance. The Hawkei would be a great platform on which to enable reconnaissance skills to be developed (and transferred to the Armoured Cavalry Regiments as tactical scenarios might require).
Finally … I’m aware of ‘Death Before Dishonour’ in relation to the RAAC red over gold tac sign, but ‘Death Before Dismount’ is something I’d have to think about (having had to dismount under fire). Hopefully organisations such as the RAAC Corporation will support a wide debate into issues such as you’ve raised.
The Author: Sergeant Edward Howson was born on 13 May 1990 in Southport, Queensland. He enlisted into the Australian Regular Army on 9 July 2007 as a Cavalry Crewman ASLAV within the Royal Australian Armoured Corps. On completion of his initial employment training, Sergeant Howson was posted to the 2/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) in May 2008. During his time, Sergeant Howson has served as a recon scout, driver, gunner, crew commander, troop corporal, acting troop sergeant, training corporal and acting training sergeant. In 2011, Sergeant Howson deployed as an ASLAV gunner to Afghanistan on Mentoring Task Force 3, as part of the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment battle group.
Finally … mine is so far the only comment. Why oh why, isn’t the RAAC Corporation and its members interested in promoting the widest possible discussion on subjects such as this? Would it really be a bridge too far for the RAAC Corporation to provide a prize for the best article on an RAAC matter by a serving member of the Corps each year?
27 August 2020
How Are We Affected by Moral Injuries That We May Have Experienced?
Is moral injury a factor in recent veteran suicides?
What is Moral Injury?
This is the term “used to describe a cluster of symptoms – similar to those associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – that result from personal experiences, which violate a person’s deepest and most closely held values and principles. While a complex concept, moral injury has been defined in an Australian defence context as: ‘Being confronted with events and experiences associated with perpetuating, failing to prevent, or bearing witness to inhumane or cruel actions, or learning about acts that transgress deeply-held moral beliefs and expectations’.”
“Moral injury is not yet well defined. The term is being increasingly used when Defence thinks about the impact of armed conflict on its personnel, but existing definitions are imprecise and the anecdotes that ‘confirm’ moral injury exists outstrip the empirical evidence. There is little consensus amongst many people who study and treat it and they also fail to clearly articulate ‘what is actually injured in moral injury?’. As moral injury cannot be seen and can be hard to describe, clinicians and patients face the same challenges that Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) once faced for legitimacy.”
Might have misunderstood your comment but my understanding is that the track guards were deliberately removed in SVN because vegetation got wedged between the guards and tracks when going through the jungle.
The track guards were one of the first casualties of jungle ‘bashing’ (ie. debris caught up in the tracks), plus mine damage. The overhangs were cut off and support brackets reinforced, but eventually the guards had to be replaced with new ones made from heavier gauge steel plate. The photo with the two front guards missing was taken in 1968, ie. the first squadron; later the MBSGD were cut off as well (as you can see in the coloured image above).
“Might this not be an opportune time for a national conference that brings together experts in relevant fields and representatives of the various sectors noted above? Such a forum could consider creatively but strategically the options for refocusing the national conversation on security.”
“This is a very timely ‘wake up’ call. But is it only a matter of “refocusing” the national conversation? I suggest that it is more a matter of starting a national conversation. It seems to me that there is no real debate about national defence strategy and relevant priorities, at present. Rather than the well proposed initiative being limited to “experts in relevant fields” … a forum involving the wider public, could help in developing awareness and encouraging debate.
For example, a recent edition of the Indian Defence review states that:
In the latest incident in a long string of Chinese actions to assert unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea (SCS), Chinese Coast Guard vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands in April 2 this year.
During June 2020, a Chinese submarine cruised through the waters near Japan, prompting a scramble of aircraft and ships to track its furtive movements, while Chinese fighter jets and at least one bomber buzzed Taiwan’s territorial airspace almost daily.
In June 2020, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel and a speedboat chased, rammed, and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat near Lincoln Island in Vietnam’s Ho and Sa (Paracel) Archipelago.
These events have relevance for security in our region, but they don’t appear on the radar screen that’s presented for public information.”
[Joseph Camilleri is managing director of Alexandria Agenda, Emeritus Professor at La Trobe University in Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Social Sciences.]
The events Bruce mentions below are a few among many that Australians don’t know about or hear discussed if they rely on the MSM [News] and our politicians. We are told by them who and what to fear, and many oblige. We are not told what our military forces are doing in the South China Sea, the Persian gulf, in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria, or why. We are not told what American forces are doing in Pine Gap or Darwin or other bases in Australia. We can’t claim to have a democratic system of government if the people are not informed. So, I am with Joe Camilleri: we need a public discussion about what’s in Australia’s interests and what is not
25 August 2020
The Atomic Tank
The following sequence of posts on the Centurion Tank Appreciation Society Facebook page resulted from the above photo. It is of ARN 169042 (which according to the late Col Filtness has been stored at Moliagul, Victoria).
I’m aware that a number of claims were made by families of those associated with the tank who died of radiation related causes. As far as I know, liability was denied …
Hi Bryan, The Atomic Tank is ARN 169041. I should say that a great ‘book’ has been written about the history of the tank by its crew from Vietnam. They presented a copy to the CO, 1 Armd Regt, where the tank is now located.
The bomb was detonated on 15 Oct 53. Three days later the tank was driven from the test site and then recovered to the nearest base, arriving 25 Dec 53.
It was decontaminated in early 1954 and later transported back to the Armoured Centre, arriving July 54.
Nine months after the explosion, a radiation assessment was conducted. It was found that it was not (then) “severely contaminated”.
The tank resumed its training role.
What happened to Army’s ‘duty of care’, one might ask.
—————————————————————————————-
23 August 2020
Updates Needed: 1 AR Association/RAAC Corporation Webpages
The following suggestions have been passed to the 1AR Assn (with the request that those relevant be passed onto the RAAC Corporation). Similar suggestions have been made in the past, without any changes being made, but hope springs eternal.
1AR Assn
History
“The main Battle Tanks that have seen service in the Regiment have been the … Centurion Mk 5”. This should read the ‘Centurion Mk 5/1 (Aust). The reason for this distinction is an important part of 1 Armd Regt’s history. The Centurion Mk 5 was not uparmoured, nor did it incorporate a RMG or IR capability.
Rather than saying that “the unit now consists of a tank squadron and two ASLAV squadrons”, it would be more informative to state that ‘the unit is now an Armoured Cavalry Regiment comprising one tank and two reconnaissance squadrons’.
About
“The RSM-A WO Don Spinks OAM attached the Governor General approved unit citation for gallantry to the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard.” What is being attached is the Streamer for the unit citation for gallantry, not the citation itself.
“The citation is for the actions at the battles of Coral and Balmoral 50 years ago.” The actions took place in 1968, it is now 2020. The reference should state: ‘the battles of Coral and Balmoral in 1968’.
In Memoriam
The Vale page acknowledges MIDs awarded to members, but the In Memoriam page does not.
WO2 T Phillips is listed as having DOW, this should read: ‘WO2 T D Phillips MID’.
The page does not list Cpl A M Anderson MID as having DOW.
History.
The entry “Jan – May 1971: The first four months are spent mainly in providing protection parties to Engineers” does not explain the situation and is very misleading. It should read: ‘Jan-May 1971: The first four months were spent patrolling, conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations, protecting land-clearing and training newly arrived infantry battalions’.
Constitution
In respect to applications for membership, the Constitution states that “the Management Committee must conduct and complete a due diligence process on the completed application”. Having done so, the C’tee decides whether to accept or reject the application. There is no appeal available to the applicant.
This is one of the most draconian powers that a C’tee can vest in itself. There is no explanation as to what the “due diligence process” is. It could involve the acceptance of any manner of biased opinion. In the latest revise of the Constitution, the applicant has to be advised the reason for rejection (this was not the case previously). Surely, if the reason was able to be shown to be false, the applicant should have the right of appeal.
Newsletter.
Honour Roll: WO2 N Lowes did not DOW “post Vietnam”. He died within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War and his name, therefore, is inscribed of the ROH at the AWM
1 Armd Regt Theatres of Operation: 1 Armd Regt did not participate in the Japan Theatre. To show that this was a theatre of operation of its predecessor, it should be listed as: ‘Japan (1 ACS)’.
RAAC Corporation
The Corporation’s website states that:
“The Corps has its origins in the Australian Tank Corps which was formed in 1928; and
Units of the RAAC include tank regiments, reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel-carrier regiments”.
The AAC was formed in 1927 (Hopkins) and units of the RAAC comprise armoured cavalry regiments and light cavalry regiments.
22 August 2020
Defence Preparedness III
A recent article in the Indian Military Review stated that:
China’s maritime militia has been involved in several incidents of crowding islands illegally claimed by China with scant regard to the territorial integrity of its neighbours.
In the latest incident in a long string of Chinese actions to assert unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea (SCS), Chinese Coast Guard vessel sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands in April 2 this year.
During June 2020, a Chinese submarine cruised through the waters near Japan, prompting a scramble of aircraft and ships to track its furtive movements, while Chinese fighter jets and at least one bomber buzzed Taiwan’s territorial airspace almost daily.
In June 2020, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel and a speedboat chased, rammed, and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat near Lincoln Island in Vietnam’s Ho and Sa (Paracel) Archipelago.
In July, China held a five-day military exercise near Vietnam’s Paracel Islands.
These Chinese actions have led to the US and Vietnam signing a memorandum of understanding aimed at strengthening Vietnam’s fisheries management and law management capabilities, which includes US support against illegal “intimidation” of Vietnamese fishermen at sea.
How is it that there is no real debate about Defence preparedness? Is it because the major powers are regarded as having no real intent, ie. they’re simply engaged in power broking?
Seems to me that if the concept of the United Nations was not able to be brought into being, eg. an effective body with combined forces ready to uphold world peace; then the competitive nation state scenario that we’re left with, has to be considered likely to erupt at any time into quests for power and domination.
That’s not to say that diplomacy should not be Australia’s primary effort, but that we have to have a sound contingency plan (just in case).
21 August 2020
Defence Preparedness II
Image: ASPI
“Who acts first, and the extent to which the adversary’s ability to launch a counter offensive can be degraded, could be decisive.”
The above is a quote from an article by Mike Scrafton (see below for link etc).
The article attracted many comments. Mine was the only one which pointed out the need for Defence preparedness. It is copied below.
“If you were the leader of a nation and wanting to defend its people and national interests against attack, what would you do?
Most will agree that a contingency plan is essential. What is the most vital input to this … the warning time determined by your intelligence sources. Presumably pre-positioned ‘agents’ in the threat country/countries would have indicators that they would report on; as well there being information provided by satellite imagery and intelligence gathering.
As the warning time indicators dictate, forces would be deployed to locations to both interdict an attack and initiate a first strike if required.
The contingency plan will almost certainly involve the disruption of the threat nation’s command and control networks. This would already have been tested by minor and unobtrusive ‘raids’.
“…the avoidance of war should be the priority of foreign policy”. Agreed. But if diplomacy fails, the contingency plan must be there.”
Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the Minister for Defence.
———————————————————————————————————
20 August 2020
Mentioned in Despatches
The following letter is self-explanatory
Dear Minister, [The Hon Darren Chester, MP, Minister for Veterans’ Affairs]
Recognition of the Bravery of Australian Soldiers:
My tank driver received very serious head wounds in Vietnam in 1971. Despite these wounds, he endeavoured to go the aid of the rest of us in the turret of the tank. He was Mentioned in Despatches (MID or MiD) for his bravery and concern for others. He is presently endeavouring to obtain a copy of his MID Certificate. The one presented to him has faded on the wall over time and he wishes to bequeath it to his daughter.
In the course of helping him to this end, I came across DVA’s policy regarding recording MID on the Memorial plaque for a soldier who was either killed in action, or died of his wounds. In essence, the Office of Australian War Graves (OAWG) takes the view that being MID is not an award; and postnominals don’t apply as these are only relevant to the award of orders and decorations. As a result, MID is not permitted to be inscribed on OAWG Memorial plaques. This not the case with private memorials, however, and the OAWG provides helpful advice to NOK on spelling, abbreviation etc.
This seems to me to be a case of officialdom reigning over respect. If my driver had been killed, he would have been eligible for only one of two awards: the VC or MID. The Certificate (copy attached) presented to him on behalf of HM The Queen, states that it was in recognition of his “distinguished service”. He was also presented with an insignia to wear on his Vietnam medal ribbon, to designate that he had been MID.
There is no issue with respect to postnominals not including MID. It is, however, a recognised abbreviation (as the OAWG acknowledges).
Why is it not possible to include the abbreviation, MID, on the Memorial plaque of a recipient who has died of his wounds?
The OAWG maintains graves in perpetuity in recognition of the sacrifice of soldiers who have died in the service of their country. Unless you act to allow MID to be included on the Memorials of soldiers who have earned that honour, those passing such graves in the future will have no idea of the bravery of the deceased (and the fact that he/she might just have missed out on being awarded the VC).
There will be considerable opposition to making this change. Precedence shouldn’t be of concern, however, as the MID is no longer an Australian award and there are few alive who have received it (even fewer who would also qualify for an official Memorial plaque). Because a custom has been in place for many years (contributing to the lack of recognition for many deserving soldiers), doesn’t dictate that it can’t be changed for the benefit of those (and their families) going forward
In recognition of demonstrated bravery of Australian soldiers and with respect for their families, please consider introducing this means of acknowledgement on behalf of the Nation.
Yours sincerely
PS. Their Name Liveth For Evermore. I’ve attached a short piece I prepared some time ago. I think the submission above is relevant in the context of society’s role in preserving their ‘Name’.
“Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:
“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her”.
“Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore” does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world that these young men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
19 August 2020
Our Defence Preparedness
Credit: The review suggests the future of warfare won’t involve tanks and traditional weapons, but will be fought online. (ABC News)
Part 1:
A landmark report, released under Freedom of Information laws, is the Department of Defence’s first internal reassessment of war preparedness since the Vietnam era
The report finds Australia is unprepared for an increasingly likely cyber war
The review warned last June that a pandemic would emerge from Asia within a decade
An extract is copied below:
The year is 2022 and ticketing for the football grand final goes down. Fans don’t know it yet, but this is an act of cyber sabotage designed to distract Australia from a brewing regional war.
With the reason for the ticketing failure still unknown, confusion spreads as another wave of cyber attacks disrupts imports of Australia’s crucial supplies, reviving mass panic over medical shortages during the COVID-19 outbreak.
The supplies that keep our essential services running — such as medicines, fuel and components for power grids — slow to a trickle as a foreign enemy sabotages vulnerable importers.
This is a different kind of invisible enemy from the coronavirus. This time, the public doesn’t know why Australia has been thrown into chaos.
A foreign power is covering its tracks in a stealth cyberwar aimed at eroding faith in the Australian Government while the adversary achieves military objectives in the region.
This scenario — which might read like a TV plotline — was relied upon by a top-secret Department of Defence review, obtained by the ABC, which last year concluded the nation was unprepared despite facing the highest threat of war or economic crisis since the 1950s.
“These kinds of attacks are plausible because they could happen tomorrow,” says Professor Rory Medcalf, whose influential National Security College at the Australian National University devised the scenario for the Defence review.
“When we think about national security, we often think about submarines or warships or the military, but it’s quite plausible that the conflicts of the future will begin well before violence is inflicted and may even end before a shot is fired.”
Part 2: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI’s) publication, ‘The Strategist’, of 11 August included an article on our preparedness to deal with a resurgent terrorism threat. I have confidence that the ADF hasn’t taken its ‘eye off the ball’, but what about elsewhere? An extract is copied below:
“In conversation with journalist Stan Grant as part of ASPI’s ‘Strategic Vision 2020’ conference series, Sir John Scarlett, a former head of MI6, and Duncan Lewis, former head of ASIO, ran through the critical issues facing allied intelligence agencies.
Terrorism, long a preoccupation of intelligence agencies, has been pushed off the front page by Covid and climate change. But it will come roaring back, warns Scarlett. Even though the Islamic State group has been defeated territorially, roughly 18,000 foreign fighters are still active, and the power of IS ideology remains, spreading across Africa and beyond. ‘The idea is infectious’, adds Lewis. ‘It’s a bit like Covid.’
Terror groups of all kinds, including those on the far right, have been quick to take advantage of the fact that more people are online and socially isolated due to the pandemic. Combined with economic uncertainty, these conditions create a perfect climate for online recruitment and radicalisation. ‘The seeds for those things to prosper are in the ground now in our communities and we need to be very, very careful of it’, says Lewis.”
An album of 47 photos of the 2/6 Armd Regt was recently posted on the RAAC Facebook page. I commented to say:
“Great photos. Interestingly, the title 2/6 Armd Regt was so designated when the unit was formed (as part of 1st Armoured Brigade), so as to maintain links with 6 Light Horse Regt [NSW]. It’s disappointing to see these linkages disappearing. One might hope that the RAAC today might look at how they might be retained into the future.”
Someone else followed up to say: “I agree. Units like 6 NSWMR and 7/21 AH should have never been allowed to be lost to the RAAC”.
I’d said “6th LH Regt”, and he’s said “6NSWMR”. What’s going on?
It turns out that the 6th NSW Mounted Rifles’ lineage goes back to the 6th Light Horse Regiment (NSW Mounted Rifles). An Internet forum adds some info:“In 1949, the Regiment was reformed from the 6th Motor Regiment (New South Wales Mounted Rifles) to become the 6th New South Wales Mounted Rifles and had depots in Western New South Wales.
Effective 1st July 1956, the regiment was transferred from the RAAC to the Royal Australian Infantry Corps and become an Infantry Battalion. It became part of the Royal New South Wales Regiment as part of the Army’s restructure around 1960 and was eventually disbanded soon after.”
He also mentioned 17/21AH … on checking with Google, the Australian Light Horse Association provides the information under.
7th/21st Australian Horse
After World War Two, Citizen Force training was resumed in 1948. The 7th/21st Reconnaissance Regiment (Australian Horse) was raised as a unit of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps.
The principal equipment was Staghound armoured cars and Canadian scout cars. In 1949, the designation was altered to 7th/21st Australian Horse.
National Service (NS) was introduced in Australia in 1951. This led to the strength of the Regiment being considerably increased. In [that year] the role of the Regiment was changed from reconnaissance to anti-tank defence. Then, in 1956, there was a major re-organization and thenceforth the unit was raised only in and around Wagga Wagga. It became an Anti-Tank Regiment, RAAC and was still part of 2nd Division. Its primary equipment was changed from armoured and scout cars to 6-pr anti-tank guns towed by 1-ton trucks. As from 14th September 1956, 7th/21st Australian Horse was disbanded.
I responded on the RAAC Facebook page to say:
“Thank you for mentioning 6 NSWMR and 17/21 AH … I’ve found it very interesting in reading up about these units. Wouldn’t it great if there was an RAAC Heritage website/forum to keep the Heritage alive? Something for the RAAC Corporation perhaps?”
17 August 2020
The RAAC Heritage
In the Blog posts on 9 and 10 August 2020 (‘Our Forebears’ and ‘Was 2/9 Div Cav Regt Part of the AAC?’), I stated that:
“The 2/8 Div Cav Regt was raised in 1940. Soon after, with 2/8 Div going to Malaya, it became the 2/9 Div Cav Regt. At this time, crews were still members of the AASC.”
“The Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) came into being on 9 July 1941; prompted by the decision to raise the 1st Armoured Division. Although they did not form part of 1 Armd Div, divisional cavalry regiments then became part of the AAC.”
I made two errors. These were:
(i) Members of the div cav regts were NOT members of the Service Corps at any time (unlike tank crews); and
(ii) The div cav regts did NOT become part of the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) when it was formed.
Thankfully, Bruce Scott was aware of something amiss and raised this with Armouredadvocates. Subsequent enquiries led to the identification of the errors above.
The question then becomes: what was the status of those members of the div cav regts operating Bren gun carriers, Vickers Light and Crusader tanks? These units are part of the RAAC heritage and one would think that the answer would be well known. But not so.
With the help of the Corps Historian (Maj John Baines), the answer was that the div cav regts were classed as being part of the Australian Light Horse (ALH).
It’s recorded that when the AAC was formed, its precedence followed that of the ALH. When was the ALH removed from the ORBAT?
All I can say at this point is ‘not before 1947’. My belief is that this occurred when the RAAC came into being in 1948 … but this is still being looked into.
Wikipedia states: As a result of the increasing mechanisation of the Army, the Armoured Corps absorbed the Australian Light Horse, Australia’s Cavalry of World War One fame, on 8 May 1942. If this was the case, why did the ALH remain on the ORBAT? A question still to be answered. Maybe Wikipedia and other references will need to be corrected.
Just goes to show that you can’t take anything for granted.
————————————————————————————————-
16 August 2020
Blowing His Own Trumpet (Not For the First Time)
It’s often said that it’s only when we’re residents of a cemetery, that we’re all equal.
On 12 August 2020 I reposted the Blog from 7 July 2015 about the decision of the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation not to advocate in support of the submission for recognition of supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. Interestingly, this attracted more readers than normal. (Word of mouth seems to apply when some posts are of more interest than others.)
Yesterday, the 1AR Assn circulated a notice, seemingly drafted by the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation. It quoted all the congratulations afforded to him for advocating in favour of the VC award to Teddy Sheean, including the following:
“It is not often you get a Prime Minister to change his mind despite advice to the contrary from his Defence Minister and the Chief of Defence, but you did it.” (WOW!!)
The notice prompted me to contact the person who organised a 25,000 strong petition to the Government in support of the award being made. Guess what … when I congratulated him, he was gracious enough the say: “It wasn’t only me, there were many others who voiced their support”. These included those who wrote letters to newspaper editors, MPs and the CDF, radio hosts who conducted interviews (including with Keith Payne VC), social media campaigns etc.
This was all to convince the Govt to reconsider their decision not to support the independent Tribunal’s recommendation that the award should be made. (The main justification for the Govt’s position was that no new evidence had been found.) The weight of public opinion compelled the PM to appoint another panel to review the matter. The new Panel (chaired by Brendan Nelson, former AWM Director) went looking for ‘new evidence’ and found it in Japanese archives from WWII. Well done, Dr Nelson and team!
But … we now know that none of the above is true.
It was actually the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who got the PM to change his mind!
—————————————————————————————-
15 August 2020
Strategic Defence Policy
Image: Defence and Strategic Studies, ANU
The title of an article published by Mike Scrafton, a former adviser to the minister for defence is: ‘Australian strategic policy: why we need a robust public debate’. (See link below)
I preceded my comment (below) with a quote from the article:
“While strategic circumstances can shift relatively quickly, as the 2020 Strategic Update argues, the procurement of the assets that make up the force structure takes decades. The logical connection between the judgements about anticipated threats and the decisions to acquire capability are therefore tenuous.”
In the dark ages when I was in the military, we referred to ‘warning times’ and ‘lead times’. These were obviously inter-related … ie. if the ‘lead time’ exceeded the ‘warning time’, we were in trouble. Of course, the ‘lead time’ is not only the time to acquire equipment, but also the time to train personnel to crew it and organisations to employ it.
I worry that the time to develop necessary skills (both individual and collective) is forgotten … the idea being that as soon as the equipment arrives, forces can be deployed. Teaching personnel how to operate equipment is one thing, training forces to deploy it effectively is something else altogether.
The Reserve forces used to provide a means by which these tactical skills could be maintained as an expansion base, however, this element of our defence preparedness seems to have dropped off the radar.
The following are extracts from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s publication of 11 August.
I have confidence that the ADF hasn’t taken its ‘eye off the ball’, but what about elsewhere?
“In conversation with journalist Stan Grant as part of ASPI’s ‘Strategic Vision 2020’ conference series, Sir John Scarlett, a former head of MI6, and Duncan Lewis, former head of ASIO, ran through the critical issues facing allied intelligence agencies.
Terrorism, long a preoccupation of intelligence agencies, has been pushed off the front page by Covid and climate change. But it will come roaring back, warns Scarlett. Even though the Islamic State group has been defeated territorially, roughly 18,000 foreign fighters are still active, and the power of IS ideology remains, spreading across Africa and beyond. ‘The idea is infectious’, adds Lewis. ‘It’s a bit like Covid.’
Terror groups of all kinds, including those on the far right, have been quick to take advantage of the fact that more people are online and socially isolated due to the pandemic. Combined with economic uncertainty, these conditions create a perfect climate for online recruitment and radicalisation. ‘The seeds for those things to prosper are in the ground now in our communities and we need to be very, very careful of it’, says Lewis.”
One only has to Google: Covid (plus) Terrorism to see the number of different agencies expressing concerns similar to those above. The question has to be asked: Will the Covid pandemic enable terrorist groups to multiply and become stronger?
13 August 2020
The AWM Expansion
Image: Defence.news
The following is a worthwhile article: file:///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/4YU00UYK/1828-Piggott-AWM-EPBC-submission%20(1).pdf
‘Who is the Memorial for now?’ the author (Michael Piggott) asks and goes on to state:
The short answer is and should be “all Australians”. A slightly longer answer would add “including those who have a family connection to a name on the Roll of Honour”. Not anymore. Now, apparently, the AWM is essentially, primarily, for a much narrower section of the community. In recent decades, the AWM Council and senior management have signaled to current and former members of the ADF that, first and foremost, it is for them.
A reader states that: “I agree with Michael Piggott except for the ‘in recent decades’ part of the ADF focus statement – I worked at the AWM from 1994 to 2013 and that wasn’t my experience then. However, there has now been a noticeable shift. Management and Council have definitely gone down a strange path – the Memorial is less because of this extreme ADF focus and at risk from the gross overdevelopment they believe they need to support this position. The Memorial has connections for all of us but I can’t help feeling my connection, which doesn’t include service in the ADF, has somehow become less worthy there.
For my part, I suggested that:
“The fundamental question is whether or not the AWM can honour the recent active service of ADF members, without detracting from the honour afforded to their forebears, ie. ‘live within means’ or expand? If expansion is the choice made, the question becomes: how should this be done?
The underlying question is: who is the AWM for? Is it for ‘all Australians’, or all just ‘all veterans’? It would seem self-obvious that the AWM is for all Australians, ie. veterans, their families, and citizens as a whole. Where does this leave us? Is an expansion warranted? If so, how should it be done? Seems to me that the two questions, and therefore the arguments related to the AWM expansion, have become entwined. I would like to see the debate as a more ‘focused’ one”.
—————————————————————————————————–
12 August 2020
After Thought: Operation Hammersley
I came across armouredadvocates ‘Archives’ by accident (see link at end). I haven’t had the chance to investigate this at all as yet, but thought the Blog post from 7 July 2015 that had suddenly ‘popped up’, worthy of copying below. It should be noted that while the President 1AR Assn subsequently stepped down from this position (he is still a Director of the RAAC Corporation), he did not advocate to have the submission supported by the RAAC Corporation.
Extension of Eligibility of the CGWP Awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley
The RAAC Corporation’s Position and the Consequences. As it is understood, President 1 AR Assn supports the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s view that the Corporation cannot take the lead re the CGWP Submission, because the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation (the Submission seeks to have those who provided support for 1AR, i.e. 3 Cav and RAE, acknowledged). The 1AR Assn, therefore, has to advocate the award alone. If unsuccessful, the RAAC Corporation might then offer support.
What’s this mean in terms of the Submission? The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAT), where the real power lies in terms of approving the Submission, can only consider it after Defence Honours and Awards (DHA) have ‘knocked it back’. So, 1 AR Assn submits to DHA, it is knocked back (as expected) and is resubmitted to DHAT. If it is knocked back, the new submission, supported by the RAAC Corporation, is submitted to DHA and then, finally, DHAT. The whole process has been made twice as complicated as it need be, with consequential lessening of its chances of approval (compared with a Submission which is supported by the RAAC Corporation right from the start).
The Lack of Moral Justification for This Position. Part of the RAAC Corporation’s Constitution refers to fostering the interests of the RAAC. The members of 3 Cav Regt who served in Vietnam did so as part of the RAAC. Some are members of the 3 and 4 Cav Regt Association (a member of the RAAC Corporation), some are members of the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association (not a member of the RAAC Corporation), while others are not members of either Association. How petty can we be as former members of the RAAC, to deny to those who fought with 3 Cav Regt during Operation Hammersley,the best opportunity to achieve the recognition that is due to them? Apart from anything else, recognition for them, is recognition for the RAAC. Isn’t this what the RAAC Corporation stands for??
Reason for 1 AR Assn’s Acceptance of the Position.Whenever a Director of a Corporation is also the President of one of the Corporation’s own member Associations, there is likely to be a conflict of interest. By simply agreeing to the position of the Corporation Chairman, 1 AR Assn is not only a party to denying due recognition of those who served with 3 Cav Regt, but also denying its own members the best chance of due recognition of their gallant efforts.
What Should be Done. The President of the 1AR Assn should step down from his Directorship of the RAAC Corporation and strongly advocate the justification for the RAAC Corporation to support the Submission (noting in doing so that there is minimal work involved … the Submission is complete, it only needs to be submitted.)
I’m reminded that a number of people sign off emails with the words “Yours in Armour”, how hollow this sounds in light of the above..
Google: armoured advocates ARCHIVES: July 2015 – WordPress.com The archive comes up as a link to a file on the bottom.
The following post relates to just how easy it is to take things for granted, ie. not wonder why things are as they are. An example from an earlier blog is the story as to why the RAAC has red and gold as the colours of its tactical signs. (When you look into the background, the story is very interesting.)
As mentioned on 6 August, one of the responses I received to my ‘What’s Wrong With The RAAC Family?’ post was the following: “We do not wish to duplicate or ‘lobby’, only to further esprit de corps.”
Another comment was that “It seems to me that it [esprit de corps] has become an easy phrase, that rolls off the tongue very easily, and seems to mean something of the ‘spirit’ that effects people in one way or another.[But] I often cogitate on whether or not most people who use it, know or understand the true meaning …”.
So, what is meant when the association concerned says it wants to further ‘esprit de corps’?
Esprit de Corps is generally defined along the lines of the common spirit existing in the members of a group and inspiring enthusiasm, devotion, and strong regard for the honour of the group.
The first recorded use of the term was in 1780 with a French origin, literally ‘spirit of the body’.
The term became much more widely known when incorporated by Henri Fayol (1841-1925) as one of his fourteen principles of management, ie. ‘striving for the involvement and unity of the employees. Managers are responsible for the development of morale in the workplace; individually and in the area of communication. Esprit de corps contributes to the development of the culture and creates an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding’.
Although it’s included in the above, it wasn’t until I read another source which made it clear that Fayol emphasized the need for teamwork and the importance of communication in obtaining it.
The importance of communication! How insightful is this! The lack of communication has been the most significant failing affecting ESOs over recent years. I wonder if the statement that we ‘only want to further esprit de corps’, includes the intention to improve communication between committees and members, ie. explain the reasons behind intentions in advance and seek comments and input before decisions are made … or is it the term being used as a euphemism for camaraderie?
As an aside; when I left the Army, I went for a job interview and was asked how I could have any knowledge of industrial democracy having been in the Army. I explained (to some surprise) that the Army was the most democratic organisation of all … those participating in activities were briefed beforehand and their views requested; during the activity they were coached as to how to gain the best outcome, and, at the end, they were debriefed on how things had gone so that lessons could be learnt for the future. I got the job. (Maybe I’m an idealist.)
————————————————————————————–
10 August 2020
Was the 2/9 Div Cav (Cmdo) Regt Part of the AAC?
Image: Paul Handel
Following from yesterday …
The Australian Tank Corps dates from 1927. In 1932, however, it was realised that the Defence Act didn’t allow for a Corps of this type. So it was that AFV crews, such as there were, became part of the Australian Army Service Corps (AASC).
When 2/6 Div left for the ME in 1940, it was accompanied by a reconnaissance regiment to be equipped with machine gun [‘Bren gun’] carriers, and Vickers Light tanks. The name was later changed to 2/6 Div Cav Regt.
The 2/8 Div Cav Regt was raised in 1940. Soon after, with 2/8 Div going to Malaya, it became the 2/9 Div Cav Regt. At this time, crews were still members of the AASC. The unit saw action in the ME, arriving in March 1941. In the lead up to El Alamein, the Regt was allocated Crusader tanks.
The Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) came into being on 9 July 1941; prompted by the decision to raise the 1st Armoured Division. Although they did not form part of 1 Armd Div, divisional cavalry regiments then became part of the AAC.
On return from the ME, divisional cavalry regiments changed roles to become commando regiments for service in New Guinea and Borneo.
As organiser of the C Sqn, 1 Armd Regt reunion dinner next year (to be held in conjunction with the National Commemoration for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord) I have contact with many former members of the tank squadron.
Recently I was asked if it was possible for a friend of someone in the Squadron to attend. There was no question about this being ok … this friend had served on Operation Overlord as a mini-team member with 3 Cav. Both 3 Cav and engineers have been invited. But the last bit of info was significant. The fathers of both the crewman and the sapper served together in the 2/9 Cavalry (Commando) Regiment in the ME during WWII.
Re the former: “he was a sergeant on a Bren gun carrier. It was Dad who told me to go to Armoured if possible. One of the best things he ever advised me to do”.
Wouldn’t it have been great to have this person as a special guest at the dinner; a representative of our parents’ generation and honoured accordingly? Sadly, as was to be expected, he’s passed on.
It’s things like this which remind us our history and heritage. For example, was the 2/9 Cav Regt a unit of the Australian Armoured Corps? One would’ve thought so, but it seems to me that this wasn’t necessarily so. (There is some research to be done here to verify one way or the other …more to follow.)
I was reminded by the above that I was at the dedication of the 2nd/10th Armd Regt plaque at the AWM a few years ago. The daughter of Sir Robert Menzies was there and it turned out that her brother, Kenneth, was in the Regt and Dame Pattie used to be very active in terms of organising functions and family support. (This brought to my attention the story of Sir Robert’s family, which some readers might wish to look into.)
—————————————————————————————
8 August 2020
Where Do Women Feature in the RAAC ‘Family’?
Following from yesterday ….
I don’t think I’m racist or sexist, but …
I met a female tank troop leader at 1 Armd Regt in 2012. She seemed to me to be a very capable officer.
Why is it that we don’t see any women in advisory positions as far as our RAAC family is concerned?
Is it only because no female members of the Corps are yet to reach senior rank? Of course, this doesn’t solely refer to officer ‘rank’; nor does it solely refer to unit associations.
Should director/committee/advisory positions be confined to those who have served in the RAAC?
Is it possible that someone with a different skill set could inform and advise us for the benefit of the RAAC family as a whole?
Is it right that committees are only made up of those with membership qualifications? Would it not provide a less ‘inbred’ outlook if those with outside qualifications and experience were to be involved.
It’s interesting to see that DVA have recently appointed a number of members to a council in an advisory capacity; they aren’t only there to be asked questions, but to offer advice as they see fit.
The press release from the Veterans’ Affairs Minister a couple of days ago stated:
“THE voices of women who have served in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and family members of ADF personnel will be better heard with nine new members appointed in advisory roles to support the important work of the Council for Women and Families United by Defence Service.
The 14 current members of the Council will continue to provide invaluable insight and advice going forward, but with the new members providing additional expertise, experience and skills in ensuring the Council is fully informed and able to provide effect and timely advice to Government. The advisors will also participate in consultation and communication with veterans and their families. Chair of the Council Ms Gabrielle Costigan MBE said the Council is delighted that these nine amazing Australians have joined as Advisors.”
So, the Council will be better informed as a result of having advisory members appointed who can provide “additional expertise, experience and skill”.
One can be excused for thinking that this is what advisory members do, ie. contribute advice to the Council based on their experience … which, after all, is presumably why they were selected.
The RAAC Corporation has an Advisory Board:
“The Advisory Board shall be appointed by the Council and shall provide advice and guidance when sought by the Council. The Council will direct the Advisory Board’s advocacy efforts through a process of consultation and consensus with regard to what deserves the attention of its members based on what is in the best interests of the Corporation.”
Unlike the DVA Council arrangements above, Advisory Board members can’t simply make suggestions to the RAAC Corporation Council, they HAVE to be asked. Any efforts the members might suggest, will be DIRECTED by the Council.
So, the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board is mute until asked for guidance by the RAAC Corporation Council. Why on earth would such restrictions be set in concrete by a corporation’s constitution?
It would seem that the presence of an Advisory Board might add some credence to the Corporation as a whole. But the members aren’t there to offer advice and make suggestions (as one might think). It follows that they’re mere puppets (unlike the women appointed in advisory roles above).
It would seem that those who drafted the RAAC Corporation Constitution sought to enshrine the place of those in power (ie. one couldn’t have someone in an advisory position making suggestions which were ‘different’ from the accepted thinking). Have them on the letterhead, but keep them in their place. Sad really.
————————————————————————————————-
6 August 2020
What is Wrong With the RAAC Family? 3
Image: Kingscorporal.com.au
Following on from yesterday; as expected, my post on 2 August upset some people. Included in comments received were:
[Our aim is to] “to keep in touch with each other, discuss current and old affairs and crack a joke or two!”
“We leave the welfare of our members to individuals and other organisations!”
“We do not wish to duplicate or ‘lobby’, only to further esprit de corps.”
Previously, an Association of which I used to be a member, took the view that their aim was simply to facilitate opportunities to swap stories and have a beer or two. Anyone in need of assistance in any form, was directed to the RSL.
But, surely, it’s not all about ‘Fellowship’? Or is it?
If this is the view of unit associations, it follows that the RAAC’s senior leadership group will also take this line.
Other comments which might help to explain this were:
“In a now aging group of Vietnam veterans, many suffer old wounds, injuries and illness related to old age, either theirs or their partners’. It is now about 50-60 years since Coral/Balmoral and Binh Ba etc, many Veterans are of the opinion that they have ‘done their bit’; – “… someone else can do the lifting now.”
“For the main part they are there for the fellowship (the older I get the better I was) and the dinner or piss-up that follows. The heavy lifting is someone else’s job.”
I can understand … but I don’t have to agree. I will continue to try and encourage veterans to contribute to both the betterment of their ‘mates’ and those serving today.
———————————————————————————————–
5 August 2020
What is Wrong With the RAAC Family? 2
Image: diggerhistory
Following on from 2 August 2020, I had this reply:
“Bruce I totally agree with your term status quo because that is exactly what 3 Cav did on return to Australia. For example the ammunition racks were removed because they were deemed to be an illegal modification to the APC. No thought was given to where ammunition was to be stored, just simply remove the racks. The same illegal modification term was applied to the hammock bar strung between the ramp locks, in-spite of the fact that in 6 years they had caused no damage to the ramp or it’s operation. There was a series of items like these deemed to be illegal modifications regardless of the fact that the APC was a more functional vehicle with them in place.
As far as stress related issues are concerned the SOP covering this area is in favour of the veteran and for the first time DVA had to try & suggest that infantry, armour etc did not serve in stressful situations.
However with the RMA being the sole determining body, orthopedic injuries to areas such as back & neck became difficult because all medical papers covering this area were written about industrial accidents or motor vehicle accidents and no one in the medical profession stepped up to thoroughly research the area of orthopedic damage caused by military operations or service. During my 15 years of voluntary advocacy the lack of a “measuring stick” caused untold problems. Myself and a few others were instrumental in having “multiple minor trauma” accepted but only on a case by case basis.The RMA has certainly relied on a lack of “sound medical scientific evidence” in their determination of orthopedic SOPs.
I agree with your view point that Armour has not provided a single united voice which has not helped our veterans. By comparison, infantry, through the RAR Association have done a much better job. Plus they have canvassed advocates to create a data base of claims both accepted & rejected with particular emphasis on recording the reason for each decision. (Here I should point out that this is the situation here and I am not sure if this was done Australia wide.) In summary, we have certainly not helped ourselves at all, and the lack of a single united voice has been to our detriment.”
My response:
Someone just mentioned to me that we’re all either ‘leaners’ or ‘lifters’. I’d certainly place you among the latter. I get so frustrated when there is an almost total focus on fellowship. It is essential to our well-being, but in my view shouldn’t be to the exclusion of everything else, ie. adding value to the way things are done today, as a result of our learnt experiences. The Chief Health Officer for DVA was with Defence when I came across a cluster of former RAAC members who had experienced ‘acoustic neuromas’ .
This was when I was doing research for my book and I felt that I had no choice but to write to the CA. He passed the letter to Defence Health and Safety, who initiated an investigation. One of the causes of this type of tumour is thought to be high powered radio transmissions and I was concerned that some AFV crew positions might have reflective surfaces which would increase the risk. The outcome was that, taken as a whole, those in the Army were not at increased risk compared to the general population. But when AFV crewmen were considered as a separate group, they were twice as likely to suffer such a tumour. The good news is that international standards now apply in relation to AFV crewmen and exposure to RF radiation. AFV design has to meet these standards.
In my response to DVA’s recent request for input, I suggested that it could be great if there was a support function within their organisation. At the moment they solely administer the programs that they deliver. I quoted the case of my tank driver trying to get a copy of his mid certificate. The reason that his initial request went off the rails was the person responding to his request, thought that it was a trade certificate and therefore should be on his file held by Defence records. After dealing with Defence Honours and Awards and the British Defence Liaison Staff, the request is now with Government House. Presently, DVA assume that ESOs provide veterans with such support. Of course, this is not always the case. I suggested to DVA that veterans deserve to have a source of advice that they could go to with respect to difficulties that they are having in connection with all matters arising from their ADF service. I guess that I’m an idealist.”
————————————————————————————————-
4 August 2020
The Tank of the Future II
Image: Streamcommunity,com
Following on from yesterday, it is known that the US Army is examining the possibility of the ‘optionally manned tank’, ie. an AFV which could operate either with a crew or as an autonomous unit. Speaking of which, the acronym AAAS, might not be well known: Abundant, Affordable, and Autonomous Systems.
The concept of the battlefield being dominated by AAAS, is not as extreme as it sounds. The impetus as far as this is concerned, is likely to be the development of active (and relatively lightweight) protection systems. Without the burden of armour, AAAS will be able to revolutionise warfare.
The question arises: ‘Could autonomous systems hold rank?’.
The following extract is from an article in The Cove by Major Andy Bell, Royal Logistics Corps
“Imagine … It is 2050. After a quarter century of successful service, Boxer is being phased out. Its replacement: the autonomous infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). The Section Command variant carries 8 dismounts; individual headsets connect each soldier to the command ‘brain’, which is connected to the company, battlegroup and brigade information networks. Situational updates are continuously received and assessed, the plan amended to reflect the latest information and personalised orders issued simultaneously to each soldier in the section immediately before the engagement. When the section dismounts, the commander autonomously manoeuvres, providing fire support to ‘his’ soldiers from the turret-mounted cannon, and using visual, thermal and acoustic sensors to lead the soldiers onto the objective. The autonomous IFV holds the rank of Corporal …”.
The recent Government announcement re future defence planning included reference to “Options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life” and “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks”.
(See Blog post for 8 July 2020 and subsequent.)
This is exactly the foresight that’s to be expected of our Defence staff. The US is looking at exactly the same thing (and have been for many years). The Abrams tank is great today and can be improved to meet the needs of tomorrow. But what about the day after and the day after that? What will the replacement for the Abrams look like?
The answer to that has to start with the role that the tank fulfills on the battlefield. Is it possible that future wars will not involve infantry? There will be all sorts of autonomous machines, but will any be able to take the place of a soldier? The answer is certainly ‘no’ in the timeframe under consideration. It follows that there will be a need to provide direct fire support, aka the tank.
It also follows that the Abrams replacement may not be anything like the Abrams. It will be mobile, but conceivably a hovercraft to reduce the limitations imposed by terrain. It will be protected, but possibly not by armour but by an active force shield. Its weapon might be a laser, but could also be a ‘rail-gun’. (I know the latter inside out.) Crew are likely to be minimal.
All these aspects are open to technological development. What does the final solution have to be capable of? Lethality … survivability … mobility: under all extremes of climate and terrain. Sounds a bit like a tank.
————————————————————————————————–
2 August 2020
What is Wrong With the RAAC Family?
Why is it that we, the RAAC Family, are so ‘divided’? Why is it that we can’t support each other? Where does the problem lie?
From my perspective … the problem is that there is no Leader prepared to take up the issues and unite the, dare I say it … ‘family factions’, for the benefit of us all.
Why is this so? Because we don’t care enough!
I’m not saying that I care any more, or any less, than anyone else.
But if the truth be known … as a ‘Whole’, we don’t give a collective ‘damn’.
We tend to just wander along, picking up the titbits thrown to us along the way.
What’s the problem with this?
Nothing really. Everybody goes home at night to a square meal. What’s more to want?
Think about it … is the ‘status quo’ all there is?
The AWM recently asked for input into ways in which its exhibits are to be displayed in the future … can we collectively respond re AFV related items? No … because ‘we’re not a lobby group!’.
Like all service personnel, a number of former and serving members of the RAAC suffer mental illness … are there specific issues which relate to service as members of AFV crews, and, if so, should these be made known to medical authorities involved in making assessments? No … ‘it’s not our responsibility’!
Why does our RAAC family not wish to advance such matters (and there are many more)?
Truthfully? Because the leadership group doesn’t care.
So, it would seem that we’re the victims of our own ‘success’! We have associations and a hierarchy that have committees, hold AGMs and conduct reunions. What more is there to want? It would appear that none of us would want to upset the ‘status quo’.
Sadly, the same attitude applied during Vietnam. Nobody amended the training to never unload a 20pdr misfire; nobody took action to obtain fire-retardant ‘hot weather’ reinforced tank suits; nobody amended the 9mm pistol drill used for Puckapunyal guard parades; nobody removed the .50cal solenoid and replaced the WP ammo with ball; the inf/tank telephone was removed, nobody thought to waterproof it; nobody thought that the constant following of defile drills etc, would lead to the enemy taking advantage; nobody thought that after three drivers were wounded by shrapnel, that they should be closed down prior to an assault and be better protected in case of ambush … and the list goes on.
This is what happens when the ‘status quo’ applies. This is the situation today.
How to change it? It’s a bit like pushing a tank uphill against the force of apathy.
————————————————————————————————
1 August 2020
That Which is [Supposedly] Akin to the Tank or the Aeroplane in Revolutionising Land Warfare …
The claim of a revolutionary new capability was made by Dr. Albert Palazzo, Director of War Studies in the Australian Army Research Centre, when describing the proposed procurement under LAND 8113 (Long Range Rocket and Missile System Fires). See Blog post for 30 July re A2/AD.
So, what is this capability exactly?
The latest issue of the Defence Technology Review encapsulates the three phases of the Project:
Phase 1: The acquisition of a battery of long range rocket artillery and missile system over the next three to five years. The battery is likely to comprise six launcher vehicles (trucks).
I mentioned on previous Blog posts that I was confused by the statement by Minister for Defence: “Long-range strike capabilities would enable the ADF to threaten potential enemy forces and infrastructure from greater distances. ‘Let me be clear, though, the government is not planning to invest in intercontinental ballistic missiles’, Reynolds said. ‘We are focused on the protection of our deployed forces from ballistic missile threats, rather than the protection of the Australian continent.”
Initially I thought this apparent contradiction was explained by the long range strike capability being related to RAN and RAAF assets. Then we came across LAND 8113.
It seems to me now that the explanation is that Australia is not acquiring a long range strike capability in order to engage threat nations from Australia (ie. intercontinental missiles). The capability will be used to defend the Australian continent in support of operations if need be; it will also be used in support of Army operations conducted offshore.
———————————————————————————————-
31 July 2020
“Ask Not What We Can Do For You …”.
“The Royal Australian Armoured Corps Association is for all those who are still serving or who have served in ARMOUR. This is your opportunity to enjoy the advantages of RAACA membership and continue your association in the spirit of ARMOUR.”
Purposes of the RAAC (NSW) include:
To perpetuate the bond of comradeship gained through military service between the members of the Association,
To foster the heritage of the Corps, and of units of the Corps,
To represent the interests of serving, and former serving members of the Corps and their families.
I’ve been a member of the RAACA (NSW Branch) for many years … never asked for anything, often contributed articles for the newsletter. The following email explains why I’ve now resigned:
“I’m looking at a couple of expenses associated with DVA’s National Commemoration (50th Anniversary) of Operation Overlord next year: a wreath for the Last Post Ceremony on 6 June 2021 ($200) and printing of name tags and menus for the dinner ($200). These costs are specifically provided for in terms of reimbursement by DVA (see below). Catch is … only an incorporated association can apply.
I’m a member of the RAACA (NSW) and asked if I could apply through them. Sadly, they declined (‘Not approved!’ … no reason why, no offer of alternative support). Would it be possible for you to ask if … would be happy to ‘sponsor’ an application to this end? There is absolutely no risk of any untoward mismanagement; the usage would be specified in the application and payment only made against receipts for the items so specified. I would prepare the application for consideration by yourself and others involved in approval.”
An application might have to be made to the Minister. It’s all about ‘due process’ in doing the right thing … something I’m pursuing in trying to get a copy of a mid certificate for my tank driver.
———————————————————————————————————–
Saluting Their Service Commemorative Grants Program: Grant Opportunity Guidelines (1 April 2020)
Commemorative events for significant anniversaries of wars, conflicts or peace operations (a significant anniversary is defined as ending in a 5 or 0).
5.2 Eligible expenditure
Publishing, printing and/or editing costs (e.g. advertising, printing of commemorative booklets or orders of service and copying fees)
Purchase of eligible materials (e.g. CCTV, wreaths, unit banners, solar audio posts and lighting) Note: Maximum cost of wreaths must not exceed $500
—————————————————————————————————–
30 July 2020
LAND 8113 (Army’s A2/AD)
Image: AARC
What is A2/AD? Wikipedia advises that Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) is a device or a strategy used to prevent an adversary from occupying or traversing an area of land, sea or air. The specific method used does not have to be totally effective in preventing passage (and sometimes is not) as long as it is sufficient to severely restrict, slow down, or endanger the opponent.
The Australian Army Research Centre (AARC) describes Project LAND 8113 (Long Range Fires) as a momentousacquisition program for the Australian Army … one which will “revolutionise the Army’s way of war, as well as the land force’s place in the strategic defence of the nation; its effect on defence capability will be transformative” and has the ability to change the character of war which “will likely rank with the introduction of the airplane and the tank”.
Extracts from an article by Dr. Albert Palazzo, Director of War Studies in the Australian Army Research Centre, include:
“Australia’s ability to dominate a defensive zone several thousand kilometres deep would also reduce the amount of territory that the INDOPACOM would have to secure, allowing the United States to concentrate its assets and attention elsewhere. A more capable Australia can only be seen as a benefit to the United States and the well-being of the Alliance.
Through Land 8113 the ADF will progressively acquire a land-based long-range strike capability, allowing it to create a killing zone throughout the approaches to its territory. This offers Australia the opportunity to create an independent deterrence capability across all domains”.
“In 2016, Major General MacLaughlan [sic] who was then Head of Modernisation and Strategic Planning Army, used similar language. He highlighted that a future Army concept will propose that adding a land-based A2AD envelope to military operations in the maritime environment, making any adversary’s challenge significantly greater as we attack air and maritime systems from the land. His successor, Major General Toohey, also highlighted that the Army will be able to create dilemmas for adversaries through cross-domain engagement in a speech to RUSI in June 2019.”
The Blog on 19 July quoted the Minister for Defence: “Long-range strike capabilities would enable the ADF to threaten potential enemy forces and infrastructure from greater distances. ‘Let me be clear, though, the government is not planning to invest in intercontinental ballistic missiles’, Reynolds said. ‘We are focused on the protection of our deployed forces from ballistic missile threats, rather than the protection of the Australian continent.” (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/that-future-is-now-defence-minister-explains-strategic-update/)
I mentioned at the time that I was confused. I am even more so now. We are acquiring a land based A2/AD capability that is not to be used in the protection of “the Australian Continent”. How is it to be used? An Anti Access/Area Denial weapon system which will revolutionise warfare as we know it … but not be used in the defence of Australia itself?
What’s going on … who’s misleading who?
————————————————————————————————
29 July 2020
Around the ‘Traps’
Photo: Britishbadgeforum.com
Facebook provides a means of keeping up to date with ‘goings on’ in the RAAC. Somewhat surprisingly, given the potential for unit PR and keeping families et al informed, 3/9 SAMR and 10 LH don’t have FB pages and that for 2/14 LH Regt (QMI) is ‘private’. Having said that: 4/19 PWLH Association Band has a FB page, as does 10 Light Horse Bunbury Troop. Another private site is that for ‘3 Cav Regt and B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt (Past and Present)’. [This is interesting as it means that 4 Cav Regt has been written out of history in terms of FB …. alongside 8/13 VMR.]
Links to the Unit FB pages that were found are copied below.
For some reason, there was a break in posts on the 1 Armd Regt site between 18 Feb and 21 Jul 20. The latest post relates to the Regt deploying to Melbourne to help civil authorities with the COVID 19 response. There is a good brief on the mission by Lt Col Tim Orders. The post attracted 23 Comments and 130 ‘Likes’, demonstrating the value of the FB page.
It’s easy to see that 2 Cav acknowledge the role of FB. I wonder what 2 Cav Regt’s 50th Anniversary commemoration on Cambrai Day this year, will involve (Covid-19 willing)?
Great to see the ‘comaraderie’ evident in the posts, plus the tribute to the efforts made with respect to COVID Assist and the bushfire effort.
————————————————-
Wouldn’t it be great if the RAAC Corporation could serve as ‘focus’ for the dissemination of ‘news’ across the RAAC as a whole? Sadly, it would seem that there is a lack resources (or enthusiasm) to engage in any such ‘initiative’.
————————————————————————————————-
28 July 2020
Centurion 169001
A story (or two) …
Centurion ARN 169101 was used the RAEME Training Centre as an AFV to be recovered by those on the recovery mechanics training course. Eventually, it became surplus to needs. It was acquired by 3 Combat Support Service Bn (T’ville) as a refurbishment project, as explained by one of those involved:
“This was built last year [2019] by 3CSSB GE, we tried to get as many original parts as possible but had to fabricate a lot of parts such as the storage bins on the sides and the coax. The bottom of the tank was painted as one huge RAEME flag and signed by the lads that worked on it but unfortunately was painted over at the last minute.”
The tank now stands outside 1RAR HQ, having been named ‘Coral-Balmoral’ in commemoration of 1RAR’s involvement and the support of C Squadron. The tank number was hard to read and it is now shown as ‘169001’.
But there is more …
It turns out that it actually is ARN 169001.
“It is 169001. It was a designated range target at the Range Control Singleton until 2018 however they never had the heart to shoot it. It was left at Range Control under the trees until 2CAV put forward it be restored and placed in front of 3BDE HQ. 2CAV then acquired ownership and after some dedicated work by RAEME soldiers, then BRIG Scott Winter dedicated it in 2019.”
The above all came from posts on the RAAC Facebook page after I asked if anyone knew the ARN (as 169001 didn’t fit with it having been a range target). Well done to 2 Cav Regt, 3CSSB and Brig Scott Winter!
PS. Interestingly, 169001 wasn’t the first tank in the Centurion fleet … it was 169000. ‘Triple zilch’ had quite a reputation. Also, I mentioned on the FB page that: “Should it be of interest to anyone in 3 Bde … 1969001 was not used in Vietnam. Its log book, therefore, should be with National Archives (log books for tanks designated as range targets that had been used in Vietnam, went to the AWM)”.
—————————————————————————————————-
27 July 2020
The On-Going Tank Capability
Photo: Ammsydney.com
‘DefenceNews’ advises that “ The Australian Army is to receive an active protection system for its Hawkei and Bushmaster fleets of protected mobility vehicles; two regiments of self-propelled howitzers, to be built locally; and a replacement for its Abrams M1A1 main battle tanks.
How is it that a Government announcement can be so ‘misinterpreted’?
Then again … what was said was: “Defence will develop options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life”.
So, maybe it was me who failed to appreciate the significance of the statement.
I simply saw it as a statement of the obvious … when a capability nears the end of its life, action is initiated to replace it in such a way that no ‘capability gap’ arises. But, on refection, it is more than that.
I initiated a post on the RAAC Facebook in relation to this, saying (inter alia): “The fact that Defence seems to have committed to developing options to replace the Abrams, indicates that the tank capability is recognised in terms of its importance for the ADF (and the Nation’s contingency plans). Well done to all those who have contributed to this end!”.
Well, did it attract a response! Forty four ‘Likes’ and fifty one Comments (and growing).
Interestingly, a large number of commentators were of the opinion that the Abrams would not be replaced by another tank. I made a number of responses, some of which are copied below:
I don’t cling to the thought of another “tank” … I cling to the thought of another ‘tank capability’. What does this mean? To me … it’s a means by which mobile warfare can be conducted and direct fire support can be provided to ground operations.
I made no mention of “Aust armour [being sent] overseas”, nor to “long term engagements”. I believe it to be of significance that the RAAC tank capability is being factored into the ADF’s future contingency plans. It would be great if commentators could confine their comments to the posts that were actually made.
I made no reference to [Australia] receiving “help from anyone in war”. This has no relevance at all to the post I made. Please initiate a new post if you so desire.
You mention “committed to having the capability”. I believe this to be a significant step forward and I applaud those responsible (which was the purpose of my post).
In my final post I acknowledged that it was: “Great to see the interest in the tank capability (aka mobile warfare) of the future! PS. The Land Power Forum is a useful source to keep up to date (more or less) on this”.
————————————————————————————————–
26 July 2020
Seeing the ‘Funny’ Side
EPSON DSC picture
“There’s a challenge that every soldier in history has faced in the field: what do you do when nature calls? Deployed soldiers encounter several obstacles to relieve themselves in the most disparate settings, from the freezing Himalayas to scorching deserts. It’s no secret that everyone, including those in uniform, needs to defecate, and despite the perfecting of several techniques over time, it’s very often an arduous task, especially for women soldiers”.
The above quote from the Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI) newsletter ‘The Strategist’ … brought back a memory.
Tanks designed for operations during the Cold War, included ‘defecation seats’ … so as to allow for prolonged closed down operations during a nuclear attack. Earlier tanks, such as the Centurion, had no such facilities … after all, you just hop out (or do you?).
The following quote is from my book): ‘Canister! On! FIRE!: Australian Tank Operation in Vietnam’. It relates to Operation Overlord (the 50th Anniversary of which is to be commemorated in Canberra on 7 June 2021).
“One thing which had not been covered in training was what a member of a tank crew does when caught short without the opportunity to leave the tank. For the troop leader, 5 Troop, there was no alternative other than to use an empty twenty-pounder case.71”
Footnote 71 stated: “During a BBC TV documentary on the history of the tank, a tank commander from the Second World War was interviewed. He stated that after a lengthy period of ‘closed-down’ operations, the only option available was to fire a 75mm round towards Germany and use the shellcase, ‘being careful, because it was hot’. BBC TV, Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle: The Tank”.
Note: We’d been in contact with the enemy for less than three hours, however, the Troop had left its night position in a rush soon after 6am and there had been no time for ‘morning routine’. I can attest (as can my crew) that urine mixed with hot cordite does not provide a pleasant smell (especially in a confined space).
————————————————————————————————-
25 July 2020
The ‘Vision’
“Advisory Board members will be those Board members who will, subject to consultation with and the guidance of the Executive Council, take issues up with the relevant levels of Government. They will be the SABOT round of the Corporation.”
“The SABOT round of the Corporation”. Wow! The members of the Advisory Board really will be taking it up to ‘them’ in Government to ensure RAAC ‘issues’ are appropriately addressed. But … is this how it’s actually worked out, seven years later?
Significantly, the Corporation subsequently stated that it will not advance any issue unless it is in accord with the RAAC Head of Corps’ policy. This, of course, will not diverge from Defence policy. A former HOC pointed out that the Corporation had the opportunity to advance issues that he could not, but this idea didn’t gain traction … the Advisory Board has to be kept ‘muzzled’ by those pulling the strings. It would seem that the Advisory Board members’ powder has been kept dry (it might even have been put back into the magazine).
I’m reminded of the promise made by the Secretary, DVA on 19 July 2019:
“Tell me if we’re still getting it wrong and I will work with you to get it right because I’m in this job for four more years and if I’m still part of the problem in 12 months I will hand over. But I want to get this right …”.
Fortunately, there are some who registered this undertaking (bless them). Now that the 12 months have elapsed, we should see something in the media explaining how the results have matched the ‘vision’. More to follow on this.
————————————————————————————————-
24 July 2020
The Army of the Future
Following on from 8 July …
Included in the recent Defence strategic guidance was the following ‘new’ commitment for the future: “A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks”. [The same intention is repeated in the latest Army newspaper.]
The Lowy Institute were quick to cold water on the possibility of the ADF installing tank killing lasers on its AFVs: “Finally, the strangest proposal in the plan must surely be for the development of laser guns able to be mounted on vehicles and “defeating” targets up to and including main battle tanks.
This sounds like an odd idea. Recently, no less than the head of Research and Engineering for the US Department of Defense stated he was sceptical that lasers – even ones large enough to be put on a 747 – could shoot down a missile. And rockets, of course, don’t have armour.
If that’s what you can get from a jumbo jet, how is a weapon on a Bushmaster meant to stop a 50-ton fighting vehicle?’
A little research into the state of the art shows that a laser with sufficient power to burn through armour is not practicable in the foreseeable future. This is why the efforts of other Armies are being directed at weapons systems capable to defeating drones, helicopters and aircraft (all of which are unarmoured). The possibility of extending this to missile defence is the next challenge.
How is it that such a fantasy is included in an ADF strategic policy announcement?
The Lowy Institute wondered if “Defence may be thinking about much lower‑powered lasers to destroy enemy [AFV] electro-optical systems, rendering them blind and thus ‘defeated’.”
Surely Defence would have made this clear … or would they?
————————————————————————————————-
23 July 2020
The Ethics and Moral Values of Our Society.
What if you believe in the ability of a person (and more so, a group of like-minded people) to improve humanity as a whole (just a little bit) … and then found that it was a goal that was becoming increasingly difficult to fulfill (even just a little bit)? What do you do?
I’m reminded of the high jumper who is striving, but failing, to reach new heights … their ‘couch’ is saying again and again: “Try harder!!”.
Obviously … the couch should have had the insight to say: ‘let’s look at your approach and technique and see if there is anything we can improve’.
The first thing to do is to provide an example to others as to how to act and behave with respect and consideration for your neighbours (no matter who they are). But what if you’re ignored? Even elbowed out of the way? What if no-one wants to know about doing the ‘right thing’?
Of course, you get up and try again. But sometimes … just sometimes, you feel like a voice in the wilderness. The following is relevant (from 2018):
What will you be thinking about during the Silence on 11th November?
I’ll be thinking about those who are adorned with the mantle of making the world a different place to that in which competition between nation states led to the loss of so many innocent lives.
The same thing has happened over and over in the years since and every tomorrow seems destined to herald the Last Post. I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
In my despair, I will think of the birth of my children. How is it that such wondrous things can occur in a world which is so conflicted? I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
Elections will be held next year, a chance for everyone’s voice to be heard. I will seek out the candidate who promises to safeguard my grandchildren’s future. Is everything now safe for our future generations? I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
My thoughts will end in outrage at the outlook for the future; in frustration at the inability of those who are adorned with the mantle of leadership to do so; in anger at the misrepresentations made by those seeking my vote. What qualities are required of the person to lead our nation at such a time? I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
————————————————————————————————–
22 July 2020
From 20 July … it was good to see that the CDF, and Chiefs of Army, RAN and RAAF all did ‘The Right Thing’ in terms of paying compliments at the 50th Anniversary of Op Hammersley last year. See (mins 42-44) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgi-oUfR_eo I’ve sure that my observation and email to RSM-A would not have achieved such things (but maybe it contributed a little). Possibly even the suggestion to the RAAC Corporation Inc that the RSM Ceremonial should brief wreath carriers, had some measure of success.
Next ANZAC Day (25 April 2021)
I thought for a moment that I’d march with the Frontier Wars Contingent (if they’d have me) next ANZAC Day… on doing so, I’d hope to help with the goal expressed below. Reason took over, however, and I can see that it could be somewhat divisive. I’ll continue to try and find a way in which the bravery of indigenous warriors standing up against colonial forces to protect their family, possessions and country … can be incorporated into the pantheon of Australian military legends and help achieve just recognition in terms of what it means to be Australian.
Interestingly, right at the end of the article below is something that I’ve taken the AWM to task about previously. The statement that the AWM’s responsibility is to “honour Australian forces deployed overseas” is simply wrong (the defence of Darwin, for example). The AWM now acknowledge this.
“Recognition and acknowledgement of the Frontier Wars between Indigenous peoples and European colonisers and their inclusion in the national memory of war is an important step towards reconciliation and national unity. Setting the historical records right and naming the violence that has been perpetrated are fundamental to heal the national trauma and move forward.”
This Thursday, 25 April [2019], marks the ninth anniversary of the annual Frontier Wars March in Canberra. This parade is a commemoration of First Nations resistance to the British invasion of the continent that began in 1788 and continued on in some areas until as late as 1934.
These conflicts were written out of local history books from the late 1900s onwards and only started to re-emerge in Middle Australia over recent decades with the rise of black armband historians in the 1960s. Indeed, what prevailed was the myth of peaceful settlement.
This week’s march is part of the ongoing breaking of the silence surrounding the bloodshed that was signature to the British consolidation of power over this landmass. And a key aim is to have this fighting acknowledged in the great sandstone edifice that is the Australian War Memorial (AWM).
Aboriginal Tent Embassy co-founder Ghillar Michael Anderson leads the Frontier Wars March. The Euhaliya elder has explained that it highlights “the wars fought on Australian soil since 1788, when our country was taken by superior force at gunpoint, and those who stood in the way were shot.”
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander procession follows the same route as the Anzac Day parade. And while the crowds gathered in the nation’s capital warmly receive the Indigenous marchers, the local police have a habit of turning them away before they reach the AWM.
Breaking the silence
“Our ancestors were the first to fight and defend this country from invasion,” said Chris Tomlins, an organiser of the Frontier Wars March. “That hasn’t been recognised: our ancestors being the first defenders.”
The Arunta elder said that on Anzac Day, the Gallipoli conflict is referred to as “a defence of this country. But it comes second”. He asserts that what First Nations people want is an acknowledgement that “our ancestors were the first to defend”.
From a remote outstation on the outskirts of Alice Springs, Tomlins is currently in Canberra conducting preparations for the march. On Wednesday, a wreath making workshop will be held, with ornate rings being fashioned out of desert pea flowers: the blood flower of the Frontier Wars.
Every year support for the march has been on the increase, said Mr Tomlins. “This is my fifth year. And it’s just been growing, and the awareness has too. We hope that this year will set the precedent for that acknowledgment.”
The rising toll
Estimates of the numbers that fell during the Frontier Wars have been growing over the decades. In the early 1980s, eminent historian Professor Henry Reynolds calculated that 20,000 First Nations peoples lost their lives during the conflicts. But, over the last decade, he’s upped that to 30,000.
An early leader of the First Nations resistance was renowned Bidjigal warrior Pemulwuy. He initially led a 12 year conflict that began in 1795 against the encroachment of British settlers along the NSW rivers that are today referred to as the Hawkesbury and Nepean.
The fighting consisted of a series of three wars, fought using guerrilla tactics. Pemulwuy also led a raid on the settlements at Parramatta accompanied by 100 men during the late 1790s. Following his death in 1802, the warrior’s son, Tedbury, took over leadership of the fighting on the river system.
The 1824 Bathurst War was fought between the Wiradjuri nation and the British. The local people carried out raids against the invaders in May, which led them to bring in reinforcements. And the subsequent onslaught perpetrated upon the First Peoples brought the war to an end in September.
The European takeover of the continent was marked by massacres of First Nations peoples. As recently reported in the Guardian, “there were at least 270 frontier massacres over 140 years, as part of a state-sanctioned and organised attempt to eradicate Aboriginal people”.
Knee-deep in lies
Long-term social activist Graeme Dunstan was with Tomlins at the AWM when Sydney Criminal Lawyers spoke to them. The pair were standing before the recently unveiled For Our Country sculpture, which honours First Nations servicepeople who died fighting for the Australian military.
AWM director Dr Brendan Nelson said during his dedication speech at the unveiling that the coming of the British saw a “process of dispossession, violence and brutality,” which was “perpetrated against the First Peoples by pastoralists, police, and at times mounted Aboriginal militia”.
Mr Dunstan recalled that Nelson went onto suggest that this violence and inequality “was all overcome by the Aboriginal servicemen who joined up to defend their country”, as “they won equality and inclusion by this act”.
“This is bullshit. This is lies. It’s a deception to steer people away from the Frontier Wars,” Dunstan said defiantly. “Why can’t they admit the Frontier Wars? They were the biggest wars in this land. In 100,000 years, there had never been a slaughter like this before or a transformation of landscape.”
Despite the growing calls to acknowledge the Frontier Wars at the AWM over recent years, Dr Nelson, a former federal Liberal leader, has continued to maintain that the memorial is only for commemorating Australians deployed overseas, not internal colonial conflicts.
————————————————————————————————–
21 July 2020
The RAAC as it is Presented by Defence Today.
The extract copied below is from the current ADF website re the RAAC. It is on this basis that recruits are attracted.
I’d be interested if anyone was able to find any information about the ‘Light Cavalry Patrol Vehicle’ that a potential recruit might like to see … presumably it is a Landrover/Perentie derivative; pity that it’s unlikely to be a Hawkei (just ‘maybe’ in the future).
I know how out of date the extract is, but surely those in Defence do as well … or not? It’s a pity that the RAAC Corporation Inc’s website states that “Units of the RAAC include tank regiments, reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel-carrier regiments”.
I guess it’s just all a bit confusing … isn’t it? But why is it so? Surely, we’re better than this?
“The role of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps is to locate, identify, destroy or capture the enemy, by day or night, in combination with other arms, using fire and manoeuvre.
The Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) is a combat arm with a range of capabilities that can be employed by the Army. RAAC units are able to participate in a range of operations including direct attack, reconnaissance and armoured mobility to infantry. Units of the RAAC are equipped with the Abrams M1A1 main battle tank (MBT) family of vehicles or the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle (PMV).
The main types of Armoured Corps units are:
The tank regiment – The tank regiment operates the Abrams main battle tank. The Regiment’s manning and equipment make it suitable for a variety of employments. The role of the tank, in coordination with other arms, is to close with and destroy the enemy using fire, manoeuvre and shock action.
The cavalry regiments – The cavalry regiments operate the ASLAV and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle. A cavalry unit’s personnel and equipment enable it to conduct a variety of tasks. The role of cavalry is to locate, dislocate, and disrupt the enemy through the conduct of offensive, defensive and security actions.
The light cavalry regiments – The light cavalry regiments/units are Army Reserve units that can operate either in a mounted or dismounted role. The units are equipped with either the light cavalry patrol vehicle (LCPV) and the interim infantry mobility vehicle (IIMV) or the Bushmaster (PMV). Light cavalry conducts stability and enabling activities and augments cavalry regiments. Light cavalry tactics comprise security, stability and enabling activities including the operations of protection, counter-insurgency, evacuation and strategic response options and RFSU operations.”
An article by Christopher Jobson, author of ‘Looking Forward, Looking Back: Customs and Traditions of the Australian Army’. Is included the recent 3/9 SAMR Association newsletter. It is entitled: ‘Saluting in Civilian Attire’. http://www.samrainc.org/newsletter/2020Jun.pdf
I’ve sent the following email to the SAMR Secretary:
“I noticed the article by Christopher Jobson in the latest 3/9 SAMR Assn newsletter, entitled ‘Saluting in Civilian Attire’. Watching the recording of the National Commemoration of Binh Ba in 2019, I saw that there seemed to be a failure in protocol (even by the Chief of Army). See https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=443072706524990&ref=watch_permalink . The relevant part is from 38-43 minutes. (It takes a while to download on my computer.)
As a result, I wrote as per below to the RSM of the Army. His reply follows on.
The point in mentioning this to you is that the question of the protocol applicable to a veteran in civilian clothes wearing a beret is not covered by Christopher’s article (but it is very relevant to former RAAC personnel). I wondered if that below might be of interest in terms of the next newsletter. Best wishes ..,
“Dear RSM-A,
I am a retired member of the RAAC. Following the Binh Ba Commemoration yesterday, some questions of protocol have arisen in the context of veterans attending such ceremonies and wishing to pay respect in accord with appropriate procedures.
When a gentleman wearing civilian clothes and a hat, passes Colours/Guidons etc, he removes his hat and does an eyes left/right.
But what happens when the retired person is wearing their old unit beret (probably also wearing medals)?
Should he (i) remove his beret and do an eyes left/right; (ii) keep beret on and salute with eyes left/right; or keep beret on and simply do an eyes left/right.
Supplementary question is: what should such a person do when the national anthem is played: (i) stand, keep beret on and salute; (ii) stand and remove beret; or (iii) just stand.
Your help in answering these questions would be much appreciated.
It is recognised that former service personnel are not subject to the dress/ceremonial manual stipulations, but, even so, most would like to be able to do what is considered the ‘right thing’. Many thanks …
[Obviously, the same protocol would apply when Colours/Guidons are marched past, ie. stand and ….]
Response from RSM-A:
“Dear Bruce thank you for your email. You are correct, gentlemen wearing civilian attire with hats on, are to remove their hats when passing Guidons and Colours and look to their left or right.
In regards to wearing berets in civilian attire and paying respect to guidons/colours, I’m more than comfortable with those veterans turning their head and eyes to the left or right.
Regards to the national anthem … leave berets on and sing loudly.
At the end of the day it’s all about showing respect.”
PS. The Secretary has replied with thanks, saying that he’ll “put [my] email in our next newsletter”.
PPS. It seems that saluting when in civilian attire is against military protocol (though nobody is actually saying this). I would like to see a definitive policy which also addresses the contingent commander on an ANZAC Day march past. In Canberra, at the moment, the commanders (which have included those such as Laurie O’Donnell, former CGS) salute the reviewing officer. I wonder if I’ll be able to get an official ruling on this … ie. is this the ‘only’ occasion when saluting by a former ADF member wearing a beret, is approved? I’ve written to the Secretary 3/9 to suggest that possibly the RAAC Corporation could investigate and publish the protocol to be followed when compliments are to be paid, by former RAAC personnel wearing berets.
————————————————————————————————-
19 July 2020
Australia’s Defence Strategy: A Little Confusing
Photo: Defencenews,com
The quote below is from an article entitled ‘That future is now: defence minister explains strategic update’ in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s newsletter, ‘The Strategist’
“The defence minister said the government was committed to shaping security developments in Australia’s immediate region.
‘Government has directed Defence to sharpen its capabilities across five defence domains—maritime, land, air, information and cyber, and space—to build an even more potent ADF.’
The minister said the ADF’s capacity to deter and respond would be sharpened in many ways.
Reynolds said the ADF’s weapons systems would be formidable, with more potent capabilities to deter adversaries and keep their forces away from Australia.
Long-range strike capabilities would enable the ADF to threaten potential enemy forces and infrastructure from greater distances. These would include the long-range anti-ship missile, or LRASM.
The goal was to strengthen the ADF’s ability to deter and respond to threats to Australian interests. ‘Possessing weapons of this type influences the decision-making of those who seek to threaten our national interests.’
‘Let me be clear, though, the government is not planning to invest in intercontinental ballistic missiles’, Reynolds said. ‘We are focused on the protection of our deployed forces from ballistic missile threats, rather than the protection of the Australian continent. This is in line with the current threat assessment’.” (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/that-future-is-now-defence-minister-explains-strategic-update/)
I was confused. The aim is to deter and respond to threats to our national interests, but this doesn’t include protection of the Australian continent (?). I had to reread the above, a number of times. With the benefit of that below, I now see (I think) that “protection of deployed forces” refers to RAN vessels operating forward of Australia (with a long-range offensive capability to be provided to the RAAF). Having been a soldier, I read ‘deployed forces’ as involving land forces. Silly me.
The Inspector General of the ADF is reported to be handing down the results of his inquiry into allegations of war crimes in Afghanistan this month, i.e. July 2020. (See Blogs for 25 Jun and 3/15 Jul 20.)
The report by the enquiry into the Sheean VC is to be presented by Brendon Nelson by 31 July 2020. (See Blog for 12 Jun 20.)
If I was at all cynical, I would posit that the IGADF report might be critical of events in Afghanistan and that Mr Nelson’s report might support that award of the VC … and that the latter might be agreed to by the Government in terms of ‘offsetting’ the fallout from the first.
The quote below is from an interview with John Menadue, the Secretary of PM&C at the time of the ‘Dismissal’. It seems to me that he makes a good point in asking if he can always trust his ‘betters’.
“Little did I know that Kerr, at the same time he was talking to me, was also talking to the Palace, the Queen, Prince Charles and two high court judges. One of those High Court Justices Anthony Mason was coaching Kerr over about three months on the dismissal. Kerr was directly talking on the phone to Malcolm Fraser about what was planned. It’s disgraceful, disgraceful what happened. And I don’t think this country will ever properly recover from the deception and the complicity that we had at that time from people that I thought could be trusted.
This is the thing which I take away from those events is that that I was too trusting. I was naive to believe that these people, a Governor-General, the Queen, High Court judges a leader of Her Majesties opposition and people like Rupert Murdoch could be trusted. I learnt from bitter experience that I had to temper my trust of people who parade themselves as being better, more credible and trustworthy than the rest of us.
I’m more careful about trusting people now. I guess we’re all brought up to learn and believe that we need to trust people. Our society could not survive without trust. We can’t just rely on laws. We need to trust one another, that we will each behave in a temperate, reasonable, sensible and honest way. Society couldn’t be any other way. And the people that I thought believed most in that were people, institutions like the High Court and the Governor-General.
I naively thought that these were somehow my betters. That they could be trusted. What a fool I was to think that they were my betters and that I could trust them. To my bitter experience, I learned that I could not trust them. And that shook my confidence in so many of our institutions, like the High Court, the Monarchy and the Governor-General ship. The so-called powerful and influential people could not be trusted. That’s what I carry. That’s the scar that I carry. The events of November 1975 still live in me today, I was naïve to trust these people. I learnt that one has to be more discerning in the people you trust.”
—————————————————————————————————–
17 July 2020
AWM Redevelopment II
Photo: AWM
Following on from yesterday …
The central discussion regarding the redevelopment of the AWM relates to the need for additional display space to honour all Australia’s veterans. Some argue that the AWM should ‘live within its means’ and manage the collection accordingly. Others are pleased to see the display space expanded so that existing galleries don’t have to be reduced to allow for recent conflicts.
But … what of the people the Director mentioned, who visit the AWM to learn ‘What it is to be Australian’? He was, I believe, referring to those who gain a sense of nationhood by reflecting on the sacrifices that have been made by so many during Australia’s relatively recent history. This, of course, is an Anglo-Saxon/European view of history.
What of our indigenous brothers and their history in defending country, ie. ‘our’ land?
The Parliamentary Standing Committee, Public Works, asked about representation of the ‘Frontier Wars’ and was advised that it was not the intention of the AWM to honour our indigenous forebears in this way.
Is an appreciation of this aspect of our history, not a central part of understanding ‘What it is to be Australian’?
If so, how is it that the bravery of aboriginal warriors is not commemorated by the AWM?
———————————————————————————————–
16 July 2020
The AWM Redevelopment
Photo: The Canberra Times
I listened to the proceeding of the Parliamentary Hearing into the AWM redevelopment. I couldn’t believe it when a former AWM Director stated those who have died in recent conflicts, bear no comparison with those from WWI and WWII. He was talking about the numbers involved. This reminded me of an AWM historian giving a lecture in which he said that the Battle of Long Tan was “small beer”. He was making a comparison with the casualties suffered on the Western Front. I stood up and made it clear that he had no right to say such a thing. I’ve submitted the following letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times:
“The Parliamentary Standing Committee, Public Works, held a hearing into the proposed AWM redevelopment project on 14 July 2020. One of the witnesses expressed his belief that the AWM should allocate commemorative space in its galleries on the basis of proportional representation, i.e. because of the greater numbers that served (and casualties suffered), the exhibits related to WWI and WWII should be given much more space than that provided to more recent conflicts.
Listening to the broadcast of proceedings, one had to wonder about the importance of the AWM in terms of today’s veterans, relative to that of the descendants of those no longer with us. There is no doubting the fact that the AWM has a historical function, but is this a lessor one in terms of veterans themselves? The question was answered later by the AWM Director. He explained that honouring the service of current veterans in a timely manner was the AWM’s top priority. I, for one, have to agree.”
————————————————————————————————–
15 July 2020
Military Ethics.
Photo: ‘The Cove’
“The argument being made here is that any Just War Theory and military ethics training requires ‘firm ethical foundations’. There needs to be a means by which the individual is able to determine what ‘Just’ is.”
“Maj Gen Jake Ellwood recently wrote in ‘The Cove’ that: “… ethical conduct is a personal thing. It must come naturally and instinctively to a person, especially in combat.” In my response, I asked rhetorically if such things were a “a Rules of Engagement (ie. military law) matter or a personal ethics matter?” I ventured that it was both, ie. one without the other wouldn’t work.
Mentioning this to a friend (also a Vietnam veteran) he commented that: “There is, in my view, a hierarchy in the moral code of responsibility and accountability. First comes the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the training necessary to ensure understanding and acceptance that such rules are no different from any other ‘Order’. Second, when confronted with a situation which might entail a breach of ROE, the soldier must be cognisant that he is about to disobey an ‘Order’. Only then does the soldier confront the third hurdle referred to by Ellwood [ie. a personal thing [which] must come naturally and instinctively to a person].”
I agree entirely that “ethics training must extend beyond simply defining what is and is not ethically acceptable to the organisation” and that soldiers must be challenged to ponder such things, “especially prior to operations”.
But I also believe that there is a place for stressing the need to obey orders … something drilled into soldiers from Day 1. This, of course, raises the dilemma of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ orders. Here lies the responsibility of the individual. ROE as applied to a theatre of operations, clearly define the ethical boundaries, ie. ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. Such Rules constitute an ‘Order’. It is only when the ROE are countermanded by a superior [or someone considers acting on his own volition], that a soldier faces a personal crisis. Training must address such a possibility.”
Once self-respect is lost, it’s very hard to find again.
*Dan Cassidy is a Chaplain in the Australian Army and has responsibilities for the Vasey Resilience Centre (VRC), which is part of the Human Performance framework for the 3rdBrigade.
————————————————————————————————
14 July 2020
What Odds, the Importance of Our Heritage? Part 2
Following on from yesterday …. July is an important month for the RAAC; the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) was ‘gazetted’ on 9 July 1941 and 1 Armd Regt on 7 July 1949.
There are some other interesting dates associated with this ‘lineage’ … the Australian Tank Corps (ATC) was ‘gazetted’ in 1927. Five years later (1932), however, it was discovered that the Defence Act at the time did not allow for a tank corps. As a result, ATC members became part of the Australian Army Service Corps for the next nine years (ie. until 1941).
The other date of significance is 14 December 1948, when the AAC became the RAAC.
Those who have no interest in regimental history, might think … so what?
As mentioned yesterday, 1AR Assn promotes the view that 1 Armd Regt was not formed as a new unit on 7 July 1949; rather, 1 Armoured Car Squadron (1ACS) was simply renamed on that date. The Association supports its argument by quoting the CO in 1955 as stating that 1 Armd Regt’s birthday is 21 January 1946 (the date 1ACS was formed).
It’s all a bit confusing, isn’t it?
Accepting for the moment that the birthday of 1 Armd Regt is 7 July 1949 (71 years ago) why isn’t there any mention of this commemoration on the 1 Armd Regt FB page or the 1 AR Assn website? It’s left to those on other RAAC related sites to ‘ring the bell’.
I wonder what happened to Birthday greetings from Hon Col, HOC, CO 1 Armd Regt, and President 1AR Assn? When the 80th Anniversary of the AAC comes round next year, if the same lack of interest will apply?
PS. Re the photo above, I was asked what the vehicles were. My response:
“Good question. You’d need a uni thesis to answer it. The title of the photo is “ACS, Tokyo, 1947”. I think that the manufacture of the original Alvis Scout Car (nicknamed ‘Dingo’) was taken over by BSA/Daimler, with manufacture shared with Canada early in WWII. The modified version became known as the ‘Doodlebug’ (or ‘Golfball’). At some stage, I believe it was manufactured in Australia. I think the answer to your question is Canadian Scout Car (‘Doodlebug’), also known (generically as ‘Dingo’)
—————————————————————————————–
13 July 2020
What Odds, the Importance of Our Heritage?
Photo: Wikipedia
“This history commences with our birthday on the 21st January, 1946, as it was on that day that the First Australian Armoured Car Squadron· was formed in Puckapunyal for service in Occupation Forces in Japan.” ‘Tracks to Tradition’ Lt Col C J Miles. (Link at end)
The above is a quote published in an article by the fifth? (see below) CO of 1 Armd Regt in the Regimental Journal of August 1955. It was republished on the 1AR Assn website 65 years later (23 August 2020).
The Blog post on 28 April 2020 was entitled: ‘Things That Should be Corrected: 1AR Assn Publications’. It included the following recommendations:
1st Armoured Car Squadron (1ACS) was renamed 1st Armoured Regiment. In fact, 1ACS was disbanded and a new unit formed. Despite the article recently published by the 1AR Assn, units of the Australian Army are not simply renamed … they must first be disbanded and then reformed (one unit is removed from the Order of battle and another is added.)
1 Armd Regt Theatres of Operation are described as including “Japan”. This should be deleted as it was only 1ACS which so served. An alternative would be to state: ‘Japan (1st Armoured Car Squadron)’.
So, as the then Lt Col Miles posited, if 1ACS was simply renamed (rather than a new unit being formed) then the 1 Armd Regt Birthday would be 21 January 1946. BUT, this is not the case … the birthday of 1 Armd Regt is celebrated on 7 July each year, as per the following references:
“Formed as a tank unit in the new Australian Regular Army on 7 July 1949”. (Wikipedia)
“When the 1st Armd Regt was reconstituted on 7 July 1949 …”. (Hopkins)
“The formation of 1 Armoured Regiment in July 1949 gave the ARA its first armoured regiment”. (Handel)
If 1ACS was simply renamed 1 Armd Regt, then Lt Col Miles would not be the fifth CO … presumably there were at least three OCs of 1ACS … making him the eighth.
So, to be consistent, 1 AR Assn must state that, either:
(i) 1ACS was renamed 1 Armd Regt, the b’day of which is 21 Jan 46, with Lt Col Miles as the eighth CO and including entitlement to emblazon the battle-honour ‘Japan’; or
(ii) 1 Armd Regt was formed as new unit, the b’day of which is 7 Jul 49, with Lt Col Miles as the fifth CO, and without entitlement to emblazon the battle-honour ‘Japan’.
I think I know the likely outcome: ‘Who cares?’. (Sad really … but I’m an optimist and remain hopeful that some importance might be given to ‘our’ history ‘in the fullness of time’.)
————————————————————————————————-
12 July 2020
Our Centurion Heritage
The photo above was posted on the Centurion Tank Appreciation Facebook site. The ‘author’ saying that he had no idea when or where it was posted.
Anyone with an interest in Centurions will look at this and try to find identifying features (either in the tank or background).
I posted the following in response: “Seems to me that this might be an early Mk3 with the ‘escape hatch’ welded closed. It also doesn’t have the driver’s long march hood bin (which I thought was part of the BAOR tactical requirement). It has a symbol of some sort on the right track guard (but not that of the RAC). Could it be at Port Glasgow, having been built at ROF Dalmuir, Clydebank)?”.
I’m not an ‘expert’ by any means, but I know a few things … two of which are worth discussing below.
The ‘Escape Hatch’. Is it right to use this term? While it is known that the reason for the hatch at the rear of the turret was to enable the removal of the 17 pounder gun and the Mks 1 and 2 Cents, it is still widely referred to as an escape hatch. Was it really able to be used as a means of escape by the crew (rather than their access hatches in the top of the turret), or was it simply for maintenance, ie. replacement of the 17 pdr? If the former, presumably it would have been retained after the 17 pdr was replaced with the 20 pdr (the barrel of which could be removed from the front of the turret). The answer to this is probably provided by the fact that the hatch was welded closed in Mk 3 tanks to improve the ballistic integrity of the turret.
Secondly … the Driver’s Long March Hood. What is this? When tanks are required to travel long distances on their tracks, drivers used to have to do so ‘opened up’, ie. they have no protection against the elements. So, in Europe, ‘pissing’ down rain and snow and required to move from one side of the front to the other, what’s the answer? The Long March Hood sat up over the driver’s compartment and allowed him to drive ‘opened up’ under cover. It also provided a wiper to clear the ‘windscreen’.
————————————————————————————————–
11 July 2020
Defence Strategy 102 : The RAAC
Photo: Herald Sun
Following on from yesterday …
A reader commented that: “On the topic of whether or not Australia should have an armoured warfare capability, I agree strongly with the argument you make. Australia’s strategic posture and the force structure supporting it changes over time, has in the past, will in the future. There can be no certainty over the place armoured capability may have in the future. What we do know is that the command, tactical, technical and training skills required to conduct armoured warfare are easily and rapidly lost, and armoured assets degrade in effectiveness over time. Not a lesson we should forget. Again”.
Along these lines, I mentioned in yesterday’s post that:
“Tanks are an essential part of the combined arms force around which land operations are based. The skills required for these to be successful, take decades to develop. Unless both the skills and equipment are maintained, the capability is lost. This has happened on at least one occasion … the CDF, Gen Peter Cosgrove, stated in his autobiography that our tanks at the time “were aging orphans” (and therefore he was unable to deploy them).”
Centurions were aging orphans in Vietnam, but that didn’t stop either their deployment there or the operational success that they achieved. General Cosgrove was referring to our Leopard tank fleet and the deployment of tanks to the Middle East. The suggestion that they couldn’t be supported logistically was not well founded. Experienced logisticians have stated that they could’ve easily been supported from Europe. The problem, as I understand it, was that the Leopard fleet had not been kept up to date with interoperability requirements, ie. they weren’t equipped with Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) facilities which would enable them to identify themselves as ‘friendly’, if interrogated electronically by aircraft or other tanks.
One has to wonder of the designation ‘aging orphans’ was appropriate. Could it have been that it was used to deflect attention from a failure by the ADF to ensure the maintenance of a strategic capability, ie the ability to operate in conjunction with allies?
———————————————————————————————-
10 July 2020
Defence Strategy 101 (The RAAC)
The following quotation is taken from an article in Defence Connect by Stephen Kuper:
“Australia has now declared its willingness to confront and to deter Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea, its corrupt interference in Australian life, its disinformation campaigns and its economic coercion. Morrison deserves praise for his courageous stand.”
There has been a lot of commentary resulting from the PM’s recent announcement about Defence. But what’s it all amount to … exactly? The particular interest of ‘armouredadvocates’ is that related to the RAAC and its role within the ADF.
Some commentators suggest that there is no need to defend our nation against any foreseeable threat of invasion. The inference here is that there is no need to maintain a deterrent capability or at least not one which would be capable of quickly responding to an emerging threat. The follow-on from this, is the suggestion that Australia only needs to be able to interdict the sea/air gap at long range.
If this was to be true … there would be no need to maintain a capability for mobile warfare. This would enable funds to be allocated elsewhere. The following quotes are from a 2016 paper ‘Fighting to Win’, by the then Head of Corps (RAAC), Brig Chris Mills and Lt Col Leo Purdy:
“An Australian tank capability is critical to deter and defeat armed attacks against Australia and its interests. Tanks are necessary for future independent combat operation to defend Australia and as part of combat operations regionally and globally. Tanks and other AFVs are the foundation of credible conventional land deterrence for Australia.”
“Australia cannot be lulled into the falsity that it has the luxury to merely contribute forces of choice to wars of choice. Australia cannot now, nor has it been able to in the past, accurately predict the wars it fights.
The expectation that Australia can opt out of conflict when its interests are involved, either in our region or globally, is naïve and potentially dangerous. It also ignores the reality of the connected world where we are bound to many nations by diplomacy, information, economics, heritage and culture. Australia may find itself embroiled in crises or conflict, which it can neither choose to nor afford to avoid.”
Tanks are an essential part of the combined arms force around which land operations are based. The skills required for these to be successful, take decades to develop. Unless both the skills and equipment are maintained, the capability is lost. This has happened on at least one occasion … the CDF, Gen Peter Cosgrove, stated in his autobiography that our tanks at the time “were aging orphans” (and therefore he was unable to deploy them).
I came across a book ‘Call to Arms‘ which I’d forgotten that I had. It’s the autobiography of Gen Sir Richard Gale (who had a pivotal role in the formation of the Parachute Regiment). I remembered that his nickname was ‘Windy [Gale]’. No surprises here, but it made me reflect on other nicknames.
There are some which are steeped in tradition, eg ‘Spud’ Murphy (from a fictious librarian who threatened to shoot anyone who made a noise with a ‘spud’ gun) and ‘Nobby’ Clark (possibly from when clerks in the City of London used to wear Nobby hats, a type of bowler hat).
There are others which are related to places of birth, e.g, ‘Taffy’, ‘Jock’, and ‘Pommy’; others related to physical characteristics, e.g. ‘Lofty’, ‘Shorty’, and ‘Blue’; and others related to surnames eg, ‘Monty’ (Montgomery) and ‘Snapper’ (Snape). Some are derived from a slightly different ‘twist’ eg. ‘Doc’ for someone whose (first name) initials were D. R.
But what about those such as that at the start … ie. a nickname derived from a surname. There are a few that I can bring to mind: ‘Logga’ Woods; ‘Dinga’ Bell; ‘Screamer’ Howell; ‘Dickie’ Bird. While these are somewhat international, I think ‘Seedy’ Yates might be homegrown.
I asked on another site if anyone could add to these. The results included a lot in the nicknames related to what I’ll call ‘traditional’, eg. ‘Doris’ Day; ‘Debbie’ Reynolds; ‘Chuck’ Berry; ‘Molly’ Malone. Also ‘Stoney’ Bourke … I was unsure where this came from and looked it up … a 1960s TV show (a western).
Other suggestions, however, followed my interest in nicknames which were derived from the surname (other than rhyming with it). These were (some traditional, others home grown):
Another batch had some beauties: ‘Plonky’ Wines; ‘Skid’ Marks; and ‘Truck’ Laurie.
————————————————————————————————
8 July 2020
2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan
Included in the recent Defence strategic guidance announcement are the following commitments which will shape the Army of the future:
Defence will develop options for a system to replace the current tank capability when it reaches its end of life. This new system will integrate with reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles to ensure the land force retains a decisive land combat capability into the future.
An active protection system for Bushmaster, Hawkei and heavy truck protected vehicles and landing craft able to defeat modern anti-armour weapons and protect vehicle crews;
Acquisition of a fleet, up to a brigade in size, of un-crewed systems, to include vehicles, to support operations by land forces. This will enhance the war-fighting capability of the ADF while also protecting Australian personnel; and
Upgrades to the ADF’s current Bushmaster protected mobility vehicles to a common standard, incorporating lessons from Afghanistan and recent disaster relief operations
A future program to develop a directed energy weapon system able to be integrated onto ADF protected and armoured vehicles, and capable of defeating armoured vehicles up to and including main battle tanks. The eventual deployment of directed energy weapons may also improve land force resilience by reducing the force’s dependence an ammunition stocks and supply lines;
Is it possible that the first and last points are linked? Does it make you feel old?
An Aside. The following statement was seen in a recent publication: China may be behaving as a bully, but there are cleverer ways of dealing with bullies than resorting to strident bloviation.” If, like me, you are unaware of the meaning of ‘bloviation’, I recommend you Google it.
Note. A ‘PS’ has been added to yesterday’s post.
7 July 2020
‘How we Consult the Ex-Service Community’: or Not
I received this advice (as I expect did many others):
“The Department of Veterans’ Affairs reviews the National Consultation Framework (NCF) every three years to ensure mechanisms for consultation between the Department, Commissions and the ex-serving community remain effective and fit-for-purpose. As you’re aware, a review of the existing NCF structure commenced in mid-2019 and will include input from the broader serving and ex-serving community via an online survey conducted by an external research company, ORIMA.
Input is encouraged from any serving and ex-serving members of the Australian Defence Force, as well as family members. Input is also encouraged from people acting as representatives of ex-service organisations and other organisations that support the veteran community. This survey will commence on Monday, 29 June 2020 and be open to the public until Sunday, 26 July 2020. The survey can be accessed via the DVA website, at www.dva.gov.au/about-us/overview/consultations-and-grants/how-we-consult-ex-service-community.”
I wanted to comment that it was very difficult for an individual veteran to raise a matter of concern which affected him or her, but was not related to issues of individual benefit/compensation etc, i.e. something which was outside these parameters. Of course, I’d thought from the above, that the survey was about improving consultation between DVA and veterans.
I ticked ‘yes’ when asked if I was a member of an ESO … I think everything went downhill from there. All the questions thereafter related to the functioning of the ESO. The opportunity for me to raise a matter affecting an individual veteran was non-existent.
The leading question is: ‘Does DVA advocate on behalf of veterans?’.
DVA’s vision is to: “be a responsive and flexible organisation, efficiently delivering high quality, connected services to all generations of veterans and the wider veteran community”. DVA supports veterans by delivering services; not by advocating on their behalf.
If a veteran has an issue with which he needs assistance … can he/she contact DVA? Not unless the issue relates to one of the programs which DVA is responsible for delivering. Is this right and proper? DVA publicity suggests that the Department is there to help care for veterans. The ‘rub’ is that this is true, but only so far as its mandated services are concerned. For anything else, the veteran needs to go elsewhere.
Is there any other help that a veteran might need? Of course, there is. A veteran might have difficulty in dealing with a whole range of matters related to his military service. One might think that a survey relating to consultation between the Department and veterans, would facilitate such feedback.
Seems to me that the title of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs is a misnomer (given that it suggests the whole gambit of assistance to veterans) … it should be the Department for Administration of Veterans’ Programs.
I submitted the above to DVA vide the website Feedback pro-forma. I was asked what response I hoped to receive. I replied: “DVA will respond to say that matters raised by a veteran (although not related to a DVA delivered program) will be considered and advice provided to him/her. An ‘administrative help line’ (as distinct to a lifeline’ emergency number) will be provided to this end”.
PS. I had a telephone call from DVA asking me to expand on the feedback I provided (as a result of interest by a senior officer). I had the opportunity to explain the basis for my suggestion at some length. I offered to provide a relevant paper if required.
—————————————————————————————–
5 July 2020
The Redevelopment of the AWM
Photo: Architectureau
I don’t know how many others have had the opportunity to read the AWM proposal, but this is my response.
“Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the AWM’s redevelopment plans. I have read through the EPBC submission and offer the following comments for consideration:
It’s to be expected that the most important element of the submission is the need for the project. Four key reasons are given. These are:
A lack of capacity to provide equitable coverage of conflicts and operations;
A lack of capacity to describe a broader description of war;
A lack of circulation space; and
Poor accessibility and access.’
Only reasons 1 and 2 relate to the need to increase the present size of the displays.
The need to ‘describe a broader description of war’ is interesting. The submission explains that this need is to meet “the deep community interest in understanding more diverse contexts of war such as the efforts made by the Australian Defence Force and other agencies to avoid war”. This does not appear to be one of the purposes of the AWM, as described in the submission:
“In 1952 the role of the Memorial was further expanded, adapting to include commemorating and telling the story of Australia’s national experience in all wars, regional conflicts, international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations as these commitments have continued through time. The Memorial’s purpose remains the same today, as it has since its inception in the fields of France in 1916, and yet it continues to grow in significance with each new generation of Australian servicemen and servicewomen.”
It is hard to understand how the need to explain the diverse contexts of war justifies the expansion of the AWM’s display area. This is described as a need generated by “deep community interest”, however, there are no examples provided of the community’s feedback to the AWM in this respect.
One might expect that as the number of conflicts increases, so does the AWM’s need for area in which to commemorate those who served. It’s my belief that, for many people, this is the principle justification for expansion of the AWM. Yet there are only three comments provided from a survey conducted of visitors to this effect (Annex D).
I’ve previously asked how the AWM intends to display exhibits in the new galleries that are planned. I was advised that this aspect was to be considered later in the project. It seems to me that this is something of the ‘cart before the horse’. I am a veteran and a supporter of the AWM’s commemoration of the service and sacrifice of veterans from all conflicts. I find it hard to understand, however, how expansion can be justified without an outline of the changes proposed in terms of the display galleries.”
————————————————————————————————-
4 July 2020
Right Sizing the Abrams Fleet: At Last!
Photo: The Australian
Blog posts on 6, 8, and 9 May 2020 addressed the operational limitations imposed by the current size of the RAAC’s Abrams tank fleet.
To recap briefly … the geographical dispersal of the three squadrons, coupled with the limitations on repair pools, has meant that serviceability levels have fallen drastically. In order to correct this, Army identified that an additional 31 tanks were required to ‘right size’ the fleet to a total of 90. This need was first voiced publicly by Army over three years ago.
To date, as has been highlighted in the Blog, there has been no public commitment of any sort by Defence. Armouredadvocates was at the point of despair. No amount of lobbying seemed to have any effect. I asked in the earlier posts whether or not there might be some trade-off between tank numbers and simulators.
The PM made a statement announcing an increased Defence capability three days ago. No mention of any action to address the capability gap in mobile warfare. Then I saw the latest issue of the Defence Technology Review. (https://dtrmagazine.com/)
Almost buried in an article on page 47 was the following: “The project [LAND 907 Phase 2] scope is known to include an additional 29 tanks, for a total of 88 … the larger tank fleet will provide regional maintenance pools in the three combat brigade locations (Townsville, Brisbane, Adelaide) and a national repair and attrition stock held at the Army’s logistic centre at Bandiana, Victoria. This will allow a more efficient fleet management process for improved platform availability and reduce the fleet’s total cost of operation”.
So … two tanks short of the optimal fleet size of 90. Was there a ‘trade-off’ with simulators?
DTR states that not only are more gunnery simulators to be procured, but also so are those used to provide “immersive tactical collective training”. So, all is good … or is it? We’ll just to wait until ‘the fat lady sings’.
“… ethical conduct is a personal thing. It must come naturally and instinctively to a person, especially in combat.”
In relation to the cold-blooded killing of a wounded enemy soldier in Vietnam, I asked rhetorically: “…is it a Rules of Engagement (ie. military law) matter or a personal ethics matter?” My answer was: “I believe it is both. One without the other won’t work”.
The report of the inquiry into possible unlawful actions in Afghanistan is about to be handed down. If unlawful actions are found to have occurred, where will ‘blame’ be assigned? (Another question is … how will Government media sources endeavour to minimise the ‘fallout’?)
Will blame be attributed to a failure of leadership by those on the ground, or will it be seen as a failure of leadership in the upper echelons of the Army in terms of the relevant training and procedures which were conducted (or not) on their watch?
In relation to the Vietnam incident, I asked the then Minister for Defence if he could assure the nation that training standards were such that nothing at all similar could be ‘condoned’ at any level again? He replied to say that the content of relevant training courses which had been introduced, would prevent such incidents occurring again. (To be fair, he could not guarantee that such incidents would not occur again, however, he expressed confidence in the ADF training. This confidence was obviously as a result of the advice he received from Defence.)
Who is it that should take responsibility?
I recall a time when military pay rises were frozen (because of economic circumstances). We’re all in it together, I thought. But then I discovered that the pay of service chiefs was aligned to that of MPs and while there were no pay rises for the troops, that wasn’t the case for them.
I had this sort of thing in mind when on one occasion my superior [Colonel David Ashmore, RAA, retd] came out of his office and into the work area waving a document … “Who’s responsible for this”, he shouted over the ‘hubbub’!!! I responded that: “If it’s good then it was my team’s work, if it’s bad then it’s my responsibility”. There was a moment’s silence and he said: ‘It’s very good”. Needless to say, my team appreciated the stance I took.
————————————————————————————————
2 July 2020
Does the RAAC ARES Have a Role?
Photo: Northerndailyleader
Wouldn’t this have been a great media release on 30 June 2020 ….
TO OUR RESERVE FORCES – AUSTRALIA SAYS THANK YOU
“Tomorrow is Reserve Forces Day. I ask all Australians to join with me in applauding the selfless sacrifice of reservists, both former and present, in helping to ensure the defence of our nation. The role of the Reserves is vital to our national security. The dedication and professionalism with which they undertake their part-time service is an example to us all.
The Government is committed to ensuring that the Defence budget is adequate to meet their needs now and in the future. In this way, the force structure of the ADF is able to be clearly defined. Rather than a large standing army with Reserves limited to specialist civilian and simple military skills, we have a smaller regular army, with Reserves encompassing both specialist civilian and complex military skills. It is our Reserve forces that provide, as they have in the past, the surge capacity in time of defence emergency (whether it be a military threat or natural disaster).”
Anyone might have thought that a Minister’s media release might have solely referenced the recent bushfire and COVID-19 responses. Maybe they’d right … see below. The above suggestion clearly articulates the essential role of the Reserve as part of our national security, both now and in the future.
In May I took issue with the following proposal related to the ARES: “Do away with corps, instead generate an all corps reserve capability. The effort saved in training so many corps with long training and upskilling could be reinvested into a capability which supports local security and emergency responses and can deploy to low level Pacific security support”.
I expressed the view that: “There is a disconnect here. Focusing on the strategic direction is right; doing away with long term training (because of its length) is not. It is precisely the length of the training which makes it important. When military equipment was unsophisticated, the militia or CMF could be readily mobilised to provide a wide range of military skills.
Today the choice is to have either (i) a large standing army and ARES limited to specialist civilian and simple military skills; or, (ii) a smaller standing army and ARES encompassing both specialist civilian and complex military skills (eg. qualified to operate LAND 400 AFVs). In terms of investment cost, the latter is, by far, the less expensive.”
————————————————————————————————-
1 July 2020
1AR Assn: Open and Transparent 2?
Photo: raatior.com
As one who has poured over every word and helped develop the draft on which the Assn’s Constitution is based, I claim to be eligible to comment on the Constitution actually adopted … in terms of membership.
If you’ve been a member of 1 Armd Regt you’re partially eligible to join the Assn. Your eligibility depends of whenever or not, in the eyes of the C’tee, you’re a “a fit and proper person for consideration of admission or re-admission”.
The Constitution defines a ‘fit and proper person’ as: “A person who is suitable, appropriate or legally eligible to undertake a particular activity”.
That’s clear … isn’t it?
If you wanted to be an ordinary member, for example, you would have to be considered suitable by the C’tee. How would be C’tee do this? The Constitution states that the C’tee would “conduct and complete a due diligence process on the completed application”. On what grounds would an application be considered to pass the due diligence test?
Well you might ask. There is no explanation as to what the ‘due diligence’ test amounts to.
That’s ok you might think … the applicant can always appeal. But there in lies the ‘rub’ … the Constitution states that: “The Management Committee has the discretion absolutely, to accept or reject an application for membership of the Association”.
At least if you’re applying for membership, the C’tee is required to inform you why your application has been rejected. If you’re applying to renew your membership, however, there is no such requirement (which explains why at least one former member has not had his membership renewed without explanation).
How should the Constitution be amended?
Firstly, what constitutes the ‘due diligence’ action by the C’tee and the criteria for a ‘fit and proper’ person needs to be made clear.
If this was to involve, for example, the opinions of others outside the C’tee … surely this should be made known to the applicant. But, would this be of any import?
If the applicant can’t appeal, what’s the use of knowing where any untrue assertions came from?
———————————————————————————————-
30 June 2020
Thank You for Your Service: What a Joke!
My intended Blog post for today, has been delayed until tomorrow. That below is much more pressing. Our bureaucratic mind set is simply unbelievable. Australia is heading in the wrong direction if this philosophy gains traction! I sent the following email to Defence ‘Customer Support’ yesterday:
“Help Please
In 1971, Peter, my tank driver received very serious head wounds in Vietnam, resulting in him being Totally and Permanently Incapacitated. Because of the gallantry he displayed at the time, he was Mentioned in Dispatches. He wishes to leave his mid certificate to his daughter, however, it is very badly faded and he would like to obtain a replacement.
Enquires were made and it was recommended that he apply to Defence Records. Peter did this in February 2021. As he hadn’t heard anything in response, I enquired on his behalf today.
I was advised that it was an Honours and Awards matter. I asked if Peter’s email request and the copy of his mid certificate (that he sent to Defence records) could be forwarded to Defence Honours and Awards. I was told that Defence records either can’t, or aren’t allowed to, communicate with Defence Honours and Awards.
I made a new enquiry to Defence Honours and Awards. I was told that I couldn’t make an inquiry on someone else’s behalf, because of privacy provisions. It was confirmed that Honours and Awards could not access the information held by Defence Records … an application had to be made by the person concerned. I explained that this was difficult for Peter, because of his wounds.
An alternative was found! My request could be considered on the basis of being a non-specific enquiry, ie. what is the process, as a general question, for obtaining a replacement mid certificate?
Hopefully you (ie. Defence Honours and Awards) will receive this general enquiry in due course. The above is sent in the hope that it might provide background to assist in responding to the request.
“Minute 45 of 2019/20 – Nominal Roll of the Association. After one or two questions had been addressed, the Secretary (Russ James) moved that:
The Association publish a Nominal Roll of Association members on the Association website
the Nominal Roll is only to include surname, post nominals, given name or names as well as nicknames, squadron and dates of service in each squadron
inclusion on the Nominal Roll is by ‘opt-in’ and all members wishing to be included must provide written advice to the Secretary by either email or snail mail
all Association members be informed via MailChimp and by Face Book pages that the Association uses for communication purposes, that the Association intends to publish a Nominal Roll of the Association approximately 21 days after the notification is provided.
After additional discussion concerning the inclusion of members currently serving with the Regiment it was determined that serving members should seek approval from the Regiment before inclusion on the Nominal Roll. The Secretary is required to notify the Adjutant of Association intentions.”
Not for the first time, the C’tee don’t say WHY they’re going to do something; in this case, publish the Roll. You could understand it, if they were to say … “in order to facilitate contact between members,the C’tee would be prepared to put members in contact with each other if they were asked to do so”.
While the published Roll is being developed on an ‘opt-in’ basis, it’s interesting that there seems to be a suggestion that it’s possible for membership info to be kept private … but the Constitution means that the details re ALL members must be made available on request of another member*, ie: “Register of members (1) The Secretary must keep and maintain a register of members that includes— (a) for each current member— i. the member’s name; ii. the address for notice last given by the member; iii. the date of becoming a member; iv. if the member is an ordinary, affiliate, honorary, associate or Life member, a note to that effect; v. any other information determined by the Committee; vi. each member’s preferred method of notification; and (b) for each former member, the date of ceasing to be a member. (2) In accordance with section 57 of the Act, any member may, at a reasonable time and free of charge, inspect the register of members.” *This is a requirement common to all associations incorporated under Victorian law.
Given the past circumstances, one has to wonder how well the Register of Members has been maintained by C’tees over the years as required by Consumer Affairs Victoria (as per the above requirements in the Constitution), and if “any other information [as] determined by the C’tee” is recorded in the Register? More tomorrow.
The discussion re one item is summarised as: Item 24/20 – Died of Wounds – the Secretary (Russ James) advised that the request for information submitted to Defence Archives had been rejected and the Association was advised to submit an FOI Request. An additional request for information submitted to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs on 27 May 2020 had not been answered. This would be followed up after the end of this financial year.
This matter was referred to in Blog posts on 24, 25, and 26 May. In the last, I copied an email to the Secretary:
“As I advised a previous C’tee, there is no barrier to Associations listing members on their Honour Rolls who are officially classified as DOW, but are not able to be included on the AWM ROH as it is restricted to only listing war related deaths that occurred during the prescribed period of a War, plus two years.
All that has to be done is to ask “DVA to investigate whether or not the veteran’s death was war-related”. If it was, the veteran is entitled to be listed as DOW (as well as receiving an official commemoration).
I recently advised DVA that: ‘I wish to ascertain if 1200348 Cpl Andrew Martin Anderson’s death (on 20 April 2017) can be attributed to wounds he received on 25 June 1971 in Vietnam. (His left arm was amputated and he lost the sight in his right eye). The reason for asking is that DVA is to hold a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord in Canberra on 7 June 2021. A Last Post Ceremony will be conducted at the AWM on 6 June 2021. Wreaths will be laid during the LPC and Cpl Anderson’s ‘mates’ wish to ensure that all who Died of Wounds (both during and post-Vietnam) are recognised appropriately”.
DVA responded to say that Cpl A M Anderson’s death was so attributed and that he had been officially commemorated by the Office of Australian War Graves at the site of his ashes placement in the Toowoomba Garden of Remembrance and Crematorium … which will be maintained in perpetuity in recognition of his service to his country. The 1AR Assn may care to include Cpl A M Anderson on its Honour Roll.”
So … the Secretary (although he doesn’t acknowledge it) accepted my recommendation and emailed DVA the next day. But that was a month ago and they’re not going to follow-up until July.
I sent the following email to the Secretary yesterday:
“Dear Secretary, I see that the Minutes of the latest C’tee meeting state:
“Item 24/20 – Died of Wounds – the Secretary (Russ James) advised that the request for information submitted to Defence Archives had been rejected and the Association was advised to submit an FOI Request. An additional request for information submitted to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs on 27 May 2020 had not been answered. This would be followed up after the end of this financial year.”
I see that you followed up my email to you on 25 May 2020 (copied at the end) re contacting DVA.
I’m surprised that you haven’t had a response. The lady below has recently helped (in a very timely manner) friends of Phil Barwick and Andy Anderson confirm their DOW status. May I suggest you call her re the enquiry that you have: Ms Kerry Russell Manager, Official Commemorations & Information Services, Office of Australian War Graves, Ph: 02 6225 4675. (I see that the Assn is yet to list A. M. Anderson as DOW.)”
McCarthy makes the point that “Vietnam’s [economic] rise has been remarkable. When Saigon fell in 1975, Vietnam was already exhausted. Because in 1978 Vietnam occupied Cambodia, the former fought a bitter border war with China, the ASEAN states ostracised it and most of the West denied it aid. In 1991, the Cambodian Settlement brought the 40 years of Indochina wars to a close. Since then, Vietnam’s economy has grown faster than those of its neighbours … “.
Surprisingly (or not) for a former diplomat, there is no mention of human rights abuses. The appalling treatment of Australia’s former South Vietnamese allies from 1975 until now, doesn’t rate a mention. The economy is all important. Well, not quite … geo-strategic politics rate highly as well.
“Less obvious is that while Vietnam is neither the largest nor wealthiest country in south-east Asia, it is the most crucial in ASEAN’s attempts to manage China’s strategic expansionism. Its diplomacy is arguably the most skillful in the region.
In navigating its relationship with China , Vietnam has been at the forefront of the south-east Asian countries in pushing for a code of conduct in the South China Sea (SCS) and has opposed a number of actions which China has taken there, including the latter’s recent establishment of administrative districts in the contested Paracel and Spratley islands.”
So, what does this mean for Australia?
“Our foreign policy system understands the importance of Vietnam – but not enough. While Scott Morrison made a welcome visit to Hanoi last year. it was the first bilateral visit by an Australian prime minister since 1992. It is time we promoted Vietnam to the first tier of our Asian relationships. By so doing we will further our interests.”
One cannot but ask again … why is it that human rights abuses are not mentioned?
*John McCarthy has served as Australian ambassador to seven countries, including the US, Indonesia, Japan and India.
————————————————————————————————
26 June 2020
‘Centurion Tank ARN 169056 (Cont 2)’
Following the post on 21 June, I’ve been asked if I knew how ARN 169056 came to be at the AWM. The story goes back to 2003 and I’ve copied my response below.
“I was involved in lobbying the AWM (with help from a couple of others) for a Centurion to be retained at the AWM … after it’d been decided that there was no longer sufficient space inside ANZAC Hall.
The then Chief of Army supported our case. The AWM finally agreed that a tank could be located in the grounds (this possibility had been rejected initially). The two Cents held by the AWM were important as items in its Collection and they couldn’t be allowed to deteriorate outside. At first, I was considering raising funds to buy the Cent owned by Peter Jarratt (former CO 1 AR). I was involved in discussions with him when the CA offered one of the tanks at Puckapunyal (a number were ‘parked’ around the parade ground at the School of Armour).
I went to Pucka and looked at them. Ideally the tank for the AWM should be one which had been used in Vietnam. Lo and behold … 169056 was one of the tanks next to the parade ground. I was writing my book at the time, so I knew its providence. I thought that I would have to raise funds to move it to Canberra, however, the CA came to the rescue again. He arranged for the movement on the basis of an Aid to Civil Power project.
When the AWM received the tank it had to be refurbished before it could be placed on display. The AWM staff were clever. Located outside, the engine and gearbox would deteriorate. At the time, these items were still in reasonable condition. They were donated to AFV enthusiasts, in return for their assistance in doing the external refurb. A suitable site was prepared by the AWM and when ready, the tank was lowered into position. A Dedication ceremony was later conducted … and there you have it!
PS. The CA at the time was Lt Gen Peter Leahy, AC (CA 2002-2008). The Representative Honorary Colonel of the RAAC was former CA(CGS), Lt Gen Laurie O’Donnell, AC. Both he and the Hon Col, 1 Armd Regt (Maj Gen Roger Powell, AM) had a significant role in achieving the outcome … behind the scenes. (Gen O’Donnell also flew to Darwin to launch the history of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam in 2012.)”
—————————————————————————————————
25 June 2020
Ethical Conduct
The following is the link to an article (and previous comment) in ‘The Cove’ by Maj Gen Jake Ellwood (Commander of 1st Division/Deployable Joint Force Headquarters): https://cove.army.gov.au/article/leading-the-tactical-level. My response is copied below:
“… ethical conduct is a personal thing. It must come naturally and instinctively to a person, especially in combat.”
While researching a unit history from Vietnam I tried to read widely. One book provided a detailed account of an ambush in which an enemy soldier was wounded. The ambush commander radioed his HQ and was told not to bring back any prisoners. The ambush party stood up and emptied their magazines into the wounded enemy soldier. Moreover, the Foreword of this book was written by a serving Brigadier (later Maj Gen), saying what a sterling account it was of Australian soldiers on operations.
What do I do? There is a no Statute of Limitations on murder. I reported the incident to Defence … I was told that this was a police matter. I wrote to the Minister. A Defence investigation was conducted. I believed it to have been somewhat superficial and a follow-up enquiry was held. It was concluded that the author had ‘exaggerated’ the account. I asked the Minister if he could assure the Australian people that nothing like this would happen again. I was informed that appropriate training would guarantee this.
So, is it a Rules of Engagement (ie. military law) matter or a personal ethics matter?
I believe it is both. One without the other won’t work.
(The book had been on sale at the AWM, but was subsequently withdrawn.)
————————————————————————————————–
24 June 2020
Operational Research: Operational Analysis
“Does the ADF fully appreciate the need for OR to complement the investment in new capability and properly achieve an integrated force?”
The article is very relevant in relation to the Blogs posts on Operational Analysis (15 Apr 20 and earlier) and Aust Defence Strategy (wargaming) on 21 May and 1 Jun 20. [Also previous posts on Australian Defence Strategy.] OA is the analysis of past operations to better inform forces today. Simulation (wargaming) is the testing of contingency plans to further develop and modify them. This forms part of operational research.
The article makes the point that “Effective employment of OR in the military context requires more than simply adding a cadre of OR practitioners to an organisation. It begins with a framework setting out the critical missions the force is expected to perform—against what threat or for what operational task, and under what circumstances, must the force be able to achieve what outcome, how rapidly and for how long?”
Also … “The judgement on what objectives are most strategically important to Australia is critical to this analysis. Analysis in force design must be characterised in measurable terms by leaders who understand analysis. OR techniques can then be used to establish the cost-effectiveness of various options for mixes of forces, and the capabilities of the units and systems making up those forces. These techniques can also enable operational planners to decide how these capabilities could best be employed as part of a joint force, to achieve specific outcomes”.
Note: The US site referenced in the image above, is worthy of investigation. Maybe the difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’ is what underlies the article (?).
“Gaining the initiative on the battle field requires training your subordinates to achieve surprise. They need to out-think the enemy using cunning to affect the enemy at an unexpected time or place.”
Good article. Gaining and maintaining the initiative is obviously key to success on the battlefield. To me, there are two words above, which are crucial: surprise and cunning. Neither of these are involved in repetitive tactical drills, such as a defile crossing drill.
The enemy capitalised on the repetitive nature of the drills we conducted in Vietnam. For example, anti-personnel mines were spread out, but the main goal was not to inflict a casualty … it was to destroy the ‘casevac’ helicopter. The enemy knew the requirements for an LZ and that the ground would be checked; the mine was set in a tree and activated by wind turbulence. The plan worked.
Another example was a disturbance to the surface of road. The enemy knew that a mini-team would be sent forward. The object was rigged so that a bayonet used to prod the area would detonate the mine. It worked, a sapper was KIA. I’m sure that there are equivalent examples from Afghanistan… the only difference is the openness of the country and the degree of visibility.
To my mind, the key is to “out-think the enemy”; this ties together the elements of surprise and cunning. Whenever you achieve surprise, you gain the initiative. Thinking dominated by repetitive drills will never achieve surprise.
——————————————————————————————————–
22 June 2020
The Vietnam Requiem
An edited version of the latest information from Chris Latham (Artist in Residence at the AWM and Flowers of War organiser) is copied below. Previous Blogs posts on 19, 21 and 23 March referred to the Vietnam Requiem. As will be seen, its premiere performance will be in Canberra (immediately preceding the 50th Anniversary dinner of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt); and followed the next day by the National Commemoration for Operation Overlord).
Our next concert program is being created…
We are delighted to say that we have used the lockdown to create the program foundations for the Vietnam Requiem; our war abroad and at home
This is our first commemorative work that will be focused on living veterans and those directly affected by a war, including protestors and refugees and is designed to help assist in the healing of the trauma arising from that conflict.
Concert details:
Sunday, 6 June 2021 from 1.30pm to 4pm
Llewellyn Hall, ANU, Canberra
This concert will be the first time the Anzac story behind the conflict will be told. We have assembled a deeply committed and experienced creative team, including many from the Gallipoli Symphony and the Diggers’ Requiem, in order to bring authenticity and truth, however painful, to this concert. We are aiming to have the full concert program finalised by early 2021. The recording and the sheet music will all be gifted to the nation, to allow free use by those for whom it is meaningful.
There will be opportunities for anyone wishing to dedicate a newly commissioned work to someone affected by this war. We will be posting further details via the Australian Cultural Fund soon.
We are proud that we will be employing around 100 musicians, from across all musical genres, to present the Vietnam Requiem in 2021.
The Great War Collection is complete
“When the last note of the Somme Lament was sounded, Kelly’s last composition, it resonated so strongly with the audience that no one moved for minutes.”
After Many years of research, performances and recordings, the Flowers of the Great War Collection was gifted to the nation by the Governor General of Australia in Canberra. Copies were given to the 12 Ambassadors of the nations who invested in it, as well as to our National Cultural Institutions and all those present at the French Embassy on Remembrance Day 2019. With thanks to the French Ambassador Christopher Penot and his staff, the Flowers of War team and all those who shared Chris’s vision and supported his determination, we say thank you.
Dean Lee, the CEO of the Melbourne’s Shrine of Remembrance, summed it up in his letter to the Australian War Memorial. “I was greatly moved by the performance of the Flowers of the Great War … No other experience, exhibition, book, movie or performance I have experienced since I joined the commemorative community in 2014 has caused me to reflect so deeply upon the costs of the First World War.”
Ambassadors from Turkey, Belgium, NZ, UK, Germany, France, EU, Austria and Portugal received their collection from the Governor General in company with Chris Latham and David Whitney as MC. Photo by Peter Hislop.
21 June 2020
Centurion Tank ARN 169056 (Cont)
The Blog post on 23 May 2020 explained the AWM’s intention to move the tank. The following email from the Assistant Director responsible for the Memorial’s collection is copied below:
“Many thanks for your recent email regarding the Australian War Memorial’s movement of Centurion ARN 169056, which has now been successfully undertaken. While pressures of time precluded the Memorial from sharing the proposed new text with you prior to the tank’s relocation, your comments on the existing caption were certainly taken into consideration, and I trust that the new panel will prove satisfactory to you. The only area in which space constraints prevented us from incorporating changes as per your suggestion was with regard to Bo Janic’s role as Operator/Loader, which remains largely as on the original.
The newly installed outdoor display really serves to emphasise the size, power and significance of the three vehicles, particularly the Centurion, and I hope that you will be as pleased with it as we are.
My thanks also for the advanced notice on the C Sqn 1 Armoured Regiment reunion in Canberra next June. Although the Memorial already holds recorded interviews with yourself, Bo Janic and Kim Bayly, the opportunity to interview the complete crew together would be an unusual one, and is worthy of consideration. I will discuss the idea with staff to determine what may be achievable.
I visited the AWM yesterday. The new AFV line-up is pictured:
I responded … “I was the crew commander of the Centurion when it was hit by an anti-tank rocket on 26 June 1971. The driver was badly wounded, but despite this, tried to come to the aid of the rest of us in the turret. A new driver came forward and the tank continued to attack the enemy position (which was subsequently overrun by the combined arms team). Crew members will be coming together in June next year to mark the 50th Anniversary of the action.”
The RAR Corporation have a much greater membership base than that of the RAAC Corporation … but that aside, why can’t the members and former members of the RAAC do better?
Look at the news and information updates provided on the RAR site. If someone wanted to find out about the RAAC’s involvement with Operation Bushfire Assist or Operation COVID-19 Assist (for example), they have to go looking … and even then might not find it.
Surely there is the capability within the RAAC family to provide such website support and media updates. Is it a matter that the RAAC Corporation doesn’t think that it’s important and hasn’t asked?
The current RAAC Corporation website has recently been amended to reflect the actual AFVs operated by the RAAC (at last!), but what about the incorrect info displayed re the 1 Armd Regt Standard and the 3 Cav Regt Guidon? Surely it wouldn’t take an Einstein to add updated information (given that it’s probably very difficult to amend the original publication)?
One also has to wonder why the RAAC Corporation Constitution is not available on the website?
—————————————————————————————————–
19 June 2020
The Ha Go Tank Saga (Cont)
Photo: Wikipedia
The following is an exchange of emails with the AWM, following on from the Blog post on 30 May 20.
“Dear AWM, Many thanks for the attention given by the AWM to this matter (see email below). It is nice to see the conflict in the AWM’s previously published information, resolved, eg. “While it is thought that the crew size on these tanks was typically three, contemporary evidence, including the interrogation report of a Marine captured at Milne Bay, indicated the two used in this battle had a crew of four” and “This particular Type 95 tank had a crew of four (usually reported as three): commander, gunner, driver, and hull gunner”.
While a young officer, I attended the British Army Tank Technology course. During this, I was given the task of assessing the fighting arrangements of the Tiger tank (in the Museum). I was given a weighted mock-up of an 88mm round. Anyone who has had experience operating tanks in action, would praise the dedication of the two crew fulfilling the duties of commander and gunner in the turret of a Ha Go tank. How they did this would make an excellent project for someone at the AWM (as well as adding great value to the exhibit, both nationally and internationally).”
Earlier email from AWM:
“Dear Mr Cameron,
Thanks for your recent email regarding references on the Australian War Memorial’s website to the crew of the Japanese Type 95 Ha Go tank. As you can probably imagine, Memorial staff have been extremely busy during the COVID pandemic period, particularly our Digital Experience team, who look after the AWM website, but who also played a major role in the delivery of this year’s Anzac Day ceremonies and broadcasts to the public. For this reason, the conflicting Ha Go crew figures shown on several parts of our website had not been prioritised for correction. I am pleased to say, however, that these issues have now been addressed, and a more consistent and accurate position on this topic is on the Memorial’s website.
Our curatorial staff note that the references in the Intelligence Bulletin to Japanese machine gunners travelling on top of tanks at Milne Bay would appear to refer to supporting infantry troops, rather than tank crew, and that the Tank Museum’s very entertaining presentation on the Ha Go does not offer any new insights, particularly given that staff there are not currently able to access the crew compartment of their preserved example. As regards crew numbers, it uncritically accepts modern thinking on the subject, rather than examining or considering contemporary evidence. The Memorial has based its position upon study of period references, and particularly upon the identities of the four crew members of our tank known to have been present at Milne Bay. We accept that your own view, and that of some others, is at odds with this, and respect the reasoning which has led to your conclusions. However, having agreed to disagree, I would ask that correspondence on this topic now be closed. Yours sincerely …”.
.———————————————————————————————–
18 June 2020
1 AR Assn: Fostering and Perpetuating Ties of Comradeship?
The following email to Maj Gen Orme, Patron, 1 AR Assn (cc. the President, 1AR Assn) is self-explanatory:
“I wonder if (as Patron of the 1AR Assn) you’ve considered the implications of acknowledging (vide the attached) only those members of the 1 Armd Regt Association who were involved in the actions at Coral – Balmoral?
Seems to me that ALL those members of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt who took part in the battles related to Coral and Balmoral, deserve to be honoured. Furthermore, it is within the capacity of the 1 AR Assn to do this. I hope that you will agree …”.
The Constitution of the 1AR Assn states that its first two Purposes are to combine everyone into an association and “foster and perpetuate ties of comradeship created by those eligible for membership”.
Exactly how do you foster ties of comradeship by acknowledging only the efforts of those who are members of the Assn and ignoring those equally deserving, but not members?
Are we not capable of showing genuine respect to all veterans, rather than simply praising our own members?
Interestingly, the certificate offers congratulations to all members of the Association who were involved in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral between “12 May 1968 and 6 June 1968”. Anyone who is familiar with the Regiment’s history, knows that the tanks arrived at FSB Coral on 23 May 1968 and left on 5 June 1968.
This might not seem like much of an oversight, but the story behind the tanks’ late call forward and the impact they subsequently achieved, is one of 1st Armoured Regiments’ greatest military achievements.
PS. As well as being Patron 1 AR Assn, General Orme is also Hon Col 1 Armd Regt. So, a bit of a conflict of interest … recognise only members of the Assn, or also former members of 1 Armd Regt?
———————————————————————————————-
16 June 2020
Ensuring the Accuracy of Our History
Photo: Army
The following email to the AWM is self-explanatory:
I recently came across this video https://www.facebook.com/groups/228239040566963 which was posted on a website in commemoration of Binh Ba (6 Jun 69). I believe that those who saw the footage, thought that it was actually filmed during the battle on that day.
The fact is, that it was not taken on 6 June during the assault on Binh Ba, but on 7 June during the assault on the neighbouring hamlet of Duc Trung. The latter was very different and the footage used gives a completely false impression of what happened the day before.
There a couple of other points re commentary:
(i) The tank and ARV did not “pass through the village”. The tank was hit by the RPG and sped through; the ARV turned around and headed back to Nui Dat. (The RPG had damaged the tank’s radio harness and the ARV’s radios were not working … the first that 1ATF HQ knew of the enemy presence in the village was the verbal report from the ARV crew comd) and
I think the AWM reference is: The Battle of Binh Ba (V8); Film Maker: McJannett, Ray. Audio Visual Produced for Conflicts 1945 to Today gallery – The Battle of Binh Ba (V8). PAFU2015/140.01; but F08332 also seems applicable.
Is it possible to add something to the on-line description of the AWM’s film to avoid the confusion outlined above?
The AWM responded to say: “Thanks for the comment and suggestion, I have passed it to a colleague for their input”.
——————————————————————————————–
15 June 2020
A Tankie’s View from the Infantry Perspective
The following article, by an inf sgt, is on the Army Professional Military Education website: ‘The Cove’: https://cove.army.gov.au/article/tank-action-the-case-increased-anti-armour-capabilities
My response is copied below
Hi Tavis, You point out that “… infantry lack modern doctrine on how to defeat enemy armoured vehicles such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers”, and argue that “we need to significantly increase the organic anti-armour capabilities of the infantry battalions at the company level”.
You’ve presented your case commendably and I hope you don’t mind if I try to add some further value. In a previous life I was a member of the British Parachute Regiment. When I returned to Australia, I joined the Army and qualified as a tank commander. On a subsequent visit to the UK, I visited my old unit while they were on exercise. Knowing that I had had some experience with armour, I was asked to give some guidance as to how infantry could use their characteristics to best advantage against tanks. Surprisingly, I had never before had to put myself in an infantryman’s position when confronted by armour and I realised that my training had been lacking.
What are the vulnerabilities of tanks? Lack of vision for one, especially if forced to close down. Their speed and shock action effect can be reduced by difficult going and obstacles. The underside, top and rear of the tank are its weakest points. Armoured forces are controlled by electronic means and are, therefore, vulnerable to EW measures (though this usually something initiated by higher command). How can infantry capitalise on these weaknesses?
It follows that the more early-warning systems and anti-armour weapons (both indirect and direct fire; long range and short range), the greater the defensive capability. What else can be done, however? There is a fallacy that if tanks are not stopped beyond the range of their main armament, then the battle is lost. Indeed, it can be said, that it’s just starting. Where possible, the use of ground (and creation of obstacles) to channel the AFVs is an obvious tactic. This can be combined with measures such as indirect fire to keep the crews closed down, reducing their visibility further with smoke. (Tanks breaking through a smoke screen make ideal targets.)
While the ability to rapidly deploy mines is a defensive asset, infantry can also use mines locally to good effect (especially in conjunction with obstacles). An infantryman’s main advantage when confronted by tanks is his difficulty in being seen. Shoot and scoot tactics are useful in this respect. Where should infantry direct fire weapons be located? There will always be areas of ‘dead ground’ which tanks are unable to observe. This could be in the lee of a hill, which tanks will skirt around (rather than driving over the crest) … allowing a flank-on engagement.
It’s to be expected that tanks, when closing with an objective, will be advancing behind supporting artillery and with infantry following in support. Such a deliberate combined arms situation will limit the use of initiatives such as listed above. In conclusion, my advice to my former para mates, was to capitalise on the limited visibility available to tanks and take full advantage of ground which slows their movement.
PS. I forgot to mention the value of snipers in both inflicting casualties and forcing tanks to operate closed down
——————————————————————————————-
14 June 2020
1 AR Assn: Will they Move on or Will they Build Their Lives Around it?
I was particularly interested in what he had to say about ‘forgiveness’.
I wrote to the President 1AR Assn some time back and said that I could: forgive the things that had happened; concede that the present C’tee had done much to correct the wrongs of the past; and offer to delete the Introduction to the Blog which highlighted these.
The President declined to respond. So, the 1 AR Assn’s ‘failings’ of the past are still listed at the start of the Blog … serving to remind us of how much better things have now become (and some of the reasons why).
The question is … why wasn’t the President prepared to recognise the efforts that former members made to correct the prior shortcomings in governance? See Blog 27 May 2020. Maybe he was, but was overruled by the C’tee. Then again, maybe he wanted to shore up his own place in history as the one who fixed the Constitution, ensured fair voting practices, and introduced the Assn to open and transparent governance. Or … maybe he simply wanted to whitewash all such aspects from 1AR Assn’s history.
The old African saying at the top of the Blog is: If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.
Seems to me that it follows that if you’re not prepared to go together, you’re destined not to go very far.
———————————————————————————————-
13 June 2020
Hammersley Recognition: What’s Right for the Goose …
The following letter to Mr Mark Sullivan, AO; Chairman, Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, is self-explanatory …
Dear Mr Sullivan,
It’s been reported on the ABC News, with respect to the Sheean review, that: Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal Chairman Mark Sullivan AO wrote to Senator Reynolds saying she had misled the Senate [and] demanding she “correct the record”.
You will recall that I wrote to you on a number of occasions with the respect to the Tribunal’s report at https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Cameron.pdf. I asked not that the outcome be changed, but that the public record of proceedings be corrected to correspond with the evidence actually presented. A quotation to this end is copied below
Firstly, para 48: “ The second avenue considered by the Tribunal was whether the supporting units proposed by Colonel Cameron could be considered to be elements of 8RAR for the purposes of the citation as presented — in other words, could those units be considered to be part of 8RAR from 28 November 1969 through to the date of the award? Defence was asked to consider this avenue in a question placed on notice at the October hearing.” This following omission was made: ‘The Applicant was subsequently advised that his response to this question would be welcomed and considered by the Tribunal.’
Secondly para 49: “Defence has provided the advice that the sub-units nominated by Colonel Cameron were not permanently assigned for the duration of the Battalions tour.In response to this advice, Colonel Cameron has re-stated his opinion that the sub-units were under command for Operation HAMMERSLEY.” This statement is false. The correct statement would be: Colonel Cameron provided a formal response which was supported by a 57page submission. He argued that the fact that elements of all the supporting arms were under command of 8RAR for all its operations and were critical to the successes achieved, meant that they could be considered to have been elements of 8RAR for the purposes of the citation as presented.
Given your recognition of the importance of the correctness of the public record, I ask that you reconsider my requests on the same basis as that you’ve made to Senator Reynolds.
Many thanks, Bruce
——————————————————————————————–
12 June 2020
The Victoria Cross for Australia III: Two Classes and Floodgates (or Not?)
On 29 May 2020, on the Alan Jones radio program, the Prime Minister said:
“Well, Alan, there’s no doubt that the bravery and the story of Teddy Sheean is truly remarkable, like so many stories that were remarkable of that time. And you point rightly to the valour- there was a Valour Inquiry that was held back in 2016 [sic], the ‘19 Inquiry followed that it didn’t identify additional evidence as I’m advised. The VC is the most important of all awards. Actually, not that long ago it was the New Zealand Government that made such a recommendation to the Queen and it was rejected. Les Carlyon, who I know you are a great fan of, said doing this sort of thing for a reconsideration of a VC says it creates two classes of VCs. And Keith Payne VC, who I know you greatly respect, and other VC holders have always taken a very strong view about these issues and they don’t want to see a two class system of VCs.”https://www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-alan-jones-2gb-8
Less than two weeks after his radio interview, the Prime Minister said:
“I have today commissioned an expert panel [to be led by former director of the AWM, Dr Brendan Nelson, AO] to provide me with advice as to whether the 2019 review by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal had any significant new evidence, not available to the previous reviews and otherwise available, that is compelling enough to support a recommendation by the Government that Sheean’s Mention in Despatches be replaced by a Victoria Cross.” The panel is to report by 31 July 2020.
In the same article quoted above, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/expert-panel-to-review-wwii-sailor-s-victoria-cross-case-20200610-p551dy.htm, it was reported that Chief of the Defence Force Angus Campbell has previously “strongly advised” both Mr Morrison and Defence Personnel Minister Darren Chester not to seek the honour for Sheean. In a letter to them both, General Campbell acknowledged the young sailor’s bravery but warned a request to grant him a VC could open the floodgates to a “swath of additional claims for retrospective military honours” from “all past conflicts”.
The latter consequence is a newly published one as far as the CDF is concerned. He had been reported previously as objecting to the award because, if it was made, the Queen would be put in a difficult position (because HM had previously rejected a similar request for a retrospective award from NZ).
So, if Dr Nelson’s panel was to recommend that the VC be awarded to ‘Teddy’ Sheean … in the opinion of the PM and CDF, it would entrench two classes of VC and open the floodgates to a swath of claims for retrospective awards (as well putting the Queen in a difficult position). What would these ‘two classes of award’ comprise? It would seem that they would be: (i) awards recommended on the battlefield; and (ii) awards made retrospectively. Even if compelling new evidence was to come to light, a retrospective award would always be classed differently … possibly a VC (R)?
The PM has previously accepted these reasons and rejected the recommendation of the Tribunal for the award to be made. BUT … public opinion (aka votes) means that a face-saving new enquiry is now to be held. What odds … the political acceptance or rejection of the outcome?
“Each event is significant, and none can really be meaningfully compared to the other.”
I totally agree. My similar anecdote is from a presentation on Long Tan, given at the AWM. The historian remarked: “It was just small beer”. He was comparing Long Tan with Passchendaele. I was so incensed that I stood up and stated that he had no right to use the term ‘small beer’; asking if he could understand how insulting it would be to the NOK of the Long Tan casualties to have the sacrifices of their family members, portrayed on this basis? The bravery and dedication of soldiers is the same, not matter the scale of the battle.
You mention that “Our Army has Courage, Respect, Initiative and Teamwork as its core values”. I don’t doubt for one minute that our soldiers today live up to, and indeed, exceed, these expectations. I wonder, however, if they are being supported well enough.
Sometimes the maturity of a nation is expressed in terms of the degree to which it cares for its veterans. I believe that the maturity of an Army can be expressed in terms of the degree to which it embraces the lessons that have been learnt from past experiences (not only those of yesterday, but also those happening in real time).
The Vietnam experience was that combat lessons had to be re-learnt (at the cost of casualties) by every new unit deployed. There was no attempt interview soldiers returning from active service, so as to gain (and build on) their insights and experience. Has the Australian Army of today, reached maturity?
—————————————————————————————–
9-10 June 2020. Note: There will be no Blog posts on 9 or 10 June. I’ll be away on ‘grandparental duties’.
—————————————————————————————–
8 June 2020
Our History (And How it Becomes Distorted) II
Following on from 18 March 2020,
A post on another site (copied at end) shows just how easily our history can become distorted. The wording in the post is included on this site https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Centurion_tank, though it might have been copied from a different one. Tracking some of the references given, shows that some of the source material has been misquoted. Research undertaken for ‘Canister! On! FIRE! (two print runs now sold out) allows me make the following observations. Of course, others could well add even more value to the subject (one I believe to be important, not just in terms of historical accuracy, but also by way of obligation to the tank crews involved).
The presence of the HQ 7NVA Division (plus other Divisional units) was a factor in terms of the enemy’s offensive capability during the Coral-Balmoral actions.
The composite troop (formed at FSB Coral) did not include two tank dozers (none had been able to reach the FSB). For the action on 2 June 1968, two additional tanks were ‘borrowed’ from 1 Troop. Later in June the blades were removed from the tank dozers (because of mechanical problems, which were later resolved) and 3 Troop was formed.
“By 1969” should read “By the end of 1970 …” (and A Squadron 3rd Cavalry should be added).
“Originally deployed as 26 Centurion tanks” is misleading. The tank squadron comprised 20 tanks; six others were held by the Forward Delivery Unit (an independent entity).
Two tank crewmen were not Killed In Action. One was KIA, the other Died of Wounds.
Main armament stowage for the Centurion Mk 5/1 (Aust) was reduced from 62 to 60 because of the space taken up with stowage for RMG ammo and IR batteries.
Stowage for machine gun ammunition amounted to 7000 x .30cal (incl 2500 in the rack behind the commander’s cupola) and 700 x .50cal rounds.
The fact that the Centurion had a petrol engine did not, of itself, necessitate the additional fuel tank. This was added to provide greater range, as was expected to be required for operations in Vietnam.
————————————————————————–
“Here’s something I did not know –
After the battles at firebases Coral and Balmoral, in which the 1 ATF defeated the 141st and 165th NVA Infantry Regiments in May 1968, a third Centurion troop, which included two tankdozers, was formed. By September 1968, ‘C’ Squadron was brought to its full strength of four troops, each equipped with four Centurion tanks. By 1969, ‘B’ Squadron, 3rd Cavalry; ‘A’ Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment; ‘B’ Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment; and ‘C’ Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, had all made rotations through South Vietnam. Originally deployed as 26 Centurion tanks, after three and a half years of combat operations, 58 Centurions had served in country; 42 had suffered battle damage with six beyond repair and two crewmen had been killed in action.
The Centurion crews, after operating for a few weeks in country, soon learned to remove the protective armoured side skirts from both sides of the tank, to prevent the vegetation and mud from building up between the track and the mudguards. Each Centurion in Vietnam normally carried a basic load of 62 rounds of 20 pounder shells, 4,000 rounds of .50 cal and 9,000 rounds of .30 cal machine gun ammunition for the tank commander’s machine gun as well as the two coaxial machine guns. They were equipped with petrol engines, which necessitated the use of an extra externally mounted 100-imperial-gallon (450 L) fuel tank, which was attached to the vehicle’s rear.”
———————————————————————————————–
7 June 2020
The Thucydides Trap
At the end of my Blog post on 2 May 20, I said “Sometimes I’m ashamed of my country”.
This story was brought to my attention by a member of Australia’s Vietnamese Community:
The member of the Vietnamese Community went on to say that “It’s so absurd and ridiculous that a student of the University of Queensland is facing expulsion [see below] over his criticising China’s authoritarian regime, whereas everyone in Australia is free to criticise the Australian government of all levels (ie. the right to freedom of expression and opinion). Why so? More to the point, I question – Is this Australia or China? Is Australia part of China? Does Australia belong to China? Or has Australia been taken over by China?”. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8327139/University-Queensland-student-faces-expulsion-speaking-against-Chinese-Communist-Party.html
I guess those who have lived under a communist regime (or the real threat of one) are more aware of our democratic freedoms and less likely to take them for granted.
The ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, said that “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” The 500 years since have seen ‘sixteen cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one. Twelve of these ended in war.
6 June 2020
ADF Culture and Learning
In the Blog about Leadership in the ADF on 3 June, I said: “May I suggest that something used in the commercial world, would be of value in terms of the Army’s hierarchical assessment system. I refer to bottom up assessment, ie. rather than a superior officer being the sole reporting authority, an officer’s/NCO’s subordinates be required to provide input. I know that it’s a revolutionary concept and will never be adopted, but I really think the answer lies in this type of radical change”. It was subsequently brought to my attention that :
It’s been said that: “The amount of time spent in legal consultations and “political correctness training” take away from the amount of time available for training for things such as warfighting and nation building.” Makes me wonder what the core learning competencies are for ‘Warfighting 101’. In this vein, I was intrigued to read the following in an article earlier today: “I was taken aback to see that the bronze servicemen guarding the Cenotaph in Martin Place (Sydney) have fixed bayonets – indicating their readiness to kill”. I wonder if a ‘readiness to kill‘ is one of the competencies required for ‘warfighting’? Surely not.
I believe that there are some significant lessons that business can pass on to the military.
I’m aware of an industrial laundry which met the needs of some major companies. The owners (who’d been in the business for generations), thought that their competitive advantage was the precision with which they produced uniforms with crisp creases.
When we surveyed the customers, they didn’t care a hoot about this … they valued the laundry because it had a facility to add patches to the uniforms so that different divisions of the business could be differentiated. When this was made know to the owners, it transformed their business. (I was also involved in a survey of the customers of the Australian munitions factories … those running the factories had absolutely no idea as to what their customers thought of their products and their delivery commitments … the factories were sold!)
I wonder if the Army will ever survey its soldiers.
———————————————————————————————
5 June 2021
National Defence Strategy: Safeguarding the Sea Routes
Commentators are everywhere, saying things like:
The greatest military risk we run is being led by the nose into a US war with China.”
“This crap that is going on politically and economically with China could force a war. Whether it is a shooting war or an economic sanctions type standoff … I have a very strong feeling it could be coming and soon.”
Whether or not this sense of ‘threat’ is real is for everyone to judge for themselves. When doing so, the following extract is relevant:
‘Common wealth? The state of Australian foreign policy’ (Andrew Carr*)
“ … what’s required is far more national discussion about how Australia as a single nation should view the world. … The way to ensure that the right kinds of behaviour occur without direct control is to have a clearer sense of who we are as a nation, what we want from the world, and what values we will and will not accept.
In yesterday’s Blog I made the point that “Australia is dependent on sea-borne imports”. Extracts from a recent Australian Security Policy Institute article are copied under.
‘Time for a standing force to keep the Malacca Strait clear of mines’ (Greg Mapson**)
Much has been said about the parlous state of Australia’s fuel reserves and the plan to stockpile oil in the United States. If the time comes to call on that emergency reserve, it will pass through the Malacca Strait. It is also a crucial route for much of Australia’s other imports and exports, including most of our coal, gas, bauxite and iron.
A mining incident in the Malacca Strait would be cataclysmic for many Asian nations and for Australia.
Mine-countermeasure assets, skills and practices among Southeast Asian navies bordering the Malacca Strait are poor, except for those of Singapore, which has continued to build its mine countermeasure capabilities and now, arguably, is well ahead of Australia.
To counter the growing threat in the region, Australia needs to champion the establishment of a standing mine countermeasure force for the Malacca Strait. This initiative could be forged under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Australia, the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore all have the capacity to contribute to such a standing force, which should be ready to react at short notice to any mining incident in the strait or its approaches.
The following quote is from an article by Nick Deane*, ‘My fear – a US led war with China?’.
“I await the day when serious strategists within the defence establishment acknowledge the enormous difficulty that presents itself to any party thinking to invade or take over Australia by military means. The country is under no military threat, and that situation is never likely to change. We are an island continent. That simple, geographical fact makes invasion exceedingly difficult, if not downright impossible. We have an entire continent, with all its resources, united under a single government. We are in an extraordinarily safe situation, that makes our pre-occupation with militarism slightly absurd. The British Conquest took about 100 years before it was complete, and it was only possible because the invaders had extraordinary technological advantage.”
“It’s interesting to see the colonisation of Australia classed as a “conquest [which] took about 100 years” [See Blog post on 29 May 2020.] Makes one wonder why the first defenders of our nation’s sovereignty and its people’s families, possessions and land, are not able to recognised in the AWM. (A simple stroke of a pen to amend the charter could reverse this.) Can it never happen again? Can we really retrain the ADF to solely aid in natural defence emergencies? Australia is dependent of sea-borne imports. Another nation that wishes to impose its will on Australia, simply has to interdict these supply routes.”
Another commentator added:
Bruce, very similar prior to the dropping of the A bomb 6 August 1945. Japan had experienced a naval blockade that prevented the arrival of any food or other supplies. Japan was on their knees, starving to death and anticipating a land invasion that they were prepared to defend with bamboo sticks rather than surrender. So it can happen!
*Nick Deane is an ex-public servant with a degree in Sociology. He is a member of the co-ordinating committee of the Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN) and convenor of the Marrickville Peace Group.
—————————————————————————————
3 June 2020
Everlasting Leadership
The following quote is from an article in the latest edition of ‘The Cove’:
“A careerist is a professional who is intent on furthering their career by any means possible and often at the expense of their own integrity. They place their personal success over their job and over others and will go to great lengths to be successful.” WO1 John Pickett, OAM* https://cove.army.gov.au/article/leadership-the-profession-arms-good-soldiering-capital-l
I hadn’t heard the term ‘careerist’ before.
There was a folk lore in my time (70s-80s) that if you proposed a new idea and it worked, you got a good mark; if you proposed a new idea and didn’t work, you got a black mark … therefore (so the theory went) if you want to get ahead, don’t propose anything and you’re assured not to have any black marks.
RSM Prickett went on to say:
“Minimising the negative effect, a careerist can have on the organisation becomes somewhat difficult when we consider the nature of military service. Striving for promotion, taking on greater leadership and responsibility, along with a reporting and selection system that would appear to reward the safe conformist or careerist over the more dynamic inspirational leader, exacerbates this negative organisational behaviour.
Ultimately, if we can create a culture within Army that is failure tolerant, that all are comfortable with trying and failing without facing the repercussion of ending our career, and that is premised on the ability to develop those we lead, then it would change some attitudes by recognising and rewarding the right example and reducing the number of self-serving careerist.”
I responded to say that: “May I suggest that something used in the commercial world, would be of value in terms of the Army’s hierarchical assessment system. I refer to bottom up assessment, ie. rather than a superior officer being the sole reporting authority, an officer’s/NCO’s subordinates be required to provide input. I know that it’s a revolutionary concept and will never be adopted, but I really think the answer lies in this type of radical change”.
*John Pickett is an Infantry soldier with over 35 years’ experience. As a Warrant Officer Class One (WO1) he has been privileged to have held the appointments as Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) of the Forty First Battalion The Royal New South Wales Regiment, Second Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, a Career Advisor within the Directorate of Soldier Career Management – Army, RSM of the Combat Training Centre and RSM of the 13th Brigade. He is currently posted to the Centre for Australian Army Leadership.
—————————————————————————————————
2 June 2020
ADF Readiness: Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Explosive (CBRNE) Warfare
“The coronavirus crisis reveals the grim and terrible new potential for biological warfare. And the news is almost all bad. However, there is one bit of good news. COVID-19 itself is not biological warfare, even accidental biological warfare. There is a pretty virulent conspiracy theory going around to the effect that the pathogen was created, or curated, in China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology — and then deliberately, or accidentally, leaked.”
‘Coronavirus: Biological war is now top of mind’ Greg Sheridan, The Australian, 1 April 2020
Defence Science and Technology (DST) have an on-going responsibility to ensure:
properly trained and equipped forces for contamination avoidance of CBRN hazards
protection of individuals, units and equipment from unavoidable CBRN hazards
decontamination in order to restore operational capability.
But to what degree is the ADF prepared? Who knows about the Special Operations Engineer Regiment (SOER)
“SOER training is similar to combat engineers, but goes beyond into Special Forces areas of ability and missions. Currently, the composition of SOER is A and B Squadrons and a Logistic Support Group, all of which are based in Sydney, New South Wales. The Regiment has grown in strength and depth to provide agile and highly trained teams that provide integrated, rapidly deployable and specialised capability to enable Special Operations. These include neutralising CBRNE threats, as well as mobility and survivability capabilities. The SOER is able to respond both domestically and in support of Australian forces deployed overseas in high threat environments. As a rapid response organisation, elements of the Regiment are maintained on short notice to move to incident sites at all times.”http://www.cbrneportal.com/australias-cbrne-defense/
Is this enough? I wonder to what degree exercises are conducted in which responses to the the Biological threat are tested.
————————————————————————————–
1 June 2021
Wargaming II
In the Blog on 21 May 2020: ‘Australian Defence Strategy IV (Wargaming?)’ I stated that:
“One wonders how much those involved in contingency planning (or the debate about our national security) make use of wargaming and simulation. This is a means open to us all to evaluate the ADF’s ability to respond to a threat against our national interests … to be continued.”
As part of their charter, the ADCSC has responsibility to contribute to the betterment of military decision making. To this end:
‘JSWAT (Joint Seminar Wargaming Adjudication Tool) produced by DST, is a computer based war-gaming environment combining features of seminar and system war-games. It uses a set of models to assist with the adjudication of movement, outcome of hostilities, detection by opposing forces, and logistics of consumption, replenishment and transport.
There is also the Australian Defence Simulation Training Centre (ADSTC), but this is related solely to co-ordination of simulators in terms of individual and collective training (rather than strategy development).
Of interest is the following paper: airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Working%20Papers/WP13-Effective-Wargaming-Impact-of-the-Changing-Nature-of-Warfare.pdf An extract from the Conclusion (below) asccords with my thinking when initiating this post:
“Wargaming as a tool for military thinkers and commanders have been in existence for a long time. The increasing complexity of modern warfare points towards it becoming even more important as a mechanism to develop, test and validate emerging concepts. Correctly used it is capable of clearly identifying and establishing the preconditions for success as well as the factors that would effectively shape the environment and thus the outcome of events.”
My original premise is not addressed by public sources, however. Are ADF contingency plans wargamed as part of their development/revision? I guess this falls into the ‘Classified’ category.
“In a series of recent wargaming activities, DST has looked at how Army may need to re-design its armoured vehicle fleets to enhance their effectiveness in future joint land warfare.
As part of this, a recent study examined the question of how well the different types of vehicle will fare in various ambush situations. Subject matter experts from Army participated in a week-long series of computer-based war games in which they played out vehicle ambush scenarios. By recording their responses, information on manoeuvre and tactics was generated for a range of vehicle types and ambush scenarios.
This information was then fed into a computer model that tested dozens of options through thousands of simulations in which certain events occurring in them were randomly determined. Through this work, the researchers arrived at the key characteristics a modern armoured vehicle must have in order to survive in a future ambush scenario.”
When I signed the petition, I stated that: “I’m signing because the current system is flawed (though it’s better than no system at all). At least it will be easier to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (rather than having to spend tens of thousands of dollars to appeal a DHAAT decision in the Federal Court). The Letters Parent allow the award to be made retrospectively, Defence cannot deny it on this basis. Advice from Defence to the Govt must be made public if democratic principles are to be upheld”.
It seems that the advice from Defence to Government has now been made public (via a ‘leak’ to the Mercury newspaper). The Information below is from the organiser of the petition. [Note: NZ now have the same ‘No retrospective’ award policy, as Australia.]
“Fifteen thousand signatures in a week! (May 30, 2020)
A huge well done everyone for your support and sharing the petition. We are starting to gain good media traction with regular articles in the Press. The Mercury has published a leaked letter from the Chief of the Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, to the Minister and the PM.
In a question by Alan Jones to the PM on 2GB yesterday, the PM stated on air that: ” there’s no doubt that the bravery and the story of Teddy Sheean is truly remarkable…’
The PM explained his reluctance to accept the recommendation was because of advice from the CDF. The CDF was concerned that “the Queen might be put in a difficult position”. The PM explained: “…not that long ago it was the New Zealand Government that made such a recommendation to the Queen and it was rejected.”
The PM should not accept this advice as a reason for not doing the right thing. New Zealand and the UK do not have an Honours and Awards appeals process – that we introduced in 2011. The NZ government sent a delegation to meet with the Queen’s representatives in 2006. The meeting resulted in an amicable compromise, although the VC was not awarded. The Kiwis at least gave it a go – the other half of the ANZACs must follow.
We now need our PM to show courage and support the brave Teddy Sheean by accepting the recommendation of the DHAAT and forwarding that recommendation through the GG to the Queen.
16,480 have signed. Let’s get to 25,000!”
So, the CDF is not prepared to support the recommendation of the DHAAT, because it might put the Queen in a difficult position! Has there ever been a more insidious position taken by a Chief of the Defence Force in relation to one of those for whom he is responsible. Bravery and sacrifice on behalf of our nation is ditched in favour of political nicety! Why not have the gumption to put the matter to the GG and request that he either (i) make a recommendation to the Queen, or (ii) seek her advice?
————————————————————————————————–
30 May 2020
Ha Go Tank
The following email is self-explanatory ….
Dear Brian, [Maj Gen Brian Dawson, AM, CSC (Retd), Asst Director National Collection]
On 3 April 2020 I forwarded the email below to point out that the AWM’s references re the number of crew on the Japanese Ha Go tank were conflicting. You responded shortly after to say that:
“You are quite correct that there are a number of apparently contradictory articles concerning the size of the tank’s crew. As you can imagine, with the wealth of information on the Memorial’s web pages, it is often only through helpful contact from members of the public that such discrepancies are brought to light. We will endeavor to correct this information.”
I notice, however, that the conflicting references are still published on the AWM’s website. Reason for mentioning is that it was recently brought to my attention that sometimes Japanese machine gunners rode on top of the tanks. http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/jp-milne-bay/index.html. AWM staff may also care to consider the Tank Museum (Bovington) presentation re the tank: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhCsc_rYgA4
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
Hi Brian,
I wonder if you might be able to consider amending the AWM’s references to the Ha Go Tank, so as to be consistent as regards the number of crew. At the moment there are contradictory references as to whether or not the crew was three or four. (See under.)
I, and a number of others interested in armour, are firmly of the belief that the tank had a crew of three. It is our contention (and that of the international community as a whole) that the term tank ‘crew’ refers to those who actually operated the AFV. We’re aware that some documents may include references to others, such as Japanese Landing Force ground guides, as part of the ‘crew’.
Any number of references can be supplied to back up the number of the tank’s crew as being three. That of the AWM conservation team would seem to be most relevant. However, another more recent one is provided here (also a restoration): https://riddlemagazine.com/ha-go/
Many thanks for your consideration, Bruce Cameron
AWM Contradictory References: Ha Go Tank
“This area of the Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the front proper right side of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the lower portion of the hull in the proper left side; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret.” https://www.awm.gov.au/about/our-work/projects/Ha-Gotype95lighttankconservation
This week is National Reconciliation Week. The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs stated in a press release that: “… all Australians are encouraged to learn about our nation’s shared history, cultures, and achievements, and to explore how each of us can contribute to achieving reconciliation”. http://minister.dva.gov.au/media_releases/2020/may/va052.htm
This is very laudable, but it’s not what he means.
His intention is explained in the following quote: “This year’s theme for National Reconciliation Week ‘In This Together’ is a perfect representation of how Indigenous men and women have served our nation alongside non-Indigenous men and women for more than 120 years”.
We’re not being encouraged to learn about the brave Australians who defended their family, possessions and land against the colonising forces of the 18th and 19th centuries. Neither are we being encouraged to learn about the wider Frontier Wars. To avoid these subjects, while at the same time giving the impression of championing reconciliation, the Government is highlighting the service of indigenous Australians in the armed services of the 20th and 21st centuries. A special edition of the Army newspaper was published along these lines with the catch cries “side by side” and “standing together”. https://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/NewsPapers/Army/editions/1466.pdf
These stories are important and deserve to be told, but so too are those related to ‘Australia’s first defenders’. Surely the Australians who tried to protect their family with spears when confronted by muskets and canon, deserve our admiration and respect. As a nation we honour those who can trace their ancestors back to the First Fleet. Why do we not do the same for our indigenous brothers, ie. those who can trace their ancestors to the time of colonisation.
Why is it not possible for ‘Australia’s first defenders’ to be honoured with all the Nation’s other past (and present) defenders on ANZAC Day? Why can’t indigenous Australians attend ceremonies on 25 April each year that will honour their ancestors who died on the shores of their own/our own country, while defending it?
When asked why they can’t be honoured in the AWM, the response is that the AWM Charter doesn’t allow it. But the Charter can be amended with the stroke of a pen, if there was a will to do so.
What the Government is saying, in effect, is that promotion of Reconciliation is a good thing … but only on our terms.
——————————————————————————————
28 May 2020
1AR Assn: Then and Now II
Following on from yesterday … a recent email from the 1AR Assn to members states:
“Over a period of four (4) to five (5) months, whilst [we] were learning to use the Association’s accounting package (Xero), we became aware of a number of accounting anomalies that impacted the Financial Reports that were presented to the AGM held on 12 October 2019, and which were subsequently submitted to Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) as required by legislation.
To ensure that the Management Committee acted with complete honesty, accountability and transparency[we] recommended to the President of the Association that revised Financial Statements should be prepared and provided to all members of the Association as well as consulting with CAV to ensure the Association acted in accordance with the legislative requirements. At the Management Committee meeting held on Monday 18 May 2020, a number of resolutions were passed for the actions that [were] recommended.”
So, the past Treasurer wrongly accounted for a few things; which, in turn, led to the Financial Statement being falsely certified as true and correct. (These things happen, but it would seem that an honorary auditor would be a valuable addition to the C’tee.)
It’s to the C’tee’s credit that the errors were picked up (albeit ‘accidentally’) and were made known to both CAV and members. This is in contrast with the 2017 Financial Report where members had to raise their concerns about irregularities. Part 4 of the Introduction to the Blog (above) refers:
“… the financial statement was not only not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, but also it failed to encompass the whole FY and did not disclose reasons for the expenditure of funds. All irregularities with respect to the Constitution were brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response was received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past twelve months.) It is to be hoped that governance provisions as required by law can be enacted so that the Assn will be able to move ahead with its good work looking after former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt.”
As asked yesterday … should any acknowledgement be given to the members who acted to improve the regulatory processes within the Assn? Of course.
Will this be done by the current C’tee? Snowball’s!
(It’s interesting to reflect on Snowball’s view that ‘All animals are born equal – what they become is their own affair’.)
———————————————————————————————–
27 May 2020
1AR Assn: Then and Now
“Over the last 20 or so months, the current Management Committee has implemented new policies, procedures, processes and standards which we believe have achieved significant improvements in accountability and transparency.” 1AR Assn newsletter, May 2020.
It follows that before the current C’tee was elected in July 2018, there were shortcomings in terms of openness and transparency regarding what the 1AR Assn C’tee did and how it did it, ie. there was a failure in terms of accountability to members.
Pats on the back all round!! What a great job the new C’tee’s done to fix this.
Were any members involved in bringing about this change? It would appear not.
The Secretary also states that: “Our members are now more attuned to our basic tenets (as outlined in the Constitution) of having respect for each other”. Were any members involved in calling for a valid Constitution and drafting it? It would appear not.
Why are those who contributed to the development of the Association not recognised? Maybe it’s an oversight?
The 1AR Assn website includes a page related to the Commanders’ Diaries from Vietnam. Someone spent months at the AWM going through the diaries, transcribing them in a notebook and then ‘simplifying’ them so that grid references, military ‘shorthand’, etc, were meaningful to someone reading the entries. See https://www.paratus.org.au/commander-s-diaries The Present C’tee were informed about the work involved, but refuse to make any acknowledgement of the author.
So, it’s not an oversight … something else is at play. Part 2 of the Introduction to this Blog is relevant. It’s copied below. It is for readers to form their own opinion.
Part 2 Service in the military, no matter what capacity, inculcates a commitment to doing ‘the right thing’. This became obvious when a group of members banded together to lodge a grievance to protest at the lack of natural justice provided to the member who had been expelled. While preparing this they noticed that actions taken against the member were not in accord with the Assn’s Constitution.
Delving into this more deeply, they discovered that the process required to change the Constitution had not been followed. Furthermore, the reasons given to members for having to change it were not correct. The group sought advice from Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), the authority for associations incorporated in that State. The outcome was that the Constitution was declared to be invalid, as were actions taken on the basis of its provisions.
The group of members who had brought about this outcome, asked for an apology from those who had misled members as to the reasons for changing the Constitution. This was not forthcoming. Not long after, the President and other committee members resigned. The new President and Committee spent $960 of members’ funds to get an independent legal opinion re the Constitution.
The findings confirmed the view of CAV that the Constitution was invalid. Furthermore, any member adversely affected by it was entitled to take action against the Association. The member who had been expelled was reinstated, together with his Life Membership. He agreed not to seek an apology so as to avoid causing any divisiveness in the association.
The new C’tee examined the original Constitution and found valid reasons for changing it, eg. the CAV’s default ‘Model Rules’ are ok for a State based association, but have limitations as far as a national organization is concerned. A proposed draft was sent to members. The group which had taken action against the now invalid constitution saw that the required process was still not being adopted (by oversight).
Bringing this to the attention of the C’tee stirred up something of a hornets’ nest among some members of the Assn. Social media went into a frenzy, accusing ‘constitutionalists’ of forcing younger members to leave the association because they had become fed up with “rules and BS” which mean nothing to them.
This is a recognized situation within many ex-service organizations. At least one PhD thesis is being compiled on the subject of maintaining the interest of younger members. The C’tee have been put in touch with the author. As one member of the ‘constitutionalists’ has stated, however, the Constitution is the members’ contract with their association. It must be got right, both for the members’ and Association’s sake. There is no other option. Those donating their time and energy to help the C’tee ensure the Constitution is a valid one, should be thanked, not persecuted, by the wider membership.
————————————————————————————-
26 May 2020
Honouring our Deceased 3
Following on from yesterday, I’ve sent the email below to the Secretary 1AR Assn. It is self-explanatory.
Dear Secretary,
As I advised a previous C’tee, there is no barrier to Associations listing members on their Honour Rolls who are officially classified as DOW, but are not able to be included on the AWM ROH as it is restricted to only listing war related deaths that occurred during the prescribed period of a War, plus two years.
All that has to be done is to ask “DVA to investigate whether or not the veteran’s death was war-related”. If it was, the veteran is entitled to be listed as DOW (as well as receiving an official commemoration).
I recently advised DVA that: ‘I wish to ascertain if 1200348 Cpl Andrew Martin Anderson’s death (on 20 April 2017) can be attributed to wounds he received on 25 June 1971 in Vietnam. (His left arm was amputated and he lost the sight in his right eye). The reason for asking is that DVA is to hold a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord in Canberra on 7 June 2021. A Last Post Ceremony will be conducted at the AWM on 6 June 2021. Wreaths will be laid during the LPC and Cpl Anderson’s ‘mates’ wish to ensure that all who Died of Wounds (both during and post-Vietnam) are recognised appropriately”.
DVA responded to say that Cpl A M Anderson’s death was so attributed and that he had been officially commemorated by the Office of Australian War Graves at the site of his ashes placement in the Toowoomba Garden of Remembrance and Crematorium … which will be maintained in perpetuity in recognition of his service to his country.
The 1AR Assn may care to include Cpl A M Anderson on its Honour Roll.
25 May 2020
Honouring Our Deceased 2
Following on from yesterday re the latest 1AR Assn Newsletter… it was good to see WO2 J Stone (it should be WO2 J M Stone) listed as KIA (rather than incorrectly as DOW as per the 1AR Assn website). See https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1715269
As per the discussion yesterday, the email below has been send to DVA:
Dear Sir/Madam,
In accordance with the following advice provided on the DVA website, “an application can be made to the Deputy Commissioner, DVA, primary.claims@dva.gov.au, requesting that the death be investigated as war related”, I wish to ascertain if 1200348 Cpl Andrew Martin Anderson’s death (on 20 April 2017) can be attributed to wounds he received on 25 June 1971 in Vietnam. (His left arm was amputated and he lost the sight in his right eye).
The reason for asking is that DVA is to hold a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord in Canberra on 7 June 2021. A Last Post Ceremony will be conducted at the AWM on 6 June 2021. Wreaths will be laid during the LPC and Cpl Anderson’s ‘mates’ wish to ensure that all who Died of Wounds (both during and post-Vietnam) are recognised appropriately.
Many thanks for your consideration ….
——————————————————————————————-
24 May 2020
Honouring our Deceased
The 1AR Assn latest newsletter advises that “Major points from the 27 February [C’tee] meeting included further discussion on definitions of ‘died of wounds’ and actions that may be taken by Associations to add DOW after a veteran has died. The Association was waiting on information from Defence Records at that time, and the waiting continues”.
In the Blog on 28 April 2020, I pointed out that “WO2 N. Lowes is classed as ‘DOW Post Vietnam’ [on the Assn Honour Roll]. In fact, he is listed on the AWM Roll of Honour, meaning that he died within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War and should not be listed as Post Vietnam [but simply DOW]”. The prescribed period ended on 29 April 1975.
I previously advised that the C’tee that there was no barrier to Associations listing members who are officially classified as DOW, that the AWM was not able to list (because it is restricted to only making known war related deaths that occurred during the prescribed period).
Obviously, the death has to have been related to wounds resulting from active service. How is this determined?
If the cause of death of a veteran has not already been assessed as a result of a NOK request, all the C’tee need do is to “apply in writing to their nearest state DVA office asking for DVA to investigate whether or not the veteran’s death was war-related”. If it was, the veteran is entitled to be listed as DOW (as well as receiving an official commemoration).
———————————————————————————————-
23 May 2020
Centurion Tank ARN 169056
The AWM has advised that:
“… as you are aware, the Centurion is currently displayed outside the Memorial’s Anzac Hall, together with two other armoured vehicles, a LAV-25 and a Bushmaster PMV. Given the intent to rebuild Anzac Hall in the near future as part of the Memorial’s major Development project, it is evident that all three will have to be moved. Rather than place the vehicles in store at Mitchell, however, it is intended to move them a short distance onto the plinths currently occupied by three First World War era artillery pieces; the 6 inch BL gun from HMQS Gayundah, the 9.2 inch Howitzer used by Australian Siege batteries in France, and the German 15 cm Kanone 16 captured by the 45th Battalion AIF in August 1918.
With the conclusion of the First World War centenary, it seems appropriate that these guns should now return to store, and that the outdoor displays should reflect the Memorial’s current focus upon more recent conflicts.
New interpretive panels will be added next to each of the vehicles. The Centurion’s will be larger than the existing signage and will be updated to include both information on Operation HERMIT PARK, 25 June 1971, and the crew of 5B. It is anticipated that the movement (which will probably take place over three days) and installation of new signage will occur in mid-June of this year.”
“We trust that updating the interpretive panel will reinforce that this is not merely an object or piece of military equipment, but is integral to and contains personal stories of individual service, and in this case your own.”
Very encouraging and appreciated actions of the part of Mr Mark Anderson, PSM, Director, and Maj Gen Brian Dawson, AM, CSC (Retd), Asst Director National Collection. The RAAC and its members, past and present, have been well served.
——————————————————————————————-
22 May 2020
The Centurion Which Was Hit by the Most RPGs in Vietnam
A number of readers have reminded me that following the post on 19 May ‘RPG Strikes on Centurions in Vietnam’, I failed to outline the circumstances of the Centurion which was hit by four RPGs.
This was ARN 160104, 21 Alpha, commandeered by Sgt Len Swarbrick. It was involved in Operation Goodwood on 16 February 1969:
“Swarbrick’s tank was hit. The enemy’s opportunity came when 21Alpha’s RMG and coaxial .30cal suffered stoppages at the same time. While the operator, Trooper Graeme Jackson, was desperately trying to get them going again, Swarbrick continued to engage the bunkers using the commander’s machine gun. The enemy, however, had been waiting for the slightest lull in the firing and seized the moment.
The first RPG hit the operator’s periscope, destroying it, but doing little damage otherwise. The second struck the right front of the turret, penetrating the fighting compartment. Its energy dissipated between the turret wall and the traverse gearbox in front of the gunner. Not all the crew were spared, however. When the second RPG exploded against the turret, ‘splash’ went down through the open driver’s hatches, badly wounding the driver, Trooper Mick Ingram. It also set the canvas mantlet cover alight. Unaware of Ingram’s condition, Swarbrick continued firing his .30cal. Seconds later he was forced to duck down into the turret. A bullet (possibly from a sniper) had nicked his neck. No sooner had this happened, than 21Alpha was hit by more RPGs, fired from the right of the tank.
The third RPG penetrated the side of the turret, the jet passing across the inside of the fighting compartment to hit one of the ready-round bins. Jackson was wounded in the thigh. To be precise, the left thigh. He had been facing the rear of the tank, trying to access ammunition in the floor bins. The fourth RPG also penetrated the side of the turret, this time immediately adjacent to the commander’s seat, seriously wounding Swarbrick in the lower body and thighs. Haward, in the gunner’s seat, was also wounded by the fragmentation.
Apart from the crew wounds, 21Alpha’s RPG penetrations had other repercussions. The spall caused short-circuits which cut the power to the turret and prevented the wirelesses being used. Added to this, the fighting compartment started to fill with thick smoke. Swarbrick called on to Ingram to reverse, only to discover that his driver had been wounded and was unconscious. In such circumstances, a tank crew commander has no choice but to give the worst possible order, especially when under fire: ‘Bail Out!’
Callsign 21, meanwhile, had moved up close behind 21Alpha. With wounded infantry still on the ground, Sullivan used his commander’s machine gun to fire over the top of them to neutralise the area from which the RPGs had been fired. While this was happening, Swarbrick, who because of his wounds had no strength in his lower body, used his arms to raise himself up out of the turret. Obviously in excruciating pain, he then ‘rolled’ off and onto the ground, a fall of about 2m. Jackson and Haward followed quickly, their tank being raked by small arms fire the whole time. Haward recalls:
We all then crawled under the rear petrol tank and tried to assist Len by wrapping our shirts around what was left of his legs. All this time the VC were trying to direct fire at us under the tank, but there were a number of trees in the way.”
According to the AWM, “Centurions were nearly impervious to most enemy weapons”. Hopefully this description and the impression it conveys will be changed in the redeveloped galleries. (There have been enough representations!)
“While Germany quietly rearmed, the Allies, including Australia, sleepwalked to the next war.
Australia had no significant defence industry.
In 2020, Australia’s relatively small ADF has been on operations for two decades.
Professional excellence is unsurpassed in comparison with earlier generations, though the ADF is top heavy with individuals more interested in professional advancement than the best interests of those they command.
Valour in the field means nothing when the hounds begin to bay.
Australia is still overly reliant on external sources for major capital equipment.
Some purchases defy any logical or value for money test, such as French conventional submarines which will not be online for years, if ever.
Add helicopters, fighters – the list is endless – and future generations have been saddled with what may prove to be crippling debt for no useful return.
Elsewhere, nations which harbour aspirations for Australia’s limitless resources are rearming – not quietly – with the potential Australia may never be able to defend its national interests.
Numbers rather than strategy may seize the day. The parallels with 1920 are too potent to ignore.”
What documents/measures are essential for Australia’s national security?
The need for a security strategy to protect our national interests is obvious. As is the fact that this must include measures for defence self-reliance (including defence industry and stockpiling measures as necessary). The strategy is based on a threat analysis provided by intelligence sources. The critical documents flowing from the strategy are the contingency plans. These dictate the size, equipment and level of preparedness of the ADF (including the reserve forces). It’s not rocket science, but the debate (such as it is) is confused; often failing to ‘see the forest for the trees’.
The last Defence White Paper was published in 2016. (The White Paper is the closest that any ordinary Australian gets to see the provisions made by the Government for our national security.) The next looks as if it might be released in 2021. Unfortunately (but necessary for obvious reasons), missing from all White Papers are the Contingency Plans. This makes it very different to reconcile the basis for the level of preparedness of the ADF and make judgements are to whether or not it’s right.
One wonders how much those involved in contingency planning (or the debate about our national security) make use of wargaming and simulation
This is a means open to us all to evaluate the ADF’s ability to respond to a threat against our national interests … to be continued.
I tried to do the same with an article to the Army Newspaper, but it was rejected. What I had sought to do was to point out the failings that sometimes occur within the Army ‘culture’ and the associated training ‘environment’.
During my time at 1st Armd Regt in the 70s, the duty Guard was always inspected. This included the 9mm pistols. The weapons drill orders for inspection were : ‘Draw pistols!’, ‘Inspect pistols!’. On the latter, the working parts were drawn to the rear and a thumb inserted into the chamber to reflect light up the barrel for the inspecting officer. The final order was: ‘Return pistols!”; at which the working parts were let forward, the action fired, and the pistol returned to the holster.
So what? At no time was the magazine removed!!
Remember that this is a ‘drill’, something inculcated during training so that it would be followed automatically!
Fast forward a few months and the same soldiers are in Vietnam. They are issued with 9mm pistols and ammunition. You don’t have to be Einstein to anticipate what happened!
The result of which was what? Soldiers were charged. Were exceptional circumstances accepted? No, they were found guilty and punished accordingly. Was a change made to 9mm guard drills at Puckapunyal? No. Were provisions inserted into the Introduction into Service Instructions for new small arms, to ensure that ceremonial drills did not compromise safety? No.
This is a matter which is directly (and solely) related to training. The Army (and all who sail in her) must be held accountable for training standards.”
Having commented on The Cove as above ….
I just remembered (I think correctly). The problem with the Browning 9mm during Vietnam was the magazine safety which was designed to prevent the action being fired unless a magazine was inserted. (A biro or the like had to be used in lieu of an empty magazine).
This ‘safety’ mechanism was later removed. The ceremonial weapons drill which involved the weapons being inspected without removing the magazine, compounded the problem.
—————————————————————————————-
19 May 2020
RPG Strikes on Centurions in Vietnam
Following on in the sequence of 1 Armd Regt historical milestones ….
My checks indicate that seventeen Centurions were stuck by 28 RPGs on seventeen different occasions during the Vietnam War. Most Cents were struck by just the one RPG, but some were struck multiple times. Which tank was struck by the most RPGs?
Only one is recorded as having been struck by RPGs during more than a single contact (one RPG in two different contacts).
When they were hit in these actions …three tanks were struck by two RPGs, three tanks were struck by three RPGs, but only one was struck by four.
According the available records, those tanks which were struck by at least three RPGs were:
169066 (Cpl Bill Burton, 31Bravo, Coral, 26 May 68);
169079 (Cpl Mick Rainey MM, 33Bravo, Op Nowra, 22 Aug 68); and
169110 (Lt Jack Brennan, [2]1, Op Hammersley, 18 Feb 70).
There was some confusion about the ability of RPG2s to penetrate the Centurion:
RPG2 rounds could penetrate about 180mm of armour. Often the slope of the armour or the angle at which the rocket was fired increased the thickness to be penetrated. Nevertheless, the side of the Centurion turret was only 89mm thick, and the side of the hull 51mm. The frontal turret armour of the Centurion was 152mm thick. The RPG7, the replacement for the RPG2, could defeat this easily, penetrating 320mm of armour. First seen in Moscow in late 1962, the RPG7 was not introduced into general service until some years later (first reported in SVN in 1967). Although not as common as the RPG2 in May 1968, the enemy took advantage of its longer range as part of the bombardment of Coral and Balmoral. Five RPG7s were recovered by 1RAR from around Coral.
NOTE. It should be acknowledged that the ‘records’ might not have recorded all RPG strikes. My tank, for example, was hit by an RPG, but the range at which it was fired was too short for the rocket to arm itself. After the contact we found green plasticine-like ‘stuff’ adhering to the turret bustle … an aluminium RPG 7 exhaust turbine was found in the IR basket. No damage was caused, so there is no ‘Operational Damage Report’.
———————————————————————————————
18 May 2020
The Australian System of Gallantry Awards
Following on from yesterday ….
A few years ago, I had reason to query the policy of Defence that there should not be any retrospective awards. This was when the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG) was being considered for those at Coral-Balmoral.
I wrote to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) to point out that Defence could not insist that this be the case, ie. that there be no retrospective award (as they had maintained during the Hearing). The Letters Patent for the award allowed for it to be made retrospectively. This viewpoint was supported by a legal opinion.
The CDF at the time was Air Chief Marshal Binskin. I had a number of exchanges with his Office questioning their justification for the policy, ie. what made proven gallantry from the past any different to proven gallantry today. (His predecessor and current GG, had also been totally opposed to retrospective awards.)
Defence responded to say that the reason that they allowed the Letters Patent as drafted, was that there had to be provision made for the possibility that an administrative error might have been made (eg. the contemporary recommendation had been ‘lost’).
The Coral-Balmoral award was finally allowed … it’s relevant here that the DHAAT were conducting an Inquiry (initiated by the Government as a result of the Hulse/Parr petition), rather than a Review initiated by an individual (as is the case with Sheean). See difference below.
It will be seen that there is opportunity for ‘political’ influence to affect all outcomes: Reviews are “independent”, but the Government can override the Tribunal’s decision; Inquires, on the other hand, are initiated (or not) by the Government itself.
There’s still hope for the ‘Sheeans’, ie. an appeal against a Government decision is ‘easier’ to initiate and less expensive than an appeal against a DHAAT decision.
An individual is able to apply directly to the Tribunal for an independent reviewof a decision of the Department of Defence concerning eligibility for a defence honour, defence award, or foreign award.
The Government is also able to refer general eligibility issues to the Tribunal for inquiry and recommendation.
——————————————————————————————–
17 May 2020
The Victoria Cross for Australia
Part of a news item reported by the ABC earlier this year is copied below:
“World War II hero Edward ‘Teddy’ Sheean gets another chance at top honour.
…. It is also a challenge to receive recognition after death, with Mr Petrow, saying under Queen Elizabeth II’s reign, she has granted just six posthumous Victoria Crosses to British armed forces personnel. That is because it is harder to justify an award if it was not suggested at the time, but it is also possible for recommendations to be lost or forgotten in the heat of battle.
Mr Cannon said this time the tribunal would look exclusively at Mr Sheean’s actions and whether they warranted a posthumous award, including a VC.
Mr Petrow said it was more likely an award would be recommended at this review because it was only his behaviour being considered. ‘If you’re actually looking at the act and you’re looking at the criteria for the VC, it’s an entirely different context for assessing whether Teddy and others who were denied a VC should get one,’ he said.
Mr Barnett said the narrowing of the scope of the review provided the ‘best chance yet to see Teddy’s courage more appropriately recognised’. ‘The Tribunal will be focused on Teddy’s actions, which are self-sacrificing and courageous,’ he said.
There is some confusion on the part of the reporter. The difficulty is not one of an award being made posthumously, but one being made retrospectively, i.e. an award not having been recommended at the time. One quarter of the VCs awarded during the First World War were awarded posthumously. It’s possible that no award of the VC has ever been made retrospectively. It’s also stated that the Tribunal would consider if another award was justified. At the time of the action (and up until after Vietnam) the only British awards which could be made posthumously were the VC or Mentioned in Despatches (mid)
The reporter suggests that the DHAAT review will be different to others because this time “only his behaviour will be considered”. The reference here is to an earlier enquiry that the DHAAT was tasked to undertake into a number of unresolved acts of gallantry. It would seem that his assertion here was correct … the Tribunal recommended that ‘Teddy Sheean’ be awarded the VC.
For the first time (I believe, but I might be wrong) the Government overruled the recommendation of the DHAAT:
In a statement, a spokesman for Prime Minister Scott Morrison said Ordinary Seaman Sheean was an extraordinary Australian — but “no case has been made … Sheean was denied a VC because of manifest injustice”.
“This Government’s, as well as the previous governments’, clear policy, and the expressed views of Her Majesty the Queen, is that consideration of the awarding of the Victoria Cross would only occur in light of compelling new evidence or if there was evidence of manifest injustice, such as where due process had not been followed,” he said.
“No compelling new evidence has been presented by the Tribunal that supports a reconsideration of the decisions by the authorities at the time to recognise the gallant actions of Ordinary Seaman Sheean on the HMAS Armidale with the award of Mention in Despatches in 1942.
Despite Australia having its own gallantry awards, the Government statement refers to the “expressed views of Her Majesty the Queen”, as basis for denying the award of the VC for Australia. Prima facie, it would seem that the DHAAT failed to prove that new evidence was provided, or, if it was, it was not ‘compelling’ new evidence.
One has to wonder at what level this judgement was made and on what basis. How is it that no reasons need to be given by the Government for arriving at its conclusion? The Department of Defence is firmly opposed to retrospective awards. But they have been made. DHAAT recommendations to this end have sometimes been accepted by the Government.
If an applicant wished to appeal against a DHAAT decision, the only option is to go the Federal Court. In one case recently, Defence stated that they would be prepared to commit $70,000 or more to the defence of the DHAAT in one of the matters it considered (which was not even related to the decision itself, but to the accuracy of the published report). This made the appeal impossible for the applicant.
What happens if an applicant wishes to appeal the decision made by the Government to overturn the DHAAT decision? The Administrative Appeals Tribunal … this might actually cost almost nothing. It’s all about justice. Or is it?
——————————————————————————————-
16 May 2020
Recording the Human History of the RAAC (3)
Following on from the posts on 12 and 14 May 2020 … the following is the text of an email sent to the AWM on 30 April 2020:
“Dear Director,
Sitting opposite your office window is a Centurion tank, Callsign 5Bravo (5B).
5B, along with other tanks of C Squadron was involved in intensive fighting in South Vietnam. In June 1971, 5B was fighting in ‘Operation Hermit Park’ during which it was ‘knocked out’ by an RPG. The driver was seriously wounded and ‘dusted off’.
5B is our tank and we the crew are proud to call it ours.
When visiting the AWM some years ago I took a photograph of a plaque which was attached to the rear-left side of 5B. (Refer attached). As you can see, the plaque provided details of 5B’s crew. This bonding of crew and tank means so much to us because it brings together a human connection to what would otherwise be ‘just another tank’! It was also of human interest to the general public.
Unfortunately, and inexplicably, the plaque has disappeared, much to our great dismay.
The purpose of my writing to you is in the hope that you may give sympathetic consideration to having the plaque re-instated on our 5B or at your discretion, some other means of recognising the crew so that it’s not regarded as just another piece of military equipment.
On behalf of 5B’s crew. Yours sincerely …”.
The AWM responded on 11 May as follows:
“Thank you very much for your email to the Memorial, and for providing background information on the plaque which was attached to the Centurion tank 5Bravo.
The Memorial is currently considering your request, and will explore options to include interpretive signage to recognise the crew.
We will be in touch once an outcome has been reached.
Thank you again for taking the time to write. Kind regards …”.
The above illustrates the point I tried to make in my earlier Blog posts, ie. Centurion tanks (and other AFVs) are not just pieces of military technology which weigh so much and travel so fast … they are weapon systems operated by soldiers. The challenge is to investigate ways by which the challenges faced by AFV crews and the suffering they experienced, can be made known by the AWM to those who have absolutely no idea about such things. Such an endeavour requires the widest possible consultation. I wonder if the RAAC HOC will help facilitate this, or simply go it alone (or even sitep the matter completely)?
————————————————————————
15 May 2020
The RAAC ARES Stranded? II
Wow! The Blog post on 13 May attracted more than three times the normal number of readers. As it seems that it is the issue of the RAAC ARES which has sparked this interest, I’ve decided to do a follow-up post re the Cove article:‘Stranded Capability? : The Value of the Army Reserve Asset in 2020’, by Mike Kalms*.
The quotations below are from comments on the article made by a contributor.
“COL Kalms is correct to highlight that the Army Reserve no longer offers the outputs asked of it in 1948. However, the central issue is that it is unclear what the outputs required now are. The 2016 Defence White Paper only mentions the Reserve as a flexible means of employing ADF members. No strategic direction is given as to what is required of ADF reserves, or single service Reserves. With a lack of stated objectives, it is little wonder there is confusion as to what should be done.”
This I agree with. The recommendation below, I don’t
“Do away with corps, instead generate an all corps reserve capability. The effort saved in training so many corps with long training and upskilling could be reinvested into a capability which supports local security and emergency responses and can deploy to low level Pacific security support”.
There is a disconnect here. Focussing on the strategic direction is right; doing away with long term training (because of its length) is not. It is precisely the length of the training which makes it important. When military equipment was unsophisticated, the militia or CMF could be readily mobilised to provide a wide range of military skills.
Today the choice is to have either (i) a large standing army and ARES limited to specialist civilian and simple military skills; or, (ii) a smaller standing army and ARES encompassing both specialist civilian and complex military skills (eg. qualified to operate LAND 400 AFVs).
In terms of investment cost, the latter is, by far, the less expensive.
*Mike Kalms is a Colonel in the part-time ADF. He is Director of Studies for ACSC(R) where full and part time officers from all Services and broader government come to learn and grow.
———————————————————————————————
14 May 2020
Recording the Human History of the RAAC (2)
Following the Blog post on 12 May, the Corps RSM advised: “In relation to capturing some living history, consultation was not required due to the era and nature of details the AWM requested and the corps could provide. There are plans for other era’s to have information collected, which have been shelved for 2020 due to COVID 19. The corps will look to continue engagement with the AWM to capture individuals experiences in the future years”.
It’s great to have such feedback; but, sadly, it would seem that there is some misunderstanding involved. Apparently, the AWM were seeking to engage with the RAAC re its early exhibits (so it was thought that no consultation with veterans from later conflicts was required). My concern, however, is related to the exhibit of tanks from WWI onwards. A tank from 1917 is described as weighing X tons and being able to travel at Y mph. A tank from 1968 is described as having a 20pdr gun and three machine guns. What is missing from both exhibits, is any insight into what challenges the crew had to face in operating them. My response to the RSM is copied below (hopefully, the RAAC family might grasp the opportunity to collectively advise the AWM):
“Thanks for your feedback re my Blog.
Re the AWM … what I’m trying to address is how to represent AFV exhibits in general (not any particular era).
At present, the exhibits are presented as items of technology; rather than weapons operated by soldiers.
What I would like to do is to create a discussion as to how AFVs should be portrayed (you’ll have seen from my Blog post that this is a need something shared by museums around the world). It would be great if you could contribute to this. It’s not an easy task, but one which could well be achieved with combined efforts.
I’ve been speaking with the sappers and they’re engaging with the AWM to achieve an appropriate means by which the experience of a field engineer prodding for an IED might be presented. I hope to achieve the same for the gunner of a tank in combat.
(As an aside, many years ago I suggested to our Tank Museum that it would be great if those who crewed tanks such as the Matilda, Stuart etc had their experiences recorded. The response was that “people aren’t interested in the crews, only the tanks themselves”. Of course, now those crewmen are dead and the opportunity is lost forever.)”
—————————————————————————————-
13 May 2020
The RAAC ARES : ‘Stranded?’
Below are two quotes from an article in Army’s ‘Cove’ newsletter: ‘Stranded Capability? The value of the Army Reserve Asset in 2020’ by Colonel Mike Kalms*. They are part of my response to the author.
“The Army Reserve of today can no longer deliver on the purpose for which it was conceived.”
This is an irrelevance. Whether or not we’re talking about the Militia or the CMF or the ARES, the purpose at the time it was conceived cannot be thought to be set in stone; purposes and mission statements must evolve as circumstances change. Stakeholders demand that this happens; realising that, otherwise, we’d never be ready for the challenges ahead.
This is different: “Stranded Assets – if not addressed – become Irrelevant Assets. Irrelevant assets have no economic, social or national value – let’s not allow the Reserve to drift there.”
Now this is stakeholder language and would be applauded at the AGM!
What is working as far as the ARES is concerned? From my pov, I see civilian specialists (such as doctors, lawyers, engineers etc) being recruited and usefully employed (thereby saving the Army money). I also see some non-specialist personnel (eg. infantry) being deployed overseas to supplement regular personnel (thereby saving the army money).
What is not working as far as the ARES is concerned? Army roles which involve the operation of complex equipment, eg. AFVs, are considered beyond the capability of the ARES. (The Army saves money by not having to procure materiel to equip them.)
Where to from here? Firstly, we have to get away from a reliance on ‘catch phrase’ thinking. ‘Army in Motion’, Accelerated Warfare’, ‘Future Ready’ etc. In terms of the ARES in particular, we have “One Army”, which PR link to the theme ‘our full and part-time people who have one mission: to prepare land forces for war to defend Australia and its national interests’.
Let’s accept that the regular army and the ARES are different. Some components of the ARES are interchangeable, while others are not. How can the ‘others’ best add value to Army capability? This must be related to the contingency plans which flow from our National Defence Strategy. Associated with this is the matter of lead times for training of those who are to operate specialist equipment. If we are self-reliant in terms of the equipment and stockpiling aspects of our defence strategy, are we equally well positioned in terms of trained personnel (recognising that skills are needed to both operate the equipment AND to use it effectively tactically).
Seems to me that part of our National Defence Strategy must relate to the ability to provide trained personnel within a certain time-frame; this, in turn, suggests an ARES training capability for operators of specialist equipment, e.g. LAND 400 AFVs.
*Mike Kalms “is a Colonel in the part-time ADF. He is Director of Studies for ACSC(R) where full and part time officers from all Services and broader government come to learn and grow”.
————————————————————————————————-
12 May 2020
Recording the Human History of the RAAC
The December 2019 edition of the 2/14 LH (QMI) Association newsletter includes the following extract:
“Brigadier Mills launched a key initiative in 2019 to ensure the Corps is capturing the living history of the Corps and the importance of recording the human history that we have in our serving and transitioned members, and the importance it plays in the educating new members of the corps. This initiative has been launched by the Corps RSM and established with co-operation of the Australian War Memorial. The HOC has also been actively engaged with the Australian History Unit in preparing for the eventual new Museum, this is looking particularly positive and something the Corps should look forward to.”
So … the HOC, the Corps RSM, and the Army History Unit are working together to ensure that the human history of the RAAC is effectively recorded at the AWM. Where’s the consultation? Where are the draft guidelines provided for comment? Sorry … I should not have expected a precedent to be set.
In a previous Blog post, I mentioned that the 1 AR Assn didn’t want to have anything to do with offering input in response to the AWM’s request for suggestions re their major development project (“We’re not a lobby organisation!“). This meant that the RAAC Corporation could not be involved (they can only take any action when asked to do so by a Member Association). This, in turn, meant that I had to ‘go it alone’. It seems a pity that we have the AWM asking for suggestions and no representative body is prepared to do anything with respect to the portrayal of RAAC crews in combat. (In fact, I’ve been pilloried for trying to do so.)
In the spirit of consultation, I posted my submission on the Blog, asking that if anyone could suggest improvements, to please do so.
The covering email to my subsequent submission to the AWM was as follows:
“Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide input into considerations being made re the coming redevelopment project.
I now wish to that there is a need to portray a human presence as part of objects which, within the AWM at present, are only represented in terms of technology. In particular, I believe that Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) should be displayed not only in terms of their technical characteristics, but also in the context of a well-informed and engaging interpretation of what it was like for crews fighting inside them.
My attached submission includes quotes from studies which have been conducted overseas which have come to the same conclusion. I have also included reference to the factors which are unique to those crewing AFVs in combat.
I have consulted with the crews of AFVs who served in Vietnam, both in respect to my book ‘Canister! On! Fire! : Australian Tank Operations In Vietnam’ and subsequently in relation to this submission. Thank you for considering the attached. “
Being interested in the way in which the ADF is responding to the changing strategic circumstances, I Googled ‘Australia’s Defence’ and came up with a Defence page titled “Defence Priorities”. (https://www.defence.gov.au/Priorities.asp).
It started off by stating that: “Defence’s primary focus continues to be to protect and advance Australia’s strategic interests through the provision of appropriately prepared and equipped armed forces”. ‘Right on!’ I thought, and proceeded to read further.
Then I came across: “The development of a new Defence White Paper has commenced and will be finalised by mid 2015”.
I thought that I must have come across an old website, so Googled the ‘Department of Defence’ portal. Once this opened, I went to the ‘Priorities’ tag and, guess what … I ended up with link above.
What on earth is happening? Has the world gone mad?
The website doesn’t get any better (though the current Minister for Defence is actually listed!).
Seems to me that public information about Australia’s defence outlook and associated preparedness is seen as a very low priority. This probably comes about as a result of a lack of debate about defence matters.
I decided to check the Australian Defence Association website. I clicked on: “How does the ADA contribute to informed public debate?”. The answer was “publishing comprehensive discussion papers and commentary on national security issues, including an electronic bulletin, Defence Brief, and a national journal, Defender”.
I looked for the latest issue of Defender … it stopped being published in 2008.
What more can I say.
———————————————————————————————————————–
10 May 2020
Defence Self Reliance II
On 4 May 2020, I referred to an article by Senator Jim Molan, AO, DSC. I believe it to be of value to quote a little more and do so below:
“It seems self-evident to most Australians that we need to be more self-reliant without trying to be completely self-sufficient. Self-reliance reflects how resilient as a nation we must be against internal or external shocks, which allows us to retain a higher degree of sovereignty. Self-reliance improves resilience, which itself improves sovereignty.”
“The reliance on the US that we have enjoyed since 1945 remains critically important and we must maintain our alliance. But an overdependence on the US is as dangerous for our future as an over reliance on globalisation was for a pandemic.”
“We have no medium or longer term strategy to position all elements of our nation for an uncertain future. We are brilliant at handling crises, as our government is currently handling COVID-19. But we cannot tell if we are achieving or failing on the bigger issues because we are a strategy-free nation. Given the uncertainty of the new era, we must increase our self-reliance or we will lose our sovereignty.”
The project I led at the Command and Staff College observed that:
“In evolving both the Defence force structure and the most appropriate mix of domestic and overseas supply and support, Australia will have to continuously choose from a range of options in reconciling technological and resource constraints with strategic requirements”.
We recommended (inter alia) that:
“Defence allocate a self-reliance rating to all materiel procurement projects; and
This rating should also be applied in the assessment of stockpiling requirements, not only for prime equipment, but also for associated ammunition and spares”.
——————————————————————————————————
9 May 2020
The Abrams Fleet II
Following on from yesterday …
A recent ADF press release stated that
“The Australian Army currently operates 56 M1A1 SA Abrams Main Battle Tanks acquired in 2006 which are employed within the Main Battle Tank Squadrons of each of the three Armoured Cavalry Regiments …”.
But 59 were procured … what happened to the other three? It seems that they were badly damaged in training incidents and aren’t now fully capable. An example of the extreme end of the serviceability problems.
The Press Release went on to say: “The future Australian Army Main Battle Tank capability will be based on M1A2 configured Abrams MBT hulls and turrets upgraded to Abram’s System Enhancement Package Version 3 (SEPv3) designated M1A2C, or Abrams System Enhance package Version 4 (SEPv4) designated M1A2D”.
What does this mean? I believe it to say that our Abrams will be upgraded to M1A2C or D , ie. the tank itself is not going to be replaced, it will modified. Will this solve the unserviceability problems plaguing the tanks? If it doesn’t, the funding for the upgrade will be wasted.
But what is another way to (theoretically) address this situation? Answer: using simulators. This is what the press release was announcing:
“The Department of Defence has issued an official Approach to Market (ATM) for M1A2 Immersive Tactical Trainer(s) calling for digital training simulator systems to support the introduction of an M1A2 Main Battle Tank capability in the immediate future.
The LAND 907 Phase 2 Abrams M1A2 Immersive Tactical Trainer (ITT) ATM calls for Immersive Tactical Training and Procedural Gunnery Training ITTs that provide, a high fidelity simulation system to train Abrams crews as a precursor to Live Fire practical training.”
What’s the betting that there’s been a trade-off between tank numbers and simulators. Would this really be the answer? There’s no doubt that simulators can add value to training practices, but I don’t believe they can compensate for actual crew-based vehicle/tactical training.
Footnote. In 1972, I was nearing the end of my third year as a Centurion tank troop leader. A visiting VIP was brought over to where we were by the CO. “And what do you think about your tanks (or some such question)?” I responded to say that they were good in their day, but now the amount of time we spend maintaining them is completely out of proportion to the time we get to actually use them”. I was relieved that the CO gave me a ‘thumbs up’ as they were leaving.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 May 2020
The Abrams Tank Fleet
Following on from the Blog post of 6 May: ‘The Passing of ‘Right Sizing’ the Abrams Tank Fleet’ ….
“Each of the army’s three brigades is expected to eventually include three four-tank troops, with two other Abrams at brigade headquarters supported by a single dozer and armoured bridging variants. Given the need to retain critical mass and adequate support capability, this structure could require the acquisition of additional Abrams; this has been recently rumoured but is not specifically included in the DIIP. “
So, three times four tank troops per squadron. Given that the problem (Blog, 6 May) is one of maintainability … this means that each tank troop can operate tactically with three tanks, if one is unserviceable.
So, because of the problems with serviceability, instead of having four troops with four tanks (the normal tank squadron organisation), a troop is removed from the ACR organisation.
But what about the span of command? This is the basis on which a squadron commander is trained. Rather than four troops, he has only three manoeuvre elements to command and control
Defence has stated that: “A final decision on the shape and size of the replacement M1A2 fleet and its level of capability will be announced in in September 2021”.
So, maybe the Abrams really will be right sized with an additional 30 tanks to compensate for the dispersed ACR squadron locations (rather than the previous centralised 1 Armd Regt and the toll that training is having on serviceability. Maybe this will see four troops of four tanks in each ACR.
Do I believe in fairies at the bottom of the garden? Too right!
————————————————————————————————————————–
7 May 2020
The Centurion ‘Gun Tank’ Which Spent Most Time in Vietnam
Following the recent blog posts related to ‘milestones’ of one sort or another in 1 Armd Regt’s history, is a matter which may, or may not, have interesting connotations.
On 3 May, the Blog looked at 169047 which was on operations in Vietnam for one month only, May 71. It hadn’t detonated a mine.
Which tank’s time in Vietnam was the longest? Shane Lovell (‘Military Briefs No 3’) records ARN 169099 as having served from Apr 68 to Apr 70. This by far the longest time for any Cent tank. (ARN 169079, a Cent dozer, managed to do an additional four months).
Starting off with 2 Troop in 1968, 169099 spent most of 1969 and 1970 with 3 Troop.
As most of those who’ve served with Cents will attest, some tanks just seem to keep going and going, while others have endless problems.
I don’t know how many engine changes it might have had and I’ve forgotten the mileage ‘life’ of Centurions in Vietnam. (Once this was reached, they were withdrawn from ops and returned to Australia for rebuild.)
I do know that the average main engine life in 1969 was 1100 kms and that in 1971, engines were failing after less than 250km. This was critical at the time … with C Sqn being progressively withdrawn, the availability of each and every Cent was crucial to operational capability.
Why did the life of main engines decline so suddenly? I can’t answer this. But a number of investigations were conducted at the time. These included the work at Hawker De Havilland’s Aircraft Engine Factory in Sydney where the engines were rebuilt.
Where is 169099 now? According to the late Colin Filtness’s research … it is one of two tanks at Caribbean Gardens, Melbourne.
Footnotes: (i) ARN 169099 was the first Cent tank to come ashore in Vietnam. It was driven by the late Sergeant Nev Calliss and commanded by the then Capt Bernie Sullivan.; (ii) The photo above is not of 169099, but the other tank at Caribbean Gardens (169115).
————————————————————————————————————————
6 May 2020
The Passing of ‘Right Sizing’ the Abrams Tank Fleet
“We see the optimum fleet size for the M1 Abrams fleet as 90” Col Anthony Duus, Mar 17
The following is an extract from an article authored by the HOC, Brig Chris Mills AM and Lt Col Leo Purdy published on 12 Sep 18 (it dates from 2016):
“Complementary studies of the M1 tank in US service by the RAND Institute demonstrate that the combination of age and training tempo result in higher costs as vehicles breakdown more frequently and consume parts quicker.
Further, this maintenance liability increases with the age of the vehicle. These factors correlate to the challenges the ADF faces in the generation of a sustainable tank capability. The small Australian M1 fleet is now 10 years old and endures a rate of effort at least twice that when compared to US Army units. While this maintains a high standard of training and proficiency, this also places significant stress on the vehicle, reducing the mean time between components failing and increasing the number of components which fail – more things break more often.
This training is routinely conducted in some of the harshest tank -training environments in the world ranging from dry desert to wet tropical jungle, further exacerbating these factors. Consequently, the M1 tank is wearing out faster than anticipated, which ultimately affects the ADF’s ability to generate the unique effects the tank provides in combat. This is compounded by Australia being at the end of a very long supply chain extending back to the US for items such as track, fire control systems and ammunition.
Fleet size underwrites all of these issues. When balanced against the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore unavailable.
This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of the tank capability. How does the ADF sustain the tank capability into the future when these factors are considered?”
makes no mention by the HOC, RAAC Rep HOC, or ACR COs of the need to ‘right size’ the Abrams tank fleet. For the CO, 2 Cav ACR it would appear that the most pressing problem is the lack of serviceability of the ASLAVs (and to his credit, he made this known).
But what’s happening about the Abrams? Seems to me that the Government’s position has been made known to the ADF, ie. tanks are a low priority in terms of our Defence strategy. Given that this viewpoint seems to date from 2017, the budgetary impact of the bushfires and COVID-19 would not seem relevant. to it
Why don’t all those contributing to Ironsides say it as it is? Let’s not go back to the days of complete subservience to our ‘masters’, rather than a co-operative situation where all points of view are respected. Can’t have industrial democracy in the military (?) … poppycock!
———————————————————————————————————————–
5 May 2020
Australia-Vietnam Relationship
Following on from the Blog post on 2 May, the ABC News report from last year is revealing …
“But Mr Morrison’s visit [to Vietnam] is not just about business. It is also about China. While Australia expresses concerns about China’s aggressive actions and military build-up in the South China Sea — a key global trading route — Vietnam lives it. Its sovereign rights are constantly being challenged.”
“The rise of China is helping to bring old adversaries together. Australia and Vietnam may have fought on opposite sides of a war, and have vastly different political systems, but they have a shared interest in ensuring the Asia-Pacific region remains stable and peaceful.”
So, maximum effort to cement a strong diplomatic relationship with Vietnam, while leaving aside any influence to improve human rights conditions (especially for those who were Australia’s ‘Allies’ and their families during 1965-1975).
How inhumane can Australia get … to do nothing, for those, alongside of whom we, as Australians, fought and died. Each one giving their lives on behalf of the other!
If there is reciprocal benefit to both nations in terms of containing China, why can’t Australia ask for improvements in terms of the human rights of the “bad elements” (see 2 May blog, ie. Australia’s Allies and their families)?
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 May 2020
Sorry about the late post … it’s been somewhat chaotic (but all positive)!
The photo is from a 1993 publication by Graeme Cheesman: “Controversial critique of Australia’s current defence policy. Outlines the evolution of Australia’s defence policy and organisation from 1970-1991 and discusses associated problems, dilemmas and contradictions”.
The Importance of Self-Reliance
”Given the uncertainty of the new era, we must increase our self-reliance or we will lose our sovereignty. “
The above is a quote from an article by Senator Jim Molan: ‘The importance of a National Sovereignty Strategy’.
In 1983, I proposed a project and then led a team to investigate it at the Australian Command and Staff College. The tile was ‘Defence Self-Reliance: A Study of the Operational Capabilities for which Self-Reliance is Essential’.
We concluded (inter alia) that:
“Objectives should be specified which link operational capabilities to industry development (in order of priority)” and
“The degree of industry assistance warranted should be determined according to a project’s rating (ie. its operational significance). The rating system should also be applied in the assessment of stockpiling requirements, not only for prime equipment, but also for associated ammunition and spares.”
This isn’t rocket science … but look today at how dependant we’ve become on overseas supply lines. Lead times don’t seem to feature in strategic planning (as pointed out by Senator Molan). How much more relevant would Graeme Cheesman’s book be today!
———————————————————————————————————–
3 May 2020
The Centurion Which Spent the Shortest Time in Vietnam
Following on from earlier Blog posts re 1 Armd Regt Vietnam Milestones …
An enormous effort went into preparing and transporting a Centurion to Vietnam. One would hope that this effort would be justified by the tank being used until (hopefully) it reached its mileage limit. Of course, sometimes a tank might detonate a mine and be classified as having to be returned to Australia. What of ARN 169047, however?
Shane Lovell’s book ‘Military Briefs 3’ has 1Bravo serving in Vietnam for one month only (May 1971). What happened? It wasn’t involved in a mine incident.
By May, 4 Troop and 2 Troop had both been withdrawn form operations. 3 Troop would be next, then 1 Troop, and finally 5 Troop. My theory is that 169047 suffered an engine failure (or some other major malfunction), and, rather than repairing it, the tank was swapped with another and returned to Australian in its place. This would explain why the old 2Charlie, became the new 1Bravo. Postscript: I’ve just referred to COF and there’s reference (p258 Vol 20) to the 106 Wksps having run out of main engine spares at the end of April 1971.
Some background about engine failures is provided under (from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’).
When C Squadron first took the field in 1968, an abnormally high failure rate of idler wheels threatened to cause a loss of operational capability; a similar crisis now existed in relation to main engines.
Although overheating was associated with the recent failures, there was no apparent reason as to why this might have suddenly become such a major problem. 106 Field Workshop did an exhaustive analysis on all engine failures experienced in Vietnam, to see if a pattern would point to a cause. It was expected that the Dry season would have been a factor in terms of tanks operating over longer distances, coupled with high ambient temperatures and dust. Somewhat surprisingly, the increase was not significant. What the analysis did highlight, however, was an overall increase in the number of incidents of overheating.
The fracturing of pipes and seals associated with the cooling system was a factor in many of the incidents. As this could be the result of overpressure, it was decided that a complete cooling system inspection would be conducted on the next tank that suffered an engine failure. Before this could be done, something caught the eye of the Workshop Manager, Captain Mick Condon, as he was walking past a tank undergoing repair.
The radiators were lifted (as was done to provide access to the transmission compartment) and he realised that he could not see through the passages where air would normally be drawn by the fans; they were blocked by a mixture of oil, dust and fine bamboo particles. Many of the cooling fins were also bent over. While it was not a panacea for what was a complex problem (i.e. the engines of some tanks with clean radiators still overheated), regular steam cleaning of radiators reduced the failure rate considerably. The immediate ‘crisis’ was averted.
Vietnam’s human rights situation is dire. Among the abuses are the facts that freedom of speech, opinion, press, association, and religion, are all restricted and the police use torture and beatings to extract ‘confessions’. While the younger population is growing up to accept this, the lives endured by our former ‘allies’ (eg, ARVN soldiers and their families) are still extremely harsh. The extracts below from ‘Vietnam After the War’ illustrate some of this:
“The North quickly made clear that previous agreements for sharing power with allied groups in the south were no longer valid. According to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords (another set of negotiations that aimed to bring an end to the conflict), South Vietnam “was supposed to continue to exist as a separate and sovereign state” until the northerners and the southerners could agree on how to “unite the two Vietnams via elections or negotiations.”
Finding the “bad elements”: One tool the government used to identify so-called “bad elements”—those who were opposed to the North’s communist ideology—was the personal dossier. These were written biographies that included a person’s name and the names of his or her family members, as well as his or her ethnicity, religious affiliation, and current job. The government used this information to categorize people as “good” or “bad.” If a person had a sister, father, or uncle who had worked with the French, American, or South Vietnamese government, for example, he or she would likely be put in the “bad” category. Similarly, if someone’s family owned a business or other property, it meant that person was a capitalist, which was also bad. In total, the number of people who were believed to have such affiliations was estimated to be one-third of the south’s population.
People from families that had shown loyalty to the communist cause and liberation—especially those with a family member who died fighting South Vietnam and/or the Americans—were usually put in the “good” category. Unlike the “bad elements,” these people had opportunities under the new system, such as getting a good job working for the government or military, or better access to a university education.” https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/learning-module/vietnam-after-war
What do we see in the media about Australia’s efforts to improve the human rights for the “bad elements” who were our Allies from 1965 to 1975 and Vietnamese more generally? Maybe it’s out there … but I haven’t seen it. What I DO see, however, are articles describing how much Australia is doing to help the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The following extract is from the latest edition of the Army newspaper:
“Exchange of combat skills. Defence Administrative Assistant Hanoi WO2 Mat Dabinet developed the idea to bring some of Army’s combat shooting instructors to Vietnam after seeing the VPA’s Shooting Team attend the Australian Army Skill at Arms Meet (AASAM) for the first time last year. He said VPA soldiers were enthusiastic and became more confident as the course progressed. “They shot well at AASAM in the deliberate serials, but you could see they were uncomfortable with firing and moving, and close combat serials”. WO2 Dabinet said. “In developing the activity with the VPA we asked them to construct a wide range of targetry and range equipment. VPA personnel were very well prepared for the activity, applied the proficiencies they achieved quite rapidly and practised in their own time.”
WO2 Dabinet said the culture among VPA soldiers was similar to Australians. “It’s just like teaching a bunch of Australian diggers,” he said. “They have a very similar sense of humour and similar ways of being taught. “You get all the same characters you get back home, someone’s the grumpy guy, another is the class clown – it’s so similar it’s scary.” WO2 Dabinet said the course should continue and expand in future. The success of the course was recognised by officials on both sides, with Defence Minister Linda Reynolds and VPA Deputy Chief of General Staff Lt-Gen Nguyen Van Nghia attending the closing ceremony.”
This article suggests that in some ways, Vietnamese people today, on an individual basis, are very much like ourselves. But what about the Government and its treatment of the “bad elements” and wider human rights abuses?
Surely the Australian Government has a moral and ethical responsibility, as well an economic and trade function. One can well imagine a voice within Government saying … before long there won’t be any Vietnamese alive who need to be classed as “bad elements” by their Government. Why make a fuss?
Sometimes I’m ashamed of my country.
———————————————————————————————————————–
1 May 2020
ANZAC or Anzac II
Following on from yesterday, the response from DVA is copied below. It’s interesting they must get some many people raising this matter, that they have a section dedicated to responding to these queries.
In essence, the Government position is the same as that of the Canberra Times, ie. the correct format is: Anzac Day … though the AWM adopts the ‘ANZAC Day’ convention.
You’d think that, as a nation, we could agree on something like this.
Dear Mr Cameron
Thank you for your email. In response to your question, I’ve included a copy of the relevant section from the Use of the word ‘Anzac’ Guidelines:
Is it Anzac or ANZAC?
Historically, ANZAC was an acronym devised by Major General William Birdwood’s staff in Cairo in early 1915. It was used for registering correspondence for the new corps, and a rubber stamp was cut using the letters A.&N.Z.A.C.
After the landing at Gallipoli, General Birdwood requested that the position held by the Australians and New Zealanders on the peninsula be called ‘Anzac’ to distinguish it from the British position at Helles. Permission was also sought to name the small bay, where the majority of the corps had come ashore on 25 April 1915, ‘Anzac Cove’.
The letters now were upper and lower case, indicating that the original acronym had already found a use beyond that of a military code word or corps designation. Since that time, ‘Anzac’ and ‘ANZAC’ have been used interchangeably.
There is no rule or law that indicates how the word ‘Anzac’ should be capitalised. For example, DVA only uses ‘ANZAC’ when referencing the ANZAC Corps itself and uses ‘Anzac’ in all other circumstances while the Australian War Memorial (AWM) generally uses ‘ANZAC’ given the AWM’s focus on historical records and memorabilia.
Thank you for your active interest in preserving the significance of ‘Anzac’ and taking the time to contact to us.
I wrote a letter to the Editor, Canberra Times about ANZAC Day (see Blog 26 April 2020). I was disappointed that, when published, my text was amended by changing ANZAC to Anzac. BHP and ANZ are also examples of acronyms and are always referred to in capitals. Why not Bhp or Anz?
I expressed my view to the editor of the paper that the convention that journalists must adhere to in relation to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, diminishes the importance and recognition that our service men and women deserve.
The editor advised that journalists must adhere to the paper’s Style Guide.
When I looked into this a bit more, I discovered the Canberra Times style guide is in accord with DVA’s position, ie. the correct designation is Anzac, not ANZAC.
I’ve asked DVA if they “Can please explain why this?”.
Interestingly, DVA state in their on-line publications that “The men who served on the Gallipoli Peninsula created a legend, thereby adding the word ‘Anzac’ to our vocabulary and creating the notion of the Anzac spirit”.
BUT that’s not true. The word added to vocabulary was ‘ANZAC’.
I note that the RSL refers to ANZAC Day and I’ve asked what their position is in terms of this matter.
It took me quite a while to find the image above. There are many that refer to ANZAC DAY all in upper case … finally I found one that highlighted the difference.———————————————————————————————————————–
29 April 2020
Hammersley Final Fling
The Blog on 26 March 2020 copied a letter I’d written to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs (Darren Chester) re the false statements included in the report of the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) into the failure to recognise the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
I was not able to appeal to the Federal Court to have these errors corrected as I had to demonstrate that I could meet the costs of bringing this action if I was to lose. Defence advised that they were prepared to expend $70,000 or above in defending the case. I could not justify such an expense. (Maybe I was being ‘intimidated’ into withdrawing my application … I’ll never know.)
My request to the Minister was for an independent consideration to ensure that the record of the inquiry conducted by the DHAAT was a truthful one. I provided evidence to show that the existing report was false.
I’ve now received the Minister’s response.
Guess what.
The DHAAT continues to endorse its Report and the Minister has no power to review the its truthfulness. To initiate a review, I have to appeal to the Federal Court (and be prepared to pay $70,000 or more.)
Openness and transparency in Government … an ideal too far! Indeed, a culture that extends to other organisations as well.
My Blog post on 11 March 2020 is relevant.
————————————————————————————————————————-
28 April 2020
Things That Should be Corrected: 1AR Assn Publications
“WO2 N. Lowes” is classed as ‘DOW Post Vietnam’. In fact, he is listed on the AWM Roll of Honour, meaning that he died within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War and should not be listed as ‘Post Vietnam’.
“WO2 John Stone” is listed as Died of Wounds (DOW). In fact, he was Killed in Action (KIA).
“Tpr J Kerr” is listed as KIA in the newsletter, this entry should be amended to Tpr J K Kerr (James Kelly)
“Tpr M Hannaford” is listed as DOW in the newsletter, this entry should be amended to Tpr M J Hannaford (Michael John)
1st Armoured Car Squadron (1ACS) was renamed 1st Armoured Regiment. In fact, 1ACS was disbanded and a new unit formed. Despite the article recently published by the 1AR Assn, units of the Australian Army are not simply renamed … they must first be disbanded and then reformed (one unit is removed from the Order of battle and another is added.)
1 Armd Regt Theatres of Operation are described as including “Japan”. This should be deleted as it was only 1ACS which so served. An alternative would be to state: ‘Japan (1st Armoured Car Squadron)’.
“The Regiment is now equipped with … M88 ARV”. This should read ‘M88A2 ARVs’.
“Regimental Sergeant’s Majors” should read either ‘Regimental Sergeants Major’ or ‘Regimental Sergeant Majors’. (There is some debate about which is correct. The former is the accepted case with respect to Governors General.)
The transcription of the Commanders’ Diaries for Vietnam was provided by Bruce Cameron and he should be acknowledged as the author.
It is disappointing to see only some photos of the deceased on the Vale page. A request for photos of the others would undoubtedly see them forthcoming.
The ‘Standards and Guidons of the RAAC’ should be amended (or a note affixed) to state that the Battlehonour Coral-Balmoral’ is now emblazoned on the Standard and the Vietnam Theatre Honour has been corrected to state ‘1968-71’.
Q Store. The image at Item 2n depicts the tank advancing from the ‘green fields’ into the ‘mud’. This heresy should never be tolerated (let alone promoted).
The latest issue of the Newsletter notes that it is obviously wrong that Jack Chipman is referred to in the DVA Nominal Roll as serving with B Sqn from 17 Dec 69 to 17 Dec 70. It is one thing to identify an error, and another to correct it. The following advice has been provided to DVA: The entry should read: B Sqn, 17 Dec 69 to 23 Dec 69; A Sqn 24 Dec 69 to 16 Dec 70
———————————————————————————————————————-
27 April 2020
ANZAC Day 2020 III
‘Thoughts on an unusual Anzac Day’
The above is the title of an article published by Henry Reynolds*.
“The heroic image of the digger inhibits any assessment of the costs and benefits of war. Questions about the wisdom of engagements are seen as diminishing the sacrifice and suffering of participants. Without serious debate about our involvement in overseas conflicts, we appear to be shadowing our American allies, who as Judt observed, were convinced that war works”.
The two issues raised here should not be linked. The Australia in 1914, was different to the Australia in 1964; different to the Australia in 2014, and different to the Australia now.
There can be no denying the bravery of those who fought on behalf of their country during WWI. Historians can provide retrospective evidence to show that the nation’s contribution to the War should have never been made. But this evidence wasn’t available at the time, so there is no justification for suggesting that Australia should have adopted a different approach. The nation’s homage for its dead cannot be dismissed as a valueless tribute to an ‘heroic image of the digger’.
“Without serious debate about our involvement in overseas conflicts …” is a completely different issue. The following quote suggests that debate is encouraged re Defence issues:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.” https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/modernisation-projects/project-land-400
No matter how hard I’ve tried, however, I can’t find any Defence point of contact that is prepared to enter into informed debate about necessary Defence capability and preparedness. Might I suggest thatthis is the matter that Australians should be concerned about today.”
*Henry Reynolds is an eminent Australian historian.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 April 2020
ANZAC Day 2020 II
A letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times
“The Prime Minister in his ANZAC Day Address (CT, 25 April 2020, p8) stated that “… along the walls of the Australian War Memorial are the names of 102,000 men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice for our country”.
There are two things wrong with this statement. Firstly, the number of names on the walls of the AWM number 102,888. How can anyone ‘round up (or down)’ the number of Australians whose lives have been lost in the service of our nation? Each and every life is equally important.
Secondly, Mr Morrison should have said “some of the men and women” who made the ultimate sacrifice. The names on the walls of the AWM are of those service personnel who died within the prescribed periods of the Wars in which they were involved. Anyone who died as a consequence of their wounds after the ‘cut off’ date is not listed on the Roll of Honour at the AWM. The cost to the nation of the wars in which we have been involved is much greater than 102,888.”
At least the PM did not refer to ‘servicemen who had been lost’ (as has happened before) and recognised that the Honour Roll includes women. But the speechwriters and PM’s staff still don’t ‘get it’! One day, perhaps perchance.
———————————————————————————————————————-
ANZAC Day 2020
Thoughts for Anzac Day. ‘Never such innocence again.’
“Perhaps today, our private Anzac remembrances can be more in keeping with the spirit of the troops – those who urged after the Great War that, in future, any choice for war must be incontrovertibly a last resort, and incontrovertibly defensive. Giving the choice for war to parliament would be a good start.”
The last sentence would have to be the classic ‘sting in the tail’. Presumably the unsaid part is that the Australian Government is so tied to the US that our Parliament (and therefore we as a nation) has had, and will have, no say in whether or not to become involved in recent wars and those in the future.
There is no doubt that we cannot dwell solely on the past, ie reflect only on the selfless deeds of servicemen and women who have sacrificed themselves on behalf of their nation in the years to now. We must always honour this service and ensure that it is never forgotten. We must also maintain our faith with those who have put themselves in harm’s way and build on it for the benefit of our nation and our countrymen. It is this latter obligation which needs our utmost focus. Not to do so would devalue the sacrifices.
The defence of our nation and its national interests is, and always has been, solely in the hands of Parliament (ie. the Australian people). Only if we are all apathetic to the nation state tensions around us, can we elect a government whose foreign policies we either don’t support or care about.
If this is the situation … we deserve what we get!
*Douglas Newton is a retired academic and historian. He has published on the history of Britain, Germany, and the First World War. His most recent book was Hell-bent: Australia’s Leap into the Great War (Melbourne: Scribe, 2014).
———————————————————————————————————————-
24 April 2020
Given tomorrow is ANZAC Day, I thought this letter to the Canberra Times in November last year was relevant.
———————————————————————————————————————–
23 April 2020
Australian Defence Strategy III
The author* of the article which I commented on in the Blog on 20 April 2020, has responded to my comment as below.
‘They underpin the agreed strategy for the defence of our nation.’ (Bruce Cameron)
What agreed strategy for a major war in Northeast Asia? That’s not the issue. It is in a great war-a conflict between China and the US in North Asia-who will be call the shots and what scope would having a highly interoperable force give Australian politicians to make an independent decision in Australia’s interest. National strategy is not about what the ADF can do. It’s about what the political leadership decides to do in a crisis. I understand that the highly professional ADF makes contingency plans for defence of Australia. Which plan they operate, if any at all, will be the call of the political leadership-the leadership’s strategy. But in the build up to a great power war in Northeast Asia are they so locked into the US’s forces that they will fall in behind the US’s strategy without choice.
My response to Mr Scrafton was as follows:
“I think it’s important to define terms. We have Military Strategy and Grand Strategy. ADF Contingency Plans for the defence of Australia are formulated on the basis of military strategy; this in turn, is developed within an agreed grand strategy.
The ANZUS treaty currently forms part of the grand strategy for our defence. The US is by far the predominate partner in this security agreement. This means a subordinate role for Australia and NZ.
If the relationship with the US is to be scrapped, what form of grand strategy is to be adopted. One option is to become a ‘neutral’ state, ie. accept that we are willing to the being manipulated by any state more powerful than ourselves. Other options? Enter into a bilateral defence agreement with another nation (Indonesia, perhaps) or another group of nations (such as used to exist with SEATO)?”
*Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 April 2020
Australia’s Defence Strategy II
Photo: ‘Defence Connect‘.
One of the other responses to the article that I commented on yesterday, stated (inter alia) that:
“The military/intelligence complex in Canberra continues to play toy soldiers when that type of conflict is no longer viable if national survival is the issue.
In a major conflict between the US and China, with Australia being an embedded ally of the former, we would be toast in no time. The power systems that drive our economy would be paralysed and our military retaliatory capacity would at best be marginal. The devastation would be catastrophic”.
I didn’t immediately realise that the author and I had previously adopted differing positions (as now) in a similar debate. Eight months ago, Andrew Farran* stated the following in a Pearls & Irritations article that was published:
“The military and intelligence community is ceaseless in talking up the threat to ensure its ‘share’ of resources. But at the same time such talking up can be seen as fuelling the threat and counter-productive for rational foreign policy objectives and the broader interests of the Australian people.”
My response at that time was:
“Dear Andrew
“A Defence policy is akin to an insurance policy. If you value your house, you insure it. If it’s built of weatherboard, you expect to pay a higher premium than if it was built of brick. Why? Because the threat to it is greater. How much greater? The community leaves this to the insurance company actuaries to determine. If we don’t agree with their threat assessment, we elect not to have any insurance and bear the risk ourselves.
I suggest that it’s part of the Australian culture (formulated by our collective experience) that insurance is considered a necessary factor in our daily expenses. The insurance companies might well ‘talk up’ the risk, but we’re capable of evaluating it for ourselves … depending on our personal circumstances. The trouble is, one’s sovereign identity is not quite the same as one’s house.
This is a ‘red herring’ of sorts … how would you feel if you had been an indigenous Australian when the first fleet arrived and colonisation commenced? As a nation, we still do not have an empathy with those who endeavoured to defend their family, their land and their possessions. We will not even acknowledge these Australian warriors and their families in the Australian War Memorial.
Many might agree with this this injustice, but would they agree that Australia’s “military and intelligence community” are talking up the threat to our country to keep themselves in a job?
I, for one, have more faith in my fellow Australians.”
*Andrew Farran is a former diplomat who also worked as Executive Assistant to Sir Arthur Tange in Defence in 1971-72. He is a retired law academic and trade policy adviser.
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 April 2020
Re Yesterday’s Blog post, Bruce Scott has added that:
1. Hopkins in Appendix 8 (P351) of Australian Armour says, “The 1st Armoured Car Squadron returned to Australia in December 1948. It was reorganised and renamed the 1st Armoured Regiment and so became the first armoured unit in the Australian Regular Army.”; and
2. Lieutenant Colonel Miles in his ‘Tracks To Tradition – A REGIMENTAL HISTORY’ article in the first issue of the Tracks magazine in 1955 wrote, “On the 7th of July, 1949, the Squadron was renamed the First Armoured Regiment, and at about the same time we were equipped with Churchill tanks. ” More here: file:///Users/lisa/Downloads/Histories,%20Diaries%20and%20other%20Resources.html
Thanks, Bruce! [So renaming might have been what happened. I’ve asked the RAAC Historian and will post his response.]
Australia’s Defence Strategy
“The clear course set by successive governments to develop military forces prioritised to be interoperable with those of the US and explicitly designed to operate in the South China Sea indicates that recent governments have abandoned any prospect of strategic autonomy and national independence. On current planning, in the next great war Australia will have no strategy.”
The quote above is from ‘Australia’s strategic quandary: political leadership and the abandonment of strategy’ by Mike Scrafton* (in John Menadue’s ‘Pearls and Irritations’).
I think this assessment is overly dismissive of the efforts made by the ADF’s planning staff and the intelligence gathering services which help inform their work.
There are numerous contingency plans around which our military capability is developed and maintained. These plans have differing levels of priority. They underpin the agreed strategy for the defence of our nation.
We are currently seeing what happens when we, as a nation, take our eye off the ball. Our last pandemic preparedness exercise was conducted over ten years ago. After that, the need for regularly updated contingency planning lost importance. The ADF, however, continually maintains its readiness to execute the contingency plan(s) considered most likely to be needed be meet the current threat assessment.
The ADF at all its levels of responsibility is both professional and dedicated. As is undoubtedly right, only by the direction by the Government of the day, can the use of military force be authorised. It is the responsibility of the ADF to make known to Government the appropriate preparedness levels required at all times. I, for one, have confidence in the ADF’s unswerving commitment to this end.
*Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
———————————————————————————————————————–
20 April 2020
1 Armd Regt: Was a New Unit Formed or Was an Existing Unit Renamed?
There have been a number of recent posts related to ‘preserving our history’. This is another. The 1AR Assn states in its history of 1 Armd Regt that “the 1st Australian Armoured Car Squadron was renamed 1st Armoured Regiment”, ie an existing unit was renamed. But is this what actually happened?
Could it be that the 1st Armoured Car Squadron was disbanded and those personnel remaining, were incorporated into a new unit? Differing perceptions are expressed in the sources quoted below.
“It was intended that the 1st Armoured Regiment would be formed at Puckapunyal from the personnel of the Armoured Car Squadron when they returned from Japan.”
‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ (page xv)
“The 1st Armoured Car Squadron returned to Australia in December 1948. In July 1949 the Squadron was expanded and re-equipped with Churchill tanks to form the 1st Armoured Regiment.’ Wikipedia
“The Squadron returned to Australia in December 1948, together with its remaining vehicles. In July 1949, the remaining members of the unit were formed into a new unit, the 1st Armoured Regiment, to become the first armoured unit of the new Australian Regular Army.” http://anzacsteel.hobbyvista.com/Armoured%20Vehicles/austarmourinjapanph_1.htm
“The regiment’s nucleus consisted of personnel from the 1st Australian Armoured Car Squadron, which had returned from Japan several months earlier as part of the occupation force.” http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13757vietnam.asp
It’s my belief that the last of these, that from the AWM, is most likely to be correct, ie. the 1st Armoured Car Squadron was disbanded and the personnel who remained, formed the nucleus of 1st Armoured Regiment.
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 April 2020
The Centurion Which Detonated the Most A/T Mines in Vietnam.
A number of tank crewmen experienced numerous anti-tank mine incidents in Vietnam … before reflecting on who they were, it’s worth looking at which tank held the ‘record’.
A number of Cents detonated two anti-tank mines. Only one, however, detonated three: ARN 169067 (between Oct 69 and Jun 70). During this time is was callsign 24A and 4A in B and A Sqns. The tank spent eight months in Vietnam … is that another record for the shortest time? (More about that milestone in another Blog.)
The post on 1 April 2020 described the last of these incidents (the first Centurion to detonate an RPG mine). What happened on the other two occasions?
23 October 1969: Not everything could keep going Tango Force’s way, however. At 7.35am, the lead tank (Ferrari) struck a 7kg mine. It was not on a track, but positioned close to the edge of the Xa Cam My Rubber Plantation, just west of Route 2. This was probably predicted to be a likely place for AFVs to leave the road. As always, considerable thought and planning had gone into laying the mine. The fact that the ground was quite soft where the incident occurred probably reduced its effectiveness*. This was not immediately realised by the crew commander, however:
“It all happened so fast, a loud bang, cessation of forward motion and a feeling of numbness. I checked that the turret crew were ok (Troopers Winga Williams and Java Jones), but couldn’t raise the driver (Trooper Moe Burgess) on the IC. I was so concerned for him that I broke all the rules and went over the top to check on him. He was ok; he’d just lost his headsets.”
*While there were no apparent wounds, such incidents could always involve both physical and psychological trauma (known as occult wounds) which took longer to become evident. Minimal damage was done to the tank.
25 February 1970: It was a bigger mine than 1Charlie had hit a few days earlier (16kg compared to 13.5kg), but this one was not offset. Going off beneath the front left roadwheel, the suspension was able to absorb much of the blast. Despite this, the driver, Trooper Moe Burgess, was badly knocked around by the concussion. While he was checking their gunner, Trooper Bob Joyce, Wicks asked Williams to help their driver: ‘I climbed out of the turret and down the front to find poor bloody Moe half out of his driver’s compartment. I hauled him out and laid him on the mudguard.’ Joyce was fortunate:
The force of the explosion was so great, it released the catch holding down the spring-loaded gunner’s seat and I was catapulted head first into the turret roof. Luckily for me, I was wearing a fibreglass helmet (US issue) which took the brunt of the impact and certainly saved me from serious harm.
Damaged components on the vehicle included the idler, track guard, muffler and six track links. Electrical power to the turret was also lost. In the eyes of the squadron commander, however, there was a positive side to the incident: ‘The mine caused a bush fire which detonated a second anti-tank mine … and we had found the minefield.’ Although located further to the east of the D445 position than the prisoner had indicated, the enemy had once again correctly predicted ground likely to be used by armour. Interestingly, one of the anti-tank mines later found in the area by engineers was set to be initiated by a tilt switch.
*To the credit to the LAD, repairs to the tank, ARN 169067, were completed in two hours. The OpDam report noted that this was ‘the first non-electrically initiated anti-tank mine encountered for some time’, i.e. it was a direct pressure mine, possibly of Soviet or Chicom manufacture. The device was typical of tilt switch mechanisms: a freshly cut stick, around 90cm in length, was inserted into a Chicom grenade, which in turn was moulded into the explosive charge. All that was needed for detonation was for the stick to be tilted in any direction.
———————————————————————————————————————-
18 April 2020
The Last Centurion to Detonate a Mine in Vietnam
“We hit a mine at the end of [Operation] Iron Fox. I think it was calculated at 50lbs. It created the biggest hole that the mini-team had seen.” Peter Bourke (Major), OC C Squadron, 1971
Operation Iron Fox was to conclude on 5 August; however, A Company 3RAR came across signs of enemy activity early that morning. At 8.45am, 5 Troop were ordered to take up position to the rear of the infantry. They were replaced by 1 Troop at 1pm. Soon after, it was concluded that there was little hope of any significant finds being made. At 2pm, the infantry boarded the ‘carriers’ of 2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav (Stephens) in preparation for returning to Nui Dat. 1 Troop were tasked to lead the convoy along the firetrail to Route 2.
Second Lieutenant Dave Lester, RNZAC (Troop Officer, 2 Troop, A Squadron 3 Cav) recalls that at 2.25pm:
“As they [1 Troop] came past our position, and when directly opposite my vehicle, self and Lance Corporal Dick McColl standing on top, [Farrant’s] tank detonated a mine, blowing off a suspension unit. I would say that we were no more than 5m away, and, apart from being covered in dust and dirt, no injuries were sustained [by us].”
Even closer to the explosion, were Troopers Grant Sheean and Steve Johnson. They had been detailed to bring in the Claymores from the APC ambush: ‘Incredibly, they both came staggering back out of the dust, arms full of Claymores and det cord around their necks.’
Although none of the crew was reported as being wounded [wounds revealed themselves later], the tank [ARN 169029] itself was not too well. The left final drive sprocket and centre left suspension station were badly damaged. (Roadwheels were blown off and were unable to be found within 300m of the tank.) SHQ and 5 Troop joined up with 1 Troop and a harbour was formed while arrangements were made to get the tank mobile. Improvisation worked initially, but it was not long before the tank had to be towed. Repairs would probably have been completed in the field if 1 Troop were to remain on operations. According to Operation Timothy, however, the troop were supposed to have been withdrawn on 1 August 1971.
Notes. (i) ARN 169029 ended up as a ‘hard’ target on Singleton Range. Its logbook is held by the AWM; (ii) the photo above is not of 169029.
————————————————————————————————————————-
17 April 2020
ESOs : Open and Transparent?
The post on 12 April 2020, took issue with the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s rant about negative feedback being given to ESOs by a ‘sub-section of veterans’. It concluded with the request to “please be open and transparent in terms of making known the things that are done in the name of the RAAC family”.
The video clip below is from the President of the Hawthorn RSL Sub-Branch. He is providing feedback to RSL HQ in an open and transparent manner. Should he be condemned? There are probably some in the RSL who will say: “Yes!”. A bit like the situation with the captain of the USN aircraft carrier who was sacked recently for speaking out about the Covid-19 cases aboard his ship.
(The video will not play direct; post link below into URL bar.)
My Comment: “Well spoken, Lucas! You’ve stood up for veterans first and made that a priority. RSL National and State needs to be completely open and transparent as far as funds (in and out) are concerned. The same applies to other ESOs, but they won’t all acknowledge the need for this unfortunately”.
Please feel free to openly disagree with me. I welcome feedback … as they say in private enterprise, this is the only way that ‘you/the organisation’ can continually improve (though some ESOs would disagree).
———————————————————————————————————————–
16 April 2020
A Photo Too Far
A caption to the above might be: ‘2Lt Ian Farrant (Acting 1 Troop Leader), Maj Peter Bourke (OC C Sqn 1 Armd Regt), and Major John Doyle (OC A Coy 3RAR); taken during Op Iron Fox Ph 2 (2-5 Aug 71)’. It may or may not be an AWM photo … enquires in this regard have been commenced.
The photo emerged recently during preliminary preparations for a C Squadron 1 Armd Regt 50th reunion in Canberra on 6/7 June 2021. The get-together is timed to coincide with a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord (which preceded Iron Fox.).
A similar Commemoration was conducted by DVA in Feb 2020 for Operation Hammersley.
I advocated at the time for 1AR Assn to take early action for an A Sqn 1 Armd Regt reunion to be conducted. Being in Canberra, I offered to help. I was pilloried, as DVA had not committed to the Commemoration as funding was within the 2019/20 FY budget allocation (and could not be ‘anticipated’).
By the time the Commemoration was confirmed, there was either insufficient time or nobody prepared to take on the work to organise a Squadron function … as it did not happen.
Preparations for a C Squadron reunion are proceeding with great support. If funding for the DVA Commemoration is not approved, then we can either cancel the arrangements or go ahead on our own. The main thing is that we have alerted Squadron members to the possibility and made preparations. Do those who served, deserve any less?
———————————————————————————————————————-
15 April 2020
Lessons Learnt on The Job (Again)
The photo above appeared on the Centurion Appreciation Society FB page. I commented thus: “Some might wonder about the removal of the side plates. These were done away with early in ’68 (soon after the tanks arrived) because of the constant need to clear the mud build up behind them. There was only one RPG penetration into the fighting compartment through the hull. This was extremely ‘lucky’, passing between the top of the track and bottom of the track guard. The tank above was photo’d in late 68 or after. In Jun 68, it was found that long approach marches chewed up roadwheel rubber, so two extras were carried on the glacis. Originally they were placed at the same height … then it was found that the driver’s vision was impeded and so that in front of him was lowered”.
I was then asked to explain why the MBSGD had been removed. My response was:
“I wish it was just a matter of saying that too many vines etc were getting caught around them when pushing through jungle, but the lesson related to training can’t go without mention. A ridiculous situation existed in Australia … the rubber covers to hold WP grenades in place were classed as ‘War Stocks’ and so whenever grenades were loaded, drivers had to be closed down and the levers splayed out to hold the grenades in place. Training suffered accordingly. Prior to a 150 km approach march in Vietnam in May 68, grenades were loaded (in case of ambush). Covers were fitted (for the first time ever). One came loose, however, allowing a grenade to fall out.
It exploded as it hit the track guard. The driver was burnt. Once again, the importance of realism in all aspects of training was highlighted.”
I added that the driver “was one lucky guy (if the turret had been traversed anywhere else …). Mustn’t forget his replacement who burnt his bum on the WP remnants on the driver’s seat”.
———————————————————————————————————————
14 April 2020
Hierarchical Command
This is an extract from a recent article in Army’s Professional Military Education newsletter, ‘The Cove’:
“We’ve mulled over this problem for a while. How do you quicken change in organisations that have a closed workforce and draw new hires entirely via ab initio entry? It’s a thorny one. Ideas are quickly dismissed by those in the system. Armies are different they say – by necessity.
One cannot hire a Colonel off the street. Generals know its takes years of training and education, foundation warfighting skills need to be taught and embedded; only upon them can the institution of the Army then graft specialisations and expertise in the myriad of employment categories a complex effect generator like the Army requires.” https://cove.army.gov.au/article/cultural-reform-middle-army-melting-iron-colonels
The thrust might be summed up by another extract: “As Defence and the three services review their missions and perhaps also align values across Defence, there could be an opportunity to leverage change with a transformational approach to accelerating change in Army’s middle.
My comment is copied below:
“Great article. My experience (1968-1988) was that there was a culture of ‘not questioning [or risk …]’. This was pervasive. An example of the consequences of this occurred in Vietnam.
The misfire drill for the Centurion tank was to wait 20 mins before unloading (in case of a hangfire). A gunnery instructor who questioned the wisdom of this in a combat situation was told bluntly to just teach the drill as laid down.
During an attack on an enemy defensive position a misfire occurred. The situation was dire and the crew commander told the loader to remove the round. The loader refused … he knew that it could explode. The crew commander insisted … the round was unloaded, thrown out, and the battle resumed.
When writing the story of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, I looked into the basis for this drill. It turned out that the chance of a hangfire was 2%. Waiting 20 mins reduced the likelihood to zero. Obviously the crew should have been
made aware of this, so that an informed decision could be made when in action.
I later became aware of the different culture in the private sector, where input from the bottom up is encouraged and supported at all levels.”
————————————————————————————————————————
13 April 2020
Australian Strategy and the Gathering Storm in Asia: The Remote Likelihood of Greater Public Engagement
The above is the title of an article by Michael Evans*, published in Quantum On line at file: ///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/Content.Outlook/V5PAP7NL/Untitled%20attachment%2000310.pdf
An extract from the Conclusion follows:
“America’s elder statesman, Henry Kissinger, once said that there are only two roads to strategic stability: domination and equilibrium. As the era of unchallenged Western domination is replaced by Sino-American bipolar competition, Australia must invest in the complex process of equilibrium. As a nation, we must reinforce the Australian-American alliance but at the same time put far greater effort into helping to shape a new ecosystem in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Such an endeavour will require intellectual rigour in the form of increased defence self-reliance and much greater public engagement in the country’s national security debate.”
The December 2019 2/14 QMI (LH) Assn Newsletter states the following:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.” I asked the Editor if he could “provide an email address for such queries about RAAC capability to be sent?”.
I’ve asked two different Defence directorates, in the spirit of ‘debate and independent’ about the timetable to procure the additional 30 Abrams needed to ‘right size’ the Australian tank fleet (see numerous related blog posts).
The response … zilch! So much for greater public understanding “on Army and how it does its business”.
*Michael Evans is the General Sir Francis Hassett Chair of Military Studies at the Australian Defence College in Canberra and a professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University. His article is based on an address to the Australian alumni of the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, at the Commonwealth Club in Canberra last October.
———————————————————————————————————————-
12 April 2020
How the RAAC Corporation Views Feedback.
The Blog on 9 April 2020 referred the Defence Force Welfare Assn’s call for feedback from members in terms of the direction that the DFWA should be taking to achieve the greatest benefit to its members.
How different this approach is to that of the RAAC Corporation. An extract from its annual report in Ironsides is copied at the end.
The Chairman criticises everyone who dares suggest another approach to that of his choosing. He doesn’t explain why he regards the feedback as “malicious, misguided and myopic”, he just states that it is. He doesn’t give any examples of what he regards as “toxic commentary” … he just states that that’s what it is. All ESOs, he says, are unfairly criticised.
Apparently, the feedback came from “a small sub-section of the veteran community”. So not a small section, but a small ‘sub-section’. Does it matter? Some members of the veteran community have offered feedback. Rather than accept this for what it is … the Chairman says ‘How dare you!’.
Well … let’s return serve! As far as Armouredadvocates is concerned, all that has been called for is openness and transparency. But the RAAC Corporation won’t agree to this. Why isn’t its annual financial statement available to the public? Those of other charitable organisations are. Why aren’t the Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGM available to all? Of course, we know how secretive the RAAC Corporation is in terms of the Chairman’s response to the FOI submission regarding the Corporation’s position re the Ministerial submission concerning the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour. That outcome there was that one of the considerations was that if the RAAC Corporation’s position was made known, it would lead to member associations withdrawing their membership.
Apparently, the feedback also extends to “the Corporation’s own Member Associations, who have voluntarily devoted a huge slice of their lives battling their own accepted service-related disabilities, to look after those who are struggling with many issues.”. Yet, the Corporation’s position is that neither it, nor its members, have the resources to assist veterans in need … anyone who needs help has to be referred to other ESOs. How can this be, when Corporation members are giving up “a huge slice of their lives” to look after them?
To the Chairman RAAC Corporation … I understand that (i) you are familiar with the posts on this Blog and (ii) you’ve just undergone an operation. I wish you well with your recuperation, but please just be open and transparent in terms of making known the things that are done in the name of the RAAC family (remembering that the lack of such protocol in the past has led to the downfall of other ESOs).
———————————————————————————————-
ADVERSE COMMENTS FROM THE VETERAN COMMUNITY
Our key stakeholders, the serving members of the RAAC, need to know what is being done for them and what can be done for them in the veterans’ space contrary to often bitter and ill-informed toxic commentary from a small sub-section of the veteran community, as has been the case this year.
The malicious, misguided and myopic nature of such commentary is truly disappointing.
To see all ESOs damned to hell and back, as being like the RSL in having snouts in the trough, etc., is offensive in the extreme and cannot be allowed to stand.
Such toxic commentary is unhelpful, completely ignoring, tarnishing and diminishing the good work being done in the broader veterans’ support space.
This includes the Corporation’s own Member Associations, who have voluntarily devoted a huge slice of their lives battling their own accepted service-related disabilities, to look after those who are struggling with many issues including navigating the treacherous shoals of MRCA 2004.
ADSO is now rightly seen as the go-to entity in view of the fact the RSL’s star has waned. The RSL’s good name and reputation will take many years to recover from this damage.
All ESOs have unfairly and unjustifiably, been infected and tainted by the recent scandals in RSL NSW and RSL National and it is grossly unfair to tar all ESOs with the same brush.
Similarly, the concerted personal attacks on the Secretary DVA and on ADSO members individually and collectively, are on every level, as egregious as it gets and all ESO members of ADSO continue to support the Secretary in her attempts as a Change Champion, to transform DVA
————————————————————————————————————————
11 April 2020
Postscript: The Bizarre Story of the Last 20Pdr Round Fired in Vietnam.
The Blog on 15 March 2020 described the above circumstances.
As is often the case, however, all was not as it seemed.
What happened becomes even more bizarre when the ‘back’ story is revealed.
The shell case of the last round fired in contact was ‘lost’. (It was collected after the action and was supposed to have been transported back to Nui Dat and kept separate from all others).
The round fired by the squadron group returning from Operation Iron Fox was ordered to be fired by the Squadron OC (so as to provide a replacement).
Even here there is a ‘twist’, however. It seems (from a subsequent patrol report) that enemy may well have been present in the location at the time that the round was fired.
So, the ‘new’ shell case gets back to 106 Field Workshop. The details that the OC wrote out were being engraved when a mistake is made. What to do?
I understand that a section was cut from another round, engraved and then fitted in place of the damaged inscription.
So… it seems that the details on the shell case in the Werribee RSL round re the last contact with the enemy, are correct.
But the round itself is not the last fired in action (but then again, it could’ve been).
———————————————————————————————————————-
10 April 2020
‘Like a Trooper!’
On the TV earlier this evening, there was a discussion about how the virus had affected education. A spokesperson stated that “students were working like absolute troopers!”.
Why did she say this? Does she know any ‘troopers’? (I won’t go any further on this tangent.)
There are a number of definitions on Google re ‘trooper’, ie. “an enlisted soldier in the cavalry” and “someone who courageously faces harshness and unpleasant conditions to obtain a goal”, ie. striving to ensure that he/she got the last pack of chewing tobacco in the ration pack!
This begs the question … how did the association between the qualities above, and the characteristics of a ‘trooper’, originally come to be made?
Google provides an explanation …
LIKE A TROOPER means with great energy, enthusiasm, or display, or just doing things to the extreme (like the early British soldiers supposedly did). And people have using the simile and attributing many things to being ‘done like a trooper’ since at least the 18th century including ‘swear like a trooper, ‘lie like a trooper, ‘eat like a trooper,’ ‘laugh like a trooper,’ and ‘die like a trooper.’ But, as mentioned above, some people may be referring to the characteristics of a hardworking actor (which technically should probably be spelled ‘trouper’ in this instance (see above).
SWEAR LIKE A TROOPER or ‘curse like a trooper’ meaning to spew forth oaths/profanity/obscenity first appeared in print in the early 1700s and was originally referring to the cursing habits of British cavalrymen (troopers), who actually were probably no more likely to swear than other military men.
The question? Why is it that the term ‘trooper’ is related to swearing, eating, lying, laughing, and dying? Is there anything that these actions have in common?
Is it to do with the sequence … or is it to do with the fact that troopers weren’t/aren’t prepared to simply lie down and die?
Should there be any doubt as regards the SAS rank of ‘Trooper’ … the following is relevant: Before the rank was approved, the permission of the RAAC HOC was sought. The then Director granted his approval for SAS soldiers to be awarded the rank Trooper, as the SAS had a similar role to cavalry, ie, reconnaissance. It was deemed that those who participated in warfare of this nature should be ‘brothers in arms’.
———————————————————————————————————————–
9 April 2020
The Unique Pressures on AFV Crews
The latest newsletter (Apr20, No 6) of the Defence Force Welfare Association (DFWA) will soon be available here: https://dfwa.org.au/. One extract is:
“With the passing of the Military Covenant into law in late 2019, many people still don’t realise just how military service is unique. Military service may have some similarities to other occupations or employment, but when you look at military service as a whole, it really is unique.” My response is copied below.
Hi Guys,
The E-News issue below asked for suggestions. Some time ago I asked the C’tee of the 1 Armd Regt Assn if they would support a proposal to initiate an ADF study to investigate the stressors associated with specific employment categories across the Army.
My idea was that if there was a guide available to medical professionals which set out the unique circumstances of say, those in the SAS, or AFV crewmen, or field engineers dealing with IEDs, etc, then when a veteran presents suffering mental health issues, there is a basis on which to understand those issues which may have affected him/her.
I’ve copied my submission below. The 1 Armd Regt Assn advised that they could not support it, however, as they were not “a lobby group”.
Maybe the DFWA might see some merit in recommending to Defence the value of identifying such factors and documenting them. Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
THE STRESS EXPERIENCED BY AFV CREWS
Purpose.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to some of the factors which may have affected the mental health of Armoured Corps veterans, in order to better anticipate the needs of future veterans separating from the Service.
Human Factors in General.
When considering the performance of an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its capability, such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
These factors are taken into account of when choosing between two contenders for a particular combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident they feel, eg. whether or not they are likely to suffer anxiety in any of its forms when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that identifying these is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. To complicate matters, man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
Morale.
There are two main determinants of the degree to which AFV crewmen feel ‘comfortable’ in terms of their survivability. Foremost is their confidence in the overall superiority of the system in which they are a part (ie. their commanders at all levels, their battle grouping, and their equipment) … vis a vis the enemy. Following from this, is their confidence regarding the provisions which have been made for their individual protection.
What happens, however, when a loss or reversal in combat is suffered (eg. an AFV is penetrated, causing crew casualties). It is understandable that confidence in the superiority of the overall system is reduced, while provisions for individual survivability are also called into question.
Matters Affecting Confidence in Individual Survivability
All military training is conducted on the basis that it equips service personnel with skills superior to those of the enemy. This means that AFV crewmen are confident in meeting their responsibilities when under fire. They know that their fellow crew members are similarly trained and they will support each other.
When the enemy demonstrates that they possess an equivalent ability, AFV crew have to accept that their vehicle could be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon or severely damaged by an anti-tank mine, leading to a catastrophic ammunition fire. Apart from the obvious anxiety of being wounded or killed at any time, the following matters are some of those which become particularly important:
Being able to exit the AFV quickly if it is ‘knocked out’ or experiences a fire (particularly important for someone like a tank gunner who does not have direct access to the outside);
Knowing that the vehicle fire-fighting system will always operate immediately and effectively;
Being assured of the fire/flash retardant capability of crew combat clothing;
Being kept informed of what is happening beyond the AFV itself and not being forced to imagine the possibilities;
Being able to maintain contact with other crew members and not put in a situation of feeling isolated and alone (as can happen when the inter-communication system fails) and
Knowing that medical support will ensure that all wounded will immediately receive life-saving treatment and evacuation.
Loss of confidence in any of these areas will significantly increase the anxiety and fear that comes with the stress of battle. Should information overload occur in this digital age, the situation will be exasperated.
Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
One definition of PTSD is a particular set of reactions that can develop in people who have been through a traumatic event which threatened their life or safety, or that of others around them. It is generally recognised that it is not only the experience of a single traumatic event which can generate these reactions, other stressful situations (especially if repeated over and over) can have the same effect.
Conclusion.
AFVs, by definition, operate at the forefront of operations against the enemy. Even if a crewman does not directly experience a traumatic event, being enclosed in a vehicle which could be penetrated by an enemy rocket or detonate an anti-tank mine at any time, gives rise to stressful feelings associated with being wounded or killed, being trapped inside an AFV and burnt to death; and/or being abandoned in a disabled vehicle on the battlefield. These thoughts are often made worse by a lack of communication with other crew members, feelings of isolation, and a constant uncertainty about what is happening around him.
There are unique factors which impact on the stress experienced by the crews of AFVs on active service. These must be taken into account when any assessment is made of their mental health.
Please take a look and pass it on to all the veterans you know prior to Anzac Day if you can. It is not out on CD or the like, so it can’t be purchased anywhere and I think that all Vietnam vets will relate the intent and sentiment of the song.
Thank You. Francis Edwards”
I responded to the person who sent the email above as follows:
“I just spoke to Francis to congratulate him on the recording.
I explained that there might be another song needed to reflect those who died of their wounds after the end of the prescribed period of the War (29 April 1975).
He wasn’t aware that the 521 were ‘only’ those who died before that point and that hundreds had died from 30 April 1975 onwards.
I explained how schoolchildren are taught that the cost the nation of the Vietnam War was 521 dead, but this is probably just half of the actual toll.
Francis had thought that 521 was the total casualty figure for Vietnam. He might do a second song. Cheers, Bruce”
————————————————————————————————————————-
7 April 2020
The First Round Fired in Action by a Centurion in Vietnam
Sergeant Allan Jago and Sergeant Sid Russell … both soldiers are members of the Independent Armoured Squadron Workshops. Note the newly arrived Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARV) ARN 169122 (left) and ARN 169112 (right) in the background. (AWM Photo: CRO/68/0108/VN)
The following milestones for 1 Armd Regt RAAC have been covered in earlier posts: the first round fired in action and the first main armament round fired in action … but what were the circumstances of the first round fired by a Centurion in action?
“This occurred on 8 March 1968, just over a week after the tanks arrived at Nui Dat. HQ 1ATF had requested help with landclearing in an area known as the Light Green. The aim was to restrict the cover available to enemy withdrawing from the Long Hais, this being their most likely escape route once Operation Pinnaroo, which had just commenced, got into full swing. The VC were expected to try and break through the cordon, cache their weapons, and mix with villagers in the area.
The Squadron LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens, set off in his ‘carrier’ with the two dozers (commanded by Sergeants Bob Snape and Graeme Millington), a bridgelayer (Sergeant Andy Zsolt), a fitters ‘track’ (Sergeant Kevin Craig, RAEME), and an ARV (Sergeant Peter De Jong, RAEME). This was one of the few occasions that Special Equipment Troop deployed as an entity, albeit part of a composite force under the command of Captain Bruce Richards (2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav).
Snape recalls that the notice to move was so short that ‘the crews had no idea how resupply was to occur and the details were worked out on the way’. En route to Fire Support Base Herring, De Jong saw a person running frantically with an RPG. He engaged with his .30cal machine gun, but the range was too great and the ‘VC fled to hell out of it’.
Interestingly, RAEME (and the Late Bob Owens) feature in both the first round fired and the first round fired by a Centurion (both AFVs belonging to 1 Armd Sqn Wksp)
————————————————————————————————————————
6 April 2020
Saying What Needs to be Said ….
One of the comments received re yesterday’s Blog was
“Agree with almost everything Bruce, but the decision for the driver to fight opened up was taken out of our hands when we were closed down in SVN clearing AP minefields. 45 minutes before the driver passed out through heat exhaustion in a measured 55deg + and reduced air in the turret. Having said that, I agree that closed down driving should be the norm in normal circumstances.”
My response was:
“I should’ve explained …
One thing I’ll never accept is that there was no feedback from one tank squadron to the next. Three drivers in three different squadrons were WIA as a result of attacking enemy bunkers system opened up.
The training at Puckapunyal remained the same throughout, ie. opened up in open country at all times. In a Cent, the driver had to stop and totally expose himself to close down. So, in an ambush, the only option is to drop his seat. Of course, then he can’t see (episcopes are in the hatches).
A tank can operate successfully in this situation, but it takes training to make it work. Of course, drivers can still be (and were) wounded by RPG shrapnel. So, helmets and flak jackets are needed. Eventually, on our third bunker assault (and the last in country), drivers wore flak jackets and helmets on the approach; they were closed down at the FUP prior to the assault. There were no crew casualties.
But this was Aug 71, the first bunker assault occurred in Jun 68. By 1969, an enemy defended position should have been established at Puckapunyal and tank crews trained in how to assault (rather than everyone having to relearn the same lessons ‘on the job’).
Crew safety was jeopardised in favour of the overriding requirement not to knock down any trees in the State Forrest and practising how to support inf conducting cordon and searches of villages. Tank crews were trained for the totally wrong war!
On my first bunker assault everything happened very quickly. Our training meant that it didn’t even occur to me to tell my driver to drop his seat … he didn’t think of it either and just resorted to his pistol. Fortunately, the enemy were even more surprised than us and we had bigger guns (so no crew casualties). It was with a false sense of invulnerability that we went into our second attack. (The enemy learnt faster than we did and had sufficient warning to stockpile RPGs.)”
————————————————————————————————————————
5 April 2020
At last, someone in responsibility prepared to say what it’s really like …
Let us hope that this man will be applauded by all those in the RAAC and seen as a role model for others tasked with preparing a unit for active service:
“2nd Cavalry Regiment …
Looking at past unit SITREPs it seems that the custom, with a few exceptions, is to expound the achievements of our units beginning with an obligatory reference to a busy year. We’re all busy, and we’re all proud of our units, so I won’t dedicate any time to those topics beyond thanking our people and families for their efforts.”
“The best example of contemporary normalised deviance within the Corps is the acceptance of four vehicle CRV Troops and two Troops in each Squadron. This is the equivalent of telling an infantry platoon they can only have two sections per platoon because we can only afford enough EF88s for two sections. The correct number of CRV in a Troop (for tactical and trade model purposes) is six. 2nd Cavalry Regiment Squadron directed Troop training and Stage 5 activities will all be done with six vehicle Troops by rotating platforms”.
The experience of tank crews prior to Vietnam revealed many similar shortcomings; but no-one was prepared to stand up like the CO 2 Cav. Well done that man!
Some of the above shortcomings were:
Complete lack of training with drivers closed down as needed when attacking an enemy defended position (drivers were WIA as a consequence);
No crew protective headgear or appropriate goggles provided;
No provision for hot weather fire retardant crew protective dress, reinforced to assist lifting of wounded turret crew (lifting a wounded crewman from the turret floor was required in a least one incident);
No consideration given to the means by which infantry indicate targets to tanks when confronting an enemy defended position (‘watch my fall of shot!’ did not work; a ‘Very’ type pistol was required;
No revision of the immediate misfire drill to enable crew commanders to decide whether to remove a round from the breech or wait 30 mins (it was fortunate that a delay caused by this training was not fatal in one incident).
No removal of the three-round solenoid (and replacement of the WP tipped ammo) to enable the RMG to be used as a ‘proper’ machine gun when necessary;
No training with blank ammo for personal weapons (the benefit of which is obvious); insistence on peacetime parade drill for weapons which, if followed with a loaded weapon, resulted in an AD; and
An insistence on tactical drills which were quickly used by the enemy to their advantage.
———————————————————————————————————————-
4 April 2020
Maintaining Our History (Cont …)
Attention has recently been drawn to the need for corrections in terms of the 1 AR Assn Honour Roll. The C’tee may or may not make these.
Another ‘fact’ is in need of consideration. The 1AR Assn currently states that I Armd Regt’s Theatres of Operation include Japan. Is this correct?
Is it important either way? The 1AR Assn Newsletter carries a caveat to say that, despite care, information should not be taken to be historical fact, ie. it may or not be true. The background here is interesting.
Some time ago the Newsletter carried an article by a crew member of the ARV which was behind a tank when it was fired on from Binh Ba. The crew member said that he was surprised at the sound of the exploding RPG, as he was reading a ‘stick book’ at the time.
There were errors of ‘fact’ in the article, but apart from these, the manner in which it was written seemed to give the ‘ok’ to the fact that the crew member (with, presumably, the ‘ok’ of his commander) was not on lookout for enemy, despite this possibly contributing to the wounding of the crewman in the tank immediately in front.
I was horrified. When I contacted the Assn C’tee, expressing my dismay at the publication … I was accused of ‘bullying’ (the Newsletter caveat was inserted thereafter). My dismay worsened when I contacted the HOC, RAEME. “That’s what typical RAEME soldiers do!”, I was told. (I’d thought that some sort of formal position might have been expressed, decrying the account and any acceptance of it being appropriate … distancing the act as being typical of that of RAEME soldiers in such circumstances; I had ‘higher’ regard for them.) The view expressed was that we should all ‘lighten up’.
Try explaining that to the Centurion operator who was WIA (and could easily have been KIA) by the RPG … the firer of which could have been seen by those on the ARV (if they’d been on ‘lookout’ as they should’ve been). Anyway … so now there’s a caveat re information published in the Newsletter.
Should we just ignore such matters, or alert the C’tee. (I’ll never know as the President has directed the C’tee not to correspond with me.) But I’ll try to do the right thing, nevertheless …
It’s easy to understand how the reference to the Japan Theatre of Operation came about. The 1st Armd Car Sqn served in Japan with BCOF. They were formed from volunteers from 4 Armd Bde at the end of WWII. On return to Australia in 1948 they provided the nucleus of 1 Armd Regt which was formed in 1949.
So, Japan was NOT a Theatre of Operation for 1 Armd Regt (either AAC or RAAC); it was, however, for members of 1 Armd Car Sqn, AAC. But, if we’re going to include their Theatres, why not include those for 4 Armd Bde? Indeed, why not include the Theatres of Operation for 1 Armd Regt, AAC?
————————————————————————————————————————
3 April 2020
The Ha Go Tank Saga (with thanks to Rod Ward)
The Assistant Director, National Collections at the AWM is Maj Gen Brian Dawson, AM, CSC (Retd). A former infantry (SAS) officer, he joined the AWM in 2013.
While the correspondence with the AWM has been to and fro for some time re the Ha Go tank (see previous Blog posts and NB 2 above), this is the first time the matter has been raised to his level.
“Hi Brian,
I wonder if you might be able to consider amending the AWM’s references to the Ha Go Tank, so as to be consistent as regards the number of crew. At the moment there are contradictory references as to whether or not the crew was three or four. (See under.)
I, and a number of others interested in armour, are firmly of the belief that the tank had a crew of three. It is our contention (and that of the international community as a whole) that the term tank ‘crew’ refers to those who actually operated the AFV. We’re aware that some documents may include references to others, such as Japanese Landing Force ground guides, as part of the ‘crew’.
Any number of references can be supplied to back up the number of the tank’s crew as being three. That of the AWM conservation team would seem to be most relevant. However, another more recent one is provided here (also a restoration): https://riddlemagazine.com/ha-go/
Many thanks for your consideration, Bruce Cameron”
AWM Contradictory References: Ha Go Tank
“This area of the Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the front proper right side of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the lower portion of the hull in the proper left side; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret.” https://www.awm.gov.au/about/our-work/projects/Ha-Gotype95lighttankconservation
“Thank you for the email. I will provide you with a considered response in the near future”.
What more could anyone ask … the courtesy of a prompt response and an undertaking to look into the matter raised. Why is this so rare?
———————————————————————————————————————
2 April 2020
Common Courtesy: Not That Common?
(The Blog post for 17 November 2019 is copied at the end. )
Recently I received an email from someone who had been a recipient of one of the items. He said that he had worn it ever since. (I should mention that some clothing items manufactured in years past are of a better ‘quality’ than later manufactured items.) Having recently been promoted however, it was no longer permitted by the ‘dress regs’ and so he passed it on to another member of the RAAC for their use (with the names of the previous owners sewn inside).
I was really pleased to receive this email. Given that it came some three months after my Blog post below, I don’t think that there is any link. Rather … I’m encouraged to think that the little courtesies of life are still among us. I’m glad of that. I don’t believe this Blog is so widely read as to lead to the above. I think of it as being confined to a small number of interested parties (though others tell me it was a wider following). Who knows?
I also gave away my boxed George Boots and spurs…. maybe they’re still out there somewhere (?).
Blog: 17 Nov 19. Some fifteen years ago I decided that there was little likelihood that I would ever have need of my military uniforms and accoutrements (as an ADC to the GG, I had received a second complete ‘issue’ of uniforms, as well as an allowance for spurs and overalls etc). I contacted the RAAC instructor at RMC and offered to bundle up the things I had and pass them on to him for the whatever benefit they might hold to forthcoming graduates. The following extract is from a note which was contained within a copy of a book:
“My name is …. I am a First Class cadet completing my studies at the RMC- Duntroon. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your donation of your Sam Browne and mess boots and I am very appreciative of your gift. In return for your kind gesture, I would like to present you a copy of the history of the Royal Military College of Australia as a token of my appreciation.”
Interestingly the recipient above was not from the RAAC (I had included two Sam Brownes, one blackened and the other not).
I believe that there was certain excitement among the cadets going to armoured corps, about obtaining the older style mess kit (better quality manufacture) and RAAC buttons (everyone is now relegated to ADF buttons, unless you have the former).
The author of the note above called at our house to deliver the book. My wife and I were delighted to welcome him and thank him for his kind gesture.
His was the only ‘thank you’. None were expected, but how great it was to receive one!
So maybe there are some serving RAAC officers (or former RAAC officers) who benefited from my ‘gift’. But who knows?
That’s the question …
Why is it that there was just one recipient who took the time to say ‘Thank You’.
As the song goes: Times are a changing. But surely, Australia’s fundamental values aren’t changing … we know what the right thing to do is. Don’t we?
———————————————————————————————————————-
1 April 2020
The First Centurion to Detonate an RPG Mine.
“Suddenly there were two sharp bangs followed by a whoosh of flames and .30/.50cal ammo cooking off.”
Prior to 7am that day [16 June 1970] a 4.5kg mine was laid. It was offset (see below) and coupled with two RPG warheads. A 15kg mine was buried nearby.
If the mines had been there the day before, 4 Troop missed the one on the track as they moved into an ambush position, just 100m further on, before last light. The mines may, of course, have been laid after the tanks had passed by, in the expectation that they would return along the same route. If this was the case, there was nothing that night to alert the troop.
The drizzle became sufficiently heavy [during the night] to make the driver of 4Alpha unroll the canvas blind behind him and ‘hook it over the driver’s hole where I was sleeping’. Just on 7am next morning, 4 Troop left their ambush position to commence their patrol for that day. 4Alpha’s driver left the blind hanging behind his seat; he would roll it up later.
Suddenly, there was a loud thump, followed by flames. A fireball engulfed them. The fact that the operator was looking towards the rear of the turret, was the ‘only thing that saved [his] face from burns’. As it was, he suffered burns to both his elbows and back. The driver was equally lucky: ‘a bloody big flame came through the right-hand side of the curtain, curling around in front of me. It took all the hairs off my right arm.’
The commander had just a few seconds to take stock of the situation, determine if enemy were present, and, if so, which side of the tank the crew should bail out.
The situation inside the turret was critical: ‘All the floor bins and portion of the twenty-round bin spontaneously caught fire from the initial explosion.’ The crew of 4Alpha had little idea that they had experienced the ‘first reported use of RPG projectiles as mines’.
It is difficult for many people to understand how the VC explosives expert got his mine to work. In simple terms, when the pressure switch closed, an electrical current made the RPG rounds detonate as they would if they had struck a target nose first. The result, if it could be repeated, was a breakthrough in terms of mine warfare; an enormous advance when compared with the effort and resources involved in producing the traditional device built around 30kg of explosive.
Note: ARN 169067 (the crew name for which is shown above) is now in private ownership. A check is to be made to see if the RPG penetration repairs can been seen.
———————————————————————————————————————-
31 March 2020
Centurions in Vietnam
The Blog on 14 Feb 20 made reference to Centurions in the Australian Army. A previous post on 24 Jan 20 referred to a suggestion on another site that ARN 169079 was the first Cent to fire a main armament round in Vietnam. It was, of course, ARN 169106. The Blog mused “while we’re at it, why not id the other tanks that were associated with ‘Milestones’? A number of subsequent posts have done this …
The 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, vehicle which fired the first round in action: M113A1 Fitters’ Track (2Lt Bob Owens, Blog 6 March 2020)
The first Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam: 169104 (Sgt Len Swarbrick, Blog 9 March)
The Centurion which fired the last 20pdr round in Vietnam/in anger/in contact: 169091 and others (Blog 14 March).
The first Centurion to detonate an anti-tank mine in Vietnam: 169106 (Sgt Jock McConnell, Blog 16 March)
The first Centurion to fire a main armament round in action in Vietnam: 169106 (Sgt Bob Snape, Blog 17 March)
The milestones outstanding are:
The Centurion which detonated the first ‘off-set’ anti-tank mine;
The Centurion which spent the longest time in Vietnam;
The Centurion vehicle which spent the longest time in Vietnam;
The Centurion which spent the shortest time in Vietnam;
The Centurion which detonated the last anti-tank mine;
The Centurion which detonated the most anti-tank mines; and
The Centurions which were ‘written off’ as the result of damage caused by anti-tank mines.
The circumstances concerning the first of these, The Centurion which detonated the first ‘off-set’ anti-tank mine are described below. It is easy to see why the enemy changed their tactics to off-set mines …
“C Squadron’s task on 15 September 1968 was to escort Battery A 2/35 Artillery (US) from Nui Dat to Fire Support Base Coolah. At 8.15am, close to Ap Ngai Giao, a mine exploded beneath 3ZeroDelta (Corporal Joe Dziedzic).
At the time the tank (ARN 169080) was part of 1 Troop, having replaced 31Charlie which had mechanical problems. The gunner, Trooper Michael Bidey, was thrown out of his seat by the explosion. The reason was soon apparent. The mine had gone off directly under the middle of the tank, rather than, as usual [before then], under one of the tracks. The blast bowed the bottom of the hull upwards by about 18cm, with devastating effects inside the vehicle: the casings of the vehicle batteries, which were mounted on the floor, were split open, spraying acid everywhere and filling the fighting compartment with fumes; in addition, a number of twenty-pounder rounds, also stowed just above the hull floor, were broken open, causing propellant to spill out.
If this was not bad enough, the Rotary Base Junction (RBJ) was badly damaged. This was the electrical distribution unit that facilitated turret rotation; located on the hull floor, it was directly above the point of the explosion. The combination of acid, toxic fumes, ammunition propellant and electrical short-circuits, in a confined space, is a recipe for disaster. As had happened with 31Alpha’s fire in April, quick action and cool-headedness on the part of both the crew and the Troop as a whole saved the day.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
30 March 2020
Maintaining Our History III …
Following on from yesterday, why is it that so little is known about those listed on the Honour Roll?
I’ve informed the 1AR Assn that I intend to do a ‘summary’ re all those currently listed. (Of course, I haven’t had a response in line with the President’s edict for the C’tee not to communicate with me. But I can live with that.)
One of those currently listed on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll is Craftsman B Silver (LAD) “Killed Accidently”.
One would expect that those listed would have been killed in circumstances in which they were on duty and for whom, therefore, 1 Armd Regt had a duty of care.
My understanding is that someone came across a private memorial in Shoalwater Bay Training Area to Cfn Silver. It was assumed that he had died while on duty serving the Regiment. Indeed, there was information that he was driving an Army vehicle in a convoy returning from Ex Nutcracker in Nov 1962 when he was killed in a road accident.
Interestingly, however, there is no reference to him on the listing of Defence training deaths between 1945 and 2004 provided to Parliament at:
The newspaper article above confirms the timing, but the circumstances are different … which would seem to explain why there was no mention in the Parliamentary listing.
BUT … the again, the following recollection suggests that he should remain on the Honour Roll.
“My recollection is that he was returning from Nutcracker. I was about 1hr behind him was informed by a NSW police officer that one person killed. All vehicles on that trip had co-drivers, much more comfortable than sitting in the back of a truck. That convoy was a cannon ball run.”
Wait a minute … could this be one of those ‘cover ups’? On 7 Nov 62, concern was expressed in Parliament about 100 injuries having been experienced during Ex Nutcracker.
It would not do the Govt’s position any good for a fatality to have occurred during the subsequent return movement from the Exercise. Or is this imagination gone wild?
Presumably there is a difference in terms of the above as far as ‘compensation’ is concerned. I can’t imagine that this could’ve been denied in the circumstances (though public information might have been suppressed).
——————————————————————————————————————-
29 March 2020
Maintaining Our History II
Following on from yesterday, another email to the President, 1AR Assn.
Following my email re Noel Lowes, I see that the 1AR Assn website lists those members who died of wounds as including “WO2 John Stone”.
I emailed the 1AR Assn C’tee on 29 July 2016 to say:
“The late WO2 John Stone is described as KIA, Thua Tein. I think this is another typo, Thua Tien (possibly today Thua Thien). The inclusion of John Stone is interesting. He was RA Inf when posted to AATTV (as per AWM Honour Roll). Presumably he had previously been RAAC and served with 1 Armd Regt before corps transferring. Could it be, however, that he is ‘confused’ with the late Sgt Jim Stones, RAAC who was badly WIA as an APC Section Commander in Oct 69 and subsequently DOW?”.
A check of the DVA Vietnam Roll will show that no John Stone (RAAC) served in Vietnam. James Stones served with 3 Cav Regt in Vietnam. I suggest that WO2 John Stone no longer be included on the 1 AR Assn Honour Roll. [He is, of course, included on the ROH at the AWM and on the AATTV Memorial. Fittingly, he was Mentioned in Dispatches (posthumously)].
I assume that you will give this matter the attention that the accuracy of the Honour Roll deserves. Bruce
PS. To further confuse the issue …. while the 1AR Assn webpage lists WO2 John Stone as having DOW; the Assn newsletter lists him as having been KIA. The facts are that WO2 John Stone (RA Inf) was KIA while serving with the AATTV; Sgt Jim Stones (RAAC) DOW (post-Vietnam) received while serving with 3 Cav.
PPS. I’ve just been advised that John Stone DID serve with 1 Armd Regt before Corps transferring to infantry. His listing on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll suggests that all those who had served at one time with 1 Armd Regt and later died while serving, should also be listed.
———————————————————————————————————————–
28 March 2020
Maintaining Our History …
(AWM P05655.161)
The following email to the President, 1AR Assn is self-explanatory.
Dear President.
I see that the latest issue of the 1AR Assn Newsletter lists those who died of wounds “post Vietnam” as:
WO1 L. S. Swarbrick; WO2 N. Lowes; TPR P G. Barwick ; TPR R. S. Bellott
You will see that he died on 6 July 1971; within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War (which is why he is listed on the RoH). Len Swarbrick, Phil Barwick and Rod Bellott died after the end of this period (which is why they’re not on the RoH).
Background is provided below [showing that Noel Lowes should be listed as having DOW].
Bruce Cameron
“I’ve had to correct statements by PMs who referred to the: “the 521 Australian servicemen killed in Vietnam”. The number is ‘officially’ correct (see below) but they were not all men. Barbara Black was an Army nurse.
“Killed in Vietnam” is wrong. Not all were killed and not all died in Vietnam.
To be correct, the PM would have had to say “521 Australian service personnel died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam during the prescribed period of the War”.
Even this is ‘drawing a long bow’. The 521 refers to those eligible to be listed on the ROH at the AWM. This means that they were on the roll of a unit which served in Vietnam between 3 Aug 62 and 29 Apr 75. If you returned to Australia and died of war caused factors within that time, you’re on the Wall. If you were on R&R in HK and died in a traffic accident, you’re on the Wall. If you died from malaria, you’re on the Wall. What I’m saying is the 521 were not all battle casualties killed in Vietnam. Many died from illness or accident in places other than Vietnam.
The other aspect that’s important is that relating to the ‘prescribed period’. Someone who stood on a mine in Vietnam and died of his wounds on 30 April 1975, is not eligible to be recorded as a casualty of the War (but someone standing next to him when the mine exploded, who died on 29 April 1975, is eligible). I have advocated for ALL those who die as a direct result of the wounds, to be formally acknowledged by the Nation. I have not won (as yet). It is an abomination that schoolchildren are taught that the cost to Australia of the Vietnam War was 521 dead. Many hundreds have died following the prescribed period, but are not acknowledged by their country.
“Capability is a concept of impressive elasticity in defence policy.”
There is a danger here of losing sight of what the required ‘capability’ actually is, ie. the ability to fulfil contingency plans for the Defence of Australia. If we have too little capability, the consequence is obvious; if we have too great a capability, we are denying resources that could be better used in other areas.
A well-known dog analogy was once used in relation to the Second Indochina War. It was found to have been very misleading …
“Sir Robert Thompson, an acknowledged British authority on counter-insurgency warfare who served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese Government, argued:
Getting government forces into the same element as the insurgent is rather like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The dog may not find the tomcat; if it does, the tomcat will escape up a tree … the answer is to put in a fiercer tomcat. The two cannot fail to meet … [and] the weaker will be eliminated.
This, of course, is an oversimplification. The defending tomcat, if it is smart, will make use of defences which will wear down the other tomcat. Furthermore, the defending cat is likely to call for reinforcements. A case can be made for an emphasis on specially trained and equipped, highly mobile infantry, in the first stage of revolutionary warfare when the guerrillas are endeavouring to develop their infrastructure. The challenge is to realise when this phase has passed, to be conscious of the options available, and to restructure forces appropriately. In hindsight, the nature of the enemy forces involved in the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966 should have made it clear that the time for the deployment of an enhanced armoured capability, including tanks, had arrived”
“Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson KBE CMG DSO MC was a British military officer and counter-insurgency expert who “was widely regarded on both sides of the Atlantic as the world’s leading expert on countering the Mao Tse-tung technique of rural guerrilla insurgency” Wikipedia.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 March 2020
Operation Hammersley: The Story Goes On!
Photo: Winga Williams
The following letter is awaiting a response:
Dear Minister,
Recognition of Supporting Arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
Your Department conducted a very successful 50th Anniversary National Commemoration of Operation Hammersley on 18 February 2020. Unfortunately, the bravery and sacrifice of only one element of the forces involved in 1970 have been recognised. It was hoped that this injustice might have been able to be corrected before the Commemoration, but this was not to be.
Apart from my desire to have my own statements correctly recorded in an ‘official’ public document, I wish to ensure that the DHAAT Decision is an accurate one when I forward it to the President of the United States. My reasoning is that if the Australian Government is not able to acknowledge the outstanding service of its own soldiers (because of ‘technicalities’), then possibly the United States can do so … given that the units involved were serving under its operational control. (The Meritorious Unit Citation awarded to HMAS Perth for its service in Vietnam is an example of this.)
I repeatedly asked the DHAAT to amend the above decision, however, was informed that the decision (and the document) was final and I had to lodge an appeal with the Federal Court. I prepared this (see attached). One of the requirements prior to lodgement was to show that I could meet the costs of the respondent (if necessary). The DHAAT advised that “the estimated legal costs for the Respondent would be from $40,000 to $70,000, or above”.
Not having “$70,000 or above”, I have no recourse to the rule of law. There did seem to be a possibility to seek explanation under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, however, the DHAAT quoted an exemption clause which prevented this from being possible.
So, I now come to you Minister. I do not ask for the DHAAT decision to be overturned, I simply seek to have the Government’s public record corrected so that it is a true statement of what occurred in its name.
The relevant section of the document is copied below. Deletions and insertions required to make it an accurate record of Government proceedings are highlighted:
“48. The second avenue considered by the Tribunal was whether the supporting units proposed by Colonel Cameron could be considered to be elements of 8RAR for the purposes of the citation as presented – in other words, could those units be considered to be part of 8RAR from 28 November 1969 through to the date of the award? Defence was asked to consider this avenue in a question placed on notice at the October hearing”. (INSERT) ‘The applicant was also advised that he was welcome to respond to the Tribunal on the same basis.’
“49. Defence has provided the advice that the sub-units nominated by Colonel Cameron were not permanently assigned to 8RAR for the duration of the Battalion’s tour. In response to this advice, Colonel Cameron …” (INSERT) ‘stated that supporting arms should be considered to be part of 8RAR for the purposes of the Citation as elements were under operational control for all operations and were vital to the success of each of these actions … a 57 page supporting submission to this effect was presented to the Tribunal’.(DELETE: “re-stated his opinion that the sub-units were under command of 8RAR for Operation HAMMERSLEY”).
“The command relationships and the contribution of the supporting units to the success of Operation HAMMERSLEY is not in dispute. However, as the Tribunal accepts that the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for the entirety of that unit’s tour to the date of the award, those supporting units assigned to 8RAR specifically for Operation HAMMERSLEY and not permanently assigned to the Battalion for its tour of duty cannot be considered to be part of the Battalion for the purposes of the award”. The second part of paragraph 49 (i.e. that copied immediately above) needs to be amended to state why the supporting arms named cannot be “considered” to have been part of 8RAR for the purposes of the Citation, given that elements were under operational control for the entire tour (albeit, not permanently assigned).
Your review of this matter is greatly appreciated,
Yours sincerely, Bruce Cameron
Attachment: Originating Application for Judicial Review (together with Genuine Steps Statement)
————————————————————————————————————————
25 March 2020
Some ‘Facts’ About Australia’s Involvement in the Vietnam War
In helping others understand what lies behind the public perception, I recently explained thus…
“I’ve had to correct PMs who have said or were about to say: “the 521 Australian servicemen killed in Vietnam”. The number is ‘officially’ correct (see below) but they were not all men. Barbara Black was an Army nurse.
“Killed in Vietnam” is wrong. Not all were killed and not all died in Vietnam.
To be correct, the PM would have had to say “521 Australian service personnel died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam during the prescribed period of the War”.
Even this is ‘drawing a long bow’. The 521 refers to those eligible to be listed on the ROH at the AWM. This means that they were on the roll of a unit which served in Vietnam between 3 Aug 62 and 29 Apr 75. If you returned to Australia and committed suicide within that time, you’re on the Wall. If you were on R&R in HK and died in a traffic accident, you’re on the Wall. If you died from malaria, you’re on the Wall. What I’m saying is the 521 were not all battle casualties killed in Vietnam. Many died from illness or accident in places other than Vietnam.
The other aspect that’s important is that relating to the ‘prescribed period’. Someone who stood on a mine in Vietnam and died of his wounds on 30 April 1975, is not eligible to be recorded as a casualty of the War (but someone standing next to him when the mine exploded, who died on 29 April 1975, is eligible). I have advocated for ALL those who die as a direct result of the wounds, to be formally acknowledged by the Nation. I have not won (as yet). It is an abomination that schoolchildren are taught that the cost to Australia of the Vietnam War was 521 dead. Many hundreds have died following the prescribed period, but are not acknowledged by their country.
It is generally forgotten that “Four Australian journalists – Bruce Piggott, John Cantwell, Michael Birch and Ronald Laramie – were shot dead on May 5, 1968, when they drove, against army advice, into Saigon at the height of Mini Tet.”
Of relevance here is the fact that a Commemorative Book is located in the AWM in which the names of those Australians who served on behalf of their nation (but were not enlisted) and died within the same criteria as per the ROH, are listed. This includes members of “the merchant navy, philanthropic organisations; official war correspondents, photographers, and artists”. The journalists mentioned above and Cathy Wayne should be listed. But I think there are others, maybe Red Cross, maybe press photographers … they also served their country and should not be forgotten.
———————————————————————————————————————-
24 March 2020
Grand Strategy for the Long-Term Future of Australian ESOs.
Following on from the 22 March 2020 blog …
The ESO ‘pie’ is made up of DFWA, RSL, ADSO, Australian Defence Assn (ADA), and Defence Reserves’ Assn (DRA).
The Issues are: ADF welfare policy (serving and retired), individual advocacy, heritage, commemoration, national defence and reserve forces.
I believe there is a requirement for an overarching consensus (the form of which I’m sure can be ‘nutted out’) which allocates prime responsibility along the lines of:
ADF welfare policy (DFWA); individual advocacy and commemoration (RSL); national defence (ADA); and reserves (DRA). ADSO would contribute to all (given that it is an alliance of corps/service-based associations with ‘camaraderie’ based agendas).
I know that this is ‘pie in the sky’ as far as the parochial interest of the various ESOs are concerned.
However, I believe it is essential to ‘give oxygen’ to the concept, in order to focus attention on the need to clearly differentiate between ESOs (as happens in industry whenever there are a number of ‘players’ in the same marketplace).
Remember it was quite recently that the RAAC Corporation and member associations agreed that they did not have the resources to provide advocacy services for those who needed them. Seems that RAAC unit associations are solely camaraderie focused … as one member of the then 1AR Assn C’tee said: ” we just want to have a few beers and swap stories”.
PS. Interestingly, the following post has just been made to the RAAC Facebook page:
“Dear Fellow Association Member or former member of the 1st Armoured Regiment,
At this difficult time there may be some things that we may be able to do for our fellow members including those former members of the Regiment who may not be Association members.
Whilst our financial resources are limited, we do have around 480 members and some of us may be able to assist one or two others. The Secretary has spoken to around 30 members in the last week and generally these members did not need any immediate help. However, if you do need some assistance, then please contact either the Secretary (secretary@paratus.org.au) or your State Representative whose email address may be found on our website at https://www.paratus.org.au/membership.
Those members who may be feeling down, anxious or depressed should seek assistance from Overwatch Australia on 1800 699 2824, Open Arms Australia (VVCS) on 1800 011 046, Lifeline on 13 11 44.
We cannot promise that we can help everyone due to our geographical dispersion, but at least we can try. These are trying times – please take the time to check on your mates via phone or social media.
Keith Meloncelli, President 1st Armoured Regiment Association”.
Compassion … supposedly, but there are some conflicting messages here. If you need assistance contact the Secretary or State Rep. Presumably this is not financial assistance, but a brokering service to link those who might be in need of practical assistance, eg. transport, delivery of goods etc. with members who might be able to help. This is a great gesture and the C’tee is to be commended. Those feeling down, anxious, or depressed are told to go elsewhere, however. The recommended organisations for the latter are interesting. (Not long ago the Tasmanian Rep was telling anyone who asked about advocacy, to go to the RSL.) It’s previously been suggested that this an area where the State Reps should have a network of contacts and should be able to assist.
———————————————————————————————————————
23 March 2020
Vietnam Requiem: Australian Nurses and Surgeons
“More than 200 Australian civilian nurses, 100 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and 43 nurses from the Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps (RAANC), served during the Vietnam War.”
One of the proposed movements of the second half of the Requiem is described as: “Lacrimosa the Tet Offensive / Nurses Tet Offensive erupts across South Vietnam, largest operation of war, 30 Jan until 8 June 1969. Terrible civilian casualties. Wounded civilians treated by recently arrived Australian Nurses – this is Tet seen through the eyes of nurses. Elena Kats-Chernin scored for Alice Giles harp plus orchestra 8 mins”.
I managed to establish contact with the Australian Medical Association and explained that “I tried contacting the Nurses and Midwives Assn, however, haven’t had a response. I know that there is a ‘Civilian Nurses Vietnam’ website/Assn, however, making contact is difficult for me. If you could have representatives of those involved, contact Chris [Latham, see earlier Blogs re the Requiem] that would be great! I know that the story of Australian med/surgical teams in Vietnam is one which mustn’t be overlooked and input from those involved is essential. (I advocated in a very minor way for PTSD recognition by the Govt and I’m pleased that this has happened.)”
Interestingly, it turns out that Chris Latham’s grandmother was a nurse during WWI and he has composed music in this context.
Go to http://theflowersofwar.org/ Scroll down to chapter 8, ‘The Healers’, and click on the links. I’m just beginning to appreciate what a great ‘Gift to the Nation’ that this was.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 March 2020
Changing Times for ESOs
In the latest Defence Force Welfare Association journal (March 2020) the President raised questions about the future of the ESO (even the possibility of merging with the RSL). He asked for members’views. [The latest journal isn’t available as yet on-line, but should be able to be read here before long https://www.dfwa.org.au/publications/camaraderie.%5D My input is as follows.
Dear Kel,
The following is in response to your request for members’views in Camraderie:
An ESO is brought into being and exists because a body of members wish it to be; i.e, they want it to represent them in particular ways and thereby bring about specific outcomes (either aspirational or practical).
Enthusiasm and support for the ESO waxes and wanes in accord with the significance of the impact that these outcomes (or lack of them) has on its membership.
An ESO whose primary membership comprises those who seek camaraderie, ie. social engagement, will have a different relationship with its members, compared to an ESO which was formed on the basis of representing them in other ways. The latter ESO is affected by the changing demographic of its members, much more so the ‘social club’.
Issues which were of fundamental importance to a particular cohort, may no longer be of any significance to its successors.
It is easy to suggest that the answer to these changing priorities is to conduct a survey of members … to identify the issues of most importance for the majority,. Ie. why they value their membership; and for the ESO governance body to respond accordingly.
I’ve previously recommended this to the C’tee of an ESO and it went down like the lead proverbial. It seemed in that case, that the C’tee feared that they would lose control in terms of setting the agenda.
I know that this wouldn’t be so re the DFWA and I wonder if the idea might be worthy of consideration?
PS. Personally, I’d much rather be a member of an Assn that placed importance on what matters to me as an individual; as compared to an Assn whose mission statement was determined without any consultation with members.
The President has expressed his interest “in any thoughts you may have on such a survey, questions to ask ….”. I’m happy to help with this and will attempt to do so.
———————————————————————————————————————————————–
21 March 2020
Vietnam Requiem
Following on from the 19 March Blog …
The first part of the Performance will involve a selection of music from the time. Little Patti is helping with this. The second part is where the orchestral pieces come in. A sequence has been identified to process from the First Indochina War through Deployment, National Service, ‘Patrolling’, Long Tan, Tet Offensive, Nurses, Major Battles and on. I was asked to provide some advice re the last aspect. I’ve copied it at the end …noting that it applies equally to the earlier ‘Patrolling’ segment, as well the ‘Major battles’.
The composer for the major battle sequence (pictured above; website: http://www.richardmills.com.au) is Richard Mills. Brief bio notes:
Richard Mills is deservedly one of Australia’s most sought after composers and music directors. In recent years he has pursued a diverse career as a composer and a conductor, which has seen him working with a large number of the nation’s music organisations.
Mills’s works are regularly performed throughout the world. Compositions range from major orchestral and choral works to ballet music. Commissions for the Sydney Symphony include Tenebrae, Emblems, and Totemic Journeys. Requiem Diptych was commissioned and premiered by the Chicago Chamber Musicians Brass in 2001. His symphonic/choral work for the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra, The Little Mermaid, was premiered in August 2005.
——————————————————————————————-
“My view is that, unlike the First World War, the Vietnam War can’t be defined by individual battles.
The experience for service personnel (I’ll say ‘soldiers’ hence, as a generic for male and female service personnel) was one of long periods living in an alert situation, punctuated by brief periods of intense danger, during which conspicuous courage was frequently demonstrated. The major battles which did occur represented the difference between Vietnam and the counter-insurgency of the Malayan Emergency. In the latter, the first stage of revolutionary or guerrilla warfare (during which the enemy develop their infrastructure) was paramount throughout. It should have been realised following Long Tan in Aug 1966, that this had ended for Vietnam and the enemy had moved to the second stage, Preparation for the Counter Offensive (in which regular units of the North Vietnamese Army became involved, rather than just local guerrillas). Unfortunately, this realisation of this didn’t occur until after Operation Bribie in Feb 1967. At this point Australia deployed a third infantry battalion and a squadron of tanks. (Prior to this time, the strong view was that there was no place for tanks in operations limited solely to counter-insurgency warfare.)
So … the Vietnam War for Australians was unlike anything ever experienced. The scale and intensity could change in the blink of an eye … from dealing with local guerrillas setting mines and booby traps, to attacking extensive defensive positions occupied by regular battalions of the North Vietnamese Army. The constant tension that resulted from this, was significant in the experience of Australian soldiers. Training prior to deployment was not adequate preparation. The effect manifested itself in many ways, as seen by the number of mental health issues which were present in returning veterans. [Moving between the two different levels of warfare was also a factor in the experience of members of the AATTV, I think; but John could elaborate.] Australian forces experienced isolated, but similar, situations in which Cathy Wayne was shot by an American soldier. The pervasive tension and stress were constant throughout.
As I’ve tried to describe, the major battles were one part of the experience only. Five battlehonours were awarded: Long Tan; Binh Ba, Bien Hoa (the Tet Offensive), Coral-Balmoral and Hat Dich. (These are all described on the Internet.) Other major actions were Operation Hammersley; Operation Bribie; the Battle Long Khanh (Operation Overlord) and the Battle of Nui Le. The bravery and courage of Australian soldiers was also demonstrated time and time again on operations at the other end of the spectrum, ie. searching a village or a tunnel system, conducting an ambush, denying food supplies to local VC, helping protect villages etc. The dichotomy is such that the major battles were similar to those experienced in, say, New Guinea during the Second World War; while the counter-insurgency actions were not unlike those of the Malayan Emergency.”
————————————————————————————————————————
20 March 2020
The RAAC Corporation : Open and Transparent Governance?
Given that the RAAC Corporation has been so secretive in terms of its submission in support of mine regarding the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour (see Blogs below, re the FOI Saga), is it open and transparent in areas of its own governance?
It receives $10,000 pa as a grant-in-aid from DVA. This is provided to assist with travel and accommodation for attendance at its AGM. The same applies to the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation.
According to the press release at the time, “The RAAC Corporation (the Corporation) was formally established through the ratification of the Constitution at the SOA on 6 October 2012. The Corporation was registered on 14 March 2012 with ASIC. It is a Tier 1 public company, limited by guarantee, formed for a charitable purpose”. (http://www.lancers.org.au/documents/Newsletters/aug_13/RAAC_Corp_Release.pdf)
The Australian Charities and Not for Profit Commission provides open and transparent access to records of companies formed for charitable purposes. The RAR Corporation is registered with the Commission. This enables public access to its financial records. See: https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/43a66707534052e2e7169332aa402507#financials-documents
This is exactly as one would expect. But why is the RAAC Corporation not registered in this way? Surely it could not be to prevent public scrutiny of its financial records? Of course, I might well be wrong … the RAAC Corporation might well be registered with ACNC, but I just couldn’t find it.
If the financial statement of the RAAC Corporation was to be publicly available, what would it tell us? Would the whole grant from DVA be expended on the AGM? If so, how much was for travel and how much for accommodation? Would any funds have subsidised the AGM dinner, or would attendees have paid their own way?
One can’t but wonder … without the DVA grant, how would the RAAC Corporation achieve its charitable purpose?
If it was able to function without the grant to fund the AGM, is it possible that these funds could be used for a better charitable purpose as far as the RAAC ‘family’ is concerned?
Note: Charities wanting to access Australian Government tax concessions have to register with the Commission; other than that, registration appears to be voluntary. Surely the RAAC Corporation wishes to avail itself of tax concessions? Donations for example … why pay tax on such income?
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 March 2020
Vietnam Requiem: Something ‘Big’ is in the Offing.
I met today with Chris Latham. He previously directed the The Diggers’ Requiem …”an Australian tribute to the 100th anniversary of the end of the First World War. In an astonishing piece of musical teamwork, the Requiem has been composed by seven contemporary Australian composers working with Artistic Director Christopher Latham on existing and new musical pieces”. You can re more about him in the links below.
At the moment he is working on a new musical performance … a Requiem to commemorate the Vietnam War.
In his words, this will be: “a two act concert where in the first act we will perform the songs most loved by Vietnam veterans and in the 2nd half we will present the premiere of a newly commissioned 12 part work that will become part of this National commemorative repertoire that I am developing in my artist in residence position at the AWM. The Vietnam Requiem is going to be written by the same leading composers who worked on the Gallipoli Symphony and the Diggers’ Requiem. These will be the first major symphonic works written about many of Australia’s Vietnam war experiences. We hope to present as wide and accurate a picture of the events surrounding that war. I expect much of it will be quiet, subdued and reflective”.
Reason for my involvement is that the premiere performance of this work is scheduled to coincide with the National Commemoration of Operation Overlord in June 2021 (I’m organising a 50th Anniversary Reunion of C Sqn 1 AR). Chris is working with Little Patti to finalise a list of songs (and singers) to be performed in the first half of the program.
I’ve copied below some of the topics we discussed:
The anguish and anger felt by veterans when people say the Vietnam War was ‘lost’ (and their success on the battlefield and service to their country is not recognised).
The shame felt by veterans at the failure of the US (and the Australian Govt for its part) to keep their promise to provide air support to SVN (leading to NVA overrunning SVN in 1975).
The difference between Australians cheering troops when they went to Vietnam and jeering them when they returned (and the political reasons for this).
The fact that Australia soldiers, both ARA and NS, continually performed with enormous courage and self-sacrifice in many different roles, and that this is frequently overlooked. Rather than being apologetic for the losses suffered, there is a need to commemorate the incredible bravery displayed by a generation on behalf of their nation.
The importance of the ‘combined arms team’ whereby soldiers supported (and depended on) each other at all levels and the need to recognise the contribution of all parts (not just one).
The difference between North/South Korea and North/South Vietnam situations and the political circumstances behind this.
The lack of human rights currently afforded to former SVN soldiers and their families (in particular) by the present Socialist Republic of Vietnam and how distressing this is to Veterans, given that these were our ‘Allies’ alongside of whom, we were fighting. This is exasperated by the Government’s failure to advocate for just treatment in this respect.
The fact that the Vietnamese Community in Australia and the Australians who volunteered with the civilian medical teams deployed to Vietnam (and who are equally deserving of Govt recognition) will have valuable input the offer.
Note. Chris, we didn’t discuss it … but if you view the cd, you’ll see numerous images of the compassionate approach adopted by Australian soldiers to the Vietnamese population in general. The humanitarian work done is often overlooked. Part of a quote from a tank crewman in a letter home (1968) …
‘How do I feel about being here? The physical discomforts, i.e. the heat, humidity, filth, temporary accommodation; the mental or psychological discomforts, i.e. we are in a theatre of war; and isolation from family and loved ones etc; are the biggest hardships; and for those reasons I do not like being here. Nevertheless, I firmly believe we have a moral obligation to the South Vietnamese people—not because of who they are, but because of what they are, namely an oppressed people, denied by a Communist influence the rights due to them as human beings. We, as Australians, are the most fortunate people in the world today, and therefore have so much to be grateful for. Surely it is not too much for us to help these people.’
————————————————————————————————————————-
18 March 2020
Our History (And How it Becomes Distorted)
My attention was recently drawn to a book about Centurions in Vietnam. I was caused to reflect on how easy it is, when something is published, for the information to be ‘set in concrete’ and taken to be an undeniable ‘fact’.
I’ve copied below a quick selection of ‘facts’ about the Centurion which have been included in publications in recent times:
Centurion …
(i) fans were electric;
(ii) gunsights were stabilised;
(iii) callsigns were allocated to individual tanks;
(iv) modifications were all made prior to deployment to Vietnam;
(v) fired HESH and WP rounds;
(vi) suspension stations were fitted with two roadwheels;
(vii) provided stowage for 54 main armament rounds;
(vii) were equipped with two machine guns and a 20 pound cannon;
(viii) fired WP illumination rounds;
(ix) bridgelayer weighed over 60 tonnes;
(x) unladen weight was 49 tonnes;
(xi) bridge classification was 50;
(xii) could push through the thickest jungle in Vietnam;
(xiii) squadron organisation in Vietnam was three troops of four tanks;
(ix) radios were incompatible with the APCs’ 46/49 installation;
(xx) bridgelayer callsign was 98D; and
(xxi) could not be penetrated by the RPG2.
Makes one realise that if such technical specs are so wrongly represented, what happens when tactics are discussed ….
————————————————————————————————————————
17 March 2020
Continuing the ‘Milestone’ series … interestingly someone has pointed out that 169106 could have been both the first Centurion to fire a 20pdr round in action in Vietnam, AND the Centurion to fire the last 20pdr round in Vietnam. (Even MORE reason to continue to discover how its logbook simply ‘vanished’ from the Tank Museum.)
First 20 pdr Round to be fired in Action in Vietnam
“Who in their right mind would have thought that tank dozers and bridgelayer would be in action before [the sabre troops]”. Bob Snape, Special Equipment Troop Sergeant, 1968
Somewhat surprisingly, it was a Centurion dozer which fired the first twenty-pounder round in action. This occurred on 8 March 1968, just over a week after the tanks arrived at Nui Dat. HQ 1ATF had requested help with landclearing in an area known as the Light Green.* The aim was to restrict the cover available to enemy withdrawing from the Long Hais, this being their most likely escape route once Operation Pinnaroo, which had just commenced, got into full swing. The VC were expected to try and break through the cordon, cache their weapons, and mix with villagers in the area.
The Squadron LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens, set off in his ‘carrier’ with the two dozers (commanded by Sergeants Bob Snape and Graeme Millington), a bridgelayer (Sergeant Andy Zsolt), a fitters’ ‘track’ (Sergeant Kevin Craig, RAEME), and an ARV (Sergeant Peter De Jong, RAEME). This was one of the few occasions that Special Equipment Troop deployed as an entity, albeit part of a composite force under the command of Captain Bruce Richards (2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav).
Snape recalls that the notice to move was so short that ‘the crews had no idea how resupply was to occur and the details were worked out on the way’. En-route to Fire Support Base Herring, De Jong saw a person running frantically with an RPG. He engaged with his .30cal machine gun, but the range was too great and the ‘VC fled to hell out of it’.
Not long after, with the vegetation becoming thicker, Snape sensed movement close at hand. He immediately traversed and ordered his gunner, Trooper Des Mahar, to fire canister. This was a speculative engagement, designed to pre-empt a possible ambush. While no sign of enemy was revealed, the incident was significant historically: the first tank round had been fired in action by 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, since being raised on 7 July 1949.**
*This was a narrow region of dense vegetation east of the Long Hais. Named for the colour used to depict it on maps, it should not be confused with the Long Green to the north-east (a longer strip of more dense vegetation, coloured dark green on maps).
** Captain Sullivan arranged for the shellcase to be polished and returned to Puckapunyal where a plate was affixed giving details of the action. It was mounted on a wooden base and is now with the 1st Armoured Regiment.
———————————————————————————————————————-
16 March 2020
The First Centurion to Detonate an Anti-Tank Mine in Vietnam
The Blog on 14 Feb 20 made reference to Centurions in the Australian Army. A previous post on 24 Jan 20 referred to a suggestion on another site that ARN 169079 was the first Cent to fire a round in Vietnam. It was, of course, ARN 169106 (Sgt Bob Snape) that fired the first 20pdr round in action in Vietnam.
The Blog mused “while we’re at it, why not id the other tanks that were associated with ‘Milestones’? A number of subsequent posts have done this …
The 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, vehicle which fired the first round in action: M113A1 Fitters’ Track (2Lt Bob Owens … Blog 6 March 2020)
The first Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam: 169104 (Sgt Len Swarbrick …Blog 9 March)
The Centurion which fired the last 20pdr round in Vietnam/in anger/in contact: 169091 and others (Blog 14 March).
The story below continues this ‘Milestones’ series. It relates to ARN 169106 (Sgt Jock McConnell) and the incident which occurred en-route to FSB Coral on 22 May 1968:
92Alpha [ARN 169106] being recovered to Blackhorse. (AWM, ERR/68/0534/VN)
“Everyone was conscious that close attention had to be paid to maintenance checks en-route. It was important, for example, to spot track pins starting to work themselves loose. Injuries, damage and loss of time were all likely consequences if a pin came free, allowing track links to separate. This was especially the case if the convoy was travelling at speed; crews had to keep a close watch on the tracks of the vehicle in front.
Good progress was made for about 35km along Route 2. The convoy had just passed the entrance to Camp Blackhorse, the base of the US Army’s 11 Armoured Cavalry Regiment (11ACR), when Major Badman noticed that one of the dozers (92Alpha), was starting to veer towards the left of the road. With a US Army truck heading towards them, Sergeant Jock McConnell was told to remind his driver (Trooper Gerry Veldhuis) that traffic drives on the right in Vietnam.
As the Centurion moved back to the correct side of the road, it was rocked by the explosion of an estimated 7kg mine. When the dust settled, there was great relief when it was found that the crew all seemed to be ok. The same could not be said for the tank: among other damage, its right forward suspension station was now lying on the road.
Regarding it as their responsibility for ensuring the security of roads in their immediate vicinity, 11ACR were very apologetic. During his reconnaissance, Badman had been assured that this section of Route 2 was kept clear; and it probably was, as much as was generally possible. The fact that immediately after the explosion, both McConnell and his driver glimpsed someone running away, provides a clue as to what might have happened.
It was a known VC tactic: bury a mine at night and run the wires needed to arm the pressure switch to a point at the side of the road. Ensure that nothing can be seen by security patrols. It might be weeks or months before the right convoy comes along; when it did, all that was needed was for a battery to be connected to the wires.”
Given that ARN 169106 was also the first tank to fire a 20pdr round in action in Vietnam and the second Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam … makes it so much more galling that its logbook simply ‘disappeared’ from the Tank Museum. At least we know that Mr Mike Cecil transcribed the logbook before this happened (while working at the AWM).
———————————————————————————————————————-
15 March 2020
The Bizarre Story of the Last 20Pdr Round Fired in Vietnam.
Following on in the ‘Milestones’ series below … there are three aspects to the above (note the difference):
The last 20pdr round fired in Vietnam;
The last 20pdr round fired in anger in Vietnam;
The last 20pdr round fired in contact in Vietnam.
The circumstances re the first of these is explained below:
“Many calculated decisions had to be made in the context of the withdrawal. One involved the fact that twenty-pounder rounds could only be returned to Australia if they were packed in the protective metal cylinders in which they had been delivered. The C Squadron Ammunition Point held both cased and uncased rounds (the latter from tank troops which had been withdrawn from operations). As there were insufficient cylinders to repack all rounds, it was decided that the ‘left over’ ammunition would be expended during H&I fire missions. As a result, the nights of 26 and 27 August saw 5 Troop move to the Nui Dat firing point. The sound of artillery engaging suspected enemy positions at odd hours was a familiar one. On these nights, however, tank crews were the ones making the noise.”
The second is explained this:
“The squadron group set off for Nui Dat at 10am on 6 August under the command of Captain David Watts, the ‘TechO’. It was a slow trip, especially for the 15km or so before Route 2 was reached. As they headed south, 5 Troop were detached to take up position on Courtenay Hill. The last tank troop had been placed under the operational control of 4RAR/NZ. It was nearing 9.30pm when SHQ and 1 Troop approached the Nui Dat gate. The commander of the lead tank radioed that Brigadier McDonald was there to greet them. Watts recalls the Task Force Commander reflecting: ‘I’m about to lose half my firepower.’ Tomorrow he would have just one tank troop to provide close support for two infantry battalions.”
Although there was no report in either the Sqn Commander’s diary or the HQ 1ATF daily sitrep, the C Sqn ‘Techo’ told me when I was writing the story of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam, that he came across some suspected enemy elements during the return to Nui Dat (before 5 Troop was detached to Courtney Hill). A 5 Troop tank commanded by Ian Tulk engaged with speculative fire. This is likely to have been my tank, as Ian was my operator and I had been picked at the end of Iron Fox to go on R&R.
“The fact that the tanks were able to develop fire superiority to their front did not immediately force the enemy to retreat. 274 Regiment had previously shown themselves to be brave and resolute; capable of exploiting their defensive advantage to achieve delay and inflict casualties among their attackers. The C Squadron radio log provides some idea of the fighting involving the tanks, at this point:
1606hrs: RPG fired 10m to callsign 5’s front — engaged;
1611hrs: 1Alpha [Sergeant Ian Smith] engaged by RPG, returned fire with canister;
1619hrs: 1Alpha engaged by RPG;
1634hrs: 5Charlie engaged by MG;
1635hrs: Three bunkers engaging infantry on 5 Troop’s left flank;
1640hrs: 5 Troop given ‘check fire’ by infantry;
1651hrs: 1 Troop engaged movement;
1652hrs: 5 Troop engaged to their front;
1701hrs: 5 Troop engaged bunkers to front.
How did the shell case end up where it was found? Hopefully, someone will clear their conscience at some point. (Well done to Werribee RSL for the members’ respect in caring for the item.)
Given that 5 Troop was the last to be withdrawn from operational service in Vietnam, it’s not surprising that all three of the above ‘milestones’ relate to 5 Troop tanks. (It’s also not surprising, being the 5 Troop leader, that I’ve got an interest in this.) The Troop tanks at that time were: 169106; 169090; 169091; and 169049. (Thank you Shane Lovell.)
So …
Last 20pdr round fired in contact with the enemy: 169091;
Last 20pdr round fired in anger in Vietnam: 169091; and
Last 20pdr round fired in Vietnam: 169106; 169091; 169090; or 169049.
———————————————————————————————————————–
14 March 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga.
Theoretically, this long running saga (see summary across Blogs 6-12 February 2020) was a matter between Defence and myself.
But this was not the case. I reported the proceedings in an open and transparent manner on the Blog as they occurred. It transpired that the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation sought to influence the Information Commissioner’s consideration (not once, but four times). One can’t but wonder what was claimed (in secret) and why.
“On 10 October 2017, 11 October 2017, 14 August 2018 and 15 August 2018 the third party individual [ie. the Chairman] made submissions in a personal capacity and as an officer of the third party ex-service organisation [the RAAC Corporation] objecting to disclosure of the document.”
The Commissioner decided that “the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation who signed the submission in the document at issue is the personal information of an individual”.
Access to the document which the Chairman states was in support of my submission to the Minister (a submission that he states he hadn’t seen) was consequently denied.
No problems I said, simply delete all personal information. I even made the point that I would be happy with a blanked-out piece of paper.
No… this can’t happen, as: “having regard to the nature and contents of the document and the submissions of the parties relevant to the relationship between the individual officer and the ex-service organisation, I [the Commisioner] am also satisfied that the specific content of the submission or representation by the third party ex-service organisation says something about the individual officer who signed the document in the circumstances of this case and constitutes their personal information”.
What is it one has to wonder, that the content of the submission says about the Chairman, which means that it would be damaging to him if made public?
Open and transparent governance: an unattainable ideal.
———————————————————————————————————————-
13 March 2020
Recovering the First Centurion to be Penetrated by an RPG.
Following on from the post on 9 March (‘The First Cent to be Penetrated by an RPG’), the topic was picked up by a Facebook page, one contributor to which asked: “what did they do to block up the R.P.G. entry holes?”. Further info was provided on 10 March about this.
It is necessary now that the same be done re the following comment re the recovery of Sgt Swarbrick’s tank: “[It] was recovered from the battlefield by [an ARV] crew whilst under fire. It was the same contact Lt Sullivan got his MID”.
This is what happened:
“Now that the wounded had been moved to safety, [2Lt Brian] Sullivan had one last thing to do, recover 21Alpha. For very good reasons, all crew commanders knew how to perform the duties of all crew members; so, it was that Sullivan was able to climb into the driver’s compartment and move Swarbrick’s tank back from the bunkers and out to the edge of the clearing (about 50m).
Seeing what was happening, Tocock and Ovans [in the ARV] came forward quickly to take over from him and finish the recovery. Without pausing, the troop leader immediately returned to his own tank (which had followed behind as he drove 21Alpha), took over from Burgess, and directed his driver, Trooper Rod Bellott, back to the contact.”
“[Later], Trooper Burgess reminded his crew commander that their driver had been wounded above the eye soon after they came under fire from the bunker system. Trooper Bellott had driven, without complaint, throughout the subsequent battle, despite his pain and the fact that he could hardly see. The twenty-one-year-old, who had been ‘in-country’ less than a month, was immediately helped from the driver’s compartment and given first aid. His place was taken by Corporal Dave Ovans, RAEME, from the ARV.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
12 March 2020
Vietnam in Retrospect: Why Are we so Defeatist?
The following is the ending of a post by Peter Edwards: ‘Australia and the Vietnam War: 50 years on’ at https://johnmenadue.com/peter-edwards-australia-and-the-vietnam-war-50-years-on-the-strategist-29-2-2020/ It makes one wonder about our inability to differentiate between soldiering and politicking. Military action is, of course, an extension of politics (ie. the will of the nation). Soldiers serve the nation. Assessment of the political wisdom should be kept separate to that of the service and sacrifice of soldiers … but it isn’t. It was the case on return from Vietnam and it is the case still.
“There is ample evidence that, when faced with the question of involvement in Vietnam in 1964–65, Menzies thought that he was simply applying the same formula that had worked so well in the previous 15 years of his prime ministership. We now know that he failed to understand several major differences. First, Australians at all levels—in government, business, the media and the general public—knew much less about the mainland of Southeast Asia, especially the former French colonies in today’s Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, than they did about maritime Southeast Asia, especially the former British and Dutch territories that today are Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Australian politicians, officials, diplomats and military leaders had fewer opportunities to make independent political and military assessments, or to exercise independent diplomacy, in and around Vietnam than was the case in the islands and peninsulas between Sumatra and New Guinea. Australia also had less confidence in, or opportunity to influence, our principal ally’s military and political strategy.
Second, Menzies underestimated the risk that the US might be defeated or forced into a humiliating withdrawal. Given his personal experience as a young man of military age in 1917, and then as a young prime minister in 1939–41, it is not surprising that Menzies, like many of his generation, assumed that the crucially important point was to ensure that the US was engaged in the struggle. The danger, as they saw it, was American isolationism, not imperial overreach. Taking these points together, Menzies and his colleagues did not realise that the Americans themselves knew so little about the region, and greatly overestimated their ability to succeed where the French had failed.
A famous Chinese proverb, quoted but not originated by Sun Tzu, is sometimes rendered as: ‘Know yourself, know your enemy, and in a hundred battles win a hundred victories.’ The lessons of Vietnam for Australian strategists cannot be expressed so succinctly, but a prosaic summary might be as follows: before committing to a distant intervention alongside an ally, be sure that you know yourself; that you know your enemy; that you know your ally; and that you know not just the recent history but also the deep history of the contested territory and its surrounding area. Then, and only then, will you have a reasonable chance of success.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
11 March 2020
Openness and Transparency: Will it Ever be Achieved?
The following article was published in yesterday’s ‘Pearls and Irritations’.
JOHN MENADUE: ‘The Order of Australia, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Murphy’.
No wonder we have lost confidence in institutions when even a Governor General and Justices of the High Court act improperly
My comment (below) on John’s post refers to the DHAAT Decision re Operation Hammersley.
This matter is still being progressed. I hope for a just outcome, but like John Menadue … I might have to accept that real justice is an ideal ‘too far’.
“Open and transparent governance is an ideal that is beyond our reach in practical terms.
Organisations like the RSL strive to achieve it, but it seems to slip through the grasp of those who seek to provide a means by which only honest acts are possible.
I’m presently involved in trying to correct a public Government document in which a statement attributed to me is untrue (and can be proved by a recording of proceedings). I was informed that the document was ‘functus officio’ and I had to apply to the Federal Court for any correction to be made.
One of the criteria for my application to the Court was that I had to show that I had the capacity to pay the respondent’s costs.
I was advised by the Government agency involved that these were likely to be “$40,000 to $70,000 or above”. Not having this amount of disposable assets, means that even the rule of law is unavailable to me.
Open and transparent governance, the rule of law … why do we still believe in these ‘ideals’?”
———————————————————————————————————————–
10 March 2020
Battlefield Damage Repair Techniques/Kits
Photo: Geoff Andrews
If a tank is damaged in battle, one of the elements that contributes to ‘Combat Power’ is the ability to return the tank to the battlefield as quickly as possible. I raised questions about the availability of battlefield damage repair kits at the time of the Abrams purchase and hope that some thought might have been given to this.
Following on from yesterday’s Blog post, the topic was picked up by a Facebook page, one contributor to which, asked:“what did they do to block up the R.P.G. entry holes?”. The following will add to the comments made by a couple of other contributors to that site.
The following extracts from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, are relevant:
“Swarbrick’s tank was subsequently repaired at 106 Field Workshop and returned to B Squadron on 10 March 1969. One of the tasks that had been completed was listed as: ‘Plug and weld three holes in the turret’. This was a challenging undertaking for the RAEME personnel involved. Their field repair responsibility was to return the vehicle to an acceptable battleworthy state as soon as possible; as distinct to restoring it to an ‘as new’ condition.
One of those involved … recalls using stainless steel rod to weld fill one of the holes: ‘the parent steel was melted into the weld itself’. He wanted the repair completed asap, ‘as people, most of them tankies, were coming and looking at the tank and I thought it [seeing the holes] may have had a psychological effect on them’.
The consequences of damage caused by penetration of Centurion armour had not been considered prior to the deployment of tanks for Vietnam. As a result, no procedure for such repairs had been developed. Those at 106 Field Workshop knew they had to ensure that, in the event of another strike in the same area, the armour was not weakened by welding and any ‘plug’ used would not become a secondary projectile. A later OC at the Workshop, Major John Sinclair, was conscious that there was another element involved; repairs needed to be done in such a way that crews did not have ‘constant markers in front of their eyes of their vulnerability, or anything that leads [them] to lose confidence in their equipment to perform’.
It would have been impossible for RAEME tradesmen undertaking battle damage repairs to do so in a detached and unemotional manner, to completely divorce themselves from thoughts of the casualties that had occurred. 106 Field Workshop endeavoured to minimise such trauma by actively discouraging speculation about the crew of the vehicle being repaired; nevertheless, there were many who found the work very difficult indeed.”
————————————————————————————————————————-
9 March 2020
The Centurion Which was the First to be Penetrated by an RPG.
The Blog on 5 March 2020 referred to ‘milestones’ in the history of 1 Armd Regt’s Centurion days. ARN 169104 is the second tank to be included in this‘series’.
Trooper Glenn Darlington inspects an RPG strike on 21Alpha. (Chris Nation)
16 February 1969
“Swarbrick’s tank was hit. The enemy’s opportunity came when 21Alpha’s RMG and coaxial .30cal suffered stoppages at the same time. While the operator, Trooper Graeme Jackson, was desperately trying to get them going again, Swarbrick continued to engage the bunkers using the commander’s machine gun. The enemy, however, had been waiting for the slightest lull in the firing and seized the moment.
The first RPG hit the operator’s periscope, destroying it, but doing little damage otherwise. The second struck the right front of the turret, penetrating the fighting compartment. Its energy dissipated between the turret wall and the traverse gearbox in front of the gunner. Not all the crew were spared, however. When the third RPG exploded against the turret, ‘splash’ went down through the open driver’s hatches, badly wounding the driver, Trooper Mick Ingram. It also set the canvas mantlet cover alight. Unaware of Ingram’s condition, Swarbrick continued firing his .30cal. Seconds later he was forced to duck down into the turret. A bullet (possibly from a sniper) had nicked his neck. No sooner had this happened, than 21Alpha was hit by more RPGs, fired from the right of the tank.
The fourth RPG penetrated the side of the turret, the jet passing across the inside of the fighting compartment to hit one of the ready-round bins. Jackson was wounded in the thigh. To be precise, the left thigh. He had been facing the rear of the tank, trying to access ammunition in the floor bins. The fifth RPG also penetrated the side of the turret, this time immediately adjacent to the commander’s seat, seriously wounding Swarbrick in the lower body and thighs. Haward, in the gunner’s seat, was also wounded by the fragmentation.
The consequences of damage caused by penetration of Centurion armour had not been considered prior to the deployment of tanks for Vietnam. As a result, no procedure for such repairs had been developed. Those at 106 Field Workshop knew they had to ensure that, in the event of another strike in the same area, the armour was not weakened by welding and any ‘plug’ used would not become a secondary projectile. A later OC at the Workshop, Major John Sinclair, was conscious that there was another element involved; repairs needed to be done in such a way that crews did not have ‘constant markers in front of their eyes of their vulnerability, or anything that leads [them] to lose confidence in their equipment to perform’.
Apart from the crew wounds, 21Alpha’s RPG penetrations had other repercussions. The spall caused short-circuits which cut the power to the turret and prevented the wirelesses being used. Added to this, the fighting compartment started to fill with thick smoke. Swarbrick called on to Ingram to reverse, only to discover that his driver had been wounded and was unconscious. In such circumstances, a tank crew commander has no choice but to give the worst possible order, especially when under fire: ‘Bail Out!’
‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, pp 319-320
Sergeant Swarbrick’s tank was the first Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam (and quite probably the first anywhere in the world … British Defence personnel visited Nui Dat soon after the contact, expressing particular interest in the RPG strikes). While Bidey would later write: ‘We all know what RPGs can do now’, it was important to conceal this from the enemy for as long as possible. 21Alpha could have been recovered by the ARV, but this would have made it readily apparent that the tank had been disabled. Operating with an ad hoc crew made it appear that the tank was still battleworthy (even though its gunnery control equipment had been ‘knocked out’).
‘‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, p329.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 March 2020
The RAAC Corporation
The idea for the RAAC Corporation came from the late Brigadier Ian Bryant, AM. He asked me if I wanted to be a part of it (but I was writing the history of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam at the time and had to forego the honour). Would he be pleased to see what his idea has ‘grown’ to become?
Email posts on an RAAC Facebook page:
Dave MenzOwen Heather the reason I posted on this page is to advise members of what RSL is attempting to do. If I have offended any members of this group, my sincerest apologies
Dave Menz (to) Noel Mc Laughlin TBH* if it’s removed no problems, all I am doing is providing all info, I am by no means attempting to dictate or say what should or should not be posted. I will not remove my post, however, if admin decide to remove that is not a problem. (*TBH: To Be Honest.)
Bruce Cameron Hi Dave Menz, I gather that you have been contacted by the RAAC Corporation directing the Admins to remove your post. I believe that the same thing happened re one of my posts (see below). This is the way the Corporation operates. There is no doubt that the RSL contributes greatly to the welfare of veterans, however, not every ‘apple in the basket’ is the same. Only by shining the light on the problem areas, can those doing the good work thrive. I’ve campaigned continuously for open and transparent governance as far as Associations are concerned. Unfortunately, there are those for whom sunlight is anathema.
Bruce CameronDave Menz I was confused about this: “Noel Mc Laughlin TBH if it’s removed no problems, all I am doing is providing all info, I am by no means attempting to dictate or say what should or should not be posted. I will not remove my post, however, if admin decide to remove that is not a problem.
Another post (not immediately related to the above):
Eamon HaleNoel Mc Laughlin I think you’ll find we are. All of the noise and momentum being generated right now is by the younger generation, not the older one. The older generation have left the RSL in a precarious position. It’s up to the youth to rescue it and make it relevant.
The comments made by the Chairman, RAAC Corporation, which Eamon Hale responded to, have been deleted.
Why is it that such comments are deleted after having made them? Why is the originator not prepared to stand behind them?
(Photo: AWM)
Bruce Cameron All; the comments above emphasize why it was that those responsible for Contingency Plans at the time, should’ve made an effort to acquire lightweight flame retardant protective clothing for AFV crews prior to their deployment. This was a failure of the duty of care on the part of Army. The point of which … is the ensure that the same thing isn’t part of today’s contingency plans.
GavAn M. Vigar From memory only the chopper crews had Nomex two piece suits Bruce as they were a new item in our military back in Viet Nam, not even the other nations in country had them in their Armoured crews but in their air crews only.
Paul MaccaBruce Cameron different rules back then I think buddy, no such thing as OH&S or PPE lol just agent orange upsets and watch your step. I recon the boys had other worries on their minds.
Bruce CameronHi Gavan, The point is, has the lesson been learnt? Is suitable protective clothing designated as part of our contingency plans to be available for AFV crews deployed overseas (and are stockpiles held)? I’ve spent a lot of time chasing this. Disappointingly, the RAAC Corporation is not interested.
Bruce CameronPaul Macca The point is that there WERE very strict regs regarding the dress to be worn while a crew member of a Cent on Pucka range. These were thrown out the window when deployed to Vietnam.
Geoff Mac Protective clothing in a war zone? now that’s an oxymoron.
Bruce CameronIt wasn’t just flame protection, but also the provision of reinforced elements to facilitate removal (lifting) of a wounded crewman from the turret floor. The failure of Army to meet its duty of care in these respects was inexcusable.
Lee ArnouldBruce Cameron how many of us cut the harness out to make it easier for ironing for parade
Bruce CameronLee Arnould Exactly my point! It’s only when the need arises to extract a wounded and unconscious operator from the turret, that the importance of the straps is realised. It must not be allowed to happen again! But I worry that such ‘lessons’ are being forgotten.
Now this IS a worry:
Sam Foxton Tankys might be different but 6 months in the ghan I’m 2012 zero anti flame was the norm… I’m in aviation now and our cams are worse zero breathability and not that flam retardant… Boots don’t even meet Australian standards… Business as usual
—————————————————————————————————————————–
7 March 2020
AFV History
Taking a break from 1 Armd Regt/Centurion history for a moment …
Former Centurion crewman, Rod Ward, has been invaluable to helping the AWM with AFV related information. A further example is illustrated by the emails below (photos, AWM):
Dear ….
An amateur tank ‘historian’ has brought the following images to my attention.
At issue is the type of tanker involved. The photos are contradictory, ie. one states petrol, the other water.
The former is more likely in the context of providing water to Japanese troops.
But if the context is that of supplying fuel to the Japanese Ha Go tanks (also very plausible, even more so than water), then it should be described as a ‘diesel’ tanker, as that was the fuel used by the tanks (see last reference).
2 February 1968: The First Round Fired in Action by 1 Armd Regt, RAAC.
Yesterday’s Blog referred to ‘milestones’ as far as the history of 1 Armd Regt and the Centurion tank fleet is concerned. The following extract from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ (p 87-89, Vol 1; less footnotes)
Photo: AWM P05539.012
“Despite their losses during Tet, the enemy were not defeated. They set about planning new attacks, to be directed against Saigon in May 1968. This next campaign became known as ‘mini Tet’ and was designed to influence the Paris Peace Talks commencing at that time. The involvement of 1ATF in helping to counter this offensive would become a watershed for the Australian Army.
One of those who arrived with the C Squadron Advance Party, was the LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens. The last thing he had expected, was to find himself on operations three days later, even before the tanks had arrived. Prior to Tet most of 1ATF had been deployed north to Bien Hoa Province to help protect the US military complexes at Long Bien and Bien Hoa. It was left to the 1ATF Ready Reaction Force to respond to a determined attack on the ARVN Sector HQ at Baria at 5am on 1 February 1968.
A Company 3RAR (Major Brian [Horri] Howard) and 3 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav (Second Lieutenant Roger Tingley) did a magnificent job in clearing and securing the town, following a well-planned occupation by D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion. While the battle was being fought, arrangements were made to collect the closest infantry (B Company 3RAR, Major Bert Irwin) from Binh Ba, and bring them back to Nui Dat to reconstitute a reserve.
One of the problems was that there were only two troop-carrying trucks available, resulting in engineer dump trucks being pressed into service. Another problem was the need for an escort and someone to lead it. This was where Owens came in:
“The only [armoured] vehicles available for the escort were two fitters ‘tracks’, still in transportation mode with cranes stowed inside, no gun shields, and guns still in boxes. The machine guns were quickly prepared and briefly test fired before departing.”
With twelve infantry squashed into each of the two fitters ‘tracks’, the company made it back to Nui Dat. The same elements were deployed to Baria the next day, 2 February. The enemy were well known to set ambushes to catch relief forces and considerable care was taken to ensure that the route was safe. Second Lieutenant Owens again commanded the escort … such as it was.
He recalls:
“As we neared the outskirts of Baria, the Company Commander [Irwin] requested that we engage an area from which sporadic pot shots were being received. This we did, however, as luck would have it, [after a number of rounds] my ‘fifty’ experienced a stoppage. Fortunately the enemy fire had been suppressed and the remainder of the escort passed without incident. Apart from me, the crews on both vehicles were from the Armoured Squadron Workshop.”
Such were the circumstances under which 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, fired their first shot in action. It was to be hoped that Centurions would be present when the enemy were next encountered.”
NOTE: I have no idea as to which fitters’ ‘track’ it might have been, nor whether it has even been identified. Seem to me that this might be a worthwhile task to be undertaken as part of group leadership training at 1 Armd Regt. The AFV which fired the first round in action by 1 Armd Regt RAAC may well still be out there … somewhere. (The reference to RAAC is important. Obviously, a different AFV would have fired the first round in action for 1 Armd Regt, AAC.)
———————————————————————————————————————–
5 March 2020
Hi, Back after a six day stint in Perth (meant to be five days, but leap year got in the way). Based on my experience there, the RAAC collegiate group is alive and well (even better than that)!
Prior to departure, I’d hoped to be able to fill in the ‘blanks’ below. Tomorrow (hopefully).
Centurions in Vietnam
The Blog on 14 Feb 20 made reference to Centurions in the Australian Army. A previous post on 24 Jan 20 referred to a suggestion that ARN 169079 was the first Cent to fire a round in Vietnam. Of course, it was ARN 169106 (Bob Snape) that fired the first 20 pounder rounder in Vietnam. While we’re at it, why not id the other tanks….
The tank which detonated the first ant-tank mine:
The tank which detonated the first ‘off-set’ anti-tank mine
The tank that fired the first main armament round in action:
The Centurion vehicle which fired the first round in action:
The tank which spent the longest time in Vietnam
The Centurion vehicle which spent the longest time in Vietnam:
The tank which spent the shortest time in Vietnam:
The tank which fired the last main armament round in Vietnam:
The tank which detonated the last anti-tank mine:
(9 March 2020) The tank which was the first to be penetrated by an RPG:
The tank which detonated the most anti-tank mines:
The tanks which were ‘written off’ as the result of damage caused by anti-tank mines:
Also of interest:
(6 March 2020) The 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, vehicle which fired the first round in action:
————————————————————————————————————————
26 February 2020
Please note: This will be the last Blog post until 5 March 20202. (I’ll be absent on grandparental duty.)
Operation Hammersley: False Allegations and Information re the DHAAT Decision
The following is a copy of information provided to 1 AR Assn Members by the Assn C’tee. The points highlighted are discussed under.
“Association members are advised that the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal (DHAAT) has affirmed the decision, in the above own-motion personal appeal lodged by Bruce Cameron, to refuse to extend eligibility for the award of the RVN CGWP to members of the following three units involved in Operation Hammersley: A Sqn 1st Armoured Regiment, B Sqn 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1 Field Sqn RAE.
Members should note however, the detailed evidence-based submission made by the RAAC Corporation and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association (under the auspices of Noel McLaughlin and Pedro Rosemond [our authorised representative]), which was originally tabled in 2017, is still with Defence and is still being assessed by their Historical Awards people pending final determination. There have been a number of unacceptable delays in dealing with this submission including inaction as well as setting aside by higher authorities dealing with the same matter. Constantly changing validation research staff has not helped.
That submission is tendered in favour of the above three Supporting Arms Units as well as the elements of 161 Recce Flight and 9 Sqn RAAF who also provided support during Hammersley.
The RAAC Corporation in conjunction with the 1st Armoured Regiment Association as lead client is advocating on behalf of all five units and not three.
The investigation was suspended in August 2019 because of the application made by Bruce Cameron to the DHAAT which heard his appeal on 29 October 2019. As previously advised, the 2017 submission has been fully supported by the Management Committee and 1st Armoured Regiment Association since it was originally submitted. It remains fully supported.
Given that there are another four separate submissions plus the Corporation’s submission to be investigated, it is anticipated that Defence may not make a decision concerning the original submission for a number of months. It has also been confirmed that the option to appeal to the DHAAT, against a rejection of the 2017 Submission by Defence, remains open to the RAAC Corporation and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association.
Further information will be provided when available. Russ James Secretary …
I’ve asked the President of the 1AR Assn to provide the following corrections to the Statement made to members.
“own motion personal appeal”. This is totally false. The 1 Fd Sqn RAE Assn and 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn joined with me in the Appeal. (The President of the former giving evidence at the Hearing.) The submission was supported by the OC and 2IC of the tank squadron at the time (the former making a written submission and the latter giving oral testimony). The troop leader of the APC troop involved in the attack on the Minh Dam Secret Zone provided a written submission to the Tribunal.
“Detailed evidence-based submission”. The inference here is that the submission to the DHAAT was neither detailed nor evidence based. This is not true. (A restrained response!)
“was originally tabled in 2017”. The inference here is that the 1AR Assn submission predated that from me. This is both wrong and deceptive. I originally prepared my submission on 2015 and offered it to the 1AR assn. I thought that they might wish to forward it to the RAAC Corporation for consideration. The RAAC Corporation, however, said that they “wanted to have nothing to do with the bloody thing”. In February 2017, I sent my submission to the Minister.
“…advocating on behalf of all five units”. I’ve asked the Assn whether or not their 2017 submission was lodged with the support of the 1 Fd Sqn RAE Assn and the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, however, I’ve had no response.
“Given that there are another four separate submissions plus the Corporation’s submission to be investigated, it is anticipated that Defence may not make a decision concerning the original submission for a number of months.” The inference here is that the number of different submissions for Defence to investigate is the reason that there will be a delay in responding to the 1AR Assn submission. This is not so. Defence stated at the Hearings that they were involved with the other Services in preparing an ADF-wide policy on the RVN CGWP Unit Citation being awarded to all Australian service personnel simply for being in Vietnam (as per the US Services). I responded to this suggestion to say that if this was approved, every Australian who was awarded the CGWP in recognition of an individual act of gallantry for their service in Vietnam, would have to be awarded an equivalent Australian award to maintain their recognition as having provided service over and above the call of duty. Defence stated that it was likely to take a couple of months before the Policy was able to be recommended to the CDF. PS. It would be great to think that Defence might rule that the RVN CGWP should not be awarded to ALL Australians who served in Vietnam, but could be awarded in special circumstances, eg. supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. Sadly, this is unlikely to come about, given that Defence argued that, as supporting arms were not permanently attached to 8RAR throughout its tour of duty, they’re not eligible for the award.
———————————————————————————————————————-
25 February 2020
The Army’s Understanding of Operation Hammersley.
The Cove is the Army’s Professional Military Education forum.
Their understanding of Operation Hammersley (and that being inculcated across the Army) is set out below. Coming so soon after the 50th Anniversary National Commemoration, one might expect a certain amount of rigor in the account (interesting to see the reference to the RVN CGWP Unit Citation) ….
‘Dear Cove,
On 18 Feb 20, a National Commemoration for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Hammersley was held in Canberra. It is timely therefore, that This Week in History should refer to it.
Unfortunately, the reference (copied below) gives a false impression as to the circumstances of the Action. While I don’t feel that it is my place to rewrite it, I have taken the opportunity to make some points to the researcher who might do so.
“17 February 1970: Battle of Long Hai, South Vietnam.
On 10 February 1970, the 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment took part in Operation Hammersley, a reconnaissance operation in the Long Hải area. On 18 February, the Battalion captured a large bunker complex after the Vietnamese Communist defenders withdrew following air raids. The operation continued until 9 March, with the battalion carrying out patrols and conducting ambushes in order to engage Communist troops. These operations were successful, and 8 RAR was awarded the South Vietnamese Government’s Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation for its role in the operation.”
The Battle of Long Hai is a made-up name without foundation. The 50th Commemoration was for Operation Hammersley as the action should be referred to.
It was not a reconnaissance operation. (Hint: It’s first objective was changed to something completely different; neither of which involved recon.)
On 18 Feb, 8RAR did not capture a large bunker complex.
Air raids did not occur before 18 Fed.
The enemy did not withdraw following air raids (this is a central point as far as the operation is concerned).
Operation Hammersley did not “continue until 9 Mar”. (Hint: Prior to that time Operation Hammersley II had commenced.
8RAR were not awarded a Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley; nor were they awarded the MUC, including the CGWP. (Note: Although this appears in the Official History, the DHAAT recently ruled that neither was true.)
Operation Hammersley DID involve a combined arms attack on a strongly defended enemy position with examples of bravery and sacrifice which deserve to be made known throughout the Army and preserved in its history. It is one of the Australian Army’s most significant offensive actions.’
————————————————————————————————————————
24 February 2020
1AR Assn Assistance to Members in Need
Photo: Google images
The info below was recently sent to members of the 1AR Assn:
Accredited Advocate Register Members are able to use the Accredited Advocate Register (AAR) to find an ESO with qualified advocates who are trained to assist you in accessing services relating to wellbeing, rehabilitation, compensation and appeals.
The latest AAR is located on the Association Website at http://www.advocateregister.org.au/
This is great to see, as not long ago, a very vocal (and influential among some) person stated that “members only join the Assn to have a few beers and a good time!’, ie. the Assn didn’t want to have anything to do with helping others (apart from sending them to the RSL).
A post from the Blog a while ago is copied below:
5 September 2018
Assistance to Members. One of the goals mentioned in Part 6 [the Introduction the Blog, above] is:
“The By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.”
It might be thought that this was self-evident as the Purposes of the 1AR Assn, as per the Constitution, include:
“(4) promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependants and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve;
(5) provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.”
Surprisingly, Mr C M Fenton OAM (the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation) stated recently that all members of the Corporation passed a motion at an AGM to state that they did not have the resources to provide welfare support to their members and that those in need of assistance would be passed to organisations such as the RSL that do have the resources.
How does this stand vis a vis the Purposes of the 1AR Assn (above)? It seems to me that the relationship between the RAAC Corporation motion, the Purposes of the 1AR Assn (as per the Constitution) and the intentions of the current C’tee … needs to be clarified. (This is due, in part, because members of the 1AR Assn receive neither a copy of the Minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs, nor any report from Mr Fenton.)
The Blog post below from 18 June 2018, is relevant (posted after the RAAC Corporation motion):
What Would I Like to See Characterise the 1AR Assn?
Question. If candidates for the 1AR Assn C’tee were to be asked to state their ‘platforms’, what would I vote for?
Answer. This is what I would say:
(i) A commitment to Openness and Transparency in all things, eg. Minutes of C’tee Meetings made available to members; and financial statements circulated for consideration prior to AGMs;
(ii) A Program of Work, with priorities, for the coming year… established with the agreement of members;
(iii) Emphasis on Consultation with Members, eg. if an initiative is to be introduced, or changes made to the Constitution, members are asked for their views and input at the earliest possible stage;
(iv) A system of Communications Between C’tee and Members established so that members at any time might ask questions or make suggestions and be assured of receiving responses from the C’tee’;
(v) A system of Communication Between Members established so the members might freely discuss ideas for the betterment of the 1AR Assn and its endeavours;
(vi) A clear Policy Regarding Donations be established so that there is no confusion as to was is, or is not, an acceptable donation to the Assn;
(vii) A Commitment to Help Former or Serving Members who require assistance to manage their personal circumstances (rather than simply referring them to the RSL as agreed by RAAC Corporation members).
(viii) A Continuation of the Good Projects initiated by past C’tees; such as awards to 1 Armd Regt soldiers/students of merit and gift packs to those on operations.
————————————————————————————————————————-
23 February 2020
Our History ….
Cpl Kevin Alexander, August 1965 (www.awm.gov.au/collection/C308559)
Thanks goodness, for those in the AWM who seek to continuously improve our history.
According to the AWM, the video below shows: “Armoured personnel carriers of the recently formed 1 APC troops of the 1st Cavalry Regiment transporting men of 1 RAR as they move through villages of War zone D”. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C190823
What is the background to this?
1 Tp A Sqn 4/19 PWLH arrived in Vietnam in June 1965. 1 APC Sqn was raised at Puckapunyal in September 1965.
1 Tp A Sqn 4/19, officially became 1 Tp, 1APC Sqn at this time (though continuing to operate as the ‘Pony Solders’ under R K Hill in Vietnam).
APC Sqn arrived Vietnam June 1966 and were at full strength by September 1966.
In January 1966, the ARA Sqns of 4/19 and 2/14 became A and B Sqns, 1 Cav Regt, a cavalry (not APC) unit.
After consultation with former 4/19 PWLH, 1 Cav and 3 Cav members, I suggested to the AWM that this be amended to: “Armoured personnel carriers of 1 Troop, A Squadron 4/19 PWLH Regiment (‘officially’ redesignated 1 APC Troop in September 1965) transporting men of 1 RAR as they move through villages of War zone D”.
This how the caption reads today.
Well done AWM in being responsive to feedback from veterans!
PS. A comment re the above: “Thanks for that ,Bruce. I was and still am ,proud to have been a member of the 4/19th. When we were notified of the redesignation to 1APC Troop, I and I am sure the other members of the troop felt that no matter the name, we would always be Pony Soldiers”.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 February 2020
HAMMERSLEY RECOGNITION: IT’S BEEN DEALT A BLOW, BUT … PART II
There are two reasons that the likely cost to an applicant (should he lose) an Appeal to the Federal Court re the Hammersley decision have been estimated by Defence to be “$40,000 to $70,000 ot more”. One was explained yesterday, ie. the cost of a barrister’s fee to prevent a precedent being set re the Tribunal’s claim that it’s decisions are ‘functus officio’.
The second is documented below. In essence, the Tribunal said that supporting arms could be eligible for the award if they could be considered to have been elements of 8RAR for the duration of its tour in Vietnam. They seem to have realised subsequently that the wording of the question was a mistake. Considerable legal costs would be involved in defending it.A copy of an email the Chair, DHAAT is copied below. A similar email has been sent to individual members of the Tribunal panel that hear the Appeal.
Dear Mr Sullivan,
Just in case there should be any doubt as what it is that the veteran community’s perception is that DHAAT don’t want to make known … it’s made plain in the email below; ie. if the question was open to interpretation as described, then the response we provided (ie. a separate format response and 57page supporting submission) could make legal arguments in support of it, difficult to deny.
It would seem that this is the reason given for ‘deleting’ all references to the actual responses to the question (other than the dates) and inserting something completely false.
Your sincerely,
From: Bruce Cameron > Sent: Tuesday, 17 December 2019 9:33 AM To: DHAAT Subject: RE: Directions Hearing [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]
Hi,,
Thank you for providing a copy of the Defence response to Question 1 and for providing the opportunity for representatives of 8 RAR’s combined arms team to provide comments by 15 Jan 20.
With the Direction Hearing scheduled for 18 Dec 19, I ask that the Tribunal give consideration to making a Direction to Defence with respect to Question 1.
Defence has answered the question by stating that supporting arms were not part of 8RAR. ALL units and sub-units that were part of 1 ATF, including 8RAR, were permanently commanded by HQ 1ATF (specifically, the Task Force Commander). ALL units and sub-units were “force assigned” as combined arms teams as operations required. While none of this is disputed; neither is it relevant to Question 1.
The question was whether or not the tanks, APCs and field engineers could be considered to part of 8RAR for the purposes of the Citation awarded to 8 RAR on 24 Oct 70.
Obviously, if they were a formal component of 8 RAR, they would have received the Citation. What circumstances then would give rise to them being “considered” to be part of 8 RAR for the purposes of the Citation?
Representatives of the combined arms teams which formed the 8 RAR group for the operations referred to in the Citation believe that there is one crucial element and one only: evidence that supporting arms were critical to the success of the operations for which the Citation was awarded.
It is on this basis that the combined arms team’s response to the Tribunal’s question has been prepared and submitted. It is our contention that this has been shown to be the case without any doubt whatsoever. This being so, it would appear that matter is resolved in our favour, ie. without the supporting arms, 8 RAR would not have had the operational success referred to in the Citation and the contribution of supporting arms should be acknowledged with eligibility being extended to them for the same award.
Having said this, there would seem to be grounds for Defence to appeal if they were to have misunderstood the question. The Tribunal may wish to direct Defence, therefore, to respond to Question 1 in terms of whether or not supporting arms were critical to the success of the operations which form the basis of the Citation awarded to 8RAR.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
———————————————————————————————————————–
21 February 2020
HAMMERSLEY RECOGNITION: IT’S BEEN DEALT A BLOW, BUT …
Five years of effort by many people has resulted in a decision being made as to the eligibility of supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley, to receive the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR.
The DHAAT ruled (i) that the Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its entire tour of Vietnam.
The Tribunal also accepted the advice provided by Defence that the supporting arms were not permanently assigned to 8RAR during this period. (The Tribunal did not accept evidence from the Applicant in this regard and did say why.)
The DHAAT ruled (ii) that supporting arms were not therefore eligible for the Citation.
Subsequent efforts to appeal the decision are described below.
A Tale of Injustice
Section 110 XE of the Defence Act 1903 states that:
(2) The [Defence Honours and Awards Appeals] Tribunal’s decision on the review of a reviewable decision must include a statement of the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision.
Section 13 (1) of the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 states that a “person who is entitled to make an application to the Federal Court, may, by notice in writing given to the person who made the decision, request him or her to furnish a statement in writing setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision”. Notice was given to the Tribunal on this basis.
BUT, Section 13 (11) (b) of the ADJR provides exemption to the above for “a decision that includes, or is accompanied by a statement setting out, findings of facts, a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and the reasons for the decision”. The Tribunal claimed this exemption.
A review decision which claims to provide reasons, but omits reference to submissions made which are central to the matter (other than the dates they were made), can be appealed to the Federal Court as a matter of law on the basis of ‘failure to consider relevant evidence’. This evidence may have been considered, but as the written decision makes no reference to why it was not judged to be relevant, the above applies.
Added to this, if a review decision attributes something to have been stated by the applicant, when he made no such statement and this can be proven, an appeal can also be lodged in this basis.
An Applicant to the Federal Court has to make a ‘Genuine Steps’ statement, i.e. he has to show that he has taken steps to try and resolve the issue directly with the respondent. Initially I expected that the Tribunal would be helpful and provide an explanation.
BUT, this was not to be, despite numerous appeals to the Chair. In the words of the Tribunal, which I’ve heard more than once, ‘this matter is closed!’. In support of the above, the Tribunal claims that its decision is ‘functus officio’, i.e. its mandate to deal with the matter has expired and it can no longer enter into further considerations related to it. (If this caveat didn’t apply, matters could drag on and on interminably.)
BUT, what if the decision has been made without considering relevant evidence and under an apparent false assumption that something was stated by the applicant?
Are all administrative decisions ‘functus officio’ without any question? No, of course not. If they, were the Law would be unjust.
A recent judgement by the Victorian Supreme Court “usefully clarifies that the assessment of whether an Award is a ‘Final Award’ so as to render the tribunal functus officio should be assessed as a matter of substance not form. The label ‘Final Award’ does not render the tribunal functus where the tribunal has left questions open for further resolution”. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8fe300c2-96d3-43df-9235-fa70fea64b39
BUT, what if an appeal was made to the Federal Court on such a basis? If the application was approved and the Court found in favour of the applicant and made an Interrogatory Order (ie. the Court supported the applicant’s request for the Tribunal to provide answers to specific questions as to why evidence submitted was judged not to be relevant and why a false statement was attributed to the applicant) … would this create a precedent which could limit the Tribunal’s ability to make decisions in the future without any fear of them being challenged?
Is this why the estimate by the Defence Legal Section, as to the costs that the applicant might have to bear in terms of his application to the Federal Court in this matter, “would be from $40,000 to $70,000, or above?
Before an application can be accepted by the Federal Court, an applicant has to demonstrate that he can meet the respondent’s costs, if so ordered.
The operation of the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal is founded on these Rules. Is there a need for an amendment to relevant Acts to allow questions to be asked by the Applicant in relation to a Tribunal decision, prior to having to make an application to the Federal Court? The latter option is fine if one has $70,000 or more in disposable assets (but how many veterans are so endowed?).
If it were to be resolved by Government that there is no justification for such an amendment … is real justice able to be provided to those who have jeopardised their lives to serve their country?
SO, while the matter might be closed as far as the Tribunal is concerned, where to now as far as just recognition for supporting arms is concerned? The Court of Public Opinion was ruled in favour of just applicants before. The issue is far from being ‘over’.
PS. Interestingly, the Registrar of the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (based on considerable experience) advises that the Tribunal chair cannot be named as the respondent in such an application to the Federal Court, as he was not a member of the Tribunal panel … the Tribunal as a whole must be named as the respondent. (Even though the chair signed the letter that accompanied the decision and there were no other signatures to the document which would indicate who else might have written it or amended it.) Furthermore, although the Federal Court Rules state that the initiating application has to ‘served’ by the applicant to the respondent directly, the Registrar advises that he is the one who must receive it.
Why is it that although procedural Rules are very clear, a veteran might be intimidated into doing something different? Are our Institutions really focused on the needs of those they are established to serve?
PPS. A copy of the Blog has been sent to Mr Mark Sullivan AO, Chair, DHAAT, with the comment:
“I thought you might be interested in the following aspect: Is there a need for an amendment to relevant Acts to allow questions to be asked by the Applicant in relation to a Tribunal decision, prior to having to make an application to the Federal Court? The latter option is fine if one has $70,000 or more in disposable assets (but how many veterans are so endowed?).
Should the case be that you would’ve been prepared to provide an explanation, but were prevented by Legislation from doing so … you may like to suggest a change to allow the Tribunal to provide a ‘clarifying statement’ in such circumstances should they arise in the future.”
“The obvious problem with this thinking is that items that may one day help tell our story such as a flag, or a street sign, or a number plate from a rolled vehicle will not be kept, and when they are lost, so are our stories.
The photographs and memories of the humid days pouring concrete in Timor, or months on exercise in Shoalwater Bay, may seem unimportant to some but they help paint a backdrop to the stories – our history and sacrifices – that we must never forget.
These little bits of everyday army life will help future generations connect with the soldiers of today and the soldiers of yesterday. It will give young Australians a chance to know the lives of their ancestors and the history of their units. So how do we achieve this?”
The comments I submitted are as follows:
“Well written, Todd.
There is another dimension, a complementary one, as well. I wrote a book about Australia’s tank operations in Vietnam and remarked to a RAEME friend that it was evident that military history is primarily about strategy and tactics, there is very little about the innovative skills and techniques which have evolved and proven invaluable at different times. He agreed and quickly established a website titled ‘RAEME Know How’ which tries to capture and preserve practical knowledge for future generations. Of course, the other side of this is the lessons learnt on the battlefield which should be documented so that they don’t have to be relearnt over and over again. The sapper mine warfare room at Nui Dat was a great example of this. Sadly, during Vietnam, the feedback of lessons to reinforcements in other Corps was not nearly as good.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
19 February 2020
How Our History Becomes Corrupted.
A question posted on another site was: “Did the Cents ever convert to VIC 1 harness and associated radios at any time?”.
Answers included: “No Aus ones did Larkspur c42 and b47”; “The Larkspur had the same frequency range, but old squelch had to be used for comms between US and Brit sets”; “the Cents never did. And the US system was called the VRC47 and 125 sets”; I don’t remember a VRC 47… I do remember an AN VRC 46,49,125,64 and 160. I also remember the C42 and B47 and C13 in the Cents”. Well done to the last poster … almost nailed it.
There are a number of errors in the responses above. That’s understandable, but so it is that our history becomes corrupted. Writing ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, I was forever coming across references to ‘facts’ that were deemed to be so, because the information had appeared in a publication.
When people rely on memory they are often misled. Of course, they could anticipate this and prefix they input with ‘If my memory serves me correctly …’ or some such. Of course, they could always check on Google (but who does this?).
It’s not correct to say that no Australian Cents were concerted to VIC 1 harness. I believe that a trial was conducted by the Engineering Design Establishment (but the installation did not come into service). The Larkspur range did not have the same frequency range as the US radios … I believe that Larkspur could only tune in 100 Khz steps, whereas the US sets could tune in 50Khz steps. I don’t believe that the AN/VRC 47 installation was used by Australian AFVs; rather a single installation of the RT 524 was the AN/VRC 46; a double installation, an AN/VRC 49. (Only a former radio instructor would comment that it should be ‘AN/GRC 125′ and’ AN/VIC-1′.)
The usual mistake made in publication is to state that the US radios were incompatible with the British radios. This was not the case if the latter used ‘old’ squelch and a frequency ending in a 100 Khz step.Top of Form
I think that the above is correct, however, I could easily be wrong. Anyone wanting to reference it, please undertake independent research to verify.
———————————————————————————————————————-
18 February 2020
Operation Hammersley
The following press release by the Minister for Veterans Affairs’ and Senator Molan presents one account of Operation Hammersley:
“During the Vietnam War our troops were sent to the Long Hai area of Phuoc Tuy Province from February 1970, where they had the objective of securing a quarry site at the foot of the Long Hai Hills, the target of previous operations and air strikes,” Mr Chester said. “Despite early successes and the support of armoured vehicles, the Australians were hindered by the rugged terrain and the enemy’s expert knowledge of the land and in March 1970 the operation concluded.
If the only objective was to secure the quarry, few (if any) casualties would have resulted. What happened was that the objective was changed. The Operation became that of a battalion group tasked to exploit the success of an ambush and attack the enemy in the previously invincible Minh Dam Secret Zone. The following extracts from my book explain the sequence leading up to the attacks.
Stage One. Road building materials were required by 17 Construction Squadron engineers tasked with upgrading Route 44. (The civil aid project would make it much easier for vehicles to travel between the village of Long Hai and Route 23, thereby connecting the Long Hai Peninsula with the population centres of Long Dien, Baria, and Dat Do.)
Operation Hammersley was to be undertaken by a company group comprising C Company 8RAR (Major David Rankine), 2 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav (Captain Peter Murphy), and 2 Troop (Brennan). As well as having 161 Battery (RNZA) in direct support, a mortar section from 8RAR (mounted in M125A1s) were attached. The plan was for part of the force to guard the quarry, while the remainder patrolled the surrounds and ambushed likely enemy approaches.
Stage Two. About 3.5km north-east, just as 9 Platoon C Company 8RAR were moving from their day to their night ambush position on a small knoll, one of the sentries sighted a group of enemy approaching. The initial estimate was a staggering 40 or 50. A little later, by the time 30 had passed, the enemy strength had been revised to around 100! With about 40 in the killing ground, the Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant Peter Lauder, ordered the Claymores to be fired. It was 7.30pm.
Stage Three. The presence of such a large number of enemy was sufficient for the Task Force Commander to postpone a planned 8RAR operation and order Lieutenant Colonel O’Neill to exploit the success of the ambush. As a result, Battalion HQ 8RAR and B Company (Major Mike Jeffery), moved to Isa on 16 February 1970. O’Neill’s armoured support was augmented for the mission and both tank and APC Squadron Commanders (Chipman and Rooks) deployed their HQs accordingly. 1 Troop (Meredith) joined Brennan’s 2 Troop and McNeilage’s SHQ Troop, the three tank troops being able to form operational groupings with B, C and D Companies if required. The APCs of 1 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav (Lieutenant Bill Burgher) supplemented those of Ashman’s 3 Troop at this time.
I’ve suggested to DVA that they might like to explain the significance of Operation Hammersley (and what it was that those involved were fighting for) in the next DVA news.
PS. Great to see Senator Molan, the CDF, and Service Chiefs paying compliments as they passed the Colours at the Commemoration.
————————————————————————————————————————
17 February 2020
Centurion Auction : How Much Will They Bring?
Vince Ryan (rural NSW) once had nineteen Centurions and two ARVs, as well as two other Cents that he was wrecking for parts. The images below show that he is to auction off four of his Cents, plus one of the ARVs. (The number of other AFVs which may have been sold off earlier are unknown.)
None of the four Cents was used in Vietnam. The two ARVs which were/are owned by Mr Ryan were/are : 169114 and 169113. If it’s the latter that’s for sale, it was used in SVN with B and A Sqns (28D and 8D).
How much is a Centurion worth? $100,000?
I’m told that the reserve is $105,000 – 120,000 plus commission. None of the vehicles is a runner, however, so such a price might be a bit optimistic.
Also informed that the ARV is 169114, so not a vehicle used in Vietnam. (Apparently ARN 169113 was sold off previously.)
“The Binh Ba Commemoration was well organised and conducted. Congrats to all involved.
What happened when those laying wreaths twice passed the assembled Standard, Guidons, Colours and Banners, however?
One expects that service personnel in uniform would salute the Colours … as I understand the Ceremonial Manual, however, civilians are to turn their heads to acknowledge the Colours, while gentlemen wearing headdress are to remove it.
Some ‘civilians’ such as Murray Blake correctly removed their headdress and turned their heads … but others who passed by neither saluted, nor turned their heads.
Am I out of order in asking: ‘Please, RSM Ceremonial, include the paying of compliments to Colours in the briefing notes for such commemorations’.
Is there a special category of retired personnel wearing military headdress? Seems to me that it might be inappropriate for them to salute, so should they remove their military headdress? Maybe an amendment to the Ceremonial Manual here? (For example, if you’re wearing a beret with a suit when the National Anthem is played, do you salute, remove your beret, or just stand there?
The two central questions are, what do you do if you’re in civilian clothes and wearing a beret and:
(i) the National Anthem plays; or
(ii) you walk past a Standard, Guidon or Colour?”
On 7 June 2019, I asked the RSM-A the following questions:
“Dear RSM-A,
I am a retired member of the RAAC. Following the Binh Ba Commemoration yesterday, some questions of protocol have arisen in the context of veterans attending such ceremonies and wishing to pay respect in accord with appropriate procedures.
When a gentleman wearing civilian clothes and a hat, passes Colours/Guidons etc, he removes his hat and does an eyes left/right.
But what happens when the retired person is wearing their old unit beret (probably also wearing medals)?
Should he (i) remove his beret and do an eyes left/right; (ii) keep beret on and salute with eyes left/right; or keep beret on and simply do an eyes left/right.
Supplementary question is: what should such a person do when the national anthem is played: (i) stand, keep beret on and salute; (ii) stand and remove beret; or (iii) just stand.
Your help in answering these questions would be much appreciated.
It is recognised that former service personnel are not subject to the dress/ceremonial manual stipulations, but, even so, most would like to be able to do what is considered the ‘right thing’.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron [Obviously, the same protocol would apply when Colours/Guidons are marched past, ie. stand and ….]”
A response from someone who has seen service in numerous operational theatres was:
“I would strongly argue that if you are wearing your old Regiment’s head attire with badge etc and as an individual walking past ANY regimental colours, you would salute. I would!
In my view, you are in spirit, still very much of the military and the head wear reflects your past, your beliefs, your traditions, your total respect and the way you in which you were trained. To remove is as you pass by to me is surrendering all of the above.
If you are in command of a veteran group passing the colours, you would give an eyes right/left and salute FOR the column you lead. Thus the remainder, hat or no hat, as in military style would comply with an order for eyes right. The same rules would apply on the playing of the national anthem. Without military hat, civilian headwear removed on all such examples above.
Mate, I have never read of any rules for such circumstances but I can categorically state without hesitation, if I was in that situation, then be it right or wrong in the eyes of the rule makers, I would do it as above.”
Interestingly, the above fits with the practice on ANZAC Day in Canberra, ie. the leader of an RAAC contingent passing the Reviewing Officer/Stone of Remembrance orders ‘Eyes Right’ and salutes (wearing his beret)
The response from the RSM-A was”
“Dear Bruce thank you for your email. You are correct, gentlemen wearing civilian attire with hats on, are to remove their hats when passing Guidons and Colours and look to their left or right.
In regards to wearing berets in civilian attire and paying respect to guidons/colours, I’m more than comfortable with those veterans turning their head and eyes to the left or right.
Regards to the national anthem … leave berets on and sing loudly.
At the end of the day it’s all about showing respect.”
What will happen on 18 Feb 20. Hopefully it will not be the same as 6 Jun 19. These are members of the Australian Army that we’re paying respect to!! I gather that the Chairman, RAAC Corporation, has advised former RAAC personnel attending of the advice provided by the RSM-A. That’s as it should be, ie. we learn from the past and continually improve going forward.
(Look at the video above, not even the Chief of Army acknowledged the Colours!) How could this be?
————————————————————————————————————————
15 February 2020
How to Torture Our History
Following yesterday’s theme, another post has appeared on the same site. It is about ‘Denton: The Dynamic Duckling’. Someone commented that the name was ‘Benton’. Wrong! Was the response.
If you were the person who originally posted the photo, what should you say? Should you simply believe the newspaper whose headline you quoted and dismiss the other comment? Or should you keep an open mind and say to the other poster, ‘why do you suggest this name’?
An extract from ‘Canister! On! Fire!’ (without footnotes) provides the background.
“On 23 August 1968, after the enemy were forced from Long Dien, B and D Companies 1RAR, supported by 1 Troop, conducted a search of the battle area. At one point, a mother duck, followed by a line of ducklings, crossed the road directly in front of Lieutenant McCormack’s tank. The driver, Lance Corporal Hunter, quickly jumped out, scooped up the last in line, and passed it back to the turret crew.
Things did not work out as planned: ‘We had the idea of fattening up the duck to augment our rations; the problem was that everyone fell in love with it, including the infantry we were with. The whole group spent the next few days collecting frogs and other delicacies. It lived in the bin beside the driver until we got back to the Dat.’
Trooper Jack Luff, 31’s gunner, became the duckling’s unofficial custodian, naming it Fenton after the main character in Chickenman, a popular radio serial broadcast on US Armed Forces radio.
During the following fortnight, while 1 Troop remained at Baria, the duckling was Luff’s constant companion, following him everywhere, about one pace behind. Not long after, the PR people got wind of the story and, as sometimes happens, the ‘facts’ became slightly distorted. The headline which appeared in a number of papers was ‘Denton, the Dynamic Duckling’. “
So, Denton was a name invented to make a good headline. But there is more to the story … the name of the main character in Chickenman [ie. the Winged Warrior] was actually Benton. Jack had presumably misheard the American accent and called the duckling ‘Fenton’ (which, after the newspaper ‘licence’, became Denton).
History is such a rich font of knowledge.
———————————————————————————————————————-
14 February 2020
Centurions in the Australian Army
A recent post on another site suggested that Australia’s early Cents were fitted with 17 pounder guns. This is incorrect. Another fallacy more often seen is the modification which resulted in the Cent being converted from Mk 3 to Mk 5. Finally, few realise that the Cent used by Australia was unique in the world. It didn’t fit with any of the ‘official’ marks of Centurion and a different classification was used to described it. An extract from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘ (less footnotes) is copied below and after that a list of the ‘official marks from Wikipedia.
“Centurions employed in Vietnam had undergone a number of modifications since they were first produced in the UK in 1945. Mark 1 and Mark 2 tanks were armed with a seventeen-pounder (76mm) gun. Australia’s first 60 tanks, which started to arrive in late 1951, were Mark 3 vehicles which mounted a twenty-pounder (84mm) gun, together with a 7.92mm Besa coaxial machine gun. Subsequent orders, amounting to 57 tanks and six ARV Mark 2s, were delivered between 1956 and 1958.
Tanks in the later orders were built to Mark 5 standard prior to shipping. The essential difference between the Mark 3 and Mark 5 vehicles was the replacement of the Besa with a more reliable .30cal Browning. The tanks which had earlier arrived in Australia as Mark 3s were modified in the late 1950s/early 1960s to match the Mark 5 criteria.
The tanks sent to Vietnam had been further modified to Mark 5/1 standard by fitting applique armour to the glacis plate, the sloping frontal armour forward of the driver. The uparmour kit was designed in the UK in response to NATO concerns about developments in anti-armour weapons; it increased the thickness of the glacis plate from 76mm to 120mm.
The base overhaul program that the tanks went through prior to Vietnam involved a number of modifications. As well as the rear-mounted fuel tank, vehicles were fitted for IR night driving and gunnery equipment. The most significant change to the vehicles on which crews had trained up until that time, was the installation of the .50cal RMG. The modification also involved new commander’s and gunner’s sights.
The designation Mark 5/1 (Aust) was used to differentiate the unique Australian build standard (uparmoured twenty-pounder plus RMG and IR) from that of other marks of Centurion.
Browning machine guns fitted to coaxial and commander’s cupola mounts, turret rear escape door deleted, turret roof reshaped, deletion of 2″ bomb thrower in turret roof, extra stowage bin on glacis, addition of guide roller in track run, vehicle weight 51 tons.
When this was posted on another website, someone responded to say: They have missed two incidents, one on the 18th when [callsign] 22 was hit on the left side just behind the driver by an RPG. Second one they probably don’t want known … the latter was described in my book in this way:
“The circumstances under which 11 Platoon D Company (as they were later identified) were first seen, made recognition impossible. For a start, they were on high ground with the sun behind them. To those in the 2 Troop ‘carriers’ 600m away, the figures moving among the rocks on the hill ‘appeared to be wearing black and looked very suspicious indeed’. ‘We continued to observe for some time, until we received clearance from Task Force to engage; we were told that there were no “friendlies” at that grid; this was confirmed twice [by the APC Troop Leader] before we engaged.’ The blue-on-blue incident resulted in D Company suffering ten WIA.”
But the ‘back’ story is even worse. A Footnote to the above:
“The incident attracted considerable media and (as a consequence) political attention. Details of a regrettable saga in which the ‘facts’ of the incident were made to fit the politics, can be found in Hall, Combat Battalion, p. 182.”
It wasn’t appropriate for Canister On! FIRE! to go into detail about this, but, in essence, the investigation was ‘modified’ to indicate that the casualties were caused by the enemy.
One might think that this par for the course as far as politics is concerned. Of more concern is the fact the opportunity to learn lessons from the incident was lost … no attempt to improve CP procedures, frequency of locstat updates, or communication protocols. How many more casualties might have been caused as a result?
What happened was that, because of the politics involved, HQ 1ATF decided that no investigation was necessary. A report was sent to AHQ Canberra which said that 11 Platoon had come under fire from the enemy and that any casualties were the result of supporting fire. The location of 11 Pl at the time was moved to fit with the operations map at the time.
Openness and transparency … why do people think that they can get away with ‘covering things up’?
——————————————————————————————————————————
12 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 7
Following on from yesterday and blog posts immediately preceding that, the second half of the submission sent to the Minister on 7 Feb 17 is copied below. The RAAC Corporation claims (see 10 Feb Blog) that it made a separate submission a month later and, as a result, a “legislative anomaly” was found which enabled its submission to be approved to have the Battlehonour emblazoned. Posts 1-5 on this topic have investigated why it is that the RAAC Corporation will not allow anyone to see their ‘submission’.
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. (Part 2)
Precedent for Re-evaluating Convention. A precedent has been set in which the Australian Army acted contrary to Imperial directions and authorised a battle honour to be emblazoned because of the extent of bravery displayed by Australian soldiers in the action concerned. Those soldiers, it was decided, had earned the right for their sacrifice and gallantry to be formally acknowledged. There is no doubt that gallant efforts of those who fought at FSBs Coral and Balmoral deserve no less.
Nature of Modern Warfare. As the Second World War was different to the First World War, so are modern conflicts different again. Why should the extent to which today’s soldiers can be honoured be based on circumstances from over 70 years ago?
Why should those former members of 1st Armoured Regiment who fought and earned three battle honours for Vietnam, only be able to see two of them emblazoned on their Regiment’s Standard? Why should members of that Regiment today, not be able to fully appreciate the significance of all the battle honours their forebears were awarded?
Wider Implications. What would be the implications of endorsing the existing provisions of DI (A) Admin 38-3? Three more battle honours would be able to be emblazoned on the Colours of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Guidon of 3rd Cavalry Regiment; one more battle honour would be able to be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment.
Timing. The emblazing should carried out as soon as possible. It will further boost unit morale, provide enhanced public profile of the gallantry of soldiers who fought during those iconic battles, and boost the public profile of Army’s heritage. Furthermore, for the ever decreasing numbers of veterans who participated in the battles and are still alive, it will be seen as public acknowledgement of their job well done before they all succumb to the ravages of time.
Conclusion.
Today’s Army fights different wars to those of 1914-18 and 1939-45. The basis on which the gallantry of today’s soldiers is honoured should be determined on current circumstances, not those of more than 70 years ago.
The existing provisions of DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions,which state that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned on colours etc, should be strongly endorsed, rather than any thought being given to reverting to benchmarks set last century. The Battle Honour, “Coral-Balmoral”, should be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment as soon as possible.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
Footnote: So ends this series of posts related to secrecy imposed by the RAAC Corporation on their ‘lobbying’ of Government and the public statements made about this. The Information Commissioner advises that the third party involved made at least three submissions to her Office claiming personal privacy provisions prevented disclosure (the initial reasons advanced by Defence having been discounted). I have no interest in any such personal information and have asked that I receive the document with personal info blacked out, even if it means receiving a totally blacked out page. If this request is denied, there are review mechanisms still be be employed.
———————————————————————————————————————–
11 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 6
Following on from yesterday and blog posts immediately preceding that, the first half of the submission sent to the Minister on 7 Feb 17 is copied below. The RAAC Corporation claims (see yesterday’s Blog) that it made a separate submission a month later and, as a result, a “legislative anomaly” was found which enabled its submission to be approved to have the Battlehonour emblazoned. Posts 1-5 on this topic have investigated why it is that the RAAC Corporation will not allow anyone to see their ‘submission’.
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the1st Armoured Regiment Standard. (Part 1)
Background.
Following the First World War, a British/Imperial Battle Honours Committee (BHC) decided that emblazoned battle honours should be limited to ten per regiment (because of constraints on the available space on colours etc). The same constraint was imposed following the Second World War.
Because of differences in scale, the limit set for Korean War battle honours was one theatre honour and one battle honour. This decision was initially accepted by the Australian Army. Twenty years later, however, it was considered that the Battleof Maryang Sanwas so important that the BHC edict would no longer be complied with — both Maryang Sanand KapyongBattle Honours would be emblazoned.
The limit of one theatre honour and two battle honours was maintained by the Vietnam BHC.
1st Armoured Regiment was awarded three battle honours for Vietnam, but only Hat Dichand Binh Baare emblazoned on its Standard. Despite Coral-Balmoral’s overwhelming importance in terms of the Australian Army’s military heritage, the battle honour is not able to be emblazoned.
Is it not time to question a policy founded in the days of Empire which denies an Australian unit the right to proudly proclaim all its battle honours?
Aim
This submission argues that the use of the First and Second World Wars as benchmarks on which to base the number of battle honours able to be emblazoned on the colours etc of today’s Army, is outdated and completely inappropriate in terms of acknowledging the service to the Nation selflessly given by Australian soldiers in modern conflicts.
Justification.
Authorisation Already Exits. It could be argued that there is no need for this submission. Current Army policy as set out in DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions, states that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned.
It has been suggested, however, that this is a ‘known error’. If so, it raises the question: why has no amendment been made? Presumably this is a matter that is already recognised as requiring further consideration in light of the very different circumstances in which today’s Army operates.
This is not the only reference at variance with a limit of two battle honours. Christopher Jobson spent thirty years in the Army. Prior to retirement, he was RSM Ceremony and Protocol and an acknowledged expert in the subject. In his 2009 book,‘Looking Forward, Looking Back : Customs and Traditions of the Australian Army’, he states that there is no limit on the number of battle honours that can be emblazoned on colours etc today.
———————————————————————————————————————–
10 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 5
Given the background explained in the previous posts, it’s understandable that I was surprised by the following announcement:
“On 10th March 2017 the Corporation lodged a submission on behalf 1AR through the Corps to have the BH Coral-Balmoral emblazoned on the 1Armd Regt Standard. A legislative anomaly was found and used to great effect. The submission was approved on 28/3/17 and action was commenced by AHQ to correct the error and make it consistent the relevant D-I(A).” Chairman, RAAC Corporation
The Freedom of Information Saga Parts 1-4 have dealt with the inexplicable case of the RAAC Corporation refusing to make public its submission.
The letter below from the Minister is relevant. Of course, it seems that I need not have written to him, as the RAAC Corporation had already ‘sorted’ the matter.
“Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Parliament House CANBERRA ACT 2600 Dear Lieutenant Colonel Cameron Thank you for your letters of 7 and 22 February 2017 seeking approval to display the Battle Honour for Coral-Balmoral and to amend the date of the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment’s Standard [letter of 22 Feb 17]. I am pleased to advise there is no administrative impediment to meeting both of your requests. I have been assured that Army Headquarters, in conjunction with the 1st Armoured Regiment and the Royal Australian Armoured Corp Cooperation, will endeavour to have the emblazing amended and completed by the 49th anniversary of Coral-Balmoral at the end of May 2017. Previous Army protocols !imited the number of Theatre Honours, Battle Honours and Honour Distinctions that may be emblazoned on Unit and Corps Colours, Standards or Guidons to two Battle Honours against each Theatre Honour. As you may be aware, this restriction was reviewed and amended by the then Chief of Army on 1 February 2013. Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention and I trust this information is of assistance to you.” [Pity about the reference to the “Royal Australian Armoured Corp Cooperation”.]
“The Government has refused to release the Gaetjens report which purportedly exonerates the former Minister, Bridget McKenzie, and thereby the Government from charges of political bias in the distribution of the Community Sport Infrastructure grants. But why this refusal to release the report – the only obvious answer is because the report cannot stand-up to public scrutiny.”Another matter of failure to be open and transparent …
The background has been provided in the previous three Blog posts.
To summarise, the following reasons have been given ‘officially’ for NOT disclosing the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence, ‘supposedly supporting mine to the Minister’:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it;
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.
Disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
Disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
The following public interest factors were ‘officially’ regarded as being in favour of disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
What was the reasoning considered by the Information Commissioner in relation to the release of the RAAC Corporation’s submission (‘supposedly’ supporting mine?)
In Favour:
“I agree with the Department and the applicant that disclosure of the document would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that may have informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision making, and would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.”
Against:
“I am satisfied that the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation who signed the submission in the document at issue is the personal information of an individual … I am also satisfied that the specific content of the submission or representation by the third party ex-service organisation says something about the individual officer who signed the document in the circumstances of this case and constitutes their personal information.”
“…. it was found that: a. the specific personal information relating to the individuals is not well known to the greater public; b. the specific personal information is not readily available from publicly accessible sources; and c. the third party has objected to the release of the specific personal information.”
“… the third party has made submissions objecting to disclosure of the document at issue and explaining their particular personal circumstances relevant to their objection to disclosure of the specific personal information in the document at issue.
“… it is apparent that disclosure of the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation and the submission or representation made by the individual officer on behalf of the third party ex-service organisation would be an unreasonable disclosure of personal information, having regard to the personal circumstances of the third party individual.”
Conclusion. When I was called by the OAIC to be advised of the outcome, I reiterated that I had no interest at all in personal details of anyone involved in authoring, or associated with, the document. I was informed that if this information was ‘blacked out’ that there would be nothing left of the document, ie. as had been stated earlier” Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless”.
So, the personal information of an officer (or officers) of the RAAC Corporation, writing a submission to Defence, ‘supposedly’ in support of mine to the Minister, takes up so much space that anything left would be meaningless. I think that I can imagine what the RAAC Corporation submission to Defence might have involved. I ask again, why is there so much secrecy associated with actions by an organisation on behalf of its members? Why can’t there be openness and transparency?
Why can’t matters of relevance to the RAAC be put above individual interests? What is there that the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence ‘supposedly in support of mine to the Minister’, could possibly say “about the individual officer who signed the document” which meant that it couldn’t be released? More tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 3
As stated below, the end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation supposedly acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification … a review. The third part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below. Bear with me, the ending is sensational! All will be revealed tomorrow.
The Applicant’s Response
Defence, in conjunction with the RAAC Corporation, have provided twelve different reasons that supposedly justify not releasing the document in question. In a process of rejection, followed by provision of more time, after more time, for Defence to reconsider … OIAC have rejected nine of these reasons. Turning to what’s left:
Will Defence have difficulty in obtaining similar information in the future if the document is released? I wrote to the Minister; the Minister’s Office asked for Defence’s position; Defence asked the RAAC Corporation what their position was; the RAAC Corporation provided this information to Defence. The Minister approved my (two) requests. The RAAC Corporation refuses to allow anyone to see their submission (maybe it was positive, as the RAAC Corporation claim; maybe it was negative). If the document was to be released, would, say, the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation or the 1 Field Squadron RAE Association, withhold information that Defence requested from them because of it?
Of course NOT. Integrity is crucial to their membership. A document written by their Executive on behalf of their members, would be made available to their members so requested. How could it not be, if the association had any integrity? I can obtain statements to this effect from a range of ESOs if need be.
Will an individual or group of individuals be harmed by release of the document? Defence have previously stated that the “welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy”. This is a very definitive statement; not ‘may be placed in jeopardy’, but “will be placed in jeopardy’. Presumably it is the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who is being referred to. It was he who stated that he’d prepared a submission for Defence supporting mine to the Minister, but without “having read anybody else’s including yours!”. As advised earlier, I can’t imagine that anyone could author a supporting submission, without reading the submission that it was supporting. Of course, if the submission was opposed to, rather than ‘in support of’, this could explain why release of the document could affect the author’s welfare (if he’d stated the opposite). This would also be the case if the RAAC Corporation’s ‘submission’ was a copy of mine (when he’s stated he hadn’t seen it.)
But is this justification for not releasing the document? If I was being sentenced and stated that if I was sent to jail, I would kill myself … should the Judge take this into account? Of course, not … if His or Her Honour did, there wouldn’t be anyone in jail.
Will disclosure of the document prejudice the management function of an agency? The ‘agency’ in question is the Department of Defence. Defence has 65,000 employees. Is their management likely to be affected by the release of a document supporting an application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours and a correction to an error on a unit’s Standard? The opposite is much more likely. As the Case Officer has stated:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Conclusion. I ask that the OAIC consider the above.
NOTE: I’ve been asked to remove the RAAC Corporation logo as I’d have permission from the Army Branding Agency. Use of the logo in an article about the Corporation is permitted, however.
———————————————————————————————————————-
7 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 2
As stated below, the end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation supposedly acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification … a review. The second part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below. Bear with me, the ending is sensational!
“The OAIC Appeal
On appeal, Defence stated the primary reasons were:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
When OAIC asked Defence to provide further justification, Defence provided two NEW reasons for not releasing the document:
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it; and
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
OAIC informed Defence that this was not adequate justification. Defence responded to say:
“As stated, … in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
OAIC informed Defence that this had nothing whatsoever to do with the document under consideration. More time was allowed for Defence to consult a ‘third party’. Defence then contended that:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
The OAIC Case Officer’s Position
As the case officer, you believe that “disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the Department’s operations since:
disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
In the Case Officer’s opinion, arguments for and against release of the document are:
In Favour. In this case, the following public interest factors favour disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Against: In this case, the following public interest factors weigh against disclosure of the document:
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
6 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 1
The end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification, a review. The first part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below:
“The Blog on 11 Sep 19 stated that the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) advised the day before that: “This matter is awaiting a decision by the Information Commissioner under s 55K of the FOI Act to affirm, vary or set aside and substitute the internal review decision of the Department of 26 June 2017”.
After two years, it seemed as if the matter was finally going to be resolved. Background is copied below from an earlier post.
The Latest Development: On 13 Nov 19, the OAIC desk officer advised “I would be grateful for your further assistance in the resolution of this Information Commissioner review … In relation to the material that remains within scope of this IC review, I invite you to please confirm whether you seek access to the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue. I would be grateful for your response by 20 November 2019”
My response stated inter alia:
I have no interest in “the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue”. My only interest is with respect to information provided to the Minister which may have had the potential to influence his decision in relation to my submission to him … surely this the right of each and every Australian?.
I don’t mean any disrespect to the OAIC here … simply trying to express my purpose in pursuing this matter, ie. the principle that if a Minister is asked to decide on a matter, then submissions made to him about it by other parties should be available to all … otherwise how is public confidence to be maintained?
——————————————————————————————
Background. [Although the reasons given for not releasing the material sought, seem unbelievable … it is a true account!]
In 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. I had hoped that the 1AR Association, together with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation (RAACC), might take the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1Armd Regt approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the other units involved.)
After years of inaction, in February 2017 I personally wrote to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, asking that the current limitation imposed on emblazoning Vietnam battle honours on unit colours etc, be reviewed. (I also requested that he approve a correction being made to the Theatre Honour emblazoned on the Standard.) The RAACC subsequently posted messages on social media sites advising that it had made a supporting submission.
I thanked the RAACC Chairman and asked if the Corporation’s submission was any different to mine. The Chairman responded to say: “I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours!”.
I was surprised at this, as I had automatically assumed that anyone preparing a supporting submission, would refer to the content of the submission that they were supporting. (Additionally, my submission had been available publicly since it was posted off.)
I then asked if I could see the Corporation’s submission, so as to know how it compared with the information I provided to the Minister. Surprisingly, the RAACC Chairman refused to allow me to see the submission that the Corporation had made in support of mine (no reason was given).
I was concerned that, if my submission was not approved, it might be because of information presented by the RAACC. I therefore wrote to Defence to “seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the RAACC submission made in support of my request to Minister Tehan”.
The Defence Response.
Defence initially provided the following reasons for not disclosing the document:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
6 February 2020
‘Right Sizing’ the Abrams Tank Fleet
Photo: Google images
The following email has been sent to Army’s Land Power Forum:
Dear Sir/Madam,
The 2/14 LHR (QMI) Assn published an article in its latest newsletter, part of which stated:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.”
I hope the Land Power Forum might be the right contact for this.
The background information I seek is the situation regarding the ‘right sizing’ of the Abrams tank fleet.
The following two articles provide cogent argument that an operational deficiency currently exists and the Abrams tank fleet must be increased in number to overcome it.
The Immediate Past Head of Corps, RAAC, advises that:
“When balanced against the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore unavailable. This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of the tank capability.” The former Director, AFV Systems, advises that: “…when there are three active squadrons, there have to be tanks in maintenance and being repaired, tanks kept as spares, tanks used for training and tanks being used. When you have a fleet of twelve submarines, there are only two at sea. It’s the same with these big tanks – you need the right fleet size to generate three squadrons. The first task of the current Land project is to “right-size” the fleet to 90 [from the current 59], which he says is uncontroversial and was acknowledged by the then-Australian government and the US government when the M1 was originally acquired as a foreign military sale”.
Despite the facts above, there seems to be no intention under LAND 907 to acquire additional tanks.
What is the current and future planning in this respect?
If this is not the right address to seek an update on this matter, could you please forward on as appropriate. If, on the other hand, Army has changed its published policy about providing background information to facilitate debate of capability issues, could you please let me know.
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 4
The motto of 1 Fd Sqn in Vietnam was ‘Follow the Sapper’. Sappers worked in front of the infantry and the armour to find and deal with mines, explosives, trip wires, caches, and booby traps … using their eyes, bayonets and electronic detectors. Sappers did not get the opportunity to look for enemy soldiers who might be looking for them. They had to concentrate on the ‘ping’ from their mine-detector or see that tiny sign or that scratch in the dirt that shouldn’t be there. Sappers relied on their mates coming behind to look after their backs. It took a special kind of gallantry to work like that, but it was taken for granted because it was a Sapper’s job.
Sappers went down holes in the ground … tunnels and bunkers where the risk of impalement, being shot while deep underground in inky blackness or being asphyxiated in the depths of a shaft, drive or sap came at a premium in nightmarish circumstances. But they did it anyway. That took a special kind of gallantry that is impossible to describe. Sappers defused bombs, explosive devices and mines. Some of these were fitted with anti-handling devices or demonish ‘double-bluff’ devices that were designed to kill them. Sappers knew this, but pressed on anyway. That was a Sapper’s job – and it took a special kind of gallantry. Sappers were also required to be prepared at all times to function in their secondary role, ie. to fight as infantrymen in attacks, ambushes, and defended localities.
Is it right therefore, that an infantry unit be recognised for its gallantry, when the AFV crews and sappers who continually supported it during combined arms operations, are not?
The Operations
1ATF conducted 28 operations during the period 28 November 1969 to 29 October 1970 (when the Unit Citation was presented). 8RAR was involved in 12 of them. (Not “almost every military operation” as stated in the Citation.)
An analysis of the support provided to 8RAR in each of its operations is contained in the attached Annexes. References are made to the following publications: The History of Tanks in Vietnam (‘Canister! On! Fire!); The History of APCs (‘When the Scorpion Stings); The History of Infantry (‘A Duty Done); and The History of 8RAR (‘The Grey Eight’). Quotations have also been included from Commanders’ Diaries. (Note the B Sqn 3 Cav diaries detail each APC element op con to 8RAR on a day by day basis and copies of these can be provided if required; many of the entries of other diaries record troops op con to 8RAR simply as grid references … these have not been copied.)
Conclusion
The RVN Citation awarded to 8RAR concludes that “the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force contributed significantly to the anti-communist struggle of the Armd Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam, thereby bringing great credit to the Royal Australian Armed Forces”. As clearly evidenced above, 8RAR did not make their contribution in isolation. They were supported every step of the way by tanks, APCs and sappers.
Without the involvement of these supporting arms at the forefront of actions against the enemy, 8RAR would not have achieved the operational outcomes it is credited with, and as a result, would not have been awarded the Cross of Gallantry With Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation. A combined arms team is exactly that …. a combination of complementary capabilities which creates a winning force on the battlefield. No one part is pre-eminent.
A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn, RAE deserve to be acknowledged for their role in providing support to 8RAR and for the contribution they made to the operational outcomes which led to 8RAR’s recognition. The DHAAT is asked to extend eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation accordingly.
Attachments
‘A Testing Two Days for Sapper Miller’. (Tunnel Rats Newsletter)
Operation Atherton
Operation Keperra
Operation Hammersley
Operation Hamilton
Operation Phoi Hop
Operation Concrete I
Operation Nudgee
Operation Cung Chung I
Operation Petrie
Operation Decade
Operation Cung Chung II
Operation Cung Chung III
———————————————————————————————————————-
3 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 3
Photo: AWM
The Engineers. “In all of our operations, engineer splinter teams, each consisting of two field engineers from 1st Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers, were deployed either as a component of rifle companies or with Battalion Headquarters, or on stand-by to move forward if required. The splinter teams were frequently needed, particularly during operations in southern Phuoc Tuy Province where a considerable mine threat existed. The unenviable task of neutralising these mines fell to the splinter teams. They were never found to be lacking and displayed courage and skill in the execution of their work”.
It’s of significance to note in the extracts above, that supporting arms were not just sitting idle when not engaging the enemy or searching enemy installations. Rather, they were ambushing (both night and day, sometimes in conjunction with infantry and sometimes in the same position for days at a time); patrolling in the areas of operations; defending fire support bases, helping to force the enemy into 8RAR’s ambushes; and standing-by as ready reaction forces.
What’s it Mean to be a Tunnel Rat?
This has been well described in the newsletter of 1 Fd Sqn ‘The Tunnel Rats’ in relation to the Military Medal awarded to Sapper Gary Miller for his bravery while supporting 8RAR during Operation Hamilton. The article is attached.
What’s Involved in Being Part of a Ready Reaction Force?
This has been well described in the ‘When the Scorpion Stings: The History of 3 Cav Regt in Vietnam’.
“One of the continuing tasks of the [APC] Squadron was supporting the Task Force’s Ready Reaction Force. Here the APCs were charged with dealing with any emergency situation that might arise. This role was regarded very seriously by the troops. The Squadron had its own siren, which when activated would see members assigned to the Ready Reaction Force racing from their huts, in specially issued flying suits (for easy dress), down to where the carriers were parked. The Squadron has prided itself on its ability to have its APCs outside the gates of Nui Dat within three minutes of the warning siren being activated. The APCs’ engines would be started as soon as the driver was in his compartment, and the crew commander would activate the radios and load the guns as the carriers reversed away from the high earthen wall where the carriers were parked. The troop, in tactical operation order, would then race at full speed out of the Squadron’s lines … There was perhaps no more inspiring or reassuring sight than a troop of carriers , in line-ahead formation, racing at full speed out of the gates of Nui Dat and onto Route 2 in response to a call for assistance.” (WSS p241-243)
How Were They Gallant?
Any AFV driver who sets out on an operation, knowing that he might detonate an anti-tank mine which could totally destroy his vehicle … is gallant, ie. he is doing his assigned task without having any control over the events that might occur. This is similar to the infantryman who moves forward, despite the possibility of stepping on a mine or being shot by the enemy.
Any AFV crewman who sets out on an operation, knowing that his vehicle might detonate a mine, be penetrated by an RPG, or be the target of a sniper or satchel charge, is gallant. This is similar to an infantryman who knows that he might enter an ambush at any time.
Any crewman who is part of an AFV ambush at night, without any night vision devices or other means of detecting the enemy’s approach, and without any means of stopping their vehicle emitting fuel smells and making sounds when metal parts cool, is gallant. This is a little different to an infantryman, who has a well proven ground hugging procedure for the same thing.
It’s been often said, that infantry felt that they were lucky if they were well away from AFVs, because the AFVs drew the enemy’s fire. It follows that AFV crews were particularly gallant when they led assaults on enemy defended positions … given that they were vulnerable to mines, anti-armour projectiles, snipers, satchel charges and even small arms fire (as they weren’t able to close down).
In addition to the above, AFVs provided the core of ready reaction forces. On call out, everything was subordinate to getting to the infantry as quickly as possible. It was a common tactic of the enemy to lure reaction forces onto a mine or into an ambush. AFV crewmen were gallant in putting these thoughts out of their minds as they rushed to their destination in order to save lives.
———————————————————————————————————————–
2 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 2
Photo: AWM
The first part of a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (12 Dec 19):
The Support Provided to 8RAR by Other Arms
All operations conducted by 8RAR in Vietnam were combined arms operations. Tanks and APCs provided classic armoured support: close fire support in attack; armoured mobility; assisting infantry operations by ambushing and patrolling; protecting Fire Support Bases (FSBs); and providing an on-call ready reaction force capability (for fire support, enemy cut-off, deployment of reserves, and ammunition resupply) at all times. Field engineers accompanied both 8RAR companies and tank and APC troops on each and every operation. The sappers took the lead whenever booby traps were suspected or enemy facilities such as bunkers and tunnels, had to be searched and/or destroyed. They were also the first responders whenever a mine incident occurred. .8RAR Operational Instructions made it clear what the sappers were expected to do: “All combat engineer teams to be prepared to locate and destroy or neutralize mines and booby traps and search tunnels”.
While providing this support to 8RAR operations, armoured vehicle crews and engineers suffered five KIA and 37 WIA. These figures were not included with 8RAR ‘s casualties in the HQ 1 ATF proposal for the RVN Unit Citation. (Paradoxically, a significant number of enemy casualties attributable to supporting arms, primarily during Operation Hammersley, were credited to 8RAR in the proposal.) While providing support to 8RAR, members of supporting arms were awarded two Military Medals and Mentioned in Dispatches eight times. [It should be noted that on a per capita basis per unit, 3 Cav Regt suffered more casualties than any other.]
8RAR’s own history of its time in Vietnam describes the contribution of supporting arms in the following manner:
The Tanks. “The support provided by our tanks was magnificent. It was during this operation [Hammersley] that fire support from the tanks continued, although every vehicle working with 8th Battalion was damaged either by enemy RPG fire or enemy mines. In addition to the provision of fire support, the tanks were particularly valuable in three other roles …
First was their use as a deterrent. Hoi Chanhs have told of the terror felt by the enemy when they are opposed by tanks. On a number of occasions this was put to good use by the Commanding Officer when he used most of the Battalion to ambush egress routes out of an enemy occupied area: the tanks then carried out reconnaissance in force within the ambushed area. The enemy fled into the waiting ambushes. Second was the destruction of enemy bunkers not only by fire but also by squashing under the tank tracks. Finally, and probably of greatest importance, was the capability of the tanks to precede infantry moving in closed down APCs in areas which may have been mined by the enemy. 8RAR and supporting armoured corps soldiers suffered no casualties while moving in this manner, although during Operation Hammersley alone, 30 mines were detonated by the armoured vehicles”.
The APCs. “The tracked armoured personnel carriers of B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment provided invaluable cavalry and APC support to 8RAR during every operation in which the Battalion participated. The forms of support were varied, the most common being rapid and secure insertion of infantry into areas of operation. Other tasks included the provision of accurate and sustained machine gun fire support, armoured escort during truck movement, command vehicles from which Battalion Headquarters could operate and mobile base plates for the mortar platoon.
The APCs were also a vital force in the Commanding Officer’s plans for reinforcement of half platoon and platoon ambushes which may have come into heavy contact while ambushing around the villages. The concept called for cavalry to reinforce the infantry, to effect resupply of ammunition [both during and immediately after contacts] and to assist in battlefield clearance.
————————————————————————————————————————
1 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 1
The first part of a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (12 Dec 19):
Background.
In 1970, the US Army had two unit awards: the Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Presidential Unit Citation. The Army of the RVN had only one such award: the Cross of Gallantry. This could only be awarded to a unit if it displayed specific deeds of valour or heroic conduct while fighting the enemy.
The US Army presented AATTV with a Meritorious Unit Commendation at a parade on 9 Feb 70. Soon after, the RVN Commanding General for that part of South Vietnam in which the Australian Task Force was located, made it known that he wanted to present to either the Task Force, or one of its units, an award to recognise Australia’s contribution to the War.
On 6 Mar 70, this same Vietnamese general wrote the US Commanding General and asked that his congratulations be extended to the Commander 1ATF and the “meritorious Australian servicemen” involved in Operation Hammersley.
On 22 Apr 70, it was announced that 8RAR would not be replaced at the end of its tour. The Australian withdrawal was starting.
As the end of the year neared, the idea of a unit award became more urgent. As 1ATF wasn’t a ‘unit’ per se, it was decided that the 8RAR would be nominated for “a VN Unit Award”. A citation proposal was signed by Brigadier Henderson (Commander 1ATF) on 10 Sep 70. It listed all 8RAR’s operations up to that time and emphasised the Battalion’s success in combat.
The RVN Army HQ revised the proposed citation by deleting the reference to other operations and emphasising Operation Hammersley. New material was included relating to civic action work and 8RAR’s contribution to the Pacification and Development program.
On 21 Oct 70, the Commander Australian Force Vietnam (Major General Fraser) was advised that the RVN wished to present 8RAR with a Meritorious Unit Citation. Two days later, he informed Army HQ in Canberra that the RVN wanted to present a “Meritorious Unit Citation” to 8RAR and that he had agreed to this. The signal went on to say “Bearing in mind the ceremonies attendant on the recent presentation of a US Unit Award [Meritorious Unit Commendation] to AATTV, it is politic to accept the above award in the manner of established precedent”.
The presentation to 8RAR was made during a parade on 29 Oct 70. Although it was referred to as a Meritorious Unit Citation (and this wording was included in the title of the Citation), it was based on the CGWP Unit Citation and used the same insignia and ‘Streamer’.
The fact that the Citation related primarily to Operation Hammersley and the Streamer was named ‘Minh Dam’ [the enemy’s name for their base which was attacked during Operation Hammersley], led the AWM and many others to refer to the Meritorious Unit Citation as “including the CGWP Unit Citation”, i.e. suggesting that there were two separate awards, the latter being for Operation Hammersley. There are numerous published references, even by the former Governor-General, Major General Michael Jeffery (himself an 8RAR company commander) which state that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its involvement in Operation Hammersley. The Official Historian for the Vietnam War attended the Hearing and stated that, to him, the wording of the Citation seemed to be referring to Operation Hammersley. In proof of the widespread confusion about the Citation and why it was awarded, the history of the Royal Australian Regiment in Vietnam (‘A Duty Done’, Fairhead) states: “8RAR was presented with the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Commendation primarily for its brilliant operation in the Long Hai Hills in February/March 1970”.
Unfortunately, no official documentation for the establishment of a Meritorious Unit Citation can be located. It is the belief of the Tribunal, therefore, that (i) it was the RVN CGWP Unit Citation which was awarded to 8RAR and (ii) this was for their entire service in Vietnam up until 29 October 1970, when it was presented.
It cannot be explained why 8RAR’s citation proposal was amended by the RVN to refer to the Battalion’s efforts to “reconstruct houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc”, even though the CGWP Unit Citation is awarded solely for acts of heroic conduct when fighting the enemy.
The contention that the RVN Commanding General III Corps was wanting to match his US counterpart in recognising the service of Australian units, and had ‘created’ an award to do this, cannot be substantiated without any proclamation of such an award being available. The fact that the RVN ‘created’ a Presidential Unit Citation at the same time (akin to that of the US) to award to 161 Bty RNZA, cannot be regarded as a precedent.
The Tribunal decided that, as the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for all 8RAR’s time in Vietnam, if 8RAR was supported by A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn during the operations involved, they might be eligible for the same award.
Both parties (i.e. the Applicant and Defence) were requested to provide a basis for such a decision along these lines.
———————————————————————————————————————–
31 January 2020.
1 Armd Regt Heritage
What is common to these badges?
What is different about this badge?
Showing the tank advancing into the mud is akin to flying the national flag upside down.
Surprisingly, however, this is an item in the 1 AR Assn Q Store being promoted for sale. I’ve emailed the C’tee to ask how the Assn can support such marketing?
It’s not just about the modern day 1 Armd Regt. Look at the beret above.
Description: Khaki heavy cloth beret with ‘Rising Sun’ badge and 2nd/1st Australian Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron colour patch.
Background: In April 1942, 2/1st Australian Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron was formed from a Light Independent Tank Squadron destined for Malaya but curtailed by the Japanese advance. In November 1942, 2/1st was part of an amalgamation of armoured units to provide men for the 2/4th Armoured Regiment. The 2/1st was reformed in September 1943 following the disbandment of the 1st Armoured Division.
Surely we’re good enough to maintain the traditions of those who have gone before?
———————————————————————————————————————–
30 January 2020
The 2 Cav Badge
Background.
The formation of 1 Cav Regt was announced in 1965; soon after this (according to ‘Digger History’) a competition was held to choose a basis on which to ‘model’ a unit badge; after an eagle was chosen, another competition was held to design a badge, won by Cpl Burgess in the Orderly Room; in 1967 the badge was received by the (now renamed) 2 Cav Regt. The 2 Cav Regt mascot (eagle) arrived in Oct 1967.
Trooper Glenn Darlington arrived at 2 Cav in November 1967 (recuperating from an injury at Canungra before going to Vietnam). While on light duties, he did a painting of the eagle carrying a lance (Glen had been a graphic designer before being called up). Soon after, on departure for Vietnam, he gave the painting to Cpl Burgess.
2 Cav Regt became a unit with Regimental HQ in November 1970.
The Governor General wrote to the Queen (as a result of a request from Army) in November 1968 seeking approval for the design of a 2 Cav Regt badge (this letter is in the National Archives). The Army received approval in April 1969 (NAA again).
Was Trooper Darlington’s Painting the Basis for the Design?
I can’t imagine that the badge would have issued before the Queen’s approval (Apr 69). In March 1969, when Army had not received approval for the design, a letter was written to the GG querying the delay. The subsequent response advised that approval had been previously granted (but it seems that the letter had become lost within Defence). I believe that Army’s main concern at the time was to ensure that the badge would be available when 2 Cav was formed as a regiment (this turned out to be Nov 70).
The timing, Nov 67 (the Darlington painting) and Nov 68 (design finalised) seem to confirm that the painting was likely to have been a major influence in the design concept. Added to this is the fact that a troop leader at 2 Cav during 1967/68 has stated that there was no design competition for a badge during his time.
Trooper Darlington is currently working on a retrospective version of the painting that he did in 1967. A work in progress image is copied below.
———————————————————————————————————————-
29 January 2020
How Should AFVs be Displayed at the AWM? III
(Following from Blog posts of 22 and 25 January 2020.)
The latest 2/14 LHR (QMI) newsletter states that: “Brigadier Mills launched a key initiative in 2019 to ensure the Corps is capturing the living history of the Corps and the importance of recording the human history that we have in our serving and transitioned members, and the importance it plays in the educating new members of the corps. This initiative has been launched by the Corps RSM and established with co-operation of the Australian War Memorial. The HOC has also been actively engaged with the Australian History Unit in preparing for the eventual new Museum, this is looking particularly positive and something the Corps should look forward to.”
Isn’t amazing? The 1AR Assn state, ‘because they’re not a lobby organisation’, that they want nothing to do with the preparation of a paper to suggest to the AWM how AFVs should be displayed in the extended AWM… and at the same time the Head of Corps staff is saying that they’re doing exactly this very thing. (I think that they meant to say that the HOC has been actively engaged with the Army History Unit.)
Then again, isn’t this the role I’d hoped for, for ‘Armouredadvocates’… ie. advocating matters in a public forum such that they are taken up by others in positions of responsibility?
When I last spoke with the previous AWM Director (Nov 2109) … he said ‘I tell my curators everyday, that it’s not the exhibits that are important, it’s the stories that they help tell about the soldiers that operated them’. We might achieve something at the end of the day …. but why does it have to be so non-consultative? Why can’t the HOC simply ask RAAC veterans: ‘How do you think that AFV related exhibits should be displayed at the AWM?’ or ‘How can you contribute to the history of Australian mounted warfare?’. As mentioned previously on the Blog, however, it seems that ‘consultation’ rates very low on the list of priorities.
———————————————————————————————————————–
28 January 2020
Those Who Died of Their Wounds
Quite a few years ago, I contacted the AWM with respect to those who had died of their wounds (but after the ‘prescribed period’ of the war, thereby not being listed on the AWM Roll of Honour). The AWM responded to say that they were bound to only commemorate those who died within the ‘prescribed period’; but, they said, it is open to Associations to acknowledge those who died of their wounds after this period.
The 1 AR Assn now lists the following on its ‘In Memoriam’ page: Len Swarbrick; John Stone; Rod Bellot and Phil Barwick.
In raising the injustice of this issue, my last correspondence to the AWM took issue with their claim that the AWM commemorates ALL those who died serving their country in war. I pointed out the AWM only commemorated some of these, ie. those who died within the ‘prescribed period’ of a war.
The following article has been sent to me (sorry about the orientation)
Finally, DVA has acknowledged, that those who died of their wounds after the ‘prescribed period’ should be afforded the same rights as others whose death came within the ‘prescribed period’.
I’ve suggested that the 1AR Assn might like to represent the case to DVA for Len, John, and Rod (action is already being taken with respect to Phil). This would, of course, involve contacting NOK.
I’ve also informed them that
“It would seem that ‘John’ Stones was actually James Stones. The reason for including him on the 1 AR ‘In Memoriam’ list would seem to be that he might’ve served at 1 Armd Regt following his service in Vietnam during 1966-67 and his later service in Vietnam with 3 Cav in 1969. It would seem that from FDT in 1969, he could’ve been posted to either the tank sqn or the APC sqn.”
———————————————————————————————————————
27 January 2020
New RAAC Capabilities
How great it is to see the following report (extracts copied below) in the Dec 2019, 2/14 LHR (QMI) newsletter
REGIMENTAL ACTIVITY By WO2 Stuart Camac (Acting RSM)
At time of writing, the Regiment is absorbing members back from the deployment to Iraq and is posturing itself ready to roll out for the training year of 2020.
The soldiers of the Regiment are excited and incredibly motivated for the conversion training to commence on to the new Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) in the coming implementation of the L400 program. The Regiment will see many of its crews trained in the initial roll out with the additional training of crews commencing later in the year.
The new BOXER CRV is an exciting time as the generational jump of technology has all involved, from the Brigade Commander down, assessing and hypothesising how to employ, implement and fight with it. For the older soldiers in the Regiment that saw ASLAV come into service, we look to the future and see amazing opportunities for training design and live fire manoeuvre activity prospects that will place the Regiment at the cutting edge of how Army views the RAAC and what we can achieve.
Nested directly with the new CRV is our evolving employment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) that continuously prove to be game changers in how the Cavalry Troop operates. From MILSPEC UAS to off the shelf solutions, the capability now gives the Reconnaissance troop the ability to gain an increased situational awareness within the battle space that is far superior to operating without it.
Even better was the following quote, part of a LAND 400 update:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.”
This is an offer to be taken up (I wonder if it will prove to be true?) … more to follow.
———————————————————————————————————————
26 Australia 2020
What Are THE Questions to be Answered in 2020?
Will these matters of significance to the RAAC, the Army, and the Nation be addressed and the answers made clear?
Will the Abrams fleet be increased by 90 to be ‘right sized’?
Will the role of the RAAC ARES in a defence emergency be made known?
Will the allocation of tanks to the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade be increased?
Will members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation?
Will RAAC ARES units be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare?
Will serving RAAC personnel be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense?
Will all information panels re RAAC exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery at the AWM and audio-visual narratives be correct?
Will wars in which Australia participated no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day?
Will oral history interviews be conducted with those who have crewed the different tanks used by the Australian Army, so that their experience might be recorded before they all pass away (and only the tanks are left)?
Will a system of Operational Analysis (OA) be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience, which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated?
Will First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, be commemorated by the AWM?
Note: These are just some of the goals set out at Part 7 of the Intro above.
———————————————————————————————————————–
25 January 2020
How Should AFVs be Displayed at the AWM? II
Following on from 22 January, support is copied below:
“To add to this proposal,
I visited the AWM in November and we had a small group visit organised at 0930 for us by a friend who happens to be a tour guide there. When we entered the “Post ’45” exhibit, there staring me in the face is one of our cars. I was asked by this friend to give our small group a brief as I could relate personal experiences and how we operated. I tried to keep it as simple and as short as possible. 30 minutes later the small group had expanded to over 60 people and questions were coming thick and fast. I was asked about my particular incident and yes Dick you are correct, it became a little emotional for me and a couple of vets families. My short brief lasted over 40 minutes . I was a tad embarrassed at the round of applause given to me. I left the building and went over to Poppy’s for a brew and was confronted by the entire patrons all asking extra questions. I managed to leave the AWN at about 1630 with a very sore arm from so many handshakes, Very moving.
So yes Bruce a great idea, people like to hear/read operational experiences not just the statistical details of the vehicle.”
I responded by saying:
“I can well imagine what you describe. I was involved with a reunion of our Portsea class and a AWM guide was leading a tour. When we got to the Vietnam Gallery and the barrel of Stan Hanuszewicz’s tank (RPG hit muzzle, bent barrel blocking the bore, Stan fired a solid shot round, blasted the end off the barrel and kept firing canister … having himself been wounded) one of the Class said that I might be able to add some info. The tour guide was really pleased as she had no idea as to the circumstances.
I’ve been involved as part of a team trying to get recognition for Operation Hammersley (decision expected soon). The tank squadron commander explained that the TF Commander who signed the Citation for 8RAR told him: “ Jack you armoured soldiers are not really brave because unlike the infantry who only show their shirtfronts to the enemy (pulls my shirt) you have armoured protection”. Jack went on to say: ‘This was the attitude prevalent. No matter how much cooperation and courage was exerted, you were NOT brave’.
This thinking is represented in some of the AWM exhibits. One states that ‘Tanks [in Vietnam] were nearly imperious to most enemy weapons’, giving the impression that crews operated inside a totally protected cocoon. I’ve pointed out that tanks were NOT imperious to: 57/75mm RCLs; RPG2/7s; HMGs; satchel charges; snipers; and mines. The thinking is entrenched, however.”
————————————————————————————————————————-
24 January 2020
The Missing Log Books
Oh no … not again, some might say.
The following post is from another site:
“Someone help me out here – 92A being recovered after sustaining mine damage ? I think this is the dozer currently
sitting outside the Off’s / Sgt’s mess at the SOA. The Cent that fired the first shot in anger in SVN. 169079 ???”
One of the reasons that I raised the matter of the Centurion log books which mysteriously went missing from the Tank Museum, is the fact that one of them is for Centurion ARN 169106. This is the RAAC’s most ‘historic’ tank; currently outside the Mess at SOA.
It was the first to fire a main armament round in action, the first to detonate an anti-tank mine and the first to be penetrated by an RPG. Each of these three actions represent events of significance in the history of the RAAC (but the primary source document is presumably in the hands of a private collector whose selfishness knows no bounds). Re the RPG penetration, if you get up on the hull, you can see where the RPG hit (and from what direction it came), initiating the Battle of Binh Ba,
Despite all this … the log book simply went ‘missing’. An extract from it is referred to in my book. Mr Cecil, who provided the info, has stated that he transcribed the entries in the log book (presumably while it was at the Tank Museum), ie. he does not have it.
All the log books for the Centurions retained at Puckapunyal were held by the Tank Museum. That for Centurion 169056, which was transferred from the SOA parade ground to the AWM, was there and the logbook went with it to the AWM. All the others, however, have just ‘disappeared’.
I was expelled from the 1AR Assn as a consequence of raising this matter. (Later readmitted as my expulsion had been invalid, but then fell foul of the same forces when other ‘mysteries’ were raised.)
———————————————————————————————————————–
23 January 2021
Vietnam Campaign Medal
I saw a T shirt the other day. It said across the front: ‘Did you forget to Google?’.
A post on another site asks: “How about someone lobbying the relevant department to have an end date on the 1960 clasp?”
Wikipedia advises that:
“The 1960– device is worn on the medal suspension ribbon and the 60– device is worn on the service ribbon of the medal and the miniature medal suspension ribbon.[b]
The unusual appearance was caused by the Republic of Vietnam government stating that the 1960– and 60– devices would show the dates of the Vietnam War from start to finish, with the ending year placed on the devices when the South Vietnamese had prevailed over the invading North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) forces. However, on 30 April 1975, the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon was captured, and South Vietnam surrendered that day to the North Vietnamese army under the orders of General Duong Van Minh, who since 28 April was the president of South Vietnam. “
This ‘theme’ continues tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 January 2020
How Should AFVs be Displayed at the AWM?
It’s easy to say how they shouldn’t be displayed, ie. as they are now with a total focus on technical specifications and no reference to the challenges faced by their crews and the bravery they displayed.
The last public consultation meeting held by the AWM was in relation to external aspects of the redevelopment. They explained that further meetings would be held in relation to the content and its display. I asked the 1AR Assn C’tee if they would like to help in developing some recommendations on how AFVs should be displayed. They explained that the Assn is “not a lobby group”.
So … consigned to developing a paper myself (with any input I can get) where do we start? As good a place as any is to consider what others have done.
The Kabinka Tank Museum, Moscow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kubinka_Tank_Museum is solely an AFV museum. There is a valid role for this, ie. providing a means of displaying developments in technology and design. This is a separate role to that of a War Memorial, however.
The Bovington Tank Museum in the UK has a similar focus but the following quote from its website is interesting: “The creation of The Trench Experience in 1998 brought an immersive experience to the Museum displays for the first time. It has remained hugely popular with the Museum audience and was refreshed in 2016 with the Tank Men Exhibition, telling the story of the first tank crews.” This wasn’t quite what it seems, however. The stories of eight tank crewmen from WWI relate to their personal lives, not their duties (and hardships) within the tank.
Not all is lost, however, the following suggests that the role of crews within tanks is not completely forgotten: “The Tank Museum is the only place in the world you can climb inside a real First World War Mark IV tank. This First World War Tank Experience workshop includes an interactive talk on why the tank was invented, how it worked and what life was like for the crew”. What was life like for the crew? What a novel question.
The concept is one whereby the visitor gets inside a WWI tank (presumably through a ‘door’ cut into the side) and is informed via an audio-visual screen what the crew did in operating the vehicle. Getting inside AFVs is not often possible. An AV display next to (or incorporated into) an AFV exhibit is entirely feasible, however. This could include segments featuring those who actually crewed the vehicle in combat, explaining the nature of their duties and the dangers they faced.
“One Army is Army’s identity. Army traditionally described and managed its people as permanent and reserve. The changing character of the workforce has made this boundary invalid. Army is One Army, a diverse full and parttime team of teams, with one mission: to prepare land forces for war to defend Australia and its national interests.”
If this is so, if personnel are no longer managed as “permanent and reserve”, why is it that Defence continues to refer to Reserve Forces in its job advertisements? Recently the Reserve call-out provisions were highlighted in the Bushfire crisis. Can it really be said that the boundary between permanent and reserve forces is invalid?
Of course not! But this is all about semantics. Of much more relevance is the fact that published Defence strategy makes no reference to the role that Reserve forces are allotted in time of Defence emergency. Indeed, the equipment (Budget) allocated to Reserve units suggests that they have no real role at all.
As mentioned recently, the Australian Defence Association was asked what their position was as far as Reserve forces were concerned. There was no response (akin to their published information which is bare as far as Reserves are concerned).
Do Australia’s Reserve forces have a role in Australia’s defence strategy? If so, what is it and why haven’t resources been allocated accordingly?
If self-reliance is to have a place in our Defence strategy, then a whole set of Contingency plans must involve the Reserve. But what is its role (depending on Contingency): training, ARA reinforcement, capability augmentation? How are they to be used?
This is an easy matter to address in terms of professionals such as doctors and other medical personnel, logisticians etc … they can simply be posted as individuals direct to ARA units to augment capability (providing med/log units are not to be deployed). But what about others? It would seem that the same applies … an RAAC Bushmaster driver can be sent to an infantry unit in the same way that an ARES infantry rifleman can be sent to an infantry unit. An RAAC cavalry scout can be sent to an RAAC unit.
The concept of the Reserve having a unit identity is something of the past. An RAAC ARES reconnaissance regiment will have no role as a regiment, other than to send off its members to ARA infantry and RAAC units. Unit identity, morale, and geographical/historical ties are things of the past.
Why isn’t anyone being ‘upfront about’ this? If I was to ask the RAAC Corporation what the role of the RAAC Reserve would be in time of defence emergency … I wonder what the response would be? Where does the ARES fit in terms of contingency plans and what forms the rationale for their training?
———————————————————————————————————————-
20 January 2020
1AR Assn Webpage.
The Blog post on 15 January identified a number of things which were in need of ‘revision’ on the 1AR Assn website. Although I’ve had no response, it’s good to see that another was been corrected. The Vietnamese Theatre Honour had been shown as “Vietnam 1968-1972”. It’s good to see that this has been amended to “Vietnam 1968-1971” (reason previously explained). Disappointingly, there has been no change re the others points as yet.
A few days ago, thinking that I was doing the ‘right thing’, I informed the 1AR Assn C’tee of the passing of Geoff Cooper (Coops). I had learnt of this from Facebook. I had assumed that the C’tee would want to include his name on Vale section of the webpage. It seems that they don’t (or if they do, they haven’t as yet). Maybe Coops wasn’t a member? But surely, they can’t only list Assn members on the Vale page. How cold-hearted would that be?
When I last looked … there were 311 condolences messages on Coops’s FB page.
Given that the lack of response re 1AR Assn Webpage, I’ve posted the following on the Armoured Corps FB page:
“Coops passed away unexpectedly last Thursday (16 Jan):
RELATIVES and FRIENDS of Mr Geoffrey Vincent COOPER “Coops” are respectfully advised that his funeral service will be conducted entirely in the Christian Family Centre, 185 Frederick Road, Seaton on FRIDAY January 24, 2020 commencing at 1:00 p.m. A viewing for Coops will be held in the Tony Monte Funeral Chapel, 1 Webb Street, Port Adelaide on THURSDAY January 23 2020, commencing at 6:00 pm-7:00 p.m. Last I looked, there were 311 condolence messages on his FB page.
Coops posting (below) “Harry wish John all the best please” in relation to John Carter on 14 Jan is typical of him … always thinking of others.”
Postscript. The following is a posts from Coops on the 1 Armd Regt FB page a couple of days before he passed away (referring to the Regiment’s efforts in supporting the pople of Kangaroo Island after the bushfires): “Lesley Geoffrey CooperIn early 75 we as B Sqn had a fire on the range, I was the Boss’s Driver then, and I was asked if I could go to the old Range Camp and drive the fire truck 🚒 was there for a week, with B Sqn fellas helping me. Hard times but it was something we had to do. That’s why we’ve got total respects for Volunteer Fire Crews, Emergency Services and supports, and ALL ADF people involved on the scene and behind the scene as well mate”.
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 January 2020
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the ADF of the Future
The following is an extract from an article by Michael Shoebridge, Director of the Defence, Strategy and National Security Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
“Technological change is redefining warfare by the attributes of speed, autonomy and precision. Dispersal and rapid reconstitution of combat losses will be required for the future ADF to thrive in such an environment. Speed will be essential not just for weapon systems (for example, hypersonics) but also for command, control and decision-making.
But speed and hierarchies don’t coexist easily or naturally. Hierarchies, by their nature, involve delayed decision-making and sequential decision-making at multiple levels—and they’re the enemies of speed of response. So the organisational structures and processes in ships, squadrons, platoons, brigades and joint taskforce headquarters, across the Defence organisation, in every part of Russell Offices, and right across the lake into the cabinet room will need to change to be fit for future conflict. It will be a wrenching and threatening package of reform and change, as disruptive to current military hierarchy and structures as Amazon has been to the retail industry.
For AI to take back the time advantage from adversaries using high-speed precision weapons, it will need to find its way into the ADF’s existing systems and platforms soon—well before the first new frigate or submarine gets wet.”
Juxtaposed to this is the following extract from an article last week by Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.
“But we cannot use such allies as a basis for our strategic posture and force planning. That is why I argue that we should plan to defend Australia alone. This might come as a surprise in view of the much-hyped network of defence partnerships we have built up over the past few decades. Don’t all these partners count as allies?
Well, yes, if we mean that we might cooperate diplomatically to try to resist China’s influence. But that kind of thing doesn’t count when we’re talking about military strategy and force structure. What matters then is whether we can rely on others to fight to help us defend our territory or vital interests.
The only kind of alliance that counts for defence policy is one expressing clear undertakings to fight under certain circumstances. Strictly speaking, we have only two military alliances with neighbours. One is with New Zealand under ANZUS, and the other is with Papua New Guinea under the 1987 joint declaration of principles. The Five Power Defence Arrangements pact doesn’t count because it commits us to help defend Malaysia and Singapore but doesn’t commit them to help us.”
So, where do our priorities for our Defence lie? Is it a focus on self-reliance or a scramble to acquire the next generation Defence capability?
Interestingly, Michael Shoebridge ends his article with the following summary:
“It’s great to muse about the wonders of Australia’s $200 billion ‘future force’, but our time would be much better spent on the urgent new work and thinking required to make our existing force effective in the environment it will face in the early and mid-2020s. (My emphasis.)
That means loving the force you have—acting now to develop the concepts for use of AI across the ADF, and investing to retrofit the systems and platforms that will remain in service for decades.”
‘Armouredadvocates’ asks, as it has repeatedly, when will ‘right sizing’ the Abrams tank fleet become part of the plan to defend ‘Australia alone’?
————————————————————————————————————————–
18 January 2020
Personal Ethics
Following on from yesterday … the ‘topics’ are well and truly linked.
The post below is one from the 1AR Assn Past & Present FB page, a site that I’m banned from. Mr Soutar states that I’m a “sad bully”. He further claims that this proves that “the Assn is moving with the times and puts all members first”. (It’s interesting that the FB site would allow such personal criticism, as it’s against all guidelines designed to prevent personal slander, and the consequences.)
I assume that Mr Soutar feels that I shouldn’t have shown my Life Membership cancellation letter on my Blog and that I shouldn’t have asked to see a copy of the proposal for this at the AGM or a copy of the Minutes of the AGM. Are either of these requests undemocratic or in breach of ethics? Am I not entitled to inform others of what happens to me? Am I not allowed to ask to see copies of the‘instruments’ that have affected me?
Not to be outdone, Mr Antulov tells me to “F..O. . onto obscurity!”. This motion is supported by Mr Hawkeye. I’m sure that both gentlemen have valid reasons for making these suggestions. Interestingly, Mr Antulov also declares that I’m “self-serving!”.
So, where does all this leave us? Seems to me there operates a paradigm of fear within the 1AR Assn and associated FB ‘clubs’. Those who wish to stay within the circle of brethren, acquiesce to whatever the power brokers demand.
Will this last? I don’t believe so. Society is changing. There are those who now expect that their superannuation funds will be invested in sustainable industries … so too will members of associations someday expect that matters of governance will be open and transparent.
The above images may not allow easy reading. If this is so … so be it. The think the content says more about the commenters, than it does about me.
———————————————————————————————————————-
17 September 2020
Honesty and Truthfulness: Do These Values Still Exist?
The following ‘case study’ is a true story:
You work with someone over a long time, believing that you have developed trust between one another.
One person’s ‘boss’, however, takes a dislike to his employee’s friend; he tells his employee not to have anything more to do with this person. The employee is working on a project to which his friend could add considerable stakeholder value.
He doesn’t confide in his friend as to the actual circumstances, instead he tells him that he’s involved in a “secret project that he’s not even allowed to tell his work colleagues about”.
The project turns out to be a book, it hadn’t been a secret at all. Stakeholders in the topic were disadvantaged by virtue of the errors that could have been corrected if the manuscript had been worked on in a collaborative manner.
So, what should happen?
Should the friend be offended because he wasn’t trusted enough to be confided in? Should he be offended because the history involving stakeholders was much less valuable than it could otherwise have been? Should he be offended because he’d been lied to?
… or should he understand that his former friend valued his employer (and job) to the extent that he told complete lies to him?
…. or should he just accept things for what they are, i.e. all things in life are deceitful, untrustworthy, and without honour?
I, for one, will not accept that such a thing as that immediately above is true. I will always work to do the ‘right thing’. What else is there to hope for?
What would I have done if I was in my ‘friend’s’ place? I would have undoubtedly been conflicted, but to what degree and how would I have resolved the situation?
I would not have lied. I don’t believe that there is any justification for this. If I had to, I would’ve said that “I’m not allowed to tell you what I’m working on”. Which would be true. But it draws attention to the employer. Not to do this, might have been another stipulation.
Would it have been possible for him to say, “I can’t give you any acknowledgement in the work I’m involved with, would you be prepared to assist me on this basis?” I would have unequivocally said ‘yes’ (because it is the stakeholders who are important, not those whose names are ‘Acknowledged’.).
Conclusion. The real ‘nigger in the woodpile’ (sorry) here is the employee’s ‘Boss’. He has threatened his employee (who obviously wishes to keep his job) to the total disregard of all stakeholder value …putting his personal feelings above those of the stakeholders he is supposed to represent.
Nevertheless … someone who lies to his friend, has to expect that that friendship will be jeopardised.
Of course, all the above might be absolute BS … the person concerned might simply not have wanted anything more to do his ‘friend’ and decided to ‘ditch’ him accordingly.
————————————————————————————————————————
16 January 2020
RAAC History
The photo below appeared on another website with the caption:
“Weapon handling drills on the Model 1919 Browning A4 Medium Machine Gun; Armoured Vehicle Fighting School – Puckapunyal Nov 1942”.
Given that Centurion didn’t start being equipped with the Browning until 1956 (replacing the BESA 7.92mm mg with the Browning was the main criteria which distinguished the Mk5 from the Mk3) … why would members of the recently ‘gazetted’ Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) be trained on the Browning in 1942?
The answer lies with December 1941: Pearl Harbour.
The Japanese attack stimulated America to send ship loads of M3 Lights (General Stuarts) and M3 Mediums (General Grants and General Less) to Australia.
Hence the need to train crews on the Browning. This is part of the reason that I find history fascinating … the stories ‘within stories’.
Note: There was no accreditation accompanying the photo as to where it came from.
———————————————————————————————————————-
15 January 2020.
1AR Assn and the History of 1 Armd Regt.
I offered the following information to the 1AR Assn C’tee recently:
Re the website … it’s good to see that the ‘History’ has been updated (as I suggested); but I should mention that “re rolled”, should be ‘reroled’ (the two have very different meanings).
I note that the last image on the 1AR Assn Home Page shows the Theatre Honour as “Vietnam 1968-1972”. It should, of course, be “Vietnam 1968 -1971”. (My troop was the last in-country, I have a ‘vested interest’.) I’ve attached a letter from the then Minister who approved this change (as well as the emblazoning of ‘Coral-Balmoral’.) Hope you don’t mind such ‘feedback’ … it’s all intended as part of a process of continual improvement.
The History on the Home Page states that the Regiment operated “Centurion Mk5s”. In fact, the first Cents were Mk 3, these were converted to the Mk 5 (by replacing the BESA with the Browning); the tanks were then converted to Mark 5/1 (by adding applique armour) prior to Vietnam. Maybe it would be best to just to say “Centurion tanks”.
The ‘History’ itself states that there were three tank troops when C Sqn arrived at Coral on 23 May 1968. As you would know, C Sqn at the time was a half squadron with two troops and SHQ. 3 Troop was not formed (from SHQ tanks) until 2 June 1968 (see p212 COF).
Every word in the “Commander’s Diaries” was written by me. I copied each entry from the diaries in the AWM by hand and ‘translated’ them to make them ‘readable’, eg. I replaced grid references with locations that had meaning when reading an entry; I also modified the diary entries to allow them to flow in a narrative style from one day to the next. I informed the 1AR Assn of this some time ago. I was concerned that someone may think that the ‘Commanders’ Diaries’ were an actual copy of the Diaries themselves. My email was overlooked, however, as was my request that there might be an acknowledgement of my work in making the ‘Diaries’ available to Members. I believe that the following by-line is appropriate (and necessary for the legal protection of the Assn): ‘An interpretation of the Diaries by Bruce Cameron’.
You might like to know that 1 Armd Pegt have recently put up a post on their FB page, explaining that a contingent has deployed to Kangaroo Island in support of the ARES force which has been mobilised. The video from 9 Brigade below, explains the role of those from 1AR (at the end). https://www.facebook.com/9BdeAusArmy/videos/2196176187343924/
While I haven’t had any response from the C’tee, I’m pleased to report that as a result of all my suggestions above, the short history on the Home Page (point #1 above) was been reworded to state: “In 2014, the Regiment’s role changed to …”.
It’s little by little that big change is brought about ….
————————————————————————————————————————–
14 January 2019
ADF Force Structure
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) reported in October 2019 that a new Strategic Review was being conducted:
“Defence’s worst kept secret is now officially public. Defence Minister Linda Reynolds stated at last week’s Sea Power conference in Sydney that the Defence Department is conducting a strategic review. It may not be a white paper per se, but it involves ‘working through a re-assessment of the strategic underpinnings of the 2016 Defence White Paper’ with the outcomes to be considered by government early next year.
The work is necessary because ‘the world itself has changed more quickly than we assessed in 2016 and so too [have] the consequential challenges’. The minister is not alone in reaching this conclusion. The strategic policy community is virtually unanimous in this view, although it’s divided over what to do about it. Admitting that we underestimated the speed of China’s rise is nothing new, although it’s perhaps surprising that this time around it has only taken three years for our analysis of China to be overtaken by events.”
What will this mean for the ADF’s force structure and what will be announced in the coming months (if the stated timetable is to be believed)?
According to Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, Hugh White: “the most prudent basis for Australia’s defence policy today, is to plan and build the forces required to defend the continent independently from a major power like China”.
If this was to happen, what would it mean for our warning times, our lead times, our force structure, our contingency plans, the status and role of our reserve forces? Would the Plan Beersheba force readiness cycle remain or be replaced by a different ‘construct’ for the Army? Would there be sufficient emphasis for the Abrams fleet to be ‘right sized’ by the additional 90 tanks needed (… despite the views of Sean Benporath; see Blog for 3 January 2020)?
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 January 2020
My Membership of the 1AR Assn
The Blog on 9 January was about ‘Openness and Transparency’, pointing out that this is the whole reason for the Blog to exist: “An Ideas Space to Advance RAAC Issues”. The unstated part of the by-line is ‘in an open and transparent manner’.
Some managers don’t like openness and transparency. They prefer a culture of so called ‘loyalty’. This means that no matter how much a ‘member’ raises concerns about regulatory breaches and how much their entreaties for improvements are ignored, if the situation is made public, then they are disloyal and can no longer remain part of the organisation.
It is the organisation itself which is important, not those managing it at any particular time. As previously reported, I recently made the following offer to the President (hoping for an outcome for the good of the 1AR Assn):
“This email could be my Blog post for 19 December, however, I’ve an alternative proposal that you might like to consider. If you are prepared to accept the worth of what I’ve stated below and readmit me to m’ship (but not Life M’ship), I will delete Parts 1-6 of my Blog Introduction drawing attention to the failings of previous C’tees. I would also hope that the C’tee might agree to consider proposals for the benefit of the Regiment and the Assn from me as a member (as it would from any other member). Finally, I would like to place the following statement on my Blog (if you agree):
“Following discussions with the President 1 AR Assn, the Assn has been accepted that previous actions on my part were made in the best interests of the 1AR Assn and the Regiment. My membership has been renewed and any suggestions that I might have for the betterment of the Assn and its members will be welcomed.”
I haven’t had a response.
A member of the 1AR Assn recently received a request for m’ship fees. He asked the C’tee what the situation was regarding my membership. Part of what he was told was:
“The [Management C’tee] meeting voted that Bruce Cameron be provided with a confidential ‘show cause’ as to why his membership of the Association should be renewed.”
“Over a period of three (3) or four (4) weeks Bruce published the reasons why the Management Committee believed he should show cause. Bruce also published his answers to the issues (14) raised by the Management Committee.”
“Accusations have been made that the whole process was a sham …”.
There are three points here:
The attachment to my letter which listed the reasons for which I needed to justify my actions was headed “Personnel-in-Confidence”. This to me says that it is MY privacy that’s being protected. It would seem, however, that it’s actually the privacy of the C’tee that was being sought to be protected (see below).
I published (on the Blog) “the reasons why the Management Committee believed [I] should show cause” and my “answers”. Surely this is my right? If a person who is charged with something is denied the right to make known the offence and his response, we’re living in a non-democratic society. (Maybe this is the situation the C’tee prefers?)
“The whole process was a sham”. This is news to me. I’ve not called it a ‘sham’. I’ve simply stated what happened. It seems that others have claimed that what happened was in breach of ‘due process’. I wonder why?
———————————————————————————————————————–
12 January 2020
UPDATE: Extension of Eligibility for the Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The story so far: The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) held a Hearing to consider the submission that supporting arms should be awarded the CGWP Unit Citation. They ruled that the Citation was for the whole period of 8RAR’s tour in Vietnam, not just Hammersley. If, however, it could be shown that supporting arms were important to the success of 8RAR in all these operations, the matter could be further considered.
Both the ‘Applicant’ and Defence were asked to respond; Defence also being asked to provide relevant documents. A detailed operation by operation analysis was provided by the Applicant, proving how critical supporting arms were. Defence responded to say that supporting arms were not part of 8RAR and therefore shouldn’t be considered. They said that they were having trouble finding relevant documents.
DHAAT said that they’d had enough, they were proceeding to a decision. Defence found more documentation and the Applicant was asked to comment.
Note: The ‘Applicant’ represents: OC and 2IC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, Tp Ldr B Sqn 3 Cav involved in Hammersley and RAACA WA, 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and 1 Fd Sqn (RAE) Assn. [RAAC Corp and 1AR Assn declined to participate.]
Parts of what amounts to a ‘fourth’ submission are copied below:
“In summary … the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to units that performed to the same standard as that required for individuals to be awarded the Cross of Gallantry, ie. displaying particular gallantry in the face of the enemy. This criterion is fundamental and should be maintained.
The United States Govt has stated that the Defence Order (DAGO 8) made for the Citation to be awarded to all US servicemen, does not apply to personnel from other Armies. Previous awards made to Australian Units on the basis of DAGO 8 have resulted from an acceptance of direct command linkages to the US MACV.
There is no justification for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation to be awarded generally to Australian servicemen for simply serving in Vietnam. Why Defence should be pursuing this, contrary to the position of the US Govt, is a mystery.
8RAR was awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Tanks, APCs and field engineers were under operational control of 8RAR throughout the period for which their successes were so recognised. It follows that these supporting arms should be recognised with the same award.
This action is not recommended on the basis of precedent alone, however. The continual gallantry displayed by members of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE, has been detailed in the submissions provided to DHAAT. The efforts of all involved contributed greatly to the operational successes which led to 8RAR’s Citation.
This was reflected in the wording of the RVN Citation when it refers to “the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force”. This continues the acknowledgement of the combined arms nature of operations by the Vietnamese Commanding General when he sent his compliments to the “8RAR Group” for the success achieved during Operation Hammersley. As detailed previously, the Commander 1ATF defined the 8RAR Group as comprising 8RAR, A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE.”
Defence has previously stated that supporting arms are not eligible for the award because they were commanded by 1ATF and “force assigned” to 8RAR. It must be realised that ALL units and sub-units that were part of 1 ATF, including 8RAR, were commanded by 1 ATF (specifically, the Task Force Commander). Furthermore, ALL units (including 8RAR) and sub-units were “force assigned” as combined arms teams as operations required.
The RVN CGWP Unit Citation is an award made in recognition of gallantry displayed in contact with the enemy. The gallantry of members of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE in supporting 8RAR deserves to be recognised in exactly the same way as the gallantry of 8RAR itself.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
11 January 2020
Helping Those Affected by the Bushfires
The RAAC ‘family’ has an enormous network. If there are any Black Hats affected by the fires, this network can do much to help them.
It’s not beyond the realm of possibility that there is someone out there who has been impacted in some way. One of our number lost everything in the 2013 Tasmanian fires. There’s a lot of good that the wider RAAC ‘family’ can bring to bear.
RAACA NSW report that none of their members have been impacted. I’ve asked the 1AR Assn if any of their members are affected, but haven’t had a response. Presumably all are ok, but it does seem surprising that they haven’t checked with members.
One would’ve thought that the each ESO would feed into a wider network linked with DVA to ensure veterans were able to be helped by their comrades-in-arms.
Peter Toohey is at Pamula and reports on the 3 Cav Site that they are ok (just). I’m in touch with Nobby Clark at Merimbula and, while they’re packed and ready to go, they’re not threatened at the moment.
The network for the C Sqn 1 Armd Regt (1971) 50th Reunion numbers 66. Tony Dennis, at Jamieson, has reported that they’re ok. Brad Golding is SW of Port Macquarie, they’ve got their fingers crossed.
The PM has been widely criticised for not leading from the front, but are ‘others’ also guilty?
Emails to Secretary 1AR (which have gone without response):
#1 Dear Secretary,
Any news of 1 AR Assn members or other RAAC personnel having been affected by the Bushfires?
I’m sure that the ‘RAAC Family’ network could band together to help if needed.
#2 Any response would be appreciated. There is someone in NSW who could be in need of assistance, is the 1AR Assn ‘network’ available to assist?
1st Armoured Regiment Responds!
I was informed today that 1AR are involved in the relief effort. They have recently put up a post on their FB page, explaining that a contingent has deployed to Kangaroo Island in support of the ARES force which has been mobilised. The video from 9 Brigade below, explains the role of those from 1AR (at the end).
Following on from 7 January 2020 … a post from the past:
“Without breaking the contact of secrecy imposed on me, I have responded to the insults from ‘official’ sources which describe me as a self-centred person who does everything in order to claim glory and receive public fanfare.
The following additional insult was not subject to ‘Confidentiality’:
“Your claims on Social Media are deliberately calculated to cause irreparable damage, to the RAAC Corporation in general but also in particular the 1st Armoured Regiment and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association”.
The ‘social media’ referred to was, in fact, my blog. I stated that it was “time to start the process [of achieving approval to extend eligibility to the RVN CGWP Unit Citation] over again. Sadly, neither the RAAC Corporation nor the 1 AR Assn has opted to pursue this issue.”
I was referring to the fact that sixteen months after the Corporation wrote to Defence, no (apparent) progress has been made. Should something have been discussed at the RAAC Corporation AGMs, that is a ‘secret’ denied to members of the 1AR Assn. (Mr Fenton, the 1AR Assn Rep, continues to prevent 1AR Assn members seeing the Minutes, or even doing them the courtesy of providing a report). I used the word “pursue” in the context of ‘continue with’.
I had had a response to my second submission to the Minister seven months previously (copied to HoC) and it seemed to me that the time had come to respond to the false arguments continuing to be put forward by Defence.
The RAAC Corporation submission was long overdue for a response …if one was ever going to be made. (The Corporation admit to not having any idea as to why they have not received a response after sixteen months.)
Have I attempted to do irreparable damage to the RAAC Corporation, 1 Armd Regt, and the 1 AR Assn? No. Have I attempted to hold the RAAC Corporation to account? Yes.
Have I attempted to have those RAAC and RAE veterans of Hammersley recognised for their service and sacrifice? Yes. Have I urged priority for this to be done before those veterans’ ranks dwindle further? Yes.
An update re the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) consideration to morrow.
———————————————————————————————————————–
9 January 2020
Openness and Transparency: Operation Hammersley
I feel guilty of not concentrating on the ‘positive’. But there is so much of the ‘negative’ which needs to be made known. As the saying goes … “sunlight is the best form of disinfectant (or antiseptic)”.
Following on from 7 January …
I’m not sure if I posted this previously, or if it’s something which has just been ‘hovering’ in the background:
The email from a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board advised that he understood that I had uncovered new information throwing doubt on the validity of 8RAR’s award (correct, as explained in previous Blog posts) he said that if I was to make this publicly available it could ‘upset’ the RAAC Corporation’s submission.
But the timing of the RAAC Corporation’s submission was such that Defence Honours and Awards would have been aware of the arguments it advocated, when advising the Minister not to give approval. Not to proceed would mean supporting the RAAC Corporation’s submission predicated on the basis of information known to be incorrect.
Surely the Corporation would accept my offer to review my new research and amend their submission accordingly?
Sadly, they didn’t. Instead there was an attempt to intimidate me as per the earlier blog.
When I raised issues concerning the governance of the 1AR Assn and the closure of the members’ blog (see top of this Blog) someone said, “Why don’t you start up your own website?”. So I did.
But if I hadn’t, there would be no means of responding to either the intimidation or the insults! No means of making known publicly what was going on. Thank heavens for the person who said: “Why don’t you …”.
———————————————————————————————————————–
8 January 2020
Operational Analysis
“Events created a desperate need for such a vehicle. Tragedies in Iraq and Afghanistan showed the vulnerability of troops, even the most capable special forces, when operating soft-skinned vehicles against insurgents with the technical know-how to build IEDs and the tactical skill to employ them well.
There was nothing else readily available on the world market. US troops in Iraq were welding additional steel plates onto their own poorly protected vehicles.
The Bushmaster’s capability wasn’t fully appreciated until it was in action and by then it was seen to be a defining reason why so many Australian soldiers survived IED blasts while British and American lives were lost.
After bombings in Afghanistan, troops sent back technical reports and ‘tiger teams’ of engineers and scientists were sent to the war zone to examine the damage and to find ways to strengthen the vehicle. The manufacturer, Thales, was able to improve Bushmasters on the production line and in the operational area.
A cheaper, off-the-shelf vehicle from overseas would not have given Australia the flexibility to adapt to changing enemy tactics in Afghanistan. Indeed, the way industry, the army, Defence scientists and others worked so quickly and effectively together to harden the Bushmaster against ever more devastating IEDs is a model of the ‘fundamental input to capability’ idea that promotes innovative work between Defence and industry.
Ultimately, the Bushmaster proved itself a lifesaver in combat and vindicated those who had faith in it.”
Following on from 6 January, Operational Analysis seems to be ‘in play’ in the Army (at least) today. Please the Heavens above that that this is the case!
————————————————————————————————————————
7 January 2020
‘Contracts’ of Silence
This is a compilation of blog posts from 2017:
“We are alike in some aspects but opposites in others. The main difference is that you are an “I or Me” person (as displayed in everything you write); whereby I am and have always been an “Us or We” person and rarely use the I or me. I do not believe that will ever change.”
The email I received which referred to me as being one of those in the undesirable ‘I’ category (as compared to the sender who saw himself in a more flattering ‘We’ category) showed that assessing people on such a basis is fraught with difficulty. In his email, which highlighted his own achievements, the author used the terms ‘I, me or my’ twenty times, while ‘we, us’ our’ did not appear at all.
Unfortunately, it’s happened before. Before insulting you, someone tells you that ’this is not for copying, in whole or part, to anyone else’. It’s been said that “people with heightened concerns about their privacy may use contracts of silence more aggressively”. Seems to me that there is a fundamental flaw in the concept of assuming that you can say whatever you like about another person, while at the same time telling them that it’s “confidential and must go no further”.
If I’m told that something is ‘confidential’ and is not to be shared, then my personal integrity tells me that this is what should happen. But does this caveat extend to personal insults delivered under the same banner? Why would a person be concerned that his or her insults to another might become known to others? One reason I can see is that of intimidation, ie. a person wishes to intimidate another, without anyone else knowing. Another reason might be that the person making the insults is concerned about a backlash from others who hold different views and so wishes to deliver his/her insults on the ‘qt’.
There will be occasions when one wishes to communicate privately with another person. For my part, however, I would never insult someone and expect him/her to regard this as ‘confidential’.
Seems to me that if one person is going to insult another, that this should be something able to be placed on the public record. To expect a person not to divulge insults levied against them, by imposing a rule of confidentiality, is not (to me at least) an ethical thing to do.
As a result of recent matters, I find that I’ve had enough of trying to please all the people all the time.
From now on, I’m going to use ‘I, me, or my’ and be proud to do so. Management Principles 101 can take a back seat!
PS. In terms of an ‘update’, I’ve been told very forcibly that “I wasn’t there, I don’t hold a representative position”… so what am I doing initiating a submission to have eligibility for the RVN CGWP extended to the tank and APC crews and sappers who supported 8RAR on all their operations? I would’ve thought that the answer is obvious. But who am I to comment?
——————————————————————————————————————
6 January 2020
Continual Improvement: Is it a Forlorn Hope?
“Dear Editor,
The present bush fire scenario has underscored the importance of comprehensive co-ordination and oversight. The scale and disparate nature of requirements are immense, from pre-positioned generators, to well-located and resourced evacuation centres, to traffic management plans, to availability of effective face masks etc.
There are many lessons to be learnt from the current situation and responses to it. I heard one account on the radio of an evacuation centre located at the top of a flight of twenty-five steps. There was a lift, but the power was out, hence those who were disabled could not gain access.
The lessons here are obvious. But how is Emergency Management Australia ‘harvesting’ them?
The traditional approach is to wait until the ‘crisis’ is over and then prepare a report. This is pretty much the way the Australian Army operated in Vietnam. To be truly effective, however, such operational analysis must occur in real time, with feedback enabling failures to be immediately corrected and successes reinforced. While it is essential that a detailed report inform subsequent contingency plans, so too must there be feedback and continual improvement as things are actually happening.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
5 January 2020
Compassion in all its Ugly Forms
The following was a Blog post from some years ago (originally titled: ‘The Law and its Implications’). It was presented as a ‘case study’.
Scenario: A retired RAAC person is walking along a designated walking track in an ACT Nature Reserve. He falls and breaks his neck and both he and his wife have considerable on-going medical and associated expenses. The person who fell had been his wife’s carer; he is able to have his medical costs covered by DVA, his wife; however, is left without resources to meet her on-going care needs.
I suggested that there might be grounds for a case being made against the ACT Govt on the grounds of the track having been poorly maintained. I further suggested it could be worthwhile taking a photograph of the place the incident occurred and seeking legal advice.
The response provided by our ‘RAAC Family’ representative was:
“Hitting the system in relation to a bung walking track/footpath is not a lay down misere. There have been similar cases initiated in the ACT Supreme Court related to footpath damage where the Court has held that it is the responsibility of the walker ( a reverse duty of care) to take all reasonable care to ensure they avoid surfaces which may of themselves cause a person to fall. That precedent has been applied successfully by the ACT Govt in defending claims of tort in this area.
The administering Department will not attend to repair broken footpaths unless members of the public ring up Canberra Connect up and report it. Their path inspection teams are almost non-existent.
The common law doctrine of precedent would in my personal opinion, operate against [the NOK] and that could well mean not only her own barristers’ fees/witness and expert fees, but costs awarded against her in the event of an unsuccessful common law action.
He walked it quite a bit and his fitness level was good. Ergo he would have had a very good and reasonable knowledge of the state of the track and would be aware of any pitfalls thereon during his walks.
Common dog for any walker is to suss out the ground – tankies may not be familiar with the term “ground appreciation”…Cav are.
I am a very avid walker and walk hither and yon as well as running. I do the Mt Majura West side walk – as rugged as you can get and bloody tough and I have to ensure I have good ground appreciation including on sealed and cracked walking tracks, around town.
It shits me to tears that society is always laying blame at some other entity’s feet. Put bluntly, society has abrogated its sense of common dog and responsibility in taking accountability”.
I tried to think of a suitable postscript, but words failed me!
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 January 2020
(Photo: Black Berets FB page)
PAYING COMPLIMENTS
When you pass by the Australian Army’s Colours, Guidons and Standard what do you do? If you’re a serving member in uniform, this should be obvious (but maybe not, even for the Chief of Army?). If you’re an ex-serviceman, or a civilian who’s never served, what should you do?
As a result of seeing this, I emailed the RSM-A as below. To his credit he replied soon after.
Dear RSM-A,
I am a retired member of the RAAC. Following the Binh Ba Commemoration yesterday, some questions of protocol have arisen in the context of veterans attending such ceremonies and wishing to pay respect in accord with appropriate procedures.
When a gentleman wearing civilian clothes and a hat, passes Colours/Guidons etc, he removes his hat and does an eyes left/right.
But what happens when the retired person is wearing their old unit beret (probably also wearing medals)?
Should he (i) remove his beret and do an eyes left/right; (ii) keep beret on and salute with eyes left/right; or keep beret on and simply do an eyes left/right.
Supplementary question is: what should such a person do when the national anthem is played: (i) stand, keep beret on and salute; (ii) stand and remove beret; or (iii) just stand.
Your help in answering these questions would be much appreciated.
It is recognised that former service personnel are not subject to the dress/ceremonial manual stipulations, but, even so, most would like to be able to do what is considered the ‘right thing’.
Response from RSM-A:
“Dear Bruce, Thank you for your email. You are correct, gentlemen wearing civilian attire with hats on, are to remove their hats when passing Guidons and Colours and look to their left or right.
In regards to wearing berets in civilian attire and paying respect to guidons/colours, I’m more than comfortable with those veterans turning their head and eyes to the left or right.
Regards to the national anthem … leave berets on and sing loudly. At the end of the day it’s all about showing respect.”
Interestingly, a response from someone who has seen service in several operational theatres (Vietnam and earlier) was:
“I would strongly argue that if you are wearing your old Regiment’s head attire with badge etc and as an individual walking past ANY regimental colours, you would salute. I would!
In my view , you are in spirit, still very much of the military and the head wear reflects your past, your beliefs, your traditions, your total respect and the way you in which you were trained. To remove is as you pass by to me is surrendering all of the above.
If you are in command of a veteran group passing the colours, you would give an eyes right/left and salute FOR the column you lead. Thus, the remainder, hat or no hat, as in military style would comply with an order for eyes right. The same rules would apply on the playing of the national anthem. Without military hat, civilian headwear removed on all such examples above.
Mate, I have never read of any rules for such circumstances but I can categorically state without hesitation, if I was in that situation, then be it right or wrong in the eyes of the rule makers, I would do it as above.
The ‘Official’ view (many thanks to the RSM-A!) is clear and it is to be hoped that all involved in the Hammersley Ceremony 18 February will be briefed accordingly (by the RSM Ceremonial perhaps?).
———————————————————————————————————————–
3 January 2020
Yesterday’s Blog was posted (by the Webmaster) on the FB page from which the quote at the top of it was taken. There were 37 ‘likes’ and 28 Comments.
The lone comment that stands out as being different to all the others, is copied below
“Sean Benporath This opinion shows a lack of strategic vision and situational awareness of Defence priorities. It overestimates the influence of advocacy from non-defence groups and organisations and does not represent any official opinions. Understanding Army’s priorities for modernisation and how single issue zealots can undermine a unified message in a finite resource environment is a good beginning for anyone wishing to influence outcomes. A lack of situational awareness is as deadly to a project as it is to soldiers in combat. It is not as simple as saying we need 90 gun tanks, we speak in capability terms to define a need, that need may be able to be achieved through multiple technologies, not just a tank. Leave the capability arguments to the professionals who are looking to the left and right to ensure our troops have what they need, when they need it.”
I looked up Mr Benporath on Google. It seems that he works at Defence HQ Canberra. I couldn’t find anything which gives him qualifications to accuse me of being a “single issue zealot” or having “a lack of situational awareness”. (I acknowledge that, like everybody, he has the ‘right’ to say whatever he likes about me, providing it is not defamatory.)
He states that the post did not represent any official opinions. How can this be when I provided a link to a paper by the RAAC Head of Corps. An extract is copied below:
“Fleet size underwrites all of these issues. When balanced against the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore unavailable.
This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of the tank capability.”
Increased public debate is exactly what is needed to draw attention to the capability gap that presently exists. If Mr Benporath wishes to debate the position that he is one of the (self-proclaimed) “professionals who are looking to the left and right to ensure our troops have what they need, when they need it” , and I do not act in the best interests of soldiers … then bring it on!
———————————————————————————————————————–
2 January 2020
Happy New Year to all!. Sympathy to all readers and their families who might have been affected by the fires.
Photo: Australian Defence Magazine
What’s Wrong With the Australian Army’s Tank Fleet?
A post from an RAAC FB page:
“Back in the early 70s I was about twelve living at Bandiana. A family friend and I were walking and he said see all those [Centurion] tanks there is nothing wrong with them … someone wanted a new toy … he was a RAEME Col. I am sure he was not really talking to me but showing his disgust.”
The opinion expressed by the senior officer was obviously one which influenced the prevailing view as to whether or not there was a need to replace the Centurion.
I was asked by a serving general (I’ve forgotten what position he held, but he seemed like God at the time) visiting Puckapunyal in 1972 … whether the Centurion was a ‘good tank’. I was in my third year as a Centurion troop leader (converting to conventional warfare from counter-insurgency).
I replied to say that it was a good tank when it was going, but the time the crew spent servicing and maintaining it was completely out of proportion to the time they were able to spend operating it. In essence, it had ceased to be reliable and, therefore, was no longer effective.
This wasn’t just a matter of throwing more RAEME resources at maintaining it, spare parts supply was in all sorts of difficulties. (In 1968 Australia purchased seven centurions from NZ to meet a critical shortage of spare parts.)
Sure, the Israelis replaced the engines and gearboxes of their Centurions and upgraded the fire control system, but would this work for Australia?
The Australian tank fleet comprised 132 gun tanks (including fifteen purchased from British Army stocks in HK in 1971 to enable operational capability to be maintained.) The Israeli Army had a much larger tank fleet than Australia. The cost of conversion could be amortised accordingly. Every tank in Australia’s fleet was critical to training and operational effectiveness. BUT … some said, why do we need tanks at all? (This, despite the fact that Vietnam had just proved once again, that tanks help win battles and saves lives in doing so.)
So, finally, after the arguments for and against, there was agreement to replace the Centurion. Instead of acquiring 132 Leopards, the RAAC was restricted to 90 gun tanks. The Leopard served for 30 years, being replaced in 2007 by the US M1A1 Abrams. How many new gun tanks were acquired? Ninety? Just 59!
This was the bare minimum to maintain training levels with a single armoured regiment in which all squadrons were co-located. Of course, that situation no longer exists. We now have three squadrons based in three very different locations. Apart from anything else, a single repair pool is unable to maintain operational effectiveness. Army has called for years, for Australia’s tank fleet to be ‘right sized’, ie. increased to 90 gun tanks.
What reasons are given for the lack of action? Tanks aren’t suited for operations overseas where stability operations might need to be conducted. What about New Guinea, Vietnam, Afghanistan? Tanks can’t be transported. What about the RAAF Globemaster and the RAN capabilities and commercial shipping assets as were used during Vietnam?
There is an obvious capability gap in terms of the Australian Army’s readiness levels. I guess it all comes down to the views of some people that tanks are just big boy’s “toys”; an operational capability that it is not really important … until it’s needed.
Wouldn’t it be good if the RAAC Corporation and the 1 AR Assn helped create public awareness of the pressing need to ‘right size’ the tank fleet (as has been called for by the Head of Corps)? Sadly, neither organisation consider themselves to be ‘lobby’ groups, despite claiming to promote the best interests to the RAAC in the activities they organise. Simply highlighting the HOC paper would be worthwhile, as done by the RAACA (NSW Branch) recently. (https://www.australiandefence.com.au/land/fighting-to-win-the-importance-of-the-tank-to-the-adf-in-the-21st-century)
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 December 2019
1 AR Assn : My Membership
The proposal was made to the current President on 19 December (see Blog below). There was no response. Why might this be? Who is it that should be declared a winner here?
The only winner worth ‘hailing’ is the 1AR Assn. Unfortunately, I don’t think that either the recent past, nor current, C’tees see things in these terms (with some exceptions).
It is obvious that we have a number of ‘power brokers’ in our midst. The 2017 1AR Assn AGM was a testimony to this. Power brokers think only of themselves (whether in politics or any other form of social function).
Only by publicly highlighting the shortcoming of those managing the Assn (most probably through negligence of the regulations, as well through deliberate intent) has change been able to be brought about. The current C’tee have introduced many of the changes which have been campaigned for (eg. Minutes of C’tee meetings being provided to members; a valid Constitution being approved and made available for members to see on the Website, a funeral drape being made available for those who might wish to use it, changes being made to the oversight of C’tee adherence to regulations governing Associations,, etc).
So, the 1AR Assn is a much better assn today (in terms of the way in which it functions to meet the expectations of its members, than it was before attention was drawn to the problems that had existed).
Should my role and that of those who supported me (and vice versa), be acknowledged? It would seem not. There is no preparedness to enter into any sort of dialogue on the behalf of the President (presumably with the support of his C’tee). But why should there be? All C’tee positions are occupied by volunteers who willingly give up their time to do so. But is this all there is to it?
What about someone who spends twelve years writing the history of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam and donates all royalties to the 1AR Assn? Should his contribution in this way and further suggestions in terms of the legal obligations of the C’tee, not be acknowledged?
It would seem not. But progress is a step by step process. If one has as their aim the betterment of the 1AR Assn and its contribution to 1 Armd Regt, then we can’t go wrong.
This will be Armouredadvocates’ last post until 2 Jan 20 when I come back to earth.
Best wishes to all readers and please keep the faith through the coming year. The things that have been achieved have only been done so because of your support.
Bruce
———————————————————————————————————————-
20 December 2019
Operation Hammersley: Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Citation Awarded to 8RAR.
A Directions Hearing held by the DHAAT yesterday, augers well for our case!
The Hearing was called by the Tribunal because they were frustrated by Defence’s delays in responding to their requests for information and documentation.
The Tribunal was aware that Defence were considering whether or not all Army units that served in Vietnam should be eligible for the award of the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. The Citation has been extended to RAAF and RAN units that served in Vietnam on the basis of the US Army Directive which made all units that operated in Vietnam under MACV eligible (the RAN and RAAF having supposedly found justification for their units’ status directly under MACV, rather than 1ATF).
The Tribunal had asked Defence if the sub-units that supported 8RAR could be recognised with the award on this basis. (This was the subject of the Appeal before the Tribunal).
Defence said that they couldn’t comment because they were still developing a position to be put to the CDF. (This is why the RAAC Corporation say that their submission is still under consideration by Defence.)
The Tribunal asked questions as to how Army had decided that, while 1RAR was eligible (as part of 173rd Airborne), other Army units were not. Tribunal members were quite scathing when Defence said that no documents existed. These ‘discussions’ went on for some 20-30 mins, with Defence stonewalling.
Finally, the Tribunal said that it was too late, they (the Tribunal) were going to proceed to a decision without waiting for Defence. The point was made that it was unfair to the Applicant, to do otherwise.
That might have been it and I could have left it unsaid, but I didn’t.
I asked to speak and said that in my opinion one of the reasons that Army would not have wanted to make all units eligible for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was that, because of the much greater strength, relative to RAN and RAAF, in Vietnam, the quota for Imperial awards was quickly exhausted. 1 ATF Commanders, therefore, proposed individuals for the award of the RVN CGWP (various levels) in recognition of their gallantry.
To make this award available to everyone who served in Vietnam (ie. to declare everyone performed acts of gallantry deserving of the GCWP), would diminish the significance of these awards made to individuals. If the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was to be made available to all members of all units simply on the basis of having served, an Australian equivalent award would have to be made to ensure that the gallantry of individual recipients continued to be appropriately recognised.
This was something that I genuinely believed HAD to be said.
The Answer (from yesterday)? There wasn’t one. Why am I not surprised? Explanation tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
19 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IID (My Life Membership)
The email below is self-explanatory:
“Dear President,
I’ve copied below my Blog posts for 15-16 December and those proposed for 17-18 December. They are self-explanatory.
This email could be my Blog post for 19 December, however, I’ve an alternative proposal that you might like to consider.
If you are prepared to accept the worth of what I’ve stated below and readmit me to m’ship (but not Life M’ship), I will delete Parts 1-6 of my Blog Introduction drawing attention to the failings of previous C’tees. I would also hope that the C’tee might agree to consider proposals for the benefit of the Regiment and the Assn from me as a member (as it would from any other member).
Finally, I would like to place the following statement on my Blog (if you agree):
‘Following discussions with the President 1 AR Assn, the Assn has been accepted that previous actions on my part were made in the best interests of the 1AR Assn and the Regiment. My membership has been renewed and any suggestions that I might have for the betterment of the Assn and its members will be welcomed’.
Best wishes, Bruce”
Tomorrow: The Response.
———————————————————————————————————————————————
18 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IIC (My Life Membership)
Following on from yesterday …
Which of my actions might be considered prejudicial to the Association?
I drew attention to incidents in which the then C’tee had lied to members. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to incidents in which the then C’tee made fraudulent declarations on behalf of members. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to false allegations made by the then C’tee against members. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I decided to seek neither an apology nor damages from the then C’tee (so as not cause divisiveness) for harm to my reputation … despite a legal ruling (initiated by the then C’tee) that I was entitled to do so. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I contributed many hours in helping to draft the present Constitution. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to considerable irregularities that occurred in the conduct of the 2017 AGM. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to “One of the amendments [to the Constitution] inserted by the then C’tee [which] was that which stated that just because you served in 1 Armd Regt, this no longer made you eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. Previously you were automatically eligible and would only cease to be a member if you were to be in breach of disciplinary provisions. Overnight, the C’tee gave itself the power of veto on their own terms. Now, if you apply to join (or renew your membership) and the C’tee does not consider you ‘suitable’, then your application is not approved. There is no definition as what “suitable” means in the eyes of the C’tee.” There is no requirement for members to be informed.Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I contacted the C’tee to seek action to correct the matters above. Only when this was rejected, did I draw wider attention to them (for the good of the Assn).
The list could be extended considerably. Suffice to say … which of my actions specifically, does the present C’tee consider to be prejudicial to the Assn?
STOP PRESS: Re the notification to a person applying or reapplying for membership to be informed on why they were considered unsuitable, this has been changed. The Constitution states that
“The Management Committee must notify the applicant in writing of its decision including any reasons for rejection as soon as practicable after the decision is made.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
17 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IIB (My Life Membership)
Following on from yesterday …
Why was my Life membership not confirmed?
The reason given was that “I did not meet a number of the life-membership criteria particularly: a. demonstrating a lack of commitment to the Association, b. demonstrating a lack of loyalty to the Association and the Regiment, c. displaying personal behaviour that demonstrates a lack of respect for the Regiment, the Association, for members of the Regiment and for all members of the Association, and d. behaving in a manner that brought the Association into disrepute”.
So, what are the Life Membership criteria?
The Constitution states:
Life membership (1) Life membership of the Association may be awarded in a manner approved by the Management Committee to any ordinary member, affiliate member [refer rule 27 (4)] or associate [refer to rule 28 (4)] who has made a significant contribution to the Association. (2) The Management Committee has the discretion absolutely to approve or refuse a nomination for life membership of the Association. (3) Life members will be bound by all laws, Rules and By-laws of this Constitution.
So, the ‘only’ ‘criteria’ is to make a significant contribution to the Assn. This, of course, is why I was made a Life Member.
So, I must have breached a Law, Rule, or By-law. But there aren’t any Laws or By-laws.
So, I must have breached a Rule. But there are no Rules requiring that a member be committed to the Assn, nor to be loyal to the Assn or Regiment; nor to behave in a manner which demonstrates respect for the Regiment, the Assn, members of the Regiment and members of the Assn. (Maybe there should be?)
Rule 86c states that one of the grounds for taking disciplinary action against a member is if he “engaged in conduct prejudicial to the Association”.
Tomorrow: Which of my actions might considered prejudicial to the Association?
———————————————————————————————————————-
16 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IIA (My Life Membership)
Following on from yesterday….
I wonder why the President declined to forward to me the proposal raised at the AGM with respect to confirmation of my Life membership?
Answer: because there wasn’t one; other than “The Secretary (Russ James) moved that the Life Membership for Bruce Cameron, MC conferred previously by the Association be confirmed by this AGM. Seconded by Gerry Germaine”.
What else might have been expected? Well, for as start, why not read out the reasons that I was awarded Life Membership?
One might be excused from thinking that the reason is obvious. However, why not be honest, rather than go through with such a sham?
The motion was moved and seconded by people who didn’t support it. Is this a ‘proper’ proposal, or simply a matter of going through the motions?
But wait … my membership application was refused because I was not a fit and proper person. If I can’t be an ordinary member, how could I possibly a Life Member?
Not one of those attending (list below) was prepared to say anything on my behalf. I wonder whether or not this says more about me … or them?
Beasley Mitch 2. Branagan, OAM Peter 3. Brooker, OAM John 4. Bruce Craig 5. Coutts, CSM Peter 6. Duncombe Peter 7. Forrester John 8. Frost Gary 9. Germaine Gerry 10. James Russ 11. Key David 12. Laurie Ian 13. Lukeis Peter 14. Martin Dean 15. Meloncelli Keith 16. Payne Mick 17. Quentin Paul 18. Reid Mark 19. Reynolds Iain 20. Semmens Jim 21. Smith Ian (Icky) 22. Tarran Bruce 23. Unmack Graeme 24. Watt Matthew 25. Watts Trevor 26. Wood Ray
————————————————————————————————————————
15 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications II (My Life Membership)
Following on from the 9 December blog….
Minutes of 1 AR Assn AGM (12 Oct 19)
“Minute 17 of 2019/20 – The Secretary (Russ James) moved that the Life Membership for Bruce Cameron, MC conferred previously by the Association be confirmed by this AGM. Seconded by Gerry Germaine. The President (Keith Meloncelli) asked those present to speak either for or against the proposal. A number of members spoke against the proposal and the general consensus was that Bruce Cameron, MC did not meet a number of the life-membership criteria particularly: a. demonstrating a lack of commitment to the Association, b. demonstrating a lack of loyalty to the Association and the Regiment, c. displaying personal behaviour that demonstrates a lack of respect for the Regiment, the Association, for members of the Regiment and for all members of the Association, and d. behaving in a manner that brought the Association into disrepute.
On completion of the comments, the President (Keith Meloncelli) again asked if anyone wished to speak on behalf of the original proposal. After a period of silence, the President (Keith Meloncelli) asked for a show of hands for those who supported the proposal. There was no support for the proposal. The President (Keith Meloncelli) then asked for a show of hands for those who did not support the proposal. The result was unanimous, and the proposal was not carried. The Secretary (Russ James) declared that the proposal for the confirmation of life membership for Bruce Cameron was not carried. The decision was unanimous. “
Email to President, 1AR Assn (17 Oct 19)
“Mr Meloncelli, Thank you for your letter [advising that my Life membership has not been confirmed]. Can I please see the proposal for the confirmation of my Life Membership? Many thanks, Bruce Cameron”.
The response? There was none!
More to follow tomorrow ….
————————————————————————————————————————-
14 December 2019
Operation Hammersley Commemoration
Arrangements for the above, on 18 February 2020, are set out at:
Information about such events must be both accurate and timely. There is a difference between:
“All VIPs, Official Guests and veterans, will be seated in a large marquee on the scoria median strip in front of the Memorial proper for the duration of the ceremony and may be accompanied by their spouse/partner/carer. In addition to the veterans attending, it is anticipated that widows and family members of deceased (post-Vietnam) veterans of the battles will also attend the Service”, and
‘The event is open to the public’.
The former implies that attendance at the National Commemoration Ceremony is limited to Veterans of the Operation, their NOK and partner/carer. But this is not so … everyone is eligible to attend (and as DVA state… seating is on the basis of first come, first served). It is only the Reception afterwards which is restricted as above.
I believe that it shouldn’t be me saying this, but those involved in the organisation (who it seems to me are doing a great job, but sometimes fall down on keeping everyone informed IMHO). There is little time left for those who might like to plan a family trip or a club outing to coincide with the National Commemoration.
“Wreath and Poppy Ceremony AWM Hall of Memory
This ceremony will be conducted at 9am prior to the National Commemoration by the AWM for RAAC members of both Squadrons who took part in Operation Hammersley, particularly Barry Whiston and Hugh Carlyle who were KIA during the battle on 18 Feb 70. (Congratulations to the RAAC Corporation for organising this.)
I previously posted …”I wonder what role A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and B Sqn 3/4 Cav will play in the above. Hopefully, the current OCs might lay a wreath with veterans (possibly their counterparts as OC, or 2IC, from A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt from 1970).”
I now understand that NO serving members of either squadron are to be involved in laying wreaths at the AWM. Hopefully this will not also be the case at the National Commemoration itself. But why not involve them at the AWM?
———————————————————————————————————————–
Stewardship of 1AR Heritage III.
Email from me (23 Nov 19):
“I see that Assn reps gave a presentation to 1 Armd Regt re Op Hammersley. Is there any chance that the presentation transcript could be placed on the 1 AR Assn website for the benefit of all who served?”
Minutes of the 1AR C’tee Meeting on 3 Dec 19:
“Request for OP Hammersley Presentation to 1 AR Transcript – Item 41/19 – the Secretary (Russ James) advised that a request had been received from a member for a copy of the transcript of the Op Hammersley presentation to the Regiment on 23 November 2019. The Secretary explained that the presentation was made by Peter Rosemond CSC OAM and John Brooker OAM in their capacity as members of A Sqn at the time of the Operation. The material used, primarily PowerPoint slides, was prepared by themselves and considered to be copyright. There was no transcript, as such recorded on the day of the presentation. It was agreed that the Presentation would not be provided to any person and nor would it be published on the Association web site. The President is to prepare a note of thanks to the members which is to be published in the next Newsletter”.
Crikey! … ‘copyright’ means that a presentation by two of those who participated in an Operation can’t be made available to members of their own Assn or anyone else who might be interested.
Now I would have thought that the complete opposite would be the case … all information should be made available as to what happened, out of respect for those whose sacrifices brought about the outcome. How heartless can we get? ‘Copyright’ surely NOT! Maybe there is something to hide? Otherwise, surely they would welcome comment from those on whose behalf they spoke!
Before my book was published … I made every endeavor to ensure that anyone who who could add value or correct anything which was incorrect, was able to do so. How is it so …. for anyone to give a presentation re events in February 1970, but deny those who were not present to see the transcript?
—————————————————————————————————————————
12 December 2019
Stewardship of 1AR Heritage II.
The email below is self-explanatory:
Dear Secretary
You recently sent the message below to members of the 1AR Assn.
It must be pointed out that A Sqn 1 Armd Regt did NOT serve in Vietnam in 1971.
Furthermore, the tank squadron that Baden served with was C Sqn (apart from two weeks with A Sqn). It is to C Sqn that he refers in his interview.
I ask that you send an email to all members of the Assn to apologise [for overlooking C Sqn in this regard].
How is it that the 1 AR Assn could get this so wrong? Baden is not talking about 3 Troop A Sqn … he’s talking about 3 Troop C Sqn (Tp Ldr, the late Warren Hind; operator callsign 3: the late Phil Barwick)
Bruce Cameron
I know that the 1AR Assn is trying to do the right thing, but all they have to do, to avoid such ‘errors’ and consequent anguish to those involved, is to consult with others who served at the time; not to consult (and take a ‘we know all’ attitude) is an insult to those who were impacted by the events concerned.
PS. Why do I continue to ‘engage’ with the 1 AR Assn I’ve been asked. The answer: The heritage of the Regiment has a value far greater than any personal relationship … some members of the Assn C’tee might not be on my Christmas card list, but that is no reason not to advise them of things which impact on the accuracy of heritage matters. Only if the heritage is accurate will respect have meaning.
Members of A Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment who served in South Vietnam during the 1970/71 period will be particularly interested in the Youtube clip produced by the VVAA (WA Branch Inc) with Baden Jeffrey (Philanthropic Representative – Salvation Army) talking about his experiences with A Squadron with whom he served from 3 December 1970 to 20 September 1971.
Please click on the following link (url):
Russ James
Secretary
1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc
——————————————————————————————————————–
11 December 2019
Stewardship of 1AR Heritage.
Dear President (email, 9 Dec 19)
I was interested to read the management C’tee Minutes of 3 Dec 19:
“C Sqn 1AR Vehicle Naming Initiative – Item 33/19 – the President (Mel Meloncelli) advised that the naming of the vehicles was very well accepted and there was only one small problem with the spelling of a name. The Calliss and Clugston families attended and were very well looked after by C Squadron. Members of the Crowe family were unable to attend due to prior commitments and Mick Rainey is not well enough to travel.”
It seems that the Assn has taken note of the information provided below (though whether or not an AFV is to be named ‘Cannibal’ in recognition of Coral-Balmoral action, is unknown; as is any attempt to contact the Carra family).
It’s disappointing that you declined respond to me (and others) to acknowledge the information provided to you.
Bruce Cameron
—————————————————————
“Dear President (email, 17 Nov 19)
Not having had an answer, and given that the Regt is undoubtedly fully occupied with Cambrai Day preparations, I wish to advise (with regard to the above) that:
The correct spelling of the late Nev Calliss’s surname is not Callis;
Mick Rainey’s tank at Coral was not named Cannibal, nor was any other tank at this time; and
Apart from Nev Calliss, Ambrose Crowe and David Carra are both deceased.
I understand that no permission was sought from those (or the NOK of those) whose tank or surnames names were listed, to use them as intended. This would seem to have been an oversight (for obvious reasons).
The 1AR Assn might consider contacting those concerned, on behalf of 1 Armd Regt, to gain permission. I’m sure that the opportunity to give it will be an honour to them all.
In closing, may I say what a great initiative it was by the Regt to name C Sqn AFVs in this way. I think I can speak on behalf of 1 Armd Regt Vietnam veterans in giving it their wholehearted support, together with their willingness to ensure that the basis on which the commemoration is made is an accurate one.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron”
————————————————————————————————————————-
10 December 2019
This is the post that went ‘missing’ from 7 December below (heaven knows why)
Operation Hammersley Commemoration/Citation
The following email is self-explanatory. I haven’t had a response (and didn’t expect one), but I’ll always try to do the right thing.
Dear President, 1 AR Assn,
Prior to the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal (DHAAT) Hearing into the extension of eligibility to supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley, for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR, I asked if the Assn might seek personal accounts from members of a Sqn at the time to support the submission. You declined.
As you know, the outcome of the Hearing was that the Tribunal was compelled, because of a technicality associated with the foreign award, to deem that the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation was awarded, not just for Operation Hammersley, but for all operations that 8RAR participated in during 1970. If it could shown, however, that A Sqn 1 Armd, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn provided significant support to 8RAR for these operations, and displayed gallantry in doing so, then the matter of extending eligibility would be reconsidered. Both ‘sides’ were tasked to provide a further report on this basis.
I previously asked you if the Assn might support this second submission, but received no response. The submission is to be posted off on 16 December (to meet the DHAAT deadline).
There is still time for personal accounts to be provided to support this submission. I trust that the 1AR Assn will do the right thing on behalf of its members who were part of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt in 1970 and those serving in A Sqn today and in the future. (A personal account received recently adds considerably to the value of the submission.)
Interestingly, the 1 AR Assn website states that “8 RAR and 161 Battery RNZA were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Unit Citation” for their participation in Operation Hammersley..
I’ve added the following comment:
“On 29 October 2019, the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal deemed that 8RAR were awarded the CGWP Unit Citation, not for Operation Hammersley, but for its whole tour in Vietnam. It is recorded in the Official History that 161 Bty RNZA were awarded the RVN Presidential Unit Citation for its six years in Vietnam, not the CGWP for Operation Hammersley.”
Why is it that those representing others don’t combine to achieve the best possible outcomes? Well you may ask … it might all come down to who it is that consider themselves to be anointed ‘representatives’ and seek to banish all others. But is this the be all and end all?
——————————————————————————————————————–
9 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications
I’d previously posted info on the 3 and 4 Cav Regts’ Assn website (I was a member of the Assn, having served in 4 Cav Regt) … re the possible award of the Unit Citation. The post was immediately removed (for ”political” reasons) and my membership was cancelled. The 3/4 Cav Regt Assn is a member of the RAAC Corporation … (say no more)!
The following was posted on the SOA FB page on 7 December 2019:
“Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation (B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt)
A Hearing was conducted by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal on 29 October 2019 to consider an appeal for eligibility of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR in 1970, to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
The outcome of the Hearing was that the Tribunal was compelled, because of a technicality associated with the foreign award, to deem that the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation was awarded, not just for Operation Hammersley, but for the whole period of 8RAR’s tour in Vietnam.
If it could shown, however, that A Sqn 1 Armd, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn RAE provided significant support to 8RAR during this time, then the matter of extending eligibility would be reconsidered.
To meet the deadline set by the Tribunal, the submission to this end will be submitted on 16 December 2019. The outcome will be advised.”
Maybe it will be ‘approved’ for the site, maybe it will be ‘deleted’.
Postscript: It hasn’t been deleted. There is a side bar for ‘Visitor Posts’ and there it sits. Well at least those in B Sqn 3/4 Cav know what is happening in terms of their ‘heritage’ (if not members of the 3&4 Cav Regts’ Assn). Thank you SOA FB page moderator.
————————————————————————————————————————–
8 December 2019 (7 December, see 10 December)
Further Update on 2 Cav Badge
Getting to the truth of things is never easy. Just when we thought that everything was lined up, new information emerges:
There are references which state that the badge came first, then the mascot:
“As a result of the selection of the eagle for a badge, and after viewing a documentary film dealing with wedge tailed eagles, members of the unit decided an eagle as a mascot was a sensible idea. The members of the unit petitioned the 2IC (Captain A.J. Hull) to make a representation to the Wild Life Division of the CSIRO to obtain an eagle as a mascot. A series of letters were exchanged until 26 October 1967 when a suitable eaglet was located.”
Added to this is the story regarding the competition and the Orderly Room Cpl.
The then Tpr Burgess was the 2 Cav Regt orderly room clerk in 1966, his boss in the orderly room at that time was Cpl Bill Burton (later Major Burton OAM). When Bill left in late 66 on posting to Armd Centre, Burgess was subsequently promoted as his replacement. Burton didn’t see the badge during his time at Holsworthy and didn’t hear of the competition until after he had left.
Tpr Darlington was at 2 Cav from Nov 67 to May 68. He wasn’t aware of the competition and didn’t see the badge during his time there.
There are also conflicting memories of others there at the time:
“The badge came to 2Cav very early 68. I was posted to 3Cav Jan 68 I saw blokes with the new badge on. I went to the Q store and asked the Cpl behind the counter if I could have one NO was the reply you are now 3Cav. I said come on I was one off the original members of 2Cav and would like one as a keepsake. The answer was NO.”
“I returned from SVN 3 Cav in late Oct 68 and was posted to A Sqn.2 Cav. I stayed with them for over 6 months and was reposted back to B Sqn 3 Cav (Holsworthy). I was never issued the now 2 Cav badge. We wore the Corps badge. “
So, there are reports that the badge was issued in early 1967; in early 1968; and later than March 1969. The only things we know for sure is that the Queen gave her approval on 2 Dec 68 and this was conveyed to the Australian Army on 4 April 1969. (Also … following numerous personal attestations, we also that it was NOT issued in’ early 1967’.)
On 25 Mar 69, Defence wrote to the GG’s Office asking why they hadn’t heard anything in relation to their request for approval of the badge. The GG’s Office responded on 4 Apr 69 to explain that they had previously written giving the Queen’s approval. The concern by Defence can be appreciated when considerations were underway for the formal creation of 2 Cav Regt in 1970.
I’m sure all will come out in the wash (as they say).
I made the following comment, but there has been no response as yet:
“Hi Nick,
Great article. Congrats on all you’ve achieved in grasping the opportunities presented.
I wonder, does JTW have any focus at all on armour support?
As was found in New Guinea and Vietnam, the jungle offers opportunities for an enemy to construct defensive positions which can only be successfully attacked with direct fire support provided by armour.
Best wishes, Bruce
Update on 2 Cav Badge
Following on from yesterday … it’s been established that Glenn Darlington’s painting of the very new 2 Cav mascot, was the inspiration for the 2 Cav Regt badge.
The 2 Cav Regt Assn has been in touch with Glenn. They have a C’tee meeting coming up in February and options as to how best to take the matter forward to the Regiment will be discussed. Glenn has offered to do a ‘significant’ painting, based on his original work and to present this to the Regiment. A recent example of his work below shows that he is quite a dab hand as an artist.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
5 December 2019
Why it is That we Can’t Believe Everything We’re Told or Read (II)
Following on from yesterday … re the 2 Cav Regt Badge (see post for 29 Nov 19 below)
The story presented was that Glenn Darlington, while at 2 Cav Regt (waiting to go to Vietnam) during Nov 67 – May 68, did a painting of the newly arrived mascot, Tpr Courage. When he was posted out, he gave the picture to the Orderly Room clerk to hang in the Orderly Room. A competition was subsequently held for the design of a unit badge. This was won by the newly promoted Orderly Room Cpl. The design of the badge happens to be almost identical to Glenn’s painting.
So, Glenn’s painting couldn’t have been the genesis of the design for the badge.
BUT, the references above are wrong.
A search of the Australian archives reveals that the design of the badge was sent to HM The Queen for approval on 25 Nov 68. This was granted on 2 Dec 68.
So, it could not have been before ‘early in 1969’ that the badge was issued; furthermore, Glenn Darlington is very likely to have been the inspiration for its design. (Maybe it was just a typo, ie. a 7 for a 9 … but even so, the consequences can be significant.)
————————————————————————————————————————
4 December 2019
Why it is That we Can’t Believe Everything We’re Told or Read
When I was writing my book, I was staggered at the number of errors that were included in publications. Because this information was ‘published’, it was deemed to be true.
How did I respond to this with my book? I was fortunate that the 1 AR Assn allowed a ‘Living History’ page to be included on its website, so that anyone who read the book and could add new info or correct mistakes, had the opportunity to do so. This could be printed out as an ‘Erratum’ and also included if a second edition was to be printed. [There have been a number of print runs, but no second edition as yet.]
While researching my book, I found that those I interviewed fell into three categories:
Those who told the truth;
Those who didn’t tell the truth, but thought that they were (which is readily understandable);
And those who weren’t telling the truth, and knew that they weren’t.
Fortunately, those in the last category were far and away the minority. They did what they did for a number of reasons:
(i) To promote their own standing;
(ii) For purposes of establishing circumstances by which they could fraudulently claim benefits; and
(iii) For revenge, ie. to get back at someone against whom, they hold a grudge.
I’ve just been made aware of another example of (i) and maybe also (ii). (Note: This does not relate to any ‘ANZMI type’ offence.)
Why mention it? Just to reinforce the Topic heading.
———————————————————————————————————————–
3 December 2019
The Hammersley Round 2 Submission.
Following on from yesterday …. the input to the submission provided by the 1 Fd Sqn Assn:
How Were They Gallant?
The motto of 1 Fd Sqn in Vietnam was ‘Follow the Sapper’. Sappers worked in front of the infantry and the armour to find and deal with mines, explosives, trip wires, caches, and booby traps … using their eyes, bayonets and electronic detectors. Sappers did not get the opportunity to look for enemy soldiers who might be looking for them. They had to concentrate on the ‘ping’ from their mine-detector or see that tiny sign or that scratch in the dirt that shouldn’t be there. Sappers relied on their mates coming behind to look after their backs. It took a special kind of gallantry to work like that, but it was taken for granted because it was a Sapper’s job.
Sappers went down holes in the ground. Tunnels and bunkers where the risk of impalement, being shot while deep underground in inky blackness or being asphyxiated in the depths of a shaft, drive or sap came at a premium in nightmarish circumstances. But they did it anyway. That takes a special kind of gallantry that is impossible to describe. Sappers defused bombs, explosive devices and mines. Some of these were fitted with anti-handling devices or demonish ‘double-bluff’ devices that were designed to kill them. Sappers knew this, but pressed on anyway. That was a Sapper’s job – and it took a special kind of gallantry. Sappers must also be prepared at all times to function in their secondary role, to fight as infantrymen in attacks, ambushes, and defended localities.
Is it right therefore, that an infantry unit be recognised for its gallantry, when the AFV crews and sappers who continually supported it during combined arms operations, are not?
—————————————————————————————————————————-
2 December 2019
The Hammersley Round 2 Submission.
If anyone can add to this please do. (The 1 Fd Sqn Assn has provided an equivalent explanation for sappers.)
How Were They Gallant?
Any AFV driver who sets out on an operation, knowing that he might detonate an anti-tank mine which could totally destroy his vehicle … is gallant, ie. he is doing his assigned task without having any control over the events that might occur. This is similar to the infantryman who moves forward, despite the possibility of stepping on a mine or being shot by the enemy.
Any AFV crewman who sets out on an operation, knowing that his vehicle might detonate a mine, be penetrated by an RPG, or be the target of a sniper or satchel charge, is gallant. This is similar to an infantryman who knows that he might enter an ambush at any time.
Any crewman who is part of an AFV ambush at night, without any night vision devices or other means of detecting the enemy’s approach, and without any means of stopping their vehicle emitting fuel smells and making sounds when metal parts cool, is gallant. This is a little different to an infantryman, who has a well proven ground hugging procedure for the same thing.
It’s been often said, that infantry felt that they were lucky if they were well away from AFVs, because the AFVs drew the enemy’s fire. It follows that AFV crews were particularly gallant when they led assaults on enemy defended positions … given that they were vulnerable to mines, anti-armour projectiles, snipers, satchel charges and even small arms fire (as they weren’t able to close down).
In addition to the above, AFVs provided the core of ready reaction forces. On call out, everything was subordinate to getting to the infantry as quickly as possible. It was a common tactic of the enemy to lure reaction forces onto a mine or into an ambush. AFV crewmen were gallant in putting these thoughts out of their minds as they rushed to their destination in order to save lives.
It must be noted re the above, that (i) AFV crewmen were both members of the RAAC and the RAEME and (ii) tank and APC troops were always accompanied by sappers whenever and wherever they went. How were sappers gallant in their own way?
———————————————————————————————————————————–
1 December 2019
The AWM Reconstruction: Public Consultation
An outline of the most recent consultation and that coming up was given on 28 November.
I doubt that there will be many who respond to my appeal for “wide consultation as to how armour related exhibits should be displayed within the AWM (with a view to providing such advice to the AWM Development Team)”. The aim being to influence the manner in which armoured corps stories are portrayed for future generations. I had initially grouped the light horse with the armoured corps … but the thought has just struck me, there is a very active LH Assn. I’m sure that they would welcome such an opportunity and I will get in touch with them.
The leaves the AAC and RAAC exhibits. I guess I’ll be left as the one to progress the submission to the AWM. Why not? I could offer a few reasons, but leaving that aside … what’s the plan?
As I see it … a draft submission is prepared and circulated among as many stakeholders as possible. Once input has been received, it is submitted to the AWM.
In terms of content, the main focus, again as I see it, is to move away from the technical specifications of AFVs as the be-all and end-all in terms of exhibits, to a means by which the challenges faced by those crewing the vehicles are explained, ie. why it is that they were so brave to do what they did.
The AWM Vietnam Gallery currently states, for example, that the Centurion was “nearly imperious to most enemy weapons”. This gives the impression that crews operated inside a protected cocoon with minimal risk. Of course, tanks (and APCs) and their crews were vulnerable to mines, anti-armour weapons, satchel charges, snipers, shrapnel and even small arms (given that it was not possible to ‘close down’). I believe that the information provided by AWM exhibits should include, for example, the number of AFVs penetrated by anti-armour weapons and destroyed by mines; and the number of crew casualties (possibly as a percentage of those who served).
Work in progress ….
———————————————————————————————————————-
30 November 2019
Operation Hammersley Submission II
(See numerous earlier Blog posts)
The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) has advised that 19 December is the date by which both parties (ie, Defence and ourselves) have to submit evidence to show whether or not supporting arms contributed to 8RAR’s operations throughout its tour of duty.
The Tribunal has also advised that there has been no decision as yet as to whether or not a second Hearing will be held (or if they’ll decide the matter based on the submissions etc).
The Tribunal’s deadline is encouraging, as we’ve been emphasing the National Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary on 18 Feb 20 and asking for a decision by that time.
So … it would seem that it all turns on our submission to the DHAAT and our response to Defence’s submission. As previously mentioned, … if anyone has a first-hand account in terms of supporting 8RAR during 1970 … please let me know.
PS. I say it all ‘turns on’ … hopefully this is correct as we have a rock-solid case, but just maybe there are other ‘factors’ involved. I won’t say more … but when a Citation proposal lists among a unit’s number of enemy casualties, those which can be attributed to supporting arms; but fails to include as part of its ‘own casualty’ number, those suffered by supporting arms ….
———————————————————————————————————————–
29 November 2019
The Story Behind the 2 Cavalry Regiment Badge
Glenn Darlington, an ‘8th Intake Nasho’ was posted to A Sqn 2 Cav in November 1967. His departure to Vietnam with 1 Armd Regt had been delayed a few months after an accident on the assault course at Canungra. A fractured patella resulted in a cast from hip to ankle and light duties meant that he had spare time in the 4Troop lines, near where the newly arrived mascot, a wedge tailed eagle named ‘Trooper Courage’, was kept.
An advertising artist in civvy life, he had the chance to paint a small picture of Courage… in descending flight carrying a lance and trailing the red and white fluted Cavalry lance pennant. [“It was painted in acrylic on board and about the size of foolscap (A4) and in landscape format”.]
Before leaving for South Head Personnel Depot for departure to SVN, he emptied his locker, and, on checking out from 2 Cav, gave the painting to the Orderly Room Clerk with the suggestion that it might look good on the wall, should the Orderly Room get it framed.
During 1968-1969, he served in Vietnam as a crew member on a Centurion tank. Some years after returning to Australia, still working in advertising, he saw a photograph of 2 Cav Regt on parade at Victoria Barracks, Sydney. The first thing he noticed was that their beret badge was “remarkably and substantially similar to my painting of Trooper Courage”.
Thirty years later, he came across a story which stated that a competition had been held within 2 Cav Regiment (after he had left) for the design of a unit badge. It was won by the orderly room corporal. The story went on to say that not long after, 2 Cav received its new badge … a wedge tailed eagle swooping, carrying a lance bearing the motto “Courage” in its talons.
This led to a search for the person to whom he had given his painting. “I tried locating him but could not find him. I tried Army archives but could only find correspondence sent to the Buckingham Palace for royal assent of the badge.” Resigned to things being what they were, he noted that it “was ironic that my in my civilian business I represented the copyright and design rights for Walt Disney, Lucas Film, 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros, DC Comics, Universal Studios, and Tribune Media”. On a positive note: “I’m now painting again after fifty years.
The last was an opportunity not to be missed … could you possibly paint something similar to that which you did over 50 years ago, I asked?
The response: “I belted this off a moment ago. It’s rough but it’s the components of the painting that I remember painting. Blue sky and Trooper Courage more in a descending dive
————————————————————————————————————————
28 November 2019
The AWM Reconstruction: Public Consultation
The following email to the AWM explains …
“I’ve just come from the Consultation session at the AWM. Congratulations on conducting it and for planning many more.
May I offer as suggestion. The info I received from the AWM stated that this consultation was about “the design plans for the memorial’s development project”.
When I got there, I learned that this consultation session related to the EPBC Act (I didn’t even know what EPBC stood for). To their credit, those involved did their best to answer the questions (only one of which related to EPBC).
My interest was related to the content of the planned content of the Galleries. I was informed that there will be another round of consultations related to this.
Could the AWM please be more specific in its promotional material, as to what consultation sessions are intended to address?
PS. I sent an email to you advising the nature of my interest in attending the consultation session, but didn’t receive any response.”
Having said the above, it was worthwhile attending the session. My question related to the normal expectation that you start with the exhibits and then design a building to facilitate their display … yet the consultation sessions re the galleries were still to be held? Someone else queried the same thing, from the Defence families’ viewpoint, ie. why is it that you’ve decided on the design of the building, but there hasn’t been any consultation as to how we might like to see the stories portrayed?
The answer was that the displays will never be a fixture, but will evolve and be renewed over time. The building ‘envelope’, however, will have to serve the AWM for the next 75 years.
So … if I had any involvement in stewardship matters, I’d be initiating consultation with veterans and serving members to develop an outline as to see if any have ideas as to how armour related exhibits should be displayed within the AWM (with a view to providing such advice to the AWM Development Team). The 1 AR Assn have washed their hands of any such involvement … saying that they “are not a lobby organisation!”. I wonder if the RAACA might take up such a challenge with the aim of influencing the manner in which armoured corps stories are portrayed for future generations?
PS. The speaker immediately before me said the she had just passed the tank outside on the way to the meeting and displaying such weapons of war had no place in the things that the AWM stood for. It was caused quite a surprise when I said that I was the commander of tank in Vietnam when its driver was wounded in action … making the point (tactfully) that things have different meanings to different people.
———————————————————————————————————–
27 November 2019
Our Hallowed Ground
The Director of the AWM, Dr Brendon Nelson, recently participated in (and might even have instigated) this production: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMxsogy
I suggested to him, that like his excellent description of the Hall of Memory, I’m sure that focusing attention on the Stone of Remembrance in such a way … would be a service to the Nation.
The reason for this was that it was my belief “that the one of the most hallowed places in the AWM is not fully understood for what it represents”.
Some time ago I’d sent the information (copied below) about the Stone of Remembrance to the AWM. It seems that it was thought that I asked where the inscription came from. I had to explain:
“The question I was asking was why the quotation on the Stone of Remembrance refers to “Their Name” and not ‘Their Names’, ie the meaning of the words, rather than where they came from.I think it is only Ecclesiasticus that makes this clear (as I had hoped to have pointed out). When you realise that “Their Name” relates to the Name encompassing their lives’ achievements, the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men; and it will live on as if they had never died in their youth — the significance of the words mean so much more”.
Dr Nelson was appreciative of me getting in touch with him.
————————————————————————————————————
Their Name Liveth for Evermore
Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield.. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her” and “Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore’ does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world, that these men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 November 2019
The Round 2 submission is being prepared for the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal (DHAAT). The Background section is copied below. This is already in the public arena.
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation.
Background.
In 1970, the US Army had two unit awards: the Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Presidential Unit Citation. The Army of the RVN had only one such award: the Cross of Gallantry. This could only be awarded to a unit if it displayed specific deeds of valour or heroic conduct while fighting the enemy.
The US Army presented AATTV with a Meritorious Unit Commendation at a parade on 9 Feb 70. Soon after, the RVN Commanding General for that part of South Vietnam in which the Australian Task Force was located, made it known that he wanted to present either the Task Force, or one of its units, with an award recognising Australia’s contribution to the War.
On 6 Mar 70, this same Vietnamese general wrote the US Commanding General and asked that his congratulations be extended to the Commander 1ATF and the “meritorious Australian servicemen” involved in Operation Hammersley.
On 22 Apr 70, it was announced that 8RAR would not be replaced at the end of its tour. The Australian withdrawal was starting.
As the end of the year approached, the idea of a unit award became more urgent. As 1ATF wasn’t a ‘unit’ per se, it was decided that the 8RAR would be nominated for “a VN Unit Award”. A citation proposal was signed by Brigadier Henderson (Commander 1ATF) on 10 Sep 70. It listed all 8RAR’s operations up to that time and emphasised the Battalion’s success in combat.
The RVN Army HQ revised the proposed citation by deleting the reference to other operations and highlighting Operation Hammersley. New material was included relating to civic action work and 8RAR’s contribution to the Pacification and Development program.
On 21 Oct 70, the Commander Australian Force Vietnam (Major General Fraser) was advised that the RVN wished to present 8RAR with a Meritorious Unit Citation. Two days later, he informed Army HQ in Canberra that the RVN wanted to present a “Meritorious Unit Citation” to 8RAR and that he had agreed to this. The signal went on to say “Bearing in mind the ceremonies attendant on the recent presentation of a US Unit Award [Meritorious Unit Commendation] to AATTV, it is politic to accept the above award in the manner of established precedent”.
The presentation to 8RAR was made during a parade on 29 Oct 70. Although it was referred to as a Meritorious Unit Citation (and this wording was included in the title of the Citation), it was based on the CGWP Unit Citation and used the same insignia and ‘Streamer’.
The fact that the Citation related primarily to Operation Hammersley and the Streamer was named ‘Minh Dam’ [the enemy’s name for their base which was attacked during Operation Hammersley], led the AWM and many others to refer to the Meritorious Unit Citation as “including the CGWP Unit Citation”, i.e. suggesting that there were two separate awards, the latter being for Operation Hammersley. There are numerous published references, even by the former Governor-General, Major General Michael Jeffery (himself an 8RAR company commander) which state that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its involvement in Operation Hammersley. The Official Historian for the Vietnam War attended the DHAAT Hearing on 29 October 2019 and stated that, to him, the wording of the Citation seemed to be referring to Operation Hammersley.
Unfortunately, no official documentation for the establishment of a Meritorious Unit Citation can be located. It is the belief of the Tribunal, therefore, that it was (i) the RVN CGWP Unit Citation which was awarded to 8RAR and (ii) it was for their entire service in Vietnam up until 29 October 1970, when it was presented.
It cannot be explained why 8RAR’s citation proposal was amended by the RVN to refer to the Battalion’s efforts to “reconstruct houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc”, even though the CGWP Unit Citation is awarded solely for acts of heroic conduct when fighting the enemy.
The contention that the RVN Commanding General III Corps was wanting to match his US counterpart in recognising the service of Australian units, and had ‘created’ an award to do this, cannot be substantiated without any proclamation of such an award being available. The fact that the RVN ‘created’ a Presidential Unit Citation at the same time (akin to that of the US) to award to 161 Bty RNZA, cannot be regarded as a precedent.
The Tribunal decided that, as the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for all 8RAR’s time in Vietnam, if 8RAR was supported by A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn during the operations involved, they might be eligible for the same award.
Both parties (i.e. the Applicant and Defence) were requested to provide a basis for such a decision along these lines. The Tribunal have asked how long Defence will require to gather this information, however, Defence has not responded as yet
———————————————————————————————————————-
25 November 2019
The New Blog Page
I had hoped that I could get through 2019 on the same blog page. When it started to ‘GRIND’ its way through updates, however,I decided it was time make a change.
Unfortunately, I’d left it too late and I almost brought the whole system down. Talk about pulling my hair out!!
Anyway, back on-line (just) … and on to ‘Doing the Right Thing IV’ (plus some tidying up still to do).
1 Armd Regt News.
I was interested to read on the Regt’s Facebook page [https://www.facebook.com/1ArmdRegt/] that the Paratus Cup winning troop gets to fly regimental pennants from their antennae … what a good idea!
I say surprisingly, as I had thought of Cambrai Day as a Regimental Day, not just a ‘tank’ day.
Presumably, the tank squadrons at 2 Cav and 2/14 LH QMI also paraded? Of course, 2 Cav Regt would have celebrated its birthday. Speaking of which … is it not time that Glenn Darlington was acknowledged for his involvement in the design of the 2 Cav Regt badge? (Watch this space)
Another thing I noticed was that 1 Armd Regt are creating a Regimental Museum and are asking for anyone who may have items that they are willing to donate … to do so. Well done 1 Armd Regt!
Please may there be more ‘bouquets’ across the board in the New Year. We could all do with a bit of a ‘lift’.
Let’s hope we can get the Unit Citation for Gallantry approved for supporting arms in time. The relevant submission is still a week away from completion. Defence have given no idea when their’s might be ready.
Having read DVA’s synopsis of Operation Hammersley (see URL above), I was surprised how little it conveyed of what actually happened (and why a National Commemoration is being conducted).
The following outline is 374 words (compared to 312 on the DVA website). I propose to suggest to DVA that it be considered (at least in part) to convey some measure of the bravery and sacrifice that makes the Operation so important.
“Operation Hammersley was conducted in the Long Hai hills from 10 February – 3 March 1970. The area had always been a strong enemy base, known to the Viet Cong as the ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’.
Soon after having ambushed a large enemy force, 8RAR was tasked to capitalize and a quick attack was launched when an enemy bunker system was located: an infantry company in APCs, with a tank troop leading.
A tank became bogged while crossing a gully close to the objective. APCs found another crossing and pressed forward to maintain the momentum. One APC was hit by three RPGs, infantry inside were all wounded. The commander from another APC, together with an infantryman, rescued those involved. Two crewmen from the first tank which had been able to negotiate the gully, dismounted to tow the APC and its wounded crew away from the bunkers. The enemy threw a satchel charge, killing the crew, setting fire to the APC, and wounding those trying to recover it. The combined arms force pulled back.
A follow-up attack was mounted with artillery and air support. Tanks led again, with infantry following in APCs. The enemy pulled back when confronted with the tanks’ massive firepower. When it became known that an anti-tank minefield had been laid, the attack was called off. The enemy quickly reoccupied the bunkers, bringing intense fire to bear on the tanks. One was hit by about eight RPGs.
A final task had to be completed before darkness fell. A solid wall of armour advanced toward the enemy, ‘blasting them with everything’. A tank dozer followed in reverse, heading straight for the ‘knocked out’ APC and its crew. It pushed the stricken vehicle away from the enemy, to a point where it could be hooked up by a recovery vehicle.
Following a B52 bomber strike on the position, tanks led another assault on the enemy position the next day. The enemy had had enough and abandoned over 200 bunkers, large quantities of weapons and numerous caches of supplies. Elements of 8RAR, with tank support, were tasked to interdict the withdrawing enemy. While moving into position, one of the tanks detonated a large mine. Three of the crew were wounded and the tank was destroyed.”
PS. DVA have responded to say thanks for the input and the wording will be considered by the Commemorations Team.
Note: I see that 1AR Assn members recently gave a presentation to 1 Armd Regt re Operation Hammersley. This is to be applauded, but will the presentation be included on the 1AR Assn website, so that this part of our Regiment’s history can be made more broadly available? I asked the Communications Manager. It seems that there will be an article in the next newsletter, but no on-line copy of the presentation. I wonder why?
STOP PRESS. The 1 AR Assn has advised that “some of the detail” [re the Operation Hammersley presentation given to 1 Armd Regt] may be placed separately on the Website. It is a decision yet to be made. I’d previously been informed of this, but the email had become ‘lost’ prior to compiling my Blog. Fingers crossed that this comes to pass … but how much better would it be for the whole presentation to made available on-line, rather than just some parts of
I was particularly interested in what he had to say about ‘forgiveness’.
I wrote to the President 1AR Assn some time back and said that I could: forgive the things that had happened; concede that the present C’tee had done much to correct the wrongs of the past; and offer to delete the Introduction to the Blog which highlighted these.
The President declined to respond. So, the 1 AR Assn’s ‘failings’ of the past are still listed at the start of the Blog … serving to remind us of how much better things have now become (and some of the reasons why).
The question is … why wasn’t the President prepared to recognise the efforts that former members made to correct the prior shortcomings in governance? See Blog 27 May 2020. Maybe he was, but was overruled by the C’tee. Then again, maybe he wanted to shore up his own place in history as the one who fixed the Constitution, ensured fair voting practices, and introduced the Assn to open and transparent governance. Or … maybe he simply wanted to whitewash all such aspects from 1AR Assn’s history.
The old African saying at the top of the Blog is: If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.
Seems to me that it follows that if you’re not prepared to go together, you’re destined not to go very far.
———————————————————————————————-
13 June 2020
Hammersley Recognition: What’s Right for the Goose …
The following letter to Mr Mark Sullivan, AO; Chairman, Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, is self-explanatory …
Dear Mr Sullivan,
It’s been reported on the ABC News, with respect to the Sheean review, that: Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal Chairman Mark Sullivan AO wrote to Senator Reynolds saying she had misled the Senate [and] demanding she “correct the record”.
You will recall that I wrote to you on a number of occasions with the respect to the Tribunal’s report at https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Cameron.pdf. I asked not that the outcome be changed, but that the public record of proceedings be corrected to correspond with the evidence actually presented. A quotation to this end is copied below
Firstly, para 48: “ The second avenue considered by the Tribunal was whether the supporting units proposed by Colonel Cameron could be considered to be elements of 8RAR for the purposes of the citation as presented — in other words, could those units be considered to be part of 8RAR from 28 November 1969 through to the date of the award? Defence was asked to consider this avenue in a question placed on notice at the October hearing.” This following omission was made: ‘The Applicant was subsequently advised that his response to this question would be welcomed and considered by the Tribunal.’
Secondly para 49: “Defence has provided the advice that the sub-units nominated by Colonel Cameron were not permanently assigned for the duration of the Battalions tour.In response to this advice, Colonel Cameron has re-stated his opinion that the sub-units were under command for Operation HAMMERSLEY.” This statement is false. The correct statement would be: Colonel Cameron provided a formal response which was supported by a 57page submission. He argued that the fact that elements of all the supporting arms were under command of 8RAR for all its operations and were critical to the successes achieved, meant that they could be considered to have been elements of 8RAR for the purposes of the citation as presented.
Given your recognition of the importance of the correctness of the public record, I ask that you reconsider my requests on the same basis as that you’ve made to Senator Reynolds.
Many thanks, Bruce
——————————————————————————————–
12 June 2020
The Victoria Cross for Australia III: Two Classes and Floodgates (or Not?)
On 29 May 2020, on the Alan Jones radio program, the Prime Minister said:
“Well, Alan, there’s no doubt that the bravery and the story of Teddy Sheean is truly remarkable, like so many stories that were remarkable of that time. And you point rightly to the valour- there was a Valour Inquiry that was held back in 2016 [sic], the ‘19 Inquiry followed that it didn’t identify additional evidence as I’m advised. The VC is the most important of all awards. Actually, not that long ago it was the New Zealand Government that made such a recommendation to the Queen and it was rejected. Les Carlyon, who I know you are a great fan of, said doing this sort of thing for a reconsideration of a VC says it creates two classes of VCs. And Keith Payne VC, who I know you greatly respect, and other VC holders have always taken a very strong view about these issues and they don’t want to see a two class system of VCs.”https://www.pm.gov.au/media/interview-alan-jones-2gb-8
Less than two weeks after his radio interview, the Prime Minister said:
“I have today commissioned an expert panel [to be led by former director of the AWM, Dr Brendan Nelson, AO] to provide me with advice as to whether the 2019 review by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal had any significant new evidence, not available to the previous reviews and otherwise available, that is compelling enough to support a recommendation by the Government that Sheean’s Mention in Despatches be replaced by a Victoria Cross.” The panel is to report by 31 July 2020.
In the same article quoted above, https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/expert-panel-to-review-wwii-sailor-s-victoria-cross-case-20200610-p551dy.htm, it was reported that Chief of the Defence Force Angus Campbell has previously “strongly advised” both Mr Morrison and Defence Personnel Minister Darren Chester not to seek the honour for Sheean. In a letter to them both, General Campbell acknowledged the young sailor’s bravery but warned a request to grant him a VC could open the floodgates to a “swath of additional claims for retrospective military honours” from “all past conflicts”.
The latter consequence is a newly published one as far as the CDF is concerned. He had been reported previously as objecting to the award because, if it was made, the Queen would be put in a difficult position (because HM had previously rejected a similar request for a retrospective award from NZ).
So, if Dr Nelson’s panel was to recommend that the VC be awarded to ‘Teddy’ Sheean … in the opinion of the PM and CDF, it would entrench two classes of VC and open the floodgates to a swath of claims for retrospective awards (as well putting the Queen in a difficult position). What would these ‘two classes of award’ comprise? It would seem that they would be: (i) awards recommended on the battlefield; and (ii) awards made retrospectively. Even if compelling new evidence was to come to light, a retrospective award would always be classed differently … possibly a VC (R)?
The PM has previously accepted these reasons and rejected the recommendation of the Tribunal for the award to be made. BUT … public opinion (aka votes) means that a face-saving new enquiry is now to be held. What odds … the political acceptance or rejection of the outcome?
“Each event is significant, and none can really be meaningfully compared to the other.”
I totally agree. My similar anecdote is from a presentation on Long Tan, given at the AWM. The historian remarked: “It was just small beer”. He was comparing Long Tan with Passchendaele. I was so incensed that I stood up and stated that he had no right to use the term ‘small beer’; asking if he could understand how insulting it would be to the NOK of the Long Tan casualties to have the sacrifices of their family members, portrayed on this basis? The bravery and dedication of soldiers is the same, not matter the scale of the battle.
You mention that “Our Army has Courage, Respect, Initiative and Teamwork as its core values”. I don’t doubt for one minute that our soldiers today live up to, and indeed, exceed, these expectations. I wonder, however, if they are being supported well enough.
Sometimes the maturity of a nation is expressed in terms of the degree to which it cares for its veterans. I believe that the maturity of an Army can be expressed in terms of the degree to which it embraces the lessons that have been learnt from past experiences (not only those of yesterday, but also those happening in real time).
The Vietnam experience was that combat lessons had to be re-learnt (at the cost of casualties) by every new unit deployed. There was no attempt interview soldiers returning from active service, so as to gain (and build on) their insights and experience. Has the Australian Army of today, reached maturity?
—————————————————————————————–
9-10 June 2020. Note: There will be no Blog posts on 9 or 10 June. I’ll be away on ‘grandparental duties’.
—————————————————————————————–
8 June 2020
Our History (And How it Becomes Distorted) II
Following on from 18 March 2020,
A post on another site (copied at end) shows just how easily our history can become distorted. The wording in the post is included on this site https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Centurion_tank, though it might have been copied from a different one. Tracking some of the references given, shows that some of the source material has been misquoted. Research undertaken for ‘Canister! On! FIRE! (two print runs now sold out) allows me make the following observations. Of course, others could well add even more value to the subject (one I believe to be important, not just in terms of historical accuracy, but also by way of obligation to the tank crews involved).
The presence of the HQ 7NVA Division (plus other Divisional units) was a factor in terms of the enemy’s offensive capability during the Coral-Balmoral actions.
The composite troop (formed at FSB Coral) did not include two tank dozers (none had been able to reach the FSB). For the action on 2 June 1968, two additional tanks were ‘borrowed’ from 1 Troop. Later in June the blades were removed from the tank dozers (because of mechanical problems, which were later resolved) and 3 Troop was formed.
“By 1969” should read “By the end of 1970 …” (and A Squadron 3rd Cavalry should be added).
“Originally deployed as 26 Centurion tanks” is misleading. The tank squadron comprised 20 tanks; six others were held by the Forward Delivery Unit (an independent entity).
Two tank crewmen were not Killed In Action. One was KIA, the other Died of Wounds.
Main armament stowage for the Centurion Mk 5/1 (Aust) was reduced from 62 to 60 because of the space taken up with stowage for RMG ammo and IR batteries.
Stowage for machine gun ammunition amounted to 7000 x .30cal (incl 2500 in the rack behind the commander’s cupola) and 700 x .50cal rounds.
The fact that the Centurion had a petrol engine did not, of itself, necessitate the additional fuel tank. This was added to provide greater range, as was expected to be required for operations in Vietnam.
————————————————————————–
“Here’s something I did not know –
After the battles at firebases Coral and Balmoral, in which the 1 ATF defeated the 141st and 165th NVA Infantry Regiments in May 1968, a third Centurion troop, which included two tankdozers, was formed. By September 1968, ‘C’ Squadron was brought to its full strength of four troops, each equipped with four Centurion tanks. By 1969, ‘B’ Squadron, 3rd Cavalry; ‘A’ Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment; ‘B’ Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment; and ‘C’ Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, had all made rotations through South Vietnam. Originally deployed as 26 Centurion tanks, after three and a half years of combat operations, 58 Centurions had served in country; 42 had suffered battle damage with six beyond repair and two crewmen had been killed in action.
The Centurion crews, after operating for a few weeks in country, soon learned to remove the protective armoured side skirts from both sides of the tank, to prevent the vegetation and mud from building up between the track and the mudguards. Each Centurion in Vietnam normally carried a basic load of 62 rounds of 20 pounder shells, 4,000 rounds of .50 cal and 9,000 rounds of .30 cal machine gun ammunition for the tank commander’s machine gun as well as the two coaxial machine guns. They were equipped with petrol engines, which necessitated the use of an extra externally mounted 100-imperial-gallon (450 L) fuel tank, which was attached to the vehicle’s rear.”
———————————————————————————————–
7 June 2020
The Thucydides Trap
At the end of my Blog post on 2 May 20, I said “Sometimes I’m ashamed of my country”.
This story was brought to my attention by a member of Australia’s Vietnamese Community:
The member of the Vietnamese Community went on to say that “It’s so absurd and ridiculous that a student of the University of Queensland is facing expulsion [see below] over his criticising China’s authoritarian regime, whereas everyone in Australia is free to criticise the Australian government of all levels (ie. the right to freedom of expression and opinion). Why so? More to the point, I question – Is this Australia or China? Is Australia part of China? Does Australia belong to China? Or has Australia been taken over by China?”. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8327139/University-Queensland-student-faces-expulsion-speaking-against-Chinese-Communist-Party.html
I guess those who have lived under a communist regime (or the real threat of one) are more aware of our democratic freedoms and less likely to take them for granted.
The ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, said that “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” The 500 years since have seen ‘sixteen cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling one. Twelve of these ended in war.
6 June 2020
ADF Culture and Learning
In the Blog about Leadership in the ADF on 3 June, I said: “May I suggest that something used in the commercial world, would be of value in terms of the Army’s hierarchical assessment system. I refer to bottom up assessment, ie. rather than a superior officer being the sole reporting authority, an officer’s/NCO’s subordinates be required to provide input. I know that it’s a revolutionary concept and will never be adopted, but I really think the answer lies in this type of radical change”. It was subsequently brought to my attention that :
It’s been said that: “The amount of time spent in legal consultations and “political correctness training” take away from the amount of time available for training for things such as warfighting and nation building.” Makes me wonder what the core learning competencies are for ‘Warfighting 101’. In this vein, I was intrigued to read the following in an article earlier today: “I was taken aback to see that the bronze servicemen guarding the Cenotaph in Martin Place (Sydney) have fixed bayonets – indicating their readiness to kill”. I wonder if a ‘readiness to kill‘ is one of the competencies required for ‘warfighting’? Surely not.
I believe that there are some significant lessons that business can pass on to the military.
I’m aware of an industrial laundry which met the needs of some major companies. The owners (who’d been in the business for generations), thought that their competitive advantage was the precision with which they produced uniforms with crisp creases.
When we surveyed the customers, they didn’t care a hoot about this … they valued the laundry because it had a facility to add patches to the uniforms so that different divisions of the business could be differentiated. When this was made know to the owners, it transformed their business. (I was also involved in a survey of the customers of the Australian munitions factories … those running the factories had absolutely no idea as to what their customers thought of their products and their delivery commitments … the factories were sold!)
I wonder if the Army will ever survey its soldiers.
———————————————————————————————
5 June 2021
National Defence Strategy: Safeguarding the Sea Routes
Commentators are everywhere, saying things like:
The greatest military risk we run is being led by the nose into a US war with China.”
“This crap that is going on politically and economically with China could force a war. Whether it is a shooting war or an economic sanctions type standoff … I have a very strong feeling it could be coming and soon.”
Whether or not this sense of ‘threat’ is real is for everyone to judge for themselves. When doing so, the following extract is relevant:
‘Common wealth? The state of Australian foreign policy’ (Andrew Carr*)
“ … what’s required is far more national discussion about how Australia as a single nation should view the world. … The way to ensure that the right kinds of behaviour occur without direct control is to have a clearer sense of who we are as a nation, what we want from the world, and what values we will and will not accept.
In yesterday’s Blog I made the point that “Australia is dependent on sea-borne imports”. Extracts from a recent Australian Security Policy Institute article are copied under.
‘Time for a standing force to keep the Malacca Strait clear of mines’ (Greg Mapson**)
Much has been said about the parlous state of Australia’s fuel reserves and the plan to stockpile oil in the United States. If the time comes to call on that emergency reserve, it will pass through the Malacca Strait. It is also a crucial route for much of Australia’s other imports and exports, including most of our coal, gas, bauxite and iron.
A mining incident in the Malacca Strait would be cataclysmic for many Asian nations and for Australia.
Mine-countermeasure assets, skills and practices among Southeast Asian navies bordering the Malacca Strait are poor, except for those of Singapore, which has continued to build its mine countermeasure capabilities and now, arguably, is well ahead of Australia.
To counter the growing threat in the region, Australia needs to champion the establishment of a standing mine countermeasure force for the Malacca Strait. This initiative could be forged under the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Australia, the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore all have the capacity to contribute to such a standing force, which should be ready to react at short notice to any mining incident in the strait or its approaches.
The following quote is from an article by Nick Deane*, ‘My fear – a US led war with China?’.
“I await the day when serious strategists within the defence establishment acknowledge the enormous difficulty that presents itself to any party thinking to invade or take over Australia by military means. The country is under no military threat, and that situation is never likely to change. We are an island continent. That simple, geographical fact makes invasion exceedingly difficult, if not downright impossible. We have an entire continent, with all its resources, united under a single government. We are in an extraordinarily safe situation, that makes our pre-occupation with militarism slightly absurd. The British Conquest took about 100 years before it was complete, and it was only possible because the invaders had extraordinary technological advantage.”
“It’s interesting to see the colonisation of Australia classed as a “conquest [which] took about 100 years” [See Blog post on 29 May 2020.] Makes one wonder why the first defenders of our nation’s sovereignty and its people’s families, possessions and land, are not able to recognised in the AWM. (A simple stroke of a pen to amend the charter could reverse this.) Can it never happen again? Can we really retrain the ADF to solely aid in natural defence emergencies? Australia is dependent of sea-borne imports. Another nation that wishes to impose its will on Australia, simply has to interdict these supply routes.”
Another commentator added:
Bruce, very similar prior to the dropping of the A bomb 6 August 1945. Japan had experienced a naval blockade that prevented the arrival of any food or other supplies. Japan was on their knees, starving to death and anticipating a land invasion that they were prepared to defend with bamboo sticks rather than surrender. So it can happen!
*Nick Deane is an ex-public servant with a degree in Sociology. He is a member of the co-ordinating committee of the Independent and Peaceful Australia Network (IPAN) and convenor of the Marrickville Peace Group.
—————————————————————————————
3 June 2020
Everlasting Leadership
The following quote is from an article in the latest edition of ‘The Cove’:
“A careerist is a professional who is intent on furthering their career by any means possible and often at the expense of their own integrity. They place their personal success over their job and over others and will go to great lengths to be successful.” WO1 John Pickett, OAM* https://cove.army.gov.au/article/leadership-the-profession-arms-good-soldiering-capital-l
I hadn’t heard the term ‘careerist’ before.
There was a folk lore in my time (70s-80s) that if you proposed a new idea and it worked, you got a good mark; if you proposed a new idea and didn’t work, you got a black mark … therefore (so the theory went) if you want to get ahead, don’t propose anything and you’re assured not to have any black marks.
RSM Prickett went on to say:
“Minimising the negative effect, a careerist can have on the organisation becomes somewhat difficult when we consider the nature of military service. Striving for promotion, taking on greater leadership and responsibility, along with a reporting and selection system that would appear to reward the safe conformist or careerist over the more dynamic inspirational leader, exacerbates this negative organisational behaviour.
Ultimately, if we can create a culture within Army that is failure tolerant, that all are comfortable with trying and failing without facing the repercussion of ending our career, and that is premised on the ability to develop those we lead, then it would change some attitudes by recognising and rewarding the right example and reducing the number of self-serving careerist.”
I responded to say that: “May I suggest that something used in the commercial world, would be of value in terms of the Army’s hierarchical assessment system. I refer to bottom up assessment, ie. rather than a superior officer being the sole reporting authority, an officer’s/NCO’s subordinates be required to provide input. I know that it’s a revolutionary concept and will never be adopted, but I really think the answer lies in this type of radical change”.
*John Pickett is an Infantry soldier with over 35 years’ experience. As a Warrant Officer Class One (WO1) he has been privileged to have held the appointments as Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) of the Forty First Battalion The Royal New South Wales Regiment, Second Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, a Career Advisor within the Directorate of Soldier Career Management – Army, RSM of the Combat Training Centre and RSM of the 13th Brigade. He is currently posted to the Centre for Australian Army Leadership.
—————————————————————————————————
2 June 2020
ADF Readiness: Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Explosive (CBRNE) Warfare
“The coronavirus crisis reveals the grim and terrible new potential for biological warfare. And the news is almost all bad. However, there is one bit of good news. COVID-19 itself is not biological warfare, even accidental biological warfare. There is a pretty virulent conspiracy theory going around to the effect that the pathogen was created, or curated, in China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology — and then deliberately, or accidentally, leaked.”
‘Coronavirus: Biological war is now top of mind’ Greg Sheridan, The Australian, 1 April 2020
Defence Science and Technology (DST) have an on-going responsibility to ensure:
properly trained and equipped forces for contamination avoidance of CBRN hazards
protection of individuals, units and equipment from unavoidable CBRN hazards
decontamination in order to restore operational capability.
But to what degree is the ADF prepared? Who knows about the Special Operations Engineer Regiment (SOER)
“SOER training is similar to combat engineers, but goes beyond into Special Forces areas of ability and missions. Currently, the composition of SOER is A and B Squadrons and a Logistic Support Group, all of which are based in Sydney, New South Wales. The Regiment has grown in strength and depth to provide agile and highly trained teams that provide integrated, rapidly deployable and specialised capability to enable Special Operations. These include neutralising CBRNE threats, as well as mobility and survivability capabilities. The SOER is able to respond both domestically and in support of Australian forces deployed overseas in high threat environments. As a rapid response organisation, elements of the Regiment are maintained on short notice to move to incident sites at all times.”http://www.cbrneportal.com/australias-cbrne-defense/
Is this enough? I wonder to what degree exercises are conducted in which responses to the the Biological threat are tested.
————————————————————————————–
1 June 2021
Wargaming II
In the Blog on 21 May 2020: ‘Australian Defence Strategy IV (Wargaming?)’ I stated that:
“One wonders how much those involved in contingency planning (or the debate about our national security) make use of wargaming and simulation. This is a means open to us all to evaluate the ADF’s ability to respond to a threat against our national interests … to be continued.”
As part of their charter, the ADCSC has responsibility to contribute to the betterment of military decision making. To this end:
‘JSWAT (Joint Seminar Wargaming Adjudication Tool) produced by DST, is a computer based war-gaming environment combining features of seminar and system war-games. It uses a set of models to assist with the adjudication of movement, outcome of hostilities, detection by opposing forces, and logistics of consumption, replenishment and transport.
There is also the Australian Defence Simulation Training Centre (ADSTC), but this is related solely to co-ordination of simulators in terms of individual and collective training (rather than strategy development).
Of interest is the following paper: airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/PDF-Files/Working%20Papers/WP13-Effective-Wargaming-Impact-of-the-Changing-Nature-of-Warfare.pdf An extract from the Conclusion (below) asccords with my thinking when initiating this post:
“Wargaming as a tool for military thinkers and commanders have been in existence for a long time. The increasing complexity of modern warfare points towards it becoming even more important as a mechanism to develop, test and validate emerging concepts. Correctly used it is capable of clearly identifying and establishing the preconditions for success as well as the factors that would effectively shape the environment and thus the outcome of events.”
My original premise is not addressed by public sources, however. Are ADF contingency plans wargamed as part of their development/revision? I guess this falls into the ‘Classified’ category.
“In a series of recent wargaming activities, DST has looked at how Army may need to re-design its armoured vehicle fleets to enhance their effectiveness in future joint land warfare.
As part of this, a recent study examined the question of how well the different types of vehicle will fare in various ambush situations. Subject matter experts from Army participated in a week-long series of computer-based war games in which they played out vehicle ambush scenarios. By recording their responses, information on manoeuvre and tactics was generated for a range of vehicle types and ambush scenarios.
This information was then fed into a computer model that tested dozens of options through thousands of simulations in which certain events occurring in them were randomly determined. Through this work, the researchers arrived at the key characteristics a modern armoured vehicle must have in order to survive in a future ambush scenario.”
When I signed the petition, I stated that: “I’m signing because the current system is flawed (though it’s better than no system at all). At least it will be easier to appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (rather than having to spend tens of thousands of dollars to appeal a DHAAT decision in the Federal Court). The Letters Parent allow the award to be made retrospectively, Defence cannot deny it on this basis. Advice from Defence to the Govt must be made public if democratic principles are to be upheld”.
It seems that the advice from Defence to Government has now been made public (via a ‘leak’ to the Mercury newspaper). The Information below is from the organiser of the petition. [Note: NZ now have the same ‘No retrospective’ award policy, as Australia.]
“Fifteen thousand signatures in a week! (May 30, 2020)
A huge well done everyone for your support and sharing the petition. We are starting to gain good media traction with regular articles in the Press. The Mercury has published a leaked letter from the Chief of the Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, to the Minister and the PM.
In a question by Alan Jones to the PM on 2GB yesterday, the PM stated on air that: ” there’s no doubt that the bravery and the story of Teddy Sheean is truly remarkable…’
The PM explained his reluctance to accept the recommendation was because of advice from the CDF. The CDF was concerned that “the Queen might be put in a difficult position”. The PM explained: “…not that long ago it was the New Zealand Government that made such a recommendation to the Queen and it was rejected.”
The PM should not accept this advice as a reason for not doing the right thing. New Zealand and the UK do not have an Honours and Awards appeals process – that we introduced in 2011. The NZ government sent a delegation to meet with the Queen’s representatives in 2006. The meeting resulted in an amicable compromise, although the VC was not awarded. The Kiwis at least gave it a go – the other half of the ANZACs must follow.
We now need our PM to show courage and support the brave Teddy Sheean by accepting the recommendation of the DHAAT and forwarding that recommendation through the GG to the Queen.
16,480 have signed. Let’s get to 25,000!”
So, the CDF is not prepared to support the recommendation of the DHAAT, because it might put the Queen in a difficult position! Has there ever been a more insidious position taken by a Chief of the Defence Force in relation to one of those for whom he is responsible. Bravery and sacrifice on behalf of our nation is ditched in favour of political nicety! Why not have the gumption to put the matter to the GG and request that he either (i) make a recommendation to the Queen, or (ii) seek her advice?
————————————————————————————————–
30 May 2020
Ha Go Tank
The following email is self-explanatory ….
Dear Brian, [Maj Gen Brian Dawson, AM, CSC (Retd), Asst Director National Collection]
On 3 April 2020 I forwarded the email below to point out that the AWM’s references re the number of crew on the Japanese Ha Go tank were conflicting. You responded shortly after to say that:
“You are quite correct that there are a number of apparently contradictory articles concerning the size of the tank’s crew. As you can imagine, with the wealth of information on the Memorial’s web pages, it is often only through helpful contact from members of the public that such discrepancies are brought to light. We will endeavor to correct this information.”
I notice, however, that the conflicting references are still published on the AWM’s website. Reason for mentioning is that it was recently brought to my attention that sometimes Japanese machine gunners rode on top of the tanks. http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/jp-milne-bay/index.html. AWM staff may also care to consider the Tank Museum (Bovington) presentation re the tank: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LhCsc_rYgA4
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
Hi Brian,
I wonder if you might be able to consider amending the AWM’s references to the Ha Go Tank, so as to be consistent as regards the number of crew. At the moment there are contradictory references as to whether or not the crew was three or four. (See under.)
I, and a number of others interested in armour, are firmly of the belief that the tank had a crew of three. It is our contention (and that of the international community as a whole) that the term tank ‘crew’ refers to those who actually operated the AFV. We’re aware that some documents may include references to others, such as Japanese Landing Force ground guides, as part of the ‘crew’.
Any number of references can be supplied to back up the number of the tank’s crew as being three. That of the AWM conservation team would seem to be most relevant. However, another more recent one is provided here (also a restoration): https://riddlemagazine.com/ha-go/
Many thanks for your consideration, Bruce Cameron
AWM Contradictory References: Ha Go Tank
“This area of the Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the front proper right side of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the lower portion of the hull in the proper left side; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret.” https://www.awm.gov.au/about/our-work/projects/Ha-Gotype95lighttankconservation
This week is National Reconciliation Week. The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs stated in a press release that: “… all Australians are encouraged to learn about our nation’s shared history, cultures, and achievements, and to explore how each of us can contribute to achieving reconciliation”. http://minister.dva.gov.au/media_releases/2020/may/va052.htm
This is very laudable, but it’s not what he means.
His intention is explained in the following quote: “This year’s theme for National Reconciliation Week ‘In This Together’ is a perfect representation of how Indigenous men and women have served our nation alongside non-Indigenous men and women for more than 120 years”.
We’re not being encouraged to learn about the brave Australians who defended their family, possessions and land against the colonising forces of the 18th and 19th centuries. Neither are we being encouraged to learn about the wider Frontier Wars. To avoid these subjects, while at the same time giving the impression of championing reconciliation, the Government is highlighting the service of indigenous Australians in the armed services of the 20th and 21st centuries. A special edition of the Army newspaper was published along these lines with the catch cries “side by side” and “standing together”. https://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/NewsPapers/Army/editions/1466.pdf
These stories are important and deserve to be told, but so too are those related to ‘Australia’s first defenders’. Surely the Australians who tried to protect their family with spears when confronted by muskets and canon, deserve our admiration and respect. As a nation we honour those who can trace their ancestors back to the First Fleet. Why do we not do the same for our indigenous brothers, ie. those who can trace their ancestors to the time of colonisation.
Why is it not possible for ‘Australia’s first defenders’ to be honoured with all the Nation’s other past (and present) defenders on ANZAC Day? Why can’t indigenous Australians attend ceremonies on 25 April each year that will honour their ancestors who died on the shores of their own/our own country, while defending it?
When asked why they can’t be honoured in the AWM, the response is that the AWM Charter doesn’t allow it. But the Charter can be amended with the stroke of a pen, if there was a will to do so.
What the Government is saying, in effect, is that promotion of Reconciliation is a good thing … but only on our terms.
——————————————————————————————
28 May 2020
1AR Assn: Then and Now II
Following on from yesterday … a recent email from the 1AR Assn to members states:
“Over a period of four (4) to five (5) months, whilst [we] were learning to use the Association’s accounting package (Xero), we became aware of a number of accounting anomalies that impacted the Financial Reports that were presented to the AGM held on 12 October 2019, and which were subsequently submitted to Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) as required by legislation.
To ensure that the Management Committee acted with complete honesty, accountability and transparency[we] recommended to the President of the Association that revised Financial Statements should be prepared and provided to all members of the Association as well as consulting with CAV to ensure the Association acted in accordance with the legislative requirements. At the Management Committee meeting held on Monday 18 May 2020, a number of resolutions were passed for the actions that [were] recommended.”
So, the past Treasurer wrongly accounted for a few things; which, in turn, led to the Financial Statement being falsely certified as true and correct. (These things happen, but it would seem that an honorary auditor would be a valuable addition to the C’tee.)
It’s to the C’tee’s credit that the errors were picked up (albeit ‘accidentally’) and were made known to both CAV and members. This is in contrast with the 2017 Financial Report where members had to raise their concerns about irregularities. Part 4 of the Introduction to the Blog (above) refers:
“… the financial statement was not only not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, but also it failed to encompass the whole FY and did not disclose reasons for the expenditure of funds. All irregularities with respect to the Constitution were brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response was received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past twelve months.) It is to be hoped that governance provisions as required by law can be enacted so that the Assn will be able to move ahead with its good work looking after former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt.”
As asked yesterday … should any acknowledgement be given to the members who acted to improve the regulatory processes within the Assn? Of course.
Will this be done by the current C’tee? Snowball’s!
(It’s interesting to reflect on Snowball’s view that ‘All animals are born equal – what they become is their own affair’.)
———————————————————————————————–
27 May 2020
1AR Assn: Then and Now
“Over the last 20 or so months, the current Management Committee has implemented new policies, procedures, processes and standards which we believe have achieved significant improvements in accountability and transparency.” 1AR Assn newsletter, May 2020.
It follows that before the current C’tee was elected in July 2018, there were shortcomings in terms of openness and transparency regarding what the 1AR Assn C’tee did and how it did it, ie. there was a failure in terms of accountability to members.
Pats on the back all round!! What a great job the new C’tee’s done to fix this.
Were any members involved in bringing about this change? It would appear not.
The Secretary also states that: “Our members are now more attuned to our basic tenets (as outlined in the Constitution) of having respect for each other”. Were any members involved in calling for a valid Constitution and drafting it? It would appear not.
Why are those who contributed to the development of the Association not recognised? Maybe it’s an oversight?
The 1AR Assn website includes a page related to the Commanders’ Diaries from Vietnam. Someone spent months at the AWM going through the diaries, transcribing them in a notebook and then ‘simplifying’ them so that grid references, military ‘shorthand’, etc, were meaningful to someone reading the entries. See https://www.paratus.org.au/commander-s-diaries The Present C’tee were informed about the work involved, but refuse to make any acknowledgement of the author.
So, it’s not an oversight … something else is at play. Part 2 of the Introduction to this Blog is relevant. It’s copied below. It is for readers to form their own opinion.
Part 2 Service in the military, no matter what capacity, inculcates a commitment to doing ‘the right thing’. This became obvious when a group of members banded together to lodge a grievance to protest at the lack of natural justice provided to the member who had been expelled. While preparing this they noticed that actions taken against the member were not in accord with the Assn’s Constitution.
Delving into this more deeply, they discovered that the process required to change the Constitution had not been followed. Furthermore, the reasons given to members for having to change it were not correct. The group sought advice from Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), the authority for associations incorporated in that State. The outcome was that the Constitution was declared to be invalid, as were actions taken on the basis of its provisions.
The group of members who had brought about this outcome, asked for an apology from those who had misled members as to the reasons for changing the Constitution. This was not forthcoming. Not long after, the President and other committee members resigned. The new President and Committee spent $960 of members’ funds to get an independent legal opinion re the Constitution.
The findings confirmed the view of CAV that the Constitution was invalid. Furthermore, any member adversely affected by it was entitled to take action against the Association. The member who had been expelled was reinstated, together with his Life Membership. He agreed not to seek an apology so as to avoid causing any divisiveness in the association.
The new C’tee examined the original Constitution and found valid reasons for changing it, eg. the CAV’s default ‘Model Rules’ are ok for a State based association, but have limitations as far as a national organization is concerned. A proposed draft was sent to members. The group which had taken action against the now invalid constitution saw that the required process was still not being adopted (by oversight).
Bringing this to the attention of the C’tee stirred up something of a hornets’ nest among some members of the Assn. Social media went into a frenzy, accusing ‘constitutionalists’ of forcing younger members to leave the association because they had become fed up with “rules and BS” which mean nothing to them.
This is a recognized situation within many ex-service organizations. At least one PhD thesis is being compiled on the subject of maintaining the interest of younger members. The C’tee have been put in touch with the author. As one member of the ‘constitutionalists’ has stated, however, the Constitution is the members’ contract with their association. It must be got right, both for the members’ and Association’s sake. There is no other option. Those donating their time and energy to help the C’tee ensure the Constitution is a valid one, should be thanked, not persecuted, by the wider membership.
————————————————————————————-
26 May 2020
Honouring our Deceased 3
Following on from yesterday, I’ve sent the email below to the Secretary 1AR Assn. It is self-explanatory.
Dear Secretary,
As I advised a previous C’tee, there is no barrier to Associations listing members on their Honour Rolls who are officially classified as DOW, but are not able to be included on the AWM ROH as it is restricted to only listing war related deaths that occurred during the prescribed period of a War, plus two years.
All that has to be done is to ask “DVA to investigate whether or not the veteran’s death was war-related”. If it was, the veteran is entitled to be listed as DOW (as well as receiving an official commemoration).
I recently advised DVA that: ‘I wish to ascertain if 1200348 Cpl Andrew Martin Anderson’s death (on 20 April 2017) can be attributed to wounds he received on 25 June 1971 in Vietnam. (His left arm was amputated and he lost the sight in his right eye). The reason for asking is that DVA is to hold a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord in Canberra on 7 June 2021. A Last Post Ceremony will be conducted at the AWM on 6 June 2021. Wreaths will be laid during the LPC and Cpl Anderson’s ‘mates’ wish to ensure that all who Died of Wounds (both during and post-Vietnam) are recognised appropriately”.
DVA responded to say that Cpl A M Anderson’s death was so attributed and that he had been officially commemorated by the Office of Australian War Graves at the site of his ashes placement in the Toowoomba Garden of Remembrance and Crematorium … which will be maintained in perpetuity in recognition of his service to his country.
The 1AR Assn may care to include Cpl A M Anderson on its Honour Roll.
25 May 2020
Honouring Our Deceased 2
Following on from yesterday re the latest 1AR Assn Newsletter… it was good to see WO2 J Stone (it should be WO2 J M Stone) listed as KIA (rather than incorrectly as DOW as per the 1AR Assn website). See https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1715269
As per the discussion yesterday, the email below has been send to DVA:
Dear Sir/Madam,
In accordance with the following advice provided on the DVA website, “an application can be made to the Deputy Commissioner, DVA, primary.claims@dva.gov.au, requesting that the death be investigated as war related”, I wish to ascertain if 1200348 Cpl Andrew Martin Anderson’s death (on 20 April 2017) can be attributed to wounds he received on 25 June 1971 in Vietnam. (His left arm was amputated and he lost the sight in his right eye).
The reason for asking is that DVA is to hold a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord in Canberra on 7 June 2021. A Last Post Ceremony will be conducted at the AWM on 6 June 2021. Wreaths will be laid during the LPC and Cpl Anderson’s ‘mates’ wish to ensure that all who Died of Wounds (both during and post-Vietnam) are recognised appropriately.
Many thanks for your consideration ….
——————————————————————————————-
24 May 2020
Honouring our Deceased
The 1AR Assn latest newsletter advises that “Major points from the 27 February [C’tee] meeting included further discussion on definitions of ‘died of wounds’ and actions that may be taken by Associations to add DOW after a veteran has died. The Association was waiting on information from Defence Records at that time, and the waiting continues”.
In the Blog on 28 April 2020, I pointed out that “WO2 N. Lowes is classed as ‘DOW Post Vietnam’ [on the Assn Honour Roll]. In fact, he is listed on the AWM Roll of Honour, meaning that he died within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War and should not be listed as Post Vietnam [but simply DOW]”. The prescribed period ended on 29 April 1975.
I previously advised that the C’tee that there was no barrier to Associations listing members who are officially classified as DOW, that the AWM was not able to list (because it is restricted to only making known war related deaths that occurred during the prescribed period).
Obviously, the death has to have been related to wounds resulting from active service. How is this determined?
If the cause of death of a veteran has not already been assessed as a result of a NOK request, all the C’tee need do is to “apply in writing to their nearest state DVA office asking for DVA to investigate whether or not the veteran’s death was war-related”. If it was, the veteran is entitled to be listed as DOW (as well as receiving an official commemoration).
———————————————————————————————-
23 May 2020
Centurion Tank ARN 169056
The AWM has advised that:
“… as you are aware, the Centurion is currently displayed outside the Memorial’s Anzac Hall, together with two other armoured vehicles, a LAV-25 and a Bushmaster PMV. Given the intent to rebuild Anzac Hall in the near future as part of the Memorial’s major Development project, it is evident that all three will have to be moved. Rather than place the vehicles in store at Mitchell, however, it is intended to move them a short distance onto the plinths currently occupied by three First World War era artillery pieces; the 6 inch BL gun from HMQS Gayundah, the 9.2 inch Howitzer used by Australian Siege batteries in France, and the German 15 cm Kanone 16 captured by the 45th Battalion AIF in August 1918.
With the conclusion of the First World War centenary, it seems appropriate that these guns should now return to store, and that the outdoor displays should reflect the Memorial’s current focus upon more recent conflicts.
New interpretive panels will be added next to each of the vehicles. The Centurion’s will be larger than the existing signage and will be updated to include both information on Operation HERMIT PARK, 25 June 1971, and the crew of 5B. It is anticipated that the movement (which will probably take place over three days) and installation of new signage will occur in mid-June of this year.”
“We trust that updating the interpretive panel will reinforce that this is not merely an object or piece of military equipment, but is integral to and contains personal stories of individual service, and in this case your own.”
Very encouraging and appreciated actions of the part of Mr Mark Anderson, PSM, Director, and Maj Gen Brian Dawson, AM, CSC (Retd), Asst Director National Collection. The RAAC and its members, past and present, have been well served.
——————————————————————————————-
22 May 2020
The Centurion Which Was Hit by the Most RPGs in Vietnam
A number of readers have reminded me that following the post on 19 May ‘RPG Strikes on Centurions in Vietnam’, I failed to outline the circumstances of the Centurion which was hit by four RPGs.
This was ARN 160104, 21 Alpha, commandeered by Sgt Len Swarbrick. It was involved in Operation Goodwood on 16 February 1969:
“Swarbrick’s tank was hit. The enemy’s opportunity came when 21Alpha’s RMG and coaxial .30cal suffered stoppages at the same time. While the operator, Trooper Graeme Jackson, was desperately trying to get them going again, Swarbrick continued to engage the bunkers using the commander’s machine gun. The enemy, however, had been waiting for the slightest lull in the firing and seized the moment.
The first RPG hit the operator’s periscope, destroying it, but doing little damage otherwise. The second struck the right front of the turret, penetrating the fighting compartment. Its energy dissipated between the turret wall and the traverse gearbox in front of the gunner. Not all the crew were spared, however. When the second RPG exploded against the turret, ‘splash’ went down through the open driver’s hatches, badly wounding the driver, Trooper Mick Ingram. It also set the canvas mantlet cover alight. Unaware of Ingram’s condition, Swarbrick continued firing his .30cal. Seconds later he was forced to duck down into the turret. A bullet (possibly from a sniper) had nicked his neck. No sooner had this happened, than 21Alpha was hit by more RPGs, fired from the right of the tank.
The third RPG penetrated the side of the turret, the jet passing across the inside of the fighting compartment to hit one of the ready-round bins. Jackson was wounded in the thigh. To be precise, the left thigh. He had been facing the rear of the tank, trying to access ammunition in the floor bins. The fourth RPG also penetrated the side of the turret, this time immediately adjacent to the commander’s seat, seriously wounding Swarbrick in the lower body and thighs. Haward, in the gunner’s seat, was also wounded by the fragmentation.
Apart from the crew wounds, 21Alpha’s RPG penetrations had other repercussions. The spall caused short-circuits which cut the power to the turret and prevented the wirelesses being used. Added to this, the fighting compartment started to fill with thick smoke. Swarbrick called on to Ingram to reverse, only to discover that his driver had been wounded and was unconscious. In such circumstances, a tank crew commander has no choice but to give the worst possible order, especially when under fire: ‘Bail Out!’
Callsign 21, meanwhile, had moved up close behind 21Alpha. With wounded infantry still on the ground, Sullivan used his commander’s machine gun to fire over the top of them to neutralise the area from which the RPGs had been fired. While this was happening, Swarbrick, who because of his wounds had no strength in his lower body, used his arms to raise himself up out of the turret. Obviously in excruciating pain, he then ‘rolled’ off and onto the ground, a fall of about 2m. Jackson and Haward followed quickly, their tank being raked by small arms fire the whole time. Haward recalls:
We all then crawled under the rear petrol tank and tried to assist Len by wrapping our shirts around what was left of his legs. All this time the VC were trying to direct fire at us under the tank, but there were a number of trees in the way.”
According to the AWM, “Centurions were nearly impervious to most enemy weapons”. Hopefully this description and the impression it conveys will be changed in the redeveloped galleries. (There have been enough representations!)
“While Germany quietly rearmed, the Allies, including Australia, sleepwalked to the next war.
Australia had no significant defence industry.
In 2020, Australia’s relatively small ADF has been on operations for two decades.
Professional excellence is unsurpassed in comparison with earlier generations, though the ADF is top heavy with individuals more interested in professional advancement than the best interests of those they command.
Valour in the field means nothing when the hounds begin to bay.
Australia is still overly reliant on external sources for major capital equipment.
Some purchases defy any logical or value for money test, such as French conventional submarines which will not be online for years, if ever.
Add helicopters, fighters – the list is endless – and future generations have been saddled with what may prove to be crippling debt for no useful return.
Elsewhere, nations which harbour aspirations for Australia’s limitless resources are rearming – not quietly – with the potential Australia may never be able to defend its national interests.
Numbers rather than strategy may seize the day. The parallels with 1920 are too potent to ignore.”
What documents/measures are essential for Australia’s national security?
The need for a security strategy to protect our national interests is obvious. As is the fact that this must include measures for defence self-reliance (including defence industry and stockpiling measures as necessary). The strategy is based on a threat analysis provided by intelligence sources. The critical documents flowing from the strategy are the contingency plans. These dictate the size, equipment and level of preparedness of the ADF (including the reserve forces). It’s not rocket science, but the debate (such as it is) is confused; often failing to ‘see the forest for the trees’.
The last Defence White Paper was published in 2016. (The White Paper is the closest that any ordinary Australian gets to see the provisions made by the Government for our national security.) The next looks as if it might be released in 2021. Unfortunately (but necessary for obvious reasons), missing from all White Papers are the Contingency Plans. This makes it very different to reconcile the basis for the level of preparedness of the ADF and make judgements are to whether or not it’s right.
One wonders how much those involved in contingency planning (or the debate about our national security) make use of wargaming and simulation
This is a means open to us all to evaluate the ADF’s ability to respond to a threat against our national interests … to be continued.
I tried to do the same with an article to the Army Newspaper, but it was rejected. What I had sought to do was to point out the failings that sometimes occur within the Army ‘culture’ and the associated training ‘environment’.
During my time at 1st Armd Regt in the 70s, the duty Guard was always inspected. This included the 9mm pistols. The weapons drill orders for inspection were : ‘Draw pistols!’, ‘Inspect pistols!’. On the latter, the working parts were drawn to the rear and a thumb inserted into the chamber to reflect light up the barrel for the inspecting officer. The final order was: ‘Return pistols!”; at which the working parts were let forward, the action fired, and the pistol returned to the holster.
So what? At no time was the magazine removed!!
Remember that this is a ‘drill’, something inculcated during training so that it would be followed automatically!
Fast forward a few months and the same soldiers are in Vietnam. They are issued with 9mm pistols and ammunition. You don’t have to be Einstein to anticipate what happened!
The result of which was what? Soldiers were charged. Were exceptional circumstances accepted? No, they were found guilty and punished accordingly. Was a change made to 9mm guard drills at Puckapunyal? No. Were provisions inserted into the Introduction into Service Instructions for new small arms, to ensure that ceremonial drills did not compromise safety? No.
This is a matter which is directly (and solely) related to training. The Army (and all who sail in her) must be held accountable for training standards.”
Having commented on The Cove as above ….
I just remembered (I think correctly). The problem with the Browning 9mm during Vietnam was the magazine safety which was designed to prevent the action being fired unless a magazine was inserted. (A biro or the like had to be used in lieu of an empty magazine).
This ‘safety’ mechanism was later removed. The ceremonial weapons drill which involved the weapons being inspected without removing the magazine, compounded the problem.
—————————————————————————————-
19 May 2020
RPG Strikes on Centurions in Vietnam
Following on in the sequence of 1 Armd Regt historical milestones ….
My checks indicate that seventeen Centurions were stuck by 28 RPGs on seventeen different occasions during the Vietnam War. Most Cents were struck by just the one RPG, but some were struck multiple times. Which tank was struck by the most RPGs?
Only one is recorded as having been struck by RPGs during more than a single contact (one RPG in two different contacts).
When they were hit in these actions …three tanks were struck by two RPGs, three tanks were struck by three RPGs, but only one was struck by four.
According the available records, those tanks which were struck by at least three RPGs were:
169066 (Cpl Bill Burton, 31Bravo, Coral, 26 May 68);
169079 (Cpl Mick Rainey MM, 33Bravo, Op Nowra, 22 Aug 68); and
169110 (Lt Jack Brennan, [2]1, Op Hammersley, 18 Feb 70).
There was some confusion about the ability of RPG2s to penetrate the Centurion:
RPG2 rounds could penetrate about 180mm of armour. Often the slope of the armour or the angle at which the rocket was fired increased the thickness to be penetrated. Nevertheless, the side of the Centurion turret was only 89mm thick, and the side of the hull 51mm. The frontal turret armour of the Centurion was 152mm thick. The RPG7, the replacement for the RPG2, could defeat this easily, penetrating 320mm of armour. First seen in Moscow in late 1962, the RPG7 was not introduced into general service until some years later (first reported in SVN in 1967). Although not as common as the RPG2 in May 1968, the enemy took advantage of its longer range as part of the bombardment of Coral and Balmoral. Five RPG7s were recovered by 1RAR from around Coral.
NOTE. It should be acknowledged that the ‘records’ might not have recorded all RPG strikes. My tank, for example, was hit by an RPG, but the range at which it was fired was too short for the rocket to arm itself. After the contact we found green plasticine-like ‘stuff’ adhering to the turret bustle … an aluminium RPG 7 exhaust turbine was found in the IR basket. No damage was caused, so there is no ‘Operational Damage Report’.
———————————————————————————————
18 May 2020
The Australian System of Gallantry Awards
Following on from yesterday ….
A few years ago, I had reason to query the policy of Defence that there should not be any retrospective awards. This was when the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG) was being considered for those at Coral-Balmoral.
I wrote to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) to point out that Defence could not insist that this be the case, ie. that there be no retrospective award (as they had maintained during the Hearing). The Letters Patent for the award allowed for it to be made retrospectively. This viewpoint was supported by a legal opinion.
The CDF at the time was Air Chief Marshal Binskin. I had a number of exchanges with his Office questioning their justification for the policy, ie. what made proven gallantry from the past any different to proven gallantry today. (His predecessor and current GG, had also been totally opposed to retrospective awards.)
Defence responded to say that the reason that they allowed the Letters Patent as drafted, was that there had to be provision made for the possibility that an administrative error might have been made (eg. the contemporary recommendation had been ‘lost’).
The Coral-Balmoral award was finally allowed … it’s relevant here that the DHAAT were conducting an Inquiry (initiated by the Government as a result of the Hulse/Parr petition), rather than a Review initiated by an individual (as is the case with Sheean). See difference below.
It will be seen that there is opportunity for ‘political’ influence to affect all outcomes: Reviews are “independent”, but the Government can override the Tribunal’s decision; Inquires, on the other hand, are initiated (or not) by the Government itself.
There’s still hope for the ‘Sheeans’, ie. an appeal against a Government decision is ‘easier’ to initiate and less expensive than an appeal against a DHAAT decision.
An individual is able to apply directly to the Tribunal for an independent reviewof a decision of the Department of Defence concerning eligibility for a defence honour, defence award, or foreign award.
The Government is also able to refer general eligibility issues to the Tribunal for inquiry and recommendation.
——————————————————————————————–
17 May 2020
The Victoria Cross for Australia
Part of a news item reported by the ABC earlier this year is copied below:
“World War II hero Edward ‘Teddy’ Sheean gets another chance at top honour.
…. It is also a challenge to receive recognition after death, with Mr Petrow, saying under Queen Elizabeth II’s reign, she has granted just six posthumous Victoria Crosses to British armed forces personnel. That is because it is harder to justify an award if it was not suggested at the time, but it is also possible for recommendations to be lost or forgotten in the heat of battle.
Mr Cannon said this time the tribunal would look exclusively at Mr Sheean’s actions and whether they warranted a posthumous award, including a VC.
Mr Petrow said it was more likely an award would be recommended at this review because it was only his behaviour being considered. ‘If you’re actually looking at the act and you’re looking at the criteria for the VC, it’s an entirely different context for assessing whether Teddy and others who were denied a VC should get one,’ he said.
Mr Barnett said the narrowing of the scope of the review provided the ‘best chance yet to see Teddy’s courage more appropriately recognised’. ‘The Tribunal will be focused on Teddy’s actions, which are self-sacrificing and courageous,’ he said.
There is some confusion on the part of the reporter. The difficulty is not one of an award being made posthumously, but one being made retrospectively, i.e. an award not having been recommended at the time. One quarter of the VCs awarded during the First World War were awarded posthumously. It’s possible that no award of the VC has ever been made retrospectively. It’s also stated that the Tribunal would consider if another award was justified. At the time of the action (and up until after Vietnam) the only British awards which could be made posthumously were the VC or Mentioned in Despatches (mid)
The reporter suggests that the DHAAT review will be different to others because this time “only his behaviour will be considered”. The reference here is to an earlier enquiry that the DHAAT was tasked to undertake into a number of unresolved acts of gallantry. It would seem that his assertion here was correct … the Tribunal recommended that ‘Teddy Sheean’ be awarded the VC.
For the first time (I believe, but I might be wrong) the Government overruled the recommendation of the DHAAT:
In a statement, a spokesman for Prime Minister Scott Morrison said Ordinary Seaman Sheean was an extraordinary Australian — but “no case has been made … Sheean was denied a VC because of manifest injustice”.
“This Government’s, as well as the previous governments’, clear policy, and the expressed views of Her Majesty the Queen, is that consideration of the awarding of the Victoria Cross would only occur in light of compelling new evidence or if there was evidence of manifest injustice, such as where due process had not been followed,” he said.
“No compelling new evidence has been presented by the Tribunal that supports a reconsideration of the decisions by the authorities at the time to recognise the gallant actions of Ordinary Seaman Sheean on the HMAS Armidale with the award of Mention in Despatches in 1942.
Despite Australia having its own gallantry awards, the Government statement refers to the “expressed views of Her Majesty the Queen”, as basis for denying the award of the VC for Australia. Prima facie, it would seem that the DHAAT failed to prove that new evidence was provided, or, if it was, it was not ‘compelling’ new evidence.
One has to wonder at what level this judgement was made and on what basis. How is it that no reasons need to be given by the Government for arriving at its conclusion? The Department of Defence is firmly opposed to retrospective awards. But they have been made. DHAAT recommendations to this end have sometimes been accepted by the Government.
If an applicant wished to appeal against a DHAAT decision, the only option is to go the Federal Court. In one case recently, Defence stated that they would be prepared to commit $70,000 or more to the defence of the DHAAT in one of the matters it considered (which was not even related to the decision itself, but to the accuracy of the published report). This made the appeal impossible for the applicant.
What happens if an applicant wishes to appeal the decision made by the Government to overturn the DHAAT decision? The Administrative Appeals Tribunal … this might actually cost almost nothing. It’s all about justice. Or is it?
——————————————————————————————-
16 May 2020
Recording the Human History of the RAAC (3)
Following on from the posts on 12 and 14 May 2020 … the following is the text of an email sent to the AWM on 30 April 2020:
“Dear Director,
Sitting opposite your office window is a Centurion tank, Callsign 5Bravo (5B).
5B, along with other tanks of C Squadron was involved in intensive fighting in South Vietnam. In June 1971, 5B was fighting in ‘Operation Hermit Park’ during which it was ‘knocked out’ by an RPG. The driver was seriously wounded and ‘dusted off’.
5B is our tank and we the crew are proud to call it ours.
When visiting the AWM some years ago I took a photograph of a plaque which was attached to the rear-left side of 5B. (Refer attached). As you can see, the plaque provided details of 5B’s crew. This bonding of crew and tank means so much to us because it brings together a human connection to what would otherwise be ‘just another tank’! It was also of human interest to the general public.
Unfortunately, and inexplicably, the plaque has disappeared, much to our great dismay.
The purpose of my writing to you is in the hope that you may give sympathetic consideration to having the plaque re-instated on our 5B or at your discretion, some other means of recognising the crew so that it’s not regarded as just another piece of military equipment.
On behalf of 5B’s crew. Yours sincerely …”.
The AWM responded on 11 May as follows:
“Thank you very much for your email to the Memorial, and for providing background information on the plaque which was attached to the Centurion tank 5Bravo.
The Memorial is currently considering your request, and will explore options to include interpretive signage to recognise the crew.
We will be in touch once an outcome has been reached.
Thank you again for taking the time to write. Kind regards …”.
The above illustrates the point I tried to make in my earlier Blog posts, ie. Centurion tanks (and other AFVs) are not just pieces of military technology which weigh so much and travel so fast … they are weapon systems operated by soldiers. The challenge is to investigate ways by which the challenges faced by AFV crews and the suffering they experienced, can be made known by the AWM to those who have absolutely no idea about such things. Such an endeavour requires the widest possible consultation. I wonder if the RAAC HOC will help facilitate this, or simply go it alone (or even sidestep the matter completely)?
————————————————————————
15 May 2020
The RAAC ARES Stranded? II
Wow! The Blog post on 13 May attracted more than three times the normal number of readers. As it seems that it is the issue of the RAAC ARES which has sparked this interest, I’ve decided to do a follow-up post re the Cove article:‘Stranded Capability? : The Value of the Army Reserve Asset in 2020’, by Mike Kalms*.
The quotations below are from comments on the article made by a contributor.
“COL Kalms is correct to highlight that the Army Reserve no longer offers the outputs asked of it in 1948. However, the central issue is that it is unclear what the outputs required now are. The 2016 Defence White Paper only mentions the Reserve as a flexible means of employing ADF members. No strategic direction is given as to what is required of ADF reserves, or single service Reserves. With a lack of stated objectives, it is little wonder there is confusion as to what should be done.”
This I agree with. The recommendation below, I don’t
“Do away with corps, instead generate an all corps reserve capability. The effort saved in training so many corps with long training and upskilling could be reinvested into a capability which supports local security and emergency responses and can deploy to low level Pacific security support”.
There is a disconnect here. Focussing on the strategic direction is right; doing away with long term training (because of its length) is not. It is precisely the length of the training which makes it important. When military equipment was unsophisticated, the militia or CMF could be readily mobilised to provide a wide range of military skills.
Today the choice is to have either (i) a large standing army and ARES limited to specialist civilian and simple military skills; or, (ii) a smaller standing army and ARES encompassing both specialist civilian and complex military skills (eg. qualified to operate LAND 400 AFVs).
In terms of investment cost, the latter is, by far, the less expensive.
*Mike Kalms is a Colonel in the part-time ADF. He is Director of Studies for ACSC(R) where full and part time officers from all Services and broader government come to learn and grow.
———————————————————————————————
14 May 2020
Recording the Human History of the RAAC (2)
Following the Blog post on 12 May, the Corps RSM advised: “In relation to capturing some living history, consultation was not required due to the era and nature of details the AWM requested and the corps could provide. There are plans for other era’s to have information collected, which have been shelved for 2020 due to COVID 19. The corps will look to continue engagement with the AWM to capture individuals experiences in the future years”.
It’s great to have such feedback; but, sadly, it would seem that there is some misunderstanding involved. Apparently, the AWM were seeking to engage with the RAAC re its early exhibits (so it was thought that no consultation with veterans from later conflicts was required). My concern, however, is related to the exhibit of tanks from WWI onwards. A tank from 1917 is described as weighing X tons and being able to travel at Y mph. A tank from 1968 is described as having a 20pdr gun and three machine guns. What is missing from both exhibits, is any insight into what challenges the crew had to face in operating them. My response to the RSM is copied below (hopefully, the RAAC family might grasp the opportunity to collectively advise the AWM):
“Thanks for your feedback re my Blog.
Re the AWM … what I’m trying to address is how to represent AFV exhibits in general (not any particular era).
At present, the exhibits are presented as items of technology; rather than weapons operated by soldiers.
What I would like to do is to create a discussion as to how AFVs should be portrayed (you’ll have seen from my Blog post that this is a need something shared by museums around the world). It would be great if you could contribute to this. It’s not an easy task, but one which could well be achieved with combined efforts.
I’ve been speaking with the sappers and they’re engaging with the AWM to achieve an appropriate means by which the experience of a field engineer prodding for an IED might be presented. I hope to achieve the same for the gunner of a tank in combat.
(As an aside, many years ago I suggested to our Tank Museum that it would be great if those who crewed tanks such as the Matilda, Stuart etc had their experiences recorded. The response was that “people aren’t interested in the crews, only the tanks themselves”. Of course, now those crewmen are dead and the opportunity is lost forever.)”
—————————————————————————————-
13 May 2020
The RAAC ARES : ‘Stranded?’
Below are two quotes from an article in Army’s ‘Cove’ newsletter: ‘Stranded Capability? The value of the Army Reserve Asset in 2020’ by Colonel Mike Kalms*. They are part of my response to the author.
“The Army Reserve of today can no longer deliver on the purpose for which it was conceived.”
This is an irrelevance. Whether or not we’re talking about the Militia or the CMF or the ARES, the purpose at the time it was conceived cannot be thought to be set in stone; purposes and mission statements must evolve as circumstances change. Stakeholders demand that this happens; realising that, otherwise, we’d never be ready for the challenges ahead.
This is different: “Stranded Assets – if not addressed – become Irrelevant Assets. Irrelevant assets have no economic, social or national value – let’s not allow the Reserve to drift there.”
Now this is stakeholder language and would be applauded at the AGM!
What is working as far as the ARES is concerned? From my pov, I see civilian specialists (such as doctors, lawyers, engineers etc) being recruited and usefully employed (thereby saving the Army money). I also see some non-specialist personnel (eg. infantry) being deployed overseas to supplement regular personnel (thereby saving the army money).
What is not working as far as the ARES is concerned? Army roles which involve the operation of complex equipment, eg. AFVs, are considered beyond the capability of the ARES. (The Army saves money by not having to procure materiel to equip them.)
Where to from here? Firstly, we have to get away from a reliance on ‘catch phrase’ thinking. ‘Army in Motion’, Accelerated Warfare’, ‘Future Ready’ etc. In terms of the ARES in particular, we have “One Army”, which PR link to the theme ‘our full and part-time people who have one mission: to prepare land forces for war to defend Australia and its national interests’.
Let’s accept that the regular army and the ARES are different. Some components of the ARES are interchangeable, while others are not. How can the ‘others’ best add value to Army capability? This must be related to the contingency plans which flow from our National Defence Strategy. Associated with this is the matter of lead times for training of those who are to operate specialist equipment. If we are self-reliant in terms of the equipment and stockpiling aspects of our defence strategy, are we equally well positioned in terms of trained personnel (recognising that skills are needed to both operate the equipment AND to use it effectively tactically).
Seems to me that part of our National Defence Strategy must relate to the ability to provide trained personnel within a certain time-frame; this, in turn, suggests an ARES training capability for operators of specialist equipment, e.g. LAND 400 AFVs.
*Mike Kalms “is a Colonel in the part-time ADF. He is Director of Studies for ACSC(R) where full and part time officers from all Services and broader government come to learn and grow”.
————————————————————————————————-
12 May 2020
Recording the Human History of the RAAC
The December 2019 edition of the 2/14 LH (QMI) Association newsletter includes the following extract:
“Brigadier Mills launched a key initiative in 2019 to ensure the Corps is capturing the living history of the Corps and the importance of recording the human history that we have in our serving and transitioned members, and the importance it plays in the educating new members of the corps. This initiative has been launched by the Corps RSM and established with co-operation of the Australian War Memorial. The HOC has also been actively engaged with the Australian History Unit in preparing for the eventual new Museum, this is looking particularly positive and something the Corps should look forward to.”
So … the HOC, the Corps RSM, and the Army History Unit are working together to ensure that the human history of the RAAC is effectively recorded at the AWM. Where’s the consultation? Where are the draft guidelines provided for comment? Sorry … I should not have expected a precedent to be set.
In a previous Blog post, I mentioned that the 1 AR Assn didn’t want to have anything to do with offering input in response to the AWM’s request for suggestions re their major development project (“We’re not a lobby organisation!“). This meant that the RAAC Corporation could not be involved (they can only take any action when asked to do so by a Member Association). This, in turn, meant that I had to ‘go it alone’. It seems a pity that we have the AWM asking for suggestions and no representative body is prepared to do anything with respect to the portrayal of RAAC crews in combat. (In fact, I’ve been pilloried for trying to do so.)
In the spirit of consultation, I posted my submission on the Blog, asking that if anyone could suggest improvements, to please do so.
The covering email to my subsequent submission to the AWM was as follows:
“Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide input into considerations being made re the coming redevelopment project.
I now wish to that there is a need to portray a human presence as part of objects which, within the AWM at present, are only represented in terms of technology. In particular, I believe that Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) should be displayed not only in terms of their technical characteristics, but also in the context of a well-informed and engaging interpretation of what it was like for crews fighting inside them.
My attached submission includes quotes from studies which have been conducted overseas which have come to the same conclusion. I have also included reference to the factors which are unique to those crewing AFVs in combat.
I have consulted with the crews of AFVs who served in Vietnam, both in respect to my book ‘Canister! On! Fire! : Australian Tank Operations In Vietnam’ and subsequently in relation to this submission. Thank you for considering the attached. “
Being interested in the way in which the ADF is responding to the changing strategic circumstances, I Googled ‘Australia’s Defence’ and came up with a Defence page titled “Defence Priorities”. (https://www.defence.gov.au/Priorities.asp).
It started off by stating that: “Defence’s primary focus continues to be to protect and advance Australia’s strategic interests through the provision of appropriately prepared and equipped armed forces”. ‘Right on!’ I thought, and proceeded to read further.
Then I came across: “The development of a new Defence White Paper has commenced and will be finalised by mid 2015”.
I thought that I must have come across an old website, so Googled the ‘Department of Defence’ portal. Once this opened, I went to the ‘Priorities’ tag and, guess what … I ended up with link above.
What on earth is happening? Has the world gone mad?
The website doesn’t get any better (though the current Minister for Defence is actually listed!).
Seems to me that public information about Australia’s defence outlook and associated preparedness is seen as a very low priority. This probably comes about as a result of a lack of debate about defence matters.
I decided to check the Australian Defence Association website. I clicked on: “How does the ADA contribute to informed public debate?”. The answer was “publishing comprehensive discussion papers and commentary on national security issues, including an electronic bulletin, Defence Brief, and a national journal, Defender”.
I looked for the latest issue of Defender … it stopped being published in 2008.
What more can I say.
———————————————————————————————————————–
10 May 2020
Defence Self Reliance II
On 4 May 2020, I referred to an article by Senator Jim Molan, AO, DSC. I believe it to be of value to quote a little more and do so below:
“It seems self-evident to most Australians that we need to be more self-reliant without trying to be completely self-sufficient. Self-reliance reflects how resilient as a nation we must be against internal or external shocks, which allows us to retain a higher degree of sovereignty. Self-reliance improves resilience, which itself improves sovereignty.”
“The reliance on the US that we have enjoyed since 1945 remains critically important and we must maintain our alliance. But an overdependence on the US is as dangerous for our future as an over reliance on globalisation was for a pandemic.”
“We have no medium or longer term strategy to position all elements of our nation for an uncertain future. We are brilliant at handling crises, as our government is currently handling COVID-19. But we cannot tell if we are achieving or failing on the bigger issues because we are a strategy-free nation. Given the uncertainty of the new era, we must increase our self-reliance or we will lose our sovereignty.”
The project I led at the Command and Staff College observed that:
“In evolving both the Defence force structure and the most appropriate mix of domestic and overseas supply and support, Australia will have to continuously choose from a range of options in reconciling technological and resource constraints with strategic requirements”.
We recommended (inter alia) that:
“Defence allocate a self-reliance rating to all materiel procurement projects; and
This rating should also be applied in the assessment of stockpiling requirements, not only for prime equipment, but also for associated ammunition and spares”.
——————————————————————————————————
9 May 2020
The Abrams Fleet II
Following on from yesterday …
A recent ADF press release stated that
“The Australian Army currently operates 56 M1A1 SA Abrams Main Battle Tanks acquired in 2006 which are employed within the Main Battle Tank Squadrons of each of the three Armoured Cavalry Regiments …”.
But 59 were procured … what happened to the other three? It seems that they were badly damaged in training incidents and aren’t now fully capable. An example of the extreme end of the serviceability problems.
The Press Release went on to say: “The future Australian Army Main Battle Tank capability will be based on M1A2 configured Abrams MBT hulls and turrets upgraded to Abram’s System Enhancement Package Version 3 (SEPv3) designated M1A2C, or Abrams System Enhance package Version 4 (SEPv4) designated M1A2D”.
What does this mean? I believe it to say that our Abrams will be upgraded to M1A2C or D , ie. the tank itself is not going to be replaced, it will modified. Will this solve the unserviceability problems plaguing the tanks? If it doesn’t, the funding for the upgrade will be wasted.
But what is another way to (theoretically) address this situation? Answer: using simulators. This is what the press release was announcing:
“The Department of Defence has issued an official Approach to Market (ATM) for M1A2 Immersive Tactical Trainer(s) calling for digital training simulator systems to support the introduction of an M1A2 Main Battle Tank capability in the immediate future.
The LAND 907 Phase 2 Abrams M1A2 Immersive Tactical Trainer (ITT) ATM calls for Immersive Tactical Training and Procedural Gunnery Training ITTs that provide, a high fidelity simulation system to train Abrams crews as a precursor to Live Fire practical training.”
What’s the betting that there’s been a trade-off between tank numbers and simulators. Would this really be the answer? There’s no doubt that simulators can add value to training practices, but I don’t believe they can compensate for actual crew-based vehicle/tactical training.
Footnote. In 1972, I was nearing the end of my third year as a Centurion tank troop leader. A visiting VIP was brought over to where we were by the CO. “And what do you think about your tanks (or some such question)?” I responded to say that they were good in their day, but now the amount of time we spend maintaining them is completely out of proportion to the time we get to actually use them”. I was relieved that the CO gave me a ‘thumbs up’ as they were leaving.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 May 2020
The Abrams Tank Fleet
Following on from the Blog post of 6 May: ‘The Passing of ‘Right Sizing’ the Abrams Tank Fleet’ ….
“Each of the army’s three brigades is expected to eventually include three four-tank troops, with two other Abrams at brigade headquarters supported by a single dozer and armoured bridging variants. Given the need to retain critical mass and adequate support capability, this structure could require the acquisition of additional Abrams; this has been recently rumoured but is not specifically included in the DIIP. “
So, three times four tank troops per squadron. Given that the problem (Blog, 6 May) is one of maintainability … this means that each tank troop can operate tactically with three tanks, if one is unserviceable.
So, because of the problems with serviceability, instead of having four troops with four tanks (the normal tank squadron organisation), a troop is removed from the ACR organisation.
But what about the span of command? This is the basis on which a squadron commander is trained. Rather than four troops, he has only three manoeuvre elements to command and control
Defence has stated that: “A final decision on the shape and size of the replacement M1A2 fleet and its level of capability will be announced in in September 2021”.
So, maybe the Abrams really will be right sized with an additional 30 tanks to compensate for the dispersed ACR squadron locations (rather than the previous centralised 1 Armd Regt and the toll that training is having on serviceability. Maybe this will see four troops of four tanks in each ACR.
Do I believe in fairies at the bottom of the garden? Too right!
————————————————————————————————————————–
7 May 2020
The Centurion ‘Gun Tank’ Which Spent Most Time in Vietnam
Following the recent blog posts related to ‘milestones’ of one sort or another in 1 Armd Regt’s history, is a matter which may, or may not, have interesting connotations.
On 3 May, the Blog looked at 169047 which was on operations in Vietnam for one month only, May 71. It hadn’t detonated a mine.
Which tank’s time in Vietnam was the longest? Shane Lovell (‘Military Briefs No 3’) records ARN 169099 as having served from Apr 68 to Apr 70. This by far the longest time for any Cent tank. (ARN 169079, a Cent dozer, managed to do an additional four months).
Starting off with 2 Troop in 1968, 169099 spent most of 1969 and 1970 with 3 Troop.
As most of those who’ve served with Cents will attest, some tanks just seem to keep going and going, while others have endless problems.
I don’t know how many engine changes it might have had and I’ve forgotten the mileage ‘life’ of Centurions in Vietnam. (Once this was reached, they were withdrawn from ops and returned to Australia for rebuild.)
I do know that the average main engine life in 1969 was 1100 kms and that in 1971, engines were failing after less than 250km. This was critical at the time … with C Sqn being progressively withdrawn, the availability of each and every Cent was crucial to operational capability.
Why did the life of main engines decline so suddenly? I can’t answer this. But a number of investigations were conducted at the time. These included the work at Hawker De Havilland’s Aircraft Engine Factory in Sydney where the engines were rebuilt.
Where is 169099 now? According to the late Colin Filtness’s research … it is one of two tanks at Caribbean Gardens, Melbourne.
Footnotes: (i) ARN 169099 was the first Cent tank to come ashore in Vietnam. It was driven by the late Sergeant Nev Calliss and commanded by the then Capt Bernie Sullivan.; (ii) The photo above is not of 169099, but the other tank at Caribbean Gardens (169115).
————————————————————————————————————————
6 May 2020
The Passing of ‘Right Sizing’ the Abrams Tank Fleet
“We see the optimum fleet size for the M1 Abrams fleet as 90” Col Anthony Duus, Mar 17
The following is an extract from an article authored by the HOC, Brig Chris Mills AM and Lt Col Leo Purdy published on 12 Sep 18 (it dates from 2016):
“Complementary studies of the M1 tank in US service by the RAND Institute demonstrate that the combination of age and training tempo result in higher costs as vehicles breakdown more frequently and consume parts quicker.
Further, this maintenance liability increases with the age of the vehicle. These factors correlate to the challenges the ADF faces in the generation of a sustainable tank capability. The small Australian M1 fleet is now 10 years old and endures a rate of effort at least twice that when compared to US Army units. While this maintains a high standard of training and proficiency, this also places significant stress on the vehicle, reducing the mean time between components failing and increasing the number of components which fail – more things break more often.
This training is routinely conducted in some of the harshest tank -training environments in the world ranging from dry desert to wet tropical jungle, further exacerbating these factors. Consequently, the M1 tank is wearing out faster than anticipated, which ultimately affects the ADF’s ability to generate the unique effects the tank provides in combat. This is compounded by Australia being at the end of a very long supply chain extending back to the US for items such as track, fire control systems and ammunition.
Fleet size underwrites all of these issues. When balanced against the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore unavailable.
This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of the tank capability. How does the ADF sustain the tank capability into the future when these factors are considered?”
makes no mention by the HOC, RAAC Rep HOC, or ACR COs of the need to ‘right size’ the Abrams tank fleet. For the CO, 2 Cav ACR it would appear that the most pressing problem is the lack of serviceability of the ASLAVs (and to his credit, he made this known).
But what’s happening about the Abrams? Seems to me that the Government’s position has been made known to the ADF, ie. tanks are a low priority in terms of our Defence strategy. Given that this viewpoint seems to date from 2017, the budgetary impact of the bushfires and COVID-19 would not seem relevant. to it
Why don’t all those contributing to Ironsides say it as it is? Let’s not go back to the days of complete subservience to our ‘masters’, rather than a co-operative situation where all points of view are respected. Can’t have industrial democracy in the military (?) … poppycock!
———————————————————————————————————————–
5 May 2020
Australia-Vietnam Relationship
Following on from the Blog post on 2 May, the ABC News report from last year is revealing …
“But Mr Morrison’s visit [to Vietnam] is not just about business. It is also about China. While Australia expresses concerns about China’s aggressive actions and military build-up in the South China Sea — a key global trading route — Vietnam lives it. Its sovereign rights are constantly being challenged.”
“The rise of China is helping to bring old adversaries together. Australia and Vietnam may have fought on opposite sides of a war, and have vastly different political systems, but they have a shared interest in ensuring the Asia-Pacific region remains stable and peaceful.”
So, maximum effort to cement a strong diplomatic relationship with Vietnam, while leaving aside any influence to improve human rights conditions (especially for those who were Australia’s ‘Allies’ and their families during 1965-1975).
How inhumane can Australia get … to do nothing, for those, alongside of whom we, as Australians, fought and died. Each one giving their lives on behalf of the other!
If there is reciprocal benefit to both nations in terms of containing China, why can’t Australia ask for improvements in terms of the human rights of the “bad elements” (see 2 May blog, ie. Australia’s Allies and their families)?
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 May 2020
Sorry about the late post … it’s been somewhat chaotic (but all positive)!
The photo is from a 1993 publication by Graeme Cheesman: “Controversial critique of Australia’s current defence policy. Outlines the evolution of Australia’s defence policy and organisation from 1970-1991 and discusses associated problems, dilemmas and contradictions”.
The Importance of Self-Reliance
”Given the uncertainty of the new era, we must increase our self-reliance or we will lose our sovereignty. “
The above is a quote from an article by Senator Jim Molan: ‘The importance of a National Sovereignty Strategy’.
In 1983, I proposed a project and then led a team to investigate it at the Australian Command and Staff College. The tile was ‘Defence Self-Reliance: A Study of the Operational Capabilities for which Self-Reliance is Essential’.
We concluded (inter alia) that:
“Objectives should be specified which link operational capabilities to industry development (in order of priority)” and
“The degree of industry assistance warranted should be determined according to a project’s rating (ie. its operational significance). The rating system should also be applied in the assessment of stockpiling requirements, not only for prime equipment, but also for associated ammunition and spares.”
This isn’t rocket science … but look today at how dependant we’ve become on overseas supply lines. Lead times don’t seem to feature in strategic planning (as pointed out by Senator Molan). How much more relevant would Graeme Cheesman’s book be today!
———————————————————————————————————–
3 May 2020
The Centurion Which Spent the Shortest Time in Vietnam
Following on from earlier Blog posts re 1 Armd Regt Vietnam Milestones …
An enormous effort went into preparing and transporting a Centurion to Vietnam. One would hope that this effort would be justified by the tank being used until (hopefully) it reached its mileage limit. Of course, sometimes a tank might detonate a mine and be classified as having to be returned to Australia. What of ARN 169047, however?
Shane Lovell’s book ‘Military Briefs 3’ has 1Bravo serving in Vietnam for one month only (May 1971). What happened? It wasn’t involved in a mine incident.
By May, 4 Troop and 2 Troop had both been withdrawn form operations. 3 Troop would be next, then 1 Troop, and finally 5 Troop. My theory is that 169047 suffered an engine failure (or some other major malfunction), and, rather than repairing it, the tank was swapped with another and returned to Australian in its place. This would explain why the old 2Charlie, became the new 1Bravo. Postscript: I’ve just referred to COF and there’s reference (p258 Vol 20) to the 106 Wksps having run out of main engine spares at the end of April 1971.
Some background about engine failures is provided under (from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’).
When C Squadron first took the field in 1968, an abnormally high failure rate of idler wheels threatened to cause a loss of operational capability; a similar crisis now existed in relation to main engines.
Although overheating was associated with the recent failures, there was no apparent reason as to why this might have suddenly become such a major problem. 106 Field Workshop did an exhaustive analysis on all engine failures experienced in Vietnam, to see if a pattern would point to a cause. It was expected that the Dry season would have been a factor in terms of tanks operating over longer distances, coupled with high ambient temperatures and dust. Somewhat surprisingly, the increase was not significant. What the analysis did highlight, however, was an overall increase in the number of incidents of overheating.
The fracturing of pipes and seals associated with the cooling system was a factor in many of the incidents. As this could be the result of overpressure, it was decided that a complete cooling system inspection would be conducted on the next tank that suffered an engine failure. Before this could be done, something caught the eye of the Workshop Manager, Captain Mick Condon, as he was walking past a tank undergoing repair.
The radiators were lifted (as was done to provide access to the transmission compartment) and he realised that he could not see through the passages where air would normally be drawn by the fans; they were blocked by a mixture of oil, dust and fine bamboo particles. Many of the cooling fins were also bent over. While it was not a panacea for what was a complex problem (i.e. the engines of some tanks with clean radiators still overheated), regular steam cleaning of radiators reduced the failure rate considerably. The immediate ‘crisis’ was averted.
Vietnam’s human rights situation is dire. Among the abuses are the facts that freedom of speech, opinion, press, association, and religion, are all restricted and the police use torture and beatings to extract ‘confessions’. While the younger population is growing up to accept this, the lives endured by our former ‘allies’ (eg, ARVN soldiers and their families) are still extremely harsh. The extracts below from ‘Vietnam After the War’ illustrate some of this:
“The North quickly made clear that previous agreements for sharing power with allied groups in the south were no longer valid. According to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords (another set of negotiations that aimed to bring an end to the conflict), South Vietnam “was supposed to continue to exist as a separate and sovereign state” until the northerners and the southerners could agree on how to “unite the two Vietnams via elections or negotiations.”
Finding the “bad elements”: One tool the government used to identify so-called “bad elements”—those who were opposed to the North’s communist ideology—was the personal dossier. These were written biographies that included a person’s name and the names of his or her family members, as well as his or her ethnicity, religious affiliation, and current job. The government used this information to categorize people as “good” or “bad.” If a person had a sister, father, or uncle who had worked with the French, American, or South Vietnamese government, for example, he or she would likely be put in the “bad” category. Similarly, if someone’s family owned a business or other property, it meant that person was a capitalist, which was also bad. In total, the number of people who were believed to have such affiliations was estimated to be one-third of the south’s population.
People from families that had shown loyalty to the communist cause and liberation—especially those with a family member who died fighting South Vietnam and/or the Americans—were usually put in the “good” category. Unlike the “bad elements,” these people had opportunities under the new system, such as getting a good job working for the government or military, or better access to a university education.” https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/learning-module/vietnam-after-war
What do we see in the media about Australia’s efforts to improve the human rights for the “bad elements” who were our Allies from 1965 to 1975 and Vietnamese more generally? Maybe it’s out there … but I haven’t seen it. What I DO see, however, are articles describing how much Australia is doing to help the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The following extract is from the latest edition of the Army newspaper:
“Exchange of combat skills. Defence Administrative Assistant Hanoi WO2 Mat Dabinet developed the idea to bring some of Army’s combat shooting instructors to Vietnam after seeing the VPA’s Shooting Team attend the Australian Army Skill at Arms Meet (AASAM) for the first time last year. He said VPA soldiers were enthusiastic and became more confident as the course progressed. “They shot well at AASAM in the deliberate serials, but you could see they were uncomfortable with firing and moving, and close combat serials”. WO2 Dabinet said. “In developing the activity with the VPA we asked them to construct a wide range of targetry and range equipment. VPA personnel were very well prepared for the activity, applied the proficiencies they achieved quite rapidly and practised in their own time.”
WO2 Dabinet said the culture among VPA soldiers was similar to Australians. “It’s just like teaching a bunch of Australian diggers,” he said. “They have a very similar sense of humour and similar ways of being taught. “You get all the same characters you get back home, someone’s the grumpy guy, another is the class clown – it’s so similar it’s scary.” WO2 Dabinet said the course should continue and expand in future. The success of the course was recognised by officials on both sides, with Defence Minister Linda Reynolds and VPA Deputy Chief of General Staff Lt-Gen Nguyen Van Nghia attending the closing ceremony.”
This article suggests that in some ways, Vietnamese people today, on an individual basis, are very much like ourselves. But what about the Government and its treatment of the “bad elements” and wider human rights abuses?
Surely the Australian Government has a moral and ethical responsibility, as well an economic and trade function. One can well imagine a voice within Government saying … before long there won’t be any Vietnamese alive who need to be classed as “bad elements” by their Government. Why make a fuss?
Sometimes I’m ashamed of my country.
———————————————————————————————————————–
1 May 2020
ANZAC or Anzac II
Following on from yesterday, the response from DVA is copied below. It’s interesting they must get some many people raising this matter, that they have a section dedicated to responding to these queries.
In essence, the Government position is the same as that of the Canberra Times, ie. the correct format is: Anzac Day … though the AWM adopts the ‘ANZAC Day’ convention.
You’d think that, as a nation, we could agree on something like this.
Dear Mr Cameron
Thank you for your email. In response to your question, I’ve included a copy of the relevant section from the Use of the word ‘Anzac’ Guidelines:
Is it Anzac or ANZAC?
Historically, ANZAC was an acronym devised by Major General William Birdwood’s staff in Cairo in early 1915. It was used for registering correspondence for the new corps, and a rubber stamp was cut using the letters A.&N.Z.A.C.
After the landing at Gallipoli, General Birdwood requested that the position held by the Australians and New Zealanders on the peninsula be called ‘Anzac’ to distinguish it from the British position at Helles. Permission was also sought to name the small bay, where the majority of the corps had come ashore on 25 April 1915, ‘Anzac Cove’.
The letters now were upper and lower case, indicating that the original acronym had already found a use beyond that of a military code word or corps designation. Since that time, ‘Anzac’ and ‘ANZAC’ have been used interchangeably.
There is no rule or law that indicates how the word ‘Anzac’ should be capitalised. For example, DVA only uses ‘ANZAC’ when referencing the ANZAC Corps itself and uses ‘Anzac’ in all other circumstances while the Australian War Memorial (AWM) generally uses ‘ANZAC’ given the AWM’s focus on historical records and memorabilia.
Thank you for your active interest in preserving the significance of ‘Anzac’ and taking the time to contact to us.
I wrote a letter to the Editor, Canberra Times about ANZAC Day (see Blog 26 April 2020). I was disappointed that, when published, my text was amended by changing ANZAC to Anzac. BHP and ANZ are also examples of acronyms and are always referred to in capitals. Why not Bhp or Anz?
I expressed my view to the editor of the paper that the convention that journalists must adhere to in relation to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, diminishes the importance and recognition that our service men and women deserve.
The editor advised that journalists must adhere to the paper’s Style Guide.
When I looked into this a bit more, I discovered the Canberra Times style guide is in accord with DVA’s position, ie. the correct designation is Anzac, not ANZAC.
I’ve asked DVA if they “Can please explain why this?”.
Interestingly, DVA state in their on-line publications that “The men who served on the Gallipoli Peninsula created a legend, thereby adding the word ‘Anzac’ to our vocabulary and creating the notion of the Anzac spirit”.
BUT that’s not true. The word added to vocabulary was ‘ANZAC’.
I note that the RSL refers to ANZAC Day and I’ve asked what their position is in terms of this matter.
It took me quite a while to find the image above. There are many that refer to ANZAC DAY all in upper case … finally I found one that highlighted the difference.———————————————————————————————————————–
29 April 2020
Hammersley Final Fling
The Blog on 26 March 2020 copied a letter I’d written to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs (Darren Chester) re the false statements included in the report of the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) into the failure to recognise the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
I was not able to appeal to the Federal Court to have these errors corrected as I had to demonstrate that I could meet the costs of bringing this action if I was to lose. Defence advised that they were prepared to expend $70,000 or above in defending the case. I could not justify such an expense. (Maybe I was being ‘intimidated’ into withdrawing my application … I’ll never know.)
My request to the Minister was for an independent consideration to ensure that the record of the inquiry conducted by the DHAAT was a truthful one. I provided evidence to show that the existing report was false.
I’ve now received the Minister’s response.
Guess what.
The DHAAT continues to endorse its Report and the Minister has no power to review the its truthfulness. To initiate a review, I have to appeal to the Federal Court (and be prepared to pay $70,000 or more.)
Openness and transparency in Government … an ideal too far! Indeed, a culture that extends to other organisations as well.
My Blog post on 11 March 2020 is relevant.
————————————————————————————————————————-
28 April 2020
Things That Should be Corrected: 1AR Assn Publications
“WO2 N. Lowes” is classed as ‘DOW Post Vietnam’. In fact, he is listed on the AWM Roll of Honour, meaning that he died within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War and should not be listed as ‘Post Vietnam’.
“WO2 John Stone” is listed as Died of Wounds (DOW). In fact, he was Killed in Action (KIA).
“Tpr J Kerr” is listed as KIA in the newsletter, this entry should be amended to Tpr J K Kerr (James Kelly)
“Tpr M Hannaford” is listed as DOW in the newsletter, this entry should be amended to Tpr M J Hannaford (Michael John)
1st Armoured Car Squadron (1ACS) was renamed 1st Armoured Regiment. In fact, 1ACS was disbanded and a new unit formed. Despite the article recently published by the 1AR Assn, units of the Australian Army are not simply renamed … they must first be disbanded and then reformed (one unit is removed from the Order of battle and another is added.)
1 Armd Regt Theatres of Operation are described as including “Japan”. This should be deleted as it was only 1ACS which so served. An alternative would be to state: ‘Japan (1st Armoured Car Squadron)’.
“The Regiment is now equipped with … M88 ARV”. This should read ‘M88A2 ARVs’.
“Regimental Sergeant’s Majors” should read either ‘Regimental Sergeants Major’ or ‘Regimental Sergeant Majors’. (There is some debate about which is correct. The former is the accepted case with respect to Governors General.)
The transcription of the Commanders’ Diaries for Vietnam was provided by Bruce Cameron and he should be acknowledged as the author.
It is disappointing to see only some photos of the deceased on the Vale page. A request for photos of the others would undoubtedly see them forthcoming.
The ‘Standards and Guidons of the RAAC’ should be amended (or a note affixed) to state that the Battlehonour Coral-Balmoral’ is now emblazoned on the Standard and the Vietnam Theatre Honour has been corrected to state ‘1968-71’.
Q Store. The image at Item 2n depicts the tank advancing from the ‘green fields’ into the ‘mud’. This heresy should never be tolerated (let alone promoted).
The latest issue of the Newsletter notes that it is obviously wrong that Jack Chipman is referred to in the DVA Nominal Roll as serving with B Sqn from 17 Dec 69 to 17 Dec 70. It is one thing to identify an error, and another to correct it. The following advice has been provided to DVA: The entry should read: B Sqn, 17 Dec 69 to 23 Dec 69; A Sqn 24 Dec 69 to 16 Dec 70
———————————————————————————————————————-
27 April 2020
ANZAC Day 2020 III
‘Thoughts on an unusual Anzac Day’
The above is the title of an article published by Henry Reynolds*.
“The heroic image of the digger inhibits any assessment of the costs and benefits of war. Questions about the wisdom of engagements are seen as diminishing the sacrifice and suffering of participants. Without serious debate about our involvement in overseas conflicts, we appear to be shadowing our American allies, who as Judt observed, were convinced that war works”.
The two issues raised here should not be linked. The Australia in 1914, was different to the Australia in 1964; different to the Australia in 2014, and different to the Australia now.
There can be no denying the bravery of those who fought on behalf of their country during WWI. Historians can provide retrospective evidence to show that the nation’s contribution to the War should have never been made. But this evidence wasn’t available at the time, so there is no justification for suggesting that Australia should have adopted a different approach. The nation’s homage for its dead cannot be dismissed as a valueless tribute to an ‘heroic image of the digger’.
“Without serious debate about our involvement in overseas conflicts …” is a completely different issue. The following quote suggests that debate is encouraged re Defence issues:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.” https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/modernisation-projects/project-land-400
No matter how hard I’ve tried, however, I can’t find any Defence point of contact that is prepared to enter into informed debate about necessary Defence capability and preparedness. Might I suggest thatthis is the matter that Australians should be concerned about today.”
*Henry Reynolds is an eminent Australian historian.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 April 2020
ANZAC Day 2020 II
A letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times
“The Prime Minister in his ANZAC Day Address (CT, 25 April 2020, p8) stated that “… along the walls of the Australian War Memorial are the names of 102,000 men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice for our country”.
There are two things wrong with this statement. Firstly, the number of names on the walls of the AWM number 102,888. How can anyone ‘round up (or down)’ the number of Australians whose lives have been lost in the service of our nation? Each and every life is equally important.
Secondly, Mr Morrison should have said “some of the men and women” who made the ultimate sacrifice. The names on the walls of the AWM are of those service personnel who died within the prescribed periods of the Wars in which they were involved. Anyone who died as a consequence of their wounds after the ‘cut off’ date is not listed on the Roll of Honour at the AWM. The cost to the nation of the wars in which we have been involved is much greater than 102,888.”
At least the PM did not refer to ‘servicemen who had been lost’ (as has happened before) and recognised that the Honour Roll includes women. But the speechwriters and PM’s staff still don’t ‘get it’! One day, perhaps perchance.
———————————————————————————————————————-
ANZAC Day 2020
Thoughts for Anzac Day. ‘Never such innocence again.’
“Perhaps today, our private Anzac remembrances can be more in keeping with the spirit of the troops – those who urged after the Great War that, in future, any choice for war must be incontrovertibly a last resort, and incontrovertibly defensive. Giving the choice for war to parliament would be a good start.”
The last sentence would have to be the classic ‘sting in the tail’. Presumably the unsaid part is that the Australian Government is so tied to the US that our Parliament (and therefore we as a nation) has had, and will have, no say in whether or not to become involved in recent wars and those in the future.
There is no doubt that we cannot dwell solely on the past, ie reflect only on the selfless deeds of servicemen and women who have sacrificed themselves on behalf of their nation in the years to now. We must always honour this service and ensure that it is never forgotten. We must also maintain our faith with those who have put themselves in harm’s way and build on it for the benefit of our nation and our countrymen. It is this latter obligation which needs our utmost focus. Not to do so would devalue the sacrifices.
The defence of our nation and its national interests is, and always has been, solely in the hands of Parliament (ie. the Australian people). Only if we are all apathetic to the nation state tensions around us, can we elect a government whose foreign policies we either don’t support or care about.
If this is the situation … we deserve what we get!
*Douglas Newton is a retired academic and historian. He has published on the history of Britain, Germany, and the First World War. His most recent book was Hell-bent: Australia’s Leap into the Great War (Melbourne: Scribe, 2014).
———————————————————————————————————————-
24 April 2020
Given tomorrow is ANZAC Day, I thought this letter to the Canberra Times in November last year was relevant.
———————————————————————————————————————–
23 April 2020
Australian Defence Strategy III
The author* of the article which I commented on in the Blog on 20 April 2020, has responded to my comment as below.
‘They underpin the agreed strategy for the defence of our nation.’ (Bruce Cameron)
What agreed strategy for a major war in Northeast Asia? That’s not the issue. It is in a great war-a conflict between China and the US in North Asia-who will be call the shots and what scope would having a highly interoperable force give Australian politicians to make an independent decision in Australia’s interest. National strategy is not about what the ADF can do. It’s about what the political leadership decides to do in a crisis. I understand that the highly professional ADF makes contingency plans for defence of Australia. Which plan they operate, if any at all, will be the call of the political leadership-the leadership’s strategy. But in the build up to a great power war in Northeast Asia are they so locked into the US’s forces that they will fall in behind the US’s strategy without choice.
My response to Mr Scrafton was as follows:
“I think it’s important to define terms. We have Military Strategy and Grand Strategy. ADF Contingency Plans for the defence of Australia are formulated on the basis of military strategy; this in turn, is developed within an agreed grand strategy.
The ANZUS treaty currently forms part of the grand strategy for our defence. The US is by far the predominate partner in this security agreement. This means a subordinate role for Australia and NZ.
If the relationship with the US is to be scrapped, what form of grand strategy is to be adopted. One option is to become a ‘neutral’ state, ie. accept that we are willing to the being manipulated by any state more powerful than ourselves. Other options? Enter into a bilateral defence agreement with another nation (Indonesia, perhaps) or another group of nations (such as used to exist with SEATO)?”
*Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 April 2020
Australia’s Defence Strategy II
Photo: ‘Defence Connect‘.
One of the other responses to the article that I commented on yesterday, stated (inter alia) that:
“The military/intelligence complex in Canberra continues to play toy soldiers when that type of conflict is no longer viable if national survival is the issue.
In a major conflict between the US and China, with Australia being an embedded ally of the former, we would be toast in no time. The power systems that drive our economy would be paralysed and our military retaliatory capacity would at best be marginal. The devastation would be catastrophic”.
I didn’t immediately realise that the author and I had previously adopted differing positions (as now) in a similar debate. Eight months ago, Andrew Farran* stated the following in a Pearls & Irritations article that was published:
“The military and intelligence community is ceaseless in talking up the threat to ensure its ‘share’ of resources. But at the same time such talking up can be seen as fuelling the threat and counter-productive for rational foreign policy objectives and the broader interests of the Australian people.”
My response at that time was:
“Dear Andrew
“A Defence policy is akin to an insurance policy. If you value your house, you insure it. If it’s built of weatherboard, you expect to pay a higher premium than if it was built of brick. Why? Because the threat to it is greater. How much greater? The community leaves this to the insurance company actuaries to determine. If we don’t agree with their threat assessment, we elect not to have any insurance and bear the risk ourselves.
I suggest that it’s part of the Australian culture (formulated by our collective experience) that insurance is considered a necessary factor in our daily expenses. The insurance companies might well ‘talk up’ the risk, but we’re capable of evaluating it for ourselves … depending on our personal circumstances. The trouble is, one’s sovereign identity is not quite the same as one’s house.
This is a ‘red herring’ of sorts … how would you feel if you had been an indigenous Australian when the first fleet arrived and colonisation commenced? As a nation, we still do not have an empathy with those who endeavoured to defend their family, their land and their possessions. We will not even acknowledge these Australian warriors and their families in the Australian War Memorial.
Many might agree with this this injustice, but would they agree that Australia’s “military and intelligence community” are talking up the threat to our country to keep themselves in a job?
I, for one, have more faith in my fellow Australians.”
*Andrew Farran is a former diplomat who also worked as Executive Assistant to Sir Arthur Tange in Defence in 1971-72. He is a retired law academic and trade policy adviser.
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 April 2020
Re Yesterday’s Blog post, Bruce Scott has added that:
1. Hopkins in Appendix 8 (P351) of Australian Armour says, “The 1st Armoured Car Squadron returned to Australia in December 1948. It was reorganised and renamed the 1st Armoured Regiment and so became the first armoured unit in the Australian Regular Army.”; and
2. Lieutenant Colonel Miles in his ‘Tracks To Tradition – A REGIMENTAL HISTORY’ article in the first issue of the Tracks magazine in 1955 wrote, “On the 7th of July, 1949, the Squadron was renamed the First Armoured Regiment, and at about the same time we were equipped with Churchill tanks. ” More here: file:///Users/lisa/Downloads/Histories,%20Diaries%20and%20other%20Resources.html
Thanks, Bruce! [So renaming might have been what happened. I’ve asked the RAAC Historian and will post his response.]
Australia’s Defence Strategy
“The clear course set by successive governments to develop military forces prioritised to be interoperable with those of the US and explicitly designed to operate in the South China Sea indicates that recent governments have abandoned any prospect of strategic autonomy and national independence. On current planning, in the next great war Australia will have no strategy.”
The quote above is from ‘Australia’s strategic quandary: political leadership and the abandonment of strategy’ by Mike Scrafton* (in John Menadue’s ‘Pearls and Irritations’).
I think this assessment is overly dismissive of the efforts made by the ADF’s planning staff and the intelligence gathering services which help inform their work.
There are numerous contingency plans around which our military capability is developed and maintained. These plans have differing levels of priority. They underpin the agreed strategy for the defence of our nation.
We are currently seeing what happens when we, as a nation, take our eye off the ball. Our last pandemic preparedness exercise was conducted over ten years ago. After that, the need for regularly updated contingency planning lost importance. The ADF, however, continually maintains its readiness to execute the contingency plan(s) considered most likely to be needed be meet the current threat assessment.
The ADF at all its levels of responsibility is both professional and dedicated. As is undoubtedly right, only by the direction by the Government of the day, can the use of military force be authorised. It is the responsibility of the ADF to make known to Government the appropriate preparedness levels required at all times. I, for one, have confidence in the ADF’s unswerving commitment to this end.
*Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
———————————————————————————————————————–
20 April 2020
1 Armd Regt: Was a New Unit Formed or Was an Existing Unit Renamed?
There have been a number of recent posts related to ‘preserving our history’. This is another. The 1AR Assn states in its history of 1 Armd Regt that “the 1st Australian Armoured Car Squadron was renamed 1st Armoured Regiment”, ie an existing unit was renamed. But is this what actually happened?
Could it be that the 1st Armoured Car Squadron was disbanded and those personnel remaining, were incorporated into a new unit? Differing perceptions are expressed in the sources quoted below.
“It was intended that the 1st Armoured Regiment would be formed at Puckapunyal from the personnel of the Armoured Car Squadron when they returned from Japan.”
‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ (page xv)
“The 1st Armoured Car Squadron returned to Australia in December 1948. In July 1949 the Squadron was expanded and re-equipped with Churchill tanks to form the 1st Armoured Regiment.’ Wikipedia
“The Squadron returned to Australia in December 1948, together with its remaining vehicles. In July 1949, the remaining members of the unit were formed into a new unit, the 1st Armoured Regiment, to become the first armoured unit of the new Australian Regular Army.” http://anzacsteel.hobbyvista.com/Armoured%20Vehicles/austarmourinjapanph_1.htm
“The regiment’s nucleus consisted of personnel from the 1st Australian Armoured Car Squadron, which had returned from Japan several months earlier as part of the occupation force.” http://www.awm.gov.au/units/unit_13757vietnam.asp
It’s my belief that the last of these, that from the AWM, is most likely to be correct, ie. the 1st Armoured Car Squadron was disbanded and the personnel who remained, formed the nucleus of 1st Armoured Regiment.
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 April 2020
The Centurion Which Detonated the Most A/T Mines in Vietnam.
A number of tank crewmen experienced numerous anti-tank mine incidents in Vietnam … before reflecting on who they were, it’s worth looking at which tank held the ‘record’.
A number of Cents detonated two anti-tank mines. Only one, however, detonated three: ARN 169067 (between Oct 69 and Jun 70). During this time is was callsign 24A and 4A in B and A Sqns. The tank spent eight months in Vietnam … is that another record for the shortest time? (More about that milestone in another Blog.)
The post on 1 April 2020 described the last of these incidents (the first Centurion to detonate an RPG mine). What happened on the other two occasions?
23 October 1969: Not everything could keep going Tango Force’s way, however. At 7.35am, the lead tank (Ferrari) struck a 7kg mine. It was not on a track, but positioned close to the edge of the Xa Cam My Rubber Plantation, just west of Route 2. This was probably predicted to be a likely place for AFVs to leave the road. As always, considerable thought and planning had gone into laying the mine. The fact that the ground was quite soft where the incident occurred probably reduced its effectiveness*. This was not immediately realised by the crew commander, however:
“It all happened so fast, a loud bang, cessation of forward motion and a feeling of numbness. I checked that the turret crew were ok (Troopers Winga Williams and Java Jones), but couldn’t raise the driver (Trooper Moe Burgess) on the IC. I was so concerned for him that I broke all the rules and went over the top to check on him. He was ok; he’d just lost his headsets.”
*While there were no apparent wounds, such incidents could always involve both physical and psychological trauma (known as occult wounds) which took longer to become evident. Minimal damage was done to the tank.
25 February 1970: It was a bigger mine than 1Charlie had hit a few days earlier (16kg compared to 13.5kg), but this one was not offset. Going off beneath the front left roadwheel, the suspension was able to absorb much of the blast. Despite this, the driver, Trooper Moe Burgess, was badly knocked around by the concussion. While he was checking their gunner, Trooper Bob Joyce, Wicks asked Williams to help their driver: ‘I climbed out of the turret and down the front to find poor bloody Moe half out of his driver’s compartment. I hauled him out and laid him on the mudguard.’ Joyce was fortunate:
The force of the explosion was so great, it released the catch holding down the spring-loaded gunner’s seat and I was catapulted head first into the turret roof. Luckily for me, I was wearing a fibreglass helmet (US issue) which took the brunt of the impact and certainly saved me from serious harm.
Damaged components on the vehicle included the idler, track guard, muffler and six track links. Electrical power to the turret was also lost. In the eyes of the squadron commander, however, there was a positive side to the incident: ‘The mine caused a bush fire which detonated a second anti-tank mine … and we had found the minefield.’ Although located further to the east of the D445 position than the prisoner had indicated, the enemy had once again correctly predicted ground likely to be used by armour. Interestingly, one of the anti-tank mines later found in the area by engineers was set to be initiated by a tilt switch.
*To the credit to the LAD, repairs to the tank, ARN 169067, were completed in two hours. The OpDam report noted that this was ‘the first non-electrically initiated anti-tank mine encountered for some time’, i.e. it was a direct pressure mine, possibly of Soviet or Chicom manufacture. The device was typical of tilt switch mechanisms: a freshly cut stick, around 90cm in length, was inserted into a Chicom grenade, which in turn was moulded into the explosive charge. All that was needed for detonation was for the stick to be tilted in any direction.
———————————————————————————————————————-
18 April 2020
The Last Centurion to Detonate a Mine in Vietnam
“We hit a mine at the end of [Operation] Iron Fox. I think it was calculated at 50lbs. It created the biggest hole that the mini-team had seen.” Peter Bourke (Major), OC C Squadron, 1971
Operation Iron Fox was to conclude on 5 August; however, A Company 3RAR came across signs of enemy activity early that morning. At 8.45am, 5 Troop were ordered to take up position to the rear of the infantry. They were replaced by 1 Troop at 1pm. Soon after, it was concluded that there was little hope of any significant finds being made. At 2pm, the infantry boarded the ‘carriers’ of 2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav (Stephens) in preparation for returning to Nui Dat. 1 Troop were tasked to lead the convoy along the firetrail to Route 2.
Second Lieutenant Dave Lester, RNZAC (Troop Officer, 2 Troop, A Squadron 3 Cav) recalls that at 2.25pm:
“As they [1 Troop] came past our position, and when directly opposite my vehicle, self and Lance Corporal Dick McColl standing on top, [Farrant’s] tank detonated a mine, blowing off a suspension unit. I would say that we were no more than 5m away, and, apart from being covered in dust and dirt, no injuries were sustained [by us].”
Even closer to the explosion, were Troopers Grant Sheean and Steve Johnson. They had been detailed to bring in the Claymores from the APC ambush: ‘Incredibly, they both came staggering back out of the dust, arms full of Claymores and det cord around their necks.’
Although none of the crew was reported as being wounded [wounds revealed themselves later], the tank [ARN 169029] itself was not too well. The left final drive sprocket and centre left suspension station were badly damaged. (Roadwheels were blown off and were unable to be found within 300m of the tank.) SHQ and 5 Troop joined up with 1 Troop and a harbour was formed while arrangements were made to get the tank mobile. Improvisation worked initially, but it was not long before the tank had to be towed. Repairs would probably have been completed in the field if 1 Troop were to remain on operations. According to Operation Timothy, however, the troop were supposed to have been withdrawn on 1 August 1971.
Notes. (i) ARN 169029 ended up as a ‘hard’ target on Singleton Range. Its logbook is held by the AWM; (ii) the photo above is not of 169029.
————————————————————————————————————————-
17 April 2020
ESOs : Open and Transparent?
The post on 12 April 2020, took issue with the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s rant about negative feedback being given to ESOs by a ‘sub-section of veterans’. It concluded with the request to “please be open and transparent in terms of making known the things that are done in the name of the RAAC family”.
The video clip below is from the President of the Hawthorn RSL Sub-Branch. He is providing feedback to RSL HQ in an open and transparent manner. Should he be condemned? There are probably some in the RSL who will say: “Yes!”. A bit like the situation with the captain of the USN aircraft carrier who was sacked recently for speaking out about the Covid-19 cases aboard his ship.
(The video will not play direct; post link below into URL bar.)
My Comment: “Well spoken, Lucas! You’ve stood up for veterans first and made that a priority. RSL National and State needs to be completely open and transparent as far as funds (in and out) are concerned. The same applies to other ESOs, but they won’t all acknowledge the need for this unfortunately”.
Please feel free to openly disagree with me. I welcome feedback … as they say in private enterprise, this is the only way that ‘you/the organisation’ can continually improve (though some ESOs would disagree).
———————————————————————————————————————–
16 April 2020
A Photo Too Far
A caption to the above might be: ‘2Lt Ian Farrant (Acting 1 Troop Leader), Maj Peter Bourke (OC C Sqn 1 Armd Regt), and Major John Doyle (OC A Coy 3RAR); taken during Op Iron Fox Ph 2 (2-5 Aug 71)’. It may or may not be an AWM photo … enquires in this regard have been commenced.
The photo emerged recently during preliminary preparations for a C Squadron 1 Armd Regt 50th reunion in Canberra on 6/7 June 2021. The get-together is timed to coincide with a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord (which preceded Iron Fox.).
A similar Commemoration was conducted by DVA in Feb 2020 for Operation Hammersley.
I advocated at the time for 1AR Assn to take early action for an A Sqn 1 Armd Regt reunion to be conducted. Being in Canberra, I offered to help. I was pilloried, as DVA had not committed to the Commemoration as funding was within the 2019/20 FY budget allocation (and could not be ‘anticipated’).
By the time the Commemoration was confirmed, there was either insufficient time or nobody prepared to take on the work to organise a Squadron function … as it did not happen.
Preparations for a C Squadron reunion are proceeding with great support. If funding for the DVA Commemoration is not approved, then we can either cancel the arrangements or go ahead on our own. The main thing is that we have alerted Squadron members to the possibility and made preparations. Do those who served, deserve any less?
———————————————————————————————————————-
15 April 2020
Lessons Learnt on The Job (Again)
The photo above appeared on the Centurion Appreciation Society FB page. I commented thus: “Some might wonder about the removal of the side plates. These were done away with early in ’68 (soon after the tanks arrived) because of the constant need to clear the mud build up behind them. There was only one RPG penetration into the fighting compartment through the hull. This was extremely ‘lucky’, passing between the top of the track and bottom of the track guard. The tank above was photo’d in late 68 or after. In Jun 68, it was found that long approach marches chewed up roadwheel rubber, so two extras were carried on the glacis. Originally they were placed at the same height … then it was found that the driver’s vision was impeded and so that in front of him was lowered”.
I was then asked to explain why the MBSGD had been removed. My response was:
“I wish it was just a matter of saying that too many vines etc were getting caught around them when pushing through jungle, but the lesson related to training can’t go without mention. A ridiculous situation existed in Australia … the rubber covers to hold WP grenades in place were classed as ‘War Stocks’ and so whenever grenades were loaded, drivers had to be closed down and the levers splayed out to hold the grenades in place. Training suffered accordingly. Prior to a 150 km approach march in Vietnam in May 68, grenades were loaded (in case of ambush). Covers were fitted (for the first time ever). One came loose, however, allowing a grenade to fall out.
It exploded as it hit the track guard. The driver was burnt. Once again, the importance of realism in all aspects of training was highlighted.”
I added that the driver “was one lucky guy (if the turret had been traversed anywhere else …). Mustn’t forget his replacement who burnt his bum on the WP remnants on the driver’s seat”.
———————————————————————————————————————
14 April 2020
Hierarchical Command
This is an extract from a recent article in Army’s Professional Military Education newsletter, ‘The Cove’:
“We’ve mulled over this problem for a while. How do you quicken change in organisations that have a closed workforce and draw new hires entirely via ab initio entry? It’s a thorny one. Ideas are quickly dismissed by those in the system. Armies are different they say – by necessity.
One cannot hire a Colonel off the street. Generals know its takes years of training and education, foundation warfighting skills need to be taught and embedded; only upon them can the institution of the Army then graft specialisations and expertise in the myriad of employment categories a complex effect generator like the Army requires.” https://cove.army.gov.au/article/cultural-reform-middle-army-melting-iron-colonels
The thrust might be summed up by another extract: “As Defence and the three services review their missions and perhaps also align values across Defence, there could be an opportunity to leverage change with a transformational approach to accelerating change in Army’s middle.
My comment is copied below:
“Great article. My experience (1968-1988) was that there was a culture of ‘not questioning [or risk …]’. This was pervasive. An example of the consequences of this occurred in Vietnam.
The misfire drill for the Centurion tank was to wait 20 mins before unloading (in case of a hangfire). A gunnery instructor who questioned the wisdom of this in a combat situation was told bluntly to just teach the drill as laid down.
During an attack on an enemy defensive position a misfire occurred. The situation was dire and the crew commander told the loader to remove the round. The loader refused … he knew that it could explode. The crew commander insisted … the round was unloaded, thrown out, and the battle resumed.
When writing the story of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, I looked into the basis for this drill. It turned out that the chance of a hangfire was 2%. Waiting 20 mins reduced the likelihood to zero. Obviously the crew should have been
made aware of this, so that an informed decision could be made when in action.
I later became aware of the different culture in the private sector, where input from the bottom up is encouraged and supported at all levels.”
————————————————————————————————————————
13 April 2020
Australian Strategy and the Gathering Storm in Asia: The Remote Likelihood of Greater Public Engagement
The above is the title of an article by Michael Evans*, published in Quantum On line at file: ///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/Content.Outlook/V5PAP7NL/Untitled%20attachment%2000310.pdf
An extract from the Conclusion follows:
“America’s elder statesman, Henry Kissinger, once said that there are only two roads to strategic stability: domination and equilibrium. As the era of unchallenged Western domination is replaced by Sino-American bipolar competition, Australia must invest in the complex process of equilibrium. As a nation, we must reinforce the Australian-American alliance but at the same time put far greater effort into helping to shape a new ecosystem in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. Such an endeavour will require intellectual rigour in the form of increased defence self-reliance and much greater public engagement in the country’s national security debate.”
The December 2019 2/14 QMI (LH) Assn Newsletter states the following:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.” I asked the Editor if he could “provide an email address for such queries about RAAC capability to be sent?”.
I’ve asked two different Defence directorates, in the spirit of ‘debate and independent’ about the timetable to procure the additional 30 Abrams needed to ‘right size’ the Australian tank fleet (see numerous related blog posts).
The response … zilch! So much for greater public understanding “on Army and how it does its business”.
*Michael Evans is the General Sir Francis Hassett Chair of Military Studies at the Australian Defence College in Canberra and a professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University. His article is based on an address to the Australian alumni of the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, at the Commonwealth Club in Canberra last October.
———————————————————————————————————————-
12 April 2020
How the RAAC Corporation Views Feedback.
The Blog on 9 April 2020 referred the Defence Force Welfare Assn’s call for feedback from members in terms of the direction that the DFWA should be taking to achieve the greatest benefit to its members.
How different this approach is to that of the RAAC Corporation. An extract from its annual report in Ironsides is copied at the end.
The Chairman criticises everyone who dares suggest another approach to that of his choosing. He doesn’t explain why he regards the feedback as “malicious, misguided and myopic”, he just states that it is. He doesn’t give any examples of what he regards as “toxic commentary” … he just states that that’s what it is. All ESOs, he says, are unfairly criticised.
Apparently, the feedback came from “a small sub-section of the veteran community”. So not a small section, but a small ‘sub-section’. Does it matter? Some members of the veteran community have offered feedback. Rather than accept this for what it is … the Chairman says ‘How dare you!’.
Well … let’s return serve! As far as Armouredadvocates is concerned, all that has been called for is openness and transparency. But the RAAC Corporation won’t agree to this. Why isn’t its annual financial statement available to the public? Those of other charitable organisations are. Why aren’t the Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGM available to all? Of course, we know how secretive the RAAC Corporation is in terms of the Chairman’s response to the FOI submission regarding the Corporation’s position re the Ministerial submission concerning the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour. That outcome there was that one of the considerations was that if the RAAC Corporation’s position was made known, it would lead to member associations withdrawing their membership.
Apparently, the feedback also extends to “the Corporation’s own Member Associations, who have voluntarily devoted a huge slice of their lives battling their own accepted service-related disabilities, to look after those who are struggling with many issues.”. Yet, the Corporation’s position is that neither it, nor its members, have the resources to assist veterans in need … anyone who needs help has to be referred to other ESOs. How can this be, when Corporation members are giving up “a huge slice of their lives” to look after them?
To the Chairman RAAC Corporation … I understand that (i) you are familiar with the posts on this Blog and (ii) you’ve just undergone an operation. I wish you well with your recuperation, but please just be open and transparent in terms of making known the things that are done in the name of the RAAC family (remembering that the lack of such protocol in the past has led to the downfall of other ESOs).
———————————————————————————————-
ADVERSE COMMENTS FROM THE VETERAN COMMUNITY
Our key stakeholders, the serving members of the RAAC, need to know what is being done for them and what can be done for them in the veterans’ space contrary to often bitter and ill-informed toxic commentary from a small sub-section of the veteran community, as has been the case this year.
The malicious, misguided and myopic nature of such commentary is truly disappointing.
To see all ESOs damned to hell and back, as being like the RSL in having snouts in the trough, etc., is offensive in the extreme and cannot be allowed to stand.
Such toxic commentary is unhelpful, completely ignoring, tarnishing and diminishing the good work being done in the broader veterans’ support space.
This includes the Corporation’s own Member Associations, who have voluntarily devoted a huge slice of their lives battling their own accepted service-related disabilities, to look after those who are struggling with many issues including navigating the treacherous shoals of MRCA 2004.
ADSO is now rightly seen as the go-to entity in view of the fact the RSL’s star has waned. The RSL’s good name and reputation will take many years to recover from this damage.
All ESOs have unfairly and unjustifiably, been infected and tainted by the recent scandals in RSL NSW and RSL National and it is grossly unfair to tar all ESOs with the same brush.
Similarly, the concerted personal attacks on the Secretary DVA and on ADSO members individually and collectively, are on every level, as egregious as it gets and all ESO members of ADSO continue to support the Secretary in her attempts as a Change Champion, to transform DVA
————————————————————————————————————————
11 April 2020
Postscript: The Bizarre Story of the Last 20Pdr Round Fired in Vietnam.
The Blog on 15 March 2020 described the above circumstances.
As is often the case, however, all was not as it seemed.
What happened becomes even more bizarre when the ‘back’ story is revealed.
The shell case of the last round fired in contact was ‘lost’. (It was collected after the action and was supposed to have been transported back to Nui Dat and kept separate from all others).
The round fired by the squadron group returning from Operation Iron Fox was ordered to be fired by the Squadron OC (so as to provide a replacement).
Even here there is a ‘twist’, however. It seems (from a subsequent patrol report) that enemy may well have been present in the location at the time that the round was fired.
So, the ‘new’ shell case gets back to 106 Field Workshop. The details that the OC wrote out were being engraved when a mistake is made. What to do?
I understand that a section was cut from another round, engraved and then fitted in place of the damaged inscription.
So… it seems that the details on the shell case in the Werribee RSL round re the last contact with the enemy, are correct.
But the round itself is not the last fired in action (but then again, it could’ve been).
———————————————————————————————————————-
10 April 2020
‘Like a Trooper!’
On the TV earlier this evening, there was a discussion about how the virus had affected education. A spokesperson stated that “students were working like absolute troopers!”.
Why did she say this? Does she know any ‘troopers’? (I won’t go any further on this tangent.)
There are a number of definitions on Google re ‘trooper’, ie. “an enlisted soldier in the cavalry” and “someone who courageously faces harshness and unpleasant conditions to obtain a goal”, ie. striving to ensure that he/she got the last pack of chewing tobacco in the ration pack!
This begs the question … how did the association between the qualities above, and the characteristics of a ‘trooper’, originally come to be made?
Google provides an explanation …
LIKE A TROOPER means with great energy, enthusiasm, or display, or just doing things to the extreme (like the early British soldiers supposedly did). And people have using the simile and attributing many things to being ‘done like a trooper’ since at least the 18th century including ‘swear like a trooper, ‘lie like a trooper, ‘eat like a trooper,’ ‘laugh like a trooper,’ and ‘die like a trooper.’ But, as mentioned above, some people may be referring to the characteristics of a hardworking actor (which technically should probably be spelled ‘trouper’ in this instance (see above).
SWEAR LIKE A TROOPER or ‘curse like a trooper’ meaning to spew forth oaths/profanity/obscenity first appeared in print in the early 1700s and was originally referring to the cursing habits of British cavalrymen (troopers), who actually were probably no more likely to swear than other military men.
The question? Why is it that the term ‘trooper’ is related to swearing, eating, lying, laughing, and dying? Is there anything that these actions have in common?
Is it to do with the sequence … or is it to do with the fact that troopers weren’t/aren’t prepared to simply lie down and die?
Should there be any doubt as regards the SAS rank of ‘Trooper’ … the following is relevant: Before the rank was approved, the permission of the RAAC HOC was sought. The then Director granted his approval for SAS soldiers to be awarded the rank Trooper, as the SAS had a similar role to cavalry, ie, reconnaissance. It was deemed that those who participated in warfare of this nature should be ‘brothers in arms’.
———————————————————————————————————————–
9 April 2020
The Unique Pressures on AFV Crews
The latest newsletter (Apr20, No 6) of the Defence Force Welfare Association (DFWA) will soon be available here: https://dfwa.org.au/. One extract is:
“With the passing of the Military Covenant into law in late 2019, many people still don’t realise just how military service is unique. Military service may have some similarities to other occupations or employment, but when you look at military service as a whole, it really is unique.” My response is copied below.
Hi Guys,
The E-News issue below asked for suggestions. Some time ago I asked the C’tee of the 1 Armd Regt Assn if they would support a proposal to initiate an ADF study to investigate the stressors associated with specific employment categories across the Army.
My idea was that if there was a guide available to medical professionals which set out the unique circumstances of say, those in the SAS, or AFV crewmen, or field engineers dealing with IEDs, etc, then when a veteran presents suffering mental health issues, there is a basis on which to understand those issues which may have affected him/her.
I’ve copied my submission below. The 1 Armd Regt Assn advised that they could not support it, however, as they were not “a lobby group”.
Maybe the DFWA might see some merit in recommending to Defence the value of identifying such factors and documenting them. Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
THE STRESS EXPERIENCED BY AFV CREWS
Purpose.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to some of the factors which may have affected the mental health of Armoured Corps veterans, in order to better anticipate the needs of future veterans separating from the Service.
Human Factors in General.
When considering the performance of an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its capability, such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
These factors are taken into account of when choosing between two contenders for a particular combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident they feel, eg. whether or not they are likely to suffer anxiety in any of its forms when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that identifying these is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. To complicate matters, man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
Morale.
There are two main determinants of the degree to which AFV crewmen feel ‘comfortable’ in terms of their survivability. Foremost is their confidence in the overall superiority of the system in which they are a part (ie. their commanders at all levels, their battle grouping, and their equipment) … vis a vis the enemy. Following from this, is their confidence regarding the provisions which have been made for their individual protection.
What happens, however, when a loss or reversal in combat is suffered (eg. an AFV is penetrated, causing crew casualties). It is understandable that confidence in the superiority of the overall system is reduced, while provisions for individual survivability are also called into question.
Matters Affecting Confidence in Individual Survivability
All military training is conducted on the basis that it equips service personnel with skills superior to those of the enemy. This means that AFV crewmen are confident in meeting their responsibilities when under fire. They know that their fellow crew members are similarly trained and they will support each other.
When the enemy demonstrates that they possess an equivalent ability, AFV crew have to accept that their vehicle could be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon or severely damaged by an anti-tank mine, leading to a catastrophic ammunition fire. Apart from the obvious anxiety of being wounded or killed at any time, the following matters are some of those which become particularly important:
Being able to exit the AFV quickly if it is ‘knocked out’ or experiences a fire (particularly important for someone like a tank gunner who does not have direct access to the outside);
Knowing that the vehicle fire-fighting system will always operate immediately and effectively;
Being assured of the fire/flash retardant capability of crew combat clothing;
Being kept informed of what is happening beyond the AFV itself and not being forced to imagine the possibilities;
Being able to maintain contact with other crew members and not put in a situation of feeling isolated and alone (as can happen when the inter-communication system fails) and
Knowing that medical support will ensure that all wounded will immediately receive life-saving treatment and evacuation.
Loss of confidence in any of these areas will significantly increase the anxiety and fear that comes with the stress of battle. Should information overload occur in this digital age, the situation will be exasperated.
Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
One definition of PTSD is a particular set of reactions that can develop in people who have been through a traumatic event which threatened their life or safety, or that of others around them. It is generally recognised that it is not only the experience of a single traumatic event which can generate these reactions, other stressful situations (especially if repeated over and over) can have the same effect.
Conclusion.
AFVs, by definition, operate at the forefront of operations against the enemy. Even if a crewman does not directly experience a traumatic event, being enclosed in a vehicle which could be penetrated by an enemy rocket or detonate an anti-tank mine at any time, gives rise to stressful feelings associated with being wounded or killed, being trapped inside an AFV and burnt to death; and/or being abandoned in a disabled vehicle on the battlefield. These thoughts are often made worse by a lack of communication with other crew members, feelings of isolation, and a constant uncertainty about what is happening around him.
There are unique factors which impact on the stress experienced by the crews of AFVs on active service. These must be taken into account when any assessment is made of their mental health.
Please take a look and pass it on to all the veterans you know prior to Anzac Day if you can. It is not out on CD or the like, so it can’t be purchased anywhere and I think that all Vietnam vets will relate the intent and sentiment of the song.
Thank You. Francis Edwards”
I responded to the person who sent the email above as follows:
“I just spoke to Francis to congratulate him on the recording.
I explained that there might be another song needed to reflect those who died of their wounds after the end of the prescribed period of the War (29 April 1975).
He wasn’t aware that the 521 were ‘only’ those who died before that point and that hundreds had died from 30 April 1975 onwards.
I explained how schoolchildren are taught that the cost the nation of the Vietnam War was 521 dead, but this is probably just half of the actual toll.
Francis had thought that 521 was the total casualty figure for Vietnam. He might do a second song. Cheers, Bruce”
————————————————————————————————————————-
7 April 2020
The First Round Fired in Action by a Centurion in Vietnam
Sergeant Allan Jago and Sergeant Sid Russell … both soldiers are members of the Independent Armoured Squadron Workshops. Note the newly arrived Armoured Recovery Vehicles (ARV) ARN 169122 (left) and ARN 169112 (right) in the background. (AWM Photo: CRO/68/0108/VN)
The following milestones for 1 Armd Regt RAAC have been covered in earlier posts: the first round fired in action and the first main armament round fired in action … but what were the circumstances of the first round fired by a Centurion in action?
“This occurred on 8 March 1968, just over a week after the tanks arrived at Nui Dat. HQ 1ATF had requested help with landclearing in an area known as the Light Green. The aim was to restrict the cover available to enemy withdrawing from the Long Hais, this being their most likely escape route once Operation Pinnaroo, which had just commenced, got into full swing. The VC were expected to try and break through the cordon, cache their weapons, and mix with villagers in the area.
The Squadron LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens, set off in his ‘carrier’ with the two dozers (commanded by Sergeants Bob Snape and Graeme Millington), a bridgelayer (Sergeant Andy Zsolt), a fitters ‘track’ (Sergeant Kevin Craig, RAEME), and an ARV (Sergeant Peter De Jong, RAEME). This was one of the few occasions that Special Equipment Troop deployed as an entity, albeit part of a composite force under the command of Captain Bruce Richards (2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav).
Snape recalls that the notice to move was so short that ‘the crews had no idea how resupply was to occur and the details were worked out on the way’. En route to Fire Support Base Herring, De Jong saw a person running frantically with an RPG. He engaged with his .30cal machine gun, but the range was too great and the ‘VC fled to hell out of it’.
Interestingly, RAEME (and the Late Bob Owens) feature in both the first round fired and the first round fired by a Centurion (both AFVs belonging to 1 Armd Sqn Wksp)
————————————————————————————————————————
6 April 2020
Saying What Needs to be Said ….
One of the comments received re yesterday’s Blog was
“Agree with almost everything Bruce, but the decision for the driver to fight opened up was taken out of our hands when we were closed down in SVN clearing AP minefields. 45 minutes before the driver passed out through heat exhaustion in a measured 55deg + and reduced air in the turret. Having said that, I agree that closed down driving should be the norm in normal circumstances.”
My response was:
“I should’ve explained …
One thing I’ll never accept is that there was no feedback from one tank squadron to the next. Three drivers in three different squadrons were WIA as a result of attacking enemy bunkers system opened up.
The training at Puckapunyal remained the same throughout, ie. opened up in open country at all times. In a Cent, the driver had to stop and totally expose himself to close down. So, in an ambush, the only option is to drop his seat. Of course, then he can’t see (episcopes are in the hatches).
A tank can operate successfully in this situation, but it takes training to make it work. Of course, drivers can still be (and were) wounded by RPG shrapnel. So, helmets and flak jackets are needed. Eventually, on our third bunker assault (and the last in country), drivers wore flak jackets and helmets on the approach; they were closed down at the FUP prior to the assault. There were no crew casualties.
But this was Aug 71, the first bunker assault occurred in Jun 68. By 1969, an enemy defended position should have been established at Puckapunyal and tank crews trained in how to assault (rather than everyone having to relearn the same lessons ‘on the job’).
Crew safety was jeopardised in favour of the overriding requirement not to knock down any trees in the State Forrest and practising how to support inf conducting cordon and searches of villages. Tank crews were trained for the totally wrong war!
On my first bunker assault everything happened very quickly. Our training meant that it didn’t even occur to me to tell my driver to drop his seat … he didn’t think of it either and just resorted to his pistol. Fortunately, the enemy were even more surprised than us and we had bigger guns (so no crew casualties). It was with a false sense of invulnerability that we went into our second attack. (The enemy learnt faster than we did and had sufficient warning to stockpile RPGs.)”
————————————————————————————————————————
5 April 2020
At last, someone in responsibility prepared to say what it’s really like …
Let us hope that this man will be applauded by all those in the RAAC and seen as a role model for others tasked with preparing a unit for active service:
“2nd Cavalry Regiment …
Looking at past unit SITREPs it seems that the custom, with a few exceptions, is to expound the achievements of our units beginning with an obligatory reference to a busy year. We’re all busy, and we’re all proud of our units, so I won’t dedicate any time to those topics beyond thanking our people and families for their efforts.”
“The best example of contemporary normalised deviance within the Corps is the acceptance of four vehicle CRV Troops and two Troops in each Squadron. This is the equivalent of telling an infantry platoon they can only have two sections per platoon because we can only afford enough EF88s for two sections. The correct number of CRV in a Troop (for tactical and trade model purposes) is six. 2nd Cavalry Regiment Squadron directed Troop training and Stage 5 activities will all be done with six vehicle Troops by rotating platforms”.
The experience of tank crews prior to Vietnam revealed many similar shortcomings; but no-one was prepared to stand up like the CO 2 Cav. Well done that man!
Some of the above shortcomings were:
Complete lack of training with drivers closed down as needed when attacking an enemy defended position (drivers were WIA as a consequence);
No crew protective headgear or appropriate goggles provided;
No provision for hot weather fire retardant crew protective dress, reinforced to assist lifting of wounded turret crew (lifting a wounded crewman from the turret floor was required in a least one incident);
No consideration given to the means by which infantry indicate targets to tanks when confronting an enemy defended position (‘watch my fall of shot!’ did not work; a ‘Very’ type pistol was required;
No revision of the immediate misfire drill to enable crew commanders to decide whether to remove a round from the breech or wait 30 mins (it was fortunate that a delay caused by this training was not fatal in one incident).
No removal of the three-round solenoid (and replacement of the WP tipped ammo) to enable the RMG to be used as a ‘proper’ machine gun when necessary;
No training with blank ammo for personal weapons (the benefit of which is obvious); insistence on peacetime parade drill for weapons which, if followed with a loaded weapon, resulted in an AD; and
An insistence on tactical drills which were quickly used by the enemy to their advantage.
———————————————————————————————————————-
4 April 2020
Maintaining Our History (Cont …)
Attention has recently been drawn to the need for corrections in terms of the 1 AR Assn Honour Roll. The C’tee may or may not make these.
Another ‘fact’ is in need of consideration. The 1AR Assn currently states that I Armd Regt’s Theatres of Operation include Japan. Is this correct?
Is it important either way? The 1AR Assn Newsletter carries a caveat to say that, despite care, information should not be taken to be historical fact, ie. it may or not be true. The background here is interesting.
Some time ago the Newsletter carried an article by a crew member of the ARV which was behind a tank when it was fired on from Binh Ba. The crew member said that he was surprised at the sound of the exploding RPG, as he was reading a ‘stick book’ at the time.
There were errors of ‘fact’ in the article, but apart from these, the manner in which it was written seemed to give the ‘ok’ to the fact that the crew member (with, presumably, the ‘ok’ of his commander) was not on lookout for enemy, despite this possibly contributing to the wounding of the crewman in the tank immediately in front.
I was horrified. When I contacted the Assn C’tee, expressing my dismay at the publication … I was accused of ‘bullying’ (the Newsletter caveat was inserted thereafter). My dismay worsened when I contacted the HOC, RAEME. “That’s what typical RAEME soldiers do!”, I was told. (I’d thought that some sort of formal position might have been expressed, decrying the account and any acceptance of it being appropriate … distancing the act as being typical of that of RAEME soldiers in such circumstances; I had ‘higher’ regard for them.) The view expressed was that we should all ‘lighten up’.
Try explaining that to the Centurion operator who was WIA (and could easily have been KIA) by the RPG … the firer of which could have been seen by those on the ARV (if they’d been on ‘lookout’ as they should’ve been). Anyway … so now there’s a caveat re information published in the Newsletter.
Should we just ignore such matters, or alert the C’tee. (I’ll never know as the President has directed the C’tee not to correspond with me.) But I’ll try to do the right thing, nevertheless …
It’s easy to understand how the reference to the Japan Theatre of Operation came about. The 1st Armd Car Sqn served in Japan with BCOF. They were formed from volunteers from 4 Armd Bde at the end of WWII. On return to Australia in 1948 they provided the nucleus of 1 Armd Regt which was formed in 1949.
So, Japan was NOT a Theatre of Operation for 1 Armd Regt (either AAC or RAAC); it was, however, for members of 1 Armd Car Sqn, AAC. But, if we’re going to include their Theatres, why not include those for 4 Armd Bde? Indeed, why not include the Theatres of Operation for 1 Armd Regt, AAC?
————————————————————————————————————————
3 April 2020
The Ha Go Tank Saga (with thanks to Rod Ward)
The Assistant Director, National Collections at the AWM is Maj Gen Brian Dawson, AM, CSC (Retd). A former infantry (SAS) officer, he joined the AWM in 2013.
While the correspondence with the AWM has been to and fro for some time re the Ha Go tank (see previous Blog posts and NB 2 above), this is the first time the matter has been raised to his level.
“Hi Brian,
I wonder if you might be able to consider amending the AWM’s references to the Ha Go Tank, so as to be consistent as regards the number of crew. At the moment there are contradictory references as to whether or not the crew was three or four. (See under.)
I, and a number of others interested in armour, are firmly of the belief that the tank had a crew of three. It is our contention (and that of the international community as a whole) that the term tank ‘crew’ refers to those who actually operated the AFV. We’re aware that some documents may include references to others, such as Japanese Landing Force ground guides, as part of the ‘crew’.
Any number of references can be supplied to back up the number of the tank’s crew as being three. That of the AWM conservation team would seem to be most relevant. However, another more recent one is provided here (also a restoration): https://riddlemagazine.com/ha-go/
Many thanks for your consideration, Bruce Cameron”
AWM Contradictory References: Ha Go Tank
“This area of the Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the front proper right side of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the lower portion of the hull in the proper left side; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret.” https://www.awm.gov.au/about/our-work/projects/Ha-Gotype95lighttankconservation
“Thank you for the email. I will provide you with a considered response in the near future”.
What more could anyone ask … the courtesy of a prompt response and an undertaking to look into the matter raised. Why is this so rare?
———————————————————————————————————————
2 April 2020
Common Courtesy: Not That Common?
(The Blog post for 17 November 2019 is copied at the end. )
Recently I received an email from someone who had been a recipient of one of the items. He said that he had worn it ever since. (I should mention that some clothing items manufactured in years past are of a better ‘quality’ than later manufactured items.) Having recently been promoted however, it was no longer permitted by the ‘dress regs’ and so he passed it on to another member of the RAAC for their use (with the names of the previous owners sewn inside).
I was really pleased to receive this email. Given that it came some three months after my Blog post below, I don’t think that there is any link. Rather … I’m encouraged to think that the little courtesies of life are still among us. I’m glad of that. I don’t believe this Blog is so widely read as to lead to the above. I think of it as being confined to a small number of interested parties (though others tell me it was a wider following). Who knows?
I also gave away my boxed George Boots and spurs…. maybe they’re still out there somewhere (?).
Blog: 17 Nov 19. Some fifteen years ago I decided that there was little likelihood that I would ever have need of my military uniforms and accoutrements (as an ADC to the GG, I had received a second complete ‘issue’ of uniforms, as well as an allowance for spurs and overalls etc). I contacted the RAAC instructor at RMC and offered to bundle up the things I had and pass them on to him for the whatever benefit they might hold to forthcoming graduates. The following extract is from a note which was contained within a copy of a book:
“My name is …. I am a First Class cadet completing my studies at the RMC- Duntroon. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your donation of your Sam Browne and mess boots and I am very appreciative of your gift. In return for your kind gesture, I would like to present you a copy of the history of the Royal Military College of Australia as a token of my appreciation.”
Interestingly the recipient above was not from the RAAC (I had included two Sam Brownes, one blackened and the other not).
I believe that there was certain excitement among the cadets going to armoured corps, about obtaining the older style mess kit (better quality manufacture) and RAAC buttons (everyone is now relegated to ADF buttons, unless you have the former).
The author of the note above called at our house to deliver the book. My wife and I were delighted to welcome him and thank him for his kind gesture.
His was the only ‘thank you’. None were expected, but how great it was to receive one!
So maybe there are some serving RAAC officers (or former RAAC officers) who benefited from my ‘gift’. But who knows?
That’s the question …
Why is it that there was just one recipient who took the time to say ‘Thank You’.
As the song goes: Times are a changing. But surely, Australia’s fundamental values aren’t changing … we know what the right thing to do is. Don’t we?
———————————————————————————————————————-
1 April 2020
The First Centurion to Detonate an RPG Mine.
“Suddenly there were two sharp bangs followed by a whoosh of flames and .30/.50cal ammo cooking off.”
Prior to 7am that day [16 June 1970] a 4.5kg mine was laid. It was offset (see below) and coupled with two RPG warheads. A 15kg mine was buried nearby.
If the mines had been there the day before, 4 Troop missed the one on the track as they moved into an ambush position, just 100m further on, before last light. The mines may, of course, have been laid after the tanks had passed by, in the expectation that they would return along the same route. If this was the case, there was nothing that night to alert the troop.
The drizzle became sufficiently heavy [during the night] to make the driver of 4Alpha unroll the canvas blind behind him and ‘hook it over the driver’s hole where I was sleeping’. Just on 7am next morning, 4 Troop left their ambush position to commence their patrol for that day. 4Alpha’s driver left the blind hanging behind his seat; he would roll it up later.
Suddenly, there was a loud thump, followed by flames. A fireball engulfed them. The fact that the operator was looking towards the rear of the turret, was the ‘only thing that saved [his] face from burns’. As it was, he suffered burns to both his elbows and back. The driver was equally lucky: ‘a bloody big flame came through the right-hand side of the curtain, curling around in front of me. It took all the hairs off my right arm.’
The commander had just a few seconds to take stock of the situation, determine if enemy were present, and, if so, which side of the tank the crew should bail out.
The situation inside the turret was critical: ‘All the floor bins and portion of the twenty-round bin spontaneously caught fire from the initial explosion.’ The crew of 4Alpha had little idea that they had experienced the ‘first reported use of RPG projectiles as mines’.
It is difficult for many people to understand how the VC explosives expert got his mine to work. In simple terms, when the pressure switch closed, an electrical current made the RPG rounds detonate as they would if they had struck a target nose first. The result, if it could be repeated, was a breakthrough in terms of mine warfare; an enormous advance when compared with the effort and resources involved in producing the traditional device built around 30kg of explosive.
Note: ARN 169067 (the crew name for which is shown above) is now in private ownership. A check is to be made to see if the RPG penetration repairs can been seen.
———————————————————————————————————————-
31 March 2020
Centurions in Vietnam
The Blog on 14 Feb 20 made reference to Centurions in the Australian Army. A previous post on 24 Jan 20 referred to a suggestion on another site that ARN 169079 was the first Cent to fire a main armament round in Vietnam. It was, of course, ARN 169106. The Blog mused “while we’re at it, why not id the other tanks that were associated with ‘Milestones’? A number of subsequent posts have done this …
The 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, vehicle which fired the first round in action: M113A1 Fitters’ Track (2Lt Bob Owens, Blog 6 March 2020)
The first Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam: 169104 (Sgt Len Swarbrick, Blog 9 March)
The Centurion which fired the last 20pdr round in Vietnam/in anger/in contact: 169091 and others (Blog 14 March).
The first Centurion to detonate an anti-tank mine in Vietnam: 169106 (Sgt Jock McConnell, Blog 16 March)
The first Centurion to fire a main armament round in action in Vietnam: 169106 (Sgt Bob Snape, Blog 17 March)
The milestones outstanding are:
The Centurion which detonated the first ‘off-set’ anti-tank mine;
The Centurion which spent the longest time in Vietnam;
The Centurion vehicle which spent the longest time in Vietnam;
The Centurion which spent the shortest time in Vietnam;
The Centurion which detonated the last anti-tank mine;
The Centurion which detonated the most anti-tank mines; and
The Centurions which were ‘written off’ as the result of damage caused by anti-tank mines.
The circumstances concerning the first of these, The Centurion which detonated the first ‘off-set’ anti-tank mine are described below. It is easy to see why the enemy changed their tactics to off-set mines …
“C Squadron’s task on 15 September 1968 was to escort Battery A 2/35 Artillery (US) from Nui Dat to Fire Support Base Coolah. At 8.15am, close to Ap Ngai Giao, a mine exploded beneath 3ZeroDelta (Corporal Joe Dziedzic).
At the time the tank (ARN 169080) was part of 1 Troop, having replaced 31Charlie which had mechanical problems. The gunner, Trooper Michael Bidey, was thrown out of his seat by the explosion. The reason was soon apparent. The mine had gone off directly under the middle of the tank, rather than, as usual [before then], under one of the tracks. The blast bowed the bottom of the hull upwards by about 18cm, with devastating effects inside the vehicle: the casings of the vehicle batteries, which were mounted on the floor, were split open, spraying acid everywhere and filling the fighting compartment with fumes; in addition, a number of twenty-pounder rounds, also stowed just above the hull floor, were broken open, causing propellant to spill out.
If this was not bad enough, the Rotary Base Junction (RBJ) was badly damaged. This was the electrical distribution unit that facilitated turret rotation; located on the hull floor, it was directly above the point of the explosion. The combination of acid, toxic fumes, ammunition propellant and electrical short-circuits, in a confined space, is a recipe for disaster. As had happened with 31Alpha’s fire in April, quick action and cool-headedness on the part of both the crew and the Troop as a whole saved the day.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
30 March 2020
Maintaining Our History III …
Following on from yesterday, why is it that so little is known about those listed on the Honour Roll?
I’ve informed the 1AR Assn that I intend to do a ‘summary’ re all those currently listed. (Of course, I haven’t had a response in line with the President’s edict for the C’tee not to communicate with me. But I can live with that.)
One of those currently listed on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll is Craftsman B Silver (LAD) “Killed Accidently”.
One would expect that those listed would have been killed in circumstances in which they were on duty and for whom, therefore, 1 Armd Regt had a duty of care.
My understanding is that someone came across a private memorial in Shoalwater Bay Training Area to Cfn Silver. It was assumed that he had died while on duty serving the Regiment. Indeed, there was information that he was driving an Army vehicle in a convoy returning from Ex Nutcracker in Nov 1962 when he was killed in a road accident.
Interestingly, however, there is no reference to him on the listing of Defence training deaths between 1945 and 2004 provided to Parliament at:
The newspaper article above confirms the timing, but the circumstances are different … which would seem to explain why there was no mention in the Parliamentary listing.
BUT … the again, the following recollection suggests that he should remain on the Honour Roll.
“My recollection is that he was returning from Nutcracker. I was about 1hr behind him was informed by a NSW police officer that one person killed. All vehicles on that trip had co-drivers, much more comfortable than sitting in the back of a truck. That convoy was a cannon ball run.”
Wait a minute … could this be one of those ‘cover ups’? On 7 Nov 62, concern was expressed in Parliament about 100 injuries having been experienced during Ex Nutcracker.
It would not do the Govt’s position any good for a fatality to have occurred during the subsequent return movement from the Exercise. Or is this imagination gone wild?
Presumably there is a difference in terms of the above as far as ‘compensation’ is concerned. I can’t imagine that this could’ve been denied in the circumstances (though public information might have been suppressed).
——————————————————————————————————————-
29 March 2020
Maintaining Our History II
Following on from yesterday, another email to the President, 1AR Assn.
Following my email re Noel Lowes, I see that the 1AR Assn website lists those members who died of wounds as including “WO2 John Stone”.
I emailed the 1AR Assn C’tee on 29 July 2016 to say:
“The late WO2 John Stone is described as KIA, Thua Tein. I think this is another typo, Thua Tien (possibly today Thua Thien). The inclusion of John Stone is interesting. He was RA Inf when posted to AATTV (as per AWM Honour Roll). Presumably he had previously been RAAC and served with 1 Armd Regt before corps transferring. Could it be, however, that he is ‘confused’ with the late Sgt Jim Stones, RAAC who was badly WIA as an APC Section Commander in Oct 69 and subsequently DOW?”.
A check of the DVA Vietnam Roll will show that no John Stone (RAAC) served in Vietnam. James Stones served with 3 Cav Regt in Vietnam. I suggest that WO2 John Stone no longer be included on the 1 AR Assn Honour Roll. [He is, of course, included on the ROH at the AWM and on the AATTV Memorial. Fittingly, he was Mentioned in Dispatches (posthumously)].
I assume that you will give this matter the attention that the accuracy of the Honour Roll deserves. Bruce
PS. To further confuse the issue …. while the 1AR Assn webpage lists WO2 John Stone as having DOW; the Assn newsletter lists him as having been KIA. The facts are that WO2 John Stone (RA Inf) was KIA while serving with the AATTV; Sgt Jim Stones (RAAC) DOW (post-Vietnam) received while serving with 3 Cav.
PPS. I’ve just been advised that John Stone DID serve with 1 Armd Regt before Corps transferring to infantry. His listing on the 1AR Assn Honour Roll suggests that all those who had served at one time with 1 Armd Regt and later died while serving, should also be listed.
———————————————————————————————————————–
28 March 2020
Maintaining Our History …
(AWM P05655.161)
The following email to the President, 1AR Assn is self-explanatory.
Dear President.
I see that the latest issue of the 1AR Assn Newsletter lists those who died of wounds “post Vietnam” as:
WO1 L. S. Swarbrick; WO2 N. Lowes; TPR P G. Barwick ; TPR R. S. Bellott
You will see that he died on 6 July 1971; within the prescribed period of the Vietnam War (which is why he is listed on the RoH). Len Swarbrick, Phil Barwick and Rod Bellott died after the end of this period (which is why they’re not on the RoH).
Background is provided below [showing that Noel Lowes should be listed as having DOW].
Bruce Cameron
“I’ve had to correct statements by PMs who referred to the: “the 521 Australian servicemen killed in Vietnam”. The number is ‘officially’ correct (see below) but they were not all men. Barbara Black was an Army nurse.
“Killed in Vietnam” is wrong. Not all were killed and not all died in Vietnam.
To be correct, the PM would have had to say “521 Australian service personnel died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam during the prescribed period of the War”.
Even this is ‘drawing a long bow’. The 521 refers to those eligible to be listed on the ROH at the AWM. This means that they were on the roll of a unit which served in Vietnam between 3 Aug 62 and 29 Apr 75. If you returned to Australia and died of war caused factors within that time, you’re on the Wall. If you were on R&R in HK and died in a traffic accident, you’re on the Wall. If you died from malaria, you’re on the Wall. What I’m saying is the 521 were not all battle casualties killed in Vietnam. Many died from illness or accident in places other than Vietnam.
The other aspect that’s important is that relating to the ‘prescribed period’. Someone who stood on a mine in Vietnam and died of his wounds on 30 April 1975, is not eligible to be recorded as a casualty of the War (but someone standing next to him when the mine exploded, who died on 29 April 1975, is eligible). I have advocated for ALL those who die as a direct result of the wounds, to be formally acknowledged by the Nation. I have not won (as yet). It is an abomination that schoolchildren are taught that the cost to Australia of the Vietnam War was 521 dead. Many hundreds have died following the prescribed period, but are not acknowledged by their country.
“Capability is a concept of impressive elasticity in defence policy.”
There is a danger here of losing sight of what the required ‘capability’ actually is, ie. the ability to fulfil contingency plans for the Defence of Australia. If we have too little capability, the consequence is obvious; if we have too great a capability, we are denying resources that could be better used in other areas.
A well-known dog analogy was once used in relation to the Second Indochina War. It was found to have been very misleading …
“Sir Robert Thompson, an acknowledged British authority on counter-insurgency warfare who served as an adviser to the South Vietnamese Government, argued:
Getting government forces into the same element as the insurgent is rather like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley. It is no good inserting a large, fierce dog. The dog may not find the tomcat; if it does, the tomcat will escape up a tree … the answer is to put in a fiercer tomcat. The two cannot fail to meet … [and] the weaker will be eliminated.
This, of course, is an oversimplification. The defending tomcat, if it is smart, will make use of defences which will wear down the other tomcat. Furthermore, the defending cat is likely to call for reinforcements. A case can be made for an emphasis on specially trained and equipped, highly mobile infantry, in the first stage of revolutionary warfare when the guerrillas are endeavouring to develop their infrastructure. The challenge is to realise when this phase has passed, to be conscious of the options available, and to restructure forces appropriately. In hindsight, the nature of the enemy forces involved in the Battle of Long Tan in August 1966 should have made it clear that the time for the deployment of an enhanced armoured capability, including tanks, had arrived”
“Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson KBE CMG DSO MC was a British military officer and counter-insurgency expert who “was widely regarded on both sides of the Atlantic as the world’s leading expert on countering the Mao Tse-tung technique of rural guerrilla insurgency” Wikipedia.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 March 2020
Operation Hammersley: The Story Goes On!
Photo: Winga Williams
The following letter is awaiting a response:
Dear Minister,
Recognition of Supporting Arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
Your Department conducted a very successful 50th Anniversary National Commemoration of Operation Hammersley on 18 February 2020. Unfortunately, the bravery and sacrifice of only one element of the forces involved in 1970 have been recognised. It was hoped that this injustice might have been able to be corrected before the Commemoration, but this was not to be.
Apart from my desire to have my own statements correctly recorded in an ‘official’ public document, I wish to ensure that the DHAAT Decision is an accurate one when I forward it to the President of the United States. My reasoning is that if the Australian Government is not able to acknowledge the outstanding service of its own soldiers (because of ‘technicalities’), then possibly the United States can do so … given that the units involved were serving under its operational control. (The Meritorious Unit Citation awarded to HMAS Perth for its service in Vietnam is an example of this.)
I repeatedly asked the DHAAT to amend the above decision, however, was informed that the decision (and the document) was final and I had to lodge an appeal with the Federal Court. I prepared this (see attached). One of the requirements prior to lodgement was to show that I could meet the costs of the respondent (if necessary). The DHAAT advised that “the estimated legal costs for the Respondent would be from $40,000 to $70,000, or above”.
Not having “$70,000 or above”, I have no recourse to the rule of law. There did seem to be a possibility to seek explanation under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, however, the DHAAT quoted an exemption clause which prevented this from being possible.
So, I now come to you Minister. I do not ask for the DHAAT decision to be overturned, I simply seek to have the Government’s public record corrected so that it is a true statement of what occurred in its name.
The relevant section of the document is copied below. Deletions and insertions required to make it an accurate record of Government proceedings are highlighted:
“48. The second avenue considered by the Tribunal was whether the supporting units proposed by Colonel Cameron could be considered to be elements of 8RAR for the purposes of the citation as presented – in other words, could those units be considered to be part of 8RAR from 28 November 1969 through to the date of the award? Defence was asked to consider this avenue in a question placed on notice at the October hearing”. (INSERT) ‘The applicant was also advised that he was welcome to respond to the Tribunal on the same basis.’
“49. Defence has provided the advice that the sub-units nominated by Colonel Cameron were not permanently assigned to 8RAR for the duration of the Battalion’s tour. In response to this advice, Colonel Cameron …” (INSERT) ‘stated that supporting arms should be considered to be part of 8RAR for the purposes of the Citation as elements were under operational control for all operations and were vital to the success of each of these actions … a 57 page supporting submission to this effect was presented to the Tribunal’.(DELETE: “re-stated his opinion that the sub-units were under command of 8RAR for Operation HAMMERSLEY”).
“The command relationships and the contribution of the supporting units to the success of Operation HAMMERSLEY is not in dispute. However, as the Tribunal accepts that the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for the entirety of that unit’s tour to the date of the award, those supporting units assigned to 8RAR specifically for Operation HAMMERSLEY and not permanently assigned to the Battalion for its tour of duty cannot be considered to be part of the Battalion for the purposes of the award”. The second part of paragraph 49 (i.e. that copied immediately above) needs to be amended to state why the supporting arms named cannot be “considered” to have been part of 8RAR for the purposes of the Citation, given that elements were under operational control for the entire tour (albeit, not permanently assigned).
Your review of this matter is greatly appreciated,
Yours sincerely, Bruce Cameron
Attachment: Originating Application for Judicial Review (together with Genuine Steps Statement)
————————————————————————————————————————
25 March 2020
Some ‘Facts’ About Australia’s Involvement in the Vietnam War
In helping others understand what lies behind the public perception, I recently explained thus…
“I’ve had to correct PMs who have said or were about to say: “the 521 Australian servicemen killed in Vietnam”. The number is ‘officially’ correct (see below) but they were not all men. Barbara Black was an Army nurse.
“Killed in Vietnam” is wrong. Not all were killed and not all died in Vietnam.
To be correct, the PM would have had to say “521 Australian service personnel died as a consequence of their service in Vietnam during the prescribed period of the War”.
Even this is ‘drawing a long bow’. The 521 refers to those eligible to be listed on the ROH at the AWM. This means that they were on the roll of a unit which served in Vietnam between 3 Aug 62 and 29 Apr 75. If you returned to Australia and committed suicide within that time, you’re on the Wall. If you were on R&R in HK and died in a traffic accident, you’re on the Wall. If you died from malaria, you’re on the Wall. What I’m saying is the 521 were not all battle casualties killed in Vietnam. Many died from illness or accident in places other than Vietnam.
The other aspect that’s important is that relating to the ‘prescribed period’. Someone who stood on a mine in Vietnam and died of his wounds on 30 April 1975, is not eligible to be recorded as a casualty of the War (but someone standing next to him when the mine exploded, who died on 29 April 1975, is eligible). I have advocated for ALL those who die as a direct result of the wounds, to be formally acknowledged by the Nation. I have not won (as yet). It is an abomination that schoolchildren are taught that the cost to Australia of the Vietnam War was 521 dead. Many hundreds have died following the prescribed period, but are not acknowledged by their country.
It is generally forgotten that “Four Australian journalists – Bruce Piggott, John Cantwell, Michael Birch and Ronald Laramie – were shot dead on May 5, 1968, when they drove, against army advice, into Saigon at the height of Mini Tet.”
Of relevance here is the fact that a Commemorative Book is located in the AWM in which the names of those Australians who served on behalf of their nation (but were not enlisted) and died within the same criteria as per the ROH, are listed. This includes members of “the merchant navy, philanthropic organisations; official war correspondents, photographers, and artists”. The journalists mentioned above and Cathy Wayne should be listed. But I think there are others, maybe Red Cross, maybe press photographers … they also served their country and should not be forgotten.
———————————————————————————————————————-
24 March 2020
Grand Strategy for the Long-Term Future of Australian ESOs.
Following on from the 22 March 2020 blog …
The ESO ‘pie’ is made up of DFWA, RSL, ADSO, Australian Defence Assn (ADA), and Defence Reserves’ Assn (DRA).
The Issues are: ADF welfare policy (serving and retired), individual advocacy, heritage, commemoration, national defence and reserve forces.
I believe there is a requirement for an overarching consensus (the form of which I’m sure can be ‘nutted out’) which allocates prime responsibility along the lines of:
ADF welfare policy (DFWA); individual advocacy and commemoration (RSL); national defence (ADA); and reserves (DRA). ADSO would contribute to all (given that it is an alliance of corps/service-based associations with ‘camaraderie’ based agendas).
I know that this is ‘pie in the sky’ as far as the parochial interest of the various ESOs are concerned.
However, I believe it is essential to ‘give oxygen’ to the concept, in order to focus attention on the need to clearly differentiate between ESOs (as happens in industry whenever there are a number of ‘players’ in the same marketplace).
Remember it was quite recently that the RAAC Corporation and member associations agreed that they did not have the resources to provide advocacy services for those who needed them. Seems that RAAC unit associations are solely camaraderie focused … as one member of the then 1AR Assn C’tee said: ” we just want to have a few beers and swap stories”.
PS. Interestingly, the following post has just been made to the RAAC Facebook page:
“Dear Fellow Association Member or former member of the 1st Armoured Regiment,
At this difficult time there may be some things that we may be able to do for our fellow members including those former members of the Regiment who may not be Association members.
Whilst our financial resources are limited, we do have around 480 members and some of us may be able to assist one or two others. The Secretary has spoken to around 30 members in the last week and generally these members did not need any immediate help. However, if you do need some assistance, then please contact either the Secretary (secretary@paratus.org.au) or your State Representative whose email address may be found on our website at https://www.paratus.org.au/membership.
Those members who may be feeling down, anxious or depressed should seek assistance from Overwatch Australia on 1800 699 2824, Open Arms Australia (VVCS) on 1800 011 046, Lifeline on 13 11 44.
We cannot promise that we can help everyone due to our geographical dispersion, but at least we can try. These are trying times – please take the time to check on your mates via phone or social media.
Keith Meloncelli, President 1st Armoured Regiment Association”.
Compassion … supposedly, but there are some conflicting messages here. If you need assistance contact the Secretary or State Rep. Presumably this is not financial assistance, but a brokering service to link those who might be in need of practical assistance, eg. transport, delivery of goods etc. with members who might be able to help. This is a great gesture and the C’tee is to be commended. Those feeling down, anxious, or depressed are told to go elsewhere, however. The recommended organisations for the latter are interesting. (Not long ago the Tasmanian Rep was telling anyone who asked about advocacy, to go to the RSL.) It’s previously been suggested that this an area where the State Reps should have a network of contacts and should be able to assist.
———————————————————————————————————————
23 March 2020
Vietnam Requiem: Australian Nurses and Surgeons
“More than 200 Australian civilian nurses, 100 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and 43 nurses from the Royal Australian Army Nursing Corps (RAANC), served during the Vietnam War.”
One of the proposed movements of the second half of the Requiem is described as: “Lacrimosa the Tet Offensive / Nurses Tet Offensive erupts across South Vietnam, largest operation of war, 30 Jan until 8 June 1969. Terrible civilian casualties. Wounded civilians treated by recently arrived Australian Nurses – this is Tet seen through the eyes of nurses. Elena Kats-Chernin scored for Alice Giles harp plus orchestra 8 mins”.
I managed to establish contact with the Australian Medical Association and explained that “I tried contacting the Nurses and Midwives Assn, however, haven’t had a response. I know that there is a ‘Civilian Nurses Vietnam’ website/Assn, however, making contact is difficult for me. If you could have representatives of those involved, contact Chris [Latham, see earlier Blogs re the Requiem] that would be great! I know that the story of Australian med/surgical teams in Vietnam is one which mustn’t be overlooked and input from those involved is essential. (I advocated in a very minor way for PTSD recognition by the Govt and I’m pleased that this has happened.)”
Interestingly, it turns out that Chris Latham’s grandmother was a nurse during WWI and he has composed music in this context.
Go to http://theflowersofwar.org/ Scroll down to chapter 8, ‘The Healers’, and click on the links. I’m just being to appreciate what a great ‘Gift to the Nation’ that this was.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 March 2020
Changing Times for ESOs
In the latest Defence Force Welfare Association journal (March 2020) the President raised questions about the future of the ESO (even the possibility of merging with the RSL). He asked for members’views. [The latest journal isn’t available as yet on-line, but should be able to be read here before long https://www.dfwa.org.au/publications/camaraderie.%5D My input is as follows.
Dear Kel,
The following is in response to your request for members’views in Camraderie:
An ESO is brought into being and exists because a body of members wish it to be; i.e, they want it to represent them in particular ways and thereby bring about specific outcomes (either aspirational or practical).
Enthusiasm and support for the ESO waxes and wanes in accord with the significance of the impact that these outcomes (or lack of them) has on its membership.
An ESO whose primary membership comprises those who seek camaraderie, ie. social engagement, will have a different relationship with its members, compared to an ESO which was formed on the basis of representing them in other ways. The latter ESO is affected by the changing demographic of its members, much more so the ‘social club’.
Issues which were of fundamental importance to a particular cohort, may no longer be of any significance to its successors.
It is easy to suggest that the answer to these changing priorities is to conduct a survey of members … to identify the issues of most importance for the majority,. Ie. why they value their membership; and for the ESO governance body to respond accordingly.
I’ve previously recommended this to the C’tee of an ESO and it went down like the lead proverbial. It seemed in that case, that the C’tee feared that they would lose control in terms of setting the agenda.
I know that this wouldn’t be so re the DFWA and I wonder if the idea might be worthy of consideration?
PS. Personally, I’d much rather be a member of an Assn that placed importance on what matters to me as an individual; as compared to an Assn whose mission statement was determined without any consultation with members.
The President has expressed his interest “in any thoughts you may have on such a survey, questions to ask ….”. I’m happy to help with this and will attempt to do so.
———————————————————————————————————————————————–
21 March 2020
Vietnam Requiem
Following on from the 19 March Blog …
The first part of the Performance will involve a selection of music from the time. Little Patti is helping with this. The second part is where the orchestral pieces come in. A sequence has been identified to process from the First Indochina War through Deployment, National Service, ‘Patrolling’, Long Tan, Tet Offensive, Nurses, Major Battles and on. I was asked to provide some advice re the last aspect. I’ve copied it at the end …noting that it applies equally to the earlier ‘Patrolling’ segment, as well the ‘Major battles’.
The composer for the major battle sequence (pictured above; website: http://www.richardmills.com.au) is Richard Mills. Brief bio notes:
Richard Mills is deservedly one of Australia’s most sought after composers and music directors. In recent years he has pursued a diverse career as a composer and a conductor, which has seen him working with a large number of the nation’s music organisations.
Mills’s works are regularly performed throughout the world. Compositions range from major orchestral and choral works to ballet music. Commissions for the Sydney Symphony include Tenebrae, Emblems, and Totemic Journeys. Requiem Diptych was commissioned and premiered by the Chicago Chamber Musicians Brass in 2001. His symphonic/choral work for the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra, The Little Mermaid, was premiered in August 2005.
——————————————————————————————-
“My view is that, unlike the First World War, the Vietnam War can’t be defined by individual battles.
The experience for service personnel (I’ll say ‘soldiers’ hence, as a generic for male and female service personnel) was one of long periods living in an alert situation, punctuated by brief periods of intense danger, during which conspicuous courage was frequently demonstrated. The major battles which did occur represented the difference between Vietnam and the counter-insurgency of the Malayan Emergency. In the latter, the first stage of revolutionary or guerrilla warfare (during which the enemy develop their infrastructure) was paramount throughout. It should have been realised following Long Tan in Aug 1966, that this had ended for Vietnam and the enemy had moved to the second stage, Preparation for the Counter Offensive (in which regular units of the North Vietnamese Army became involved, rather than just local guerrillas). Unfortunately, this realisation of this didn’t occur until after Operation Bribie in Feb 1967. At this point Australia deployed a third infantry battalion and a squadron of tanks. (Prior to this time, the strong view was that there was no place for tanks in operations limited solely to counter-insurgency warfare.)
So … the Vietnam War for Australians was unlike anything ever experienced. The scale and intensity could change in the blink of an eye … from dealing with local guerrillas setting mines and booby traps, to attacking extensive defensive positions occupied by regular battalions of the North Vietnamese Army. The constant tension that resulted from this, was significant in the experience of Australian soldiers. Training prior to deployment was not adequate preparation. The effect manifested itself in many ways, as seen by the number of mental health issues which were present in returning veterans. [Moving between the two different levels of warfare was also a factor in the experience of members of the AATTV, I think; but John could elaborate.] Australian forces experienced isolated, but similar, situations in which Cathy Wayne was shot by an American soldier. The pervasive tension and stress were constant throughout.
As I’ve tried to describe, the major battles were one part of the experience only. Five battlehonours were awarded: Long Tan; Binh Ba, Bien Hoa (the Tet Offensive), Coral-Balmoral and Hat Dich. (These are all described on the Internet.) Other major actions were Operation Hammersley; Operation Bribie; the Battle Long Khanh (Operation Overlord) and the Battle of Nui Le. The bravery and courage of Australian soldiers was also demonstrated time and time again on operations at the other end of the spectrum, ie. searching a village or a tunnel system, conducting an ambush, denying food supplies to local VC, helping protect villages etc. The dichotomy is such that the major battles were similar to those experienced in, say, New Guinea during the Second World War; while the counter-insurgency actions were not unlike those of the Malayan Emergency.”
————————————————————————————————————————
20 March 2020
The RAAC Corporation : Open and Transparent Governance?
Given that the RAAC Corporation has been so secretive in terms of its submission in support of mine regarding the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour (see Blogs below, re the FOI Saga), is it open and transparent in areas of its own governance?
It receives $10,000 pa as a grant-in-aid from DVA. This is provided to assist with travel and accommodation for attendance at its AGM. The same applies to the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation.
According to the press release at the time, “The RAAC Corporation (the Corporation) was formally established through the ratification of the Constitution at the SOA on 6 October 2012. The Corporation was registered on 14 March 2012 with ASIC. It is a Tier 1 public company, limited by guarantee, formed for a charitable purpose”. (http://www.lancers.org.au/documents/Newsletters/aug_13/RAAC_Corp_Release.pdf)
The Australian Charities and Not for Profit Commission provides open and transparent access to records of companies formed for charitable purposes. The RAR Corporation is registered with the Commission. This enables public access to its financial records. See: https://www.acnc.gov.au/charity/43a66707534052e2e7169332aa402507#financials-documents
This is exactly as one would expect. But why is the RAAC Corporation not registered in this way? Surely it could not be to prevent public scrutiny of its financial records? Of course, I might well be wrong … the RAAC Corporation might well be registered with ACNC, but I just couldn’t find it.
If the financial statement of the RAAC Corporation was to be publicly available, what would it tell us? Would the whole grant from DVA be expended on the AGM? If so, how much was for travel and how much for accommodation? Would any funds have subsidised the AGM dinner, or would attendees have paid their own way?
One can’t but wonder … without the DVA grant, how would the RAAC Corporation achieve its charitable purpose?
If it was able to function without the grant to fund the AGM, is it possible that these funds could be used for a better charitable purpose as far as the RAAC ‘family’ is concerned?
Note: Charities wanting to access Australian Government tax concessions have to register with the Commission; other than that, registration appears to be voluntary. Surely the RAAC Corporation wishes to avail itself of tax concessions? Donations for example … why pay tax on such income?
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 March 2020
Vietnam Requiem: Something ‘Big’ is in the Offing.
I met today with Chris Latham. He previously directed the The Diggers’ Requiem …”an Australian tribute to the 100th anniversary of the end of the First World War. In an astonishing piece of musical teamwork, the Requiem has been composed by seven contemporary Australian composers working with Artistic Director Christopher Latham on existing and new musical pieces”. You can re more about him in the links below.
At the moment he is working on a new musical performance … a Requiem to commemorate the Vietnam War.
In his words, this will be: “a two act concert where in the first act we will perform the songs most loved by Vietnam veterans and in the 2nd half we will present the premiere of a newly commissioned 12 part work that will become part of this National commemorative repertoire that I am developing in my artist in residence position at the AWM. The Vietnam Requiem is going to be written by the same leading composers who worked on the Gallipoli Symphony and the Diggers’ Requiem. These will be the first major symphonic works written about many of Australia’s Vietnam war experiences. We hope to present as wide and accurate a picture of the events surrounding that war. I expect much of it will be quiet, subdued and reflective”.
Reason for my involvement is that the premiere performance of this work is scheduled to coincide with the National Commemoration of Operation Overlord in June 2021 (I’m organising a 50th Anniversary Reunion of C Sqn 1 AR). Chris is working with Little Patti to finalise a list of songs (and singers) to be performed in the first half of the program.
I’ve copied below some of the topics we discussed:
The anguish and anger felt by veterans when people say the Vietnam War was ‘lost’ (and their success on the battlefield and service to their country is not recognised).
The shame felt by veterans at the failure of the US (and the Australian Govt for its part) to keep their promise to provide air support to SVN (leading to NVA overrunning SVN in 1975).
The difference between Australians cheering troops when they went to Vietnam and jeering them when they returned (and the political reasons for this).
The fact that Australia soldiers, both ARA and NS, continually performed with enormous courage and self-sacrifice in many different roles, and that this is frequently overlooked. Rather than being apologetic for the losses suffered, there is a need to commemorate the incredible bravery displayed by a generation on behalf of their nation.
The importance of the ‘combined arms team’ whereby soldiers supported (and depended on) each other at all levels and the need to recognise the contribution of all parts (not just one).
The difference between North/South Korea and North/South Vietnam situations and the political circumstances behind this.
The lack of human rights currently afforded to former SVN soldiers and their families (in particular) by the present Socialist Republic of Vietnam and how distressing this is to Veterans, given that these were our ‘Allies’ alongside of whom, we were fighting. This is exasperated by the Government’s failure to advocate for just treatment in this respect.
The fact that the Vietnamese Community in Australia and the Australians who volunteered with the civilian medical teams deployed to Vietnam (and who are equally deserving of Govt recognition) will have valuable input the offer.
Note. Chris, we didn’t discuss it … but if you view the cd, you’ll see numerous images of the compassionate approach adopted by Australian soldiers to the Vietnamese population in general. The humanitarian work done is often overlooked. Part of a quote from a tank crewman in a letter home (1968) …
‘How do I feel about being here? The physical discomforts, i.e. the heat, humidity, filth, temporary accommodation; the mental or psychological discomforts, i.e. we are in a theatre of war; and isolation from family and loved ones etc; are the biggest hardships; and for those reasons I do not like being here. Nevertheless, I firmly believe we have a moral obligation to the South Vietnamese people—not because of who they are, but because of what they are, namely an oppressed people, denied by a Communist influence the rights due to them as human beings. We, as Australians, are the most fortunate people in the world today, and therefore have so much to be grateful for. Surely it is not too much for us to help these people.’
————————————————————————————————————————-
18 March 2020
Our History (And How it Becomes Distorted)
My attention was recently drawn to a book about Centurions in Vietnam. I was caused to reflect on how easy it is, when something is published, for the information to be ‘set in concrete’ and taken to be an undeniable ‘fact’.
I’ve copied below a quick selection of ‘facts’ about the Centurion which have been included in publications in recent times:
Centurion …
(i) fans were electric;
(ii) gunsights were stabilised;
(iii) callsigns were allocated to individual tanks;
(iv) modifications were all made prior to deployment to Vietnam;
(v) fired HESH and WP rounds;
(vi) suspension stations were fitted with two roadwheels;
(vii) provided stowage for 54 main armament rounds;
(vii) were equipped with two machine guns and a 20 pound cannon;
(viii) fired WP illumination rounds;
(ix) bridgelayer weighed over 60 tonnes;
(x) unladen weight was 49 tonnes;
(xi) bridge classification was 50;
(xii) could push through the thickest jungle in Vietnam;
(xiii) squadron organisation in Vietnam was three troops of four tanks;
(ix) radios were incompatible with the APCs’ 46/49 installation;
(xx) bridgelayer callsign was 98D; and
(xxi) could not be penetrated by the RPG2.
Makes one realise that if such technical specs are so wrongly represented, what happens when tactics are discussed ….
————————————————————————————————————————
17 March 2020
Continuing the ‘Milestone’ series … interestingly someone has pointed out that 169106 could have been both the first Centurion to fire a 20pdr round in action in Vietnam, AND the Centurion to fire the last 20pdr round in Vietnam. (Even MORE reason to continue to discover how its logbook simply ‘vanished’ from the Tank Museum.)
First 20 pdr Round to be fired in Action in Vietnam
“Who in their right mind would have thought that tank dozers and bridgelayer would be in action before [the sabre troops]”. Bob Snape, Special Equipment Troop Sergeant, 1968
Somewhat surprisingly, it was a Centurion dozer which fired the first twenty-pounder round in action. This occurred on 8 March 1968, just over a week after the tanks arrived at Nui Dat. HQ 1ATF had requested help with landclearing in an area known as the Light Green.* The aim was to restrict the cover available to enemy withdrawing from the Long Hais, this being their most likely escape route once Operation Pinnaroo, which had just commenced, got into full swing. The VC were expected to try and break through the cordon, cache their weapons, and mix with villagers in the area.
The Squadron LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens, set off in his ‘carrier’ with the two dozers (commanded by Sergeants Bob Snape and Graeme Millington), a bridgelayer (Sergeant Andy Zsolt), a fitters’ ‘track’ (Sergeant Kevin Craig, RAEME), and an ARV (Sergeant Peter De Jong, RAEME). This was one of the few occasions that Special Equipment Troop deployed as an entity, albeit part of a composite force under the command of Captain Bruce Richards (2 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav).
Snape recalls that the notice to move was so short that ‘the crews had no idea how resupply was to occur and the details were worked out on the way’. En-route to Fire Support Base Herring, De Jong saw a person running frantically with an RPG. He engaged with his .30cal machine gun, but the range was too great and the ‘VC fled to hell out of it’.
Not long after, with the vegetation becoming thicker, Snape sensed movement close at hand. He immediately traversed and ordered his gunner, Trooper Des Mahar, to fire canister. This was a speculative engagement, designed to pre-empt a possible ambush. While no sign of enemy was revealed, the incident was significant historically: the first tank round had been fired in action by 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, since being raised on 7 July 1949.**
*This was a narrow region of dense vegetation east of the Long Hais. Named for the colour used to depict it on maps, it should not be confused with the Long Green to the north-east (a longer strip of more dense vegetation, coloured dark green on maps).
** Captain Sullivan arranged for the shellcase to be polished and returned to Puckapunyal where a plate was affixed giving details of the action. It was mounted on a wooden base and is now with the 1st Armoured Regiment.
———————————————————————————————————————-
16 March 2020
The First Centurion to Detonate an Anti-Tank Mine in Vietnam
The Blog on 14 Feb 20 made reference to Centurions in the Australian Army. A previous post on 24 Jan 20 referred to a suggestion on another site that ARN 169079 was the first Cent to fire a round in Vietnam. It was, of course, ARN 169106 (Sgt Bob Snape) that fired the first 20pdr round in action in Vietnam.
The Blog mused “while we’re at it, why not id the other tanks that were associated with ‘Milestones’? A number of subsequent posts have done this …
The 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, vehicle which fired the first round in action: M113A1 Fitters’ Track (2Lt Bob Owens … Blog 6 March 2020)
The first Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam: 169104 (Sgt Len Swarbrick …Blog 9 March)
The Centurion which fired the last 20pdr round in Vietnam/in anger/in contact: 169091 and others (Blog 14 March).
The story below continues this ‘Milestones’ series. It relates to ARN 169106 (Sgt Jock McConnell) and the incident which occurred en-route to FSB Coral on 22 May 1968:
92Alpha [ARN 169106] being recovered to Blackhorse. (AWM, ERR/68/0534/VN)
“Everyone was conscious that close attention had to be paid to maintenance checks en-route. It was important, for example, to spot track pins starting to work themselves loose. Injuries, damage and loss of time were all likely consequences if a pin came free, allowing track links to separate. This was especially the case if the convoy was travelling at speed; crews had to keep a close watch on the tracks of the vehicle in front.
Good progress was made for about 35km along Route 2. The convoy had just passed the entrance to Camp Blackhorse, the base of the US Army’s 11 Armoured Cavalry Regiment (11ACR), when Major Badman noticed that one of the dozers (92Alpha), was starting to veer towards the left of the road. With a US Army truck heading towards them, Sergeant Jock McConnell was told to remind his driver (Trooper Gerry Veldhuis) that traffic drives on the right in Vietnam.
As the Centurion moved back to the correct side of the road, it was rocked by the explosion of an estimated 7kg mine. When the dust settled, there was great relief when it was found that the crew all seemed to be ok. The same could not be said for the tank: among other damage, its right forward suspension station was now lying on the road.
Regarding it as their responsibility for ensuring the security of roads in their immediate vicinity, 11ACR were very apologetic. During his reconnaissance, Badman had been assured that this section of Route 2 was kept clear; and it probably was, as much as was generally possible. The fact that immediately after the explosion, both McConnell and his driver glimpsed someone running away, provides a clue as to what might have happened.
It was a known VC tactic: bury a mine at night and run the wires needed to arm the pressure switch to a point at the side of the road. Ensure that nothing can be seen by security patrols. It might be weeks or months before the right convoy comes along; when it did, all that was needed was for a battery to be connected to the wires.”
Given that ARN 169106 was also the first tank to fire a 20pdr round in action in Vietnam and the second Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam … makes it so much more galling that its logbook simply ‘disappeared’ from the Tank Museum. At least we know that Mr Mike Cecil transcribed the logbook before this happened (while working at the AWM).
———————————————————————————————————————-
15 March 2020
The Bizarre Story of the Last 20Pdr Round Fired in Vietnam.
Following on in the ‘Milestones’ series below … there are three aspects to the above (note the difference):
The last 20pdr round fired in Vietnam;
The last 20pdr round fired in anger in Vietnam;
The last 20pdr round fired in contact in Vietnam.
The circumstances re the first of these is explained below:
“Many calculated decisions had to be made in the context of the withdrawal. One involved the fact that twenty-pounder rounds could only be returned to Australia if they were packed in the protective metal cylinders in which they had been delivered. The C Squadron Ammunition Point held both cased and uncased rounds (the latter from tank troops which had been withdrawn from operations). As there were insufficient cylinders to repack all rounds, it was decided that the ‘left over’ ammunition would be expended during H&I fire missions. As a result, the nights of 26 and 27 August saw 5 Troop move to the Nui Dat firing point. The sound of artillery engaging suspected enemy positions at odd hours was a familiar one. On these nights, however, tank crews were the ones making the noise.”
The second is explained this:
“The squadron group set off for Nui Dat at 10am on 6 August under the command of Captain David Watts, the ‘TechO’. It was a slow trip, especially for the 15km or so before Route 2 was reached. As they headed south, 5 Troop were detached to take up position on Courtenay Hill. The last tank troop had been placed under the operational control of 4RAR/NZ. It was nearing 9.30pm when SHQ and 1 Troop approached the Nui Dat gate. The commander of the lead tank radioed that Brigadier McDonald was there to greet them. Watts recalls the Task Force Commander reflecting: ‘I’m about to lose half my firepower.’ Tomorrow he would have just one tank troop to provide close support for two infantry battalions.”
Although there was no report in either the Sqn Commander’s diary or the HQ 1ATF daily sitrep, the C Sqn ‘Techo’ told me when I was writing the story of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam, that he came across some suspected enemy elements during the return to Nui Dat (before 5 Troop was detached to Courtney Hill). A 5 Troop tank commanded by Ian Tulk engaged with speculative fire. This is likely to have been my tank, as Ian was my operator and I had been picked at the end of Iron Fox to go on R&R.
“The fact that the tanks were able to develop fire superiority to their front did not immediately force the enemy to retreat. 274 Regiment had previously shown themselves to be brave and resolute; capable of exploiting their defensive advantage to achieve delay and inflict casualties among their attackers. The C Squadron radio log provides some idea of the fighting involving the tanks, at this point:
1606hrs: RPG fired 10m to callsign 5’s front — engaged;
1611hrs: 1Alpha [Sergeant Ian Smith] engaged by RPG, returned fire with canister;
1619hrs: 1Alpha engaged by RPG;
1634hrs: 5Charlie engaged by MG;
1635hrs: Three bunkers engaging infantry on 5 Troop’s left flank;
1640hrs: 5 Troop given ‘check fire’ by infantry;
1651hrs: 1 Troop engaged movement;
1652hrs: 5 Troop engaged to their front;
1701hrs: 5 Troop engaged bunkers to front.
How did the shell case end up where it was found? Hopefully, someone will clear their conscience at some point. (Well done to Werribee RSL for the members’ respect in caring for the item.)
Given that 5 Troop was the last to be withdrawn from operational service in Vietnam, it’s not surprising that all three of the above ‘milestones’ relate to 5 Troop tanks. (It’s also not surprising, being the 5 Troop leader, that I’ve got an interest in this.) The Troop tanks at that time were: 169106; 169090; 169091; and 169049. (Thank you Shane Lovell.)
So …
Last 20pdr round fired in contact with the enemy: 169091;
Last 20pdr round fired in anger in Vietnam: 169091; and
Last 20pdr round fired in Vietnam: 169106; 169091; 169090; or 169049.
———————————————————————————————————————–
14 March 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga.
Theoretically, this long running saga (see summary across Blogs 6-12 February 2020) was a matter between Defence and myself.
But this was not the case. I reported the proceedings in an open and transparent manner on the Blog as they occurred. It transpired that the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation sought to influence the Information Commissioner’s consideration (not once, but four times). One can’t but wonder what was claimed (in secret) and why.
“On 10 October 2017, 11 October 2017, 14 August 2018 and 15 August 2018 the third party individual [ie. the Chairman] made submissions in a personal capacity and as an officer of the third party ex-service organisation [the RAAC Corporation] objecting to disclosure of the document.”
The Commissioner decided that “the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation who signed the submission in the document at issue is the personal information of an individual”.
Access to the document which the Chairman states was in support of my submission to the Minister (a submission that he states he hadn’t seen) was consequently denied.
No problems I said, simply delete all personal information. I even made the point that I would be happy with a blanked-out piece of paper.
No… this can’t happen, as: “having regard to the nature and contents of the document and the submissions of the parties relevant to the relationship between the individual officer and the ex-service organisation, I [the Commisioner] am also satisfied that the specific content of the submission or representation by the third party ex-service organisation says something about the individual officer who signed the document in the circumstances of this case and constitutes their personal information”.
What is it one has to wonder, that the content of the submission says about the Chairman, which means that it would be damaging to him if made public?
Open and transparent governance: an unattainable ideal.
———————————————————————————————————————-
13 March 2020
Recovering the First Centurion to be Penetrated by an RPG.
Following on from the post on 9 March (‘The First Cent to be Penetrated by an RPG’), the topic was picked up by a Facebook page, one contributor to which asked: “what did they do to block up the R.P.G. entry holes?”. Further info was provided on 10 March about this.
It is necessary now that the same be done re the following comment re the recovery of Sgt Swarbrick’s tank: “[It] was recovered from the battlefield by [an ARV] crew whilst under fire. It was the same contact Lt Sullivan got his MID”.
This is what happened:
“Now that the wounded had been moved to safety, [2Lt Brian] Sullivan had one last thing to do, recover 21Alpha. For very good reasons, all crew commanders knew how to perform the duties of all crew members; so, it was that Sullivan was able to climb into the driver’s compartment and move Swarbrick’s tank back from the bunkers and out to the edge of the clearing (about 50m).
Seeing what was happening, Tocock and Ovans [in the ARV] came forward quickly to take over from him and finish the recovery. Without pausing, the troop leader immediately returned to his own tank (which had followed behind as he drove 21Alpha), took over from Burgess, and directed his driver, Trooper Rod Bellott, back to the contact.”
“[Later], Trooper Burgess reminded his crew commander that their driver had been wounded above the eye soon after they came under fire from the bunker system. Trooper Bellott had driven, without complaint, throughout the subsequent battle, despite his pain and the fact that he could hardly see. The twenty-one-year-old, who had been ‘in-country’ less than a month, was immediately helped from the driver’s compartment and given first aid. His place was taken by Corporal Dave Ovans, RAEME, from the ARV.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
12 March 2020
Vietnam in Retrospect: Why Are we so Defeatist?
The following is the ending of a post by Peter Edwards: ‘Australia and the Vietnam War: 50 years on’ at https://johnmenadue.com/peter-edwards-australia-and-the-vietnam-war-50-years-on-the-strategist-29-2-2020/ It makes one wonder about our inability to differentiate between soldiering and politicking. Military action is, of course, an extension of politics (ie. the will of the nation). Soldiers serve the nation. Assessment of the political wisdom should be kept separate to that of the service and sacrifice of soldiers … but it isn’t. It was the case on return from Vietnam and it is the case still.
“There is ample evidence that, when faced with the question of involvement in Vietnam in 1964–65, Menzies thought that he was simply applying the same formula that had worked so well in the previous 15 years of his prime ministership. We now know that he failed to understand several major differences. First, Australians at all levels—in government, business, the media and the general public—knew much less about the mainland of Southeast Asia, especially the former French colonies in today’s Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, than they did about maritime Southeast Asia, especially the former British and Dutch territories that today are Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Australian politicians, officials, diplomats and military leaders had fewer opportunities to make independent political and military assessments, or to exercise independent diplomacy, in and around Vietnam than was the case in the islands and peninsulas between Sumatra and New Guinea. Australia also had less confidence in, or opportunity to influence, our principal ally’s military and political strategy.
Second, Menzies underestimated the risk that the US might be defeated or forced into a humiliating withdrawal. Given his personal experience as a young man of military age in 1917, and then as a young prime minister in 1939–41, it is not surprising that Menzies, like many of his generation, assumed that the crucially important point was to ensure that the US was engaged in the struggle. The danger, as they saw it, was American isolationism, not imperial overreach. Taking these points together, Menzies and his colleagues did not realise that the Americans themselves knew so little about the region, and greatly overestimated their ability to succeed where the French had failed.
A famous Chinese proverb, quoted but not originated by Sun Tzu, is sometimes rendered as: ‘Know yourself, know your enemy, and in a hundred battles win a hundred victories.’ The lessons of Vietnam for Australian strategists cannot be expressed so succinctly, but a prosaic summary might be as follows: before committing to a distant intervention alongside an ally, be sure that you know yourself; that you know your enemy; that you know your ally; and that you know not just the recent history but also the deep history of the contested territory and its surrounding area. Then, and only then, will you have a reasonable chance of success.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
11 March 2020
Openness and Transparency: Will it Ever be Achieved?
The following article was published in yesterday’s ‘Pearls and Irritations’.
JOHN MENADUE: ‘The Order of Australia, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justice Murphy’.
No wonder we have lost confidence in institutions when even a Governor General and Justices of the High Court act improperly
My comment (below) on John’s post refers to the DHAAT Decision re Operation Hammersley.
This matter is still being progressed. I hope for a just outcome, but like John Menadue … I might have to accept that real justice is an ideal ‘too far’.
“Open and transparent governance is an ideal that is beyond our reach in practical terms.
Organisations like the RSL strive to achieve it, but it seems to slip through the grasp of those who seek to provide a means by which only honest acts are possible.
I’m presently involved in trying to correct a public Government document in which a statement attributed to me is untrue (and can be proved by a recording of proceedings). I was informed that the document was ‘functus officio’ and I had to apply to the Federal Court for any correction to be made.
One of the criteria for my application to the Court was that I had to show that I had the capacity to pay the respondent’s costs.
I was advised by the Government agency involved that these were likely to be “$40,000 to $70,000 or above”. Not having this amount of disposable assets, means that even the rule of law is unavailable to me.
Open and transparent governance, the rule of law … why do we still believe in these ‘ideals’?”
———————————————————————————————————————–
10 March 2020
Battlefield Damage Repair Techniques/Kits
Photo: Geoff Andrews
If a tank is damaged in battle, one of the elements that contributes to ‘Combat Power’ is the ability to return the tank to the battlefield as quickly as possible. I raised questions about the availability of battlefield damage repair kits at the time of the Abrams purchase and hope that some thought might have been given to this.
Following on from yesterday’s Blog post, the topic was picked up by a Facebook page, one contributor to which, asked:“what did they do to block up the R.P.G. entry holes?”. The following will add to the comments made by a couple of other contributors to that site.
The following extracts from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, are relevant:
“Swarbrick’s tank was subsequently repaired at 106 Field Workshop and returned to B Squadron on 10 March 1969. One of the tasks that had been completed was listed as: ‘Plug and weld three holes in the turret’. This was a challenging undertaking for the RAEME personnel involved. Their field repair responsibility was to return the vehicle to an acceptable battleworthy state as soon as possible; as distinct to restoring it to an ‘as new’ condition.
One of those involved … recalls using stainless steel rod to weld fill one of the holes: ‘the parent steel was melted into the weld itself’. He wanted the repair completed asap, ‘as people, most of them tankies, were coming and looking at the tank and I thought it [seeing the holes] may have had a psychological effect on them’.
The consequences of damage caused by penetration of Centurion armour had not been considered prior to the deployment of tanks for Vietnam. As a result, no procedure for such repairs had been developed. Those at 106 Field Workshop knew they had to ensure that, in the event of another strike in the same area, the armour was not weakened by welding and any ‘plug’ used would not become a secondary projectile. A later OC at the Workshop, Major John Sinclair, was conscious that there was another element involved; repairs needed to be done in such a way that crews did not have ‘constant markers in front of their eyes of their vulnerability, or anything that leads [them] to lose confidence in their equipment to perform’.
It would have been impossible for RAEME tradesmen undertaking battle damage repairs to do so in a detached and unemotional manner, to completely divorce themselves from thoughts of the casualties that had occurred. 106 Field Workshop endeavoured to minimise such trauma by actively discouraging speculation about the crew of the vehicle being repaired; nevertheless, there were many who found the work very difficult indeed.”
————————————————————————————————————————-
9 March 2020
The Centurion Which was the First to be Penetrated by an RPG.
The Blog on 5 March 2020 referred to ‘milestones’ in the history of 1 Armd Regt’s Centurion days. ARN 169104 is the second tank to be included in this‘series’.
Trooper Glenn Darlington inspects an RPG strike on 21Alpha. (Chris Nation)
16 February 1969
“Swarbrick’s tank was hit. The enemy’s opportunity came when 21Alpha’s RMG and coaxial .30cal suffered stoppages at the same time. While the operator, Trooper Graeme Jackson, was desperately trying to get them going again, Swarbrick continued to engage the bunkers using the commander’s machine gun. The enemy, however, had been waiting for the slightest lull in the firing and seized the moment.
The first RPG hit the operator’s periscope, destroying it, but doing little damage otherwise. The second struck the right front of the turret, penetrating the fighting compartment. Its energy dissipated between the turret wall and the traverse gearbox in front of the gunner. Not all the crew were spared, however. When the third RPG exploded against the turret, ‘splash’ went down through the open driver’s hatches, badly wounding the driver, Trooper Mick Ingram. It also set the canvas mantlet cover alight. Unaware of Ingram’s condition, Swarbrick continued firing his .30cal. Seconds later he was forced to duck down into the turret. A bullet (possibly from a sniper) had nicked his neck. No sooner had this happened, than 21Alpha was hit by more RPGs, fired from the right of the tank.
The fourth RPG penetrated the side of the turret, the jet passing across the inside of the fighting compartment to hit one of the ready-round bins. Jackson was wounded in the thigh. To be precise, the left thigh. He had been facing the rear of the tank, trying to access ammunition in the floor bins. The fifth RPG also penetrated the side of the turret, this time immediately adjacent to the commander’s seat, seriously wounding Swarbrick in the lower body and thighs. Haward, in the gunner’s seat, was also wounded by the fragmentation.
The consequences of damage caused by penetration of Centurion armour had not been considered prior to the deployment of tanks for Vietnam. As a result, no procedure for such repairs had been developed. Those at 106 Field Workshop knew they had to ensure that, in the event of another strike in the same area, the armour was not weakened by welding and any ‘plug’ used would not become a secondary projectile. A later OC at the Workshop, Major John Sinclair, was conscious that there was another element involved; repairs needed to be done in such a way that crews did not have ‘constant markers in front of their eyes of their vulnerability, or anything that leads [them] to lose confidence in their equipment to perform’.
Apart from the crew wounds, 21Alpha’s RPG penetrations had other repercussions. The spall caused short-circuits which cut the power to the turret and prevented the wirelesses being used. Added to this, the fighting compartment started to fill with thick smoke. Swarbrick called on to Ingram to reverse, only to discover that his driver had been wounded and was unconscious. In such circumstances, a tank crew commander has no choice but to give the worst possible order, especially when under fire: ‘Bail Out!’
‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, pp 319-320
Sergeant Swarbrick’s tank was the first Centurion to be penetrated by an RPG in Vietnam (and quite probably the first anywhere in the world … British Defence personnel visited Nui Dat soon after the contact, expressing particular interest in the RPG strikes). While Bidey would later write: ‘We all know what RPGs can do now’, it was important to conceal this from the enemy for as long as possible. 21Alpha could have been recovered by the ARV, but this would have made it readily apparent that the tank had been disabled. Operating with an ad hoc crew made it appear that the tank was still battleworthy (even though its gunnery control equipment had been ‘knocked out’).
‘‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, p329.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 March 2020
The RAAC Corporation
The idea for the RAAC Corporation came from the late Brigadier Ian Bryant, AM. He asked me if I wanted to be a part of it (but I was writing the history of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam at the time and had to forego the honour). Would he be pleased to see what his idea has ‘grown’ to become?
Email posts on an RAAC Facebook page:
Dave MenzOwen Heather the reason I posted on this page is to advise members of what RSL is attempting to do. If I have offended any members of this group, my sincerest apologies
Dave Menz (to) Noel Mc Laughlin TBH* if it’s removed no problems, all I am doing is providing all info, I am by no means attempting to dictate or say what should or should not be posted. I will not remove my post, however, if admin decide to remove that is not a problem. (*TBH: To Be Honest.)
Bruce Cameron Hi Dave Menz, I gather that you have been contacted by the RAAC Corporation directing the Admins to remove your post. I believe that the same thing happened re one of my posts (see below). This is the way the Corporation operates. There is no doubt that the RSL contributes greatly to the welfare of veterans, however, not every ‘apple in the basket’ is the same. Only by shining the light on the problem areas, can those doing the good work thrive. I’ve campaigned continuously for open and transparent governance as far as Associations are concerned. Unfortunately, there are those for whom sunlight is anathema.
Bruce CameronDave Menz I was confused about this: “Noel Mc Laughlin TBH if it’s removed no problems, all I am doing is providing all info, I am by no means attempting to dictate or say what should or should not be posted. I will not remove my post, however, if admin decide to remove that is not a problem.
Another post (not immediately related to the above):
Eamon HaleNoel Mc Laughlin I think you’ll find we are. All of the noise and momentum being generated right now is by the younger generation, not the older one. The older generation have left the RSL in a precarious position. It’s up to the youth to rescue it and make it relevant.
The comments made by the Chairman, RAAC Corporation, which Eamon Hale responded to, have been deleted.
Why is it that such comments are deleted after having made them? Why is the originator not prepared to stand behind them?
(Photo: AWM)
Bruce Cameron All; the comments above emphasize why it was that those responsible for Contingency Plans at the time, should’ve made an effort to acquire lightweight flame retardant protective clothing for AFV crews prior to their deployment. This was a failure of the duty of care on the part of Army. The point of which … is the ensure that the same thing isn’t part of today’s contingency plans.
GavAn M. Vigar From memory only the chopper crews had Nomex two piece suits Bruce as they were a new item in our military back in Viet Nam, not even the other nations in country had them in their Armoured crews but in their air crews only.
Paul MaccaBruce Cameron different rules back then I think buddy, no such thing as OH&S or PPE lol just agent orange upsets and watch your step. I recon the boys had other worries on their minds.
Bruce CameronHi Gavan, The point is, has the lesson been learnt? Is suitable protective clothing designated as part of our contingency plans to be available for AFV crews deployed overseas (and are stockpiles held)? I’ve spent a lot of time chasing this. Disappointingly, the RAAC Corporation is not interested.
Bruce CameronPaul Macca The point is that there WERE very strict regs regarding the dress to be worn while a crew member of a Cent on Pucka range. These were thrown out the window when deployed to Vietnam.
Geoff Mac Protective clothing in a war zone? now that’s an oxymoron.
Bruce CameronIt wasn’t just flame protection, but also the provision of reinforced elements to facilitate removal (lifting) of a wounded crewman from the turret floor. The failure of Army to meet its duty of care in these respects was inexcusable.
Lee ArnouldBruce Cameron how many of us cut the harness out to make it easier for ironing for parade
Bruce CameronLee Arnould Exactly my point! It’s only when the need arises to extract a wounded and unconscious operator from the turret, that the importance of the straps is realised. It must not be allowed to happen again! But I worry that such ‘lessons’ are being forgotten.
Now this IS a worry:
Sam Foxton Tankys might be different but 6 months in the ghan I’m 2012 zero anti flame was the norm… I’m in aviation now and our cams are worse zero breathability and not that flam retardant… Boots don’t even meet Australian standards… Business as usual
—————————————————————————————————————————–
7 March 2020
AFV History
Taking a break from 1 Armd Regt/Centurion history for a moment …
Former Centurion crewman, Rod Ward, has been invaluable to helping the AWM with AFV related information. A further example is illustrated by the emails below (photos, AWM):
Dear ….
An amateur tank ‘historian’ has brought the following images to my attention.
At issue is the type of tanker involved. The photos are contradictory, ie. one states petrol, the other water.
The former is more likely in the context of providing water to Japanese troops.
But if the context is that of supplying fuel to the Japanese Ha Go tanks (also very plausible, even more so than water), then it should be described as a ‘diesel’ tanker, as that was the fuel used by the tanks (see last reference).
2 February 1968: The First Round Fired in Action by 1 Armd Regt, RAAC.
Yesterday’s Blog referred to ‘milestones’ as far as the history of 1 Armd Regt and the Centurion tank fleet is concerned. The following extract from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ (p 87-89, Vol 1; less footnotes)
Photo: AWM P05539.012
“Despite their losses during Tet, the enemy were not defeated. They set about planning new attacks, to be directed against Saigon in May 1968. This next campaign became known as ‘mini Tet’ and was designed to influence the Paris Peace Talks commencing at that time. The involvement of 1ATF in helping to counter this offensive would become a watershed for the Australian Army.
One of those who arrived with the C Squadron Advance Party, was the LO, Second Lieutenant Bob Owens. The last thing he had expected, was to find himself on operations three days later, even before the tanks had arrived. Prior to Tet most of 1ATF had been deployed north to Bien Hoa Province to help protect the US military complexes at Long Bien and Bien Hoa. It was left to the 1ATF Ready Reaction Force to respond to a determined attack on the ARVN Sector HQ at Baria at 5am on 1 February 1968.
A Company 3RAR (Major Brian [Horri] Howard) and 3 Troop A Squadron 3 Cav (Second Lieutenant Roger Tingley) did a magnificent job in clearing and securing the town, following a well-planned occupation by D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion. While the battle was being fought, arrangements were made to collect the closest infantry (B Company 3RAR, Major Bert Irwin) from Binh Ba, and bring them back to Nui Dat to reconstitute a reserve.
One of the problems was that there were only two troop-carrying trucks available, resulting in engineer dump trucks being pressed into service. Another problem was the need for an escort and someone to lead it. This was where Owens came in:
“The only [armoured] vehicles available for the escort were two fitters ‘tracks’, still in transportation mode with cranes stowed inside, no gun shields, and guns still in boxes. The machine guns were quickly prepared and briefly test fired before departing.”
With twelve infantry squashed into each of the two fitters ‘tracks’, the company made it back to Nui Dat. The same elements were deployed to Baria the next day, 2 February. The enemy were well known to set ambushes to catch relief forces and considerable care was taken to ensure that the route was safe. Second Lieutenant Owens again commanded the escort … such as it was.
He recalls:
“As we neared the outskirts of Baria, the Company Commander [Irwin] requested that we engage an area from which sporadic pot shots were being received. This we did, however, as luck would have it, [after a number of rounds] my ‘fifty’ experienced a stoppage. Fortunately the enemy fire had been suppressed and the remainder of the escort passed without incident. Apart from me, the crews on both vehicles were from the Armoured Squadron Workshop.”
Such were the circumstances under which 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, fired their first shot in action. It was to be hoped that Centurions would be present when the enemy were next encountered.”
NOTE: I have no idea as to which fitters’ ‘track’ it might have been, nor whether it has even been identified. Seem to me that this might be a worthwhile task to be undertaken as part of group leadership training at 1 Armd Regt. The AFV which fired the first round in action by 1 Armd Regt RAAC may well still be out there … somewhere. (The reference to RAAC is important. Obviously, a different AFV would have fired the first round in action for 1 Armd Regt, AAC.)
———————————————————————————————————————–
5 March 2020
Hi, Back after a six day stint in Perth (meant to be five days, but leap year got in the way). Based on my experience there, the RAAC collegiate group is alive and well (even better than that)!
Prior to departure, I’d hoped to be able to fill in the ‘blanks’ below. Tomorrow (hopefully).
Centurions in Vietnam
The Blog on 14 Feb 20 made reference to Centurions in the Australian Army. A previous post on 24 Jan 20 referred to a suggestion that ARN 169079 was the first Cent to fire a round in Vietnam. Of course, it was ARN 169106 (Bob Snape) that fired the first 20 pounder rounder in Vietnam. While we’re at it, why not id the other tanks….
The tank which detonated the first ant-tank mine:
The tank which detonated the first ‘off-set’ anti-tank mine
The tank that fired the first main armament round in action:
The Centurion vehicle which fired the first round in action:
The tank which spent the longest time in Vietnam
The Centurion vehicle which spent the longest time in Vietnam:
The tank which spent the shortest time in Vietnam:
The tank which fired the last main armament round in Vietnam:
The tank which detonated the last anti-tank mine:
(9 March 2020) The tank which was the first to be penetrated by an RPG:
The tank which detonated the most anti-tank mines:
The tanks which were ‘written off’ as the result of damage caused by anti-tank mines:
Also of interest:
(6 March 2020) The 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, vehicle which fired the first round in action:
————————————————————————————————————————
26 February 2020
Please note: This will be the last Blog post until 5 March 20202. (I’ll be absent on grandparental duty.)
Operation Hammersley: False Allegations and Information re the DHAAT Decision
The following is a copy of information provided to 1 AR Assn Members by the Assn C’tee. The points highlighted are discussed under.
“Association members are advised that the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal (DHAAT) has affirmed the decision, in the above own-motion personal appeal lodged by Bruce Cameron, to refuse to extend eligibility for the award of the RVN CGWP to members of the following three units involved in Operation Hammersley: A Sqn 1st Armoured Regiment, B Sqn 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1 Field Sqn RAE.
Members should note however, the detailed evidence-based submission made by the RAAC Corporation and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association (under the auspices of Noel McLaughlin and Pedro Rosemond [our authorised representative]), which was originally tabled in 2017, is still with Defence and is still being assessed by their Historical Awards people pending final determination. There have been a number of unacceptable delays in dealing with this submission including inaction as well as setting aside by higher authorities dealing with the same matter. Constantly changing validation research staff has not helped.
That submission is tendered in favour of the above three Supporting Arms Units as well as the elements of 161 Recce Flight and 9 Sqn RAAF who also provided support during Hammersley.
The RAAC Corporation in conjunction with the 1st Armoured Regiment Association as lead client is advocating on behalf of all five units and not three.
The investigation was suspended in August 2019 because of the application made by Bruce Cameron to the DHAAT which heard his appeal on 29 October 2019. As previously advised, the 2017 submission has been fully supported by the Management Committee and 1st Armoured Regiment Association since it was originally submitted. It remains fully supported.
Given that there are another four separate submissions plus the Corporation’s submission to be investigated, it is anticipated that Defence may not make a decision concerning the original submission for a number of months. It has also been confirmed that the option to appeal to the DHAAT, against a rejection of the 2017 Submission by Defence, remains open to the RAAC Corporation and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association.
Further information will be provided when available. Russ James Secretary …
I’ve asked the President of the 1AR Assn to provide the following corrections to the Statement made to members.
“own motion personal appeal”. This is totally false. The 1 Fd Sqn RAE Assn and 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn joined with me in the Appeal. (The President of the former giving evidence at the Hearing.) The submission was supported by the OC and 2IC of the tank squadron at the time (the former making a written submission and the latter giving oral testimony). The troop leader of the APC troop involved in the attack on the Minh Dam Secret Zone provided a written submission to the Tribunal.
“Detailed evidence-based submission”. The inference here is that the submission to the DHAAT was neither detailed nor evidence based. This is not true. (A restrained response!)
“was originally tabled in 2017”. The inference here is that the 1AR Assn submission predated that from me. This is both wrong and deceptive. I originally prepared my submission on 2015 and offered it to the 1AR assn. I thought that they might wish to forward it to the RAAC Corporation for consideration. The RAAC Corporation, however, said that they “wanted to have nothing to do with the bloody thing”. In February 2017, I sent my submission to the Minister.
“…advocating on behalf of all five units”. I’ve asked the Assn whether or not their 2017 submission was lodged with the support of the 1 Fd Sqn RAE Assn and the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, however, I’ve had no response.
“Given that there are another four separate submissions plus the Corporation’s submission to be investigated, it is anticipated that Defence may not make a decision concerning the original submission for a number of months.” The inference here is that the number of different submissions for Defence to investigate is the reason that there will be a delay in responding to the 1AR Assn submission. This is not so. Defence stated at the Hearings that they were involved with the other Services in preparing an ADF-wide policy on the RVN CGWP Unit Citation being awarded to all Australian service personnel simply for being in Vietnam (as per the US Services). I responded to this suggestion to say that if this was approved, every Australian who was awarded the CGWP in recognition of an individual act of gallantry for their service in Vietnam, would have to be awarded an equivalent Australian award to maintain their recognition as having provided service over and above the call of duty. Defence stated that it was likely to take a couple of months before the Policy was able to be recommended to the CDF. PS. It would be great to think that Defence might rule that the RVN CGWP should not be awarded to ALL Australians who served in Vietnam, but could be awarded in special circumstances, eg. supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. Sadly, this is unlikely to come about, given that Defence argued that, as supporting arms were not permanently attached to 8RAR throughout its tour of duty, they’re not eligible for the award.
———————————————————————————————————————-
25 February 2020
The Army’s Understanding of Operation Hammersley.
The Cove is the Army’s Professional Military Education forum.
Their understanding of Operation Hammersley (and that being inculcated across the Army) is set out below. Coming so soon after the 50th Anniversary National Commemoration, one might expect a certain amount of rigor in the account (interesting to see the reference to the RVN CGWP Unit Citation) ….
‘Dear Cove,
On 18 Feb 20, a National Commemoration for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Hammersley was held in Canberra. It is timely therefore, that This Week in History should refer to it.
Unfortunately, the reference (copied below) gives a false impression as to the circumstances of the Action. While I don’t feel that it is my place to rewrite it, I have taken the opportunity to make some points to the researcher who might do so.
“17 February 1970: Battle of Long Hai, South Vietnam.
On 10 February 1970, the 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment took part in Operation Hammersley, a reconnaissance operation in the Long Hải area. On 18 February, the Battalion captured a large bunker complex after the Vietnamese Communist defenders withdrew following air raids. The operation continued until 9 March, with the battalion carrying out patrols and conducting ambushes in order to engage Communist troops. These operations were successful, and 8 RAR was awarded the South Vietnamese Government’s Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation for its role in the operation.”
The Battle of Long Hai is a made-up name without foundation. The 50th Commemoration was for Operation Hammersley as the action should be referred to.
It was not a reconnaissance operation. (Hint: It’s first objective was changed to something completely different; neither of which involved recon.)
On 18 Feb, 8RAR did not capture a large bunker complex.
Air raids did not occur before 18 Fed.
The enemy did not withdraw following air raids (this is a central point as far as the operation is concerned).
Operation Hammersley did not “continue until 9 Mar”. (Hint: Prior to that time Operation Hammersley II had commenced.
8RAR were not awarded a Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley; nor were they awarded the MUC, including the CGWP. (Note: Although this appears in the Official History, the DHAAT recently ruled that neither was true.)
Operation Hammersley DID involve a combined arms attack on a strongly defended enemy position with examples of bravery and sacrifice which deserve to be made known throughout the Army and preserved in its history. It is one of the Australian Army’s most significant offensive actions.’
————————————————————————————————————————
24 February 2020
1AR Assn Assistance to Members in Need
Photo: Google images
The info below was recently sent to members of the 1AR Assn:
Accredited Advocate Register Members are able to use the Accredited Advocate Register (AAR) to find an ESO with qualified advocates who are trained to assist you in accessing services relating to wellbeing, rehabilitation, compensation and appeals.
The latest AAR is located on the Association Website at http://www.advocateregister.org.au/
This is great to see, as not long ago, a very vocal (and influential among some) person stated that “members only join the Assn to have a few beers and a good time!’, ie. the Assn didn’t want to have anything to do with helping others (apart from sending them to the RSL).
A post from the Blog a while ago is copied below:
5 September 2018
Assistance to Members. One of the goals mentioned in Part 6 [the Introduction the Blog, above] is:
“The By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.”
It might be thought that this was self-evident as the Purposes of the 1AR Assn, as per the Constitution, include:
“(4) promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependants and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve;
(5) provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.”
Surprisingly, Mr C M Fenton OAM (the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation) stated recently that all members of the Corporation passed a motion at an AGM to state that they did not have the resources to provide welfare support to their members and that those in need of assistance would be passed to organisations such as the RSL that do have the resources.
How does this stand vis a vis the Purposes of the 1AR Assn (above)? It seems to me that the relationship between the RAAC Corporation motion, the Purposes of the 1AR Assn (as per the Constitution) and the intentions of the current C’tee … needs to be clarified. (This is due, in part, because members of the 1AR Assn receive neither a copy of the Minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs, nor any report from Mr Fenton.)
The Blog post below from 18 June 2018, is relevant (posted after the RAAC Corporation motion):
What Would I Like to See Characterise the 1AR Assn?
Question. If candidates for the 1AR Assn C’tee were to be asked to state their ‘platforms’, what would I vote for?
Answer. This is what I would say:
(i) A commitment to Openness and Transparency in all things, eg. Minutes of C’tee Meetings made available to members; and financial statements circulated for consideration prior to AGMs;
(ii) A Program of Work, with priorities, for the coming year… established with the agreement of members;
(iii) Emphasis on Consultation with Members, eg. if an initiative is to be introduced, or changes made to the Constitution, members are asked for their views and input at the earliest possible stage;
(iv) A system of Communications Between C’tee and Members established so that members at any time might ask questions or make suggestions and be assured of receiving responses from the C’tee’;
(v) A system of Communication Between Members established so the members might freely discuss ideas for the betterment of the 1AR Assn and its endeavours;
(vi) A clear Policy Regarding Donations be established so that there is no confusion as to was is, or is not, an acceptable donation to the Assn;
(vii) A Commitment to Help Former or Serving Members who require assistance to manage their personal circumstances (rather than simply referring them to the RSL as agreed by RAAC Corporation members).
(viii) A Continuation of the Good Projects initiated by past C’tees; such as awards to 1 Armd Regt soldiers/students of merit and gift packs to those on operations.
————————————————————————————————————————-
23 February 2020
Our History ….
Cpl Kevin Alexander, August 1965 (www.awm.gov.au/collection/C308559)
Thanks goodness, for those in the AWM who seek to continuously improve our history.
According to the AWM, the video below shows: “Armoured personnel carriers of the recently formed 1 APC troops of the 1st Cavalry Regiment transporting men of 1 RAR as they move through villages of War zone D”. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C190823
What is the background to this?
1 Tp A Sqn 4/19 PWLH arrived in Vietnam in June 1965. 1 APC Sqn was raised at Puckapunyal in September 1965.
1 Tp A Sqn 4/19, officially became 1 Tp, 1APC Sqn at this time (though continuing to operate as the ‘Pony Solders’ under R K Hill in Vietnam).
APC Sqn arrived Vietnam June 1966 and were at full strength by September 1966.
In January 1966, the ARA Sqns of 4/19 and 2/14 became A and B Sqns, 1 Cav Regt, a cavalry (not APC) unit.
After consultation with former 4/19 PWLH, 1 Cav and 3 Cav members, I suggested to the AWM that this be amended to: “Armoured personnel carriers of 1 Troop, A Squadron 4/19 PWLH Regiment (‘officially’ redesignated 1 APC Troop in September 1965) transporting men of 1 RAR as they move through villages of War zone D”.
This how the caption reads today.
Well done AWM in being responsive to feedback from veterans!
PS. A comment re the above: “Thanks for that ,Bruce. I was and still am ,proud to have been a member of the 4/19th. When we were notified of the redesignation to 1APC Troop, I and I am sure the other members of the troop felt that no matter the name, we would always be Pony Soldiers”.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 February 2020
HAMMERSLEY RECOGNITION: IT’S BEEN DEALT A BLOW, BUT … PART II
There are two reasons that the likely cost to an applicant (should he lose) an Appeal to the Federal Court re the Hammersley decision have been estimated by Defence to be “$40,000 to $70,000 ot more”. One was explained yesterday, ie. the cost of a barrister’s fee to prevent a precedent being set re the Tribunal’s claim that it’s decisions are ‘functus officio’.
The second is documented below. In essence, the Tribunal said that supporting arms could be eligible for the award if they could be considered to have been elements of 8RAR for the duration of its tour in Vietnam. They seem to have realised subsequently that the wording of the question was a mistake. Considerable legal costs would be involved in defending it.A copy of an email the Chair, DHAAT is copied below. A similar email has been sent to individual members of the Tribunal panel that hear the Appeal.
Dear Mr Sullivan,
Just in case there should be any doubt as what it is that the veteran community’s perception is that DHAAT don’t want to make known … it’s made plain in the email below; ie. if the question was open to interpretation as described, then the response we provided (ie. a separate format response and 57page supporting submission) could make legal arguments in support of it, difficult to deny.
It would seem that this is the reason given for ‘deleting’ all references to the actual responses to the question (other than the dates) and inserting something completely false.
Your sincerely,
From: Bruce Cameron > Sent: Tuesday, 17 December 2019 9:33 AM To: DHAAT Subject: RE: Directions Hearing [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]
Hi,,
Thank you for providing a copy of the Defence response to Question 1 and for providing the opportunity for representatives of 8 RAR’s combined arms team to provide comments by 15 Jan 20.
With the Direction Hearing scheduled for 18 Dec 19, I ask that the Tribunal give consideration to making a Direction to Defence with respect to Question 1.
Defence has answered the question by stating that supporting arms were not part of 8RAR. ALL units and sub-units that were part of 1 ATF, including 8RAR, were permanently commanded by HQ 1ATF (specifically, the Task Force Commander). ALL units and sub-units were “force assigned” as combined arms teams as operations required. While none of this is disputed; neither is it relevant to Question 1.
The question was whether or not the tanks, APCs and field engineers could be considered to part of 8RAR for the purposes of the Citation awarded to 8 RAR on 24 Oct 70.
Obviously, if they were a formal component of 8 RAR, they would have received the Citation. What circumstances then would give rise to them being “considered” to be part of 8 RAR for the purposes of the Citation?
Representatives of the combined arms teams which formed the 8 RAR group for the operations referred to in the Citation believe that there is one crucial element and one only: evidence that supporting arms were critical to the success of the operations for which the Citation was awarded.
It is on this basis that the combined arms team’s response to the Tribunal’s question has been prepared and submitted. It is our contention that this has been shown to be the case without any doubt whatsoever. This being so, it would appear that matter is resolved in our favour, ie. without the supporting arms, 8 RAR would not have had the operational success referred to in the Citation and the contribution of supporting arms should be acknowledged with eligibility being extended to them for the same award.
Having said this, there would seem to be grounds for Defence to appeal if they were to have misunderstood the question. The Tribunal may wish to direct Defence, therefore, to respond to Question 1 in terms of whether or not supporting arms were critical to the success of the operations which form the basis of the Citation awarded to 8RAR.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
———————————————————————————————————————–
21 February 2020
HAMMERSLEY RECOGNITION: IT’S BEEN DEALT A BLOW, BUT …
Five years of effort by many people has resulted in a decision being made as to the eligibility of supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley, to receive the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR.
The DHAAT ruled (i) that the Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its entire tour of Vietnam.
The Tribunal also accepted the advice provided by Defence that the supporting arms were not permanently assigned to 8RAR during this period. (The Tribunal did not accept evidence from the Applicant in this regard and did say why.)
The DHAAT ruled (ii) that supporting arms were not therefore eligible for the Citation.
Subsequent efforts to appeal the decision are described below.
A Tale of Injustice
Section 110 XE of the Defence Act 1903 states that:
(2) The [Defence Honours and Awards Appeals] Tribunal’s decision on the review of a reviewable decision must include a statement of the Tribunal’s reasons for its decision.
Section 13 (1) of the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977 states that a “person who is entitled to make an application to the Federal Court, may, by notice in writing given to the person who made the decision, request him or her to furnish a statement in writing setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision”. Notice was given to the Tribunal on this basis.
BUT, Section 13 (11) (b) of the ADJR provides exemption to the above for “a decision that includes, or is accompanied by a statement setting out, findings of facts, a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and the reasons for the decision”. The Tribunal claimed this exemption.
A review decision which claims to provide reasons, but omits reference to submissions made which are central to the matter (other than the dates they were made), can be appealed to the Federal Court as a matter of law on the basis of ‘failure to consider relevant evidence’. This evidence may have been considered, but as the written decision makes no reference to why it was not judged to be relevant, the above applies.
Added to this, if a review decision attributes something to have been stated by the applicant, when he made no such statement and this can be proven, an appeal can also be lodged in this basis.
An Applicant to the Federal Court has to make a ‘Genuine Steps’ statement, i.e. he has to show that he has taken steps to try and resolve the issue directly with the respondent. Initially I expected that the Tribunal would be helpful and provide an explanation.
BUT, this was not to be, despite numerous appeals to the Chair. In the words of the Tribunal, which I’ve heard more than once, ‘this matter is closed!’. In support of the above, the Tribunal claims that its decision is ‘functus officio’, i.e. its mandate to deal with the matter has expired and it can no longer enter into further considerations related to it. (If this caveat didn’t apply, matters could drag on and on interminably.)
BUT, what if the decision has been made without considering relevant evidence and under an apparent false assumption that something was stated by the applicant?
Are all administrative decisions ‘functus officio’ without any question? No, of course not. If they, were the Law would be unjust.
A recent judgement by the Victorian Supreme Court “usefully clarifies that the assessment of whether an Award is a ‘Final Award’ so as to render the tribunal functus officio should be assessed as a matter of substance not form. The label ‘Final Award’ does not render the tribunal functus where the tribunal has left questions open for further resolution”. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8fe300c2-96d3-43df-9235-fa70fea64b39
BUT, what if an appeal was made to the Federal Court on such a basis? If the application was approved and the Court found in favour of the applicant and made an Interrogatory Order (ie. the Court supported the applicant’s request for the Tribunal to provide answers to specific questions as to why evidence submitted was judged not to be relevant and why a false statement was attributed to the applicant) … would this create a precedent which could limit the Tribunal’s ability to make decisions in the future without any fear of them being challenged?
Is this why the estimate by the Defence Legal Section, as to the costs that the applicant might have to bear in terms of his application to the Federal Court in this matter, “would be from $40,000 to $70,000, or above?
Before an application can be accepted by the Federal Court, an applicant has to demonstrate that he can meet the respondent’s costs, if so ordered.
The operation of the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal is founded on these Rules. Is there a need for an amendment to relevant Acts to allow questions to be asked by the Applicant in relation to a Tribunal decision, prior to having to make an application to the Federal Court? The latter option is fine if one has $70,000 or more in disposable assets (but how many veterans are so endowed?).
If it were to be resolved by Government that there is no justification for such an amendment … is real justice able to be provided to those who have jeopardised their lives to serve their country?
SO, while the matter might be closed as far as the Tribunal is concerned, where to now as far as just recognition for supporting arms is concerned? The Court of Public Opinion was ruled in favour of just applicants before. The issue is far from being ‘over’.
PS. Interestingly, the Registrar of the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (based on considerable experience) advises that the Tribunal chair cannot be named as the respondent in such an application to the Federal Court, as he was not a member of the Tribunal panel … the Tribunal as a whole must be named as the respondent. (Even though the chair signed the letter that accompanied the decision and there were no other signatures to the document which would indicate who else might have written it or amended it.) Furthermore, although the Federal Court Rules state that the initiating application has to ‘served’ by the applicant to the respondent directly, the Registrar advises that he is the one who must receive it.
Why is it that although procedural Rules are very clear, a veteran might be intimidated into doing something different? Are our Institutions really focused on the needs of those they are established to serve?
PPS. A copy of the Blog has been sent to Mr Mark Sullivan AO, Chair, DHAAT, with the comment:
“I thought you might be interested in the following aspect: Is there a need for an amendment to relevant Acts to allow questions to be asked by the Applicant in relation to a Tribunal decision, prior to having to make an application to the Federal Court? The latter option is fine if one has $70,000 or more in disposable assets (but how many veterans are so endowed?).
Should the case be that you would’ve been prepared to provide an explanation, but were prevented by Legislation from doing so … you may like to suggest a change to allow the Tribunal to provide a ‘clarifying statement’ in such circumstances should they arise in the future.”
“The obvious problem with this thinking is that items that may one day help tell our story such as a flag, or a street sign, or a number plate from a rolled vehicle will not be kept, and when they are lost, so are our stories.
The photographs and memories of the humid days pouring concrete in Timor, or months on exercise in Shoalwater Bay, may seem unimportant to some but they help paint a backdrop to the stories – our history and sacrifices – that we must never forget.
These little bits of everyday army life will help future generations connect with the soldiers of today and the soldiers of yesterday. It will give young Australians a chance to know the lives of their ancestors and the history of their units. So how do we achieve this?”
The comments I submitted are as follows:
“Well written, Todd.
There is another dimension, a complementary one, as well. I wrote a book about Australia’s tank operations in Vietnam and remarked to a RAEME friend that it was evident that military history is primarily about strategy and tactics, there is very little about the innovative skills and techniques which have evolved and proven invaluable at different times. He agreed and quickly established a website titled ‘RAEME Know How’ which tries to capture and preserve practical knowledge for future generations. Of course, the other side of this is the lessons learnt on the battlefield which should be documented so that they don’t have to be relearnt over and over again. The sapper mine warfare room at Nui Dat was a great example of this. Sadly, during Vietnam, the feedback of lessons to reinforcements in other Corps was not nearly as good.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
19 February 2020
How Our History Becomes Corrupted.
A question posted on another site was: “Did the Cents ever convert to VIC 1 harness and associated radios at any time?”.
Answers included: “No Aus ones did Larkspur c42 and b47”; “The Larkspur had the same frequency range, but old squelch had to be used for comms between US and Brit sets”; “the Cents never did. And the US system was called the VRC47 and 125 sets”; I don’t remember a VRC 47… I do remember an AN VRC 46,49,125,64 and 160. I also remember the C42 and B47 and C13 in the Cents”. Well done to the last poster … almost nailed it.
There are a number of errors in the responses above. That’s understandable, but so it is that our history becomes corrupted. Writing ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, I was forever coming across references to ‘facts’ that were deemed to be so, because the information had appeared in a publication.
When people rely on memory they are often misled. Of course, they could anticipate this and prefix they input with ‘If my memory serves me correctly …’ or some such. Of course, they could always check on Google (but who does this?).
It’s not correct to say that no Australian Cents were concerted to VIC 1 harness. I believe that a trial was conducted by the Engineering Design Establishment (but the installation did not come into service). The Larkspur range did not have the same frequency range as the US radios … I believe that Larkspur could only tune in 100 Khz steps, whereas the US sets could tune in 50Khz steps. I don’t believe that the AN/VRC 47 installation was used by Australian AFVs; rather a single installation of the RT 524 was the AN/VRC 46; a double installation, an AN/VRC 49. (Only a former radio instructor would comment that it should be ‘AN/GRC 125′ and’ AN/VIC-1′.)
The usual mistake made in publication is to state that the US radios were incompatible with the British radios. This was not the case if the latter used ‘old’ squelch and a frequency ending in a 100 Khz step.Top of Form
I think that the above is correct, however, I could easily be wrong. Anyone wanting to reference it, please undertake independent research to verify.
———————————————————————————————————————-
18 February 2020
Operation Hammersley
The following press release by the Minister for Veterans Affairs’ and Senator Molan presents one account of Operation Hammersley:
“During the Vietnam War our troops were sent to the Long Hai area of Phuoc Tuy Province from February 1970, where they had the objective of securing a quarry site at the foot of the Long Hai Hills, the target of previous operations and air strikes,” Mr Chester said. “Despite early successes and the support of armoured vehicles, the Australians were hindered by the rugged terrain and the enemy’s expert knowledge of the land and in March 1970 the operation concluded.
If the only objective was to secure the quarry, few (if any) casualties would have resulted. What happened was that the objective was changed. The Operation became that of a battalion group tasked to exploit the success of an ambush and attack the enemy in the previously invincible Minh Dam Secret Zone. The following extracts from my book explain the sequence leading up to the attacks.
Stage One. Road building materials were required by 17 Construction Squadron engineers tasked with upgrading Route 44. (The civil aid project would make it much easier for vehicles to travel between the village of Long Hai and Route 23, thereby connecting the Long Hai Peninsula with the population centres of Long Dien, Baria, and Dat Do.)
Operation Hammersley was to be undertaken by a company group comprising C Company 8RAR (Major David Rankine), 2 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav (Captain Peter Murphy), and 2 Troop (Brennan). As well as having 161 Battery (RNZA) in direct support, a mortar section from 8RAR (mounted in M125A1s) were attached. The plan was for part of the force to guard the quarry, while the remainder patrolled the surrounds and ambushed likely enemy approaches.
Stage Two. About 3.5km north-east, just as 9 Platoon C Company 8RAR were moving from their day to their night ambush position on a small knoll, one of the sentries sighted a group of enemy approaching. The initial estimate was a staggering 40 or 50. A little later, by the time 30 had passed, the enemy strength had been revised to around 100! With about 40 in the killing ground, the Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant Peter Lauder, ordered the Claymores to be fired. It was 7.30pm.
Stage Three. The presence of such a large number of enemy was sufficient for the Task Force Commander to postpone a planned 8RAR operation and order Lieutenant Colonel O’Neill to exploit the success of the ambush. As a result, Battalion HQ 8RAR and B Company (Major Mike Jeffery), moved to Isa on 16 February 1970. O’Neill’s armoured support was augmented for the mission and both tank and APC Squadron Commanders (Chipman and Rooks) deployed their HQs accordingly. 1 Troop (Meredith) joined Brennan’s 2 Troop and McNeilage’s SHQ Troop, the three tank troops being able to form operational groupings with B, C and D Companies if required. The APCs of 1 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav (Lieutenant Bill Burgher) supplemented those of Ashman’s 3 Troop at this time.
I’ve suggested to DVA that they might like to explain the significance of Operation Hammersley (and what it was that those involved were fighting for) in the next DVA news.
PS. Great to see Senator Molan, the CDF, and Service Chiefs paying compliments as they passed the Colours at the Commemoration.
————————————————————————————————————————
17 February 2020
Centurion Auction : How Much Will They Bring?
Vince Ryan (rural NSW) once had nineteen Centurions and two ARVs, as well as two other Cents that he was wrecking for parts. The images below show that he is to auction off four of his Cents, plus one of the ARVs. (The number of other AFVs which may have been sold off earlier are unknown.)
None of the four Cents was used in Vietnam. The two ARVs which were/are owned by Mr Ryan were/are : 169114 and 169113. If it’s the latter that’s for sale, it was used in SVN with B and A Sqns (28D and 8D).
How much is a Centurion worth? $100,000?
I’m told that the reserve is $105,000 – 120,000 plus commission. None of the vehicles is a runner, however, so such a price might be a bit optimistic.
Also informed that the ARV is 169114, so not a vehicle used in Vietnam. (Apparently ARN 169113 was sold off previously.)
“The Binh Ba Commemoration was well organised and conducted. Congrats to all involved.
What happened when those laying wreaths twice passed the assembled Standard, Guidons, Colours and Banners, however?
One expects that service personnel in uniform would salute the Colours … as I understand the Ceremonial Manual, however, civilians are to turn their heads to acknowledge the Colours, while gentlemen wearing headdress are to remove it.
Some ‘civilians’ such as Murray Blake correctly removed their headdress and turned their heads … but others who passed by neither saluted, nor turned their heads.
Am I out of order in asking: ‘Please, RSM Ceremonial, include the paying of compliments to Colours in the briefing notes for such commemorations’.
Is there a special category of retired personnel wearing military headdress? Seems to me that it might be inappropriate for them to salute, so should they remove their military headdress? Maybe an amendment to the Ceremonial Manual here? (For example, if you’re wearing a beret with a suit when the National Anthem is played, do you salute, remove your beret, or just stand there?
The two central questions are, what do you do if you’re in civilian clothes and wearing a beret and:
(i) the National Anthem plays; or
(ii) you walk past a Standard, Guidon or Colour?”
On 7 June 2019, I asked the RSM-A the following questions:
“Dear RSM-A,
I am a retired member of the RAAC. Following the Binh Ba Commemoration yesterday, some questions of protocol have arisen in the context of veterans attending such ceremonies and wishing to pay respect in accord with appropriate procedures.
When a gentleman wearing civilian clothes and a hat, passes Colours/Guidons etc, he removes his hat and does an eyes left/right.
But what happens when the retired person is wearing their old unit beret (probably also wearing medals)?
Should he (i) remove his beret and do an eyes left/right; (ii) keep beret on and salute with eyes left/right; or keep beret on and simply do an eyes left/right.
Supplementary question is: what should such a person do when the national anthem is played: (i) stand, keep beret on and salute; (ii) stand and remove beret; or (iii) just stand.
Your help in answering these questions would be much appreciated.
It is recognised that former service personnel are not subject to the dress/ceremonial manual stipulations, but, even so, most would like to be able to do what is considered the ‘right thing’.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron [Obviously, the same protocol would apply when Colours/Guidons are marched past, ie. stand and ….]”
A response from someone who has seen service in numerous operational theatres was:
“I would strongly argue that if you are wearing your old Regiment’s head attire with badge etc and as an individual walking past ANY regimental colours, you would salute. I would!
In my view, you are in spirit, still very much of the military and the head wear reflects your past, your beliefs, your traditions, your total respect and the way you in which you were trained. To remove is as you pass by to me is surrendering all of the above.
If you are in command of a veteran group passing the colours, you would give an eyes right/left and salute FOR the column you lead. Thus the remainder, hat or no hat, as in military style would comply with an order for eyes right. The same rules would apply on the playing of the national anthem. Without military hat, civilian headwear removed on all such examples above.
Mate, I have never read of any rules for such circumstances but I can categorically state without hesitation, if I was in that situation, then be it right or wrong in the eyes of the rule makers, I would do it as above.”
Interestingly, the above fits with the practice on ANZAC Day in Canberra, ie. the leader of an RAAC contingent passing the Reviewing Officer/Stone of Remembrance orders ‘Eyes Right’ and salutes (wearing his beret)
The response from the RSM-A was”
“Dear Bruce thank you for your email. You are correct, gentlemen wearing civilian attire with hats on, are to remove their hats when passing Guidons and Colours and look to their left or right.
In regards to wearing berets in civilian attire and paying respect to guidons/colours, I’m more than comfortable with those veterans turning their head and eyes to the left or right.
Regards to the national anthem … leave berets on and sing loudly.
At the end of the day it’s all about showing respect.”
What will happen on 18 Feb 20. Hopefully it will not be the same as 6 Jun 19. These are members of the Australian Army that we’re paying respect to!! I gather that the Chairman, RAAC Corporation, has advised former RAAC personnel attending of the advice provided by the RSM-A. That’s as it should be, ie. we learn from the past and continually improve going forward.
(Look at the video above, not even the Chief of Army acknowledged the Colours!) How could this be?
————————————————————————————————————————
15 February 2020
How to Torture Our History
Following yesterday’s theme, another post has appeared on the same site. It is about ‘Denton: The Dynamic Duckling’. Someone commented that the name was ‘Benton’. Wrong! Was the response.
If you were the person who originally posted the photo, what should you say? Should you simply believe the newspaper whose headline you quoted and dismiss the other comment? Or should you keep an open mind and say to the other poster, ‘why do you suggest this name’?
An extract from ‘Canister! On! Fire!’ (without footnotes) provides the background.
“On 23 August 1968, after the enemy were forced from Long Dien, B and D Companies 1RAR, supported by 1 Troop, conducted a search of the battle area. At one point, a mother duck, followed by a line of ducklings, crossed the road directly in front of Lieutenant McCormack’s tank. The driver, Lance Corporal Hunter, quickly jumped out, scooped up the last in line, and passed it back to the turret crew.
Things did not work out as planned: ‘We had the idea of fattening up the duck to augment our rations; the problem was that everyone fell in love with it, including the infantry we were with. The whole group spent the next few days collecting frogs and other delicacies. It lived in the bin beside the driver until we got back to the Dat.’
Trooper Jack Luff, 31’s gunner, became the duckling’s unofficial custodian, naming it Fenton after the main character in Chickenman, a popular radio serial broadcast on US Armed Forces radio.
During the following fortnight, while 1 Troop remained at Baria, the duckling was Luff’s constant companion, following him everywhere, about one pace behind. Not long after, the PR people got wind of the story and, as sometimes happens, the ‘facts’ became slightly distorted. The headline which appeared in a number of papers was ‘Denton, the Dynamic Duckling’. “
So, Denton was a name invented to make a good headline. But there is more to the story … the name of the main character in Chickenman [ie. the Winged Warrior] was actually Benton. Jack had presumably misheard the American accent and called the duckling ‘Fenton’ (which, after the newspaper ‘licence’, became Denton).
History is such a rich font of knowledge.
———————————————————————————————————————-
14 February 2020
Centurions in the Australian Army
A recent post on another site suggested that Australia’s early Cents were fitted with 17 pounder guns. This is incorrect. Another fallacy more often seen is the modification which resulted in the Cent being converted from Mk 3 to Mk 5. Finally, few realise that the Cent used by Australia was unique in the world. It didn’t fit with any of the ‘official’ marks of Centurion and a different classification was used to described it. An extract from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘ (less footnotes) is copied below and after that a list of the ‘official marks from Wikipedia.
“Centurions employed in Vietnam had undergone a number of modifications since they were first produced in the UK in 1945. Mark 1 and Mark 2 tanks were armed with a seventeen-pounder (76mm) gun. Australia’s first 60 tanks, which started to arrive in late 1951, were Mark 3 vehicles which mounted a twenty-pounder (84mm) gun, together with a 7.92mm Besa coaxial machine gun. Subsequent orders, amounting to 57 tanks and six ARV Mark 2s, were delivered between 1956 and 1958.
Tanks in the later orders were built to Mark 5 standard prior to shipping. The essential difference between the Mark 3 and Mark 5 vehicles was the replacement of the Besa with a more reliable .30cal Browning. The tanks which had earlier arrived in Australia as Mark 3s were modified in the late 1950s/early 1960s to match the Mark 5 criteria.
The tanks sent to Vietnam had been further modified to Mark 5/1 standard by fitting applique armour to the glacis plate, the sloping frontal armour forward of the driver. The uparmour kit was designed in the UK in response to NATO concerns about developments in anti-armour weapons; it increased the thickness of the glacis plate from 76mm to 120mm.
The base overhaul program that the tanks went through prior to Vietnam involved a number of modifications. As well as the rear-mounted fuel tank, vehicles were fitted for IR night driving and gunnery equipment. The most significant change to the vehicles on which crews had trained up until that time, was the installation of the .50cal RMG. The modification also involved new commander’s and gunner’s sights.
The designation Mark 5/1 (Aust) was used to differentiate the unique Australian build standard (uparmoured twenty-pounder plus RMG and IR) from that of other marks of Centurion.
Browning machine guns fitted to coaxial and commander’s cupola mounts, turret rear escape door deleted, turret roof reshaped, deletion of 2″ bomb thrower in turret roof, extra stowage bin on glacis, addition of guide roller in track run, vehicle weight 51 tons.
When this was posted on another website, someone responded to say: They have missed two incidents, one on the 18th when [callsign] 22 was hit on the left side just behind the driver by an RPG. Second one they probably don’t want known … the latter was described in my book in this way:
“The circumstances under which 11 Platoon D Company (as they were later identified) were first seen, made recognition impossible. For a start, they were on high ground with the sun behind them. To those in the 2 Troop ‘carriers’ 600m away, the figures moving among the rocks on the hill ‘appeared to be wearing black and looked very suspicious indeed’. ‘We continued to observe for some time, until we received clearance from Task Force to engage; we were told that there were no “friendlies” at that grid; this was confirmed twice [by the APC Troop Leader] before we engaged.’ The blue-on-blue incident resulted in D Company suffering ten WIA.”
But the ‘back’ story is even worse. A Footnote to the above:
“The incident attracted considerable media and (as a consequence) political attention. Details of a regrettable saga in which the ‘facts’ of the incident were made to fit the politics, can be found in Hall, Combat Battalion, p. 182.”
It wasn’t appropriate for Canister On! FIRE! to go into detail about this, but, in essence, the investigation was ‘modified’ to indicate that the casualties were caused by the enemy.
One might think that this par for the course as far as politics is concerned. Of more concern is the fact the opportunity to learn lessons from the incident was lost … no attempt to improve CP procedures, frequency of locstat updates, or communication protocols. How many more casualties might have been caused as a result?
What happened was that, because of the politics involved, HQ 1ATF decided that no investigation was necessary. A report was sent to AHQ Canberra which said that 11 Platoon had come under fire from the enemy and that any casualties were the result of supporting fire. The location of 11 Pl at the time was moved to fit with the operations map at the time.
Openness and transparency … why do people think that they can get away with ‘covering things up’?
——————————————————————————————————————————
12 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 7
Following on from yesterday and blog posts immediately preceding that, the second half of the submission sent to the Minister on 7 Feb 17 is copied below. The RAAC Corporation claims (see 10 Feb Blog) that it made a separate submission a month later and, as a result, a “legislative anomaly” was found which enabled its submission to be approved to have the Battlehonour emblazoned. Posts 1-5 on this topic have investigated why it is that the RAAC Corporation will not allow anyone to see their ‘submission’.
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. (Part 2)
Precedent for Re-evaluating Convention. A precedent has been set in which the Australian Army acted contrary to Imperial directions and authorised a battle honour to be emblazoned because of the extent of bravery displayed by Australian soldiers in the action concerned. Those soldiers, it was decided, had earned the right for their sacrifice and gallantry to be formally acknowledged. There is no doubt that gallant efforts of those who fought at FSBs Coral and Balmoral deserve no less.
Nature of Modern Warfare. As the Second World War was different to the First World War, so are modern conflicts different again. Why should the extent to which today’s soldiers can be honoured be based on circumstances from over 70 years ago?
Why should those former members of 1st Armoured Regiment who fought and earned three battle honours for Vietnam, only be able to see two of them emblazoned on their Regiment’s Standard? Why should members of that Regiment today, not be able to fully appreciate the significance of all the battle honours their forebears were awarded?
Wider Implications. What would be the implications of endorsing the existing provisions of DI (A) Admin 38-3? Three more battle honours would be able to be emblazoned on the Colours of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Guidon of 3rd Cavalry Regiment; one more battle honour would be able to be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment.
Timing. The emblazing should carried out as soon as possible. It will further boost unit morale, provide enhanced public profile of the gallantry of soldiers who fought during those iconic battles, and boost the public profile of Army’s heritage. Furthermore, for the ever decreasing numbers of veterans who participated in the battles and are still alive, it will be seen as public acknowledgement of their job well done before they all succumb to the ravages of time.
Conclusion.
Today’s Army fights different wars to those of 1914-18 and 1939-45. The basis on which the gallantry of today’s soldiers is honoured should be determined on current circumstances, not those of more than 70 years ago.
The existing provisions of DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions,which state that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned on colours etc, should be strongly endorsed, rather than any thought being given to reverting to benchmarks set last century. The Battle Honour, “Coral-Balmoral”, should be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment as soon as possible.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
Footnote: So ends this series of posts related to secrecy imposed by the RAAC Corporation on their ‘lobbying’ of Government and the public statements made about this. The Information Commissioner advises that the third party involved made at least three submissions to her Office claiming personal privacy provisions prevented disclosure (the initial reasons advanced by Defence having been discounted). I have no interest in any such personal information and have asked that I receive the document with personal info blacked out, even if it means receiving a totally blacked out page. If this request is denied, there are review mechanisms still be be employed.
———————————————————————————————————————–
11 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 6
Following on from yesterday and blog posts immediately preceding that, the first half of the submission sent to the Minister on 7 Feb 17 is copied below. The RAAC Corporation claims (see yesterday’s Blog) that it made a separate submission a month later and, as a result, a “legislative anomaly” was found which enabled its submission to be approved to have the Battlehonour emblazoned. Posts 1-5 on this topic have investigated why it is that the RAAC Corporation will not allow anyone to see their ‘submission’.
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the1st Armoured Regiment Standard. (Part 1)
Background.
Following the First World War, a British/Imperial Battle Honours Committee (BHC) decided that emblazoned battle honours should be limited to ten per regiment (because of constraints on the available space on colours etc). The same constraint was imposed following the Second World War.
Because of differences in scale, the limit set for Korean War battle honours was one theatre honour and one battle honour. This decision was initially accepted by the Australian Army. Twenty years later, however, it was considered that the Battleof Maryang Sanwas so important that the BHC edict would no longer be complied with — both Maryang Sanand KapyongBattle Honours would be emblazoned.
The limit of one theatre honour and two battle honours was maintained by the Vietnam BHC.
1st Armoured Regiment was awarded three battle honours for Vietnam, but only Hat Dichand Binh Baare emblazoned on its Standard. Despite Coral-Balmoral’s overwhelming importance in terms of the Australian Army’s military heritage, the battle honour is not able to be emblazoned.
Is it not time to question a policy founded in the days of Empire which denies an Australian unit the right to proudly proclaim all its battle honours?
Aim
This submission argues that the use of the First and Second World Wars as benchmarks on which to base the number of battle honours able to be emblazoned on the colours etc of today’s Army, is outdated and completely inappropriate in terms of acknowledging the service to the Nation selflessly given by Australian soldiers in modern conflicts.
Justification.
Authorisation Already Exits. It could be argued that there is no need for this submission. Current Army policy as set out in DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions, states that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned.
It has been suggested, however, that this is a ‘known error’. If so, it raises the question: why has no amendment been made? Presumably this is a matter that is already recognised as requiring further consideration in light of the very different circumstances in which today’s Army operates.
This is not the only reference at variance with a limit of two battle honours. Christopher Jobson spent thirty years in the Army. Prior to retirement, he was RSM Ceremony and Protocol and an acknowledged expert in the subject. In his 2009 book,‘Looking Forward, Looking Back : Customs and Traditions of the Australian Army’, he states that there is no limit on the number of battle honours that can be emblazoned on colours etc today.
———————————————————————————————————————–
10 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 5
Given the background explained in the previous posts, it’s understandable that I was surprised by the following announcement:
“On 10th March 2017 the Corporation lodged a submission on behalf 1AR through the Corps to have the BH Coral-Balmoral emblazoned on the 1Armd Regt Standard. A legislative anomaly was found and used to great effect. The submission was approved on 28/3/17 and action was commenced by AHQ to correct the error and make it consistent the relevant D-I(A).” Chairman, RAAC Corporation
The Freedom of Information Saga Parts 1-4 have dealt with the inexplicable case of the RAAC Corporation refusing to make public its submission.
The letter below from the Minister is relevant. Of course, it seems that I need not have written to him, as the RAAC Corporation had already ‘sorted’ the matter.
“Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Parliament House CANBERRA ACT 2600 Dear Lieutenant Colonel Cameron Thank you for your letters of 7 and 22 February 2017 seeking approval to display the Battle Honour for Coral-Balmoral and to amend the date of the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment’s Standard [letter of 22 Feb 17]. I am pleased to advise there is no administrative impediment to meeting both of your requests. I have been assured that Army Headquarters, in conjunction with the 1st Armoured Regiment and the Royal Australian Armoured Corp Cooperation, will endeavour to have the emblazing amended and completed by the 49th anniversary of Coral-Balmoral at the end of May 2017. Previous Army protocols !imited the number of Theatre Honours, Battle Honours and Honour Distinctions that may be emblazoned on Unit and Corps Colours, Standards or Guidons to two Battle Honours against each Theatre Honour. As you may be aware, this restriction was reviewed and amended by the then Chief of Army on 1 February 2013. Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention and I trust this information is of assistance to you.” [Pity about the reference to the “Royal Australian Armoured Corp Cooperation”.]
“The Government has refused to release the Gaetjens report which purportedly exonerates the former Minister, Bridget McKenzie, and thereby the Government from charges of political bias in the distribution of the Community Sport Infrastructure grants. But why this refusal to release the report – the only obvious answer is because the report cannot stand-up to public scrutiny.”Another matter of failure to be open and transparent …
The background has been provided in the previous three Blog posts.
To summarise, the following reasons have been given ‘officially’ for NOT disclosing the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence, ‘supposedly supporting mine to the Minister’:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it;
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.
Disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
Disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
The following public interest factors were ‘officially’ regarded as being in favour of disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
What was the reasoning considered by the Information Commissioner in relation to the release of the RAAC Corporation’s submission (‘supposedly’ supporting mine?)
In Favour:
“I agree with the Department and the applicant that disclosure of the document would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that may have informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision making, and would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.”
Against:
“I am satisfied that the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation who signed the submission in the document at issue is the personal information of an individual … I am also satisfied that the specific content of the submission or representation by the third party ex-service organisation says something about the individual officer who signed the document in the circumstances of this case and constitutes their personal information.”
“…. it was found that: a. the specific personal information relating to the individuals is not well known to the greater public; b. the specific personal information is not readily available from publicly accessible sources; and c. the third party has objected to the release of the specific personal information.”
“… the third party has made submissions objecting to disclosure of the document at issue and explaining their particular personal circumstances relevant to their objection to disclosure of the specific personal information in the document at issue.
“… it is apparent that disclosure of the name and title of the individual officer of the third party ex-service organisation and the submission or representation made by the individual officer on behalf of the third party ex-service organisation would be an unreasonable disclosure of personal information, having regard to the personal circumstances of the third party individual.”
Conclusion. When I was called by the OAIC to be advised of the outcome, I reiterated that I had no interest at all in personal details of anyone involved in authoring, or associated with, the document. I was informed that if this information was ‘blacked out’ that there would be nothing left of the document, ie. as had been stated earlier” Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless”.
So, the personal information of an officer (or officers) of the RAAC Corporation, writing a submission to Defence, ‘supposedly’ in support of mine to the Minister, takes up so much space that anything left would be meaningless. I think that I can imagine what the RAAC Corporation submission to Defence might have involved. I ask again, why is there so much secrecy associated with actions by an organisation on behalf of its members? Why can’t there be openness and transparency?
Why can’t matters of relevance to the RAAC be put above individual interests? What is there that the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence ‘supposedly in support of mine to the Minister’, could possibly say “about the individual officer who signed the document” which meant that it couldn’t be released? More tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 3
As stated below, the end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation supposedly acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification … a review. The third part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below. Bear with me, the ending is sensational! All will be revealed tomorrow.
The Applicant’s Response
Defence, in conjunction with the RAAC Corporation, have provided twelve different reasons that supposedly justify not releasing the document in question. In a process of rejection, followed by provision of more time, after more time, for Defence to reconsider … OIAC have rejected nine of these reasons. Turning to what’s left:
Will Defence have difficulty in obtaining similar information in the future if the document is released? I wrote to the Minister; the Minister’s Office asked for Defence’s position; Defence asked the RAAC Corporation what their position was; the RAAC Corporation provided this information to Defence. The Minister approved my (two) requests. The RAAC Corporation refuses to allow anyone to see their submission (maybe it was positive, as the RAAC Corporation claim; maybe it was negative). If the document was to be released, would, say, the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation or the 1 Field Squadron RAE Association, withhold information that Defence requested from them because of it?
Of course NOT. Integrity is crucial to their membership. A document written by their Executive on behalf of their members, would be made available to their members so requested. How could it not be, if the association had any integrity? I can obtain statements to this effect from a range of ESOs if need be.
Will an individual or group of individuals be harmed by release of the document? Defence have previously stated that the “welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy”. This is a very definitive statement; not ‘may be placed in jeopardy’, but “will be placed in jeopardy’. Presumably it is the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who is being referred to. It was he who stated that he’d prepared a submission for Defence supporting mine to the Minister, but without “having read anybody else’s including yours!”. As advised earlier, I can’t imagine that anyone could author a supporting submission, without reading the submission that it was supporting. Of course, if the submission was opposed to, rather than ‘in support of’, this could explain why release of the document could affect the author’s welfare (if he’d stated the opposite). This would also be the case if the RAAC Corporation’s ‘submission’ was a copy of mine (when he’s stated he hadn’t seen it.)
But is this justification for not releasing the document? If I was being sentenced and stated that if I was sent to jail, I would kill myself … should the Judge take this into account? Of course, not … if His or Her Honour did, there wouldn’t be anyone in jail.
Will disclosure of the document prejudice the management function of an agency? The ‘agency’ in question is the Department of Defence. Defence has 65,000 employees. Is their management likely to be affected by the release of a document supporting an application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours and a correction to an error on a unit’s Standard? The opposite is much more likely. As the Case Officer has stated:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Conclusion. I ask that the OAIC consider the above.
NOTE: I’ve been asked to remove the RAAC Corporation logo as I’d have permission from the Army Branding Agency. Use of the logo in an article about the Corporation is permitted, however.
———————————————————————————————————————-
7 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 2
As stated below, the end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation supposedly acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification … a review. The second part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below. Bear with me, the ending is sensational!
“The OAIC Appeal
On appeal, Defence stated the primary reasons were:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
When OAIC asked Defence to provide further justification, Defence provided two NEW reasons for not releasing the document:
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it; and
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
OAIC informed Defence that this was not adequate justification. Defence responded to say:
“As stated, … in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
OAIC informed Defence that this had nothing whatsoever to do with the document under consideration. More time was allowed for Defence to consult a ‘third party’. Defence then contended that:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
The OAIC Case Officer’s Position
As the case officer, you believe that “disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the Department’s operations since:
disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
In the Case Officer’s opinion, arguments for and against release of the document are:
In Favour. In this case, the following public interest factors favour disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Against: In this case, the following public interest factors weigh against disclosure of the document:
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
6 February 2020
The Freedom of Information Saga. Part 1
The end of this incredible story has arrived. It is simply unbelievable. Why is it that there is so much secrecy when an organisation acts on behalf of its members? Why is it that things can’t be open and transparent? Before revealing the decision of the Information Commissioner and her justification, a review. The first part of the Blog from 22 November 2019 is copied below:
“The Blog on 11 Sep 19 stated that the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) advised the day before that: “This matter is awaiting a decision by the Information Commissioner under s 55K of the FOI Act to affirm, vary or set aside and substitute the internal review decision of the Department of 26 June 2017”.
After two years, it seemed as if the matter was finally going to be resolved. Background is copied below from an earlier post.
The Latest Development: On 13 Nov 19, the OAIC desk officer advised “I would be grateful for your further assistance in the resolution of this Information Commissioner review … In relation to the material that remains within scope of this IC review, I invite you to please confirm whether you seek access to the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue. I would be grateful for your response by 20 November 2019”
My response stated inter alia:
I have no interest in “the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue”. My only interest is with respect to information provided to the Minister which may have had the potential to influence his decision in relation to my submission to him … surely this the right of each and every Australian?.
I don’t mean any disrespect to the OAIC here … simply trying to express my purpose in pursuing this matter, ie. the principle that if a Minister is asked to decide on a matter, then submissions made to him about it by other parties should be available to all … otherwise how is public confidence to be maintained?
——————————————————————————————
Background. [Although the reasons given for not releasing the material sought, seem unbelievable … it is a true account!]
In 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. I had hoped that the 1AR Association, together with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation (RAACC), might take the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1Armd Regt approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the other units involved.)
After years of inaction, in February 2017 I personally wrote to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, asking that the current limitation imposed on emblazoning Vietnam battle honours on unit colours etc, be reviewed. (I also requested that he approve a correction being made to the Theatre Honour emblazoned on the Standard.) The RAACC subsequently posted messages on social media sites advising that it had made a supporting submission.
I thanked the RAACC Chairman and asked if the Corporation’s submission was any different to mine. The Chairman responded to say: “I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours!”.
I was surprised at this, as I had automatically assumed that anyone preparing a supporting submission, would refer to the content of the submission that they were supporting. (Additionally, my submission had been available publicly since it was posted off.)
I then asked if I could see the Corporation’s submission, so as to know how it compared with the information I provided to the Minister. Surprisingly, the RAACC Chairman refused to allow me to see the submission that the Corporation had made in support of mine (no reason was given).
I was concerned that, if my submission was not approved, it might be because of information presented by the RAACC. I therefore wrote to Defence to “seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the RAACC submission made in support of my request to Minister Tehan”.
The Defence Response.
Defence initially provided the following reasons for not disclosing the document:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
6 February 2020
‘Right Sizing’ the Abrams Tank Fleet
Photo: Google images
The following email has been sent to Army’s Land Power Forum:
Dear Sir/Madam,
The 2/14 LHR (QMI) Assn published an article in its latest newsletter, part of which stated:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.”
I hope the Land Power Forum might be the right contact for this.
The background information I seek is the situation regarding the ‘right sizing’ of the Abrams tank fleet.
The following two articles provide cogent argument that an operational deficiency currently exists and the Abrams tank fleet must be increased in number to overcome it.
The Immediate Past Head of Corps, RAAC, advises that:
“When balanced against the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore unavailable. This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of the tank capability.” The former Director, AFV Systems, advises that: “…when there are three active squadrons, there have to be tanks in maintenance and being repaired, tanks kept as spares, tanks used for training and tanks being used. When you have a fleet of twelve submarines, there are only two at sea. It’s the same with these big tanks – you need the right fleet size to generate three squadrons. The first task of the current Land project is to “right-size” the fleet to 90 [from the current 59], which he says is uncontroversial and was acknowledged by the then-Australian government and the US government when the M1 was originally acquired as a foreign military sale”.
Despite the facts above, there seems to be no intention under LAND 907 to acquire additional tanks.
What is the current and future planning in this respect?
If this is not the right address to seek an update on this matter, could you please forward on as appropriate. If, on the other hand, Army has changed its published policy about providing background information to facilitate debate of capability issues, could you please let me know.
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 4
The motto of 1 Fd Sqn in Vietnam was ‘Follow the Sapper’. Sappers worked in front of the infantry and the armour to find and deal with mines, explosives, trip wires, caches, and booby traps … using their eyes, bayonets and electronic detectors. Sappers did not get the opportunity to look for enemy soldiers who might be looking for them. They had to concentrate on the ‘ping’ from their mine-detector or see that tiny sign or that scratch in the dirt that shouldn’t be there. Sappers relied on their mates coming behind to look after their backs. It took a special kind of gallantry to work like that, but it was taken for granted because it was a Sapper’s job.
Sappers went down holes in the ground … tunnels and bunkers where the risk of impalement, being shot while deep underground in inky blackness or being asphyxiated in the depths of a shaft, drive or sap came at a premium in nightmarish circumstances. But they did it anyway. That took a special kind of gallantry that is impossible to describe. Sappers defused bombs, explosive devices and mines. Some of these were fitted with anti-handling devices or demonish ‘double-bluff’ devices that were designed to kill them. Sappers knew this, but pressed on anyway. That was a Sapper’s job – and it took a special kind of gallantry. Sappers were also required to be prepared at all times to function in their secondary role, ie. to fight as infantrymen in attacks, ambushes, and defended localities.
Is it right therefore, that an infantry unit be recognised for its gallantry, when the AFV crews and sappers who continually supported it during combined arms operations, are not?
The Operations
1ATF conducted 28 operations during the period 28 November 1969 to 29 October 1970 (when the Unit Citation was presented). 8RAR was involved in 12 of them. (Not “almost every military operation” as stated in the Citation.)
An analysis of the support provided to 8RAR in each of its operations is contained in the attached Annexes. References are made to the following publications: The History of Tanks in Vietnam (‘Canister! On! Fire!); The History of APCs (‘When the Scorpion Stings); The History of Infantry (‘A Duty Done); and The History of 8RAR (‘The Grey Eight’). Quotations have also been included from Commanders’ Diaries. (Note the B Sqn 3 Cav diaries detail each APC element op con to 8RAR on a day by day basis and copies of these can be provided if required; many of the entries of other diaries record troops op con to 8RAR simply as grid references … these have not been copied.)
Conclusion
The RVN Citation awarded to 8RAR concludes that “the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force contributed significantly to the anti-communist struggle of the Armd Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam, thereby bringing great credit to the Royal Australian Armed Forces”. As clearly evidenced above, 8RAR did not make their contribution in isolation. They were supported every step of the way by tanks, APCs and sappers.
Without the involvement of these supporting arms at the forefront of actions against the enemy, 8RAR would not have achieved the operational outcomes it is credited with, and as a result, would not have been awarded the Cross of Gallantry With Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation. A combined arms team is exactly that …. a combination of complementary capabilities which creates a winning force on the battlefield. No one part is pre-eminent.
A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn, RAE deserve to be acknowledged for their role in providing support to 8RAR and for the contribution they made to the operational outcomes which led to 8RAR’s recognition. The DHAAT is asked to extend eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation accordingly.
Attachments
‘A Testing Two Days for Sapper Miller’. (Tunnel Rats Newsletter)
Operation Atherton
Operation Keperra
Operation Hammersley
Operation Hamilton
Operation Phoi Hop
Operation Concrete I
Operation Nudgee
Operation Cung Chung I
Operation Petrie
Operation Decade
Operation Cung Chung II
Operation Cung Chung III
———————————————————————————————————————-
3 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 3
Photo: AWM
The Engineers. “In all of our operations, engineer splinter teams, each consisting of two field engineers from 1st Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers, were deployed either as a component of rifle companies or with Battalion Headquarters, or on stand-by to move forward if required. The splinter teams were frequently needed, particularly during operations in southern Phuoc Tuy Province where a considerable mine threat existed. The unenviable task of neutralising these mines fell to the splinter teams. They were never found to be lacking and displayed courage and skill in the execution of their work”.
It’s of significance to note in the extracts above, that supporting arms were not just sitting idle when not engaging the enemy or searching enemy installations. Rather, they were ambushing (both night and day, sometimes in conjunction with infantry and sometimes in the same position for days at a time); patrolling in the areas of operations; defending fire support bases, helping to force the enemy into 8RAR’s ambushes; and standing-by as ready reaction forces.
What’s it Mean to be a Tunnel Rat?
This has been well described in the newsletter of 1 Fd Sqn ‘The Tunnel Rats’ in relation to the Military Medal awarded to Sapper Gary Miller for his bravery while supporting 8RAR during Operation Hamilton. The article is attached.
What’s Involved in Being Part of a Ready Reaction Force?
This has been well described in the ‘When the Scorpion Stings: The History of 3 Cav Regt in Vietnam’.
“One of the continuing tasks of the [APC] Squadron was supporting the Task Force’s Ready Reaction Force. Here the APCs were charged with dealing with any emergency situation that might arise. This role was regarded very seriously by the troops. The Squadron had its own siren, which when activated would see members assigned to the Ready Reaction Force racing from their huts, in specially issued flying suits (for easy dress), down to where the carriers were parked. The Squadron has prided itself on its ability to have its APCs outside the gates of Nui Dat within three minutes of the warning siren being activated. The APCs’ engines would be started as soon as the driver was in his compartment, and the crew commander would activate the radios and load the guns as the carriers reversed away from the high earthen wall where the carriers were parked. The troop, in tactical operation order, would then race at full speed out of the Squadron’s lines … There was perhaps no more inspiring or reassuring sight than a troop of carriers , in line-ahead formation, racing at full speed out of the gates of Nui Dat and onto Route 2 in response to a call for assistance.” (WSS p241-243)
How Were They Gallant?
Any AFV driver who sets out on an operation, knowing that he might detonate an anti-tank mine which could totally destroy his vehicle … is gallant, ie. he is doing his assigned task without having any control over the events that might occur. This is similar to the infantryman who moves forward, despite the possibility of stepping on a mine or being shot by the enemy.
Any AFV crewman who sets out on an operation, knowing that his vehicle might detonate a mine, be penetrated by an RPG, or be the target of a sniper or satchel charge, is gallant. This is similar to an infantryman who knows that he might enter an ambush at any time.
Any crewman who is part of an AFV ambush at night, without any night vision devices or other means of detecting the enemy’s approach, and without any means of stopping their vehicle emitting fuel smells and making sounds when metal parts cool, is gallant. This is a little different to an infantryman, who has a well proven ground hugging procedure for the same thing.
It’s been often said, that infantry felt that they were lucky if they were well away from AFVs, because the AFVs drew the enemy’s fire. It follows that AFV crews were particularly gallant when they led assaults on enemy defended positions … given that they were vulnerable to mines, anti-armour projectiles, snipers, satchel charges and even small arms fire (as they weren’t able to close down).
In addition to the above, AFVs provided the core of ready reaction forces. On call out, everything was subordinate to getting to the infantry as quickly as possible. It was a common tactic of the enemy to lure reaction forces onto a mine or into an ambush. AFV crewmen were gallant in putting these thoughts out of their minds as they rushed to their destination in order to save lives.
———————————————————————————————————————–
2 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 2
Photo: AWM
The first part of a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (12 Dec 19):
The Support Provided to 8RAR by Other Arms
All operations conducted by 8RAR in Vietnam were combined arms operations. Tanks and APCs provided classic armoured support: close fire support in attack; armoured mobility; assisting infantry operations by ambushing and patrolling; protecting Fire Support Bases (FSBs); and providing an on-call ready reaction force capability (for fire support, enemy cut-off, deployment of reserves, and ammunition resupply) at all times. Field engineers accompanied both 8RAR companies and tank and APC troops on each and every operation. The sappers took the lead whenever booby traps were suspected or enemy facilities such as bunkers and tunnels, had to be searched and/or destroyed. They were also the first responders whenever a mine incident occurred. .8RAR Operational Instructions made it clear what the sappers were expected to do: “All combat engineer teams to be prepared to locate and destroy or neutralize mines and booby traps and search tunnels”.
While providing this support to 8RAR operations, armoured vehicle crews and engineers suffered five KIA and 37 WIA. These figures were not included with 8RAR ‘s casualties in the HQ 1 ATF proposal for the RVN Unit Citation. (Paradoxically, a significant number of enemy casualties attributable to supporting arms, primarily during Operation Hammersley, were credited to 8RAR in the proposal.) While providing support to 8RAR, members of supporting arms were awarded two Military Medals and Mentioned in Dispatches eight times. [It should be noted that on a per capita basis per unit, 3 Cav Regt suffered more casualties than any other.]
8RAR’s own history of its time in Vietnam describes the contribution of supporting arms in the following manner:
The Tanks. “The support provided by our tanks was magnificent. It was during this operation [Hammersley] that fire support from the tanks continued, although every vehicle working with 8th Battalion was damaged either by enemy RPG fire or enemy mines. In addition to the provision of fire support, the tanks were particularly valuable in three other roles …
First was their use as a deterrent. Hoi Chanhs have told of the terror felt by the enemy when they are opposed by tanks. On a number of occasions this was put to good use by the Commanding Officer when he used most of the Battalion to ambush egress routes out of an enemy occupied area: the tanks then carried out reconnaissance in force within the ambushed area. The enemy fled into the waiting ambushes. Second was the destruction of enemy bunkers not only by fire but also by squashing under the tank tracks. Finally, and probably of greatest importance, was the capability of the tanks to precede infantry moving in closed down APCs in areas which may have been mined by the enemy. 8RAR and supporting armoured corps soldiers suffered no casualties while moving in this manner, although during Operation Hammersley alone, 30 mines were detonated by the armoured vehicles”.
The APCs. “The tracked armoured personnel carriers of B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment provided invaluable cavalry and APC support to 8RAR during every operation in which the Battalion participated. The forms of support were varied, the most common being rapid and secure insertion of infantry into areas of operation. Other tasks included the provision of accurate and sustained machine gun fire support, armoured escort during truck movement, command vehicles from which Battalion Headquarters could operate and mobile base plates for the mortar platoon.
The APCs were also a vital force in the Commanding Officer’s plans for reinforcement of half platoon and platoon ambushes which may have come into heavy contact while ambushing around the villages. The concept called for cavalry to reinforce the infantry, to effect resupply of ammunition [both during and immediately after contacts] and to assist in battlefield clearance.
————————————————————————————————————————
1 February 2020
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Part 1
The first part of a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (12 Dec 19):
Background.
In 1970, the US Army had two unit awards: the Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Presidential Unit Citation. The Army of the RVN had only one such award: the Cross of Gallantry. This could only be awarded to a unit if it displayed specific deeds of valour or heroic conduct while fighting the enemy.
The US Army presented AATTV with a Meritorious Unit Commendation at a parade on 9 Feb 70. Soon after, the RVN Commanding General for that part of South Vietnam in which the Australian Task Force was located, made it known that he wanted to present to either the Task Force, or one of its units, an award to recognise Australia’s contribution to the War.
On 6 Mar 70, this same Vietnamese general wrote the US Commanding General and asked that his congratulations be extended to the Commander 1ATF and the “meritorious Australian servicemen” involved in Operation Hammersley.
On 22 Apr 70, it was announced that 8RAR would not be replaced at the end of its tour. The Australian withdrawal was starting.
As the end of the year neared, the idea of a unit award became more urgent. As 1ATF wasn’t a ‘unit’ per se, it was decided that the 8RAR would be nominated for “a VN Unit Award”. A citation proposal was signed by Brigadier Henderson (Commander 1ATF) on 10 Sep 70. It listed all 8RAR’s operations up to that time and emphasised the Battalion’s success in combat.
The RVN Army HQ revised the proposed citation by deleting the reference to other operations and emphasising Operation Hammersley. New material was included relating to civic action work and 8RAR’s contribution to the Pacification and Development program.
On 21 Oct 70, the Commander Australian Force Vietnam (Major General Fraser) was advised that the RVN wished to present 8RAR with a Meritorious Unit Citation. Two days later, he informed Army HQ in Canberra that the RVN wanted to present a “Meritorious Unit Citation” to 8RAR and that he had agreed to this. The signal went on to say “Bearing in mind the ceremonies attendant on the recent presentation of a US Unit Award [Meritorious Unit Commendation] to AATTV, it is politic to accept the above award in the manner of established precedent”.
The presentation to 8RAR was made during a parade on 29 Oct 70. Although it was referred to as a Meritorious Unit Citation (and this wording was included in the title of the Citation), it was based on the CGWP Unit Citation and used the same insignia and ‘Streamer’.
The fact that the Citation related primarily to Operation Hammersley and the Streamer was named ‘Minh Dam’ [the enemy’s name for their base which was attacked during Operation Hammersley], led the AWM and many others to refer to the Meritorious Unit Citation as “including the CGWP Unit Citation”, i.e. suggesting that there were two separate awards, the latter being for Operation Hammersley. There are numerous published references, even by the former Governor-General, Major General Michael Jeffery (himself an 8RAR company commander) which state that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its involvement in Operation Hammersley. The Official Historian for the Vietnam War attended the Hearing and stated that, to him, the wording of the Citation seemed to be referring to Operation Hammersley. In proof of the widespread confusion about the Citation and why it was awarded, the history of the Royal Australian Regiment in Vietnam (‘A Duty Done’, Fairhead) states: “8RAR was presented with the Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Commendation primarily for its brilliant operation in the Long Hai Hills in February/March 1970”.
Unfortunately, no official documentation for the establishment of a Meritorious Unit Citation can be located. It is the belief of the Tribunal, therefore, that (i) it was the RVN CGWP Unit Citation which was awarded to 8RAR and (ii) this was for their entire service in Vietnam up until 29 October 1970, when it was presented.
It cannot be explained why 8RAR’s citation proposal was amended by the RVN to refer to the Battalion’s efforts to “reconstruct houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc”, even though the CGWP Unit Citation is awarded solely for acts of heroic conduct when fighting the enemy.
The contention that the RVN Commanding General III Corps was wanting to match his US counterpart in recognising the service of Australian units, and had ‘created’ an award to do this, cannot be substantiated without any proclamation of such an award being available. The fact that the RVN ‘created’ a Presidential Unit Citation at the same time (akin to that of the US) to award to 161 Bty RNZA, cannot be regarded as a precedent.
The Tribunal decided that, as the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for all 8RAR’s time in Vietnam, if 8RAR was supported by A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn during the operations involved, they might be eligible for the same award.
Both parties (i.e. the Applicant and Defence) were requested to provide a basis for such a decision along these lines.
———————————————————————————————————————–
31 January 2020.
1 Armd Regt Heritage
What is common to these badges?
What is different about this badge?
Showing the tank advancing into the mud is akin to flying the national flag upside down.
Surprisingly, however, this is an item in the 1 AR Assn Q Store being promoted for sale. I’ve emailed the C’tee to ask how the Assn can support such marketing?
It’s not just about the modern day 1 Armd Regt. Look at the beret above.
Description: Khaki heavy cloth beret with ‘Rising Sun’ badge and 2nd/1st Australian Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron colour patch.
Background: In April 1942, 2/1st Australian Armoured Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron was formed from a Light Independent Tank Squadron destined for Malaya but curtailed by the Japanese advance. In November 1942, 2/1st was part of an amalgamation of armoured units to provide men for the 2/4th Armoured Regiment. The 2/1st was reformed in September 1943 following the disbandment of the 1st Armoured Division.
Surely we’re good enough to maintain the traditions of those who have gone before?
———————————————————————————————————————–
30 January 2020
The 2 Cav Badge
Background.
The formation of 1 Cav Regt was announced in 1965; soon after this (according to ‘Digger History’) a competition was held to choose a basis on which to ‘model’ a unit badge; after an eagle was chosen, another competition was held to design a badge, won by Cpl Burgess in the Orderly Room; in 1967 the badge was received by the (now renamed) 2 Cav Regt. The 2 Cav Regt mascot (eagle) arrived in Oct 1967.
Trooper Glenn Darlington arrived at 2 Cav in November 1967 (recuperating from an injury at Canungra before going to Vietnam). While on light duties, he did a painting of the eagle carrying a lance (Glen had been a graphic designer before being called up). Soon after, on departure for Vietnam, he gave the painting to Cpl Burgess.
2 Cav Regt became a unit with Regimental HQ in November 1970.
The Governor General wrote to the Queen (as a result of a request from Army) in November 1968 seeking approval for the design of a 2 Cav Regt badge (this letter is in the National Archives). The Army received approval in April 1969 (NAA again).
Was Trooper Darlington’s Painting the Basis for the Design?
I can’t imagine that the badge would have issued before the Queen’s approval (Apr 69). In March 1969, when Army had not received approval for the design, a letter was written to the GG querying the delay. The subsequent response advised that approval had been previously granted (but it seems that the letter had become lost within Defence). I believe that Army’s main concern at the time was to ensure that the badge would be available when 2 Cav was formed as a regiment (this turned out to be Nov 70).
The timing, Nov 67 (the Darlington painting) and Nov 68 (design finalised) seem to confirm that the painting was likely to have been a major influence in the design concept. Added to this is the fact that a troop leader at 2 Cav during 1967/68 has stated that there was no design competition for a badge during his time.
Trooper Darlington is currently working on a retrospective version of the painting that he did in 1967. A work in progress image is copied below.
———————————————————————————————————————-
29 January 2020
How Should AFVs be Displayed at the AWM? III
(Following from Blog posts of 22 and 25 January 2020.)
The latest 2/14 LHR (QMI) newsletter states that: “Brigadier Mills launched a key initiative in 2019 to ensure the Corps is capturing the living history of the Corps and the importance of recording the human history that we have in our serving and transitioned members, and the importance it plays in the educating new members of the corps. This initiative has been launched by the Corps RSM and established with co-operation of the Australian War Memorial. The HOC has also been actively engaged with the Australian History Unit in preparing for the eventual new Museum, this is looking particularly positive and something the Corps should look forward to.”
Isn’t amazing? The 1AR Assn state, ‘because they’re not a lobby organisation’, that they want nothing to do with the preparation of a paper to suggest to the AWM how AFVs should be displayed in the extended AWM… and at the same time the Head of Corps staff is saying that they’re doing exactly this very thing. (I think that they meant to say that the HOC has been actively engaged with the Army History Unit.)
Then again, isn’t this the role I’d hoped for, for ‘Armouredadvocates’… ie. advocating matters in a public forum such that they are taken up by others in positions of responsibility?
When I last spoke with the previous AWM Director (Nov 2109) … he said ‘I tell my curators everyday, that it’s not the exhibits that are important, it’s the stories that they help tell about the soldiers that operated them’. We might achieve something at the end of the day …. but why does it have to be so non-consultative? Why can’t the HOC simply ask RAAC veterans: ‘How do you think that AFV related exhibits should be displayed at the AWM?’ or ‘How can you contribute to the history of Australian mounted warfare?’. As mentioned previously on the Blog, however, it seems that ‘consultation’ rates very low on the list of priorities.
———————————————————————————————————————–
28 January 2020
Those Who Died of Their Wounds
Quite a few years ago, I contacted the AWM with respect to those who had died of their wounds (but after the ‘prescribed period’ of the war, thereby not being listed on the AWM Roll of Honour). The AWM responded to say that they were bound to only commemorate those who died within the ‘prescribed period’; but, they said, it is open to Associations to acknowledge those who died of their wounds after this period.
The 1 AR Assn now lists the following on its ‘In Memoriam’ page: Len Swarbrick; John Stone; Rod Bellot and Phil Barwick.
In raising the injustice of this issue, my last correspondence to the AWM took issue with their claim that the AWM commemorates ALL those who died serving their country in war. I pointed out the AWM only commemorated some of these, ie. those who died within the ‘prescribed period’ of a war.
The following article has been sent to me (sorry about the orientation)
Finally, DVA has acknowledged, that those who died of their wounds after the ‘prescribed period’ should be afforded the same rights as others whose death came within the ‘prescribed period’.
I’ve suggested that the 1AR Assn might like to represent the case to DVA for Len, John, and Rod (action is already being taken with respect to Phil). This would, of course, involve contacting NOK.
I’ve also informed them that
“It would seem that ‘John’ Stones was actually James Stones. The reason for including him on the 1 AR ‘In Memoriam’ list would seem to be that he might’ve served at 1 Armd Regt following his service in Vietnam during 1966-67 and his later service in Vietnam with 3 Cav in 1969. It would seem that from FDT in 1969, he could’ve been posted to either the tank sqn or the APC sqn.”
———————————————————————————————————————
27 January 2020
New RAAC Capabilities
How great it is to see the following report (extracts copied below) in the Dec 2019, 2/14 LHR (QMI) newsletter
REGIMENTAL ACTIVITY By WO2 Stuart Camac (Acting RSM)
At time of writing, the Regiment is absorbing members back from the deployment to Iraq and is posturing itself ready to roll out for the training year of 2020.
The soldiers of the Regiment are excited and incredibly motivated for the conversion training to commence on to the new Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) in the coming implementation of the L400 program. The Regiment will see many of its crews trained in the initial roll out with the additional training of crews commencing later in the year.
The new BOXER CRV is an exciting time as the generational jump of technology has all involved, from the Brigade Commander down, assessing and hypothesising how to employ, implement and fight with it. For the older soldiers in the Regiment that saw ASLAV come into service, we look to the future and see amazing opportunities for training design and live fire manoeuvre activity prospects that will place the Regiment at the cutting edge of how Army views the RAAC and what we can achieve.
Nested directly with the new CRV is our evolving employment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) that continuously prove to be game changers in how the Cavalry Troop operates. From MILSPEC UAS to off the shelf solutions, the capability now gives the Reconnaissance troop the ability to gain an increased situational awareness within the battle space that is far superior to operating without it.
Even better was the following quote, part of a LAND 400 update:
“Army welcomes debate on LAND 400 and other capability issues. Debate and independent thinking on Army and how it does its business is an important part of understanding what we provide for the Government of Australia and its people. Army is prepared to provide background information to ensure that facts used in the debate are accurate and represent the most up to date information available.”
This is an offer to be taken up (I wonder if it will prove to be true?) … more to follow.
———————————————————————————————————————
26 Australia 2020
What Are THE Questions to be Answered in 2020?
Will these matters of significance to the RAAC, the Army, and the Nation be addressed and the answers made clear?
Will the Abrams fleet be increased by 90 to be ‘right sized’?
Will the role of the RAAC ARES in a defence emergency be made known?
Will the allocation of tanks to the Plan Beersheba ‘Ready’ brigade be increased?
Will members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation?
Will RAAC ARES units be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare?
Will serving RAAC personnel be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense?
Will all information panels re RAAC exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery at the AWM and audio-visual narratives be correct?
Will wars in which Australia participated no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day?
Will oral history interviews be conducted with those who have crewed the different tanks used by the Australian Army, so that their experience might be recorded before they all pass away (and only the tanks are left)?
Will a system of Operational Analysis (OA) be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience, which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated?
Will First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, be commemorated by the AWM?
Note: These are just some of the goals set out at Part 7 of the Intro above.
———————————————————————————————————————–
25 January 2020
How Should AFVs be Displayed at the AWM? II
Following on from 22 January, support is copied below:
“To add to this proposal,
I visited the AWM in November and we had a small group visit organised at 0930 for us by a friend who happens to be a tour guide there. When we entered the “Post ’45” exhibit, there staring me in the face is one of our cars. I was asked by this friend to give our small group a brief as I could relate personal experiences and how we operated. I tried to keep it as simple and as short as possible. 30 minutes later the small group had expanded to over 60 people and questions were coming thick and fast. I was asked about my particular incident and yes Dick you are correct, it became a little emotional for me and a couple of vets families. My short brief lasted over 40 minutes . I was a tad embarrassed at the round of applause given to me. I left the building and went over to Poppy’s for a brew and was confronted by the entire patrons all asking extra questions. I managed to leave the AWN at about 1630 with a very sore arm from so many handshakes, Very moving.
So yes Bruce a great idea, people like to hear/read operational experiences not just the statistical details of the vehicle.”
I responded by saying:
“I can well imagine what you describe. I was involved with a reunion of our Portsea class and a AWM guide was leading a tour. When we got to the Vietnam Gallery and the barrel of Stan Hanuszewicz’s tank (RPG hit muzzle, bent barrel blocking the bore, Stan fired a solid shot round, blasted the end off the barrel and kept firing canister … having himself been wounded) one of the Class said that I might be able to add some info. The tour guide was really pleased as she had no idea as to the circumstances.
I’ve been involved as part of a team trying to get recognition for Operation Hammersley (decision expected soon). The tank squadron commander explained that the TF Commander who signed the Citation for 8RAR told him: “ Jack you armoured soldiers are not really brave because unlike the infantry who only show their shirtfronts to the enemy (pulls my shirt) you have armoured protection”. Jack went on to say: ‘This was the attitude prevalent. No matter how much cooperation and courage was exerted, you were NOT brave’.
This thinking is represented in some of the AWM exhibits. One states that ‘Tanks [in Vietnam] were nearly imperious to most enemy weapons’, giving the impression that crews operated inside a totally protected cocoon. I’ve pointed out that tanks were NOT imperious to: 57/75mm RCLs; RPG2/7s; HMGs; satchel charges; snipers; and mines. The thinking is entrenched, however.”
————————————————————————————————————————-
24 January 2020
The Missing Log Books
Oh no … not again, some might say.
The following post is from another site:
“Someone help me out here – 92A being recovered after sustaining mine damage ? I think this is the dozer currently
sitting outside the Off’s / Sgt’s mess at the SOA. The Cent that fired the first shot in anger in SVN. 169079 ???”
One of the reasons that I raised the matter of the Centurion log books which mysteriously went missing from the Tank Museum, is the fact that one of them is for Centurion ARN 169106. This is the RAAC’s most ‘historic’ tank; currently outside the Mess at SOA.
It was the first to fire a main armament round in action, the first to detonate an anti-tank mine and the first to be penetrated by an RPG. Each of these three actions represent events of significance in the history of the RAAC (but the primary source document is presumably in the hands of a private collector whose selfishness knows no bounds). Re the RPG penetration, if you get up on the hull, you can see where the RPG hit (and from what direction it came), initiating the Battle of Binh Ba,
Despite all this … the log book simply went ‘missing’. An extract from it is referred to in my book. Mr Cecil, who provided the info, has stated that he transcribed the entries in the log book (presumably while it was at the Tank Museum), ie. he does not have it.
All the log books for the Centurions retained at Puckapunyal were held by the Tank Museum. That for Centurion 169056, which was transferred from the SOA parade ground to the AWM, was there and the logbook went with it to the AWM. All the others, however, have just ‘disappeared’.
I was expelled from the 1AR Assn as a consequence of raising this matter. (Later readmitted as my expulsion had been invalid, but then fell foul of the same forces when other ‘mysteries’ were raised.)
———————————————————————————————————————–
23 January 2021
Vietnam Campaign Medal
I saw a T shirt the other day. It said across the front: ‘Did you forget to Google?’.
A post on another site asks: “How about someone lobbying the relevant department to have an end date on the 1960 clasp?”
Wikipedia advises that:
“The 1960– device is worn on the medal suspension ribbon and the 60– device is worn on the service ribbon of the medal and the miniature medal suspension ribbon.[b]
The unusual appearance was caused by the Republic of Vietnam government stating that the 1960– and 60– devices would show the dates of the Vietnam War from start to finish, with the ending year placed on the devices when the South Vietnamese had prevailed over the invading North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) forces. However, on 30 April 1975, the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon was captured, and South Vietnam surrendered that day to the North Vietnamese army under the orders of General Duong Van Minh, who since 28 April was the president of South Vietnam. “
This ‘theme’ continues tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 January 2020
How Should AFVs be Displayed at the AWM?
It’s easy to say how they shouldn’t be displayed, ie. as they are now with a total focus on technical specifications and no reference to the challenges faced by their crews and the bravery they displayed.
The last public consultation meeting held by the AWM was in relation to external aspects of the redevelopment. They explained that further meetings would be held in relation to the content and its display. I asked the 1AR Assn C’tee if they would like to help in developing some recommendations on how AFVs should be displayed. They explained that the Assn is “not a lobby group”.
So … consigned to developing a paper myself (with any input I can get) where do we start? As good a place as any is to consider what others have done.
The Kabinka Tank Museum, Moscow https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kubinka_Tank_Museum is solely an AFV museum. There is a valid role for this, ie. providing a means of displaying developments in technology and design. This is a separate role to that of a War Memorial, however.
The Bovington Tank Museum in the UK has a similar focus but the following quote from its website is interesting: “The creation of The Trench Experience in 1998 brought an immersive experience to the Museum displays for the first time. It has remained hugely popular with the Museum audience and was refreshed in 2016 with the Tank Men Exhibition, telling the story of the first tank crews.” This wasn’t quite what it seems, however. The stories of eight tank crewmen from WWI relate to their personal lives, not their duties (and hardships) within the tank.
Not all is lost, however, the following suggests that the role of crews within tanks is not completely forgotten: “The Tank Museum is the only place in the world you can climb inside a real First World War Mark IV tank. This First World War Tank Experience workshop includes an interactive talk on why the tank was invented, how it worked and what life was like for the crew”. What was life like for the crew? What a novel question.
The concept is one whereby the visitor gets inside a WWI tank (presumably through a ‘door’ cut into the side) and is informed via an audio-visual screen what the crew did in operating the vehicle. Getting inside AFVs is not often possible. An AV display next to (or incorporated into) an AFV exhibit is entirely feasible, however. This could include segments featuring those who actually crewed the vehicle in combat, explaining the nature of their duties and the dangers they faced.
“One Army is Army’s identity. Army traditionally described and managed its people as permanent and reserve. The changing character of the workforce has made this boundary invalid. Army is One Army, a diverse full and parttime team of teams, with one mission: to prepare land forces for war to defend Australia and its national interests.”
If this is so, if personnel are no longer managed as “permanent and reserve”, why is it that Defence continues to refer to Reserve Forces in its job advertisements? Recently the Reserve call-out provisions were highlighted in the Bushfire crisis. Can it really be said that the boundary between permanent and reserve forces is invalid?
Of course not! But this is all about semantics. Of much more relevance is the fact that published Defence strategy makes no reference to the role that Reserve forces are allotted in time of Defence emergency. Indeed, the equipment (Budget) allocated to Reserve units suggests that they have no real role at all.
As mentioned recently, the Australian Defence Association was asked what their position was as far as Reserve forces were concerned. There was no response (akin to their published information which is bare as far as Reserves are concerned).
Do Australia’s Reserve forces have a role in Australia’s defence strategy? If so, what is it and why haven’t resources been allocated accordingly?
If self-reliance is to have a place in our Defence strategy, then a whole set of Contingency plans must involve the Reserve. But what is its role (depending on Contingency): training, ARA reinforcement, capability augmentation? How are they to be used?
This is an easy matter to address in terms of professionals such as doctors and other medical personnel, logisticians etc … they can simply be posted as individuals direct to ARA units to augment capability (providing med/log units are not to be deployed). But what about others? It would seem that the same applies … an RAAC Bushmaster driver can be sent to an infantry unit in the same way that an ARES infantry rifleman can be sent to an infantry unit. An RAAC cavalry scout can be sent to an RAAC unit.
The concept of the Reserve having a unit identity is something of the past. An RAAC ARES reconnaissance regiment will have no role as a regiment, other than to send off its members to ARA infantry and RAAC units. Unit identity, morale, and geographical/historical ties are things of the past.
Why isn’t anyone being ‘upfront about’ this? If I was to ask the RAAC Corporation what the role of the RAAC Reserve would be in time of defence emergency … I wonder what the response would be? Where does the ARES fit in terms of contingency plans and what forms the rationale for their training?
———————————————————————————————————————-
20 January 2020
1AR Assn Webpage.
The Blog post on 15 January identified a number of things which were in need of ‘revision’ on the 1AR Assn website. Although I’ve had no response, it’s good to see that another was been corrected. The Vietnamese Theatre Honour had been shown as “Vietnam 1968-1972”. It’s good to see that this has been amended to “Vietnam 1968-1971” (reason previously explained). Disappointingly, there has been no change re the others points as yet.
A few days ago, thinking that I was doing the ‘right thing’, I informed the 1AR Assn C’tee of the passing of Geoff Cooper (Coops). I had learnt of this from Facebook. I had assumed that the C’tee would want to include his name on Vale section of the webpage. It seems that they don’t (or if they do, they haven’t as yet). Maybe Coops wasn’t a member? But surely, they can’t only list Assn members on the Vale page. How cold-hearted would that be?
When I last looked … there were 311 condolences messages on Coops’s FB page.
Given that the lack of response re 1AR Assn Webpage, I’ve posted the following on the Armoured Corps FB page:
“Coops passed away unexpectedly last Thursday (16 Jan):
RELATIVES and FRIENDS of Mr Geoffrey Vincent COOPER “Coops” are respectfully advised that his funeral service will be conducted entirely in the Christian Family Centre, 185 Frederick Road, Seaton on FRIDAY January 24, 2020 commencing at 1:00 p.m. A viewing for Coops will be held in the Tony Monte Funeral Chapel, 1 Webb Street, Port Adelaide on THURSDAY January 23 2020, commencing at 6:00 pm-7:00 p.m. Last I looked, there were 311 condolence messages on his FB page.
Coops posting (below) “Harry wish John all the best please” in relation to John Carter on 14 Jan is typical of him … always thinking of others.”
Postscript. The following is a posts from Coops on the 1 Armd Regt FB page a couple of days before he passed away (referring to the Regiment’s efforts in supporting the pople of Kangaroo Island after the bushfires): “Lesley Geoffrey CooperIn early 75 we as B Sqn had a fire on the range, I was the Boss’s Driver then, and I was asked if I could go to the old Range Camp and drive the fire truck 🚒 was there for a week, with B Sqn fellas helping me. Hard times but it was something we had to do. That’s why we’ve got total respects for Volunteer Fire Crews, Emergency Services and supports, and ALL ADF people involved on the scene and behind the scene as well mate”.
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 January 2020
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the ADF of the Future
The following is an extract from an article by Michael Shoebridge, Director of the Defence, Strategy and National Security Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
“Technological change is redefining warfare by the attributes of speed, autonomy and precision. Dispersal and rapid reconstitution of combat losses will be required for the future ADF to thrive in such an environment. Speed will be essential not just for weapon systems (for example, hypersonics) but also for command, control and decision-making.
But speed and hierarchies don’t coexist easily or naturally. Hierarchies, by their nature, involve delayed decision-making and sequential decision-making at multiple levels—and they’re the enemies of speed of response. So the organisational structures and processes in ships, squadrons, platoons, brigades and joint taskforce headquarters, across the Defence organisation, in every part of Russell Offices, and right across the lake into the cabinet room will need to change to be fit for future conflict. It will be a wrenching and threatening package of reform and change, as disruptive to current military hierarchy and structures as Amazon has been to the retail industry.
For AI to take back the time advantage from adversaries using high-speed precision weapons, it will need to find its way into the ADF’s existing systems and platforms soon—well before the first new frigate or submarine gets wet.”
Juxtaposed to this is the following extract from an article last week by Hugh White, Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.
“But we cannot use such allies as a basis for our strategic posture and force planning. That is why I argue that we should plan to defend Australia alone. This might come as a surprise in view of the much-hyped network of defence partnerships we have built up over the past few decades. Don’t all these partners count as allies?
Well, yes, if we mean that we might cooperate diplomatically to try to resist China’s influence. But that kind of thing doesn’t count when we’re talking about military strategy and force structure. What matters then is whether we can rely on others to fight to help us defend our territory or vital interests.
The only kind of alliance that counts for defence policy is one expressing clear undertakings to fight under certain circumstances. Strictly speaking, we have only two military alliances with neighbours. One is with New Zealand under ANZUS, and the other is with Papua New Guinea under the 1987 joint declaration of principles. The Five Power Defence Arrangements pact doesn’t count because it commits us to help defend Malaysia and Singapore but doesn’t commit them to help us.”
So, where do our priorities for our Defence lie? Is it a focus on self-reliance or a scramble to acquire the next generation Defence capability?
Interestingly, Michael Shoebridge ends his article with the following summary:
“It’s great to muse about the wonders of Australia’s $200 billion ‘future force’, but our time would be much better spent on the urgent new work and thinking required to make our existing force effective in the environment it will face in the early and mid-2020s. (My emphasis.)
That means loving the force you have—acting now to develop the concepts for use of AI across the ADF, and investing to retrofit the systems and platforms that will remain in service for decades.”
‘Armouredadvocates’ asks, as it has repeatedly, when will ‘right sizing’ the Abrams tank fleet become part of the plan to defend ‘Australia alone’?
————————————————————————————————————————–
18 January 2020
Personal Ethics
Following on from yesterday … the ‘topics’ are well and truly linked.
The post below is one from the 1AR Assn Past & Present FB page, a site that I’m banned from. Mr Soutar states that I’m a “sad bully”. He further claims that this proves that “the Assn is moving with the times and puts all members first”. (It’s interesting that the FB site would allow such personal criticism, as it’s against all guidelines designed to prevent personal slander, and the consequences.)
I assume that Mr Soutar feels that I shouldn’t have shown my Life Membership cancellation letter on my Blog and that I shouldn’t have asked to see a copy of the proposal for this at the AGM or a copy of the Minutes of the AGM. Are either of these requests undemocratic or in breach of ethics? Am I not entitled to inform others of what happens to me? Am I not allowed to ask to see copies of the‘instruments’ that have affected me?
Not to be outdone, Mr Antulov tells me to “F..O. . onto obscurity!”. This motion is supported by Mr Hawkeye. I’m sure that both gentlemen have valid reasons for making these suggestions. Interestingly, Mr Antulov also declares that I’m “self-serving!”.
So, where does all this leave us? Seems to me there operates a paradigm of fear within the 1AR Assn and associated FB ‘clubs’. Those who wish to stay within the circle of brethren, acquiesce to whatever the power brokers demand.
Will this last? I don’t believe so. Society is changing. There are those who now expect that their superannuation funds will be invested in sustainable industries … so too will members of associations someday expect that matters of governance will be open and transparent.
The above images may not allow easy reading. If this is so … so be it. The think the content says more about the commenters, than it does about me.
———————————————————————————————————————-
17 September 2020
Honesty and Truthfulness: Do These Values Still Exist?
The following ‘case study’ is a true story:
You work with someone over a long time, believing that you have developed trust between one another.
One person’s ‘boss’, however, takes a dislike to his employee’s friend; he tells his employee not to have anything more to do with this person. The employee is working on a project to which his friend could add considerable stakeholder value.
He doesn’t confide in his friend as to the actual circumstances, instead he tells him that he’s involved in a “secret project that he’s not even allowed to tell his work colleagues about”.
The project turns out to be a book, it hadn’t been a secret at all. Stakeholders in the topic were disadvantaged by virtue of the errors that could have been corrected if the manuscript had been worked on in a collaborative manner.
So, what should happen?
Should the friend be offended because he wasn’t trusted enough to be confided in? Should he be offended because the history involving stakeholders was much less valuable than it could otherwise have been? Should he be offended because he’d been lied to?
… or should he understand that his former friend valued his employer (and job) to the extent that he told complete lies to him?
…. or should he just accept things for what they are, i.e. all things in life are deceitful, untrustworthy, and without honour?
I, for one, will not accept that such a thing as that immediately above is true. I will always work to do the ‘right thing’. What else is there to hope for?
What would I have done if I was in my ‘friend’s’ place? I would have undoubtedly been conflicted, but to what degree and how would I have resolved the situation?
I would not have lied. I don’t believe that there is any justification for this. If I had to, I would’ve said that “I’m not allowed to tell you what I’m working on”. Which would be true. But it draws attention to the employer. Not to do this, might have been another stipulation.
Would it have been possible for him to say, “I can’t give you any acknowledgement in the work I’m involved with, would you be prepared to assist me on this basis?” I would have unequivocally said ‘yes’ (because it is the stakeholders who are important, not those whose names are ‘Acknowledged’.).
Conclusion. The real ‘nigger in the woodpile’ (sorry) here is the employee’s ‘Boss’. He has threatened his employee (who obviously wishes to keep his job) to the total disregard of all stakeholder value …putting his personal feelings above those of the stakeholders he is supposed to represent.
Nevertheless … someone who lies to his friend, has to expect that that friendship will be jeopardised.
Of course, all the above might be absolute BS … the person concerned might simply not have wanted anything more to do his ‘friend’ and decided to ‘ditch’ him accordingly.
————————————————————————————————————————
16 January 2020
RAAC History
The photo below appeared on another website with the caption:
“Weapon handling drills on the Model 1919 Browning A4 Medium Machine Gun; Armoured Vehicle Fighting School – Puckapunyal Nov 1942”.
Given that Centurion didn’t start being equipped with the Browning until 1956 (replacing the BESA 7.92mm mg with the Browning was the main criteria which distinguished the Mk5 from the Mk3) … why would members of the recently ‘gazetted’ Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) be trained on the Browning in 1942?
The answer lies with December 1941: Pearl Harbour.
The Japanese attack stimulated America to send ship loads of M3 Lights (General Stuarts) and M3 Mediums (General Grants and General Less) to Australia.
Hence the need to train crews on the Browning. This is part of the reason that I find history fascinating … the stories ‘within stories’.
Note: There was no accreditation accompanying the photo as to where it came from.
———————————————————————————————————————-
15 January 2020.
1AR Assn and the History of 1 Armd Regt.
I offered the following information to the 1AR Assn C’tee recently:
Re the website … it’s good to see that the ‘History’ has been updated (as I suggested); but I should mention that “re rolled”, should be ‘reroled’ (the two have very different meanings).
I note that the last image on the 1AR Assn Home Page shows the Theatre Honour as “Vietnam 1968-1972”. It should, of course, be “Vietnam 1968 -1971”. (My troop was the last in-country, I have a ‘vested interest’.) I’ve attached a letter from the then Minister who approved this change (as well as the emblazoning of ‘Coral-Balmoral’.) Hope you don’t mind such ‘feedback’ … it’s all intended as part of a process of continual improvement.
The History on the Home Page states that the Regiment operated “Centurion Mk5s”. In fact, the first Cents were Mk 3, these were converted to the Mk 5 (by replacing the BESA with the Browning); the tanks were then converted to Mark 5/1 (by adding applique armour) prior to Vietnam. Maybe it would be best to just to say “Centurion tanks”.
The ‘History’ itself states that there were three tank troops when C Sqn arrived at Coral on 23 May 1968. As you would know, C Sqn at the time was a half squadron with two troops and SHQ. 3 Troop was not formed (from SHQ tanks) until 2 June 1968 (see p212 COF).
Every word in the “Commander’s Diaries” was written by me. I copied each entry from the diaries in the AWM by hand and ‘translated’ them to make them ‘readable’, eg. I replaced grid references with locations that had meaning when reading an entry; I also modified the diary entries to allow them to flow in a narrative style from one day to the next. I informed the 1AR Assn of this some time ago. I was concerned that someone may think that the ‘Commanders’ Diaries’ were an actual copy of the Diaries themselves. My email was overlooked, however, as was my request that there might be an acknowledgement of my work in making the ‘Diaries’ available to Members. I believe that the following by-line is appropriate (and necessary for the legal protection of the Assn): ‘An interpretation of the Diaries by Bruce Cameron’.
You might like to know that 1 Armd Pegt have recently put up a post on their FB page, explaining that a contingent has deployed to Kangaroo Island in support of the ARES force which has been mobilised. The video from 9 Brigade below, explains the role of those from 1AR (at the end). https://www.facebook.com/9BdeAusArmy/videos/2196176187343924/
While I haven’t had any response from the C’tee, I’m pleased to report that as a result of all my suggestions above, the short history on the Home Page (point #1 above) was been reworded to state: “In 2014, the Regiment’s role changed to …”.
It’s little by little that big change is brought about ….
————————————————————————————————————————–
14 January 2019
ADF Force Structure
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) reported in October 2019 that a new Strategic Review was being conducted:
“Defence’s worst kept secret is now officially public. Defence Minister Linda Reynolds stated at last week’s Sea Power conference in Sydney that the Defence Department is conducting a strategic review. It may not be a white paper per se, but it involves ‘working through a re-assessment of the strategic underpinnings of the 2016 Defence White Paper’ with the outcomes to be considered by government early next year.
The work is necessary because ‘the world itself has changed more quickly than we assessed in 2016 and so too [have] the consequential challenges’. The minister is not alone in reaching this conclusion. The strategic policy community is virtually unanimous in this view, although it’s divided over what to do about it. Admitting that we underestimated the speed of China’s rise is nothing new, although it’s perhaps surprising that this time around it has only taken three years for our analysis of China to be overtaken by events.”
What will this mean for the ADF’s force structure and what will be announced in the coming months (if the stated timetable is to be believed)?
According to Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, Hugh White: “the most prudent basis for Australia’s defence policy today, is to plan and build the forces required to defend the continent independently from a major power like China”.
If this was to happen, what would it mean for our warning times, our lead times, our force structure, our contingency plans, the status and role of our reserve forces? Would the Plan Beersheba force readiness cycle remain or be replaced by a different ‘construct’ for the Army? Would there be sufficient emphasis for the Abrams fleet to be ‘right sized’ by the additional 90 tanks needed (… despite the views of Sean Benporath; see Blog for 3 January 2020)?
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 January 2020
My Membership of the 1AR Assn
The Blog on 9 January was about ‘Openness and Transparency’, pointing out that this is the whole reason for the Blog to exist: “An Ideas Space to Advance RAAC Issues”. The unstated part of the by-line is ‘in an open and transparent manner’.
Some managers don’t like openness and transparency. They prefer a culture of so called ‘loyalty’. This means that no matter how much a ‘member’ raises concerns about regulatory breaches and how much their entreaties for improvements are ignored, if the situation is made public, then they are disloyal and can no longer remain part of the organisation.
It is the organisation itself which is important, not those managing it at any particular time. As previously reported, I recently made the following offer to the President (hoping for an outcome for the good of the 1AR Assn):
“This email could be my Blog post for 19 December, however, I’ve an alternative proposal that you might like to consider. If you are prepared to accept the worth of what I’ve stated below and readmit me to m’ship (but not Life M’ship), I will delete Parts 1-6 of my Blog Introduction drawing attention to the failings of previous C’tees. I would also hope that the C’tee might agree to consider proposals for the benefit of the Regiment and the Assn from me as a member (as it would from any other member). Finally, I would like to place the following statement on my Blog (if you agree):
“Following discussions with the President 1 AR Assn, the Assn has been accepted that previous actions on my part were made in the best interests of the 1AR Assn and the Regiment. My membership has been renewed and any suggestions that I might have for the betterment of the Assn and its members will be welcomed.”
I haven’t had a response.
A member of the 1AR Assn recently received a request for m’ship fees. He asked the C’tee what the situation was regarding my membership. Part of what he was told was:
“The [Management C’tee] meeting voted that Bruce Cameron be provided with a confidential ‘show cause’ as to why his membership of the Association should be renewed.”
“Over a period of three (3) or four (4) weeks Bruce published the reasons why the Management Committee believed he should show cause. Bruce also published his answers to the issues (14) raised by the Management Committee.”
“Accusations have been made that the whole process was a sham …”.
There are three points here:
The attachment to my letter which listed the reasons for which I needed to justify my actions was headed “Personnel-in-Confidence”. This to me says that it is MY privacy that’s being protected. It would seem, however, that it’s actually the privacy of the C’tee that was being sought to be protected (see below).
I published (on the Blog) “the reasons why the Management Committee believed [I] should show cause” and my “answers”. Surely this is my right? If a person who is charged with something is denied the right to make known the offence and his response, we’re living in a non-democratic society. (Maybe this is the situation the C’tee prefers?)
“The whole process was a sham”. This is news to me. I’ve not called it a ‘sham’. I’ve simply stated what happened. It seems that others have claimed that what happened was in breach of ‘due process’. I wonder why?
———————————————————————————————————————–
12 January 2020
UPDATE: Extension of Eligibility for the Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The story so far: The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) held a Hearing to consider the submission that supporting arms should be awarded the CGWP Unit Citation. They ruled that the Citation was for the whole period of 8RAR’s tour in Vietnam, not just Hammersley. If, however, it could be shown that supporting arms were important to the success of 8RAR in all these operations, the matter could be further considered.
Both the ‘Applicant’ and Defence were asked to respond; Defence also being asked to provide relevant documents. A detailed operation by operation analysis was provided by the Applicant, proving how critical supporting arms were. Defence responded to say that supporting arms were not part of 8RAR and therefore shouldn’t be considered. They said that they were having trouble finding relevant documents.
DHAAT said that they’d had enough, they were proceeding to a decision. Defence found more documentation and the Applicant was asked to comment.
Note: The ‘Applicant’ represents: OC and 2IC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, Tp Ldr B Sqn 3 Cav involved in Hammersley and RAACA WA, 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and 1 Fd Sqn (RAE) Assn. [RAAC Corp and 1AR Assn declined to participate.]
Parts of what amounts to a ‘fourth’ submission are copied below:
“In summary … the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to units that performed to the same standard as that required for individuals to be awarded the Cross of Gallantry, ie. displaying particular gallantry in the face of the enemy. This criterion is fundamental and should be maintained.
The United States Govt has stated that the Defence Order (DAGO 8) made for the Citation to be awarded to all US servicemen, does not apply to personnel from other Armies. Previous awards made to Australian Units on the basis of DAGO 8 have resulted from an acceptance of direct command linkages to the US MACV.
There is no justification for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation to be awarded generally to Australian servicemen for simply serving in Vietnam. Why Defence should be pursuing this, contrary to the position of the US Govt, is a mystery.
8RAR was awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Tanks, APCs and field engineers were under operational control of 8RAR throughout the period for which their successes were so recognised. It follows that these supporting arms should be recognised with the same award.
This action is not recommended on the basis of precedent alone, however. The continual gallantry displayed by members of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE, has been detailed in the submissions provided to DHAAT. The efforts of all involved contributed greatly to the operational successes which led to 8RAR’s Citation.
This was reflected in the wording of the RVN Citation when it refers to “the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force”. This continues the acknowledgement of the combined arms nature of operations by the Vietnamese Commanding General when he sent his compliments to the “8RAR Group” for the success achieved during Operation Hammersley. As detailed previously, the Commander 1ATF defined the 8RAR Group as comprising 8RAR, A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE.”
Defence has previously stated that supporting arms are not eligible for the award because they were commanded by 1ATF and “force assigned” to 8RAR. It must be realised that ALL units and sub-units that were part of 1 ATF, including 8RAR, were commanded by 1 ATF (specifically, the Task Force Commander). Furthermore, ALL units (including 8RAR) and sub-units were “force assigned” as combined arms teams as operations required.
The RVN CGWP Unit Citation is an award made in recognition of gallantry displayed in contact with the enemy. The gallantry of members of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE in supporting 8RAR deserves to be recognised in exactly the same way as the gallantry of 8RAR itself.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
11 January 2020
Helping Those Affected by the Bushfires
The RAAC ‘family’ has an enormous network. If there are any Black Hats affected by the fires, this network can do much to help them.
It’s not beyond the realm of possibility that there is someone out there who has been impacted in some way. One of our number lost everything in the 2013 Tasmanian fires. There’s a lot of good that the wider RAAC ‘family’ can bring to bear.
RAACA NSW report that none of their members have been impacted. I’ve asked the 1AR Assn if any of their members are affected, but haven’t had a response. Presumably all are ok, but it does seem surprising that they haven’t checked with members.
One would’ve thought that the each ESO would feed into a wider network linked with DVA to ensure veterans were able to be helped by their comrades-in-arms.
Peter Toohey is at Pamula and reports on the 3 Cav Site that they are ok (just). I’m in touch with Nobby Clark at Merimbula and, while they’re packed and ready to go, they’re not threatened at the moment.
The network for the C Sqn 1 Armd Regt (1971) 50th Reunion numbers 66. Tony Dennis, at Jamieson, has reported that they’re ok. Brad Golding is SW of Port Macquarie, they’ve got their fingers crossed.
The PM has been widely criticised for not leading from the front, but are ‘others’ also guilty?
Emails to Secretary 1AR (which have gone without response):
#1 Dear Secretary,
Any news of 1 AR Assn members or other RAAC personnel having been affected by the Bushfires?
I’m sure that the ‘RAAC Family’ network could band together to help if needed.
#2 Any response would be appreciated. There is someone in NSW who could be in need of assistance, is the 1AR Assn ‘network’ available to assist?
1st Armoured Regiment Responds!
I was informed today that 1AR are involved in the relief effort. They have recently put up a post on their FB page, explaining that a contingent has deployed to Kangaroo Island in support of the ARES force which has been mobilised. The video from 9 Brigade below, explains the role of those from 1AR (at the end).
Following on from 7 January 2020 … a post from the past:
“Without breaking the contact of secrecy imposed on me, I have responded to the insults from ‘official’ sources which describe me as a self-centred person who does everything in order to claim glory and receive public fanfare.
The following additional insult was not subject to ‘Confidentiality’:
“Your claims on Social Media are deliberately calculated to cause irreparable damage, to the RAAC Corporation in general but also in particular the 1st Armoured Regiment and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association”.
The ‘social media’ referred to was, in fact, my blog. I stated that it was “time to start the process [of achieving approval to extend eligibility to the RVN CGWP Unit Citation] over again. Sadly, neither the RAAC Corporation nor the 1 AR Assn has opted to pursue this issue.”
I was referring to the fact that sixteen months after the Corporation wrote to Defence, no (apparent) progress has been made. Should something have been discussed at the RAAC Corporation AGMs, that is a ‘secret’ denied to members of the 1AR Assn. (Mr Fenton, the 1AR Assn Rep, continues to prevent 1AR Assn members seeing the Minutes, or even doing them the courtesy of providing a report). I used the word “pursue” in the context of ‘continue with’.
I had had a response to my second submission to the Minister seven months previously (copied to HoC) and it seemed to me that the time had come to respond to the false arguments continuing to be put forward by Defence.
The RAAC Corporation submission was long overdue for a response …if one was ever going to be made. (The Corporation admit to not having any idea as to why they have not received a response after sixteen months.)
Have I attempted to do irreparable damage to the RAAC Corporation, 1 Armd Regt, and the 1 AR Assn? No. Have I attempted to hold the RAAC Corporation to account? Yes.
Have I attempted to have those RAAC and RAE veterans of Hammersley recognised for their service and sacrifice? Yes. Have I urged priority for this to be done before those veterans’ ranks dwindle further? Yes.
An update re the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) consideration to morrow.
———————————————————————————————————————–
9 January 2020
Openness and Transparency: Operation Hammersley
I feel guilty of not concentrating on the ‘positive’. But there is so much of the ‘negative’ which needs to be made known. As the saying goes … “sunlight is the best form of disinfectant (or antiseptic)”.
Following on from 7 January …
I’m not sure if I posted this previously, or if it’s something which has just been ‘hovering’ in the background:
The email from a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board advised that he understood that I had uncovered new information throwing doubt on the validity of 8RAR’s award (correct, as explained in previous Blog posts) he said that if I was to make this publicly available it could ‘upset’ the RAAC Corporation’s submission.
But the timing of the RAAC Corporation’s submission was such that Defence Honours and Awards would have been aware of the arguments it advocated, when advising the Minister not to give approval. Not to proceed would mean supporting the RAAC Corporation’s submission predicated on the basis of information known to be incorrect.
Surely the Corporation would accept my offer to review my new research and amend their submission accordingly?
Sadly, they didn’t. Instead there was an attempt to intimidate me as per the earlier blog.
When I raised issues concerning the governance of the 1AR Assn and the closure of the members’ blog (see top of this Blog) someone said, “Why don’t you start up your own website?”. So I did.
But if I hadn’t, there would be no means of responding to either the intimidation or the insults! No means of making known publicly what was going on. Thank heavens for the person who said: “Why don’t you …”.
———————————————————————————————————————–
8 January 2020
Operational Analysis
“Events created a desperate need for such a vehicle. Tragedies in Iraq and Afghanistan showed the vulnerability of troops, even the most capable special forces, when operating soft-skinned vehicles against insurgents with the technical know-how to build IEDs and the tactical skill to employ them well.
There was nothing else readily available on the world market. US troops in Iraq were welding additional steel plates onto their own poorly protected vehicles.
The Bushmaster’s capability wasn’t fully appreciated until it was in action and by then it was seen to be a defining reason why so many Australian soldiers survived IED blasts while British and American lives were lost.
After bombings in Afghanistan, troops sent back technical reports and ‘tiger teams’ of engineers and scientists were sent to the war zone to examine the damage and to find ways to strengthen the vehicle. The manufacturer, Thales, was able to improve Bushmasters on the production line and in the operational area.
A cheaper, off-the-shelf vehicle from overseas would not have given Australia the flexibility to adapt to changing enemy tactics in Afghanistan. Indeed, the way industry, the army, Defence scientists and others worked so quickly and effectively together to harden the Bushmaster against ever more devastating IEDs is a model of the ‘fundamental input to capability’ idea that promotes innovative work between Defence and industry.
Ultimately, the Bushmaster proved itself a lifesaver in combat and vindicated those who had faith in it.”
Following on from 6 January, Operational Analysis seems to be ‘in play’ in the Army (at least) today. Please the Heavens above that that this is the case!
————————————————————————————————————————
7 January 2020
‘Contracts’ of Silence
This is a compilation of blog posts from 2017:
“We are alike in some aspects but opposites in others. The main difference is that you are an “I or Me” person (as displayed in everything you write); whereby I am and have always been an “Us or We” person and rarely use the I or me. I do not believe that will ever change.”
The email I received which referred to me as being one of those in the undesirable ‘I’ category (as compared to the sender who saw himself in a more flattering ‘We’ category) showed that assessing people on such a basis is fraught with difficulty. In his email, which highlighted his own achievements, the author used the terms ‘I, me or my’ twenty times, while ‘we, us’ our’ did not appear at all.
Unfortunately, it’s happened before. Before insulting you, someone tells you that ’this is not for copying, in whole or part, to anyone else’. It’s been said that “people with heightened concerns about their privacy may use contracts of silence more aggressively”. Seems to me that there is a fundamental flaw in the concept of assuming that you can say whatever you like about another person, while at the same time telling them that it’s “confidential and must go no further”.
If I’m told that something is ‘confidential’ and is not to be shared, then my personal integrity tells me that this is what should happen. But does this caveat extend to personal insults delivered under the same banner? Why would a person be concerned that his or her insults to another might become known to others? One reason I can see is that of intimidation, ie. a person wishes to intimidate another, without anyone else knowing. Another reason might be that the person making the insults is concerned about a backlash from others who hold different views and so wishes to deliver his/her insults on the ‘qt’.
There will be occasions when one wishes to communicate privately with another person. For my part, however, I would never insult someone and expect him/her to regard this as ‘confidential’.
Seems to me that if one person is going to insult another, that this should be something able to be placed on the public record. To expect a person not to divulge insults levied against them, by imposing a rule of confidentiality, is not (to me at least) an ethical thing to do.
As a result of recent matters, I find that I’ve had enough of trying to please all the people all the time.
From now on, I’m going to use ‘I, me, or my’ and be proud to do so. Management Principles 101 can take a back seat!
PS. In terms of an ‘update’, I’ve been told very forcibly that “I wasn’t there, I don’t hold a representative position”… so what am I doing initiating a submission to have eligibility for the RVN CGWP extended to the tank and APC crews and sappers who supported 8RAR on all their operations? I would’ve thought that the answer is obvious. But who am I to comment?
——————————————————————————————————————
6 January 2020
Continual Improvement: Is it a Forlorn Hope?
“Dear Editor,
The present bush fire scenario has underscored the importance of comprehensive co-ordination and oversight. The scale and disparate nature of requirements are immense, from pre-positioned generators, to well-located and resourced evacuation centres, to traffic management plans, to availability of effective face masks etc.
There are many lessons to be learnt from the current situation and responses to it. I heard one account on the radio of an evacuation centre located at the top of a flight of twenty-five steps. There was a lift, but the power was out, hence those who were disabled could not gain access.
The lessons here are obvious. But how is Emergency Management Australia ‘harvesting’ them?
The traditional approach is to wait until the ‘crisis’ is over and then prepare a report. This is pretty much the way the Australian Army operated in Vietnam. To be truly effective, however, such operational analysis must occur in real time, with feedback enabling failures to be immediately corrected and successes reinforced. While it is essential that a detailed report inform subsequent contingency plans, so too must there be feedback and continual improvement as things are actually happening.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
5 January 2020
Compassion in all its Ugly Forms
The following was a Blog post from some years ago (originally titled: ‘The Law and its Implications’). It was presented as a ‘case study’.
Scenario: A retired RAAC person is walking along a designated walking track in an ACT Nature Reserve. He falls and breaks his neck and both he and his wife have considerable on-going medical and associated expenses. The person who fell had been his wife’s carer; he is able to have his medical costs covered by DVA, his wife; however, is left without resources to meet her on-going care needs.
I suggested that there might be grounds for a case being made against the ACT Govt on the grounds of the track having been poorly maintained. I further suggested it could be worthwhile taking a photograph of the place the incident occurred and seeking legal advice.
The response provided by our ‘RAAC Family’ representative was:
“Hitting the system in relation to a bung walking track/footpath is not a lay down misere. There have been similar cases initiated in the ACT Supreme Court related to footpath damage where the Court has held that it is the responsibility of the walker ( a reverse duty of care) to take all reasonable care to ensure they avoid surfaces which may of themselves cause a person to fall. That precedent has been applied successfully by the ACT Govt in defending claims of tort in this area.
The administering Department will not attend to repair broken footpaths unless members of the public ring up Canberra Connect up and report it. Their path inspection teams are almost non-existent.
The common law doctrine of precedent would in my personal opinion, operate against [the NOK] and that could well mean not only her own barristers’ fees/witness and expert fees, but costs awarded against her in the event of an unsuccessful common law action.
He walked it quite a bit and his fitness level was good. Ergo he would have had a very good and reasonable knowledge of the state of the track and would be aware of any pitfalls thereon during his walks.
Common dog for any walker is to suss out the ground – tankies may not be familiar with the term “ground appreciation”…Cav are.
I am a very avid walker and walk hither and yon as well as running. I do the Mt Majura West side walk – as rugged as you can get and bloody tough and I have to ensure I have good ground appreciation including on sealed and cracked walking tracks, around town.
It shits me to tears that society is always laying blame at some other entity’s feet. Put bluntly, society has abrogated its sense of common dog and responsibility in taking accountability”.
I tried to think of a suitable postscript, but words failed me!
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 January 2020
(Photo: Black Berets FB page)
PAYING COMPLIMENTS
When you pass by the Australian Army’s Colours, Guidons and Standard what do you do? If you’re a serving member in uniform, this should be obvious (but maybe not, even for the Chief of Army?). If you’re an ex-serviceman, or a civilian who’s never served, what should you do?
As a result of seeing this, I emailed the RSM-A as below. To his credit he replied soon after.
Dear RSM-A,
I am a retired member of the RAAC. Following the Binh Ba Commemoration yesterday, some questions of protocol have arisen in the context of veterans attending such ceremonies and wishing to pay respect in accord with appropriate procedures.
When a gentleman wearing civilian clothes and a hat, passes Colours/Guidons etc, he removes his hat and does an eyes left/right.
But what happens when the retired person is wearing their old unit beret (probably also wearing medals)?
Should he (i) remove his beret and do an eyes left/right; (ii) keep beret on and salute with eyes left/right; or keep beret on and simply do an eyes left/right.
Supplementary question is: what should such a person do when the national anthem is played: (i) stand, keep beret on and salute; (ii) stand and remove beret; or (iii) just stand.
Your help in answering these questions would be much appreciated.
It is recognised that former service personnel are not subject to the dress/ceremonial manual stipulations, but, even so, most would like to be able to do what is considered the ‘right thing’.
Response from RSM-A:
“Dear Bruce, Thank you for your email. You are correct, gentlemen wearing civilian attire with hats on, are to remove their hats when passing Guidons and Colours and look to their left or right.
In regards to wearing berets in civilian attire and paying respect to guidons/colours, I’m more than comfortable with those veterans turning their head and eyes to the left or right.
Regards to the national anthem … leave berets on and sing loudly. At the end of the day it’s all about showing respect.”
Interestingly, a response from someone who has seen service in several operational theatres (Vietnam and earlier) was:
“I would strongly argue that if you are wearing your old Regiment’s head attire with badge etc and as an individual walking past ANY regimental colours, you would salute. I would!
In my view , you are in spirit, still very much of the military and the head wear reflects your past, your beliefs, your traditions, your total respect and the way you in which you were trained. To remove is as you pass by to me is surrendering all of the above.
If you are in command of a veteran group passing the colours, you would give an eyes right/left and salute FOR the column you lead. Thus, the remainder, hat or no hat, as in military style would comply with an order for eyes right. The same rules would apply on the playing of the national anthem. Without military hat, civilian headwear removed on all such examples above.
Mate, I have never read of any rules for such circumstances but I can categorically state without hesitation, if I was in that situation, then be it right or wrong in the eyes of the rule makers, I would do it as above.
The ‘Official’ view (many thanks to the RSM-A!) is clear and it is to be hoped that all involved in the Hammersley Ceremony 18 February will be briefed accordingly (by the RSM Ceremonial perhaps?).
———————————————————————————————————————–
3 January 2020
Yesterday’s Blog was posted (by the Webmaster) on the FB page from which the quote at the top of it was taken. There were 37 ‘likes’ and 28 Comments.
The lone comment that stands out as being different to all the others, is copied below
“Sean Benporath This opinion shows a lack of strategic vision and situational awareness of Defence priorities. It overestimates the influence of advocacy from non-defence groups and organisations and does not represent any official opinions. Understanding Army’s priorities for modernisation and how single issue zealots can undermine a unified message in a finite resource environment is a good beginning for anyone wishing to influence outcomes. A lack of situational awareness is as deadly to a project as it is to soldiers in combat. It is not as simple as saying we need 90 gun tanks, we speak in capability terms to define a need, that need may be able to be achieved through multiple technologies, not just a tank. Leave the capability arguments to the professionals who are looking to the left and right to ensure our troops have what they need, when they need it.”
I looked up Mr Benporath on Google. It seems that he works at Defence HQ Canberra. I couldn’t find anything which gives him qualifications to accuse me of being a “single issue zealot” or having “a lack of situational awareness”. (I acknowledge that, like everybody, he has the ‘right’ to say whatever he likes about me, providing it is not defamatory.)
He states that the post did not represent any official opinions. How can this be when I provided a link to a paper by the RAAC Head of Corps. An extract is copied below:
“Fleet size underwrites all of these issues. When balanced against the remit of Army’s training requirements, the small M1 fleet size results in the vast majority of vehicles committed to training and few held in reserve to enable rotation for repairs, maintenance or upgrades. This means vehicles remain in service, or are pressed back into service prematurely, with outstanding repairs or maintenance tasks or simply becoming unserviceable and therefore unavailable.
This in turn subtracts from the fleet size, leading to an even smaller number of vehicles absorbing a greater rate of effort burden to meet the training requirement, and wearing out faster or breaking down more often as a result. This cause and effect interplay creates a cycle which leads inexorably to deterioration of the tank capability.”
Increased public debate is exactly what is needed to draw attention to the capability gap that presently exists. If Mr Benporath wishes to debate the position that he is one of the (self-proclaimed) “professionals who are looking to the left and right to ensure our troops have what they need, when they need it” , and I do not act in the best interests of soldiers … then bring it on!
———————————————————————————————————————–
2 January 2020
Happy New Year to all!. Sympathy to all readers and their families who might have been affected by the fires.
Photo: Australian Defence Magazine
What’s Wrong With the Australian Army’s Tank Fleet?
A post from an RAAC FB page:
“Back in the early 70s I was about twelve living at Bandiana. A family friend and I were walking and he said see all those [Centurion] tanks there is nothing wrong with them … someone wanted a new toy … he was a RAEME Col. I am sure he was not really talking to me but showing his disgust.”
The opinion expressed by the senior officer was obviously one which influenced the prevailing view as to whether or not there was a need to replace the Centurion.
I was asked by a serving general (I’ve forgotten what position he held, but he seemed like God at the time) visiting Puckapunyal in 1972 … whether the Centurion was a ‘good tank’. I was in my third year as a Centurion troop leader (converting to conventional warfare from counter-insurgency).
I replied to say that it was a good tank when it was going, but the time the crew spent servicing and maintaining it was completely out of proportion to the time they were able to spend operating it. In essence, it had ceased to be reliable and, therefore, was no longer effective.
This wasn’t just a matter of throwing more RAEME resources at maintaining it, spare parts supply was in all sorts of difficulties. (In 1968 Australia purchased seven centurions from NZ to meet a critical shortage of spare parts.)
Sure, the Israelis replaced the engines and gearboxes of their Centurions and upgraded the fire control system, but would this work for Australia?
The Australian tank fleet comprised 132 gun tanks (including fifteen purchased from British Army stocks in HK in 1971 to enable operational capability to be maintained.) The Israeli Army had a much larger tank fleet than Australia. The cost of conversion could be amortised accordingly. Every tank in Australia’s fleet was critical to training and operational effectiveness. BUT … some said, why do we need tanks at all? (This, despite the fact that Vietnam had just proved once again, that tanks help win battles and saves lives in doing so.)
So, finally, after the arguments for and against, there was agreement to replace the Centurion. Instead of acquiring 132 Leopards, the RAAC was restricted to 90 gun tanks. The Leopard served for 30 years, being replaced in 2007 by the US M1A1 Abrams. How many new gun tanks were acquired? Ninety? Just 59!
This was the bare minimum to maintain training levels with a single armoured regiment in which all squadrons were co-located. Of course, that situation no longer exists. We now have three squadrons based in three very different locations. Apart from anything else, a single repair pool is unable to maintain operational effectiveness. Army has called for years, for Australia’s tank fleet to be ‘right sized’, ie. increased to 90 gun tanks.
What reasons are given for the lack of action? Tanks aren’t suited for operations overseas where stability operations might need to be conducted. What about New Guinea, Vietnam, Afghanistan? Tanks can’t be transported. What about the RAAF Globemaster and the RAN capabilities and commercial shipping assets as were used during Vietnam?
There is an obvious capability gap in terms of the Australian Army’s readiness levels. I guess it all comes down to the views of some people that tanks are just big boy’s “toys”; an operational capability that it is not really important … until it’s needed.
Wouldn’t it be good if the RAAC Corporation and the 1 AR Assn helped create public awareness of the pressing need to ‘right size’ the tank fleet (as has been called for by the Head of Corps)? Sadly, neither organisation consider themselves to be ‘lobby’ groups, despite claiming to promote the best interests to the RAAC in the activities they organise. Simply highlighting the HOC paper would be worthwhile, as done by the RAACA (NSW Branch) recently. (https://www.australiandefence.com.au/land/fighting-to-win-the-importance-of-the-tank-to-the-adf-in-the-21st-century)
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 December 2019
1 AR Assn : My Membership
The proposal was made to the current President on 19 December (see Blog below). There was no response. Why might this be? Who is it that should be declared a winner here?
The only winner worth ‘hailing’ is the 1AR Assn. Unfortunately, I don’t think that either the recent past, nor current, C’tees see things in these terms (with some exceptions).
It is obvious that we have a number of ‘power brokers’ in our midst. The 2017 1AR Assn AGM was a testimony to this. Power brokers think only of themselves (whether in politics or any other form of social function).
Only by publicly highlighting the shortcoming of those managing the Assn (most probably through negligence of the regulations, as well through deliberate intent) has change been able to be brought about. The current C’tee have introduced many of the changes which have been campaigned for (eg. Minutes of C’tee meetings being provided to members; a valid Constitution being approved and made available for members to see on the Website, a funeral drape being made available for those who might wish to use it, changes being made to the oversight of C’tee adherence to regulations governing Associations,, etc).
So, the 1AR Assn is a much better assn today (in terms of the way in which it functions to meet the expectations of its members, than it was before attention was drawn to the problems that had existed).
Should my role and that of those who supported me (and vice versa), be acknowledged? It would seem not. There is no preparedness to enter into any sort of dialogue on the behalf of the President (presumably with the support of his C’tee). But why should there be? All C’tee positions are occupied by volunteers who willingly give up their time to do so. But is this all there is to it?
What about someone who spends twelve years writing the history of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam and donates all royalties to the 1AR Assn? Should his contribution in this way and further suggestions in terms of the legal obligations of the C’tee, not be acknowledged?
It would seem not. But progress is a step by step process. If one has as their aim the betterment of the 1AR Assn and its contribution to 1 Armd Regt, then we can’t go wrong.
This will be Armouredadvocates’ last post until 2 Jan 20 when I come back to earth.
Best wishes to all readers and please keep the faith through the coming year. The things that have been achieved have only been done so because of your support.
Bruce
———————————————————————————————————————-
20 December 2019
Operation Hammersley: Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Citation Awarded to 8RAR.
A Directions Hearing held by the DHAAT yesterday, augers well for our case!
The Hearing was called by the Tribunal because they were frustrated by Defence’s delays in responding to their requests for information and documentation.
The Tribunal was aware that Defence were considering whether or not all Army units that served in Vietnam should be eligible for the award of the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. The Citation has been extended to RAAF and RAN units that served in Vietnam on the basis of the US Army Directive which made all units that operated in Vietnam under MACV eligible (the RAN and RAAF having supposedly found justification for their units’ status directly under MACV, rather than 1ATF).
The Tribunal had asked Defence if the sub-units that supported 8RAR could be recognised with the award on this basis. (This was the subject of the Appeal before the Tribunal).
Defence said that they couldn’t comment because they were still developing a position to be put to the CDF. (This is why the RAAC Corporation say that their submission is still under consideration by Defence.)
The Tribunal asked questions as to how Army had decided that, while 1RAR was eligible (as part of 173rd Airborne), other Army units were not. Tribunal members were quite scathing when Defence said that no documents existed. These ‘discussions’ went on for some 20-30 mins, with Defence stonewalling.
Finally, the Tribunal said that it was too late, they (the Tribunal) were going to proceed to a decision without waiting for Defence. The point was made that it was unfair to the Applicant, to do otherwise.
That might have been it and I could have left it unsaid, but I didn’t.
I asked to speak and said that in my opinion one of the reasons that Army would not have wanted to make all units eligible for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was that, because of the much greater strength, relative to RAN and RAAF, in Vietnam, the quota for Imperial awards was quickly exhausted. 1 ATF Commanders, therefore, proposed individuals for the award of the RVN CGWP (various levels) in recognition of their gallantry.
To make this award available to everyone who served in Vietnam (ie. to declare everyone performed acts of gallantry deserving of the GCWP), would diminish the significance of these awards made to individuals. If the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was to be made available to all members of all units simply on the basis of having served, an Australian equivalent award would have to be made to ensure that the gallantry of individual recipients continued to be appropriately recognised.
This was something that I genuinely believed HAD to be said.
The Answer (from yesterday)? There wasn’t one. Why am I not surprised? Explanation tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
19 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IID (My Life Membership)
The email below is self-explanatory:
“Dear President,
I’ve copied below my Blog posts for 15-16 December and those proposed for 17-18 December. They are self-explanatory.
This email could be my Blog post for 19 December, however, I’ve an alternative proposal that you might like to consider.
If you are prepared to accept the worth of what I’ve stated below and readmit me to m’ship (but not Life M’ship), I will delete Parts 1-6 of my Blog Introduction drawing attention to the failings of previous C’tees. I would also hope that the C’tee might agree to consider proposals for the benefit of the Regiment and the Assn from me as a member (as it would from any other member).
Finally, I would like to place the following statement on my Blog (if you agree):
‘Following discussions with the President 1 AR Assn, the Assn has been accepted that previous actions on my part were made in the best interests of the 1AR Assn and the Regiment. My membership has been renewed and any suggestions that I might have for the betterment of the Assn and its members will be welcomed’.
Best wishes, Bruce”
Tomorrow: The Response.
———————————————————————————————————————————————
18 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IIC (My Life Membership)
Following on from yesterday …
Which of my actions might be considered prejudicial to the Association?
I drew attention to incidents in which the then C’tee had lied to members. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to incidents in which the then C’tee made fraudulent declarations on behalf of members. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to false allegations made by the then C’tee against members. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I decided to seek neither an apology nor damages from the then C’tee (so as not cause divisiveness) for harm to my reputation … despite a legal ruling (initiated by the then C’tee) that I was entitled to do so. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I contributed many hours in helping to draft the present Constitution. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to considerable irregularities that occurred in the conduct of the 2017 AGM. Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I drew attention to “One of the amendments [to the Constitution] inserted by the then C’tee [which] was that which stated that just because you served in 1 Armd Regt, this no longer made you eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. Previously you were automatically eligible and would only cease to be a member if you were to be in breach of disciplinary provisions. Overnight, the C’tee gave itself the power of veto on their own terms. Now, if you apply to join (or renew your membership) and the C’tee does not consider you ‘suitable’, then your application is not approved. There is no definition as what “suitable” means in the eyes of the C’tee.” There is no requirement for members to be informed.Is this conduct prejudicial to the Assn or the opposite?
I contacted the C’tee to seek action to correct the matters above. Only when this was rejected, did I draw wider attention to them (for the good of the Assn).
The list could be extended considerably. Suffice to say … which of my actions specifically, does the present C’tee consider to be prejudicial to the Assn?
STOP PRESS: Re the notification to a person applying or reapplying for membership to be informed on why they were considered unsuitable, this has been changed. The Constitution states that
“The Management Committee must notify the applicant in writing of its decision including any reasons for rejection as soon as practicable after the decision is made.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
17 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IIB (My Life Membership)
Following on from yesterday …
Why was my Life membership not confirmed?
The reason given was that “I did not meet a number of the life-membership criteria particularly: a. demonstrating a lack of commitment to the Association, b. demonstrating a lack of loyalty to the Association and the Regiment, c. displaying personal behaviour that demonstrates a lack of respect for the Regiment, the Association, for members of the Regiment and for all members of the Association, and d. behaving in a manner that brought the Association into disrepute”.
So, what are the Life Membership criteria?
The Constitution states:
Life membership (1) Life membership of the Association may be awarded in a manner approved by the Management Committee to any ordinary member, affiliate member [refer rule 27 (4)] or associate [refer to rule 28 (4)] who has made a significant contribution to the Association. (2) The Management Committee has the discretion absolutely to approve or refuse a nomination for life membership of the Association. (3) Life members will be bound by all laws, Rules and By-laws of this Constitution.
So, the ‘only’ ‘criteria’ is to make a significant contribution to the Assn. This, of course, is why I was made a Life Member.
So, I must have breached a Law, Rule, or By-law. But there aren’t any Laws or By-laws.
So, I must have breached a Rule. But there are no Rules requiring that a member be committed to the Assn, nor to be loyal to the Assn or Regiment; nor to behave in a manner which demonstrates respect for the Regiment, the Assn, members of the Regiment and members of the Assn. (Maybe there should be?)
Rule 86c states that one of the grounds for taking disciplinary action against a member is if he “engaged in conduct prejudicial to the Association”.
Tomorrow: Which of my actions might considered prejudicial to the Association?
———————————————————————————————————————-
16 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications IIA (My Life Membership)
Following on from yesterday….
I wonder why the President declined to forward to me the proposal raised at the AGM with respect to confirmation of my Life membership?
Answer: because there wasn’t one; other than “The Secretary (Russ James) moved that the Life Membership for Bruce Cameron, MC conferred previously by the Association be confirmed by this AGM. Seconded by Gerry Germaine”.
What else might have been expected? Well, for as start, why not read out the reasons that I was awarded Life Membership?
One might be excused from thinking that the reason is obvious. However, why not be honest, rather than go through with such a sham?
The motion was moved and seconded by people who didn’t support it. Is this a ‘proper’ proposal, or simply a matter of going through the motions?
But wait … my membership application was refused because I was not a fit and proper person. If I can’t be an ordinary member, how could I possibly a Life Member?
Not one of those attending (list below) was prepared to say anything on my behalf. I wonder whether or not this says more about me … or them?
Beasley Mitch 2. Branagan, OAM Peter 3. Brooker, OAM John 4. Bruce Craig 5. Coutts, CSM Peter 6. Duncombe Peter 7. Forrester John 8. Frost Gary 9. Germaine Gerry 10. James Russ 11. Key David 12. Laurie Ian 13. Lukeis Peter 14. Martin Dean 15. Meloncelli Keith 16. Payne Mick 17. Quentin Paul 18. Reid Mark 19. Reynolds Iain 20. Semmens Jim 21. Smith Ian (Icky) 22. Tarran Bruce 23. Unmack Graeme 24. Watt Matthew 25. Watts Trevor 26. Wood Ray
————————————————————————————————————————
15 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications II (My Life Membership)
Following on from the 9 December blog….
Minutes of 1 AR Assn AGM (12 Oct 19)
“Minute 17 of 2019/20 – The Secretary (Russ James) moved that the Life Membership for Bruce Cameron, MC conferred previously by the Association be confirmed by this AGM. Seconded by Gerry Germaine. The President (Keith Meloncelli) asked those present to speak either for or against the proposal. A number of members spoke against the proposal and the general consensus was that Bruce Cameron, MC did not meet a number of the life-membership criteria particularly: a. demonstrating a lack of commitment to the Association, b. demonstrating a lack of loyalty to the Association and the Regiment, c. displaying personal behaviour that demonstrates a lack of respect for the Regiment, the Association, for members of the Regiment and for all members of the Association, and d. behaving in a manner that brought the Association into disrepute.
On completion of the comments, the President (Keith Meloncelli) again asked if anyone wished to speak on behalf of the original proposal. After a period of silence, the President (Keith Meloncelli) asked for a show of hands for those who supported the proposal. There was no support for the proposal. The President (Keith Meloncelli) then asked for a show of hands for those who did not support the proposal. The result was unanimous, and the proposal was not carried. The Secretary (Russ James) declared that the proposal for the confirmation of life membership for Bruce Cameron was not carried. The decision was unanimous. “
Email to President, 1AR Assn (17 Oct 19)
“Mr Meloncelli, Thank you for your letter [advising that my Life membership has not been confirmed]. Can I please see the proposal for the confirmation of my Life Membership? Many thanks, Bruce Cameron”.
The response? There was none!
More to follow tomorrow ….
————————————————————————————————————————-
14 December 2019
Operation Hammersley Commemoration
Arrangements for the above, on 18 February 2020, are set out at:
Information about such events must be both accurate and timely. There is a difference between:
“All VIPs, Official Guests and veterans, will be seated in a large marquee on the scoria median strip in front of the Memorial proper for the duration of the ceremony and may be accompanied by their spouse/partner/carer. In addition to the veterans attending, it is anticipated that widows and family members of deceased (post-Vietnam) veterans of the battles will also attend the Service”, and
‘The event is open to the public’.
The former implies that attendance at the National Commemoration Ceremony is limited to Veterans of the Operation, their NOK and partner/carer. But this is not so … everyone is eligible to attend (and as DVA state… seating is on the basis of first come, first served). It is only the Reception afterwards which is restricted as above.
I believe that it shouldn’t be me saying this, but those involved in the organisation (who it seems to me are doing a great job, but sometimes fall down on keeping everyone informed IMHO). There is little time left for those who might like to plan a family trip or a club outing to coincide with the National Commemoration.
“Wreath and Poppy Ceremony AWM Hall of Memory
This ceremony will be conducted at 9am prior to the National Commemoration by the AWM for RAAC members of both Squadrons who took part in Operation Hammersley, particularly Barry Whiston and Hugh Carlyle who were KIA during the battle on 18 Feb 70. (Congratulations to the RAAC Corporation for organising this.)
I previously posted …”I wonder what role A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and B Sqn 3/4 Cav will play in the above. Hopefully, the current OCs might lay a wreath with veterans (possibly their counterparts as OC, or 2IC, from A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt from 1970).”
I now understand that NO serving members of either squadron are to be involved in laying wreaths at the AWM. Hopefully this will not also be the case at the National Commemoration itself. But why not involve them at the AWM?
———————————————————————————————————————–
Stewardship of 1AR Heritage III.
Email from me (23 Nov 19):
“I see that Assn reps gave a presentation to 1 Armd Regt re Op Hammersley. Is there any chance that the presentation transcript could be placed on the 1 AR Assn website for the benefit of all who served?”
Minutes of the 1AR C’tee Meeting on 3 Dec 19:
“Request for OP Hammersley Presentation to 1 AR Transcript – Item 41/19 – the Secretary (Russ James) advised that a request had been received from a member for a copy of the transcript of the Op Hammersley presentation to the Regiment on 23 November 2019. The Secretary explained that the presentation was made by Peter Rosemond CSC OAM and John Brooker OAM in their capacity as members of A Sqn at the time of the Operation. The material used, primarily PowerPoint slides, was prepared by themselves and considered to be copyright. There was no transcript, as such recorded on the day of the presentation. It was agreed that the Presentation would not be provided to any person and nor would it be published on the Association web site. The President is to prepare a note of thanks to the members which is to be published in the next Newsletter”.
Crikey! … ‘copyright’ means that a presentation by two of those who participated in an Operation can’t be made available to members of their own Assn or anyone else who might be interested.
Now I would have thought that the complete opposite would be the case … all information should be made available as to what happened, out of respect for those whose sacrifices brought about the outcome. How heartless can we get? ‘Copyright’ surely NOT! Maybe there is something to hide? Otherwise, surely they would welcome comment from those on whose behalf they spoke!
Before my book was published … I made every endeavor to ensure that anyone who who could add value or correct anything which was incorrect, was able to do so. How is it so …. for anyone to give a presentation re events in February 1970, but deny those who were not present to see the transcript?
—————————————————————————————————————————
12 December 2019
Stewardship of 1AR Heritage II.
The email below is self-explanatory:
Dear Secretary
You recently sent the message below to members of the 1AR Assn.
It must be pointed out that A Sqn 1 Armd Regt did NOT serve in Vietnam in 1971.
Furthermore, the tank squadron that Baden served with was C Sqn (apart from two weeks with A Sqn). It is to C Sqn that he refers in his interview.
I ask that you send an email to all members of the Assn to apologise [for overlooking C Sqn in this regard].
How is it that the 1 AR Assn could get this so wrong? Baden is not talking about 3 Troop A Sqn … he’s talking about 3 Troop C Sqn (Tp Ldr, the late Warren Hind; operator callsign 3: the late Phil Barwick)
Bruce Cameron
I know that the 1AR Assn is trying to do the right thing, but all they have to do, to avoid such ‘errors’ and consequent anguish to those involved, is to consult with others who served at the time; not to consult (and take a ‘we know all’ attitude) is an insult to those who were impacted by the events concerned.
PS. Why do I continue to ‘engage’ with the 1 AR Assn I’ve been asked. The answer: The heritage of the Regiment has a value far greater than any personal relationship … some members of the Assn C’tee might not be on my Christmas card list, but that is no reason not to advise them of things which impact on the accuracy of heritage matters. Only if the heritage is accurate will respect have meaning.
Members of A Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment who served in South Vietnam during the 1970/71 period will be particularly interested in the Youtube clip produced by the VVAA (WA Branch Inc) with Baden Jeffrey (Philanthropic Representative – Salvation Army) talking about his experiences with A Squadron with whom he served from 3 December 1970 to 20 September 1971.
Please click on the following link (url):
Russ James
Secretary
1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc
——————————————————————————————————————–
11 December 2019
Stewardship of 1AR Heritage.
Dear President (email, 9 Dec 19)
I was interested to read the management C’tee Minutes of 3 Dec 19:
“C Sqn 1AR Vehicle Naming Initiative – Item 33/19 – the President (Mel Meloncelli) advised that the naming of the vehicles was very well accepted and there was only one small problem with the spelling of a name. The Calliss and Clugston families attended and were very well looked after by C Squadron. Members of the Crowe family were unable to attend due to prior commitments and Mick Rainey is not well enough to travel.”
It seems that the Assn has taken note of the information provided below (though whether or not an AFV is to be named ‘Cannibal’ in recognition of Coral-Balmoral action, is unknown; as is any attempt to contact the Carra family).
It’s disappointing that you declined respond to me (and others) to acknowledge the information provided to you.
Bruce Cameron
—————————————————————
“Dear President (email, 17 Nov 19)
Not having had an answer, and given that the Regt is undoubtedly fully occupied with Cambrai Day preparations, I wish to advise (with regard to the above) that:
The correct spelling of the late Nev Calliss’s surname is not Callis;
Mick Rainey’s tank at Coral was not named Cannibal, nor was any other tank at this time; and
Apart from Nev Calliss, Ambrose Crowe and David Carra are both deceased.
I understand that no permission was sought from those (or the NOK of those) whose tank or surnames names were listed, to use them as intended. This would seem to have been an oversight (for obvious reasons).
The 1AR Assn might consider contacting those concerned, on behalf of 1 Armd Regt, to gain permission. I’m sure that the opportunity to give it will be an honour to them all.
In closing, may I say what a great initiative it was by the Regt to name C Sqn AFVs in this way. I think I can speak on behalf of 1 Armd Regt Vietnam veterans in giving it their wholehearted support, together with their willingness to ensure that the basis on which the commemoration is made is an accurate one.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron”
————————————————————————————————————————-
10 December 2019
This is the post that went ‘missing’ from 7 December below (heaven knows why)
Operation Hammersley Commemoration/Citation
The following email is self-explanatory. I haven’t had a response (and didn’t expect one), but I’ll always try to do the right thing.
Dear President, 1 AR Assn,
Prior to the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal (DHAAT) Hearing into the extension of eligibility to supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley, for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR, I asked if the Assn might seek personal accounts from members of a Sqn at the time to support the submission. You declined.
As you know, the outcome of the Hearing was that the Tribunal was compelled, because of a technicality associated with the foreign award, to deem that the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation was awarded, not just for Operation Hammersley, but for all operations that 8RAR participated in during 1970. If it could shown, however, that A Sqn 1 Armd, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn provided significant support to 8RAR for these operations, and displayed gallantry in doing so, then the matter of extending eligibility would be reconsidered. Both ‘sides’ were tasked to provide a further report on this basis.
I previously asked you if the Assn might support this second submission, but received no response. The submission is to be posted off on 16 December (to meet the DHAAT deadline).
There is still time for personal accounts to be provided to support this submission. I trust that the 1AR Assn will do the right thing on behalf of its members who were part of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt in 1970 and those serving in A Sqn today and in the future. (A personal account received recently adds considerably to the value of the submission.)
Interestingly, the 1 AR Assn website states that “8 RAR and 161 Battery RNZA were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm, Unit Citation” for their participation in Operation Hammersley..
I’ve added the following comment:
“On 29 October 2019, the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal deemed that 8RAR were awarded the CGWP Unit Citation, not for Operation Hammersley, but for its whole tour in Vietnam. It is recorded in the Official History that 161 Bty RNZA were awarded the RVN Presidential Unit Citation for its six years in Vietnam, not the CGWP for Operation Hammersley.”
Why is it that those representing others don’t combine to achieve the best possible outcomes? Well you may ask … it might all come down to who it is that consider themselves to be anointed ‘representatives’ and seek to banish all others. But is this the be all and end all?
——————————————————————————————————————–
9 December 2019
RAAC Related Communications
I’d previously posted info on the 3 and 4 Cav Regts’ Assn website (I was a member of the Assn, having served in 4 Cav Regt) … re the possible award of the Unit Citation. The post was immediately removed (for ”political” reasons) and my membership was cancelled. The 3/4 Cav Regt Assn is a member of the RAAC Corporation … (say no more)!
The following was posted on the SOA FB page on 7 December 2019:
“Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation (B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt)
A Hearing was conducted by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal on 29 October 2019 to consider an appeal for eligibility of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR in 1970, to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
The outcome of the Hearing was that the Tribunal was compelled, because of a technicality associated with the foreign award, to deem that the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation was awarded, not just for Operation Hammersley, but for the whole period of 8RAR’s tour in Vietnam.
If it could shown, however, that A Sqn 1 Armd, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn RAE provided significant support to 8RAR during this time, then the matter of extending eligibility would be reconsidered.
To meet the deadline set by the Tribunal, the submission to this end will be submitted on 16 December 2019. The outcome will be advised.”
Maybe it will be ‘approved’ for the site, maybe it will be ‘deleted’.
Postscript: It hasn’t been deleted. There is a side bar for ‘Visitor Posts’ and there it sits. Well at least those in B Sqn 3/4 Cav know what is happening in terms of their ‘heritage’ (if not members of the 3&4 Cav Regts’ Assn). Thank you SOA FB page moderator.
————————————————————————————————————————–
8 December 2019 (7 December, see 10 December)
Further Update on 2 Cav Badge
Getting to the truth of things is never easy. Just when we thought that everything was lined up, new information emerges:
There are references which state that the badge came first, then the mascot:
“As a result of the selection of the eagle for a badge, and after viewing a documentary film dealing with wedge tailed eagles, members of the unit decided an eagle as a mascot was a sensible idea. The members of the unit petitioned the 2IC (Captain A.J. Hull) to make a representation to the Wild Life Division of the CSIRO to obtain an eagle as a mascot. A series of letters were exchanged until 26 October 1967 when a suitable eaglet was located.”
Added to this is the story regarding the competition and the Orderly Room Cpl.
The then Tpr Burgess was the 2 Cav Regt orderly room clerk in 1966, his boss in the orderly room at that time was Cpl Bill Burton (later Major Burton OAM). When Bill left in late 66 on posting to Armd Centre, Burgess was subsequently promoted as his replacement. Burton didn’t see the badge during his time at Holsworthy and didn’t hear of the competition until after he had left.
Tpr Darlington was at 2 Cav from Nov 67 to May 68. He wasn’t aware of the competition and didn’t see the badge during his time there.
There are also conflicting memories of others there at the time:
“The badge came to 2Cav very early 68. I was posted to 3Cav Jan 68 I saw blokes with the new badge on. I went to the Q store and asked the Cpl behind the counter if I could have one NO was the reply you are now 3Cav. I said come on I was one off the original members of 2Cav and would like one as a keepsake. The answer was NO.”
“I returned from SVN 3 Cav in late Oct 68 and was posted to A Sqn.2 Cav. I stayed with them for over 6 months and was reposted back to B Sqn 3 Cav (Holsworthy). I was never issued the now 2 Cav badge. We wore the Corps badge. “
So, there are reports that the badge was issued in early 1967; in early 1968; and later than March 1969. The only things we know for sure is that the Queen gave her approval on 2 Dec 68 and this was conveyed to the Australian Army on 4 April 1969. (Also … following numerous personal attestations, we also that it was NOT issued in’ early 1967’.)
On 25 Mar 69, Defence wrote to the GG’s Office asking why they hadn’t heard anything in relation to their request for approval of the badge. The GG’s Office responded on 4 Apr 69 to explain that they had previously written giving the Queen’s approval. The concern by Defence can be appreciated when considerations were underway for the formal creation of 2 Cav Regt in 1970.
I’m sure all will come out in the wash (as they say).
I made the following comment, but there has been no response as yet:
“Hi Nick,
Great article. Congrats on all you’ve achieved in grasping the opportunities presented.
I wonder, does JTW have any focus at all on armour support?
As was found in New Guinea and Vietnam, the jungle offers opportunities for an enemy to construct defensive positions which can only be successfully attacked with direct fire support provided by armour.
Best wishes, Bruce
Update on 2 Cav Badge
Following on from yesterday … it’s been established that Glenn Darlington’s painting of the very new 2 Cav mascot, was the inspiration for the 2 Cav Regt badge.
The 2 Cav Regt Assn has been in touch with Glenn. They have a C’tee meeting coming up in February and options as to how best to take the matter forward to the Regiment will be discussed. Glenn has offered to do a ‘significant’ painting, based on his original work and to present this to the Regiment. A recent example of his work below shows that he is quite a dab hand as an artist.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
5 December 2019
Why it is That we Can’t Believe Everything We’re Told or Read (II)
Following on from yesterday … re the 2 Cav Regt Badge (see post for 29 Nov 19 below)
The story presented was that Glenn Darlington, while at 2 Cav Regt (waiting to go to Vietnam) during Nov 67 – May 68, did a painting of the newly arrived mascot, Tpr Courage. When he was posted out, he gave the picture to the Orderly Room clerk to hang in the Orderly Room. A competition was subsequently held for the design of a unit badge. This was won by the newly promoted Orderly Room Cpl. The design of the badge happens to be almost identical to Glenn’s painting.
So, Glenn’s painting couldn’t have been the genesis of the design for the badge.
BUT, the references above are wrong.
A search of the Australian archives reveals that the design of the badge was sent to HM The Queen for approval on 25 Nov 68. This was granted on 2 Dec 68.
So, it could not have been before ‘early in 1969’ that the badge was issued; furthermore, Glenn Darlington is very likely to have been the inspiration for its design. (Maybe it was just a typo, ie. a 7 for a 9 … but even so, the consequences can be significant.)
————————————————————————————————————————
4 December 2019
Why it is That we Can’t Believe Everything We’re Told or Read
When I was writing my book, I was staggered at the number of errors that were included in publications. Because this information was ‘published’, it was deemed to be true.
How did I respond to this with my book? I was fortunate that the 1 AR Assn allowed a ‘Living History’ page to be included on its website, so that anyone who read the book and could add new info or correct mistakes, had the opportunity to do so. This could be printed out as an ‘Erratum’ and also included if a second edition was to be printed. [There have been a number of print runs, but no second edition as yet.]
While researching my book, I found that those I interviewed fell into three categories:
Those who told the truth;
Those who didn’t tell the truth, but thought that they were (which is readily understandable);
And those who weren’t telling the truth, and knew that they weren’t.
Fortunately, those in the last category were far and away the minority. They did what they did for a number of reasons:
(i) To promote their own standing;
(ii) For purposes of establishing circumstances by which they could fraudulently claim benefits; and
(iii) For revenge, ie. to get back at someone against whom, they hold a grudge.
I’ve just been made aware of another example of (i) and maybe also (ii). (Note: This does not relate to any ‘ANZMI type’ offence.)
Why mention it? Just to reinforce the Topic heading.
———————————————————————————————————————–
3 December 2019
The Hammersley Round 2 Submission.
Following on from yesterday …. the input to the submission provided by the 1 Fd Sqn Assn:
How Were They Gallant?
The motto of 1 Fd Sqn in Vietnam was ‘Follow the Sapper’. Sappers worked in front of the infantry and the armour to find and deal with mines, explosives, trip wires, caches, and booby traps … using their eyes, bayonets and electronic detectors. Sappers did not get the opportunity to look for enemy soldiers who might be looking for them. They had to concentrate on the ‘ping’ from their mine-detector or see that tiny sign or that scratch in the dirt that shouldn’t be there. Sappers relied on their mates coming behind to look after their backs. It took a special kind of gallantry to work like that, but it was taken for granted because it was a Sapper’s job.
Sappers went down holes in the ground. Tunnels and bunkers where the risk of impalement, being shot while deep underground in inky blackness or being asphyxiated in the depths of a shaft, drive or sap came at a premium in nightmarish circumstances. But they did it anyway. That takes a special kind of gallantry that is impossible to describe. Sappers defused bombs, explosive devices and mines. Some of these were fitted with anti-handling devices or demonish ‘double-bluff’ devices that were designed to kill them. Sappers knew this, but pressed on anyway. That was a Sapper’s job – and it took a special kind of gallantry. Sappers must also be prepared at all times to function in their secondary role, to fight as infantrymen in attacks, ambushes, and defended localities.
Is it right therefore, that an infantry unit be recognised for its gallantry, when the AFV crews and sappers who continually supported it during combined arms operations, are not?
—————————————————————————————————————————-
2 December 2019
The Hammersley Round 2 Submission.
If anyone can add to this please do. (The 1 Fd Sqn Assn has provided an equivalent explanation for sappers.)
How Were They Gallant?
Any AFV driver who sets out on an operation, knowing that he might detonate an anti-tank mine which could totally destroy his vehicle … is gallant, ie. he is doing his assigned task without having any control over the events that might occur. This is similar to the infantryman who moves forward, despite the possibility of stepping on a mine or being shot by the enemy.
Any AFV crewman who sets out on an operation, knowing that his vehicle might detonate a mine, be penetrated by an RPG, or be the target of a sniper or satchel charge, is gallant. This is similar to an infantryman who knows that he might enter an ambush at any time.
Any crewman who is part of an AFV ambush at night, without any night vision devices or other means of detecting the enemy’s approach, and without any means of stopping their vehicle emitting fuel smells and making sounds when metal parts cool, is gallant. This is a little different to an infantryman, who has a well proven ground hugging procedure for the same thing.
It’s been often said, that infantry felt that they were lucky if they were well away from AFVs, because the AFVs drew the enemy’s fire. It follows that AFV crews were particularly gallant when they led assaults on enemy defended positions … given that they were vulnerable to mines, anti-armour projectiles, snipers, satchel charges and even small arms fire (as they weren’t able to close down).
In addition to the above, AFVs provided the core of ready reaction forces. On call out, everything was subordinate to getting to the infantry as quickly as possible. It was a common tactic of the enemy to lure reaction forces onto a mine or into an ambush. AFV crewmen were gallant in putting these thoughts out of their minds as they rushed to their destination in order to save lives.
It must be noted re the above, that (i) AFV crewmen were both members of the RAAC and the RAEME and (ii) tank and APC troops were always accompanied by sappers whenever and wherever they went. How were sappers gallant in their own way?
———————————————————————————————————————————–
1 December 2019
The AWM Reconstruction: Public Consultation
An outline of the most recent consultation and that coming up was given on 28 November.
I doubt that there will be many who respond to my appeal for “wide consultation as to how armour related exhibits should be displayed within the AWM (with a view to providing such advice to the AWM Development Team)”. The aim being to influence the manner in which armoured corps stories are portrayed for future generations. I had initially grouped the light horse with the armoured corps … but the thought has just struck me, there is a very active LH Assn. I’m sure that they would welcome such an opportunity and I will get in touch with them.
The leaves the AAC and RAAC exhibits. I guess I’ll be left as the one to progress the submission to the AWM. Why not? I could offer a few reasons, but leaving that aside … what’s the plan?
As I see it … a draft submission is prepared and circulated among as many stakeholders as possible. Once input has been received, it is submitted to the AWM.
In terms of content, the main focus, again as I see it, is to move away from the technical specifications of AFVs as the be-all and end-all in terms of exhibits, to a means by which the challenges faced by those crewing the vehicles are explained, ie. why it is that they were so brave to do what they did.
The AWM Vietnam Gallery currently states, for example, that the Centurion was “nearly imperious to most enemy weapons”. This gives the impression that crews operated inside a protected cocoon with minimal risk. Of course, tanks (and APCs) and their crews were vulnerable to mines, anti-armour weapons, satchel charges, snipers, shrapnel and even small arms (given that it was not possible to ‘close down’). I believe that the information provided by AWM exhibits should include, for example, the number of AFVs penetrated by anti-armour weapons and destroyed by mines; and the number of crew casualties (possibly as a percentage of those who served).
Work in progress ….
———————————————————————————————————————-
30 November 2019
Operation Hammersley Submission II
(See numerous earlier Blog posts)
The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) has advised that 19 December is the date by which both parties (ie, Defence and ourselves) have to submit evidence to show whether or not supporting arms contributed to 8RAR’s operations throughout its tour of duty.
The Tribunal has also advised that there has been no decision as yet as to whether or not a second Hearing will be held (or if they’ll decide the matter based on the submissions etc).
The Tribunal’s deadline is encouraging, as we’ve been emphasing the National Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary on 18 Feb 20 and asking for a decision by that time.
So … it would seem that it all turns on our submission to the DHAAT and our response to Defence’s submission. As previously mentioned, … if anyone has a first-hand account in terms of supporting 8RAR during 1970 … please let me know.
PS. I say it all ‘turns on’ … hopefully this is correct as we have a rock-solid case, but just maybe there are other ‘factors’ involved. I won’t say more … but when a Citation proposal lists among a unit’s number of enemy casualties, those which can be attributed to supporting arms; but fails to include as part of its ‘own casualty’ number, those suffered by supporting arms ….
———————————————————————————————————————–
29 November 2019
The Story Behind the 2 Cavalry Regiment Badge
Glenn Darlington, an ‘8th Intake Nasho’ was posted to A Sqn 2 Cav in November 1967. His departure to Vietnam with 1 Armd Regt had been delayed a few months after an accident on the assault course at Canungra. A fractured patella resulted in a cast from hip to ankle and light duties meant that he had spare time in the 4Troop lines, near where the newly arrived mascot, a wedge tailed eagle named ‘Trooper Courage’, was kept.
An advertising artist in civvy life, he had the chance to paint a small picture of Courage… in descending flight carrying a lance and trailing the red and white fluted Cavalry lance pennant. [“It was painted in acrylic on board and about the size of foolscap (A4) and in landscape format”.]
Before leaving for South Head Personnel Depot for departure to SVN, he emptied his locker, and, on checking out from 2 Cav, gave the painting to the Orderly Room Clerk with the suggestion that it might look good on the wall, should the Orderly Room get it framed.
During 1968-1969, he served in Vietnam as a crew member on a Centurion tank. Some years after returning to Australia, still working in advertising, he saw a photograph of 2 Cav Regt on parade at Victoria Barracks, Sydney. The first thing he noticed was that their beret badge was “remarkably and substantially similar to my painting of Trooper Courage”.
Thirty years later, he came across a story which stated that a competition had been held within 2 Cav Regiment (after he had left) for the design of a unit badge. It was won by the orderly room corporal. The story went on to say that not long after, 2 Cav received its new badge … a wedge tailed eagle swooping, carrying a lance bearing the motto “Courage” in its talons.
This led to a search for the person to whom he had given his painting. “I tried locating him but could not find him. I tried Army archives but could only find correspondence sent to the Buckingham Palace for royal assent of the badge.” Resigned to things being what they were, he noted that it “was ironic that my in my civilian business I represented the copyright and design rights for Walt Disney, Lucas Film, 20th Century Fox, Warner Bros, DC Comics, Universal Studios, and Tribune Media”. On a positive note: “I’m now painting again after fifty years.
The last was an opportunity not to be missed … could you possibly paint something similar to that which you did over 50 years ago, I asked?
The response: “I belted this off a moment ago. It’s rough but it’s the components of the painting that I remember painting. Blue sky and Trooper Courage more in a descending dive
————————————————————————————————————————
28 November 2019
The AWM Reconstruction: Public Consultation
The following email to the AWM explains …
“I’ve just come from the Consultation session at the AWM. Congratulations on conducting it and for planning many more.
May I offer as suggestion. The info I received from the AWM stated that this consultation was about “the design plans for the memorial’s development project”.
When I got there, I learned that this consultation session related to the EPBC Act (I didn’t even know what EPBC stood for). To their credit, those involved did their best to answer the questions (only one of which related to EPBC).
My interest was related to the content of the planned content of the Galleries. I was informed that there will be another round of consultations related to this.
Could the AWM please be more specific in its promotional material, as to what consultation sessions are intended to address?
PS. I sent an email to you advising the nature of my interest in attending the consultation session, but didn’t receive any response.”
Having said the above, it was worthwhile attending the session. My question related to the normal expectation that you start with the exhibits and then design a building to facilitate their display … yet the consultation sessions re the galleries were still to be held? Someone else queried the same thing, from the Defence families’ viewpoint, ie. why is it that you’ve decided on the design of the building, but there hasn’t been any consultation as to how we might like to see the stories portrayed?
The answer was that the displays will never be a fixture, but will evolve and be renewed over time. The building ‘envelope’, however, will have to serve the AWM for the next 75 years.
So … if I had any involvement in stewardship matters, I’d be initiating consultation with veterans and serving members to develop an outline as to see if any have ideas as to how armour related exhibits should be displayed within the AWM (with a view to providing such advice to the AWM Development Team). The 1 AR Assn have washed their hands of any such involvement … saying that they “are not a lobby organisation!”. I wonder if the RAACA might take up such a challenge with the aim of influencing the manner in which armoured corps stories are portrayed for future generations?
PS. The speaker immediately before me said the she had just passed the tank outside on the way to the meeting and displaying such weapons of war had no place in the things that the AWM stood for. It was caused quite a surprise when I said that I was the commander of tank in Vietnam when its driver was wounded in action … making the point (tactfully) that things have different meanings to different people.
———————————————————————————————————–
27 November 2019
Our Hallowed Ground
The Director of the AWM, Dr Brendon Nelson, recently participated in (and might even have instigated) this production: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMxsogy
I suggested to him, that like his excellent description of the Hall of Memory, I’m sure that focusing attention on the Stone of Remembrance in such a way … would be a service to the Nation.
The reason for this was that it was my belief “that the one of the most hallowed places in the AWM is not fully understood for what it represents”.
Some time ago I’d sent the information (copied below) about the Stone of Remembrance to the AWM. It seems that it was thought that I asked where the inscription came from. I had to explain:
“The question I was asking was why the quotation on the Stone of Remembrance refers to “Their Name” and not ‘Their Names’, ie the meaning of the words, rather than where they came from.I think it is only Ecclesiasticus that makes this clear (as I had hoped to have pointed out). When you realise that “Their Name” relates to the Name encompassing their lives’ achievements, the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men; and it will live on as if they had never died in their youth — the significance of the words mean so much more”.
Dr Nelson was appreciative of me getting in touch with him.
————————————————————————————————————
Their Name Liveth for Evermore
Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield.. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her” and “Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore’ does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world, that these men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 November 2019
The Round 2 submission is being prepared for the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal (DHAAT). The Background section is copied below. This is already in the public arena.
Recognition of the Role of Supporting Arms in the Operations for Which 8RAR was Awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation.
Background.
In 1970, the US Army had two unit awards: the Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Presidential Unit Citation. The Army of the RVN had only one such award: the Cross of Gallantry. This could only be awarded to a unit if it displayed specific deeds of valour or heroic conduct while fighting the enemy.
The US Army presented AATTV with a Meritorious Unit Commendation at a parade on 9 Feb 70. Soon after, the RVN Commanding General for that part of South Vietnam in which the Australian Task Force was located, made it known that he wanted to present either the Task Force, or one of its units, with an award recognising Australia’s contribution to the War.
On 6 Mar 70, this same Vietnamese general wrote the US Commanding General and asked that his congratulations be extended to the Commander 1ATF and the “meritorious Australian servicemen” involved in Operation Hammersley.
On 22 Apr 70, it was announced that 8RAR would not be replaced at the end of its tour. The Australian withdrawal was starting.
As the end of the year approached, the idea of a unit award became more urgent. As 1ATF wasn’t a ‘unit’ per se, it was decided that the 8RAR would be nominated for “a VN Unit Award”. A citation proposal was signed by Brigadier Henderson (Commander 1ATF) on 10 Sep 70. It listed all 8RAR’s operations up to that time and emphasised the Battalion’s success in combat.
The RVN Army HQ revised the proposed citation by deleting the reference to other operations and highlighting Operation Hammersley. New material was included relating to civic action work and 8RAR’s contribution to the Pacification and Development program.
On 21 Oct 70, the Commander Australian Force Vietnam (Major General Fraser) was advised that the RVN wished to present 8RAR with a Meritorious Unit Citation. Two days later, he informed Army HQ in Canberra that the RVN wanted to present a “Meritorious Unit Citation” to 8RAR and that he had agreed to this. The signal went on to say “Bearing in mind the ceremonies attendant on the recent presentation of a US Unit Award [Meritorious Unit Commendation] to AATTV, it is politic to accept the above award in the manner of established precedent”.
The presentation to 8RAR was made during a parade on 29 Oct 70. Although it was referred to as a Meritorious Unit Citation (and this wording was included in the title of the Citation), it was based on the CGWP Unit Citation and used the same insignia and ‘Streamer’.
The fact that the Citation related primarily to Operation Hammersley and the Streamer was named ‘Minh Dam’ [the enemy’s name for their base which was attacked during Operation Hammersley], led the AWM and many others to refer to the Meritorious Unit Citation as “including the CGWP Unit Citation”, i.e. suggesting that there were two separate awards, the latter being for Operation Hammersley. There are numerous published references, even by the former Governor-General, Major General Michael Jeffery (himself an 8RAR company commander) which state that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its involvement in Operation Hammersley. The Official Historian for the Vietnam War attended the DHAAT Hearing on 29 October 2019 and stated that, to him, the wording of the Citation seemed to be referring to Operation Hammersley.
Unfortunately, no official documentation for the establishment of a Meritorious Unit Citation can be located. It is the belief of the Tribunal, therefore, that it was (i) the RVN CGWP Unit Citation which was awarded to 8RAR and (ii) it was for their entire service in Vietnam up until 29 October 1970, when it was presented.
It cannot be explained why 8RAR’s citation proposal was amended by the RVN to refer to the Battalion’s efforts to “reconstruct houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc”, even though the CGWP Unit Citation is awarded solely for acts of heroic conduct when fighting the enemy.
The contention that the RVN Commanding General III Corps was wanting to match his US counterpart in recognising the service of Australian units, and had ‘created’ an award to do this, cannot be substantiated without any proclamation of such an award being available. The fact that the RVN ‘created’ a Presidential Unit Citation at the same time (akin to that of the US) to award to 161 Bty RNZA, cannot be regarded as a precedent.
The Tribunal decided that, as the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for all 8RAR’s time in Vietnam, if 8RAR was supported by A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn during the operations involved, they might be eligible for the same award.
Both parties (i.e. the Applicant and Defence) were requested to provide a basis for such a decision along these lines. The Tribunal have asked how long Defence will require to gather this information, however, Defence has not responded as yet
———————————————————————————————————————-
25 November 2019
The New Blog Page
I had hoped that I could get through 2019 on the same blog page. When it started to ‘GRIND’ its way through updates, however,I decided it was time make a change.
Unfortunately, I’d left it too late and I almost brought the whole system down. Talk about pulling my hair out!!
Anyway, back on-line (just) … and on to ‘Doing the Right Thing IV’ (plus some tidying up still to do).
1 Armd Regt News.
I was interested to read on the Regt’s Facebook page [https://www.facebook.com/1ArmdRegt/] that the Paratus Cup winning troop gets to fly regimental pennants from their antennae … what a good idea!
I say surprisingly, as I had thought of Cambrai Day as a Regimental Day, not just a ‘tank’ day.
Presumably, the tank squadrons at 2 Cav and 2/14 LH QMI also paraded? Of course, 2 Cav Regt would have celebrated its birthday. Speaking of which … is it not time that Glenn Darlington was acknowledged for his involvement in the design of the 2 Cav Regt badge? (Watch this space)
Another thing I noticed was that 1 Armd Regt are creating a Regimental Museum and are asking for anyone who may have items that they are willing to donate … to do so. Well done 1 Armd Regt!
Please may there be more ‘bouquets’ across the board in the New Year. We could all do with a bit of a ‘lift’.
Let’s hope we can get the Unit Citation for Gallantry approved for supporting arms in time. The relevant submission is still a week away from completion. Defence have given no idea when their’s might be ready.
Having read DVA’s synopsis of Operation Hammersley (see URL above), I was surprised how little it conveyed of what actually happened (and why a National Commemoration is being conducted).
The following outline is 374 words (compared to 312 on the DVA website). I propose to suggest to DVA that it be considered (at least in part) to convey some measure of the bravery and sacrifice that makes the Operation so important.
“Operation Hammersley was conducted in the Long Hai hills from 10 February – 3 March 1970. The area had always been a strong enemy base, known to the Viet Cong as the ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’.
Soon after having ambushed a large enemy force, 8RAR was tasked to capitalize and a quick attack was launched when an enemy bunker system was located: an infantry company in APCs, with a tank troop leading.
A tank became bogged while crossing a gully close to the objective. APCs found another crossing and pressed forward to maintain the momentum. One APC was hit by three RPGs, infantry inside were all wounded. The commander from another APC, together with an infantryman, rescued those involved. Two crewmen from the first tank which had been able to negotiate the gully, dismounted to tow the APC and its wounded crew away from the bunkers. The enemy threw a satchel charge, killing the crew, setting fire to the APC, and wounding those trying to recover it. The combined arms force pulled back.
A follow-up attack was mounted with artillery and air support. Tanks led again, with infantry following in APCs. The enemy pulled back when confronted with the tanks’ massive firepower. When it became known that an anti-tank minefield had been laid, the attack was called off. The enemy quickly reoccupied the bunkers, bringing intense fire to bear on the tanks. One was hit by about eight RPGs.
A final task had to be completed before darkness fell. A solid wall of armour advanced toward the enemy, ‘blasting them with everything’. A tank dozer followed in reverse, heading straight for the ‘knocked out’ APC and its crew. It pushed the stricken vehicle away from the enemy, to a point where it could be hooked up by a recovery vehicle.
Following a B52 bomber strike on the position, tanks led another assault on the enemy position the next day. The enemy had had enough and abandoned over 200 bunkers, large quantities of weapons and numerous caches of supplies. Elements of 8RAR, with tank support, were tasked to interdict the withdrawing enemy. While moving into position, one of the tanks detonated a large mine. Three of the crew were wounded and the tank was destroyed.”
PS. DVA have responded to say thanks for the input and the wording will be considered by the Commemorations Team.
Note: I see that 1AR Assn members recently gave a presentation to 1 Armd Regt re Operation Hammersley. This is to be applauded, but will the presentation be included on the 1AR Assn website, so that this part of our Regiment’s history can be made more broadly available? I asked the Communications Manager. It seems that there will be an article in the next newsletter, but no on-line copy of the presentation. I wonder why?
STOP PRESS. The 1 AR Assn has advised that “some of the detail” [re the Operation Hammersley presentation given to 1 Armd Regt] may be placed separately on the Website. It is a decision yet to be made. I’d previously been informed of this, but the email had become ‘lost’ prior to compiling my Blog. Fingers crossed that this comes to pass … but how much better would it be for the whole presentation to made available on-line, rather than just some parts of
If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together. (Old African saying)
23 November 2019
The Freedom of Information Saga.
Following from yesterday …
How is it that:
Because the document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation, release of it could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation?
Because of the objections and contentions outlined by the RAAC Corporation, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation?
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members?
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document?
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it, is a reason for not releasing the document?
Exposure [for wrong-doing presumably] of one member of an organisation would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers, is a reason for not releasing the document?
Disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals?
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy, by the release of a document submitted to Defence on behalf of an organisation’s members?
Disclosure [of a document submitted to Defence on behalf of an organisation’s members] may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working?
Conclusion:
What for heaven’s sake is included in the RAAC Corporation’s submission to Defence in support of my submission to the Minister? How can it be that its release could have such a damming impact on individuals and in the operation and management of the Corporation and its relationships with its member associations? How can exposure of what one member of the RAAC Corporation did, lead to concern by volunteers in other organisations? Surely, we’re all honourable men here (?).
With respect to the fact that a ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information … and given that the applicant has made it clear that he has no interest in this information … hopefully, the document will soon be released.
———————————————————————————————————————–
22 November 2019
The Freedom of Information Saga.
The Blog on 11 Sep 19 stated that the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) advised the day before that: “This matter is awaiting a decision by the Information Commissioner under s 55K of the FOI Act to affirm, vary or set aside and substitute the internal review decision of the Department of 26 June 2017”.
After two years, it seemed as if the matter was finally going to be resolved. Background is copied below from an earlier post.
The Latest Development: On 13 Nov 19, the OAIC desk officer advised “I would be grateful for your further assistance in the resolution of this Information Commissioner review … In relation to the material that remains within scope of this IC review, I invite you to please confirm whether you seek access to the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue. I would be grateful for your response by 20 November 2019”
My response stated inter alia:
I have no interest in “the name and title of any third party individuals that may be included in the document at issue”. My only interest is with respect to information provided to the Minister which may have had the potential to influence his decision in relation to my submission to him … surely this the right of each and every Australian?.
I don’t mean any disrespect to the OAIC here … simply trying to express my purpose in pursuing this matter, ie. the principle that if a Minister is asked to decide on a matter, then submissions made to him about it by other parties should be available to all … otherwise how is public confidence to be maintained?
——————————————————————————————
Background. [Although the reasons given for not releasing the material sought, seem unbelievable … it is a true account!]
In 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. I had hoped that the 1AR Association, together with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation (RAACC), might take the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1Armd Regt approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the other units involved.)
After years of inaction, in February 2017 I personally wrote to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, asking that the current limitation imposed on emblazoning Vietnam battle honours on unit colours etc, be reviewed. (I also requested that he approve a correction being made to the Theatre Honour emblazoned on the Standard.) The RAACC subsequently posted messages on social media sites advising that it had made a supporting submission.
I thanked the RAACC Chairman and asked if the Corporation’s submission was any different to mine. The Chairman responded to say: “I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours!”.
I was surprised at this, as I had automatically assumed that anyone preparing a supporting submission, would refer to the content of the submission that they were supporting. (Additionally, my submission had been available publicly since it was posted off.)
I then asked if I could see the Corporation’s submission, so as to know how it compared with the information I provided to the Minister. Surprisingly, the RAACC Chairman refused to allow me to see the submission that the Corporation had made in support of mine (no reason was given).
I was concerned that, if my submission was not approved, it might be because of information presented by the RAACC. I therefore wrote to Defence to “seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the RAACC submission made in support of my request to Minister Tehan”.
The Defence Response.
Defence initially provided the following reasons for not disclosing the document:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
The OAIC Appeal
On appeal, Defence stated the primary reasons were:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
When OAIC asked Defence to provide further justification, Defence provided two NEW reasons for not releasing the document:
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it; and
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
OAIC informed Defence that this was not adequate justification. Defence responded to say:
“As stated, … in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
OAIC informed Defence that this had nothing whatsoever to do with the document under consideration. More time was allowed for Defence to consult a ‘third party’. Defence then contended that:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
The OAIC Case Officer’s Position
As the case officer, you believe that “disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the Department’s operations since:
disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
In the Case Officer’s opinion, arguments for and against release of the document are:
In Favour. In this case, the following public interest factors favour disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Against: In this case, the following public interest factors weigh against disclosure of the document:
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.
The Applicant’s Response
Defence, in conjunction with the RAAC Corporation, have provided twelve different reasons that supposedly justify not releasing the document in question. In a process of rejection, followed by provision of more time, after more time, for Defence to reconsider … OIAC have rejected nine of these reasons. Turning to what’s left:
Will Defence have difficulty in obtaining similar information in the future if the document is released? I wrote to the Minister; the Minister’s Office asked for Defence’s position; Defence asked the RAAC Corporation what their position was; the RAAC Corporation provided this information to Defence. The Minister approved my (two) requests. The RAAC Corporation refuses to allow anyone to see their submission (maybe it was positive, as the RAAC Corporation claim; maybe it was negative). If the document was to be released, would, say, the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation or the 1 Field Squadron RAE Association, withhold information that Defence requested from them because of it?
Of course NOT. Integrity is crucial to their membership. A document written by their Executive on behalf of their members, would be made available to their members so requested. How could it not be, if the association had any integrity? I can obtain statements to this effect from a range of ESOs if need be.
Will an individual or group of individuals be harmed by release of the document? Defence have previously stated that the “welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy”. This is a very definitive statement; not ‘may be placed in jeopardy’, but “will be placed in jeopardy’. Presumably it is the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who is being referred to. It was he who stated that he’d prepared a submission for Defence supporting mine to the Minister, but without “having read anybody else’s including yours!”. As advised earlier, I can’t imagine that anyone could author a supporting submission, without reading the submission that it was supporting. Of course, if the submission was opposed to, rather than ‘in support of’, this could explain why release of the document could affect the author’s welfare (having stated the opposite).
But is this justification for not releasing the document? If I was being sentenced and stated that if I was sent to jail, I would kill myself … should the Judge take this into account? Of course, not … if His or Her Honour did, there wouldn’t be anyone in jail.
Will disclosure of the document prejudice the management function of an agency? The ‘agency’ in question is the Department of Defence. Defence has 65,000 employees. Is their management likely to be affected by the release of a document supporting an application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours and a correction to an error on a unit’s Standard? The opposite is much more likely. As the Case Officer has stated:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Conclusion. I ask that the OAIC consider the above.
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 November 2019
Honouring AFV Crews
The following email is self explanatory ….
Dear President,
When I last asked if the 1AR Assn would care to assist with the matter below, the answer was “We’re not a lobby organisation!”.
So, as is often the case, I find that I have to embark on such ‘missions’ on my own.
Information is provided below, however, should the 1AR Assn C’tee wish to assist the AWM in respect to the manner in which AFV crews are to be honoured.
HAVE YOUR SAY
You are invited to attend a public consultation regarding the design plans for the Memorial’s Development Project.
Thursday 28 November 2019 12 – 2pm BAE Systems Theatre, Australian War Memorial, Campbell
My own response to the AWM is copied below. If anyone wants to add to this, the AWM email is: ‘development@awm.gov.au.’
“Dear Development Team,
I’d like to register to attend the AWM’s Public Consultation on 28 November.
My interest lies in the means by which the AWM will move away from the traditional curatorial practices of prioritising equipment technology before the human interface, ie. most exhibits today provide visitors with endless details about weapons, planes, or tanks … but do so in the complete absence of information about those who operated these weapon systems and the challenges that confronted them.
For example, the tank I commanded during an engagement with the enemy in Vietnam is in the grounds of the AWM. My driver was badly wounded in this encounter.
No part of either the exhibit itself, nor anything within the Vietnam Gallery, explains the dangers faced by the crews of armoured fighting vehicles (tanks and APCs) in confronting the enemy (nor why they were so brave in doing so).
These dangers included: mines (both buried below and sited above), anti-armour weapons, snipers, satchel charges, small arms, and shrapnel (not to mention wasps’ nests). Of course the operating conditions (heat, humidity, and ants), constant need for vehicle maintenance, and the consequent lack of sleep on the part of the crew, are not included in the technical description of the equipment. (The fact that the Government failed to provide hot weather flame retardant crew protective dress and the reason why AFV crews had to remain ‘opened up’, are also omitted.)
The Director has informed me that the previous exhibition ‘culture’ is to change … can you please explain during the coming Consultation, how this will be achieved.
Many thanks,
———————————————————————————————————————-
20 November 2019
The 102nd Anniversary of the Battle of Cambrai
The short form is ‘Cambrai 102’. I was going to post something else, BUT … I decided to check what Google might tell me in terms of references to Cambrai commemoration in Australia.
Given that the Centenary year went by without so much as a ‘blink’ (many previous blog posts about this), I wasn’t expecting much. I wasn’t disappointed.
It was pleasing to see that the NZ Armoured Corps Assn was conducting a weekend of activities, including AFV displays, a civic parade, and a dinner.
There is no doubt that the 1st Armd Regt’s Cambrai parade will be a masterpiece of professionalism (as always); but I can’t help but wonder …
The Australian Army is going through a period in which the value of the tank is being questioned. Same old same old … too heavy, can’t be deployed; unsuited to operations in urban/jungle environments. The same thinking which delayed the deployment of tanks to Vietnam (and cost Australian lives as a result).
One might have thought that the symbolism associated with a public commemoration of Cambrai could well focus attention on the proven value of tanks over 102 years. The RAAC Corporation might grasp the opportunity to highlight this on its webpage … don’t bother checking! Maybe there will be an article from the HOC in the next Army News … pointing out the enduring combat achievements of tanks. Then again, maybe there won’t. Maybe the 1AR Assn might request the AWM Last Post Ceremony on Cambrai Day be conducted for a AAC/RAAC soldier killed in action. Then again, maybe it won’t.
What are those who have stewardship of the RAAC, doing to ensure that those who determine what the ADF force structure is to be (now and in the future) realise the operational importance of the direct fire support that can only tanks can provide? [I know the answer that would be given …. ‘we’re working quietly behind the scenes’.]
Why is it that right sizing the current tank fleet (see numerous blog posts below) is taking so long? It seems to me that the answer is obvious.
My suggestion (not that anyone would acknowledge it) is for the RAAC Corporation to establish a ‘think tank’ whereby ideas about matters affecting the RAAC could be discussed freely … the outcomes being advised to the HOC for consideration.
In March 2016, the Chairman, RAAC Corporation, stated:
“The ‘award for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always. The President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that, we have no input into the bloody thing.We are there to lobby at the higher levels of Government if the application falls over”. [I received no advice from Maj Gen Krause about this.]
The Background? I prepared a submission seeking the extension of eligibility for the Unit Citation extended to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, to supporting arms. I forwarded it to the 1AR Assn in the hope that they might send it to the RAAC Corporation to submit to Government. When nothing has apparently happened, I sent my submission to the Minister …. this led to where we are today, ie. the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal heard the case for and against. The results of their consideration have been reported in the Blog recently. In essence, if armour and engineers can show that they supported 8RAR throughout its tour in 1970, then they might be eligible for the same unit citation.
Following the Hearing, in the spirit of consultation, I send the email below to the President 1AR Assn and the RAAC Corporation:
“Hi,
As always, I try to keep everyone informed (so to be as open and transparent as possible). Sadly, there was no representative of the RAAC HOC present.
The outcome of the Hearing was that there is a possibility that supporting arms might be eligible for the award made to 8RAR, depending on the extent of their contribution to the operations for which 8RAR were cited.
These are: Atherton; Keppara; Hammersley; Hamilton; Phoi Hop; Nudgee; Cung Chung 1; Petrie; Decade; and Cung Chung 2.
Should the RAAC Corporation or 1AR Assn wish to contribute the justification to be provided to DHAAT, please let me know.”
Not unexpectedly … I’ve had no response from either of the recipients. (I’m told that their style is to ‘work quietly in the background’ The problem with this is that a lack of consultation can often equate to ‘secrecy’. Seems to me that there is a parallel with battle-procedure here … no commander would prepare an attack plan without consulting those involved (that is, if he wanted it to succeed).
They say: ‘You can lead a horse to drink, but you can’t make it water!’.
———————————————————————————————————————–
18 November 2019
The Benefits of Consultation
In some ways, this follows on from yesterday ….
The following emails are self-explanatory. There are opportunities to build on the initiative here. If members of C Sqn 1968 were to be consulted … I’m sure that lots of AFV names starting with ‘C’ would be made known. I wonder if 1AR Assn might follow up?
Sent: Sunday, 17 November 2019 3:41 PM To: ‘president@paratus.org.au’ <president@paratus.org.au>
Dear President,
Not having had an answer to the email below, and given that the Regt is undoubtedly fully occupied with Cambrai Day preparations, I wish to advise (with regard to the above) that:
The correct spelling of the late Nev Calliss’s surname is not Callis;
Mick Rainey’s tank at Coral was not named Cannibal, nor was any other tank at this time; and
Apart from Nev Calliss, Ambrose Crowe and David Carra are both deceased.
I understand that permission was not sought from those (or the NOK of those) whose tank or surnames names were listed, to use them as intended. This would seem to have been an oversight (for obvious reasons).
The 1AR Assn might consider contacting those concerned, on behalf of 1 Armd Regt, to gain permission. I’m sure that the opportunity to give it will be an honour to them all.
In closing, may I say what a great initiative it was by the Regt to name C Sqn AFVs in this way. I think I can speak on behalf of 1 Armd Regt Vietnam veterans in giving it their wholehearted support, together with their willingness to ensure that the basis on which the commemoration is made is an accurate one.
Many thanks,
Sent: Wednesday, 13 November 2019 1:43 PM To: ‘president@paratus.org.au’ <president@paratus.org.au> Subject: C Sqn Order of the Day: 29 Oct 19
Dear President,
The post on the 1AR Assn Facebook page includes a copy of the Order (as per below).
Are you aware of the mistakes?
Should these be advised to the Assn or direct to Major Murgatroyd?
C Squadron – Vehicle Names in Honour of Coral-Balmoral
To honour the memory of those who served in Vietnam, C Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment has issued an ‘Order of the Day’ to name a number of the Squadron Vehicles after the battles, four soldiers of C Squadron, and one vehicle, involved in the Battles of FSB Coral and FSB Balmoral in May/June 1968.
A copy of the ‘Order of the Day’ may be accessed by clicking on the following link (url);
Russ James Secretary 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc
————————————————————————————————————————
17 November 2019
Common Courtesy: Not That Common?
Some fifteen years ago I decided that there was little likelihood that I would ever have need of my military uniforms and accoutrements (as an ADC to the GG, I had received a second complete ‘issue’ of uniforms, as well as an allowance for spurs and overalls etc). I contacted the RAAC instructor at RMC and offered to bundle up the things I had and pass them on to him for the whatever benefit they might hold to forthcoming graduates. The following extract is from a note which was contained within a copy of a book:
“My name is …. I am a First Class cadet completing my studies at the RMC- Duntroon. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your donation of your Sam Browne and mess boots and I am very appreciative of your gift. In return for your kind gesture, I would like to present you a copy of the history of the Royal Military College of Australia as a token of my appreciation.”
Interestingly the recipient above was not from the RAAC (I had included two Sam Brownes, one blackened and the other not).
I believe that there was certain excitement among the cadets going to armoured corps, about obtaining the older style mess kit (better quality manufacture) and RAAC buttons (everyone is now relegated to ADF buttons, unless you have the former).
The author of the note above called at our house to deliver the book. My wife and I were delighted to welcome him and thank him for his kind gesture.
His was the only ‘thank you’. None were expected, but how great it was to receive one!
So maybe there are some serving RAAC officers (or former RAAC officers) who benefited from my ‘gift’. But who knows?
That’s the question …
Why is it that there was just one recipient who took the time to say ‘Thank You’.
As the song goes: Times are a changing. But surely, Australia’s fundamental values aren’t changing … we know what the right thing to do is. Don’t we?
————————————————————————————————————————
16 November 2019
This post should have appeared yesterday (gremlins!).
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy and Implementation : The Submission Part 2
Was the Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Breached?
It would seem from the above that what happened was quite in order, ie. neither Defence contractors nor Defence associations, should be deterred from doing the same thing again whenever they might wish. Even if there was uncertainty from an ethical viewpoint, incorporated associations are not subject to Defence guidelines (therefore commercial entities could, in theory, continue to ‘mask’ funding payments to Defence through the ‘books’ of associations).
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the unit? Relevant Defence regulations make this clear: donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves even a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. As stated above, in this case the contractor involved was one of two contenders for a multi-billion dollar project (which they were awarded).
Although it would seem clear that Defence’s Ethical Relationship Policy HAD been breached, it appears that the outcome of the investigation absolved the 1AR Assn’s C’tee, Defence personnel and the contractor of being party to any wrong-doing; which, in turn, meant that there was no requirement to amend the Assn’s Constitution to prevent such payments being made again.
How can this be? Channelling funds from a Defence contractor to a military unit via a third- party association, by its very nature, is an act of deception, and therefore must be ‘wrong doing’. Is it not wrong to deceive, particularly when the deception facilitates a transaction that is in breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy?
Interestingly, the Victorian Act under which the 1AR Assn operates, states that “An incorporated association must not …. do any act that is outside the scope of the purposes of the association”. ‘Masking’ payments from one entity to another would seem to be contrary to this provision.
What Should Happen Now?
It is my contention that a perceived Conflict of Interest has occurred, in breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy. I do not believe that either the 1AR Assn C’tee or Defence personnel knowingly committed any wrong-doing. However, the manner in which the investigation was handled, has failed to act as a deterrent to prevent the same thing happening again (quite the opposite).
I ask that:
Firstly, in the interest of open and transparent relationships between Defence contractors and Defence, the investigation be re-examined to confirm that there was no breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy. If a breach was found to have occurred, that this be given maximum publicity so that it is made more difficult for the same thing to happen again; and
Secondly, if Defence associations are not subject to the Defence Ethical Relationship Policy, that an examination be made into whether or not there is some means by which associations can be prevented from being used (wittingly or unwittingly) to circumvent this Policy?
—————————————————————————————————————————————
15 November 2019
For some unknown reason this post has ‘disappeared’. It’s reprinted above.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
14 November 2019
Following on from yesterday … The Submission Part 1
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy and Implementation
Background.
The 1 Armoured Regiment Association’s (1AR Assn’s) 2016/17 Financial Statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd [1st Armoured Regiment] $5,000.00.”
The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that total payments from this company to 1 Armd Regt amounted to at least $35,000; of which $25,000 was passed through 1AR Assn.
In 2016/17, Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400 Phase 2, a $5.2b Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) acquisition project (which they were awarded in 2018).
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy.
Defence guidelines include the following:
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorshipis an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above. All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN)http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DI(G)_PERS_25-7-9-8615.pdf
An Investigation is Conducted.
Being concerned that the masking of such a payment was not only unethical, but could also be illegal, a member of the 1AR Assn brought the matter to the attention of the Fraud Control and Investigations Branch. He was informed in June 2018 that an investigation had been conducted and that there was no evidence of any breach of Deference Force guidelines, nor any wrongdoing on behalf of Defence personnel. (He was prevented from sharing the Investigation Report because of confidentiality constraints imposed by Defence.)
Whenever the topic arose, the 1 AR Assn C’tee stated that “there was no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer”.
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action”; and “Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 November 2019
Ethical Relationships: Defence and Defence Contractors
This matter has been on-going for some time. It has now returned to the Ombudsman as per below. The submission will be copied tomorrow.
“Dear Ombudsman,
You will recall (below) that you were not able to consider my submission because I had the option of approaching the Inspector General Defence, one which I had not exercised.
I have now done this and attach:
My original submission to the Ombudsman; and
The response from the IGADF to me and my response to the IGADF
I’d like the Office of the Ombudsman to now consider my submission.
I’m NOT interested in matters related to either Associations or private companies.
My sole interest is related to a perceived conflict of interest having been caused and the fact that this seems to have been covered up to the extent that a finding of “no wrong doing” has been publicly stated, without any other information being made available.
I believe that it is very much in the public interest that there is complete openness and transparency regarding relationships between Defence and companies tendering for Defence contracts. (In the matter at hand the value of the contract was in the order of $5b, however, the same principles should apply, irrespective of the value of the contract.)
Many thanks …. ”
——————————————————————————————————————————-
12 November 2019
Following on from yesterday … additional material to back up the contribution and courage of supporting arms on Operation Atherton:
Published References Re Operation Atherton:
History of Tank Operations: APCs and Sappers
“The flexibility inherent in the armoured support enabled unexpected opportunities to be capitalised upon [during Operation Atherton]: redeploying in response to information from a Hoi Chanh on one occasion; and responding to a sighting from the air, on another. The enemy, in keeping with their past tactics, used mines to maximum effect.
On 14 December, engineer support was requested to destroy bunkers which had been discovered to the north of Barbara. Operational demands at the time meant that all 1 Field Squadron resources were already allocated. Staff Sergeant Paul Ryan took it upon himself to respond, in company with Sapper Chris Brooks. Loading themselves up with explosives, they set off with an infantry platoon/APC section under the command of Second Lieutenant Craig Mitchell, 2 Troop Officer, B Squadron 3 Cav. Ryan, who had almost completed his twelve months, was glad that it all seemed straight forward: ‘we got into the rubber and found the bunkers, searched them, charged them up and blew them nicely’.
While negotiating a crossing near the Suoi Lup on the way back to Nui Dat, Mitchell’s ‘carrier’ hit a mine. Estimated at around 23kg of explosive, one of the largest to be detonated by an M113A1, the force of the blast threw the vehicle into the air, causing it to land upside down. Despite desperate efforts to free him from under his hatch, the driver, Trooper Doug Voyzey, was KIA. Mitchell and the two engineers were wounded, with Ryan being medevaced to Australia six days before he was due to finish his tour.
There were two things about which there was no doubt: one, the fact that VC would continue to develop their mine warfare capability; and two, the bravery of both the AFV crews who would not be intimidated and the mini-teams who would continue to put themselves at risk in an effort to protect them.”
History of APC Operations: APCs
“The mine was estimated to be between 30-40 pounds of explosive; the force created by the placement of the mine was so great that it overturned the carrier end over end, trapping Doug Voyzey, who was still in the driver’s compartment. Despite the frantic efforts of the other section members they were unable to free the driver.”
History of Tank Operations: Tanks
“About 5pm on 21 December, elements of D Company 8RAR encountered an occupied bunker system. The infantry suffered one KIA and two WIA before the contact was broken off. 4 Troop [tanks] deployed to lead an assault on the enemy position the next day. Soon after 11am, 8RAR’s radio log recorded that D Company’s forward troops were 30m from the bunkers and ‘T’s [tanks] just fired canister!’ 4 Troop had commenced clearing through the bunker system; not surprisingly, the enemy (identified as NVA) withdrew. Large quantities of documents and medical supplies left behind suggest that they vacated very quickly.”
[On 27 December], 4 Troop were joined in support of 8RAR, by SHQ, 2, and 3 Troops. Infantry patrols reported an enemy base camp about 2km north of Peggy and additional armoured resources were requested. A sweep of the area revealed a number of bunkers and a couple of huts, one of which had been used within the last twelve hours.
It was a fact of life accepted by tank crews: wherever you were, you had to be prepared to drop everything and react at a moment’s notice. So, it was for 3 Troop late on the afternoon of 29 December 1969. It had happened before and would happen again: just when everyone was thinking about returning to the fire support base and getting set up for the night; the troop leader received a radio message, issued orders, and you took off in the opposite direction. This time a helicopter pilot had sighted two platoons of VC about 4km south of Peggy. 3 Troop, accompanied by a platoon of infantry and section of APCs, had been conducting a reconnaissance-in-force to the east and the combined arms team were tasked to investigate. They had to move quickly, if they were to do any sort of search before last light.
Despite travelling at ‘best speed’, it was not until around 6.30pm that 3 Troop neared the location of the sighting. Approaching from the east, they were confronted by a marshy depression angling across their front. A well- defined track, obviously a route used by villagers and rubber workers, lay ahead. Sergeant Nobby Clark, in the lead tank (3Alpha), was suspicious. Valuable time had already been lost while their mini-team cleared a culvert. This was no excuse to push on regardless, however. Clark tried to find a path through on the northern side, but to no avail. Ground to the south was even more treacherous. An attempt was made to use the track itself, with the tank half off to one side; this failed because of the very soft verges.
With light fading, Clark informed his troop leader that he could see no alternative other than to drive along the track for around 300m, until firm ground could be reached on the other side. There was an even more important decision to be made:
As I stood in the turret looking down the length of road we had to cover before we could move off it, my thoughts turned to 13 May 1969 when my first tank was destroyed by a mine in a similar situation. I decided to reverse the tank, thereby placing the driver to the rear and hopefully out of harm’s way if we struck a mine.
Clarke’s driver was Trooper Mike Smith. The other crew members were Troopers Hubertus (Bluey) Ummels (operator) and Bill Barlow (gunner). The normal Troop Leader, Lieutenant Angus McNeilage, had recently departed for R&R and Lieutenant Doug Blackney had taken his place. Although Sergeant Jim De Turt, 3 Troop’s former Troop Sergeant, had been attached to 8RAR as a tank liaison officer, he had gone out with Blackney to help familiarise him with the area where they were operating. Clark was the most experienced of the crew commanders, having arrived in September 1968. Corporal Bob Roberts (3Bravo), on the other hand, had only recently joined the squadron from Forward Delivery Troop. Despite their different perspectives, everyone had good cause to remember what happened next.
3Alpha reversed slowly, gun over the rear of the tank, Clark and Ummels peering intently into the gloom in an effort to detect any disturbance in the surface of the track to their front, 100m, 200m … nearly there! Clark recalls thinking that ‘we had almost made it across the low ground’, when, suddenly ‘the rear of the tank lifted off the ground in a massive explosion and a thick cloud of dust enveloped us. A wall of flames erupted in front of me.’ Within seconds, the whole of the rear of the tank was on fire. Looking down into the turret, all Ummels could see were ‘flames licking at [his] boots’.
Barlow’s perspective from the gunner’s seat was even more dramatic: ‘sheets of flame [were] coming from the engine compartment into the turret (around my boots and all the ammo below them).’ Those in the vehicles behind feared the worst: ‘There was an almighty explosion, a huge cloud of dust pierced by a sheet of flame … the tank disappeared’. For Roberts in 3Bravo, ‘it was a long count as I waited for the crewmen to leave the vehicle’.
Clark’s immediate concern was for his driver: ‘it took a second to recall that I had been travelling in reverse.’ Having quickly ‘taken stock’, he informed his troop leader that they were bailing out and coming back on foot. Clark had the presence of mind to unpin the commander’s .30cal machine gun and bring it with him, denying the enemy a very attractive ‘prize’. As Barlow scrambled up from inside, he heard shots. Just moments later, when he saw the operator fall off the turret, he thought the worst – ambush!
The realisation that Ummels had not been shot, he had just slipped, came as a relief. As the gunner, Barlow was much less conscious of what was happening outside, compared with the other crew members. Incredibly, there were no apparent wounds from the mine and the crew were all able to make it to the safety of the other vehicles. Some of the credit for their successful bail-out, must go to Smith for remembering the driver’s responsibility to set off the fixed fire extinguisher system. He would have thought himself lucky to have been able to exit at what had become the rear of the vehicle, rather than the front as normal. Just how lucky he really was, however, was not apparent until next morning.
The mine had been a big one, made up of slabs of explosive, coupled together with a number of artillery ‘blinds’. It was also offset to go off under the hull, rather than detonating under one of the tracks. The force of the explosion buckled and split the hull, as well as severely damaging the right rear suspension station; leaking petrol ignited, causing a fire which immediately engulfed the engine and transmission compartments. There is no doubt that if the tank had not been reversing, the crew (particularly the driver) would have been seriously wounded. As was expected, the Centurion had to be returned to Australia for rebuild.
That night the combined arms team occupied a position on high ground about 100m away from the abandoned tank. This was the only option available as the fire continued to burn; in the circumstances, there was a real threat of exploding ammunition. To provide observation and fields of fire, the tanks and APCs knocked down the tall grass and scrub between the burning tank and their harbour. During the night, random bursts of .30cal were fired in its vicinity to deter enemy from approaching. Clark and his crew were glad to receive their new tank from Forward Delivery Troop next day; one night manning a machine gun on the ground was enough.”
————————————————————————————————————————
11 November 2019
Extension of Eligibility for Unit Citation: Round 2
As reported previously, the DHAAT have stated that if it can be shown that 8RAR was supported by tanks, APCs and sappers during the period for which it was awarded, the CGWP Citation, then there will be justification to reconsider extending eligibility. So we’re preparing to do battle with Defence (whose policy is no retrospective awards EVER, no matter how well justified). Operation Atherton was 8RAR’s first. i don’t think that there is any question about the supporting arms involvement. This is a work in progress, ie. to provide the same info re all 8RAR’s operations.
Operation Atherton.
Synopsis. Operation Atherton was conducted from 10 December 1969 to 19 January 1970. 8RAR’s ‘shakedown’ was a hammer and anvil operation: three companies were to advance toward suspected enemy camps, forcing the enemy towards ambushes placed on known enemy withdrawal routes by the remaining company, together with the troop of tanks.
Supporting Arms: One troop of tanks (A Sqn 1 Armd Regt), one troop of APCs (B Sqn 3 Cav), and one troop of engineers (1 Fd Sqn).
Results: Enemy killed 25, wounded 26; captured 1, suspects detained 3; weapons captured 28 (together with ammo stores etc); plus, a number of bunkers destroyed.
Casualties:
8RAR: 1 KIA, 12 WIA
Supporting arms: RAAC, 1 KIA 1 WIA; RAE 3 WIA
Other Losses: One tank and one APC destroyed.
Contribution to Success by Supporting Arms: (Quotes from Comds’ Diaries)
Tanks: Provided fire support to the 8RAR company forming the ‘anvil’; closed with and engaged enemy bunkers in order provide direct fire support necessary to enable 8RAR to follow behind and attack the enemy defensive position (22 Dec); crushed enemy bunkers to prevent their reuse; deployed at short notice to (i) provide fire support (22 and 27 Dec) and (ii) capitalise on enemy sightings from the air (29 Dec); provided continuous ready reaction capability on stand-by should enemy be located.
“27 Dec: Elements of Support Coy 8RAR supported by tanks located, searched and destroyed enemy bunker system.”
APCs: Assisted with the insertion of 8RAR into Area of Operations; provided armoured mobility to 8RAR Group throughout the Operation; deployed at short notice to provide fire support (such as on 8 Jan 70 when “scrambled” to assist A Coy 8RAR during an engagement with the enemy) and redeploy forces (eg. 14 and 29 Dec); provided continuous ready reaction capability on stand-by (both for deployment of reserves and provision of fire support) should enemy be located.
“10 Dec 69. 1 Troop, 86 and 82 Sections and carried D Coy 8RAR to Northern Province border along Route 2. 13 and 82 Section became op-con at drop off point.”
“14 Dec 69: 20B hit a mine whilst entering a creek. The APC was flipped over and destroyed. There was one KIA and three WIA.”
“28 Dec 69: Section 1 Tp inserted a 13 man patrol from 8RAR at ….”.
“1 Jan 70: Section 1 Tp inserted a 15 man patrol from 8RAR into area of …”.
“9 Jan 70: 3 Troop was reacted to the 8RAR contact at GR 432824 with A Company on board at first light. The outcome was that a lot of blood trails were found in the area but no bodies or equipment.”
Engineers: Searched and destroyed enemy defensive positions (bunkers); identified and defused mines and booby traps; provided continuous on-call capability for the foregoing to both infantry and armour.
“17 Dec: 3Tp with 8RAR also started to find bunker systems and destroy them.”
“21 Dec:A member of 3 Troop splinter team was wounded today in a contact while supporting a company of 8RAR”.
Gallantry Displayed by Supporting Arms:
Tank Crews: Assaulting enemy defensive position despite the threat of penetration from anti-armour weapons and the danger posed by shrapnel, satchel charges and snipers; redeploying to provide fire support to 8RAR and interdict enemy in the quickest time possible, despite risks from deliberate attempts to lure them onto anti-tank mines; remaining calm when tank destroyed by mine in what could have been a deliberate ambush; removing machine gun from destroyed tank to prevent its capture by the enemy.
APC Crews: Remaining calm, gallantly attempting to rescue driver from under overturned vehicle, as well as providing security and aiding casualties when APC destroyed by mine and driver killed (in what could have been a deliberate ambush); deploying to provide fire support to 8RAR and interdict enemy in the quickest time possible, despite an APC having already been destroyed by an anti-tank mine.
Sappers: Volunteering to provide urgent engineer assistance to 8RAR when limited resources were available; searching bunkers thoroughly, despite the risk of booby traps; calmly clearing areas around mine incidents, despite the likelihood of secondary mines; and accompanying tanks and APCs during attacks on enemy positions.
————————————————————————————————————————
10 November 2019
I thought that I should not refrain from pointing out that the Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR was a ‘political’ award, ie it was not based on a premise that the Battalion was any better or more gallant than any other (though 8RAR have not hesitated to claim that it was the ONLY battalion so honoured).
It’s interesting that the only RVN Meritorious Unit Citation was presented to 8RAR in 1970 and the only RVN Presidential Unit Citation was presented to 161 Bty RNZA in May 1971. The RVN CGWP Unit Citation (neither the Meritorious nor Presidential Unit Citation) was awarded to AATTV in December 1971. The withdrawal commencement in 1970 seems to have prompted a surge to recognise the countries that came to the aid of SVN.
Interesting photo below … I think that this must be a US Unit Citation being awarded on behalf of MACV. (Surely an ARVN general would present a RVN award?)
GENERAL ROSSON PRESENTS MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATION to Thai Panther Division.
The following is a revise of a previous post, following some reflection on certain matters:
The RVN Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR: Background and What Happened at the DHAAT
The US Army presented AATTV with a Meritorious Unit Commendation at a parade on 9 Feb 70. Soon after, the Commanding General for the part of South Vietnam in which the Australian Task Force was located, made it known that he wanted to present either the Task Force, or one of its units with an award to recognise Australia’s contribution to the War.
The Comd 1ATF at the time, Brig Stuart Weir, was suffering from a stress related illness. He was replaced two months prior to the scheduled end of his ‘tour’ (in May 1970) by Brig Bill Henderson. This was soon after the announcement that 8RAR would not be replaced at the end of its tour in November 1970.
The Vietnamese raised the issue of the unit citation with the new commander. One operation stood out from others during 1970 — Operation Hammersley. Brig Henderson asked that a proposal for a citation to be awarded to 8RAR be drafted. This was done in August and he signed off on it on 10 Sep 70. This was cutting what was usually a minimum three-month approval process, very fine.
The RVN only had one unit citation at the time: the Cross of Gallantry. It could only be awarded to a unit if it displayed deeds of valour or heroic conduct while fighting the enemy. HQ 1ATF had not proposed that this be awarded to units involved in Operation Hammersley. In all likelihood, staff were probably not aware of the opportunity to propose such an award … otherwise units present at Coral-Balmoral, for example, would have been nominated previously. (Then again, maybe there was a belief that only a single unit, not a group of units and sub-units, could be proposed.)
So, what was the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS) to do? The answer … create a new award, the Meritorious Unit Citation. This would be for meritorious service over a prolonged period, like that of the US. But … the RVN had no such insignia. The solution: base the award on the Cross of Gallantry.
The JGS revised the 1ATF proposed citation by deleting the reference to other operations and emphasising Operation Hammersley. New material was included relating to civic action work to “reconstruct houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc”. (One has to ask if 8RAR actually did any of this? The citation proposal referred to the Battalion being continuously on operations.)
On 21 Oct 70, the Commander AFV (Major General Fraser) was advised that the RVN wished to present 8RAR with a Meritorious Unit Citation. This was the first time such an award had been proposed, ie. an award for a unit’s meritorious service over a prolonged period.
Two days later, the Comd AFV advised Army HQ in Canberra that the RVN wish to present a “Meritorious Unit Citation” to 8RAR and that he had agreed to this. The signal went on to say “Bearing in mind the ceremonies attendant on the recent presentation of a US Unit Award [Meritorious Unit commendation] to AATTV, it is politic to accept the above award in the manner of established precedent”.
The translation provided to the AWM Official Historian was that the title of the Citation was “Meritorious Unit Commendation including Cross of Gallantry With Palm Leaf”
In wanting to match the US, the RVN had shown that they too, could demonstrate appreciation to the countries which had contributed forces to its defence. This would seem to be particularly important, given the withdrawal announcements which had recently been made. The citation had been reworded by the RVN to make it apparent that the Meritorious Unit Citation was being awarded for prolonged service and this included the Cross of Gallantry Citation for Operation Hammersley. (Remember that the Cross of Gallantry is ONLY awarded for heroic conduct while fighting the enemy.)
Not to be outdone … the RVN also ‘created’ a Presidential Unit Citation (akin to that of the US) which they awarded to 161 Bty RNZA on 2 May 1971. Rather than referring one award ‘including’ another, the title used by the NZDF is “RVN Presidential Unit Citation Cross of Gallantry With Palm Leaf”.
DHAAT Consideration of the above. Neither the RVN Meritorious Unit Citation nor Presidential Unit Citation are listed in the 1967 RVN Awards Manual. Because no evidence can be found for the official creation of either the RVN Meritorious Unit Citation or the Presidential Unit Citation, the DHAAT have deemed that the only unit award made by the RVN to units was the Cross of Gallantry With Palm.
It follows that this was awarded for 8RAR’s tour of duty, as stated in the citation (ie. not just for Operation Hammersley). The Tribunal has no answer as to why the citation was amended to include matters not related to gallantry while fighting the enemy.
BUT … If it can be shown that 8RAR was supported by armour and engineers during their other Operations, then the extension of eligibility will be reconsidered. Defence has been asked to report accordingly (as have ‘we’).
—————————————————————————————————————————-
9 November 2019
VC Nomination : Draft Press Statement
Following on from yesterday ….
Background Issues Part 2
“Ways That This Understanding Might be Achieved.
Our Nation has been taking the dedication of our servicemen and women for granted for far too long. It is time for the whole community to ‘step up’ and support them. Compassion alone will not work. It must be coupled with positive action. We must ‘reach out’ in tangible ways.
How can we do this? I would suggest a couple of things…
Defence and DVA should jointly develop a communications package to increase community awareness of the demands that the Nation makes of those who serve in the ADF. This should be based on a comprehensive survey to establish the current level of understanding, across the nation as a whole, of the sacrifices made daily by members of the ADF. Greater understanding of the demands made on our service men and women will lead to greater understanding of the support measures that are not only ‘needed by them’, but also ‘owed to them’.
The Australian War Memorial (AWM) has started a major expansion project. The Act under which it operates includes the requirement for the Memorial to “use every endeavour to make the most advantageous use of the memorial collection in the national interest”.
If the deeper understanding I refer to was shared generally, there would be a different emphasis on the nature of exhibits at the AWM. Much greater focus would be placed on the soldiers who operated equipment such as tanks, and the demands placed on them, rather than on the technical specifications of the weaponry itself. Fittingly, such a change of emphasis is apparent in the recent Afghanistan Gallery.
I believe, and I know that the current Director agrees, that the new building should not just provide space for more exhibits, but more importantly, provide opportunity to increase the public’s awareness of the sacrifices made by all members of the ADF on their behalf. In doing this, the AWM must be part of the joint Defence/DVA Communication Strategy.
Conclusion
I am one of the very fortunate, to have been recognised for my service. There are so many others who deserve to be so … but, how can we honour them? The first step is to understand what traumas they’ve been through: what experiences and decisions they want to forget; but mainly, to understand what they hope for their future — what they want to live for!
The second step is to embrace them; to reach out and acknowledge their service. I pledge to use my award to this purpose.
The question I ask of us all, is: Do we have any idea of the sacrifices which the members of the Australian Defence Force make on our behalf every day (and are doing so right now); if so, how do we repay them?”
————————————————————————————————————————-
8 November 2019
VC Nomination : Draft Press Statement
Following on from yesterday ….
Background Issues Part 1
The Value of Tanks Today
Paradoxically, the value of tanks in the Australian Army today is being questioned (once again). ‘They can only operate in open country … they can’t be transported to where they might be needed … they’re overkill for regional threats’, so say the media. My response is ‘just look at history … the victories that have been achieved, and the casualties that have been prevented!’.
More tanks are needed to enable the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) operational capability to be maintained, yet even the glowing tributes from countries that deployed them in support of their troops in Afghanistan, cannot convince the ‘naysayers’. Please look at the facts and take action to close the current capability gap.
The Australian Army is made up of excellent soldiers, well trained and with great morale. They’ll always serve our country bravely wherever they’re employed (even if asked to charge enemy machine guns as at the Nek in 1915). The ADF embodies a tradition and an ethos which has been built up over many generations. ‘Duty First’ (the infantry’s motto) goes without saying. ‘Paratus (Ready)’, the motto of tank crews, likewise. Anything else is unimaginable.
The Challenge Faced by the Community in Helping Veterans.
This award of the Victoria Cross for Australia comes at a time when there is widespread unease about society’s ability to assist veterans trying to deal with the aftermath of traumatic events experienced during their service (both on the battlefield and while training for it). This is not a matter for politics. There is, I believe, bi-partisan support for new initiatives. This is as it should be.
Ideally our grandchildren would inherit a world which is a harmonious blend of nation states; one without poverty and one whose future is assured. History has shown, however, that such goals are almost unattainable, and, furthermore, those that can be achieved, come at great cost. In an ideal future world, there would be no need for either active service medals or gallantry awards … but this is unlikely.
There is a fundamental relationship between military service and national identity, one which goes even beyond the incredibly selfless commitment continually demonstrated by our medical, police and emergency services personnel. I feel that there’s a need to make known what military service involves and the debt that our nation owes to those who have been, and are today, prepared to defend our national interests and values.
The Importance of Understanding the Sacrifices that our Servicemen and Women Make on our Behalf.
The key indicator of the level of the Nation’s support for the ADF is not the percentage of GDP allocated to the Defence Budget. I believe it to be the depth of our understanding that each and every one of our servicemen and women may have to face certain death in defending Australia’s national interests, and, even more importantly, why they would be prepared to do so. With greater understanding, comes greater gratitude.
We all have choices which determine our day to day priorities; but how do these compare with the choice faced by soldiers on the battlefield: to jeopardise their life or not? Bravery cannot be taught during training, however, ‘doing the right thing’ can (and is).
In my experience and understanding of history, Australian soldiers will always be prepared to risk their life to save their mate. But are we in danger of assuming that he or she will always be prepared to risk their life on behalf of our nation? If they decide to do so (and live), how do they feel when they return home?
They went, as in the prose of G. K. Chesterton, ‘not because they hate what is in front of them but because they love what is behind them’. Their families’ love for them is as it ever was, but what of their understanding of what the soldier returning to them has experienced?
————————————————————————————————————————–
7 November 2019
VC Nomination
Following yesterday’s post re the outcome, I thought that it would be relevant to address what the situation might have been if it had been approved. For me, this was never about any individual recognition, it was about the opportunity the award might provide to focus attention on issues that would benefit. As a result, I thought through what these might be and prepared a press statement (with the help of a number of others) accordingly.
Draft Press Statement
I’m deeply honoured and humbled by this award. In terms of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and its antecedents, there are five former VC recipients; four from the Boer War and one from Gallipoli. I am very proud to be numbered among them.
The award recognises not only my actions, but also those of both my crew and the other tank crews I fought beside. I am very proud to have served with members of the RAAC in Vietnam — as the late Reverend Alan Greenshields said: “You couldn’t wish to meet a better bunch of blokes”. Sadly, some did not return, and some who did, have since died of their wounds. Few people realise what ‘Black Hats’ experienced.
All armoured fighting vehicle crews are very close-knit groups. What one person does, reflects what everyone else is doing or would have done in their place. An award to a member of a tank crew is also an award to the rest of his crew and his troop as a whole. It reflects the dangers that all those in his squadron were subjected to. This encompasses not just other tank crews, but also members of forward repair teams, field engineers, and resupply personnel … who all provided the support essential to enabling the tanks to close with and engage the enemy, as part of a combined arms force.
Tanks were deployed to Vietnam later than they should’ve been and withdrawn earlier than they should’ve been. During the four years they were there, the support they provided to infantry saved lives and helped win battles. While the impact of tanks and armoured vehicles on the battlefield has been acknowledged throughout history, the sacrifices made by their crews have never been fully appreciated. I hope this award may go some way towards changing that.
Finally, it’s been said that bravery medals are peer awards; that is, they are dependent on the testimony of others who experienced the same circumstances as the recipient and can vouch for events from their own experience. I’m very grateful for one of my peers, former tank crew commander Stan Hanuszewicz, for initiating the Review conducted by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal and for the support provided by others involved in the action which led to this award.
Tomorrow: ‘Draft Press Release: The Background Issues’.
————————————————————————————————————————
6 November 2019
VC Nomination
Now that I’ve brought everyone up to date re Hammersley, time to report on the outcome of the above.
A few days ago, Stan Hanuszewicz, who nominated me for the award, let me know that his appeal to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal had NOT been approved.
I have the upmost respect for Stan for the effort and persistence that was involved in his campaign (‘he deserves a medal’). My ‘take’ on the outcome is expressed below:
The fact is, that while my actions were gallant, they weren’t regarded as the ‘most conspicuous gallantry’, which is the requirement for the VC.
Defence categorised my award as a “very strong MC”, ie. not quite a VC. These are subjective assessments to a certain degree, but there is a more analytical aspect as well.
I hadn’t thought about it before; but now that I know that one of the criteria to qualify for an Imperial VC (the award available at the time) is that there has to be a 90% chance of the person concerned being killed.
I’ve been prompted to reflect that If I’d been asked by the Tribunal in Feb, what I thought the likelihood was that I’d get killed … I think I would’ve probably said “50:50”.
I was prepared to be killed … that’s as far as I’d thought through that part of what was happening at the time.
If I had been killed, the only two awards I’d have been eligible for were: (i) being Mentioned in Dispatches and (ii) the VC.
If the RPG that was fired at me had not struck the muzzle of the barrel of Stan’s tank, then I might have received the latter award. Not having even been wounded, however,’self-sacrifice’ had not been demonstrated.
I guess the moral is: you’re more likely to be awarded the VC if you’re KIA, than if you survive, ie. if you’re killed, you’ve demonstrated that you’ve exceeded the threshold by 10%. (Note; I believe the 90% threshold may not apply to the VC for Australia.)
All in all … I’m pleased with the outcome, ie. surviving without the VC, beats being deceased with the VC … hands down!
The text below explains where things stand re recognition for the supporting arms involved ….
Email to 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation (1 Nov 19):
“A Hearing was conducted by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal on 29 October 2019 to consider an appeal for eligibility of the RVN Cross of Gallantry With Palm Unit Citation to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. The tank sqn comd and APC tp ldr provided statements to the Tribunal. The tank sqn 2IC and President of the 1 Fd Sqn Assn attended as witnesses, as did the author of the Official History of the Vietnam War.
The 1 Armd Regt Assn declined to add its members’ support to that of the 3 Cav Assn, RAACA WA, and 1 Field Sqn (RAE) Assn because its C’tee had given support to a similar submission made to Defence by the RAAC Corporation.
Shortly prior to the Hearing, Defence submitted a report concluding that their response to BOTH submissions was that no extension of eligibility was justified and it would not be approved.
The outcome of the Hearing was that the Tribunal was compelled, because of a technicality associated with the foreign award, to deem that the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation was awarded, not just for Operation Hammersley, but for all ten operations listed in the Citation proposal.
IF it could shown, however, that A Sqn 1 Armd, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn provided significant support to 8RAR for these operations, and displayed gallantry in doing so, then the matter of extending eligibility would be reconsidered.
Defence was tasked to provide a further report on this basis. As the ‘Applicant’, I will have the opportunity, in conjunction with those mentioned above, to review the Defence Report and comment accordingly. We also have the opportunity to submit our own separate report to the DHAAT, describing the extent of support provided and nature of the gallantry displayed by supporting arms.
A sample report, based on Operation Atherton, is currently being prepared … this will be forwarded to DHAAT for agreement that it provides the information needed for them a make a decision. Once the format is agreed, we will then move on to other operations.
Should the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation wish to join in the preparation of this ‘second round’ report, please let me know.
NOTE: Defence are STILL formulating a policy with respect the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. This has nothing to do, however, with extending eligibility to recognise gallantry displayed by supporting arms in Operation Hammersley. It relates to whether or the Unit Citation should be extended to each and every Australian who served in Vietnam, on the same basis that this was done for US servicemen.
The point was made during the Hearing that the CGWP awards were made to Australian Army personnel on the basis of gallantry that they had individually displayed. Making the award available for just ‘being there’, would devalue it as recognition for those who received the award on the basis of gallantry in contact with the enemy (the criteria for individual and unit awards).
(There has been no response to the email this time.)
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 November 2019
DEFENCE HONOURS AND AWARDS APPEAL TRIBUNAL (DHAAT) HEARING : CAMERON Vs DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
Summary of What Transpired, Part 2: The DHAAT Position.
DHAAT do not accept that there were two awards, as no official documentation for the establishment of a Meritorious Unit Citation can be located. The fact that this was the name of the award used in correspondence when it was offered to the Commander, AFV; used again when General Fraser gave his approval; and that this was the award name provided to Army HQ … makes no difference.
It is the belief of the Tribunal that it was the RVN CGWP Unit Citation which was awarded to 8RAR for their service in Vietnam up until 10 Sep 71 when the proposal upon which their award was based, was signed by the Comd 1 ATF.
The Tribunal has no answer as to why the Citation for 8RAR’s award was amended by the RVN to refer to civil action work to “reconstruct houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc” (you’d think that they’d have had no time for operations), even though the RVN CGWP Unit Citation is awarded only for acts of heroic conduct when fighting the enemy.
It is not possible for anyone to argue that the CGWP was for Operation Hammersley only, and the Meritorious Unit Citation for 8RAR’s service up until 10 Sep 70. My contention that the Commanding General III Corps was wanting to match the US in recognising meritorious service of Australian units, and had convinced the JGS to ‘create’ an award to do this, was not accepted. The fact that they ‘created’ a Presidential Unit Citation (akin to that of the US) to award to 161 Bty RNZA, was also not relevant.
BUT … the Tribunal, to their credit, noted that, if the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s service up to 10 Sep 70, then if 8RAR were supported by A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn during these operations, they might be eligible for the same award.
The ten operations listed in the HQ 1ATF proposal were: Atherton; Keppara; Hammersley; Hamilton; Phoi Hop; Nudgee; Cung Chung 1; Petrie; Decade; and Cung Chung 2. Defence have been requested to report to DHAAT accordingly.
I’m certain that it can be shown that the RAAC and RAE supporting arms involved in these operations contributed markedly to their success and to the enemy casualty figures quoted in the HQ 1ATF citation proposal.
———————————————————————————————————————–
3 November 2019
DEFENCE HONOURS AND AWARDS APPEAL TRIBUNAL HEARING : CAMERON Vs DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
Summary of What Transpired, Part 1: The Circumstances re the Award to 8RAR.
In 1970, the US Army had two unit awards: the Meritorious Unit Commendation and the Presidential Unit Citation. Both of these could be awarded to units for prolonged meritorious conduct.
The Army of the RVN had only one unit award: the Cross of Gallantry. This could be awarded in five classes, depending on the level at which the citation was raised. The ‘With Palm’ class related to citing at Armed Forces Level (the highest). The Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation could only be awarded to a unit if it displayed deeds of valour or heroic conduct while fighting the enemy.
The US Army presented AATTV with a Meritorious Unit Commendation at a parade on 9 Feb 70. Soon after, the Commanding General for the part of South Vietnam in which the Australian Task Force was located made it known that he wanted to present either the Task Force, or one of its units with an award to recognise Australia’s contribution to the War.
On 6 Mar 70, this same Vietnamese general wrote the US Commanding General and asked that his congratulations be extended to the Comd 1ATF and the “meritorious Australian servicemen” involved in Operation Hammersley.
On 22 Apr 70, it was announced that 8RAR would not be replaced at the end of its tour. The Australian withdrawal was soon to start.
As the end of the year neared, the idea of a unit award arose again. As 1ATF wasn’t a ‘unit’ per se, it was decided that the 8RAR would be nominated for “a VN Unit Award”. A proposed citation was signed by Brigadier Henderson (Comd 1ATF) on 10 Sep 70. It listed all 8RAR’s operations up to that time and emphasised its success in combat.
The approval process involving the Australian Force Vietnam (AFV); Free World Military Assistance Organisation (FWMAO) and the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS) was a lengthy one. Timing was critical, if the presentation was to be made before 8RAR left Vietnam.
The JGS revised the 1ATF proposed citation by deleting the reference to other operations and emphasising Operation Hammersley. New material was included relating to civic action work and 8RAR’s contribution to the Pacification and Development program.
On 21 Oct 70, the Commander AFV (Major General Fraser) was advised by the Chairman, FWMAO, that the RVN wished to present 8RAR with a Meritorious Unit Citation. This was the first time such an award had been proposed, ie. an award for a unit’s meritorious service over a prolonged period, rather than a Cross of Gallantry solely for heroic conduct fighting the enemy.
Two days later, the Comd AFV advised Army HQ in Canberra that the RVN wish to present a “Meritorious Unit Citation” to 8RAR and that he had agreed to this. The signal went on to say “Bearing in mind the ceremonies attendant on the recent presentation of a US Unit Award [Meritorious Unit commendation] to AATTV, it is politic to accept the above award in the manner of established precedent”.
The presentation to 8RAR was made during a parade on 29 Oct 70. Although it was referred to as a Meritorious Unit Citation (and this wording was included in the title of the Citation), it was based on the CGWP Unit Citation and used the same insignia and Streamer’.
The fact that the Citation related primarily to Operation Hammersley and the Streamer was named ‘Minh Dam’, led to the AWM and others to refer to the Meritorious Unit Citation as “including the CGWP Unit Citation”, ie. suggesting that there were two separate awards, the latter being for Operation Hammersley.
Two more RVN unit citations were presented; the “RVN Presidential Unit Citation The Cross of Gallantry with Palm Leaf” to 161 Bty RNZA (12 May 71) and the RVN CGWP Unit Citation to the AATTV (6 Dec 71).
————————————————————————————————————————
2 November 2019
DEFENCE HONOURS AND AWARDS APPEAL TRIBUNAL HEARING : CAMERON Vs DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
CLOSING STATEMENT PART 2
Why do the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley deserve recognition?
Five words sums it up: Determination, Initiative, Selflessness, Gallantry, and more than anything else: Guts.
On 18 February 1970, armoured vehicle crews led three attacks on the virtually impregnable Minh Dam Secret Zone: the first, a company quick attack; the second, a battalion deliberate attack; and the third, an armoured assault to recover the bodies of two of their fellow crewmen (with recovery mechanics putting their lives on the line). During the first two combined arms attacks, the infantry remained mounted in APCs. Armour assaulted alone on the third occasion.
An APC and a tank were destroyed by mines; another APC was destroyed by a satchel charge. Nine other AFVs were damaged by mines and enemy anti-tank rockets during the course of the Operation. Two crewmen were killed and twelve wounded. Operation Hammersley involved some of the most intense fighting involving Australian troops during the Vietnam War.
When the B52s, artillery, naval gunfire, ground attack aircraft had finished pounding the enemy position, the tanks led the way in once again. This time it was the field engineers who were at the forefront, locating and disarming mines and booby traps. One was killed and five were wounded.
Seventeen individual awards were made; nine to 8RAR and eight to members of supporting arms. If matters were to rest here, there would be no issue. Unfortunately, only one part of the combined arms team, the infantry, received recognition for their collective efforts. The injustice here is palpable. On behalf of those members of the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley, I ask for this be recognised and corrected retrospectively.
It’s been said that gallantry awards are ‘peer’ awards that is, they are recommended by those who experienced the same conditions and danger as he or she who is nominated. Those who voice this reasoning, such as a former CDF, usually do so to back their argument that retrospective awards should not be allowed to be made.
Today, however, we have the ‘peers’ of those involved … those who experienced the same privations and suffering, requesting that the bravery and sacrifice of their mates be recognised.
The 50th Anniversary of Operation Hammersley is next February. DVA are organising a national commemoration in Canberra. There will be other commemorations in other places around the nation.
These will be attended by members of the supporting arms, and their families … those on whose behalf I speak today; those whose bravery and sacrifice were vital to the success of Operation Hammersley. I have assured them that the Tribunal will weigh the evidence presented appropriately and I am confident that this will be the case. I am hopeful that, come next February, they will no longer feel quote ‘as if we weren’t there’ unquote.
Thank you.
Tomorrow: What was decided.
————————————————————————————————————————
1 November 2019
DEFENCE HONOURS AND AWARDS APPEAL TRIBUNAL HEARING : CAMERON Vs DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
CLOSING STATEMENT PART 1
“I started my Opening Statement by saying that veterans of the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley feel strongly that they have been unjustly treated. As shown, there is considerable justification for their feeling.
Defence has a policy of not approving retrospective awards. At a previous Hearing, the Chairman of this Tribunal asked … how can Defence reconcile its opposition to an award on the one hand, and its support for a unit when such an award is made … on the other?
Defence’s response was that … if the Minister decides not to adhere to our recommendation, then that’s his prerogative and Defence accepts his decision.
I’m not sure that this was what the Chairman was trying to get at.
A policy has been signed off by a Chief of the Defence Force. It would seem, therefore, that the duty of every ADF member is to support this position to the best of his/her ability (irrespective of any other consideration).
For this reason, 100% of the time devoted to this matter by Defence was directed at providing justification for NOT recognising the bravery and sacrifice for those members of supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. Not one iota of effort seems to have been directed towards the opposite case, ie. why members of supporting arms SHOULD be recognised for their bravery and sacrifice. There will be some who will argue that this is as it should be.
I think that the Chairman at the earlier Hearing, however, was actually asking about the ‘morality’ of the position adopted by Defence.
I don’t want this to sound disrespectful, but don’t commanders, leaders, and dare I say it, employers, have a duty to safeguard the best interests of those for whom they are responsible? How can this duty be abrogated, even if ordered from ‘on high’?
It used to be taken for granted, that officers would stand up for those they had the privilege to lead, if there was evidence that they had been unfairly treated or disrespected. Maybe that’s the real issue here: Defence feels that there is no injustice involved in supporting arms NOT being recognised for their contribution to the success of Operation Hammersley.
Today we have had two Vietnam commanders, who couldn’t be here, make statements on behalf of their men. We’ve seen two others attend as witnesses to underscore their respect for, and honour in leading, men under their command.
BUT … Defence boast that their file research has shown that it’s fully entitled to reject an application to the Australian Government to honour the bravery and sacrifice of soldiers who put their lives on the line at its behest during Operation Hammersley.
Supporting units involved in the Operation suffered three killed and seventeen wounded. Many, many, others have suffered in different ways and continue to do so today. The families of all those involved know the pain that the unjust recognition of the bravery and sacrifice of only one part of the combined arms team has caused.
I said in my submission to the Minister that “the solace of those ‘forgotten’ and their families is in your hands”.
But, of course, I wasn’t talking to the Minister. He didn’t read my letter. My words were read by a public servant (doing his/her job to the best of their ability). I shouldn’t have had any expectation that he or she would be moved by them.
The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, with respect, is a different ‘kettle of fish’. Today, there is an opportunity for the gallantry and sacrifices of ALL those involved in Operation Hammersley to be reconsidered, and for recognition to be granted, albeit retrospectively, if it’s found to be appropriate.
I asked at the start, that if the Cross of Gallantry Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley, what was the Meritorious Unit Commendation for?
The RVN amended Brigadier Henderson’s citation proposal to include reference to civil action work such building houses, roads etc. They also referenced 8RAR’s contribution to the RVN’s Pacification and DevelopmentProgram. These changes were obviously made to describe a variety of praiseworthy undertakings over an extended period, as was necessary to justify a Meritorious Unit Commendation.
Paradoxically, the RVN removed the listing of major 8RAR operations that the Commander 1ATF had included in his proposal. This was replaced with an emphasis on the importance of Operation Hammersley.
I contend that the RVN Joint General Staff were endeavouring to reconcile two things; ie. provide a justification for BOTH a Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation and a Meritorious Unit Commendation. They’d never had to do this before. If it was just a Cross of Gallantry … the Citation wording would’ve been straight-forward and would’ve referred to both 8RAR and supporting arms.
Part 2 tomorrow.
————————————————————————————————————————
31 October 2019
The second half of the Opening Statement is copied below. Over the next few days, I’ll post a copy of the Closing Statement, followed by a copy of the summary as to what happened and where to next.
DEFENCE HONOURS AND AWARDS APPEAL TRIBUNAL HEARING : CAMERON Vs DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
OPENING STATEMENT PART 2
“Leaving politics aside and getting back to the Minister … when I sent a follow-up submission, his Chief of Staff responded by saying: “As the citation was conferred on the Battalion by the former Government of the Republic of Vietnam, it is not within the authority of the Australian Government to extend this to other units not named as … under operational control of the Battalion …”.
There are three points here.
One: While evidence has been provided which shows without any doubt, that the Citation was conferred by the Republic of Vietnam, they only did so … following a proposal prepared by the Australian Task Force Commander, presumably with input from 8RAR. This means that, in effect, the award was initiated by what is now the ADF, ie. Defence itself, NOT the former Government of the Republic of Vietnam. I can speak more about the process involved later.
Two: It is clear that the Australian Government CAN extend eligibility for the Cross of Gallantry Citation. Precedents for this, under certain circumstances, exist. Of particular significance here is the extension of the award to 9 Sqn, RAAF; initially under the command of 1ATF and then later the RAAF Commander, Vietnam (who was the Deputy Commander AFV).
Three: Strong evidence is available which proves that the supporting arms, WERE part of the 8RAR Group involved in Operation Hammersley and under operational control of the Commanding Officer, 8RAR. These same command arrangements involving all three supporting arms, applied to all the 8RAR operations listed in the Citation proposal. According to the Minister’s Office, this means that the Australian Government has another basis on which to extend eligibility.
Interestingly … Defence have stated that there is yet a further possibility.
While opposing the retrospective approval of awards as a matter of policy, they acknowledge that if an administrative error at the time can be shown, then a retrospective award might well be appropriate. A former Director of Defence Honours and Awards told me that it’s for this reason that retrospective awards have NOT been ruled out by the Letters Patent for the Australian Honours System.
The Matter at Hand.
I believe that it is counter-productive to get caught up in technical issues relating to the precise meaning, interpretation and translation of wording, ie trying to infer what it was that was meant by one party or another. Defence, for example, have drawn the Tribunal’s attention to the reference in the Citation to 8RAR’s “continuous operations in the Long Hais”. The point being, that this supposedly underscores the fact that the award was for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty.
BUT …look at the reference in context, and another explanation becomes apparent: “Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’ …. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, theforces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone …”. Hammersley was the ONLY operation in which the Minh Dam Secret Zone was attacked. 8RAR did NOT conduct continuous operations in the Long Hais during their tour of duty.
As an aside, I can’t help but ponder the phrase “with a determined spirit”. Can anyone here really suggest that this was demonstrated ONLY by the infantry and that the tank and APC crews leading the assaults or the sappers prodding for booby traps, would not have been seen in the same way by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam?
(Please note: the engineers weren’t only clearing mines after the B52 strike, when the Minh Dam Secret Zone was cleared … teams of sappers were accompanying tank and APC troops, as well as the infantry companies, throughout the Operation from Day 1.)
Going back to being counter-productive, I believe that this is also the case if we get caught up in the technical aspects of Command arrangements, but I can address this in more detail later, if required.
Where to From Here?
The question now turns to whether or not the supporting arms deserve to be recognised for their contribution to Operation Hammersley.
On the basis of evidence already presented, and to be presented, during this Hearing, there can be little doubt that the contribution made by supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley justifies recognition … some would say, even to a higher degree to that awarded to 8RAR.
Without knowing the extent of the powers vested in the Tribunal, there would seem to be at least four possible ways that this could be achieved.
ONE. It could be deemed that, as the Cross of Gallantry award to 8RAR resulted from a proposal initiated by HQ 1ATF (in effect, Defence themselves); an administrative error, meant that supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley were NOT recognised as they should’ve been; and an extension of eligibility should be recommended accordingly. I can go into more detail about the administrative error that occurred.
TWO. It’s also possible for a finding that it was the intention of the Republic of Vietnam that the contribution of supporting arms to Operation Hammersley be recognised, and eligibility for the Cross of Gallantry Citation be recommended on this basis. I can also go into more detail about this.
A THIRD possibility is that it could be found that the bravery and sacrifice demonstrated by supporting arms in Hammersley is such that it warrants the award of the Australian Unit Citation for Gallantry (which was recently presented to units involved in Coral-Balmoral). This is the option supported by the 8RAR Assn. I have had my reservations about this because it seemed to me that it would a very strange situation for supporting arms to be so recognised, but not the main unit itself.
On the other hand, it’s worth noting that it was not until recently the Australia gained its own Honours system, and thereby a means of recognising its own military units. If such a system had been in place during Vietnam, I have no doubt that the 8RAR Group as a whole, would have been awarded a Unit Citation for Gallantry. (Interestingly, Australia also now has a Meritorious Unit Citation.)
FINALLY, another possibility is a finding that ALL units involved in Operation Hammersley should be awarded the Unit Citation for Gallantry, with 8RAR’s Cross of Gallantry Citation being regarded as an award for its whole tour of duty.
I hope I haven’t been presumptuous in suggesting these possible outcomes.
Thank you. “
————————————————————————————————————————-
30 October 2019
How did it go? It’s too early to call, is all I can say. Defence have been asked to report back to the Tribunal on a matter which could make all the difference.
In the meantime ….
DEFENCE HONOURS AND AWARDS APPEAL TRIBUNAL HEARING : CAMERON Vs DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
OPENING STATEMENT PART 1
Presiding Member, Members of the Tribunal, Former and Serving Members of the ADF, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for the opportunity to present the case in relation to an injustice that was suffered in 1970 by servicemen of A Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment, B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1 Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers.
Given that I wasn’t present at Operation Hammersley, how am I involved?
It wasn’t a millennium project per se, but around 2000, I started work on a book about Australian tank operations in Vietnam. It was published in 2012.
During my research, I interviewed many former tank and APC crewmen, as well as the engineers who accompanied them into battle. I was also privileged to have been given access to many of the letters they wrote to their loved ones. I quickly realised that, of all the ‘issues’ about which these veterans felt aggrieved, the lack of recognition afforded to those who participated in Operation Hammersley … was the one that was felt most keenly!
Records show that the crews of the supporting tanks and APCs, together with the sappers, were vital to the success of the Operation. Without their bravery and sacrifice, it would undoubtedly have failed. Defence has indicated that the contribution made by supporting arms is not disputed.
The Official History of the Vietnam War records that a Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Commendation was subsequently awarded to 8RAR. This included a Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation.
While the Commendation (or Meritorious Citation, as it is sometimes referred to) is acknowledged to have been for meritorious service over a prolonged period; numerous published references state that the Cross of Gallantry (which is for gallant conduct in contact with the enemy) was awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley.
I should clarify here, that the objective for the Operation came to be a long established enemy operating base located within a tunnel complex in the Long Hai Hills. With a reputation of being virtually impregnable, the enemy called it the Minh Dam Secret Zone. The term Long Hais is frequently used in the context of referring to Operation Hammersley.
Getting back to the published references … these include the former Governor-General, Major General Michael Jeffery (himself an 8RAR company commander during Hammersley). He states that “the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palm [was] earned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais.
David Rankin, another 8RAR company commander at the time, has written: “It was this Long Hai action …. that won the Vietnamese … Citation for the Battalion”;
Other such references include the Royal Australian Regiment History published only a few years ago, an 8RAR veterans’ Internet site; the Secondary School Teachers’ Reference Material for the Vietnam War; the 8RAR War Memorial Plaque and the Current 8/9 RAR Association Facebook Page. I could go on and on.
Interestingly, the 8RAR History states that 8RAR was “awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its actions in the Long Hai Hills.” Dr Bob Hall, the author and an 8RAR platoon commander during Operation Hammersley, recently added that: “it seems to me only logical that the other units that were involved should also be recognised including the Armoured Regiment and the Cav Regiment people, and the field engineers who also did a stirling job during the operation. The operation would have been very different had we not had the armoured and engineer support we had”.
There are many other references, including from the AWM, which state that the Meritorious Unit Commendation was awarded for Operation Hammersley.
It is obvious why members of the supporting arms involved in Operation Hamersley feel aggrieved. They do not argue that they should have been awarded the Unit Commendation, but they all feel that the Cross of Gallantry was for Operation Hammersley and their contribution to its success should have been acknowledged. (“It was as if we weren’t there”, one of them said). There are other official failures to recognise supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley that I can detail later if need be.
Interestingly, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam recognised their efforts. In March 1970, the Commanding General with responsibility for the part of South Vietnam involved, wrote to his US counterpart, requesting that his congratulations be conveyed to the (quote) “elements of the 1st Australian Task Force” (unquote) that undertook Operation Hammersley.
Accordingly, the US General wrote to the Commander of the Australian Task Force, adding his congratulations to the (quote) “8th Battalion Group” (unquote) for their combat achievement. The Task Force Commander copied the correspondence under cover of his own Minute, addressed to the “8RAR Group”. The addressees listed under this heading were: “Commanding Officer 8RAR; Officer Commanding A Squadron 1st Armd Regt; Officer Commanding B Squadron 3rd Cav Regt and Officer Commanding 1 Field Squadron.” The composition of the ‘8th Battalion Group’ that undertook Operation Hammersley, could not be any clearer.
I raised the injustice with the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. He responded to say that the Unit Citation for Gallantry was awarded for the contribution made by 8RAR “throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970”. These dates are incorrect as far as the Citation is concerned; again, I can address this in detail later if required.
I have references to 8RAR being awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for its whole tour of duty; references to this Commendation being for Operation Hammersley; and many references (as you’ve heard) to the Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation being for Operation Hammersley … but now we have the Cross of Gallantry Citation being awarded for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty. If this was the case, what was the Meritorious Unit Commendation for? I can also address this in more detail later.
It’s relevant to note that the United States at the time had two Unit awards: the Presidential Unit Citation (which was awarded to D Coy, 6 RAR for Long Tan) and the Meritorious Unit Commendation which was awarded to the AATTV. Is it purely co-incidence, or did the Vietnamese Government see it necessary for political ‘face’ … to recognise units of foreign Armies in the same way? The new RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation was presented to 8RAR in October 1970 and the new RVN Presidential Unit Citation was presented to 161 Battery RNZA (the battery that supported 8RAR during Operation Hammersley) a few months later.
The political dimension is evidenced in the signal sent by Colonel Whitelaw, Chief of Staff (Saigon) to Canberra on 23 October 1970. [ Flag J-17.] In essence, he said that … given the ceremony associated with the presentation of a US Meritorious Unit Commendation to AATTV, “it is politic’ for the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation to be presented to 8RAR with the same degree of ceremony.
————————————————————————————————————————
29 October 2019
Operation Hammersley: DHAAT Hearing
This is the Day! Endeavours over five years have gone into it.
But … what right do I have to speak for those who were involved in the Operation itself?
None … other than I have listened to their stories and read many of their letters. I have also consulted with as many as possible and received letters of support from their representative organisations (apart from one).
I have also consulted with, and shared information with, those who disagree with my position. … such as the 8RAR Assn
This is the last chance to achieve recognition for supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
Even so, the 1AR Assn continues to withhold its support. I would’ve hoped that the fact that I’m no longer a Life Member or even a member, would not be relevant. It seems, however, that this might not be the case. I’ve received no response to my emails providing details of the Hearing and the opportunity to offer support.
All I can say is that I will do my best.
I’ll post my prepared Opening and Closing Statements in coming Blogs. Readers can judge whether or not my presentations have been genuine, comprehensive and, most importantly, worthy of those I’ve tried to represent to the best of my ability.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
28 October 2019
RAAC Matters
An update of Corps matters was provided by at the RAAC Corporation AGM earlier this month by WO1 Grant Gripske, RSM 12/16. This was previously mentioned in a report on the AGM on 17 October. See http://www.raacansw.com.au/News.php
The recording (at the link above) is definitely worth listening to. A few snippets are offered below:
1 Armd Regt. Who is going to replace Lt Col John Holloway as the CO 1 Armd Regt at the end of the year? Best wishes to the outgoing and the incoming.
RAAC ARES. It seems that there’s an on-going system whereby ARES personnel may be selected to serve on full time duty in ARA units (having proved themselves while on ARES duty). Not only that … there was mention of a scheme whereby ARA personnel may be assisted to transition to the ARES on leaving ARA service. Sounds good.
2/14 LH QMI. It seems that 2/14 may be the first ACR to receive the Boxer CRV. Currently deployed to provide operational support in Iraq, they will be in the Plan Beersheba readying phase on return and this would be an ideal opportunity to be introduced to the new AFV. Lt Col Thomas was mentioned as the CO-designate.
Living History. This was the name I chose to designate an on-going means by which readers of ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ would add additional input and corrections, so that the account of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam would not be set in concrete as it was written, but could continue to ‘live’ as a history. The name has now been given to a program at the AWM whereby serving veterans from different conflicts are attached to the Memorial … both to interact with the visitors and to inform staff in the History Unit. An AWM publication is forthcoming.
Retention Rates. Apparently, there is a shortfall in both officers (lieutenant to major) and both junior and senior NCOs. Interestingly, changes in corps selection procedures led to a number of failures at a recent ROBC.
Coral Balmoral Cup. This competition was conducted for the first time at the SOA this year. I gather that it involves challenges set for both MBT and CRV crews. The good news is that the tank crew winners get to compete at the Sullivan Cup at Fort Benning and the CRV crews at the Worthington Cup in Canada. Well done to those who had the initiative to propose this (and those who approved it).
Congratulations. It was mentioned that Col Tony Duus was awarded the CSC recently. This was in respect of his service as Director AFV Systems, responsible for LAND 400. I believe that he has been (or is soon to be) promoted to brigadier. Well deserved all round!
————————————————————————————————————————
27 October 2019
DHAAT Hearing : 29 October 2019
At some point during the Hearing, one would expect the question to be asked … what exactly was Operation Hammersley?
I’ve provided the following summary in advance, so as to save time during the Hearing itself.
Operation Hammersley: A Synopsis
On the evening of 15 February 1970, a platoon from 8RAR ambushed a large group of enemy near the Long Hais. This resulted in the TF Commander postponing a planned 8RAR operation and tasking the Battalion to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force operation in the area instead. On 18 February, a prisoner indicated that other members of his unit were in a bunker system nearby. The 8RAR company commander decided to launch a quick attack to capitalise. The combined arms force comprised an infantry company mounted in APCs, with a tank troop leading. Field engineers accompanied all three elements.
Unfortunately, a tank became bogged while crossing a gully close to the objective. While it was being towed free, the APCs found another crossing and pressed forward to maintain the momentum. The enemy held their fire until they were sure of their targets. One APC was hit by three RPGs, the infantry inside were all wounded. It was immediately apparent that a strong enemy force was occupying the position.
While suppressive fire was being provided, the crew commander from another APC dismounted, together with an infantryman, and rescued the infantry from inside the APC (both were awarded Military Medals). Two crewmen from the first tank through the creek, dismounted to tow the APC and its wounded crew away from the bunkers. As this was happening, the enemy threw a satchel charge, killing the APC crew, setting fire to the vehicle, and wounding the tank crewmen trying to recover it (both the last were mentioned in dispatches). In the circumstances, the only option was for the attacking force to pull back.
CO 8RAR quickly redeployed his forces for a follow-up attack, this time with artillery and air support. Tanks again led, with infantry following in APCs. The enemy retired when confronted with the tanks’ massive firepower. It was at this stage that information from the prisoner captured earlier, revealed that an anti-tank minefield had been laid. The CO decided to withdraw. The enemy immediately took advantage, reoccupying the bunkers and bringing intense fire to bear on the tanks. One tank was hit by about eight RPGs,
Given Australia’s pending withdrawal from Vietnam, a political decision was made not to incur further casualties. The enemy’s Minh Dam Secret Zone had been located, but it would be up to artillery, naval gunfire, and air power (including B52s) to target it. Before this could happen, the bodies of the crew had to be recovered from the knocked-out APC. A wall of armour advanced on the position. With the cover of suppressive fire from the gun tanks, a tank dozer, driving in reverse, positioned itself in front of the carrier and pushed it clear of the bunkers. An armoured recovery vehicle was waiting; quickly hooking up and dragging it clear.
A delay in the bombing meant that it was not until 21 February that the 8RAR Group returned to the enemy position. The engineers were now critical in terms of identifying mines and booby traps, the enemy attempting to cause as many casualties in this way as possible. Not every mine was able to be found and casualties to both infantry and AFVs resulted. There was no doubt that the enemy had suffered a major defeat.
As reflected above, the Operation had major implications for the enemy over and above their casualties and material losses. In particular, the image that they had long promoted of their sanctuary in the Long Hais being immune against attack, had been destroyed. Both the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the local population had been shown that there was no such thing as a safe haven for the VC.
————————————————————————————————————————
26 October 2019
Australia’s Army : An Army in Motion
‘Army in Motion’; ‘Accelerated Warfare’; ‘Future Ready’ … buzz phrases all.
“Preparedness is dynamic. It requires us to be ready now, while concurrently becoming future ready.
To be ready now, we must harness the whole Army and leverage the potential of the joint force and the entire enterprise. We need both capability and capacity. We must be physically, morally and intellectually prepared for operational deployment, at any time, wherever we are needed. Army must also transform to capture future opportunities. Being future ready is a way of challenging the status quo; constantly evolving how we think, equip, train, organise and prepare to compete in the future. “
Everyone understands that we have to be prepared. But how prepared? Ready to deploy a task force overseas tomorrow? Next week? What state of preparedness does our threat analysis require?
Only a couple of days ago (see blog for October), we had a defence analyst stating that the concept of warning times was obsolete. If so, what replaces it as a basis for preparedness?
The following extract from an article in ASPI’s The Strategist, by Richard Brabin-Smith makes some very relevant points:
“Times change and we change with them, as the saying goes. Much the same could be said of warning times: as our strategic circumstances change, so we should reassess the consequences for contingencies that the ADF might be involved in and their associated levels of warning.
Warning time is a key concept. It has a pervasive effect on defence planning, being a strong determinant of the force structure, including the purpose and structure of reserve forces. It is a similar determining factor for the readiness spectrum of the ADF’s force elements and the associated levels of sustainability. At least in theory, it should have a strong effect on defence policy for industry. Perspectives on warning time are integral to the assessment and management of strategic risk. If views on warning time are too optimistic, the nation is subject to an inappropriate level of risk; if too pessimistic, then we incur unnecessary expense with little compensating benefit.”
Recent blog posts have reflected on defence strategy discussions which have proclaimed that Australian must be ready to expand its military base at very short notice. This doesn’t mean that warning times are non-existent. It means that we must invest in new ways of (i)detecting the warning signs and (ii) achieving consequent preparedness requirements for force expansion and deployment goals.
I see no indication that 2 Div (the ARES) is being asked to embrace this challenge. I see only more buzz words. Hopefully I’m wrong.
————————————————————————————————————————-
25 October 2019
Defence Security Classification Overturned.
The Blog on 21 October 2019 was entitled ‘Hammersley Hearing: Defence FOUO Submission”. I explained that Defence have provided a “supplementary submission” to DHAAT and that a ‘For Official Use Only’ classification was placed on the document.
For Official Use Only (FOUO) may be used on unclassified information only, when its compromise may cause limited damage to national security, Australian Government agencies, commercial entities or members of the public.
I explained to DHAAT that such a restriction seems to challenge fair and reasonable process in terms of a matter before the Tribunal, ie. I was prevented from discussing Defence’s submission with those whom I represent. I suggested that if the Submission really did contain material which could cause limited damage to any organisation or person, then Defence should redact those parts.
Thanks heavens, for the benefits that go with a society in which such matters can be discussed in free and open manner.
I’ve been advised that “Defence has agreed that the classification of its submission can be amended to Unclassified”.
So why was the classification placed on the document in the first place. Was this an attempt to gain an advantage at the Hearing? Probably not … I don’t think that conspiracy theory can hold water here. BUT … we still have the ‘Honours-in-Confidence’ classification that the RAAC Corporation say that Defence imposed on their submission (meaning that no one else was allowed to see it). Now here’s a case where I believe that conspiracy theory might well apply.
I believe that there are many people who are waiting for me to expose those such as Mr Souter and Mr Antulov (1st Armoured Regt Past and Present Facebook page) for what they are and what they represent. All I can say is that there are more important matters that must be dealt with … Soutar and Antulov (and their like) can be consigned (I was going to say to the dustbin of history) to an appropriate place in the overall scheme of things. Let’s just thank them for their service and move on to the real issues of which they either seem ignorant of or have no interest or capability to contribute to.
————————————————————————————————————————-
24 October 2019
Australia’s Defence Planning According to a Former Ministerial Advisor (Mike Scrafton)
Following my post on 18 October 2019, ‘Australia’s Defence Planning and Relevant Priorities’, Mike Scrafton has posted on John Menadue’s Blog, ‘Pearls and Irritations’
Whereas I complimented Paul Dibb on referring to implications for the rapidly changing strategic situation re ‘warning times’, Mr Scrafton claims that: “The whole notion of warning time is now obsolete”. He follows on by saying that:
“Wars are inextricably the outcome of motive and capability. An aggressor seeking to achieve some national strategic objective through the use of military force will always approach the choice with a calculus that involves the importance and urgency of the objective, the likely costs to the nation in pursuing conflict, and the prospects of succeeding. The costs would need to encompass the post-conflict situation. Dibb rightly points out that what has changed is the prospects of a regional power (if that includes the Indo-Pacific) now succeeding in attacking Australia.
A nation under assault needs to undertake a different assessment. The first factor is the cost of submitting to the aggressor. Would the post-war situation be an intolerable situation in terms of the welfare, well-being, prosperity, security, and autonomy of the state and its citizens? The second consideration would be the prospect of success if the aggressor was resisted militarily. Would a war present a possible existential threat or a serious deterioration in the long-term security of the defending state?”
Am I missing something? Is there anything in the above that explains why ‘warning times’ are obsolete? If this assertion is correct, Australia can do without its intelligence organisation (ASIS, DSD included).
Ditching ‘warning times’, means also ditching ‘lead times’ (the period needed to train military personnel to operate complex equipment and for the ADF to order increased stocks of ammunition and spare parts for its weapon systems). Of course, lead times would be less critical in terms of the latter, if the ADF’s stockpiling policy was more attuned to self-reliance.
Fortunately, Australia supports a free and open information network in which people such as myself can challenge the views of people such as Mr Scrafton. (Heaven help us if we were bound by the same constraints as some other nation states.)
Mike Scrafton was a Deputy Secretary in the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment, senior Defence executive, CEO of a state statutory body, and chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
————————————————————————————————————————
23 October 2019
HAMMERSLEY Hearing: Matters of Legal Significance
The following matters have been brought to the attention of DHAAT.
Defence state that a number of Commanders were extremely proactive in nominating their soldiers for Vietnamese awards; but this [attribute] cannot be attributed to RAAC Commanders over the period of Operation Hammersley. In essence, Defence is saying that it was the fault of RAAC commanders at the time of Operation Hammersley that their soldiers were not appropriately recognised.
This is beyond insulting and I’ve asked for Defence to withdraw the insinuation and apologise. How can any Government official have the affront to level such accusations? The point in relation to this matter is that it was the responsibility of the operational commander (ie. CO 8RAR) to recommend awards for the soldiers he commanded.
Defence also state that Major Count was a RAAC officer processing awards on behalf of COMD 1ATF and that he was well positioned to propose changes to COMD 1ATF to extend the Unit Citation incorporating the RVCGWP to supporting elements if he thought fit. The inference here is that because (supposedly) the then Major Count made a conscious decision not to have the Citation amended, supporting arms weren’t entitled to recognition.
The late Colonel Count MBE didn’t arrive in Vietnam until four months after Operation Hammersley. He would have been unaware of the detail of what happened. Furthermore, the proposal when drafted was for a Vietnamese Unit Citation for 8RAR. It was only after it was presented, that it was known that an award for gallantry in contact with the enemy was included.
I’m hoping that the Brigadier responsible for the report containing the above accusation will respond to my message to call me back to discuss the above.
————————————————————————————————————————
22 October 2019
Moral Dilemma
What do I do when someone copies one of my blog posts and reposts it on another forum … a forum that I can’t access?
The person concerned adds his own interpretation and encourages others to belittle and slander me.
I can’t respond because I don’t have access to the site.
On the one hand, I should be confident that my post will speak for itself. This would be the case if those who supported it were encouraged to voice their opinions. But if the context prevented a fair and open expression of views, then no such debate is possible and the whole value of presenting any point of view is undermined.
The post which was copied was that related to my Life Membership of the 1AR Association on 19 October (below).
The point of the post was to draw attention to the need for openness and transparency in all matters of governance which affect RAAC personnel. I believe that due process in my case should allow me to see a copy of the proposal for continuance of my life membership and the Minutes of the meeting and to be informed as to whether or not voting was conducted by a show of hands or some other means. In my blog post I said that I’d asked the President to see the proposal put forward in my name. But the context in which this request was set in the other Forum made it appear as if I was guilty of a heinous crime.
I have previously stated that the same principles of openness and transparency would mean that the C’tee should not be allowed to refuse a membership renewal application, without informing (i) the member concerned why his application was not approved and (ii) other members that such action had been taken. I believe that it wrong for members not to be informed of governance decisions made on their behalf by those who they have chosen to represent them.
The dilemma … should I immediately stop promoting open and full disclosure concerning all decisions affecting others; or should I simply ignore the ‘thugs’ and ‘lowlife’ of the Internet and social media, and leave them to their own indulgences?
Of course, I could restrict readership of my blog … but that is hardly keeping with the spirit of a forum set up to provide free and open discussion of RAAC matters … is it?
The Chatham House Director, Robyn Niblett, made the point that: “…systems in which governments are truly accountable to their citizens – through a separation of powers, the rule of law and a strong civil society – offer greater opportunities for domestic progress over the long term, as well as for constructive international cooperation in an interdependent world”.
I would argue that ‘governments’ and ‘citizens’ could be replaced with ‘associations’ and ‘members’ and that the statement would hold true. The ideal of “truly accountable” says it all!
————————————————————————————————————————-
21 October 2019
Hammersley Hearing: Defence FOUO Submission
Defence have provided a “supplementary submission” to DHAAT. I’ve challenged the ‘For Official Use Only’ classification they’ve placed on the document.
“Point that I want to make is that the following is the basis of the classification they’ve applied to their document:
For Official Use Only (FOUO) may be used on unclassified information only, when its compromise may cause limited damage to national security, Australian Government agencies, commercial entities or members of the public.
It’s been explained to me that this means that I can only show it my legal counsel (should I have one).
This seems to challenge fair and reasonable process in terms of a matter before the Tribunal.
As mentioned previously, my submission represents many veterans who believe that they have been subjected to an injustice.
In developing the submission, I consulted with many representative organisations and veterans themselves.
Is it right to deny me the opportunity to further consult with them in terms of the new material that Defence has suddenly found?
I can consult with a legal advisor, but can’t consult with those whom my submission has been made on behalf of (?).
Surely this is not a just limitation in terms of due process
You might consider asking Defence why they imposed the FOUO classification.
I find it hard to imagine that national security, Govt agencies, commercial entities or individuals could be caused ‘limited damage’ by Defence’s policy not to support retrospective awards.
Why, therefore, has this limitation on consultation with those I represent, been imposed? Is it a ploy being used to their advantage?
————————————————————————————————————————–
20 October 2019
Hammersley: Recognition for Supporting Arms
The initial response from Defence argued that they had numerous other requests for the extension of eligibility for the RVN Cross of Gallantry With Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation and asked that the Hearing be delayed until they had formulated a policy. Interestingly, these other requests had nothing to do with Hammersley. They related to the award of the CGWP to every Australian soldier who served in Vietnam, on the same basis that this award was made to all US service personnel
If the hearing was to go ahead, Defence advised that they would prepare a supplementary submission, as they had just come across a relevant file (three months after being requested by DHAAT to respond to the submission). DHAAT declined to defer the Hearing.
The Defence supplementary submission finally arrived late yesterday. DHAAT kindly emailed the submission to me and will forward the 37 attachments next week.
It turns out that the ‘file’ suddenly discovered, was the RAAC Corporation submission re Hammersley. The Defence position was that there would be no extension of eligibility for Operation Hammersley supporting arms. This is simply a continuation of their overall policy of not supporting retrospective awards of any sort. Defence had been holding the submission in case their examination of US award document led them to approve the award to all Australian servicemen. (The RAAC Corporation are not permitted to advocate something that is not in accord with HOC policy; which, of course, is always in accord with Defence policy.)
I have pointed out that there is a vast difference between an award made in recognition of bravery and sacrifice by supporting arms in a very significant battle, and the award being granted to all soldiers, simply for being ‘in-country’.
I have asked Mr Meloncelli, President, 1AR Assn if, in light of the above, the Assn might like to join with the 3 Cav Assn, the RAACA WA and 1 Field Sqn Assn in supporting the Appeal to be heard by the DHAAT on 29 October 2019. The former OC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and APC troop leader from Hammersley have provided very convincing statements and an oral history recording, to the Tribunal. The former 2IC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt is to be a witness, as is the President, 1 Field Sqn Assn. The author of the Official History for the Vietnam War has been called by the Tribunal to provide expert evidence.
The only representative body not providing support is 1AR Assn. This is somewhat of a paradox, given the extreme bravery, selflessness, and sacrifice, shown by A Sqn 1 Armd Regt throughout Operation Hammersley.
In the context of openness and transparency (the reason that this Blog was started) it’s of interest that the RAAC Corporation informed me that the HOC had placed an ‘Honours-In-Confidence’ classification on their submission to Defence, so nobody was permitted to see it. Following on from this, Defence have placed a ‘For-Official-Use-Only’ classification on their supplementary submission. I’m told that this means that I’m only allowed to show it to my ‘legal counsel’, should I have one. Why is it that matters which should be in the public arena for all to consider, end up being locked behind closed doors?
————————————————————————————————————————-
19 October 2019
1st Armoured Regiment Association : Life Membership
It didn’t come as a surprise:
“Dear Mr Cameron,
As advised in August this year, the subject of Life Membership for six people would be considered at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) on 12 October 2019.
The six life memberships were considered individually at the AGM and you are hereby advised that the AGM did not support the proposal for the confirmation of your life membership. Therefore, you are no longer considered to be a life member of the Association.
Keith Meloncelli President 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc. 17 October 2019”
As always, I’m interested in due (ie. fair and just) process.
I’ve asked to see a copy of the proposal for the confirmation of my life membership, but no response as yet.
One imagines that someone at some time would have read out my certificate of life membership.
Would the vote have been made by a show of hands (as distinct to a secret ballot), I wonder?
Interestingly, I haven’t been asked to return my life membership certificate. Presumably recognition for past deeds is not swept away with the new broom.
I’ll ask for a copy of the Minutes in due course, but I have a feeling I know what the response will be.
I wonder if all the other former life members had their honours reaffirmed?
Interesting wording by the President … he didn’t say that I’m no longer a life member, but that I’m “no longer considered to be a life member”. I wonder what the difference is? Maybe the next President will consider things differently?
————————————————————————————————————————p
18 October 2019
Australia’s Defence Planning and Relevant Priorities
Armouredadvocates has been calling for many years for open discussion regarding the ‘threat’ to Australia and the respective ‘warning times’, as a basis for policy making.
The following article is the first that I can point to which is based on such a logical approach.
We are now in a period of unpredictable strategic transition in which the comfortable assumptions of the past are over
… in the years ahead, the level of capability that can be brought to bear against Australia will increase, so judgements relating to warning time will need to rely less on evidence of capability and more on assessments of motive and intent.
The potential warning time is now shorter because regional capability levels are higher and will undoubtedly increase in the years ahead. How should Australia respond?
Contingencies that are credible in the shorter term could now be characterised by higher levels of intensity and technological sophistication.
This means that readiness and sustainability need to be increased. We need higher training levels, a demonstrable and sustainable surge capacity, increased stocks of munitions, more maintenance spares, a robust fuel supply system, and modernised and protected operational bases in the north of Australia.
For the longer term, the key issue is whether there’s a sound basis for the timely expansion of the Australian Defence Force.
The prospect of shortened warning times now needs to be a major factor in our defence planning. Much more thought needs to be given to planning for the expansion of the ADF and its capacity to engage in high-intensity conflict in our own defence in a way that we haven’t previously had to consider. Planning for the defence of Australia needs to take these new realities into account.
The only thing that Paul doesn’t mention is ‘lead times’. He refers to stock levels, but these must be predicated on lead times, ie. the time between ordering (eg. tank repair parts) and delivery. This, of course, must factor in the possibility that the country of supply might, itself, be under threat and wanting to keep such stocks as it has for its own needs. Another ‘lead time’ is that associated with developing the skills needed to operate complex equipment.
What role does the ARES play in the expansion of the ADF and the possible need for a ‘surge capacity’? If we were to confine the RAAC ARES to a dismounted role (as was so designated until ‘reframed’ recently) the skills and knowledge involved in mobile warfare will be lost in terms of any ‘surge’ capacity for the expansion of the ADF.
————————————————————————————————————————
17 October 2019
RAAC Corporation 2019 AGM (12 October 2019)
The following account, with thanks, is from the RAACA NSW:
“At the meeting, the state of the corps report was delivered by Warrant Officer Class 1 Grant Gripske, RSM 12/16 on behalf of the corps RSM. An audio recording of this delivery can be accessed by using the controls below.
There was considerable discussion on the possibility of utilising PMV (L) Hawkeyes and PMV Bushmasters to carry cav scouts to provide light recon given the mass of the new Boxer vehicles and problems with deployment beyond Australia. This light recon capability being provided by ARA and ARES components of the Corps. It was also noted that when cav scouts are provided to round-out ARA units, ARES PMV crews are also provided.”
There are some significant points here:
(i) The size and weight of the Boxer is believed to create difficulties with deployment beyond Australia. Surely this something that would have been taken into account during the development of the User Requirement and subsequent trials?
(ii) The above perception is so concerning that the operational deployment of a light cavalry capability was discussed. But Light Cavalry Regiments are ARES units. So it is, that it’s envisaged that such a capability would have to be provided by ARA and ARES “components of the Corps”.
(iii) When ARES cavalry scouts are provided to round out ARA units , eg on exercises etc, “PMV crews are also provided”. This is puzzling. Are ACR ASLAVs so used (and configured) to operating without cavalry scouts, that there is a need to attach PMVs to cavalry troops? No this can’t be right. Maybe someone will enlighten us all.
Apart from anything else, it would seem that there’s a perception that the size and weight of the Boxer will be an operational limitation. Seems that there might be some bridgebuilding to do here.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
16 October 2019
RAAC Corporation : An Ex-Service Organisation?
“There are some things which are true, and some which are not. There are many things which are debatable, or contentious, or even undecided. But the true things will always be true.” Mark Buckley
RAAC Corp not just an ex-service organisation, then again neither are the RAR Corporation, the SASR Assn, the Defence Reserves Assn, the Air Force Assn, nor the Naval Assn. All these organisations are members of DVA’s Ex-Service Organisations Round Table (ESORT). The RAAC Corporation is not. (But, let’s face it, not every organisation can sit around the table.)
But … the RAAC Corporation IS a member of the Alliance of Defence Service organisations (ADSO). Other members are:
Interestingly, neither the Legacy; Vietnam Veterans’; Partners of Veterans; the RSL; War Widows (among others) are members. What’s this mean? Without any insights into the ‘inner workings’, I would suggest that it means that communication channels are unlikely to be as effective as they could be. Why isn’t ADSO a member of ESORT? Maybe the answer is something akin to ‘too may chefs’.
ADSO claims to represent members of the RAAC Corporation. How are their views obtained? Indeed … are they obtained, or does ADSO simply work on the basis that whatever the ‘campaign’ organisers decide will be ok. It would seem that ADSO doesn’t hold AGMs or meetings of its member organisations (or even attend members’ organisations AGMs)
ADSO recently listed its policy objectives for 2019-2022 … were these prepared on a consultative basis with the grassroots members? (ADSO can simply state that they communicate with the member organisations, whether or not these organisations consult with their members, in turn, is up the them.) I am a member of organisations that are members of ADSO. I was not invited to contribute to the development of objectives. Would I have done so, if asked. Most definitely!
Of course, it’s just ‘par for the course’. I’m also a member of an organisation that is a member of the RAAC Corporation. I wasn’t asked if I had anything which I would like to have raised at the AGM. Would I have done so if asked? Most definitely!
“There is no doubting the value of highlighting the stages in learning identified here. I would caution against referring to it as the “Adult Learning Model”. There have many studies as to what constitutes success in teaching adults, as compared with children and adolescents. The Conscious Competence Learning Model would be a better title (or the Four Levels of Competence’). Interestingly the focus of Jared Tendler is entirely on the emotional-mental domain. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NNY5nS34Yio
Many people have suggested that there is a fifth and higher level to aim for and obtain. This follows on from the comparison with analysis and intuition; level four being ‘right intuition’.
The extract below (from https://www.businessballs.com/self-awareness/conscious-competence-learning-model/) relates how this highest level can be seen in physical endeavours, such as might be the situation when a commander is unexpectedly fired on and intuitively launches very successful a quick attack (without knowing beforehand that he/she could ‘go to that level’.)
“I have been aware of and using this four level model’s concepts for a great number of years… But, I always felt that there was another level (level 5), based upon the skills of level 4, that reflected an ability to be reactively creative. That is, to do for the first time something never before considered. The ability to intuitively react to a new situation with an optimally accurate response. The “Wow, I didn’t know I could really go to that level!” experience. I have occasionally happened upon this in both snow and water skiing, tennis and driving race cars when there was no time to think about how to solve a new puzzle, but my instinctive reaction did so. I have also seen skiers I coach momentarily get there without understanding why or knowing how to get back there. I suspect this is what is often referred to as ‘being in the flow’ or ‘in the zone’ and is more dependent on ‘allowing’ and holistic trust of the ‘body genius’ rather than causing from linear thoughts or inputs. While potential for this level 5 of performance can be trained and prepared for, few can produce it on demand (i.e., Michael Jordan, Tiger Woods). The foundation definitely lies in level 4 but the results are expressed as the ultimate performance potential of an individual.” (Roger Kane, Director of Education and Training SunburstSki Area, Kewaskum, Wisconsin, November 2005)”
“The re-location of the ADF’s Armoured Regiment to South Australia has opened up significant space in Darwin’s Robertson Barracks, including vehicle storage – essential during the rainy season. The Marines will have substantial room for expansion in future. New construction at Robertson is scheduled to take place within the 2022-25 timeframe.
Interestingly, Australia’s strict quarantine requirements mean that USMC military vehicles and helicopters have to be stripped down and cleaned in order to comply with entry requirements (the same stringent regulations apply to ADF equipment returning from overseas). This adds a significant cost in time and labour. Hence the USMC’s decision to retain 137 vehicles and a skeleton staff, at Robertson Barracks, in between rotations.
There is a significant overhead attached to operating out of Darwin (US$23 million per rotation was one figure I heard), so the USMC hierarchy naturally wants to maximise the training value and access to the region. As well as offering access to several ‘nearby’ ADF training areas, including the sprawling Bradshaw field site, Darwin has obvious locational advantages as a tropical springboard into parts of maritime Southeast Asia and Melanesia. The Marines already train together regularly with French forces out of New Caledonia, and mount an annual afloat exercise, Koa Moana, in September, to Timor Leste, PNG, Fiji and Tonga.”
“It was telling that the Marines kicked off the exercise with a long-range night raid against a fictitious Islamic State cell in the vicinity of RAAF Curtin, 900 kilometres west of Darwin. Now that MRF-D (‘Murph-Dee’) has brought along its own Air Combat Element, a 900-km operational radius will not go unnoticed among Indonesian military observers. They were invited to the exercise but did not attend.”
“Indonesia’s Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu was due in Darwin this week, for bilateral talks with Minister Marise Payne, including a briefing on Crocodile Strike. But his visit has unfortunately been postponed. Keeping Jakarta ‘on side’ with MRF-D is particularly important, given suspicions previously voiced within Indonesia about the nearby US military presence, notwithstanding its modest size.”
“This temporary airfield provides a space for these aircraft to park, refuel, land and takeoff, and was constructed by Australian soldiers and U.S. Marines,” he said.
The aircraft – along with Combat Logistics Battalion 1 – will support an infantry battalion, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, an artillery battery from 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment, as well as a platoon from 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, from various bases in California, Kennard said.
Those Marines will be hosted at Robertson Barracks, Darwin, he added.
During the rotation, a company of Marines will be hosted by the Australian Army 3rd Brigade at Lavarack Barracks in Townsville, he said.
“Training will occur at various locations throughout Australia and the region, including Kangaroo Flats Training Area, Mount Bundey Training Area, Shoalwater Bay Training Area, as well as exercises and engagements ashore and afloat throughout the Indo-Pacific region,” he said.
Marines from the rotational force will also participate in Talisman Saber, a biennial exercise that involves tens of thousands of U.S. and Australian troops training Down Under for a month in summer.
The Marines will be involved in training that addresses the entire spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian assistance exercises like Crocodile Response, to intense large-scale combat operations during Exercise Koolendong, Kennard said.
The Marines will work with the Australian army’s 1st, 3rd and 7th brigades, he said.
I wonder if there will a Marine liaison element attached to any of the ACRs?
I wonder to what degree the need to provide facilities for the Marines in Darwin, contributed to 1 Armd Regt’s move to Adelaide?
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 October 2019
The RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’.
The Blog post for 5 October 2019 explained (with relief on the part of ‘Armouredadvocates’) that the Army’s former policy (see 22 April 2018 post below) had been changed. The RAAC ARES are not to be confined to a dismounted role: … it’s just that they don’t operate AFVs and are not part of what is described as the ‘armoured vehicle capability’.
Light Cavalry Regiments “are enabled through non-AFV platforms”. These are explained as ‘a range of protected and non-protected mobility platforms’, such as the G Wagon and PMV Bushmaster.
There is an important issue here. The RAAC is the exemplar of ‘mobile warfare’, of which ‘armoured warfare’ is one part. Light Cavalry Regiments have a valid role within the strategy and tactics of mobile warfare. The School of Armour must accept responsibility for teaching the skills involved in mobile warfare as a whole, rather than focusing solely on a narrow perception of armoured warfare.
The importance of the Light Cavalry Regiment role must be emphasised, in terms of both doctrine and training opportunities, and supported with appropriate equipment, e.g. Hawkei variants.
Maybe ‘Armouredadvocates’ helped bring about a change in policy … maybe it had no influence at all. All one can do is try to highlight the ‘facts’ in an open and transparent manner.
————————————————————————
Blog post from 22 April 2018
RAAC ARES Units: Now Just Infantry Reinforcements?
In an address about the ARES last year, the CA stated that:
“As well as changes in recruiting, training and participation models, change is underway
with respect to equipment. Modern land platforms, such as the armoured vehicles being
acquired for the Army in Project Land 400, are highly capable. They are also highly
complex and costly. Due to the complexity of these vehicles they will not be crewed by
Reserve personnel. This is a factor of the number of training days per year necessary to
establish and maintain crew proficiency. The high cost of this capability also makes it
unlikely that our nation can afford more than a number sufficient to equip our full time
brigades.
Of course, the Reserve will utilise Land 400 Armoured vehicles, as Cavalry Scouts for the
Armoured Cavalry Regiments and as reinforcements for the infantry battalions of the 1st,
3rd and 7th Brigades.”
So … the reasons that RAAC ARES units are theoretically restricted to a dismounted role are
LAND 400 vehicles are too complex;
There are insufficient training days available for the ARES; and
LAND 400 vehicles are too expensive to acquire an ARES training pool.
Of course, the CRV complexity is not a problem if sufficient ARES training days are allocated, but this requires funding; as does the acquisition of ARES platforms.
But the ARES don’t have to operate complex and expensive LAND 400 CRVs, they could develop mobile warfare skills using the much cheaper Hawkei … but it’s an even cheaper solution to keep them dismounted.
Armouredadvocates has highlighted the RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’ for years.
———————————————————————————————————————–
12 October 2019
AGMs: 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation
Meetings on 12 October (today) have been scheduled as follows:
1AR Assn: Broadford, Vic; and RAAC Corporation: Tamworth, NSW.
The President of the former is to stand down, however, the founding RAAC Corporation Chairman is, as far as is known, to continue his seven (?) year reign. Is this not too long at the helm? When is the right time to seek new blood to rejuvenate an organisation (assuming, of course, that there are others prepared to ‘step up’)?
What will be on the Agendas?
Of course, one topic on the 1AR Assn AGM Agenda is that of voting on whether Life Members appointed under the original Constitution (which made no provision for such membership) should be reappointed. A vote is to be taken on the basis of each individual former Life Member —- yes or no? As a former Life Member … I’m disappointed that I’m not allowed to vote.
There would be no need for such voting, if the draft of the new Constitution, prepared by a members’ team, had been adopted. The C’tee explained that, ‘inexplicably'( ?), the provision (included by the President at that time) which stated that all former Life Members would be reappointed under the new Constitution, had been “overlooked” when finalising the new Constitution. I’m not holding my breath.
In the Blog post on 6 October 2019, the 1AR Assn matters that ‘Armouredadvocates’ has been calling to be addressed, were listed. Those related to the RAAC Corporation follow below:
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to Defence’s ‘official’ position.
The submission made by the RAAC Corporation (when asked by Defence if they supported my submission to Minister for the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard) would be made available to those who may seek to view it (given that the Corporation state that no prior submissions were looked at by them). [This is currently the subject of a ruling under consideration by the Information Commissioner.]
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the Associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege. (The 1AR Assn C’tee is now making available an ‘extract’ of the Minutes that they think to be relevant to members.)
Reminder: ‘Armouredadvocates’ was established to provide a forum for the free and open discussion of RAAC matters.
————————————————————————————————————————-
11 October 2019
The Importance of the Tank in the Australian Army
Following on 8 October 2019, an article published on 4 September 2019 in the Lowy Institute’s ‘The Interpreter’ is of interest: ‘You can’t always get what you want, but you can get what you need’ (Victor Abramowicz)
An extract is copied below:
“Considered against these needs, and in my view as a former Defence capability analyst, many of the Department’s acquisitions arguably do poorly on fitness for purpose. Vast sums have been, and are planned to be, spent on capabilities that have doubtful utility for the defence of Australia, and either exceed requirements for independent operations or are redundant to supporting the US.
Three projects (although there are others) illustrate this poor fit: the Army’s Abrams tank, the Air Force’s Growler electronic attack aircraft, and the Navy’s coming Attack-class submarines.
The 59 Abrams tanks, approved in 2004, cost some $770 million (in 2018 dollars, to help with comparison) and would have a key use in high-end warfare. While such units can support the defence of Australia against an invasion, every White Paper since 1987 has recognised this as the least likely threat, given Australia’s distance from those who might wish the country harm, and the Air Force and Navy offering strong defences against any who would try.
While the Abrams can be deployed in the region, such assets are clearly overkill for peacekeeping operations, while also poorly suited to the terrain. Further, if the US needs our support, it has some 1500 active Abrams.
“Poorly suited to the terrain”?? “Overkill”??
Heaven help us … here we go again! Poorly suited to what terrain? It was this mind set which stopped tanks being deployed to Vietnam until their firepower became essential … then it was discovered that mobility challenges could be overcome.
Overkill? Ask the infantry who’ve been deployed to Vietnam or Afghanistan whether or not 20 pounder or 120mm rounds were ‘overkill’ when they enabled them to capture enemy positions with considerably less casualties than if the tanks had been able to provide support.
Oh, for a representative RAAC organisation which is free from official constraints and is able to highlight the fallacies being promulgated in the media (as was the case with the ‘light tank’ debate before Vietnam). Thank heavens for those such as Ralph Eldridge at the time.
Hammersley: The Right Thing to Do? (You be The Judge)
Some readers might not be aware of the pressures which can be applied to those who seek to create ‘an open and transparent space for the discussion of RAAC matters.
To illustrate … one of the ‘threats’ I’ve received related to my “contention that 8 RAR with 1ATF may have submitted an application for the CGWP”. I was informed that “if; that is the case and can be proven, then it will destroy any submission to have the award extended to any other unit.
There are two fundamental points here.
“…if this is the case and can be proven…”. A copy of the proposal for a ‘VN Unit Citation’ for 8RAR has been located. It was signed by the Commander 1ATF on 10 September 1970. So, proof exists that it was Defence itself that initiated the award.
Why will this knowledge “destroy any submission to have the award extended to any other unit”? Why indeed? One would think (and expect) that the ‘truth’ is the most important element in all things. How can the ‘truth’ be damaging, i.e. how can it prevent any extension of the award to any other unit? Answer: vested interests must be involved!
Another implied ‘threat’ was being informed from a highly placed source, that there are “a lot of very senior officers both within and retired from the Army who may not necessarily agree with or support” the extension of eligibility for the Unit Citation, “regardless of the strength of the evidence”.
This is a continuation of the first threat, ie. if the truth that the award was proposed by HQ 1ATF is made known, very senior officers will intervene to ensure that it is made impossible to extend eligibility. Why? Vested interests once again!
How does one address a matter like this? For me, I regard it as a question of weighing the pros and cons, as with all things … the final decision being one based on doing the right thing.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
9 October 2019
The Importance of Tanks to the Australian Army
An extract from ‘Australia’s new armoured vehicles must operate from the north’ (ASPI ‘The Strategist’,| by John Coyne and James Rickard, 30 Aug 2019) is copied below.
“It’s surprising that, three decades later, the unchanged environmental challenge of ‘the wet’ has become a justification for moving whole units and capabilities—such as the tanks of the 1st Armoured Regiment—south to Adelaide.
If wet season factors are driving any plans to divert 1st Brigade’s IFVs to Adelaide from Darwin, it must be asked whether the vehicles themselves are fit for purpose.
As a former soldier, Molan argues convincingly that ‘there can be no sound defence policy or strategy without sound tactics’. At the same time, however, tactics should not be the sole driver of policy and strategy decisions. In this case, it seems that the tactical and administrative challenges of raising, training and maintaining capabilities in northern Australia are driving decisions that run counter to good national strategy.
In today’s increasingly unpredictable strategic environment, we are more likely to find ourselves operating throughout our region than defending our nation from within our own borders. That means the possibility of having to operate our armoured vehicles in the tropics is high. At the very least, the IFVs need to be able to operate across the length and breadth of Australia regardless of the season and the weather. Without that ability they’ll be of neither tactical nor strategic value.
One of the arguments often carted out against the value of tanks is that (supposedly) they can’t operate in tropical (Asian) conditions in terms of terrain, climate and vegetation. The very successful deployment of tanks to Vietnam and Afghanistan totally disproves this. But the argument refuses to go away (opponents will latch onto anything it seems).
What of the article above? Surely ASPI would know what’s up and what’s down? Is it true that climatic conditions forced the 1st Armoured Regiment to be relocated from Darwin to Adelaide and that, therefore, its AFVs are not fit for purpose? NO!
The fact is that Darwin is not an operational area. It was being used as a training base. Plan Beersheba requires Brigades to rotate through a training sequence of ‘ready’, readying’ and ‘resetting’ (my terms). Training areas must be available 12 months of the year. This was not the case in Darwin in the ‘Wet’. There is value in training in these conditions as an adjunct to ‘basic’ training; but the latter must be given priority.
The arguments put forward in the ASPI article do not hold water.
————————————————————————————————————————
8 October 2019
Future Warfare: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV)
The 70th Anniversary parade in Beijing has been widely reported (see video at end). One thought-provoking article appeared in ‘The Strategist’ by Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at ASPI.
Extracts are copied below:
“These new military capabilities—once deployed operationally—will increase the Chinese state’s ability to undertake anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) operations so that it can deter and deny US and allied military intervention into the western Pacific in a future crisis.
Most notable was the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). An HGV is launched by a traditional ballistic missile and then follows a flight path within the atmosphere, at velocities of up to Mach 10 (approximately 12,350 kilometres per hour). HGVs are designed to manoeuvre in a way that enables them to evade ballistic-missile and naval air-defence systems. Although the DF-17 could carry a nuclear warhead, it’s more likely to carry a conventional one in order to maximise the system’s operational utility. The system on display was atop a DF-16, which normally has a range of between 800 and 1,000 kilometres; the HGV would extend that somewhat.
…..
Finally, those planning the future structure of the Australian Defence Force should take on board the key systems that were on show in Beijing. In particular, it’s clear that China is seeking to enhance and extend its A2/AD capability in a manner that will make it more difficult for the US and its allies, including Australia, to project power throughout the Indo-Pacific.
How the ADF responds to the increasing range, speed and striking power of Chinese air, naval and missile capabilities has to be a key priority for our defence planners and should affect our thinking about our own naval and air operations in the region. The parade is a wake-up call that we ignore at our peril.”
The Blog on 2 October 2019 discussed ‘Multi-Domain Operations’, ie. land, sea, air, space and cyber.
It’s not just space and cyber where revolutionary developments are occurring, however.
The latest Defence Technology Review http://defencetechnologyreview.realviewdigital.com reports that once the M113AS4s have been replaced by IFVs (LAND 400 Phase 3), they could have a new life as robotic vehicles on the future battlefield (or to be precise ‘optional crewed vehicles’).
The concept of robotic vehicles, albeit not in a troop carrying role initially, will take some time to get used to; as one former M113A1 driver asked … “if the vehicle is not crewed, who will the grunts complain to about the shirty ride, uncomfortable seats, lack of air conditioning etc?”.
The following are the things that ‘Armouredadvocates’ has been calling for, for some time:
(i) The reason that an application for membership of the 1AR Assn is denied by the C’tee must be made known to the applicant and members; the applicant must have the right of appeal.
(ii) Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise ”to assist the Association’s endeavours” (and not be rejected because a perceived obligation would be created);
(iii) 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members (and available for them to view on the Assn website) which would include the procedures to be followed by 1 AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
(iv) The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR die.
(v) The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
(vi) No-one on RAAC or related personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
(vii) The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege. (The 1AR Assn C’tee is making available an ‘extract’ of the Minutes that it considers to be relevant to members.)
(viii) The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee. (The desirability of the goal has been acknowledged, but is yet to be put into practice.)
(ix) The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned. (Minutes of C’tee meetings are now made available to members, however, not all decisions are open and transparent.)
The following things are those that that ‘Armouredadvocates’ has called for in the past and have been implemented:
(i) The 1AR Assn would have a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
(ii) Those former 1AR members who desire to do so, can use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
(iii) The 1AR Assn now has a valid Constitution approved by members
(iv) The 1AR Assn Constitution is now available to be viewed by members on the Assn’s website.
(v) Minutes of the last 1AR AGM were published without any defamatory material.
(vi) Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings are now being made available to members.
(vii) A member received just and compassionate treatment from the Federal Court, overturning the orders against him (despite the lack of any support and compassion from the Association).
The RAAC ARES do have a role (other than providing dismounted cavalry scouts) … it’s just that they don’t operate AFVs. According to the above manual, ‘Light Cavalry Regiments’ “are enabled through non-AFV platforms”. These are explained as ‘a range of protected and non-protected mobility platforms’, such as the G Wagon and PMV Bushmaster.
So, when the Defence Integrated Investment Program refers to the “armoured vehicle capability” it doesn’t mention Light Cavalry Regiments, as they are no longer part of it.
Well that’s not necessarily the end of the world. ARES units can develop individual skills and organisational tactics, without having to be equipped with AFVs. Armouredadvocates has long suggested that the appropriate variant of the Hawkei would provide a suitable platform.
The problem that Armouredadvocates has been highlighting for some time, is that because they don’t operate AFVs, the School of Armour claims to have no responsibility to determine and certify training standards. They even went so far to say that the RAAC did not operate Bushmaster PMVs (which was clearly wrong as far as the RAAC ARES was concerned).
RAAC ARES units operate Bushmasters in a completely different role to the of the RACT (ie. Not under the command of a ‘packet commander’ in a convoy). It was agreed at a RAAC Corporation AGM that crews should be qualified in skills appropriate to RAAC employment.
It’s been said to me that RAAC Bushmaster crews are taught by unit instructors qualified at the SOA. This is fine and good, but are RAAC ARES Bushmaster crew competencies defined by the SOA? If the standards of training are audited, on what basis is this conducted?
One RAAC ARES member has already been killed in a Bushmaster accident, the unit CO referring to training shortcomings. Has this been fixed across the RAAC, or is it a matter of saving training dollars and to hell with the rest?
———————————————————————————————————————–
4 October 2019
The RAAC ARES Miss Out (Again)
The ADF Integrated Investment Plan (///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/MQ9MP4IE/2016-Defence-Integrated-Investment-Program.pdf) states:
“Armoured vehicles
6 .15 There are four elements to the armoured vehicle capability: `
armour – based on the Abrams `
cavalry – based on the current ASLAV and the future replacement Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle `
armoured mobility – based on the current M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier and a future replacement Infantry Fighting Vehicle `
armoured Combat Support and Combat Service Support (specialist versions of the above mentioned platforms).
6 .16 The current Abrams fleet will be upgraded to extend its life to at least 2035 . Upgrades will maintain the tanks’ effectiveness and lethality against evolving threats as well as enhancing their interoperability with other ADF platforms and systems . The ASLAV fleet will be replaced with new Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles from around 2019 to provide an enhanced persistent close reconnaissance capability . The Armoured Personnel Carrier fleet will be replaced with new Infantry Fighting Vehicles from around 2024 . These vehicles will be equipped with superior firepower, networking and protection and will be deployable rapidly by air in small numbers and in larger numbers by Canberra Class amphibious ships and logistics support vessels .
6 .17 Upgraded or additional facilities will be required at existing bases (including in Brisbane, Darwin, Puckapunyal and Townsville) and at selected weapon ranges and training areas (including Puckapunyal and Shoalwater Bay).”
What do we see (or not see)?
The RAAC ARES has been written out. No crew served platform (or even a protected mobility role).
No provision to ‘right size’ the Abrams fleet.
How can these things just pass by without any debate? If only there was an RAAC representational organisation which facilitated just that. In the absence of which … lone dogs bark at the moon.
It’s been suggested to me before, that liked minded persons should unite. Maybe the time has come. More to follow tomorrow.
————————————————————————————————————————
3 October 2019
Open and Transparent at Last!
The Blog Post on 10 September 2019 was entitled ‘Outstanding Investigations (I)’.
Following guidance from the Ombudsman’s Office, the response below has been received:
“This is a formal acknowledgment that IGADF [Inspector General ADF] has received your recent submission.
The Office of the IGADF will undertake a review of your submission and respond with the proposed way forward. Having assessed the submission, IGADF may choose to:
direct that an inquiry be conducted into all or part of your submission
direct that further information be obtained on which to base a more detailed assessment
refer all or part of the matter to another relevant authority
take no further action
We will keep you updated on the progress of our review.”
What more can anyone ask? Thank goodness for open and transparent investigative processes and clear reasoning for decisions which are able to be made public.
Or is this hoping for too much?
But wait … a new email has just arrived:
“The Office of the Inspector General of the ADF is considering whether this matter falls within its jurisdiction.
The IGADF provides a means of review and audit of the military justice system independent of the chain of command. It endeavours to ensure ADF members are treated equitably and in accordance with current policy. Our focus is military justice miscarriages or maladministration.
The now defunct Inspector General – Defence had as its focus unethical or unlawful conduct, involving alleged fraud, theft, corruption etc. Its functions have been largely supplanted by the Fraud Control and Investigations Branch.”
Hopefully, all will soon be resolved. The Ombudsman’s Office has been consulted about their referral to a ‘defunct’ organisation.
————————————————————————————————————————
2 October 2019
Multi-Domain Operations
“The Middle East appears to be sliding into a war and it may even have already started. It is a new kind of war, a 21st century conflict for which there is no formal declaration of war, no clear fronts and a wide variety of battlefields. There are attacks the provenance of which may never be known, and while some of the fighting is conventional in nature, much of it is not and involves drones in the air and viruses in cyberspace. More than anything, it is a confusing war, in which nobody really has control, not even those who are ostensibly leading it.”
The five-domain construct — land, maritime, air, space, and cyber — is heavily debated and probably due for an update. Multi-domain operations are linked to joint operations but are conceptually distinct. For example, a coordinated ground assault involving Marine and Army infantry is joint but is not multi-domain. In contrast, anti-submarine warfare involving surface ships and naval aircraft is multi-domain, but not joint. Multi-domain operations aren’t new, as coordinated campaigns between land and sea forces have occurred since antiquity. Army air defense is inherently multi-domain. So is naval aviation.
What is (relatively) new is the recognition of space and cyberspace as domains of warfare, where they were previously treated as enablers of land, air, and sea forces. If the United States does not need a new branch of the military to fight in every domain that technology affords, then fighting in space and cyberspace must be the job of the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. Difficulty with this cognitive adjustment has led to strategic discourse peppered with neologisms like “cross-domain synergy,” “multi-domain maneuver,” and “all-domain access.” Where the word “domain” appears today, it is often code for the emphasis of space and cyber concerns within traditional service structures.
Before proceeding further, it’s necessary to clarify that Army and Air Force efforts featuring the multi-domain label are only coordinated at the most superficial levels. When researching this topic, it’s important to identify which service’s point of view you’re reading. The bulk of publicity surrounding multi-domain operations has related to a concept called “multi-domain battle,” which was proposed by Army thinkers with early contributions from the Marine Corps. “Multi-domain battle” began as an information-age analogue to the 1980s-era AirLand Battle concept, which coordinated ground and air forces to offset the numerical superiority of the Soviet army in Europe. Also a product of its time, multi-domain battle imagined a ground force under threat of high-tech weapons designed to constrain its freedom of action (“layered standoff,” or “anti-access/area denial;” pick your Pentagon buzz-phrase).
In December 2018 the Army dropped the “battle” in favor of “multi-domain operations,” expanding its concept’s scope to include non-combat operations and improving alignment with Air Force efforts. The updated concept document, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, appears to have been carefully titled to avoid placing an Army trademark on the previously generic phrase “multi-domain operations” (and for the remainder of this article, I will use “multi-domain operations” in the generic sense, not referring to the Army’s proprietary concept). The Army seeks multi-service support for its vision, with a long-term goal of rolling it into a joint concept. A host of experiments and exercises have occurred under the multi-domain battle/operations label, including the Army’s participation in sinking the ex-USS Racine using HIMARS artillery during the 2018 Rim of the Pacific naval exercises.
You may like to make a submission in support and/or advise members so that they can do the same and/or attend.
The 3 Cav Assn and 1 Fd Sqn Assn are supporting this endeavour (ie. for recognition of the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley).
Many thanks, Bruce
You may wish to advise the CO 1 Armd Regt that, should the Appeal be successful, members of A Sqn will be entitled to wear the Unit Citation insignia while so posted.
A positive response is not expected, based on previous communications (see below); but who knows … we might be surprised.
13 June 2019: Email to the President, 1AR Assn :
“Dear President, the letter below covered an application to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT). It has been approved and the Tribunal is to review Defence’s decision.
If the DHAAT overturns it, A Sqn 1 Armd Regt personnel will be able to wear the RVN CGWP unit insignia while so posted.
The 1 AR Assn might like to advise the OC and SSM of this ‘news’. (They, in turn, may like to initiate some further investigation into Operation Hammersley by Sqn personnel to raise awareness of the traditions they carry forward.)
I’ve looked through the Tribunal procedures sent to me and they can call for public submissions (which they did for C-B). They may do this later, but at the moment they’ve asked me to forward any additional evidence.
Can you so inform any members of the Assn who were involved of the current situation and ask if they could send me a statement as to their experience at the time and sense of injustice involved in not being recognised. It seems to me that the greater the weight of evidence, the better.
Speaking of which, can the Assn do up a letter (through me) supporting the Review process as a means of correcting the injustice long suffered by its members etc. Possibly the C’tee could ask Graeme Unmack to draft it, given that he was a participant.
Many thanks, Bruce
3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn Assns are also preparing letters similar to that mentioned above.
What was the response? See below.
16 June 2019: Post by the President 1AR Assn on the 1AR Social, 1AR Members Only and 1AR Past and Present Facebook pages:
“A formal submission for Operation Hammersley has been submitted (in 2017/18) by … (the 1AR ASSN representative) and with the assistance and guidance of [the Chairman], RAAC Corporation. The submission, presented in accordance with laid down procedures, is currently under investigation by Defence Honours and Awards (Army Historical Awards Committee) and a decision still pending, is expected in three (3) or four (4) months.
The active submission has the full support of the current and previous committees and no other submission will be considered as they can possibly jeopardise or adversely impact on the consideration of the in-place submission.
The Association will not support any other submissions, particularly those submitted by individuals. A single line of approach which is the current submission is the only action supported.”
NOTE: It’s now known that Defence had lumped the above mentioned submission with those for Unit Citations to be granted to all Australian units that served in Vietnam, on the same basis as that made to US units. It’s been pointed out that there is considerable difference between a unit being awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for an action in contact with the enemy in which conspicuous gallantry and heroic conducted was displayed, and the same award being made to all units that served in Vietnam under the US Army General Order No 8 … just for being there.
When do you combine award and education postnominals, e.g. MBE and MBA?
Google advises that:
The only academic credentials (degrees) that you should list after your name at the top of the résumé should be doctorate level degrees, such as MD, DO, DDS, DVM, PhD, and EdD. A master’s degree or bachelor’s degree should never be included after your name
Business administration doesn’t require a licence, specific training or credentials, so people do not need to know you have an MBA. Using the credential unnecessarily might make employers think you lack confidence or are a rookie. It is not common practice to put your MBA after your name in most cases.
Earning your Master’s in Business Administration can qualify you for a promotion and is certainly noteworthy. However, it doesn’t necessarily warrant bragging rights every time you put your name on something like stationary, your signature or your business card.
In the end … who cares? I was just intrigued to find out if there was a ‘protocol’; and, if so, what it was.
It might be assumed by some that such qualifications provide confidence in a person’s ability to perform a function. But this is a bit like the idea that ‘rank equates to competency’. Of course, we all know that this doesn’t follow at all. It’s good to see the commitment being given to on-going Professional Military Education at all levels in the Army. This addresses the fact that technical competence is just one aspect of performance, meeting ethical standards is another (for which there is no post nominal).
The Blog post on 22 September was about ‘Doing the Right Thing’. I didn’t mention it at the time, but an interesting job title has been chosen by the Inspector General of Defence: ‘Ethics.Training’. This would seem to be one area, at least, which has its priorities right.
A quote from the latest DVA Newsletter: “Ministers also agreed to work together on a quantitative research project to better understand and support veterans who find themselves in prison or dealing with the criminal justice system”.
Wouldn’t it have been great to see this attitude take in respect to someone caught up in heartless bureaucratic nightmare recently?
No consideration was given at all to his active service and sacrifice on behalf of the nation (as a national serviceman). No leniency was being requested … simply that his personal experiences as a ‘veteran’ be taken into account when considering the matter as a whole.
His unit association rejected requests for assistance (even that of simply providing confirmation of his service). It was made known that members must not create a situation where a conflict of interest might arise for those in positions of influence.
Abandoned, to all intents and purposes by ‘officialdom’, it was left to those with whom he’d served, to help others ‘better understand and support’ him.
Fortunately, when the moment of truth arrived … the Court took ALL relevant circumstances into account and ruled in his favour. But how ‘heartless’ was it that, supposed ex-service organisations, in a position to do so … ‘declined’ when needed most?
May a brave new world, in which compassion reigns supreme for one’s fellow man, follow suit when the false idol of personal aggrandisement is finally realised for what it is.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
28 September 2019
RAAC Battlehonours
It’s amazing how many things we just accept as if they’d always been ‘facts’, without any doubt as to how they came about.
Delving into ‘history’ reveals that this is often not the case at all. For example ….
The 1 Armd Regt Standard and the 3 Cav Guidon could’ve been emblazoned with: ‘Defence of Saigon 1968’; ‘Long Hai 1967-1972’ and ‘Lavarack’; with the latter also carrying ‘Bien Hoa-Long Bien’.
According to files at the National Archives (which finally became available thanks to some really helpful staff), ‘Defence of Saigon’ would’ve been the name given to a battlehonour awarded for Operations Coburg (enemy KIA 145) and Toan Thang I (enemy KIA 276). (Another possibility was that ‘Tet Offensive 1968’ could’ve been the honour for Coral, Balmoral and Baria. In the end, the battlehonour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ was decided upon.
Although there was good reason to include Binh Ba as part of Operation Lavarak (enemy KIA 99), in the end it was decided that Binh Ba (enemy KIA 99) merited its own honour.
Many operations were considered in terms of battlehonours. Among them: Esso (24), Overlander (30), Capital II (46), Camden (nil), Kings Cross (49) and Hammersley (40). When these were discounted, there was no longer justification for ‘Long Hai 1967-1972’.
Interestingly, the Theatre Honour awarded to 1 Armd Regt was ‘Vietnam 1968-1972’. Given that 1 Armd Regt was withdrawn by the end of 1971, the Theatre Honour has recently been changed. Until now, it wasn’t known where the error originated.
I was pilloried for suggesting some months ago that planning should commence asap (I was quickly informed in no uncertain terms that nothing can be done until funding is approved). However, it seems that the length of time needed to simply contact people has now been appreciated. See below.
For the 2021 Overlord commemoration we’ve managed to contact 34% of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt personnel (63) so far … the others will be harder to track down, but we’ve got time in hand. (We’re approaching June 2021 as an opportunity for a 50th Anniversary commemoration for all those who served in the tank squadron during 1971, not just at the time of Overlord).
I wonder how the 1 Armd Regt Assn will approach their new responsibility for Hammersley … will their notices be limited to members who participated in Hammersley only?
I note that there is no mention of 8RAR or the Corps RSM RA Inf. This is disappointing. I understand that they initially rejected the RAAC Corporation proposal. Their reunion is still to be held on the Gold Coast from 26-28 Feb 20. DVA’s Director Commemorations told me that they are prepared to participate in an earlier Commemoration (hence the possible “10 Feb” date). Surely this is an occasion for which parochial matters should be put aside.
[Readers will recall earlier Blog posts arguing that the commemoration was unlikely to go ahead without the participation of the major unit involved … and suggesting that lobbying to this end be undertaken. I don’t know if this occurred, but congrats to DVA for ‘brokering’ a deal with 8RAR.]
It also seems a pity that the Corps RSM RAEME has not been included. We have notified the HOC RAEME re the Overlord Commemoration (in which RAEME were as much in the firing line as anyone else)
Subject: OP HAMMERSLEY 50th ANNIVERSARY PROPOSAL TO CONDUCT A NATIONAL SERVICE OF REMEMBRANCE
PURPOSE
My purpose in writing to you is to inform you all that on 14 March 2019, the RAAC Corporation lodged a formal request with the Secretary DVA seeking funding approval to conduct a one-off National Service of Remembrance to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Long Hais during Operation Hammersley 10 Feb to 9 March, 1970. The submission seeks that DVA fund, coordinate and support a National 50th Anniversary Commemorative Service in Canberra on or about Monday 10 February, 2020.
This purpose of this email is to disseminate early advice of intent to all participants of this historic Operation, through your Unit Associations of the proposal, in order give the matter full consideration of your attendance or participation.
GENERAL
DVA will notify if funding and support for the event is approved, in due course. Associations are requested to advise their parent Service Unit of this proposal, for their planning purposes also; viz * Provision of Standard, Guidons, Colours and Banners parties, and * Other representational considerations, should the event gain approval and support.
Advice will be provided at the earliest convenience when decisions are made by DVA. The event is proposed to follow a similar format and style as Coral/Balmoral 2018 and Binh Ba 2019 events at the Vietnam Memorial, and include a Last Post Ceremony at the AWM.
ACCOMMODATION AND FUNCTIONS
Unit and Corps functions in Canberra. Unit Associations will exercise responsibility for the organisation and coordination of these activities. However liaison and combined functions could be considered.
Accommodation and Venues. Organising these will also be the responsibility of Unit Associations. This notification is provided as early warning advice so that Units, Associations and individuals have sufficient time and space to consider plans regarding their attendance and participation in this proposed significant event.
CONCLUSION
If the submission gains approval, we will seek Unit or Association contacts to act on behalf of and for each represented Unit or Association. This may take the form of attending any planning meetings organised by DVA . Units who have personnel resident in Canberra would be most helpful to enable attendance in participation in planning coordination. The Corps RSM RAAC, Corps RSM RAE and RSM Ceremonial- ADF have also been informed. Informal discussions were held on the 5/4/19 with the Assistant Director DVA Commemorations and War Graves Section and he has seen the correspondence. For your information and consideration. Regards, Noel Mc Laughlin, OAM MBA, Chairman RAAC Corporation
Finally, …a reminder:
Upcoming Public Hearing Details
Notice is hereby given of the following upcoming [Defence Honours and Awards Appeal] Tribunal public hearings. Those who wish to attend any of the listed hearings are asked to contact the Tribunal on (02) 6266 1019 or dha.tribunal@defence.gov.au three business days prior to the hearing to register their attendance.
Date
Matter
Location
29 October 2019; 1.00 p.m.
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Cameron MC (Retd) and the Department of Defence – Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation – Units supporting 8 RAR
Canberra TBA
Last, But Not Least:
Name: Operation Hammersley or Long Hais? It has been suggested to Defence by some that Operation Hammersley should be referred to as the Battle of the Long Hais or simply Long Hais (as per ‘Binh Ba’ and ‘Coral-Balmoral’). The latter names, of course, are those given to battle honours awarded for the respective operations. Operation Hammersley was considered for a battle honour, but the relevant C’tee decided not to award one. The reasons for this will be addressed in due course. [An action in 1971 has been deemed the Battle of Long Khanh … this has been done to designate it as something separate to the wide operation of which it was part.] The DHAAT Appeal will continue to refer to Operation Hammersley,
—————————————————————————————————————————–
26 September 2019
ADF Contingency Planning: Is it All it Should be, at All Levels?
If you search ‘ADF Contingency Plans’ … what do you get? Not much.
HQ, Joint Operations Command (Bungendore) has responsibility for command and control of joint ops:
For the first time, the Chief of Joint Operations and strategic staff, the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations and joint staff, Component Commanders (Maritime, Land, Air and Special Operations) and their staff, the Joint Operations Intelligence Centre, 1st Joint Movement Group, and a portion of the Headquarters Joint Logistics Command staff have been brought together in one location..
Under CJOPS, HQJOC is responsible for the command and control of all Australian Defence Force operations worldwide. This means that each of the ADF’s Combined Task Forces (CTF) and Joint Task Forces (JTF), and the Australian contingents to UN peace monitoring operations, are directly subordinate to HQJOC, and their commanders report directly to CJOPS.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Headquarters_Joint_Operations_Command_(Australia)
Rapid Force Projection Contingency Plans
Who develops contingency plans? May well you ask.
Why is it that whenever, say, a Force Projection Conference is held … there are never any speakers who acknowledge responsibility for the plans that have been developed to send the ADF into harm’s way at very short notice?
Why not undertake a case study? Because (everyone will say) details are classified. But principles are principles. Just look at the excellent presentation given on the logistics of readiness (my interpretation) above. Who does the audit to check if the ADF is logistically ready to support its contingency plans (or even its aspirations). Does the Auditor-general have a remit here? How well does the Government oversee such matters? Are there any related performance indicators … or does everyone just assume that everything’s ok?
I posit that the days of anonymous people/directorates responsible for contingency plans should be over. It is time that those responsible for these Plans stand up and be accountable to both Government and the public and the Government acknowledges its ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the ADF’s Contingency Plans are well founded and logistically supported.
Case Study: When tanks were deployed to Vietnam at short notice, there was no crew protective clothing suitable for tropical conditions, available. Tank crews just had to do without the protective clothing that safety regulations demanded they wear when operating the tanks in Australia. Tanks were on stand-by for deployment to Afghanistan. I understand from the responses given to my enquiries, that protective clothing for crews would not have been an issue.
But is there an audited process to check on such real ‘preparedness’? What can be as important …training ADF members to meet competency standards (but this has a number of checks and balances).
The moral? BEWARE the claims about plans that are not audited.
————————————————————————————————————————–
25 September 2019
‘Contingency Plan GOANNA’.
A new book set amidst Australia’s Intelligence Service foibles and cyberspace …
‘Is it only very high placed Intelligence operatives who are given top secret codenames, or are some highly classified Contingency Plans also codenamed at this level, ie. even the codename itself is classified?
Middle East conflict has placed uncertainty over the world’s oil supplies … renowned investigative journalist, Jack Paget, looks into a hypothetical: does the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have a contingency plan should another country attempt to claim sovereignty over Christmas Island?
For Jack, Christmas Island is simply an example to develop a story. What he isn’t aware of, is that significant seabed oil and gas deposits were recently identified within its maritime boundaries. The information is known to only a very few within Australia’s intelligence community
Jack’s enquiries are immediately noticed and security services are quickly on the scene. While everything seems very puzzling, it is inadvertently revealed that a nation state IS examining the possibility of just such an Annexation. Any news of undersea energy reserves could drastically shorten the time for a Contingency Plan to be developed.
How many people know about this? What pressure is put on the journalist to end his enquiries?
One of Jack’s past girlfriends once worked at Australia’s Joint Operations Command Headquarters in Bungendore outside Canberra; she knows where the Contingency Plans are prepared and about the regular updates sent to HQJOC (the Australian Defence Force’s operation command centre). More importantly, she knows the electronic ‘id’ linked to the messages.
The journalist is drawn into a world of secrecy and deception … nothing is at all what it seems. Just in time, an operative from another secret service organisation ‘befriends’ Jack and alerts him to those trying to find out how much he knows. But whose side is this ‘friend’ really on?
Those working on behalf of the ‘enemy state’ are fully aware that Australia’s security is vulnerable if its electronic data ‘hub’ is able to be disabled. Their agents set out to breach the ADF’s weaknesses, capitalising on the vulnerabilities of the commercial security firms employed to save costs. Once the ‘outer’ security is breached, electronic ‘sabotage’ is relatively easy (and unable to be detected).
Soon after, Jack’s former girlfriend is found dead. It appears to be the result of a heart attack.
Just how well are Australia’s contingency plans protected against hacking? Is there a backup data ‘hub’ or will the supposed electronic ‘outage’, allow the Christmas Island Contingency Plan to be accessed and transmitted to those wanting it (and willing to pay a high price in both lives and money)?
Is it possible that the ADF’s ability to rapidly respond in terms of force projection, has been cut back in terms of political cost cutting? Is Australia really able to ensure the security of ALL its sovereign borders against ALL threats?
The vulnerability of Canberra’s Defence HQs (Russell Offices, Campbell Park Offices, Defence Signals Directorate, ASIO and JOC) have never before been laid bare by ‘insiders’, in such a manner.
This is a book which is a ‘must read’ by anyone who not only yearns for enthralling suspense, but also has Australia’s security interests at heart.
——————————————————————————–
One only has to refer to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, to see how plausible such as scenario is: “Regardless of difficulties, if the ADF continues to develop a reliance on this vulnerable technology without being prepared to operate effectively without it, Australia’s force structure will be weak against those who can exploit this weakness.”
Anyone who would like to order a pre-launch copy of the above book, please email me at cameronshome@bigpond.com
————————————————————————————————————————
24 September 2019
The Opportunities That Pass Us By … The Centenary of Cambrai
Did the RAAC family do enough to acknowledge (if not ‘celebrate’ the Centenary of Cambrai on 20 November 2017?
I suggested that former COs and RSMs (ie. those for whom service with 1 Armd Regt was a real ‘milestone’ in their careers) might like to contribute to a trophy or award to be presented on the Centenary and each subsequent Cambrai Day. This went down like a pork chop to say the least … one former RSM even told me that he didn’t need anyone such as me to tell him how to spend his money.
So … another suggestion … this time, to the 1 Armd Regt Assn.
Why not use some of the royalties from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ to subsidise the travel costs of two deserving soldiers from 1 Armd Regt (say, a trooper and corporal), together with a member of the Assn C’tee, to attend the RTR commemoration in France. The idea was that they would help cement bonds of allegiance with the RTR and RTR Assn and give informal talks to others about their experiences when they got back home. This is what they would’ve experienced: http://www.4and7royaltankregiment.com/2017-the-centenary-of-the-battle-of-cambrai/
But … another lead balloon.
We have the 50th Anniversaries of Operations Hammersley and Overlord coming up.
I suggested on the 3/4 Cav Regt Assn website that next month’s DHAAT Hearing into extension of eligibility to supporting arms for the Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Hammersley, could mean that serving members of B Sqn 3/4Cav would be entitled to wear the insignia while so serving and they might like to read up about the Operation.
What happened?
I was barred from the website.
The reason given: “Politics”. Apparently the RAAC Corporation considered my post to be inappropriate.
I’m reminded of the way the Army used to operate (hopefully it’s well beyond this today):
The Good Ole Risk-Averse Philosophy: If you suggested something good, nobody noticed; if you suggested something bad; you got a black mark; if you suggested nothing at all, nobody noticed. The moral? Why risk getting a black mark by suggesting something … just sit back, suggest nothing, do nothing, and you’ll be better off.
—————————————————————————————————————————–
23 September 2019
1 Armd Regt Motto: What do we Know of its Origins?
“Paratus es virga caederi, flamma consumi, et ferrum recipere?”
The latter would seem to be more applicable, referring as it does to ‘imminent action’, eg the motto could be taken to mean: “Ready for action at a moment’s notice”.
Googleexplains: “While the gross meanings of prepared and ready are the same, there is a fine difference between the two. Specifically, one of time and expectations: ready is much more immediate than prepared, and we use it when talking about something expected to occur very soon”.
What is the significance of Paratus, other than its Latin meaning? Why was it chosen as the motto of 1st Armoured Regt?”
“Paratus es virga caederi, flamma consumi, et ferrum recipere (Are you ready to strike with the rod, to be burned by the fire and die by the iron?),”
“Ita (Yes).’’
“Possit ignis suam vim donare, posit tus deorum fidem donare! (May the fire give you the strength and incentive for loyalty to the gods!)’’.
“Nunc Caratacus, gladiator sum! (I am Caratacus, the gladiator!)”.
Should new recruits marching into 1 Armd Regt be asked: ‘Are you ready to strike with the rod, to be burned by the fire and die by the iron?’.
The Central question goes unanswered …
Who was it that coined 1 Armd Regt’s motto and what was in his mind at the time? I wonder if anyone might think it worthwhile to delve further. Wouldn’t it be nice to see a little bit of the above history incorporated into 1 Armd Regt’s traditions? Perhaps the above question asked of those on parade on Cambrai Day by the CO … with everyone shouting “Paratus!” in reply. Then again, maybe it’s a little OTT.
————————————————————————————————————————-
22 September 2019
Doing the ‘Right Thing’
It’s a heading that I always thought went without saying, ie. no explanation was necessary.
But a day or so ago, someone said ‘Don’t be too hard on yourself!’ This made me ask … what difference does it make? Why be concerned about whether what you do is the ‘right thing’ or not?
Of course, as it so often is … you enter something on Google and you end up opening a Pandora’s Box. For example, I’d never really thought about the difference between ‘doing the right thing’ and ‘doing things right’. One way of explaining this relates to military terminology … the former being ‘strategic’ and the latter, ‘tactical’.
For me, however, doing ‘the right thing’ is a matter of moral judgement … about integrity and self-respect
These are some wise words on the subject: . “What about when the right thing isn’t so obvious, or when it’s decidedly against prevailing opinion? If you must act in opposition to what others think or do, will you be considered a disruptor, an outsider, someone to keep at a distance, decry, criticize? Temporarily experiencing discomfort when you do the right thing is likely something you can weather without too much difficulty. The key is to be comfortable with your choice. Again, when you start with integrity and follow through with action that reflects your integrity, you’re reinforcing your commitment to truth, justice and honor.”
There is no doubt, as just one example, that it was the right thing to do to reject the request not to make known the truth behind the proposal for the 8RAR Unit Citation. Not everyone will share the premise that ‘an award based on a false premise, is not an award worth having’. It is apparent that others are of the opinion that any means to an end are acceptable.
The whole raison d’etre for this site is to provide an open and transparent forum for the discussion of RAAC matters (which experience has shown is not always available elsewhere).
Unfortunately, as expressed above, doing ‘what’s right’ nearly always comes at a personal cost.
———————————————————————————————————————–
21 September 2019
Hammersley.
The submission to the DHAAT was made with supporting letters from the 3 Cav Assn and 1 Fd Sqn Assn (RAE). The following Blog posts explain why there was no expression of support is from 1AR Assn.
Interestingly, Defence have placed all applications it received re the CGWP Citation into abeyance until they develope an appropriate policy. Unfortunately, Defence grouped submissions re Hammersley together with all the others that they had received on the basis that Australian units should be awarded the CGWP Citation in the same way that all US units were. (There is a long-standing dispute about the translation of the Vietnamese wording involved.) By writing direct to the Minister, this false ‘moratorium’ imposed by Defence has been avoided.
DHAAT have opted to conduct a hearing into the Hammersley application as a separate matter (29 October 2019).
As will be seen, one can try and be as ‘consultative’ as possible … but it doesn’t always bear fruit.
13 June 2019: Email to the President, 1AR Assn:
“Dear President,
The letter below covered an application to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT). It has been approved and the Tribunal is to review Defence’s decision.
If the DHAAT overturns it [ie. Defence’s decision], A Sqn 1 Armd Regt personnel will be able to wear the RVN CGWP unit insignia while so posted.
The 1 AR Assn might like to advise the OC and SSM of this ‘news’. (They, in turn, may like to initiate some further investigation into Operation Hammersley by Sqn personnel to raise awareness of the traditions they carry forward.)
I’ve looked through the Tribunal procedures sent to me and they can call for public submissions (which they did for C-B). They may do this later, but at the moment they’ve asked me to forward any additional evidence.
Can you so inform any members of the Assn who were involved of the current situation and ask if they could send me a statement as to their experience at the time and sense of injustice involved in not being recognised. It seems to me that the greater the weight of evidence, the better.
Speaking of which, can the Assn do up a letter (through me) supporting the Review process as a means of correcting the injustice long suffered by its members etc. Possibly the C’tee could ask Graeme Unmack to draft it, given that he was a participant.
Many thanks, Bruce
The 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn Assns are also preparing letters similar to that mentioned above.
16 June 2019: Post by the President 1AR Assn on the 1AR Social, 1AR Members Only and 1AR Past and Present Facebook pages:
“A formal submission for Operation Hammersley has been submitted (in 2017/18) by … (the 1AR ASSN representative) and with the assistance and guidance of [the Chairman], RAAC Corporation. The submission, presented in accordance with laid down procedures, is currently under investigation by Defence Honours and Awards (Army Historical Awards Committee) and a decision still pending, is expected in three (3) or four (4) months.
The active submission has the full support of the current and previous committees and no other submission will be considered as they can possibly jeopardise or adversely impact on the consideration of the in-place submission.
The Association will not support any other submissions, particularly those submitted by individuals. A single line of approach which is the current submission is the only action supported.”
17 June 2019: Email to the DHAAT.
“Dear Tribunal, Further to my email below … the 1 Armoured Regiment Association made a submission the “Army Historical Awards Committee” in 2018 in relation to Operation Hammersley and the extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. I’ve recently learnt that the Association believes that this submission is still under consideration. Should this be the case and should further time be required by the Army Historical Awards C’tee to reach a decision, I’d be happy if the DHAAT were to allow this process to proceed to completion. Many thanks, Bruce Cameron”
Note:
The President 1AR Assn mentioned in his FB post above (he didn’t have the courtesy or …. to respond to me, the post was copied to me by someone who, unlike me, had access to FB pages concerned) that an earlier submission was lodged by the Assn in 2017. (Apparently this was based on the draft submission I’d provided to the Assn in 2015; a submission they declined to consider or progress at that time.) It appears that Assn’s 2017 submission “became caught up in backlog”, so an updated version was submitted in 2018.
A prerequisite for a submission to be accepted by the DHAAT is for it to have been previously rejected by Defence. DHAAT accepted my appeal following Defence’s decisions not to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation in 2017.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
20 September 2019
Recognising the Bravery and Sacrifice of the Supporting Arms Involved in Operation Hammersley.
When the DHAAT Hearing is held on 29 October 2019, it will be almost five years since I joined with others to campaign for the above. Unfortunately, the 1AR Assn made it clear that it was “not a ‘lobby’ organisation”, so there was no option but to make representations on an individual basis. The letter to the PM below … explains some of the background:
Dear Prime Minister,
FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
I write to seek your consideration concerning a matter which has resulted in I, and many Vietnam veterans whom I represent, having been subjected to a clear lack of democratic process by the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs.
It is my expectation, as a citizen, that a query to one of your Ministers regarding a matter within his/her portfolio responsibility, will result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner.
As well as consulting widely with relevant agencies, it is expected that a response be clearly explained, so as to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved. I’m sure that you would agree that these standards should apply equally to Ministers and those who act as delegates on their behalf.
I wrote to Minister Tehan on 28 February 2017. The seven page submission, on behalf of veterans involved, asked that he consider eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
Minister Tehan responded on 7 May 2017 to say that this could not be done because the Citation was awarded for the Battalion’s whole time in Vietnam, not just Operation Hammersley. Unfortunately, the information he had been given was incorrect (the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation was awarded to the Battalion for the whole year).
Another submission (eight pages) was forwarded to Minister Tehan on 10 September 2017 (attached), providing detailed evidence that the GCWP Unit Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley and those units attached or under control of 8RAR for this Operation, should be awarded the Citation also. Additional evidence was received soon after and a supplementary submission was made on 22 September.
Minister Tehan’s Chief of Staff responded on 16 November 2017 (letter attached).
He makes no reference to the evidence presented in the submission that the Citation was awarded specifically for Operation Hammersley. Instead, with stunning insult, he says “As you know, the citation was conferred on the 8th Battalion for its service throughout its deployment to Vietnam”. It is clear that the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs took no steps to ensure the merits of the submission were investigated; nor were the relevant standards of procedural fairness observed in an open and accountable manner.
The reasons for the response were not explained at all, making it plain the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved were not considered. Furthermore, the submission requested that those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) be consulted. No mention has been made of this and it has to be assumed that the Heads of these Corps were given no opportunity to offer advice.
If it is not enough that the submission was not considered, the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs introduced a new reason for not making the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN. This is exactly what the Government did last year with respect to RAN and RAAF units. (See attached.)
Will you please take steps to ensure that the submission for eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley … is considered in accord with the standards of democratic government set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Yours sincerely,
————————————————————————————————————————-
19 September 2019
The Essential Role of the Tank in Future Conflict
“You can cyber all you like, but there is a time when only a tank will do!”
The following article gives a rundown on the modernisation of the UK’s Challenger 2 tanks:
“The planned upgrade of the Australian Army’s M1A1 main battle tank (MBT) has to overcome some challenges before it can forge ahead. Under Land 907 Phase 2, the entire fleet of M1A1 ABRAMS will be upgraded to M1A2 but a spokesperson from General Dynamics (GD) told MONCh there are issues to address including the weight of the MBT.
The programme has passed Gate 0 and is pre-Gate 1 which is expected in December 2018 with a Request for Tender to be released in the first quarter of 2019. M1A2 has improved survivability but this means a considerable weight gain that could be an issue for the Australian Army.
The GD spokesperson said that it might not have amphibious capability – the ability to be safely transported on a landing craft – due to the increased weight and that the company is exploring solutions.
Although the US Army also operates the M1A2 it has fewer issues with the amphibious capability as they operate different landing craft and use different ships for these kinds of deployment.
However, GD said it is committed to finding a low risk solution in cooperation with the Australian government and there are options available for reducing weight, however the programme is at an early stage and there is not RFT yet.
Under an upgrade to M1A2 the tank can expect to receive Australian Government Furnished Equipment such as a new Battle Management System, the EOS Remote Weapon Station and a new communications fit among other systems. The spokesperson said it is undecided what exactly the Army wants but it wants to ensure that the tank is suitable for the digital age.
There will also be upgrades to the training and simulation systems that together with the new systems will allow the MBTs to remain in-service until 2035.
The spokesperson said that another project Land 8160 Phase 1 for the acquisition of a new Armoured Engineering Vehicle (AEV) will be rolled into the MBT modernisation programme, almost as a sub-programme.
Under Land 8160 phase 1, Australia intends to buy A2 chassis from the US Army remove the turret and put an engineering turret on instead and fit it with other modules such as bridging, plough and mine rolling kits. The combined total budget for both programmes is now about A$1.75-A2.5 billion.”
————————————————————————————————————————
18 September 2019
Will Rheinmetall’s Marketing Have Changed?
The Defence Technology Review has issued a Special Edition:
LYNX KF41 AND REDBACK TO JOIN BATTLE: Rheinmetall, Hanwha head to Land 400 Phase 3 IFV trials.file:///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/IE/4YU00UYK/DTR_Special_Bulletin_16_Sept_2019.pdf
“THE SHORT-LIST announcement it seems the world’s entire armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) community had been waiting for was made today, with bids by Rheinmetall and Hanwha selected to proceed through to the Risk Mitigation Activity (RMA) stage of the Australian Army’s Land 400 Phase 3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) acquisition.
With full details as to why the Lynx KF41 and Redback were preferred over General Dynamics Land Systems’ Ajax IFV and BAE Systems’ CV90 still to be teased out, it is worth noting that the two designs short-listed were also those which had been designed primarily in response to the Army’s Phase 3 specifications. So, whilst the Ajax IFV was a stretched version of a mature baseline hull with a new 30mm turret and the CV90 refreshed and enhanced in a number of areas – and hence modifications of existing platforms in both cases – the Lynx KF41 and Redback were effectively designed from scratch to meet Australian requirements.”
With at least $35,000 being paid to 1 Armd Regt (and who knows who else) prior to Land 400 Phase 2 being awarded to Rheinmetall, will infantry units now see such largesse?
Of course, there should be not a perceived conflict of interest of any sort if Defence regulations were followed, ie “Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.”
Hopefully the Inspector General of Defence will clarify what’s what. See Blog post for 10 September 2019 (under).
———————————————————————————————————————-
17 September 2019
The Republic of Vietnam: How Quickly we Forget Those we Fought Alongside.
Just a few days ago, I noticed on one of the many ex-military orientated Facebook pages, a photographical portrayal of the very elaborate 33 NVA Memorial at Binh Ba. This is also one of the highlights on the itinerary of tours aimed at Australians visiting the battlefields:
This morning we will drive to Binh Ba to visit the memorial of 33 NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Regiment located where a big battle between Australian soldiers and NVA took place on 6 June 1966. It was a famous battle after the battle of Long Tan.
The old market place in the village centre now hosts a memorial complex dedicated to the 33rd NVA Regiment, many of whose soldiers died in the battle.
We will also visit Long Hai hill (also called ‘Minh Dam secret zone’), the main base of Viet Minh and VC during the French and American wars. The many caves served as a natural shelter, medical care and head quarter for the troops. We will also visit the VC memorial to commemorate where more than 2,000 soldiers died during the war.
Is it only a communist regime which denounces the ‘losing side’ in what some would like to think was a civil war. How long, I wonder, did it take for the US to allow memorials to be erected to those from the South who died?
As things are at the moment (and have been since 1975), it seems impossible that such a ‘maturity’ will ever be reached by the Vietnamese Communist Party.
While we seem eager to think forgivingly towards our enemy, why is it that we have no time to consider those with whom we fought?
Former members, and their families, of the Armed Forces of the RVN, are not allowed to erect memorials to their dead. Cemeteries where they were buried have been bulldozed. They are not allowed to gather to commemorate their lost ones. Of course, having undergone intensive ‘rehabilitation’ after 1975, no such things should be expected. Sadly, they also miss out on employment opportunities and health care.
Thinking about the Tamil family about to be deported to Sri Lanka … Australia is not much different. Or is it only ignorance that allows such heartless and uncaring attitudes?
16 September 2019
Hammersley and Doing What’s Right
I sometimes have trouble knowing ‘what’s what’.
I was asked not to reveal the HQ 1ATF proposal for 8RAR’s Unit Citation that I came across in the AWM files (supposedly on the basis that it could prevent any follow-on award being made to supporting arms). I responded to say that I thought that an award made on a false premise, was not an award worth having. It goes without saying that all my submissions to the Minister and DHAAT are publicly available, but others claim that they can’t do this because of ‘Honours-in-Confidence’ restrictions.
I was also informed that Defence were considering an application to extend eligibility for the Hammersley citation and would have it completed by the end of the year. I informed DHAAT and Defence that my Hearing should be delayed pending the outcome of the Defence investigation. It turns out that Defence are formulating a policy with respect to the award of the CGWP Unit Citation to all Australian forces employed in Vietnam. The basis for this is, is that this award is made to all US forces who served in Vietnam. The Hearing into my submission is now to be held next month.
I’ve made the point that … there is considerable difference between a unit being awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for an action in which gallantry was displayed to the same degree as that required for the award to be made on an individual basis, and the same award being made to all units that served in Vietnam under the US Army General Order No 8 … just for being there. To group recognition of the bravery and sacrifice of those who comprised the supporting arms in Operation Hammersley, with that of all those who simply served in Vietnam … can only be seen to ‘belittle’ the former.
Of course, I should’ve expected that this was ‘par for the course’ after being told by the Chief of Army at the time, that he’d conducted a trial into whether or not unit COs were responsible enough to oversee the wearing of suitable headwear according to UV index (like primary school principals have to). He said that the trial had made no difference and he had to ban berets completely as a result (apart from SAS berets, course). I asked under FOI for access to the trial instruction and findings. I was eventually informed by Defence that no such documents existed.
I also had the experience of a retired Admiral telling me that the behaviour of members of the Vietnamese community (from the former RVN) that I was to meet with, was such that he had reported them to the police and the meeting had to be cancelled because of the ongoing investigation. When I contacted the police, I was informed that there had been no such report, nor was there any investigation. The Vietnamese delegation had not behaved inappropriately in any way at all.
That’s life (I suppose).
——————————————————————————————————————–
15 September 2019
Things that we can Achieve if we so Desire …
George Hulse represents 1 Field Squadron RAE in our efforts to have eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR, extended to supporting arms. He is currently in France. The following extracts from the 1 Fd Sqn Newsletter explain why he is there ..
“I met with the Mayor of Amiens in France, Madame Brigitte Foure in February 2018, and we discussed the idea of a monument, in her City, to all Australian engineer units that served during the Great War. She approved in principle the idea and appointed a project manager to investigate the feasibility and location for such a monument. The monument is to be designed in the form of a bridge as an icon of engineering. It will have two assignments. One is to provide an everlasting memorial to every Australian engineer unit that served in WWI and at the same time, to provide a useful piece of infrastructure for the people and visitors to Amiens in bridging one of the numerous water crossings in the City. I became aware of the work of a vibrant historical society in Amiens Queensland. And yes, the town in Queensland, near Stanthorpe on the Granite Belt, is named after its namesake in France. There is a letter of friendship that has been signed by officials in both areas and a robust intention to keep the ties between them active. Your Association committee thought that we in the RAE could build a sister bridge in Amiens (Australia) to complement the one in France. These two identical bridges would symbolise the linking of two nations in coming together in the name of a great cause – freedom. I met the head of the Amiens (Australia) historical society, Professor Roger Willis, and he is keen to see such an idea go forward. Roger is searching for a conspicuous position for the bridge in Amiens (Australia) and will let us know of his preferences. I will visit Amiens (France) on 8 August 2018 and keep the idea moving forward with our French friends. The RAE HOC, Brigadier David Wainwright DSC is interested in the 1 FD SQN GP RAE Association project and is supportive of it. Financial backing for the idea will be another challenge, but we will move into that space when we have solid estimates of the financial requirement to work with. Watch this space.” George Hulse President 1 FD SQN GP RAE Association June 2018
“The Concept of a Memorial The 1 FD SQN GP RAE Association identified the significance of Amiens (France) and 8 August 1918 during a reunion in 2015. The Association began a project to recognise the high standard of soldiering set by our forebears in the Great War. Visits to the battle sites in 2016 and 2017 indicated that there are a number of opportunities to honour the WWI Sappers with a memorial. The Amiens City Council and the 1 FD SQN GP RAE Association agreed that a candidate memorial bridge could take the form of a Bailey Bridge because it has a distinctive military look, it provides symbolism in that WWI brought two peoples together from the opposite sides of the world in the name of freedom and it would provide the citizens and visitors to Amiens a useful piece of infrastructure in its dual role as a monument and a footbridge. The potential memorial bridge project is a work-in-progress with a lot more work yet to be done before Australia and France can celebrate the idea as the only perpetual memorial to Australian engineer units of WWI.” George Hulse President 1 FD SQN GP RAE Association 26 March 2019
The above makes no reference to his central role in other matters, such as the DHAAT’s decision to award the Unit Gallantry Citation to those units involved in Coral-Balmoral and the book he wrote to commemorate Army’s explosive detection dogs.
What a role model for all veterans and associations!
——————————————————————————————————————–
14 September 2019
Mechanised Infantry or Armoured Infantry?
A ‘starter’ re Hammersley …
I find it hard to focus at the moment on anything other than the long overdue recognition of the bravery and sacrifice of supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. I’m writing a lot about it, but can’t include anything on the Blog as this will be a disadvantage as far as our appearance before the Tribunal is concerned. Hearings conducted by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) involve the two opposing parties (for Hammersley, these are me and the Department of Defence) presenting their ‘cases’ for and against to the Tribunal (a panel comprising a Chairman and four members. Proceedings are likely to last for around four hours; following which, the Tribunal makes its recommendation to the Minister. Hearings are open to the public (though attendees may or may not be invited to comment, if they have not registered to do so.)
Anyway, leaving that aside … something that’s been in my mind for some time is that recently I was talking to a serving Army member who remarked that the British Army had been using the tactics adopted by our mechanised infantry (M113AS4) as far as vehicle/dismounted commanders were concerned. I worry about this a little, as I feel that we are in a unique situation and should evolve out own tactics accordingly. The British Army, for a start, deploys armoured infantry and mechanised infantry. The former are equipped with Warrior IFVs, while the latter operate FV432s (APCS). We are currently operating APCs, so ‘mech inf’ would seem appropriate. BUT … should the designation change to ‘armoured infantry’ when the IFVs come into service? (The difference in name, of course, relates to the tactics associated with a mounted assault with tanks onto an enemy objective and the point at which the inf dismount.)
To what degree, should the Australian Army base its mounted infantry tactics on those of the British Army with its very different force structure?
Moving along, … the Blog has recently reflected the pressure being felt by those serving, to justify the need for the tank in the Australian Army. The following article is of interest:
(Interesting to see it acknowledged that, no matter what, technology can’t replace a well-trained tank crew.)
————————————————————————————————————————————-
13 September 2019
Today’s Army.
There are some fascinating on-line sites which some might not be aware of. One is ‘Grounded Curiosity’ https://groundedcuriosity.com/ I’m not sure where this originates from, but I think it might be linked with the Australian Defence College http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/
It is an extremely comprehensive forum, but does it challenge the Status Quo?
The Cove (https://cove.army.gov.au/) is aimed at a lower level of professional military education … one that has featured in the Blog quite a few times.
Seems to me, however, that we’re still lacking a forum designed to push the boundaries and challenge conventional wisdom, ie. a ‘think tank’ which encourages free thinking, rather than hierarchical ‘dogma’.
———————————————————————————————————————
12 September 2019
There was Sliced Bread and then …
… there was the letter from the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) enclosing the response from Defence to my submission to extend eligibility for the RVN Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, to supporting arms involved in that Operation.
DHAAT advised that they “eagerly await your comments [on the Defence response] and in the meantime we are progressing our own research”.
The date for the public Hearing has been scheduled for Tuesday, 29 October 2019, commencing at 1300hrs. It is to be in Canberra, but the venue is still to be confirmed.
The wording of the 27 May 2019 Application to DHAAT is copied below:
“The application concerns the officers and men of A Squadron 1st Ärmoured Regiment, B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment and I Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers. It seeks to correct the injustice resulting from their bravery and sacrifices in supporting 8RAR during Operation Hammersley, not having been acknowledged when 8 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR) alone were awarded the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation. Evidence is provided that these units were part of the “8RAR Group” which were congratulated by the RVN for their success during the Operation. They suffered three killed and thirteen wounded in action. Two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and a tank were destroyed, while another two tanks and four APCs were struck by anti-armour rockets. The 8RAR Association Inc supports retrospective recognition.”
Numerous Blog posts regarding this matter are to be found under.
————————————————————————————————————————-
11 September 2019
Outstanding Investigations (II).
The Freedom of Information Saga.
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) advised on 10 September 2019 (yesterday) that: “This matter is awaiting a decision by the Information Commissioner under s 55K of the FOI Act to affirm, vary or set aside and substitute the internal review decision of the Department of 26 June 2017”.
After two years, it seems as if the matter will finally be resolved. (‘Oh, what a web we weave …‘ ). Details were last posted in early April 2019 and are copied below:
Background.
In 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. I had hoped that the 1AR Association, together with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation (RAACC), might take the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1Armd Regt approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the other units involved.)
After years of inaction, in February 2017 I personally wrote to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, asking that the current limitation imposed on emblazoning Vietnam battle honours on unit colours etc, be reviewed. (I also requested that he approve a correction being made to the Theatre Honour emblazoned on the Standard.) The RAACC subsequently posted messages on social media sites advising that it had made a supporting submission.
I thanked the RAACC Chairman and asked if the Corporation’s submission was any different to mine. The Chairman responded to say: “I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours!”.
I was surprised at this, as I had automatically assumed that anyone preparing a supporting submission, would refer to the content of the submission that they were supporting. (Additionally, my submission had been available publicly since it was posted off.)
I then asked if I could see the Corporation’s submission, so as to know how it compared with the information I provided to the Minister. Surprisingly, the RAACC Chairman refused to allow me to see the submission that the Corporation had made in support of mine (no reason was given).
I was concerned that, if my submission was not approved, it might be because of information presented by the RAACC. I therefore wrote to Defence to “seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the RAACC submission made in support of my request to Minister Tehan”.
The Defence Response.
Defence initially provided the following reasons for not disclosing the document:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
The OAIC Appeal
On appeal, Defence stated the primary reasons were:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
When OAIC asked Defence to provide further justification, Defence provided two NEW reasons for not releasing the document:
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it; and
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
OAIC informed Defence that this was not adequate justification. Defence responded to say:
“As stated, … in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
OAIC informed Defence that this had nothing whatsoever to do with the document under consideration. More time was allowed for Defence to consult a ‘third party’. Defence then contended that:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
The OAIC Case Officer’s Position
As the case officer, you believe that “disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the Department’s operations since:
disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
In the Case Officer’s opinion, arguments for and against release of the document are:
In Favour. In this case, the following public interest factors favour disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Against: In this case, the following public interest factors weigh against disclosure of the document:
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.
The Applicant’s Response
Defence, in conjunction with the RAAC Corporation, have provided twelve different reasons that supposedly justify not releasing the document in question. In a process of rejection, followed by provision of more time, after more time, for Defence to reconsider … OIAC have rejected nine of these reasons. Turning to what’s left:
Will Defence have difficulty in obtaining similar information in the future if the document is released? I wrote to the Minister; the Minister’s Office asked for Defence’s position; Defence asked the RAAC Corporation what their position was; the RAAC Corporation provided this information to Defence. The Minister approved my (two) requests. The RAAC Corporation refuses to allow anyone to see their submission (maybe it was positive, as the RAAC Corporation claim; maybe it was negative). If the document was to be released, would, say, the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation or the 1 Field Squadron RAE Association, withhold information that Defence requested from them because of it?
Of course NOT. Integrity is crucial to their membership. A document written by their Executive on behalf of their members, would be made available to their members so requested. How could it not be, if the association had any integrity? I can obtain statements to this effect from a range of ESOs if need be.
Will an individual or group of individuals be harmed by release of the document? Defence have previously stated that the “welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy”. This is a very definitive statement; not ‘may be placed in jeopardy’, but “will be placed in jeopardy’. Presumably it is the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who is being referred to. It was he who stated that he’d prepared a submission for Defence supporting mine to the Minister, but without “having read anybody else’s including yours!”. As advised earlier, I can’t imagine that anyone could author a supporting submission, without reading the submission that it was supporting. Of course, if the submission was opposed to, rather than ‘in support of’, this could explain why release of the document could affect the author’s welfare (having stated the opposite).
But is this justification for not releasing the document? If I was being sentenced and stated that if I was sent to jail, I would kill myself … should the Judge take this into account? Of course, not … if His or Her Honour did, there wouldn’t be anyone in jail.
Will disclosure of the document prejudice the management function of an agency? The ‘agency’ in question is the Department of Defence. Defence has 65,000 employees. Is their management likely to be affected by the release of a document supporting an application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours and a correction to an error on a unit’s Standard? The opposite is much more likely. As the Case Officer has stated:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Conclusion. I ask that the OAIC consider the above.
————————————————————————————————————————
10 September 2019
Outstanding Investigations (I).
There are two matters pending. The first of these was initiated in a letter of 19 May 2019 (copied in the Blog post of that date). The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office has considered the matter and investigation is on-going. Details are repeated below.
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy and Implementation
Background.
The 1 Armoured Regiment Association’s 2016/17 Financial Statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd [1st Armoured Regiment] $5,000.00.”
The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence.It was subsequently discovered that total payments from this company to 1 Armd Regt amounted to $35,000; of which $25,000 was passed through 1AR Assn”.
In 2016/17, Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400 Phase 2, a $5.2b Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) acquisition project (which they were awarded in 2018).
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy.
Defence guidelines include the following:
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorshipis an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above. All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN)http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DI(G)_PERS_25-7-9-8615.pdf
An Investigation is Conducted.
A member of the Association, concerned that the masking of such a payment was not only unethical, but could also be illegal, brought the matter to the attention of the relevant area of Defence. He was subsequently informed that an investigation had been conducted and that there was no evidence of any breach of Deference Force guidelines, nor any wrongdoing on behalf of Defence personnel.
Whenever the topic arose, the 1 AR Assn C’tee stated that “there was no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer”.
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action”; and “Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
Was the Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Breached?
It would seem from the above that what happened was quite in order, ie. neither Defence contractors nor Defence associations, should be deterred from doing the same thing again whenever they might wish. Even if there was uncertainty from an ethical viewpoint, incorporated associations are not subject to Defence guidelines (therefore commercial entities could, in theory, continue to ‘mask’ funding payments to Defence through the ‘books’ of associations).
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the unit? Relevant Defence regulations make this clear: donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves even a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. As stated above, in this case the contractor involved was one of two contenders for a multi-billion dollar project (which they were awarded).
Although it would seem clear that Defence’s Ethical Relationship Policy HAD been breached, it appears that the outcome of the investigation absolved the 1AR Assn’s C’tee, Defence personnel and the contractor of being party to any wrong-doing; which, in turn, meant that there was no requirement to amend the Assn’s Constitution to prevent such payments being made again.
How can this be? Channelling funds from a Defence contractor to a military unit via a third- party association, by its very nature, is an act of deception, and therefore must be ‘wrong doing’. Is it not wrong to deceive, particularly when the deception facilitates a transaction that is in breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy?
Interestingly, the Victorian Act under which the 1AR Assn operates, states that “An incorporated association must not …. do any act that is outside the scope of the purposes of the association”.‘Masking’ payments from one entity to another would seem to be contrary to this provision.
What Should Happen Now?
It is my contention that a perceived Conflict of Interest has occurred, in breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy. I do not believe that either the 1AR Assn C’tee or Defence personnel knowingly committed any wrong-doing. However, the manner in which the investigation was handled, has failed to act as a deterrent to prevent the same thing happening again (quite the opposite).
I ask that:
Firstly, in the interest of open and transparent relationships between Defence contractors and Defence, the investigation be re-examined to confirm that there was no breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy. If a breach was found to have occurred, that this be given maximum publicity so that it is made more difficult for the same thing to happen again; and
Secondly, if Defence associations are not subject to the Defence Ethical Relationship Policy, that an examination be made into whether or not there is some means by which associations can be prevented from being used (wittingly or unwittingly) to circumvent this Policy?
——————————————————————————————————————–
3 September 2019
Note: This will be the last Blog Post until 10 September due to ARL.
The Importance of Tanks in the Australian Army
Recent Blog posts have related to the continuing challenge faced by those serving today to convince those who wield the power of approval for financial outlays, of the essential role played by tanks in the Australian Army. On 30 August, a recent paper by the RAAC Head of Corps was quoted … a much earlier paper (2007) is at:
Extracts from (the now) Professor David Kilcullen’s conclusion:
“Contrary to mythology, tanks are not old, expensive, technology only intended for killing other tanks in high-intensity warfare. Nor have they been supplanted by attack helicopters or infantry bunker-busting weapons. Moreover, contrary to the claims of some armchair commentators, tanks do not send an unacceptable political message, nor are they are unsuited to Asia–Pacific terrain and they are certainly not difficult to deploy outside Australia. Modern tanks are flexible, high-technology weapon systems that provide an enormous tactical advantage and can also reduce casualties by a factor of six in close battle. In the Australian context they operate primarily as part of a combined-arms team with artillery, light forces and air power.”
Our new tanks are … agile, well-armed, well-protected additions essential to the effective manoeuvre of a balanced joint team. This applies at every level of intensity because of the universal need to cross ‘the last three hundred metres’.
“We will win our wars only by considered and diligent development of integrated joint capabilities that include air and maritime power and, in the land forces projected and supported by such power, balanced combined arms combat teams of infantry, tanks, armed helicopters and artillery.”Ê
I find it hard to understand why links to the above article, as well as that of the Head of Corps, are not included on the websites of the RAAC Corporation and 1AR Assn. From my understanding of the situation, there is a real need to help change the prevailing attitude towards tanks; one that revolves around the ‘myths’ addressed in the above article.
Of course, it was the AAC that was founded in 1941, the RAAC not coming into being until 1948; three of the eight ‘regiments’ exist only as squadrons; and the ASLAV is an acronym for Australian (AS) Light Armoured Vehicle.
According to http://www.raacansw.com.au/About.php, the RAAC is the senior Corps in the Australian Army. This is not correct, the Corps of Staff Cadets is. (I fell into this misconception not so long ago … thank you to Derek Simpson for correcting me. I had attempted to correct a statement that the RAAC was the Senior Arms Corps of the Australian Army, by saying that the RAAC was not just the Senior Arms Corps, but the Senior Corps in the Australian Army. I think the best compromise is to say that the RAAC is the senior Corps in the Australian Army, other than the Corps of Staff Cadets.)
According to https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/corps/royal-australian-armoured-corps, the following is the order of precedence of RAAC units: 1st Armoured Regiment ; 2nd Cavalry Regiment ; 1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers ; 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry); 4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment ; 12th/16th Hunter River Lancers; ‘B’ Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment ; ‘A’ Squadron, 3rd/9th Light Horse (South Australian Mounted Rifles); ‘A’ Squadron, 10th Light Horse; and the RAAC includes tank and cavalry regiments.
It happens that ARA units take precedence over ARES units … 2/14 QMI and B Sqn ¾ Cav Regt are listed incorrectly; and tank and cavalry regiments have been replaced by armoured cavalry regiments.
I made myself very unpopular with the previous Director of the AWM in bringing such ‘errors’ to his attention. I contacted Defence PR some years ago and they assured me that they would correct the false info on Army’s PR websites. Nothing has happened. Why I am I not surprised?
“Last month Australian defence company, Electro Optic Systems (EOS), again denied its weapons system was being used in the Yemen war when photographs surfaced of four consignments of its Remote Weapons System for export in June and July to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. But what slipped through in relation to EOS is its February 2019 media release confirming its collaboration with Israeli company, Elbit Systems to develop a turret that ‘adds a next generation, medium calibre turret to the EOS family of weapon systems and has been designed to meet a rapidly emerging global market worth more than AUD$4 billion.”
“The Government has provided more than $36 million in financial assistance to EOS. Why? What for? Would taxpayers be comfortable with its collaboration with a company that ‘produces internationally banned cluster munitions, white phosphorus bombs and most of the drones the Israeli military uses to attack Palestinian civilians.”
What relationship does this company (EOS) have with the RAAC?
EOS is the company behind the Remote Weapon Station (RWS) fitted to the Bushmaster PMV. The School of Armour is the training authority for the RWS. The Marketing Manager/ Business Development Executive for EOS was the immediate past President of the 1 AR Assn. (He’s still shown as the 1AR Assn representative on the RAAC Corporation executive Council, though this has not been the case for a year … http://www.raaccorpltd.org.au/council.htm).
Why does the article above resonate with me? I was contacted by a lawyer commissioned by the previous 1AR Assn President. (I believe the lawyer was/is a member of the Army reserve and was not paid for his advice by the 1AR Assn; whether or not this has some relevance as far as anything’s concerned — I don’t know.) The lawyer informed me that I must NOT make any further donation to the 1AR Assn.
My Blog post for 28 June 2018 explains:
When Does a Donation Create a “Constructive Obligation”?
The Author’s Note in the history of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam (published in 2012) states:
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author ave been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours. “
The Association Committee was represented at the book launch and provided bank account details for the Publisher to pay royalties direct to the Association for use as the C’tee thought appropriate over time. There was no constraint, nor ‘obligation’, imposed by me on how any funds that might accrue should be spent, other than the expectation that they would be used “to assist the Association’s endeavours”. I trusted the C’tee of the Association not to use the funds for any other purpose (e.g. personal advantage).
Some years later, lawyers hired by the C’tee advised accountants hired by the C’tee that when I made the donation to the Assn, “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds” was created; this obligation only being removed when the donated funds were returned to me.
As made clear at the time of the donation, the funds were donated to assist with the purposes of the 1AR Assn, in any way the C’tee thought fit, i.e. there was no constraint, nor obligation, with respect to the use of the funds. [This was demonstrated by the use of the funds for purchasing building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club and for a TV set for D Squadron in Adelaide. This usage was exactly what I had hoped for, ie. to further the purposes of the 1AR Assn.]
Other members have subsequently made donations. Have these members also created “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds” and will the Assn have to refund the donations to them to discharge this obligation? If this situation arises, there would seem to be little point in anyone donating funds to the Assn.
If, on the other hand, these donations don’t create “a constructive obligation”, (i) why don’t they? and (ii) why did my donation so do?
It would seem important to inform members that either they can’t make donations; or if they can, what the criteria is that they must meet to avoid a ‘constructive obligation’ being formed. Would a donation made solely for the purpose of maintaining Centurion 169005, for example, create a ‘constructive obligation’?
This was in my mind when I commented on the draft Constitution, suggesting that where “donations” were mentioned, clarification re what constitutes a ‘constructive obligation’ should be made.
The C’tee’s response was that : “Decisions concerning the acceptability or otherwise of individual donations must be left with the Executive and Management Committees as each case arises”.
I guess that clarifies everything.
——————————————————————————————————–
31 August 2019
The Essential Role of Tanks in the Australian Army III
Just before I sent it off, I realised that the article was dated 6 November 2017.
Nevertheless, the comment is still relevant”
Dear Declan
“But the small number of tanks in each regiment [armoured cavalry regiment] means that they are too few to carry out effective armoured warfare against enemy tanks or an independent breakthrough role against enemy lines. To remedy that, the goal is to increase the fleet from 59 tanks to 90, as well as provide a number of support vehicles based on the Abrams chassis.”
Thank you for highlighting the urgent need to ‘right size’ the Australian tank fleet. You are absolutely right about the requirement, however, it’s not a matter of more tanks to spearhead action on the battlefield. It’s a much more mundane reason that they are needed … fleet maintenance!
When the 59 tanks were first acquired, there was only one field force unit (1st Armoured Regiment, based in Darwin). Following Plan Beersheba, there are now three separate squadrons, one in each of the armoured cavalry regiments located in Adelaide, Brisbane and Townsville.
This requires three separate repair pools, rather than one. (A repair pool provides a means of replacing a tank which breaks down, while it is being repaired.) Not only this, but the age of the tanks and their very high usage rate, means that timely repair parts supply is critical. Unfortunately, this is almost impossible to achieve … partly because of the model of tank operated by the Australian Army, compared that in service with the US Army.
This is well argued in a paper prepared by the RAAC Head of Corps three years ago (and published by the Australian Defence Magazine more recently).:
“Vehicles are not only required in the operational tank squadrons and in training schools but are also required to provision a robust repair and sustainment pool.
The size of this base should be sufficient to enable a ‘best practice’ maintenance regime to be applied, facilitating fleet rotation to reduce the burden per vehicle in regional areas and enabling major servicing, repairs and upgrades on a national level. A regime such as this would yield improved vehicle serviceability and availability rates.
For the present, the small fleet size is and will remain a significant constraint on the ADF unless a cost effective method can be developed to acquire sufficient vehicles to provision the operational and training forces as well as a robust sustainment pool. Without a ‘right sized’ fleet the ADFs tank capability will face even greater challenges as it continues to age.”
Problems with convincing others of the importance of tanks was brought to my attention by discussions with serving members at the Army Demonstration Day. This is an annual display at Russell Offices (AHQ) prior to the ADFA Open Day … this year it was held on 23 August. Equipment included an Abrams, ASLAV and M113AS4 from School of Armour (great to see the 3/4 Cav Regt badge being worn by those members of what used to be called Support Sqn).
I had some extensive conversations with serving personnel (who, as always, make you feel good about today’s Army). One of the topics discussed was the urgent need to ‘Right Size the Tank Fleet’ (from 59 to 90+, as highlighted in many previous Blog posts). Surprisingly, those at AHQ are still having to mount an argument for the need for tanks in the Army today! The arguments being presented are the ‘same old same old’: they’re no good in jungle; and they can’t be taken anywhere because of poor strategic mobility.
Of course, those with any background in armour, or knowledge of its impact on the battlefield … know that these ‘arguments’ are BS. But how to convince those who control the strategic priorities governing our force structure?
Surely, this is something that the RAAC Corporation should be right on top of? Three years since the HOC paper was distributed, there’s not been a murmur in terms of anything being done in support. The Corporation is not allowed to advocate any position which is contrary to that of the HOC, but you’d think that they could advocate in support of him.
I intend to emphasise whenever I can, the importance of tanks in saving lives and winning battles. I hope that the RAACA NSW might do what they can as well.
I might have asked the 1AR Assn to contribute, however, they have stated very clearly in the past that they are not a ‘lobby organisation’. (I tried to involved the Assn in defining the stresses placed on tank crews during training and operations … so that the mental health issues faced by RAAC members separating from the service might be better understood; the answer was very blunt … we don’t want to have anything to do with any such matter!
The Essential Role of Tanks in the Australian Army
After speaking to number of serving members at the Army demonstration day 2019, I stated on the Blog post for 24 August that:
“A lot of previous Blog posts have related to the seeming inaction in acquiring the ‘around 30’ extra Abrams needed to make the tank capability a viable one. Surprisingly, an argument is still having to be mounted for the need for tanks in the Army today.”
I was pleased, therefore, to see the following statement in an unexpected quarter (though he could have added: ‘… as well as being, the best way to overcome enemy defensive position’:
“Combat experience has proven that armour heavy enough to resist man-portable anti-tank weapons and mines is often the best way to counter well-armed light infantry. Australian forces demonstrated this with Centurion tanks in the overwhelmingly successful Battle of Binh Ba during the Vietnam War and foreign operations in recent wars have reinforced the lesson.”
The author, Reece Anthony, is “an ex-Ready Reserve Non-Commissioned Officer and has subsequently worked as a public policy analyst across a variety of sectors. Reece has tertiary qualifications in economics, finance, project management and journalism”.
Reece’s article, like all those I’ve seen (and I’ve seen lots) focuses on the ‘Threat’ and completely avoids any attempt at defining Australia’s national security interests, ie. what it is we want an ADF to be capable of securing.
I commented favourably on the article, however, as (apart from emphasising the crucial role of tanks) Reece brings a new perspective to the Threat scenario … the likelihood of conflict by ‘proxy’. The relevant paragraph from his article is quoted below.
“However, China’s ability and willingness to engage in asymmetric conflict against Australia should be taken seriously. The most practical way that China could take military action against Australia is by proxy war in the developing island nations that surround us. Think of an intervention like East Timor in 1999 where the militia had been armed with modern portable anti-tank weapons and landmines. It would be cheap and easy for China to arm and train local groups with weapons like this and they would pose a great challenge to Australian forces.”
There really does need to be more encouragement of such ideas being put forward and openly debated without fear or favour. (Why didn’t anyone propose taking the head off a Centurion canister round and using the blast effect to uncover possible mines in Vietnam … rather than sending mini-teams to check – a drill the enemy used to their advantage?)
My comments on the Cove site are as follow:
“Congratulations Chris. A great proposal, well presented. I hope it achieves the influence it deserves and encourages others to contribute their ideas, as you have done. I just have a couple of points to offer.
Firstly, the beaten zone of machine gun fire would suggest that the location of the firing point vis a via the target, is critical in terms of the effectiveness of the fire. An extension of the capability you propose would be its incorporation into planning for, say, support for a deliberate attack; or suppressive fire to restrict the enemy’s freedom of movement.
Secondly, you state that “Vehicles will never be able to achieve surprise in the same way that dismounted DFSW soldiers can”. I know what you mean (ie. Bushmaster, Hawkei vehicles), but there is a more generic view. Vehicles will always have the potential to achieve surprise, by virtue of their mobility. The advantage to be gained, depends on the nature and number of the vehicles. With the Bushmaster, the advantage might be in the unexpected deployment of combat troops to a particular location. With the Hawkei, it could be the demolition and blocking of a critical defile.
As an aside, I wonder if extended range ammunition is available, ie. with a longer tracer burn out time. It would be nice to think that the firepower that could be brought to bear, could also be adjusted (but I guess this might be a bridge too far). Finally, would the weapon mount on the vehicle have to be ‘stiffened’? “
Lieutenant Chris Thorburn is the Direct Fire and Support Weapons Platoon Commander at the Fifth Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment.
“It seems to me that the pendulum has swung away from White. That’s not just because the majority of the strategic policy community disagrees with his uncompromisingly bleak assessment of the future of US power and what it means for Australia.
It’s also because the Platonist approach focuses on the worst case, which is generally defined as military invasion of Australia, and that the defence force should be designed for that. However, over the past two decades, there has been growing acknowledgement that the ADF is not just a ‘break glass in case of emergency’ fire extinguisher, or an insurance policy, but a tool of national power that can and should be used every day to help shape the world in ways that support our national strategy.
This has been amplified by the view expressed by many that we have entered into a world characterised not by Platonic binaries (such as war versus peace) but by constant competition and even conflict at a threshold below war. This view has perhaps been put most compellingly here in Australia by ADF chief Angus Campbell in his analysis of political warfare.
I haven’t had time to consider the CDF’s views on ‘political warfare’; however, is Australia to use its military power to influence other nations, rather than as a means of defending our sovereignty? If so, should the Australian Defence Force be renamed the APPF (Australian Political Persuasion Force)?
Hugh White has stated in his book: “Our massive investment in amphibious land forces, and the even bigger investment in a fleet of warships designed to protect them, are completely unsuited to the strategic objectives and operational imperatives of the next few decades”.
What a surprise! The strategic objectives for which the ADF is unsuited, are not specified!
As quoted in recent Blog posts, according to the 2016 Defence White Paper: A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication is Australia’s first Strategic Defence Interest”. Second and third Strategic Defence Interests are: “a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and South Pacific (comprising Papua (comprising Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Island Countries), and a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order”.
The current threat assessment provides the raison d’etre for the standing Army. As that assessment changes, so too does the ADF’s readiness level and response force organisation. There is a real need for more debate about Australia’s defence preparedness, but there needs to be a limit on the sole rights of supposedly ‘acknowledged’ experts, to reign over this.
Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability
——————————————————————————————————————-
26 August 2019
Army Demonstration Day 2019: A Rethink
Two matters that I reported on in the Blog for 24 August have got me thinking. They are discussed below.:
“Right Sizing the Tank Fleet. A lot of previous Blog posts have related to the seeming inaction in acquiring the ‘around 30’ extra Abrams needed to make the tank capability a viable one. Surprisingly, an argument is still having to be mounted for the need for tanks in the Army today. I had always thought that the pressure on tank numbers related to the now dispersed location of tank sqns (compared to a centralised tank regiment when Abrams were acquired). This is not the only challenge, however. The availability of spare parts is just as much of a problem limiting tank availability.”
Increasing repair pool numbers (as a result of acquiring more tanks) was not agreed to be the ‘real’ solution, given that the main problem was repair parts availability. But is that not what repair pools are for? I agree that if you improve spare parts supply, the demand on repair pool numbers is reduced. But as long as spare parts are unavailable, repair pools provide the only option. The problem seems to be related to the Abrams model that Australia operates. As it’s out of step with the tanks in US service, spare parts suppliers are being scare. Of course, another way of addressing such a problem is through stocking policy. The whole situation, of course, is a self-reliance in a conflict.
IFVs. The restriction placed on the flexibility of infantry battalions through their manning of the IFV might not be as great as I previously thought. It is expected that there will be a small core of IFV specialists who will remain in the role. For others, training in an IFV role could be considered similar to training as a sniper and then moving on to say, amphibious ops. (This may be understating the challenge.)
In terms of manning, the platoon commander is also the IFV commander, while the section 2IC is the commander in other vehicles. It is hoped that not having external vision for those inside the IFV will not be a major problem, with the situational awareness systems called for in the new vehicle.
To what degree, I wonder, can we be confident in conducting operations fully closed down with situational awareness being provided to all those in the IFV via external sensors? It’s one thing to have improved vision blocks to inform turret crew, but expecting an infantry section to be fully aware of the battlefield when they exit on the objective … is this a step too far for electronic sensors? The section 2IC is the IFV commander, the section commander dismounts. It’s the IFV commander who has best understanding of what’s happening and the most effective firepower at his disposal.
Unlike the section commander, the platoon commander is the IFV commander. When he dismounts, who takes over from him? Does the platoon sgt then command the firepower and manoeuvre of the IFVs?
I’m sure that they’ll work through it eventually; but it makes you wonder if there’s been sufficient debate regarding the pros and cons of all the options (including the RAAC manning the IFVs).
———————————————————————————————————————
25 August 2019
Australia’s Defence Strategy and its National Interests
“Defend new Zealand’s sovereignty and territory, and contribute to protecting new Zealand’s critical lines of communication;
conduct a broad range of operations in the South Pacific, including leading operations when necessary, to protect and promote regional peace, security and resilience; and
Support new Zealand’s presence in the Ross Dependency of Antarctica, and work with other agencies to monitor and respond to activity in the Southern Ocean.”
A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication is Australia’s first Strategic Defence Interest.
Second and third Strategic Defence Interests are:
… secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and South Pacific (comprising Papua (comprising Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Island Countries),
… a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.
I’ve said it before … although they might sound similar, the statement of New Zealand’s primary national security objective is much more specific: “Defend new Zealand’s sovereignty and territory, and contribute to protecting new Zealand’s critical lines of communication”. It is a specific action statement, rather than an aspirational goal.
New Zealand states categorically that it will defend its sovereignty in the Antarctic, for example; whereas, Australia gives no such assurance re Christmas Island or Cocoas (Keeling) Islands (for example).
I believe that Australia must spell out its core security objectives as a first step to any rethinking of security strategy.
The Atomic Tank
Previous posts (Atomic Tank I, II and III) were posted on 30 July, 2 August and 7 August respectively. What great news to learn that RAACA NSW have decided to donate $1400 to cover the shortfall in Graeme Munsell’s and Barry Hodges’ publication costs. Fantastic to see the RAAC ‘family’ working together in this way. (Oh, that it might happen more often!!).
———————————————————————————————————————–
24 August 2019
Army Demonstration Day 2019
An annual display at Russell Offices (AHQ) prior to the ADFA Open Day … included an Abrams, ASLAV and M113AS4 from School of Armour (great to see the 3/4 Cav badge being worn by Support Sqn members). [See Note below.] Had some extensive conversations with serving personnel (who, as always, make you feel good about today’s Army). Topics discussed were:
Right Sizing the Tank Fleet. A lot of previous Blog posts have related to the seeming inaction in acquiring the ‘around 30’ extra Abrams needed to make the tank capability a viable one. Surprisingly, an argument is still having to be mounted for the need for tanks in the Army today. I had always thought that the pressure on tank numbers related to the now dispersed location of tank sqns (compared to a centralised tank regiment when Abrams were acquired). This is not the only challenge, however. The availability of spare parts is just as much of a problem limiting tank availability.
Tank Sqn Org. The numbers of tanks allocated to the Resting, Retraining and Ready Brigades (my terms) under Plan Beersheba, are 10, 14, and 14. In the latter, the sqn comprises three troops of four tanks, with two in SHQ
1 Brigade. The Cultana training area is ideal for manoeuvre exercises (it also has very good access to medical facilities, avoiding the logistic ‘headaches’ associated with many other training areas when planning exercises). The Edinburgh base area provides good amenities for soldiers and families.
Multi-Role Combat Brigade. The reinforced brigade concept reported a while ago in Armouredadvocates, is just one of a number of organisational options available depending on various contingency plans.
IFVs. The restriction placed on the flexibility of infantry battalions through their manning of the IFV might not be as great as I previously thought. It is expected that there will be a small core of IFV specialists who will remain in the role. For others, training in an IFV role could be considered similar to training as a sniper and then moving on to say, amphibious ops. (This may be understating the challenge.)
In terms of manning, the platoon commander is also the IFV commander, while the section 2IC is the commander in other vehicles. It is hoped that not having external vision for those inside the IFV will not be a major problem, with the situational awareness systems called for in the new vehicle.
Personal Weapons. The ASLAV includes mounting brackets for an F88A1C Austeyr carbine variant of the F88 Austeyr for each crew member. The MAG 58 commander’s mg is designed to be easily removed and used in a ground role, if necessary to dismount from the vehicle (that’s a good move). Unfortunately, the Browning (Mk III?) 9mm pistols are still in service with little known about their replacement.
Employment of Bushmaster by RAAC. Good to see the enthusiasm of 12/16 HRL (I think) members showing the public over the Bushmaster. It wasn’t so long ago that it was being said that the Bushmaster was not an AFV and that it was completely inappropriate for the RAAC to operate it. There is undoubtedly a battlefield role for the PMV (hence the equipping of regular inf battalions). While being denied in some quarters, the RAAC has operated the PMV for many years. It does not do so, however, in the same manner as the RACT, ‘ie. in convoy under the command of a packet commander. Hopefully, responsibility has been accepted to train RAAC personnel to a level appropriate for their usage of the vehicle.
Note: Thanks to Derek Simpson for pointing out that: “the comment of seeing the Bsqn 3/4 Cav badge by Support Sqn members is innacurate. They are members of B Sqn, support Sqn is a part of the Schools history now”. What I should’ve said (and meant to say) was that it was great to see the 3/4 Cav Regt badge being worn by members of B Sqn, 3/4 Cav Regt performing the duties of what used to be Support Sqn, ie. crewing and maintaining the School of Armour vehicle fleet to enable them to be available as and when needed for the conduct of training courses.
———————————————————————————————————————
23 August 2019
Army Demonstration Day 2019
An annual display at Russell Offices (AHQ) prior to the ADFA Open Day … included an Abrams, ASLAV and M113AS4 from School of Armour (great to see the 3/4 Cav badge being worn by Support Sqn members). [See Note in post above.] Had some extensive conversations with serving personnel (who, as always, make you feel good about today’s Army). A report tomorrow.
“Learning Technologies, a branch of the Army Knowledge Centre, provides Army with a niche capability that produces industry-standard media to optimise learning and knowledge acquisition. The branch is comprised of a team of Education Officers, multimedia technicians and audio-visual specialists. This video: ‘Army’s Learning Ecosystem’ was recently produced by the team as part of a Professional Development activity.”
My response was as follows:
Hi Guys, Congrats on a great video. The way in which all parts fitted together was tremendous to see.
But I feel that one part was missing altogether. I’m referring to the formal system by which things that happen on active service can be analysed and ‘lessons’ deduced; these lessons being fed back into the training environment so that those replacements going into the war zone are able to benefit accordingly.
This used to be called Operational Analysis. It is much much more than an after action report. An example … mines started out being laid on the ground. It was drilled into tank crews going to Vietnam to pay particular attention to any disturbance on the ground in front of them. Then the enemy realised that by attacking an AFV from above, they were able to target its most vulnerable point. What happened? Tank crews continued to be taught to focus on the ground. Why? There was no system of Operational Analysis to deduce lessons and pass them back in real time to the places where they needed to be understood.
It seems to me that we’re no further advanced today. Or are we?
——————————————————————————————————————-
22 August 2019
Australia’s Defence Strategy
The following article appeared in Defence Connect’s website newsletter on 14 August 2019:
“It is time for us to throw open the debate about our force structure. It is time to ask what more do we need to do and what do we need to be capable of doing.” Dr Malcolm Davis, ASPI
You quote the above.
In order to spark debate about Defence strategy and force structure … please try to define Australia’s national interests. Unless this is done, any other discussion is groundless. (Perhaps the same might be asked of ASPI and Dr Davis).
National interests could include, for example, protection of Australia’s off-shore islands and associated oil and gas fields; and safeguarding of Australia’s maritime supplies and exports. Once these goals are defined, then one can embark on consideration of how best to control or deny access to particular maritime zones.
The starting point for any strategic consideration (having defined the priority of national interests) is always the threat assessment. Following on from this, are applicable warning times; following from these is the ADF’s force structure and readiness level.
You further state that:
“Enhancing Australia’s capacity to act as an independent power, incorporating great power-style strategic economic, diplomatic and military capability, serves not only as a powerful symbol of Australia’s sovereignty and evolving responsibilities in supporting and enhancing the security and prosperity of Indo-Pacific Asia.”
All the rhetoric aside … can you state simply what you believe the Government has tasked the ADF to be capable of doing? This is of immense interest to Defence manufacturers (as you would appreciate). If the Government has tasked the ADF to be capable of action outside Australia’s national interests, then we all need to be concerned.
As long as the ADF core security objectives are ill defined … we have a problem.
————————————————————————————————————————
21 August 2019
C Sqn (1971) Reunion (Part 4)
Following on from 19 August and earlier …. copied below is an email sent to the President 1AR Assn yesterday. It is self-explanatory.
Dear Keith,
Thank you for including my early warning notice of a proposed C Sqn (1971) 50th Anniversary get-together to be held in Canberra in conjunction with a National Commemoration of the Battle of Long Khanh (Operation Overlord), in 1AR Assn information to members. I note your advice that you amended the notice to say that the National Commemoration is under “active consideration” by DVA, so as to avoid the impression that it has been given definite approval.
You explanation for this is as follows:
“In relation to your word is not good enough, I stand by the comment. Please go back to Maj Gen Nothard AM CSC (Retd), DVA’s National Manager of Commemorations, and ask for written confirmation, if that is who has told you. If it is true I’m sure he would be more than happy to formally release the confirmation of the activity for the benefit of veterans, especially now that you are telling veterans that it is a go.
Happy to be proven wrong however, I have more confidence in the multiple channels that I have spoken with, who have stated it is under active consideration and no funding has been announced. Additionally they have also requested that we do not release misleading or wrong information as it could impact on considerations being conducted. How you word your request to get confirmation and prove me wrong is up to you however, without that confirmation I will rely on my information not yours.”
Why be so devious? Why do you have to hide the identity of the “multiple channels” that you have spoken to. “They” have given you information, but you will not say who ‘they’ are. Could these multiple sources be ‘insiders’ who might be at risk of some penalty if their identity was made known … or do they have any authority at all? Can you really expect such secret “channels” to be given credence. (This reminds me of the 1AR Assn President who said that the Members’ Forum had to closed down because a formal complaint had been made. Nobody could be told what the complaint was about, or who had made it, because it had been made ‘in confidence’.*) I assume that the information that has been given to you is also ‘in confidence’. BUT, interestingly in your case, it’s just the sources that have to remain secret. The closure of the Members’ Forum for such ‘secret’ reasons, led directly to me setting the Armouredadvocates blog “to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters”. Why can’t there be open and transparent discussion of the DVA National Commemoration planned for 7 June 2021?
I will try to present one side of the story. The former CO 3RAR (1971) initiated a proposal for a National Commemoration. The proposed date was not the date of the Battle. His discussions with DVA led to a date of 7 June 2021 being agreed. The DVA National Manager included this in a list of proposed Commemorations. The Minister gave his in-principle support. There was no funding approval at that stage. When I spoke DVA’s National Manager for Commemorations some months later, he indicated to me that both the Operation Hammersley (2020) and Operation Overlord (2021) were to be commemorated. The date for the latter was the 7 June 2021, while the date for the former was still to be finalised (likely to be around 18 February 2020). If your secret sources are to be believed. I may have misinterpreted the situation, ie. funding for proposed Commemoration program might not have been approved. This may or may not suggest that there is any doubt about the program going ahead … it might just relate to DVA’s funding approval cycle, ie. at a certain time of the year forward funding arrangements are confirmed. For the moment, the reunion is a proposed event and is quite satisfactory for it to be linked with a ‘proposed’ National Commemoration.
A couple of days ago, I asked if “you could please advise which individual squadrons have conducted reunions “over many years” (as you said previously).. I am aware of the Binh Ba and Coral Balmoral get-togethers associated with National Commemorations and the 4 Troop B Sqn (1969) reunion … I’m unaware, however, of any individual squadron reunions such as that planned for C Sqn (1971). Reason for asking is that there may well be an A Sqn (1970) get-together held in conjunction with a National Commemoration for Operation Hammersley in Feb 2020. Anyone who offers to organise such an event will have much less time to inform potential participants and investigate suitable venues, compared to our two years. We may be able to offer some help.”
I suggest that it is in the interests of former members of 1 Armd Regt for these matters to be discussed with as much openness and transparency as possible. Yours in Armour …
* Interestingly, the first ‘cover up’ soon led to another … it was stated that members had made inappropriate comments on Forum and that was why it had to be closed. Neither the members concerned, nor the comments that they had supposedly made, could be revealed (no reason was given).
———————————————————————————————————————-
20 August 2019
Rethinking Australia’s Defence Strategy
The following link is to an article, published in Defence Connect: https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/blog/4160-game-plan-the-need-to-rethink-our-national-security-strategy?utm_source=DefenceConnect&utm_campaign=19_08_19&utm_medium=email&utm_content=6
My response is as follows:
Dear Ross,
My only concern about the steps you recommend relates to the following:
“First, the Australian government must explain more effectively to the community the changing nature of the country’s security challenges and the need to take new defensive measures.
Second, the government needs to re-state the country’s core security objectives and define a new grand strategy that is tailored for the more challenging times ahead. I have argued in detail elsewhere that a strategy of partnership and leverage would be effective in the new era.”
I believe that the order should be reversed. Not until our core security objectives are identified and spelt out, can an argument be mounted in relation to the challenges associated with achieving them; and, as a consequence, the “need to take new defensive measures”.
National security objectives could include, for example, protection of Australia’s off-shore islands and associated oil and gas fields; and safeguarding of Australia’s maritime supplies and exports. Once these goals are defined, then one can embark on consideration of how best to achieve them, including control of, or denial to, particular maritime zones.
Australia’s primary security objective is currently stated (publicly) to be: “A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication is Australia’s first Strategic Defence Interest.”
Although they might sound similar, New Zealand’s is much more specific: “Defend new Zealand’s sovereignty and territory, and contribute to protecting new Zealand’s critical lines of communication”. It is an action statement, rather than an aspirational goal.
New Zealand states categorically that it will defend its sovereignty in the Antarctic, for example; whereas, Australia gives no such assurance re Christmas Island or Cocoas (Keeling) Islands (for example).
I believe that Australia must spell out its core security objectives as a first step to any rethinking of security strategy.
[Taking a break from the topic below … more to say about it, unfortunately, soon.]
——————————————————————————————————————-
19 August 2019
C Sqn (1971) Reunion (Part 3)
Following on from yesterday, the President responded to say:
“1st Armoured Regiment Association is willing to assist were it can however, if you do not wish to provide a useful release document to post in the newsletter or on the association website that is not our problem.
As indicated in your previous emails you do not want Association support however you do not want to provide a reasonable release document/text that can be posted that will provide contact details, dates/times, potential costs, etc. I would think as part of your plan to advise members of C Sqn and others as soon as possible, you would wish to provide to them indicative dates, possible planned activities, how to contact organisers and may be more. We cannot draft one for you.
If you are unwilling to provide this simple information please cease contacting the association, we will post reasonable constructive information for members however we will not do your work for you for you.” [My emphasis, I found the comment particularly revealing.]
I replied as follows:
“There is no point in me providing a “useful release document”, if, as you state below, my word is not good enough and you require evidence of DVA’s planned National Commemoration.
Have you rescinded this requirement or am I required to write to Maj Gen Nothard AM CSC (Retd), DVA’s National Manager of Commemorations, and say ‘Dear Sir, I know you told both myself and the former CO 3RAR (1971) about the National Commemoration (50th Anniversary) for the Battle of Long Khanh (Operation Overlord) scheduled for 7 June 2021. However, the President of the 1 AR Assn requires “evidence” of DVA’s commitment to a National Commemoration before any information will be provided to Assn members. Unfortunately, my ‘word’ is not good enough. Could you please provide a letter to this effect.”?
Just in case the “evidence” requirement HAD been rescinded, I followed up with a structured post re the Reunion. It will be interesting to see if it’s posted on the Website/Facebook page.
Possible Concern About the 1AR Assn Doing Work on MY Behalf.
On 16 August, I asked the President: “You’ve said that ‘Over many years individual Squadrons of the 1st Armoured Regiment have organised, funded and conducted reunions with very little or minimal input from the Association’. Could you let me have details about these reunions so that we can contact the organisers and benefit from the lessons they learnt?”
The President responded on 18 August,to say:
“No we will not provide the contact details of the organisers however if you provide a contact details that can be released through facebook or our web site we may be able to pass on your request.
Just wish to confirm you do not want any assistance from 1st Armoured Regiment Association?’.
I responded to say:
“I can confirm that no assistance from 1 AR Assn is sought.
I understand that you can’t provide contact details, but can you please advise which individual squadrons have conducted reunions “over many years”. I am aware of the Binh Ba and Coral Balmoral get-togethers associated with National Commemorations and the 4 Troop B Sqn (1969) reunion … I’m unaware, however, of any individual squadron reunions such as that planned for C Sqn (1971).
Reason for asking is that there may well be an A Sqn (1970) reunion held in conjunction with a National Commemoration for Operation Hammersley in Feb 2020. Anyone who offers to organise such an event will have much less time to inform potential participants and investigate suitable venues, compared to our two years. We may be able to offer some help. (If this info is to be classed as “assistance from 1AR Association”, please don’t bother.)”
(An interesting post to have to compile on Vietnam Veterans’ Day.)
——————————————————————————————————————–
18 August 2019
C Sqn 1971 Reunion (Part 2)
Following on from yesterday, the response from the President was:
“The association is willing to publish information on a Sqn reunion however you have failed to provide:
A structured post for the web site or the newsletter including:
Contact details by which members who wish to attend can contact someone.
Nor have you provided any alternative web site by which they can obtain further information.
Evidence of DVA support or commitment to a National Commemoration.
Please provide a structured post that is suitable and we will consider posting it, however in the current content we will not post anything.
In relation to your answers to the questions previously asked, your written word is not evidence, specifically the DVA support and National Commemoration.
When you can provide a suitable post happy to initiate.”
I couldn’t believe it! Look at the way the 3RAR Association informs its members http://www.3rar.com.au/ of the National Commemoration.
It’s too far ahead for DVA to list on their commemorations website.
What I’m being asked to do, therefore, is write to Maj Gen Nothard AM CSC (Retd), DVA’s National Manager of Commemorations, and say ‘Dear Sir, I know you told both myself and the former CO 3RAR (1971) about the National Commemoration (50th Anniversary) for the Battle of Long Khanh (Operation Overlord) scheduled for 7 June 2021. However, the President of the 1 AR Assn requires “evidence” of DVA’s commitment to a National Commemoration before any information will be provided to Assn members. Unfortunately, my ‘word’ is not good enough. Could you please provide a letter to this effect.”
It’s quite sad really.
My reply to the President was:
“In your last email you said:
‘As soon as you clarify the above issues the Association will advise Association Members via the website, face book and MailChimp of the proposed reunion and indicating that interested person should contact you.’
I’ve clarified these issues … but, now you’ve changed your mind (or someone else has had an afterthought).
You say that “I’ve failed to provide …”; how could this be, if I wasn’t asked to do so? (Read your email below.)
You now require a structured post and evidence of DVA arrangements (my ‘word’ about these not being good enough). Only then, will you “consider posting it”.
The information I referred to was given to me by DVA’s National Manager, Commemorations. I referred only to the National Commemoration being organised by DVA, not to any other “support” as you suggest below.
Given that the Commemoration is almost two years away, there is unlikely to be any information posted on DVA’s website. [There isn’t when I checked.]
Members of C Sqn (1971) 1 Armd Regt are being contacted now to provide early warning. If the 1AR Assn does not wish to help in this regard, so be it. (I assume that the Assn has ‘other’ priorities.)”
———————————————————————————————————————
17 August 2021
C Sqn 1971 50th Anniversary Reunion (Part 1)
I posted information on the 1AR Assn website which provided details about the proposed 2021 50th Anniversary reunion. It had to be taken down. Why? The President advises:
“Over many years individual Squadrons of the 1st Armoured Regiment have organised, funded and conducted reunions with very little or minimal input from the Association. Whilst the Association is willing to publish a notice that you are organising a reunion, the Management Committee is concerned about the scope of the reunion and assumptions that may be made by members in various groups (elements) that would or could be eligible to attend. Specific concerns include:
Are you seeking some type of support from the 1st Armoured Regiment Association, as we as yet have not received any type of appropriate request detailing what type of activity you are running and for whom? Information covering:
(i) Are members who served with C Sqn in late 1970 and early 1971 (for days or weeks), primarily A Sqn personnel, eligible to participate?
(ii) Are all members of Detachment, 1 Forward Delivery Troop (1970 and 1971) eligible to participate, or only those who were either tank trained or posted for short durations to C Squadron?
(iii) Are all members who trained with C Squadron in Australia – but who did not serve in Vietnam – eligible to attend?
(iv) As members of 3 Cav Regt are able to participate, is this a Squadron Reunion or an Operation Overlord reunion?
The Association is not prepared to publish, either on face book pages or the web, any information that is either incorrect or misleading. As soon as you clarify the above issues the Association will advise Association Members via the website, face book and MailChimp of the proposed reunion and indicating that interested person should contact you. In the interim, the information currently available on the Noticeboard of our website will be removed.”
A week earlier I had copied the latest update to the Secretary 1AR Assn and asked if the reunion was one worthy of being made known to members. See Blog post for 12 August 2019 below. As information relevant to the questions above is plain to see, the President’s email was a surprise. Nevertheless, I’m gratified that the Assn sees itself as having a role to inform members about matters which are likely to be of interest (to some, at least). My response to the President:
“No support is being sought from the 1AR Assn. The activity being organising is a mini-reunion of all personnel who were part of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt (including FDT) in Vietnam. C Sqn took over from A Sqn on 17 December 1970. All those who served with the Sqn for any period from that date on are being asked if they would like to receive updates about the proposed ‘get together’ in Canberra.
The idea is for a dinner to be held on Sunday 6 June 2021, following the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM. A National Commemoration for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord is to be conducted by DVA the following day. The reunion is not confined to those who participated in Overlord. The National Commemoration is simply seen as an opportunity to reunite all those who trained and served together fifty years before.
The number of personnel who served in or with C Sqn as above, numbers 235 (made up of RAAC, RAEME, RAAMC, RAASC, and AACC). Of these 37 are known to be deceased. Those who have responded positively and asked to be kept informed of arrangements amount to 57 so far. Invitations are to be extended to NOK of those deceased, with arrangements made for those attending to be ‘hosted’ by close friends of their loved one. Information has been passed to the other Corps Associations, together with the names of the personnel being sought.
Liaison has been on-going with the 3 Cav Assn and 1 Fd Sqn Associations. If they don’t intend to hold separate get-togethers, they know that their members are welcome to join C Sqn. A number of 3 Cav personnel have asked to be included in updates. Some personnel trained with C Sqn but did not deploy to Vietnam. They are also invited to attend and attempts to track down such people are being made. Two have already been located and wish to attend.
(i) One of the purposes of the Assn was stated to be: “In conjunction with other ex-Service organisations, to promote and assist with the welfare and well-being of members and their dependents” and
(ii) A highlighted note at the end of the Newsletter stated: “Please let a member of the Management Committee know if you are unwell and are happy for the information to be shared amongst the membership”.
The above is interesting, given, that at their 2017 AGM, all RAAC Corporation member associations decided that welfare and advocacy was NOT part of their role, as there were plenty of other ESOs that provided such services.
As a member of the 1AR Assn, I raised objections to this ‘policy’ over many months. (I subsequently lost my membership because of my “unwillingness to support the purposes of the Association”.) The Blog post below is relevant.
—————————————————————————————————
What’s Important? (16 April 2018)
Recently, the 1AR Assn Facebooks pages have been full of comments about what the Assn stands for.
Mr Fenton: “Unit Association’s do not have the logistics, money, resources, training or willing members [to look after serving and ex serving members]. Unit Association’s should be able to refer there (sic) members to the RSL”.[Apparently this is what the unit associations agreed at the last RAAC AGM … according to Mr Fenton, the 1AR Assn rep. But members aren’t provided with Minutes, so we’ll never know.]
Mr Soutar: “I get a few [members] asking me about gold cards but usually point them to the local RSL!”.
I responded to Mr Soutar to say: I suggest you refer to the register of qualifications of 1AR Assn members in your area as a first step; if there are none that you can refer the person seeking help to … you contact other ESOs such as DFWA and, VVAA,, as well as the RSL. Some people will be more qualified to help than others. The important thing is to follow the process through, so that the person who approached you for help doesn’t find himself/herself left in the gutter.
Purposes of the Association. The present Constitution specifies to the Assn exists to fulfil the Purposes set out at the end of this post. But do we really want to “look after” serving and ex-service members? Or do we just want to organise get-togethers and send anyone needing help to the RSL? Are the Purposes a statement of what we believe in and want to see happen … or are they just for ‘show’?, ie. to kid ourselves that we have good intentions and the will to carry them out.
Register of Qualifications. If we did want to fulfil the Purposes we set for ourselves, you’d think that State Reps would hold a register of members listing their skills. Possibly a disabled member needs help in providing wheelchair access for his house. Possibly one of the other members is/was a carpenter. If the Assn thought that looking after serving and ex-service members was important, there is one hell of a lot that could be done.
But there has to be a will. Food for thought perhaps (perhaps not).
The purposes of our existing “model rules” Constitution are:
(1) To combine into an Association:
(a) former members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(b) currently-serving members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(c) widows, dependents and next of kin of former and present members of the units however prescribed.
(2) To foster and perpetuate ties of comradeship created by those eligible for membership;
(3) To unite members of the Association for their mutual benefit; (4) To promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve; (5) To provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity;
(6) To preserve the history of 1st Armoured Regiment through the fostering and sponsorship of awards for excellence in soldiering;
(7) To diffuse or disseminate knowledge and information or otherwise further these Objects;
To maintain, promote and encourage the establishment of groups of members to act as a branch or branches of the Association; and
(9) To do all such other acts and things and enter such affiliation as are incidental or conducive to the furtherance of the above objectives. .
(iii) Are all members who trained with C Squadron in Australia – but who did not serve in Vietnam – eligible to attend?
(iv) As members of 3 Cav Regt are able to participate, is this a Squadron Reunion or an Operation Overlord reunion?
The Association is not prepared to publish, either on face book pages or the web, any information that is either incorrect or misleading. As soon as you clarify the above issues the Association will advise Association Members via the website, face book and MailChimp of the proposed reunion and indicating that interested person should contact you. In the interim, the information currently available on the Noticeboard of our website will be removed.”
A week earlier I had copied the latest update to the Secretary 1AR Assn and asked if the reunion was one worthy of being made known to members. See Blog post for 12 August 2019 below. As information relevant to the questions above is plain to see, the President’s email was a surprise. Nevertheless, I’m gratified that the Assn sees itself as having a role to inform members about matters which are likely to be of interest (to some, at least). My response to the President:
“No support is being sought from the 1AR Assn. The activity being organising is a mini-reunion of all personnel who were part of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt (including FDT) in Vietnam. C Sqn took over from A Sqn on 17 December 1970. All those who served with the Sqn for any period from that date on are being asked if they would like to receive updates about the proposed ‘get together’ in Canberra.
The idea is for a dinner to be held on Sunday 6 June 2021, following the Last Post Ceremony at the AWM. A National Commemoration for the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord is to be conducted by DVA the following day. The reunion is not confined to those who participated in Overlord. The National Commemoration is simply seen as an opportunity to reunite all those who trained and served together fifty years before.
The number of personnel who served in or with C Sqn as above, numbers 235 (made up of RAAC, RAEME, RAAMC, RAASC, and AACC). Of these 37 are known to be deceased. Those who have responded positively and asked to be kept informed of arrangements amount to 57 so far. Invitations are to be extended to NOK of those deceased, with arrangements made for those attending to be ‘hosted’ by close friends of their loved one. Information has been passed to the other Corps Associations, together with the names of the personnel being sought.
Liaison has been on-going with the 3 Cav Assn and 1 Fd Sqn Associations. If they don’t intend to hold separate get-togethers, they know that their members are welcome to join C Sqn. A number of 3 Cav personnel have asked to be included in updates. Some personnel trained with C Sqn but did not deploy to Vietnam. They are also invited to attend and attempts to track down such people are being made. Two have already been located and wish to attend.
Part II follows tomorrow.
—————————————————————————-
15 August 2019
Scam Watch (Alert!!!)
I’ve been using Facebook to pass on info re a reunion of those who served with C Sqn 1 Armd Regt during 1971.
I came across one person whose Facebook page included a fund-raising appeal for a very worthwhile purpose.
I followed the instructions in terms of making a donation. Surprisingly, the website did not accept my credit card details. I checked and tried again.
About two minutes later I had a call from the Commonwealth Bank … they explained that they’d just had someone try to use our credit card details for a purchase in the US. Because we had the ‘overseas on-line purchase’ option blocked through the Bank’s card settings, an alert was sounded.
The person whose Facebook page I’d come across (above) subsequently advised that his computer had been hacked.
How careful do we have to be? It seems to me that you must not provide your credit card details unless absolutely sure of the site that they are being made available to.
But … how can you be sure that the site (that you would normally trust) has not been ‘hacked’?
The answer: you can’t be.
———————————————————————————————————————-
14 August 2019
Australia’s Defence Strategy
The following ‘Defence Connect’ article is interesting.
‘Maritime and Undersea Warfare’ (12 August 2019) By: Stephen Kuper
A extract follows: “Further compounding the tactical and strategic challenges presented by these competing centres of strategic gravity is the need for a clearly defined role and objective for the Royal Australian Navy in the 21st century – directly challenging the effectiveness of the Cold War-era Two Oceans policy, necessitating a dramatically different response to developing force structure and force posture.”
My response was:
Dear Stephen,
I’m not sure that a strategy for the RAN can be considered in isolation from that of the ADF. The latter, of course, requires a clear statement of Australia’s national interests and their priority in terms of defence effort. National interests could include, for example, protection of Australia’s off-shore islands and associated oil and gas fields; and safeguarding of Australia’s maritime supplies and exports. Once these goals are defined, then one can embark on consideration of how best to control or deny access to particular maritime zones.
Sadly, informed public debate about Australia’s defence strategy is abysmal.
The starting point for any strategic consideration (having defined the priority of national interests) is always the threat assessment. Following on from this, are applicable warning times; following from these is the ADF’s force structure and readiness level.
If I was involved in Australian defence industry investment, I would be insisting on absolute clarity in terms of decision making regarding these matters … before putting shareholders’ funds at risk. Without this assurance, ‘sovereign risk’ (ie. the risk of the Government announcing a policy leading to investment decisions, then changing its mind) cannot be ignored.
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 August 2019
The Need to ‘Right Size’ Australia’s Abrams Tank Fleet
A very important paper authored by the HOC, Brig Chris Field, and Lt Col Leo Purdy, was written in Nov 2016 and published in the Australian Defence Magazine in Sep 2018.
‘Fighting to Win – The importance of the tank to the ADF in the 21st Century.’
It is well worth reading (albeit very long). My response is copied below:
Hi Chris,
A very comprehensive paper. Well done to you and Leo. I’ve only just seen it, and, given that it is almost three years old, the apparent lack of any response makes me very concerned. The argument for a ‘right sized’ fleet of 90 (published in the AFR in May 2107) received considerable publicity. Yet, again, nothing seems to have happened, ie. no announced acquisition plans, not even a project proposal (as far as any public information is concerned).
One would have to assume that the increased fleet numbers needed to support three widely dispersed tank squadrons, as compared with a single concentrated tank regiment, was identified during the Plan Beersheba considerations. Surely, if the applicable cost was overlooked, or worse still, disregarded … this must be highlighted now (as much as anything else, to avoid it happening again).
At a time when Australia’s defence strategy is under review regarding its capability to defeat “a large-scale lodgement of adversary forces on our territory” (Hugh White), the shortcoming in terms of tank numbers must be stressed in public debate and the need for commitment of project funding (which I’m sure must have been identified) further emphasised.
————————————————————————————————————————
12 August 2019
C Sqn (1971) 1 Armd Regt 50th Anniversary Reunion
The latest update is copied below.
Dear All,
The numbers on the Contact List for the Reunion have now reached 50 (thanks Les!). Seems a reasonable excuse for an update for a 50th year reunion.
If half of those receiving this email attended the reunion and half of those were accompanied … we’d have a dinner for about 40.
I’m expecting to be able to contact at least 80 and for dinner numbers to be around 70.
Of course, this would be higher with official guests. I’d expect (following consultation with you all) to invite at no cost to others: (showing current incumbents) the Rep Hon Col RAAC (Maj Gen Roger Powell); the Hon Col 1 Armd Regt (Maj Gen Craig Orme); the Head of Corps, RAAC (Brigadier Cristopher Mills); the HOC RAEME (Brigadier Andrew Freeman) and the RAAC Corps RSM (Peter Swinfield). If anyone would like to nominate any other invitees, please do so.
Rather than a restaurant, as was initially considered, numbers would indicate a venue such as Olims Hotel at Ainslie will be required. This offers accommodation and is close to the AWM and the site of the National Commemoration on Anzac Parade. I’ll discuss their group rates next week and advise.
Graeme Jones spent almost all of his time with A Sqn, however, he also served with C Sqn for a short period in 1971 (he did a handover with the late Warren Hind on the aircraft ‘runway’). I used to have his contact info when I was writing my book … but now lost. If anyone can help, this would be appreciated. Others in this category (ie. the crossover period between C and A Sqns) include Bob Wicks, Chris Prickett and Geoff Whittley.
‘STATS’ at Present are as follows:
Total who served with C Sqn during 1971 (including LAD and FDT): 235
Deceased: Peter Cormack; Roger Kendall; Phil Barwick; Dave Raymond; Andy Haymon (cook); Joe Palucus (Paul Lucas);John Wakefield; Max Colles; Jeff Rassmussen; Ray Frazer; Bernie Flynn; Lance Clarke; Nev Calliss; Iliya Todorovic ; Andy Anderson; Stan Iry; Andrew McGrath-Kerr; Phil Cotter; Peter Bourke; Warren Hind, Jim de Turt, Harry Percival (RAEME); Peter Hunter (RAEME); Ian Robinson (Big Robbie); ‘Gerry’ Van Hoof; Ray Evans; John (Jack) Brennan; Noel Lowes. Total 28. Total to ‘Find’: 207
The Current ‘List’: Brian Agnew; ‘David Watts; ‘John SCALES’; ‘Bill Burton’; ‘Martin Boyle’; ‘John Muir’ (3Cav) ; ‘Stan Hanuszewicz’; Shorty Watson; ‘Ron Baikie’; ‘Marc Hoskin’; ‘Tony Dickinson’; ‘Geoff Stelmach’; Dave Lester (3Cav); Doug McDonald; Paul Giles; ‘Dal Crocker’; Kim Bayly; Terry Bird (RAEME); Russell Bird; ‘Des Thompson’; Baden Jeffrey (Milo); Bo Janic; Garry Court; Tony Dennis; Ian Farrant; Roger Martlew; David Maxwell; Chris Stevens (3 Cav); Brad Golding; Russell Stewart; Ian Tulk; Mike McEvoy; Wayne McCulloch; Pat McAuliffe; Roger Costello; Martin Craze; Graeme Potts; Barry Kappler; Rod (Wally) Ward; George Stojkovic; Greg Harris; Ron Bonny; Bronte Roesler; Peter Cadge; Ian Angow (RAEME); Geoff Jewell; Charlie Harris; Peter Liefman; Kevin Hunter; Gerry (Mooch) Powell; ‘Scotty’ Harris; Kerry Slavin; Les Snelling. Total 50/207 (24%) [Plus three 3 Cav]
No response to emails [which haven’t ‘bounced’]: Phil Reeves; Ric Chaisty … could be away and will try again. Recently emailed (by me): Rob Millstead; Ian Tapley; Greg Cornell; and (by Ron Baikie) Peter Nation; Grant Lane; Neil Holbrook (3 Cav); Dick Reading. Doug McDonald is seeking Ron Medley, Gary ‘Smoothie’ Taylor; Allan Hoseason-Smith and Greg Cornell. Barry Kappler is contacting Bob Imlach and Kim Bayly has written to Peter Thomson. Bounced emails: Specs Fuller (see Note below); Chris Prickett; and Dan Zwart.
The following have had messages posted on their Facebook Timelines: Phil Reeves; Roger Bicheno; Grant Lane; Barry Filsell; Jim King; Mick Payne; John Kostin; Peter Goldman and Don Rogers.
Paul (Seedy) Yeates was in Victoria, but it seems he has moved to Brisbane. Peter Ferguson (3 Cav Assn) is trying to contact him. I’ve phoned Pixie’ Webster, but three wrong numbers so far. Lastly, a post has been placed on the website of the RAEME National Association and also DVA’s “Noticeboard’. If anyone else can spread the word through newsletters, websites and the like, please do so.
It should be noted that the 235 ‘total number’ includes, as well as members of the LAD and FDT … three RAAMC, one RAASC, and five AACC. Does anyone have any contacts re these other Corps guys? In terms of RAAC, we are at 30% in terms of response; RAEME, however, are only at 4% (I hope that the LAD might pile on board in the coming months.) As yet, no one who has responded has indicated that they have no interest (a few have raised concerns about their health, come 2021).
Note: Geoff Stelmach and David Maxwell weren’t with us in 1971 through no fault of their own (Geoff, injury; David, suddenly, no more nsm to be posted with the Sqn); however, we all knew them from our training in 1970. ‘Specs’ is also in this category.
Finally, I spoke with Peter Scott, CO 3RAR 1971, a few days ago; he hasn’t had any recent info from DVA … he’ll keep us posted.
———————————————————————————————————————
11 August 2019
Australia’s Defence Strategy
The following extracts are from an article in the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s journal ‘The Strategist’. I found it refreshingly straightforward; an analysis which doesn’t get lost in theoretical algorithms. An example of the latter can be found in some of the articles surrounding how to secure Australia’s maritime supply lines in case of a defence emergency. This should be ‘bread and butter’ stuff for military professionals and strategic analysts. Whether their arguments are accepted by Government is another matter entirely. It is heartening to see some solid proposals below.
Forward … from the (hardened) north of Australia; Malcolm Davis, 3 May 2019
“I’ve already argued that our traditional approach of relying on the strategic moat of the sea–air gap for defence is outdated and needs to be reviewed, and that we should switch to a strategy of ‘forward defence in depth’ (see here, here and here). Rather than hide behind a sea–air gap which, like the French Maginot Line defences of 1940, is rapidly being overtaken by advances in military technology, we must build an Australian Defence Force that can quickly respond to threats with minimal warning and exploit greater speed and longer reach.
Australia should invest in long-range power-projection capabilities that can rapidly deploy from the north deep into the Indo-Pacific to blunt an adversary’s campaign before it can threaten our northern air and maritime approaches. Most importantly, we must acquire new capabilities quickly and not emulate the future submarine program, which won’t deliver the first operational Attack-class submarine until 2035.
In adopting a new strategy of ‘forward defence in depth’, we should seek capabilities that will enable the ADF to project power responsively and at long range, but we must not ignore the rear area of northern Australia. An essential first step to secure the rear is to harden pieces of military infrastructure to make them tougher targets for threats ranging from special forces attacks to missile strikes.
In particular, we need to ensure that we can defend against emerging ballistic and cruise missile threats to Australia’s northern bases. “
—————————————————–
“… we need to examine whether civil northern infrastructure can be better adapted to support the ADF in wartime. That analysis could include consideration of greater civil–military integration as part of a northern Australia ‘total force’ that expands the use of reserve units.
It’s well past time to end the comfortable coast of defence policy on autopilot. To paraphrase analyst Ross Babbage, it’s a coast too long.”
Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI.
———————————————————————————————————————
10 August 2019
The Ethics of Management (aka From Feather Duster to Cock of the Walk).
On 14 May 2019, I was advised by the President 1AR Assn that my membership would not be extended because of my “unwillingness to support the purposes of the Association”.
On 2 August 2019, the same President thanked me “for [my] commitment to the 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc”.
To understand this, it is relevant to reread the Blog post for 17 May 2019:
My Life Membership of 1AR Assn
Following on from 14 May, the following questions have been asked of the President, Mr Keith Meloncelli:
“I have two questions which I would appreciate you answering as the President, 1AR Assn.
Firstly the ‘Facts’ (as I understand them):
A number of Life Members of the 1AR Assn (including myself) were appointed by the C’tee in recognition of their efforts on behalf of the Assn;
It was later discovered that at the time of their appointment, the 1AR Assn Constitution did not provide for such membership;
When the new Constitution was prepared, Life Members were informed on 5 January 2018 that: “A member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution has his Life Membership continued under this Constitution”.
You told me on 12 May 2019 that this provision was not included in the Constitution which was approved on 14 July 2019 (I think you mean 2018) and that, as a result, there are presently no Life Members in the 1AR Assn.
It would seem that at some point between 5 Jan 18 and 14 Jul 18, the 1AR Assn C’tee decided to strip Life Membership from those members who had previously been recognised for their significant contributions to the Assn.
I received no notification that my Life Membership had been revoked until your email on 12 May 2019.
The Questions:
(i) Why did the 1AR Assn C’tee decide to renege on the earlier decision that been advised to Life Members that their memberships would be continued? and
(ii) Why weren’t Life Members informed of the new decision to revoke their Life memberships?
————————————————————————————–
Current Situation: In his letter of 2 August, the President advises the reason that the C’tee did not notice that the provision for existing Life Memberships to be continued had been removed from the draft of the Constitution considered at the AGM,, was an “oversight” which the Association “failed to detect”. As a result, resolutions for the continuance of each former life member’s membership are to be considered at the AGM on 12 October 2019. Each resolution must be approved by three quarters of the members voting, whether in person or by proxy.
My immediate question to the President was: “Am I eligible to vote?”. I have not had a response as yet. If I’m not able to vote on my own behalf, then that’s it! I simply place myself in the hands of others.
If I am able to vote, there are related matters to be addressed. I am currently banned from the Members’ Facebook page (as a result of my m’ship being cancelled). This forum has, in the past, been used to advocate for and against matters to be considered at AGMs. Is it right that I should be denied the ability to comment on those views that relate to me?
——————————————————————————————————————–
9 August 2019
Australia’s Defence Strategy
An article entitled How not to defend Australia in ASPI’s The Strategist on 27 July by Peter Jennings included the following quote:
“White [in his recent book ‘How to Defend Australia’, see below] concludes that Christmas and Cocos Islands would be hard to defend and worries about ‘emotive questions about how much we should be willing to pay to defend every part of our sovereign territory’ (page 129). That strikes me as a particularly despairing judgement.”https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/how-not-to-defend-australia/
Peter Jennings is the executive director of ASPI and a former deputy secretary for strategy in the Department of Defence
My blog post for 13 June is copied below:
“The Security of Australia’s National Interests.
The following article in Defence Connect makes a call for increased debate about Australia’s security needs. I support this, but only if such a debate was a rigorous one (rather than simply sabre rattling to boost defence industry). My response in the ‘Comments’ section is copied below.
If the debate keeps focusing on generalities and motherhood statements, we won’t achieve any sort of useful outcome. What is the warning time for a credible threat to Australia’s interests to develop? This is the fundamental premise of the ADF’s existence, ie. its degree of readiness. The time presently at the heart of Contingency Plans, is, of course, classified. But realistic scenarios can be painted and the capability of the ADF to respond, evaluated.
What might constitute threats to our (various) national interests, also differ. But once again, differing scenarios can easily be developed. Only when we start talking in these terms, can we start to understand the degree to which the ADF is appropriately manned, equipped, and trained.
One scenario could be an annexation of Christmas Island by a nation seeking to develop previously untapped oil and gas reserves. What nations could theoretically do such a thing? How much warning would there be of such plans and does the ADF have the capability to respond? If the answer to the latter is ‘no’, does Australia have security ties with allied nations to enable its territory to be defended. If the answer to the latter is ‘no’, should Australia enter into a regional security treaty, such as SEATO used to be?”
So, Australia’s pre-eminent Defence strategist states publicly that Christmas and Cocas can’t be defended. Is this it? Do we as a nation, pull stumps, pack up and leave our off-shore islands to the will to those who might wish to annex them? [‘Difficult to defend’ is not quite the same as ‘unable to defend’, but there is a clear inference in what was said.]
The post I prepared is copied below. I’ve just heard back from the Cove team and a change in the hosting of their website, plus a number of related manning factors, created the problems I experienced as a ‘commentator’. This has been rectified now and I look forward to seeing the discussion that my comments might give rise to.
LAND 400 Phase 3: IFV (and how They Should be Operated).
My response to the Combat Team commander was as below:
Dear Christian,
Great to see lessons learnt being promulgated like this. My question relates to the separation of section commander and crew commander.
I can understand the situation during dismounted action, ie, the section commander on the ground giving orders to both his dismounted members and the those mounted (in terms of fire support). But what of the situation during a mounted assault, together with tanks, onto a defended enemy position (with the AFVs closed down)?
One answer to this is for the section commander to be the crew commander until the dismount phase, whereupon a ‘spare’ crew commander takes over. I find it hard to understand how a section commander can exercise his commander without visibility of the battlefield (as happens to ‘passengers’ when an APC/IFV is closed down).
Did you encounter this aspect at all during Combat Team Alpha’s experience to date?
Having posted this comment, I found that my access to the site “was denied”.
One has to wonder … it’s one thing to deny access to those who express views which an affront to society’s ‘norms’, but what is the intention when a comment from one of the few living (maybe three) people who have commanded a mounted assault against an enemy defended position, is denied?
Surely this input is to be valued, no matter what the ‘politics’? (One might even have thought that a person with such experience might be asked for his views … but that might be taking things a bit too far).
——————————————————————————————————————–
7 August 2019
The Atomic Tank III
The Atomic Tank I and II were posted on 30 July and 2 August respectively.
The latter included the text of an email to the Australian Ex-Services Atomic Survivors Association. The response (part of which is copied below) raises the importance of record keeping. It is well recognised that the Commanders’ Diaries kept for units in Vietnam have been found to be missing many details required to support claims by veterans. (Not intentionally, but like the experience described below, because their importance was just not recognised).
“You hit the nail right on the head in talking of “Nightmare”. On this side of the Country [ie. WA], RAN Ships involved in the Monte Bellos Tests in ’52…’& 56, were all small ships & commanded by relatively young Lieutenants & Lieut Commanders.
The Captains then mostly were only mid 20’s in age , & there was a marked difference in Rules & Regulations between here & in the East where big Ships carried Commanders , Commodores, Captains …etc , & such things as proper uniform “Dress of the Day “ …& exact & correct reporting via the Ships Log, saw a vast difference between here & there. Such as stopping overnight at a highly favourite fishing Bay ….& not reported in the Log. Items of small interest which should have been recorded in the Log …were simply dismissed…there are tales galore still doing the rounds in the Mess or the Bar , which support all this.
While this can be understood in that era, it was not foreseen in later years, & now when a veteran seeks adequate recognition for Nuclear Radiation Injury ….he finds he cannot prove that he was present in danger areas & times…because his presence was not recorded……..in some cases there was some information plainly deleted by black ink. So , 60 years after this atrocity was created by our “Friends” the British Ministry of Defence and blindly permitted by our Aussie Govt, [it is now seen to have] inflicted drastic injury & death , to innocent servicemen who simply followed orders .
Now…when the eventual damage to Human Beings reaches its peak…our Govt states that they have , in many cases , no record to support their claims for help. So …. some poor devils live …or die … as Guinea Pigs . If you have had, or do have, dealings with DVA , & run into difficulty in having your claim for justice & recognition received…you will understand. Some years back …about 2011, I think it was, a Solicitor, acting on our behalf, stated in winding up a TV interview, “Our Govt is clearly waiting for us all to die…then their troubles will be over “.
I can only repeat his words, & I miss no opportunity in doing so.”
In my response to the Association I included the following:
In doing so I realised how many mistakes were made by those in positions of authority (not all of which were neglect of their duty), but the ‘system’ just wasn’t good enough then … and I’m not sure that it is all that much better now. Whenever I can now, I try to draw attention to ‘oversights’ that were made (especially those for which efforts were subsequently made to ‘cover up’).
Seems to me that while it’s disgusting that responsibility hasn’t been accepted for the health effects experienced by those who were exposed to radiation at the time, at least something might be able to be done for those children who might have inherited related conditions.”
——————————————————————————————————————–
6 August 2019
The Changing Nature of the Australian Army’s Role
Two articles from two Institutes in recent weeks … both suggesting much the same thing: the Army must now be structured, equipped and trained to engage in all forms of warfare, including being capable of responding to a large scale lodgement on our shores. (I see in the Canberra Times today that the ‘price’ for helping the US patrol the Straits of Hormuz might be access to US strategic fuel reserves if supply is interrupted.)
An extract (speaking about Hugh White’s recent book) is: “Another headline force-structure story in ‘How to defend Australia’ is a reworking of the army to make it fit for defeating a large-scale lodgement of adversary forces on our territory. That’s a significant change of focus from the amphibious expeditionary approach that has occupied a lot of recent thinking. (I’m okay with scaling back on amphibiosity.) Perhaps realising that having an army that’s large, mobile and hardened enough to fight back a determined adversary presents a real challenge, the book’s prescription is for long-range missile forces to bombard any landing area.
Andrew Davies is a senior fellow at ASPI and lectures on defence acquisition at the Australian National University.
“Yet there is a yawning gap between this price and the probable bloodletting of intensive war – a war that government, the Defence Department and many analysts recognise is possible in an increasingly unstable region. The probability that future war will be brutally intense only rises as regional states grow their military capability – compounded by the possibility that future enemies may have a different understanding of what war is, as Australia’s defence chief General Angus Campbell has pointed out.
As a consequence, the Australian Defence Force now has a mandate to widen its focus from several decades of counterinsurgency operations to the whole spectrum of conflict. The government’s commitment to deter or conduct conventional war is clear in the decision to acquire 12 submarines, strike aircraft and a new fleet of armoured vehicles”.
“The gap between professional and public understanding might be described as a lack of societal engagement with a deteriorating regional security environment. The assumption is that because the ADF is a highly competent organisation, the risks and costs of instability can be outsourced to it. This then translates to the lack of planning or legislative arrangements for a whole of nation effort. It is reflected in the failure to mandate substantial stocks of fuel or other key imports that are essential for the economy, much less the provision of war stocks.”
Cate Carter is a PhD Candidate in the field of Armed Forces and Society at Deakin University. She holds a Masters Degree in International Relations from the University Queensland and other degrees from the Australian National University and University of South Australia. Cate has been an Army officer for 25 years, working in Bougainville, Timor Leste and the United Nations Headquarters, and is currently the Managing Editor of the Australian Army Journal
Dr Charles Knight researches technologies and methods for operations among populations and teaches on the postgraduate terrorism program at Charles Sturt University. Commissioned at Sandhurst, his service with the Royal Air Force, British and Omani Armies and in Asia informed his counterinsurgency PhD. He built simulation and weapons systems, spent a decade in Special Operations development and delivered novel capability and futures analytic methods. For urban operations he wrote doctrine and reformed training, and his Masters research analysed vulnerabilities to asymmetric attacks in cities. A surveillance, collection and analysis practitioner, he has held senior civilian security management positions, and continues to serve part time with the Australian Army Research Centre.
———————————————————————————————————————
5 August 2019
The Missing Centurion Logbooks
The Blog on 28 July 2019 started with the following quote:
“There are also Centurion log books held in other private collections and in public institutions such as the AWM and the Army Tank Museum. I’ve been fortunate to have tracked down and examined many of them in detail, and transcribe the information they contain into my database. “
This quote from Mr Cecil’s website, might serve to suggest that his is not the only private collection and that he might not have the log book for ARN 169106; but if he transcribed information from it … it means that he must’ve had “access to, at least one of the missing logbooks” at some time. So why deny it?
Well … Mr Cecil has now published a statement admitting that he “was given access to the log book for 169106 – once, on 27 October 1996, and transcribed the information from it to the Centurion database I was compiling at the time”.
This is interesting as, when in 2007 Centurion ARN 169056 was moved to the AWM, Mr Cecil know that its logbook was in the Tank Museum. He contacted them and the logbook was transferred to the AWM
The following Background from the Blog archives is relevant:
“In 2014, a former member of the Regiment posted a message on the [1AR Assn Members’] Forum to say that the Cairns Artillery and Tank Museum had acquired a Centurion tank and were keen to find out its history. After some investigation it was found that the only source of this was the tank’s log book. The topic was discussed further on the Forum.
Where were the logbooks? [I knew that Mr Cecil had many logbooks, so many that I thought it must be the ‘only’ private collection; but I didn’t know which ones and he’d sworn me to secrecy in relation his holdings. My self respect meant that I had to work within this constraint.]
The person [Mr Tim Vibert] who had purchased the majority of Centurions from the Army was contacted. He said that he sold the log books as a single lot, to a private collector on a confidential basis. [Mr Cecil subsequently admitted that he and Mr Vibert had agreed to this fabrication so as to ‘have a bit of fun at others’ expense’.] Mr Vibert was asked if he could pass a message to the purchaser to let him/her know about the Cairns Museum’s quest. He said he would, however, nothing was heard in response. [Much later, the Cairns Museum advised that they had heard from Mr Cecil who had provided background re the tank.]
In the course of seeking information about the whereabouts of logbooks, it was revealed that the log books for all the Centurions at Puckapunyal had ‘disappeared’ from the Tank Museum. The Army History Unit (AHU) were unable to investigate the loss because it had happened before the AHU assumed responsibility for the Museum.
Suddenly, the 1AR Assn C’tee closed the Members’ Forum (in such a way that all posts were lost). When asked, the explanation was that the Forum was costing too much and the Association could not afford to maintain it. A person who operated a similar forum hosted by the same company was surprised, as there had been no cost to him. It was subsequently revealed that 1AR Assn members were NOT being levied any charge by the C’tee for the forum.
[With one reason shown to be false …] it then transpired that [supposedly] a “formal complaint” had been made about the ‘tone’ of a post on the forum. No information as to the basis of the complaint or who it was made by, was able to be provided because it was made “on a confidential basis”. [Who might have made a formal complaint, given that the only topic being discussed at the time was the missing logbooks? Could the person who held the logbooks have had some influence?]
So now we know that the logbook for ARN 169106 had been at the Tank Museum on 27 October 1996 (possibly at the same time as Mr Cecil was seconded periodically from the AWM to advise on the running of the Tank Museum).. This is a step forward, unless, of course, it was not at the Tank Museum and Mr Cecil was given access to it by a third party (whose name he won’t divulge).
Why, oh why, … is there so much deviousness, deception and trickery? Mr Cecil holds most logbooks and didn’t want anyone to know he had them. As far as I knew: (i) this was because he didn’t want people ringing him up all the time asking for information; and (ii) he had purchased all of them legally.
Why would anyone make a ‘formal complaint’ to close down a Members’ Forum discussing missing Centurion logbooks?; why would this fictitious complaint be supported by those in authority?; why would two people conspire to conceal the identity of the purchaser of logbooks, supposedly just ‘to have fun at others’ expense’?
Note: Centurions at the tank Museum, apart from 169106, are 169006; 169034; 169072; 169079 (dozer); 169112 (ARV); 169123 (ARV); 115541 (bridge); 115544 (bridge). (Thanks to the late Col Filtness.)
——————————————————————————————————————-
LAND 400 Phase 3 (IFV): Has Debate Been Suspended?
There have been many posts on the blog about the Project, particularly the present Multi Role Combat Brigade organisation and whether or not it would be better for the RAAC to operate the IFVs.
Discussion on the Army Cove (Professional Education site) might have been controversial in challenging Army’s intention for the infantry to crew the IFVs. While discussion I prompted raised many differing viewpoints (some quite ‘vocal’), surely this is good. Most would think so, but it seems that I’ve been banned from commenting on articles posted in Cove. My Blog post from 31 July 2019 has not been allowed to be posted on Cove. Staff at The Cove have responded to my query and have undertaken to look into what’s happening. Maybe it’s just a technical ‘glitch’; then again, maybe like an RAAC website, it’s “politics”.
A post which may have sparked this decision, is copied below from the Blog on 3 March 2019:
LAND 400 Ph 3 IFVs/Current Brigade Structure
My Cove article certainly seems to have sparked some debate (which is what it was intended to do).
I responded to the comment (posted on 27 February) as below:
“The value of these matters being robustly discussed, is (I believe) to be seen in the recent production of the draft Concept of Employment (CONEMP) for a Reinforced Combat Brigade (RCB). I gather this is something which might underpin some Contingency Plans.
Our concerns about the present brigade structure’s lack of flexibility in forming balance battlegroups, might be addressed by the ORBAT proposed for the reinforced brigade. The reinforced brigade deployed on Ex Talisman Sabre in 2017 included an additional 2300 personnel. This would suggest that a heavily augmented HQ would’ve been required.
I doubt that the RCB envisaged would be anywhere as large, however, one would expect that significant improvement would be made to the limited battlegroup Comd & Control options presently available.”
Where did I learn about the concept of a deployable Reinforced Combat Brigade? … from the latest Ironsides (the brief on 3 Brigade provided by Brigadier Winter).
We can deduce from the above, that the current brigade organisation, is not necessarily the ORBAT of a brigade response force to be deployed in terms of contingency plans. Rather, it’s a convenient all corps grouping to fit in with the force rotation cycle (ie. Plan Beersheba).
It’s a pity, it seems to me, that Defence PR is not more forthcoming in terms of informing the general defence community. One becomes concerned about an apparent shortcoming … he digs and digs and a little more info emerges, indicating that it’s not quite as bad as it seems. Why not be more open and transparent in the first place, thereby allowing the public to have more confidence in the command/management system?
———————————————————————————————————————-
3 August 2019
The Strategy for Defence of Australia
Blog posts for 21-23 July dealt with a range of matters associated with the strategy for Australia’s defence. An article has now been published which introduces the concept of a Grand Strategy. See Defence Connect:
The concept of a Grand Strategy for security of Australia now and in the future, is fantastic; but is it realistic? Like its sibling, ‘building national power’, it’s a goal which can only be achieved over the long term.
How is this possible with the three-year election cycle? If we were governed by a benevolent dictator, there would be a chance that it could be brought into being.
The other option, of course, is to have a bi-partisan oversight of the development of the strategy and its implementation. But how likely is it, that this would be feasible?
Many would agree that the possibility of America being able to achieve the same thing is laughable. Is Australia any different?
Theoretically, a Grand Strategy* could be ‘housed’ in the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and be continually revised as circumstances change. But would we also need a Grand Strategy for the economic development of Australia and a Grand Strategy for Australia’s environmental management, etc?
It seems to me that before we can even think about a Grand Strategy of any sort, we need a mechanism for long term Government policy development and implementation. Possibly within a constitutional framework? What do you think?
*What for you call the physical form of a Grand Strategy … a Document, an Agreement, a Covenant?
What Should be Done … if we are to Keep our Self-Respect?
Atomic Tank I was posted on 30 July. The following is a sequence of ‘developments’ about this matter should be best addressed:
(i) The School of Armour holds a number of files related to claims made for compensation by the NOK of some of those involved with 169041 who subsequently suffered cancers. I believe that radiation measurements were made of the tank, but this was sometime after it got back to Puckapunyal. As far as I’m aware, no compensation was provided. There would be a different view taken if the cases were to be reconsidered today; however, there’s probably a statute of limitations which would prevent this happening.
(ii) Re the post above … the more I think about it, the more I believe that an injustice has been done to the NOK of those who died from cancers caused by the radiation they were exposed to from Centurion tank ARN 169041,
I’m looking at how I might be able to have this investigated.
If he was still at work, I’d contact Ian McPhedran (together, with the support of many others, we tackled the RSL’s proposed MOU with the Govt of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam… and won). Sadly he has retired, if anyone knows an investigative journalist they would recommend, please let me know.
(iii) Part of the matter is fixed …
I started to look into it and quickly realised that RAAC/RAEME pers associated with the tank would be eligible for the same Government recognition as the ‘Maralinga Veterans’.
See https://www.abc.net.au/news/story-streams/federal-budget-2017/2017-05-07/federal-budget-2017-veterans-welcome-gold-card-decision/8504884
John Haynes and the RAACA (NSW) did much good work in advocating on behalf of those who were affected.
The Gold Card is a long overdue ‘first step’. There are birth abnormalities and other health conditions which have been passed on to the children of those affected. It’s a disgrace that compensation has not been provided for those directly involved; but hopefully justice will be done as far as their children are concerned.
There is a little more that can be done and I’ll speak to the Nuclear Veterans Group.
(iv) Text of an email to the Australian Ex-Services Atomic Survivors Association
I’m a retired Army armoured corps bloke, who has an interest in the history of Australian tanks. I recently came across this video ….. This was a co-incidence, as I’d also recently been presented with a book about the same Centurion tank.
The youtube clip above reminded me that the tank concerned was driven away from Emu Field just three days after the test. There were a number of breakdowns before it was finally recovered back to Woomera. Concerns about exposure to radiation by the crew and recovery mechanics were addressed in the 1983-5 McClelland Royal Commission Report.
The tank was decontaminated at Woomera before being returned to Puckapunyal (Vic); arriving around 21 Jul 54. Five days later, tests were made to determine the level of radioactive contamination. The result was that it was “not severely contaminated”. I believe that in 1974, the Commonwealth paid $8,600 to the widow of a warrant officer who had died of leukemia six years previously. The WO had been “exposed to a relatively high dose of radiation while repairing a tank”.
My reason for emailing is that I once worked at what is now called The School of Armour at Puckapunyal. I was aware that there were at least a couple of files relating to claims for compensation by the families of soldiers who had been involved with the tank used in the atomic test. I don’t profess to understand the legal nightmare that you and others must have had to fight your way through, however, should the existence of these files be of any interest … I’d happy to provide contact details (of course they could now be at Army HQ or the National Archives).
——————————————————————————————————————–
1 August 2019
Free Speech for the Benefit of all … or Rule by Those ‘in Charge’ for Their own Purposes?
I’m getting fed up. Not before time … some might say.
A Blog post from some years ago was about the ‘Armoured Corps Mafia’ (down below, but I can’t give a date). I was made aware of this insidious amorphous entity as a tank troop leader over 50 years ago. I might have been privileged to have this information shared with me without really knowing it (or why).
I have had offers with respect to various roles within the ex-armoured corps ‘fold’, but have always said that I must be able to maintain my Independence. This wasn’t acceptable.
Why the term ‘Mafia’? Because they operate ‘below the radar’. (I could’ve said ‘behind the scenes’, but I’m trying to keep abreast of the times.)
So, what do we have? In essence … a ‘shadowy’ group who seek to influence matters in accord with what they themselves consider to be ‘right’ for the RAAC.
Will we find public statements? No (of course not). Public statements can lead to public responses and, like wide-consultation with stakeholders, we can’t have that.
Will we find anything, if we were to search relevant websites, in respect to the positions they maintain? No. This is a group which doesn’t want debate (you can’t have ‘others’ contributing or making suggestions … what would they know?)
How are you to you know what position the ‘Mafia’ take regarding those they represent? You don’t. That’s the problem. You have to give up on your own views and believe in theirs. A bit like faith healing.
If you dare to post something which they think is inappropriate, they’ll have you barred from the website … calling it “politics”. If you raise questions which they find uncomfortable, your membership will be revoked.
Public debate is an anathema and everything will be done to avoid it. Such debate could raise doubts about the direction that is being followed. How to avoid such doubts arising? Ban debate. Simple.
Who was that ‘fool’ who suggested that open and free debate was the core of principle democracy? But then … when have the ‘Mafia’ believed in democracy?
“… when the next war comes it will not be the desk officers or policy experts that do the fighting, or the dying, in foreign fields. It is the young military practitioner who, regardless of rank, will find themselves trying to solve a unique problem set in the most testing of circumstances.”
My thought when reading this was … who is it that will be commanding the ‘young military practitioner’?
Well done for highlighting the Professional Military Education (PME) issue, but are we in danger of assuming that rank equates to competency? Maybe this should be assumed. If it was, however, the training of the ‘young military practitioner’ would be thought to be good enough and there’d be no need for PMV.
It follows that middle-aged and near retirement aged military commanders should also be the beneficiary of PME. This, it seems to me, is a multi-facetted undertaking.
The catch cry in business is ‘continual improvement’, meaning that every effort has to be made to avoid ‘plateauing’, or in other words, working according to the maxim ‘don’t fix it if it’s not broken’.
How do we know if improvements can be made? Any repository for lessons learnt needs to be supported by an operational analysis organisation which can provide comprehensive reports on all aspects of current conflicts (including command). This information must be able to analysed in real time and fed into the training and doctrine Centres, so that immediate reinforcements to the conflict zone will benefit. This is just one facet of the process.
I’m worried that we don’t have an integrated system which is capable of continually improving military practitioners at all levels to “solve a unique problem set in the most testing of circumstances”.
——————————————————————————————————————-
30 July 2019
The Atomic Tank
The following link was recently provided by the RAACA (NSW):
This is an amazing co-incidence … I was honoured recently, to be presented with a copy of a book about this very tank.
Graeme Munsell and Barry Hodges, two crew members of ARN 169041 in Vietnam became aware that it was positioned as a guard tank at 1 Armd Regt (Chauvel Lines, Edinburgh Defence Precinct, ADELAIDE).
When they learnt that little was known of the history of the tank (from Woomera to Vietnam), they decided to embark on a project to fix this. (The circumstances of the RPG penetration in Vietnam are described at p373-375, Vol 1, ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’)
They produced an excellent ‘coffee table’ book, encompassing many photos illustrating its remarkable story. A copy was presented to the CO 1 Armd Regt so that all those who had cause to wonder about the history of the Centurion ‘guarding’ the entrance to the barracks, would have the story available to them. A plaque is now positioned on the front of the tank providing some of the details.
The word got about and requests for copies by Institutions, MPs and others, has led to another print run.
I’ve suggested to RAACA (NSW) that it would be nice for the President to advise the CO 1 Armd Regt about the video, so as to allow those interested to have the benefit of a ‘multi-media’ experience.
Even more significant, however, would it be if the RAACA could put the producer of the video in touch with the authors of the book. Who knows where such a ‘partnership’ could lead?
“Members of B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt will be interested to know that the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) has accepted an application to investigate why the Department of Defence has not extended eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry With Palm Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley (Vietnam, 1970) … to supporting arms including A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt. A public Hearing into the application is expected to be held before the end of the year.”
I’ve just come across the above. It was part of the post I placed on the 3 & 4 Cav Regts Assn website, after I received news from the DHAAT that the Application had been accepted. I also suggested that B Sqn might like to initiate a unit project to research Operation Hammersley, an Operation for which they could become entitled to wear the insignia of the RVN CGWP Unit Citation … while so posted. I would’ve been happy to assist in any such project (imagining that it would be good for serving members today, to be associated with something in real time which related to their unit’s history).
I explained in the Blog for 27 June 2019, that this resulted in me being blocked, by direction from the RAAC Corporation, from the 3 & 4 Cav Regts Assn website. Oh, for openness and transparency in the things that are done for the good of the RAAC. If I was to contact the RAAC Corporation, I think that I’d be told that the “politics” (see below) related to not raising expectations about something which might not happen.
Is this the way it should be? I’d have thought that association with on-going efforts to have a past injustice corrected (one which affects the unit), would be something to be encouraged.
The Blog post from 27 June is copied below ….
The Dirty Tricks Campaign. PART 2C (What Happened Next?)
This is probably the most bizarre example of the recent Dirty Tricks campaign waged by the RAAC Corporation
I posted on the 3 & 4 Cav Regts Assn FB Page, information that the DHAAT had agreed to conduct a Review and suggesting that B Sqn ¾ Cav Regt (whose OC follows the Assn FB page) might wish to initiate a project to look into the history of Operation Hammersley.
I thought that this is what you do when you receive new information that could affect others (eg. B Sqn personnel could become eligible to wear the RVN CGWP Unit Citation insignia while so posted). This is part of the heritage of the Unit.
I had thought that this was news which should be celebrated. But what happened?
I’m immediately blocked from the 3 & 4 Cav Regts Assn FB page (and I assume that my post was deleted).
Why? The reason I was given, attributed to the President, was “politics!”.
It seems that the RAAC Corporation had decided that I was to be prevented from providing any further information in regards to this matter and had directed their member Assn to delete me from their FB page. It seems that they perceive themselves as the only ‘authorised’ party to make pronouncements.
Why is it so? You’ll have to excuse me if I say that I doubt that it was for the good of the RAAC.
—————————————————————————————————————–
28 July 2019
The Missing Centurion Log Books
Following on from 25 July …
“There are also Centurion log books held in other private collections and in public institutions such as the AWM and the Army Tank Museum. I’ve been fortunate to have tracked down and examined many of them in detail, and transcribe the information they contain into my database. “
This quote from Mr Cecil’s website, might serve to explain that he might not have the log book for ARN 169106, but if he transcribed information from it … it means that he must’ve had “access to, at least one of the missing logbooks” at some time. So why deny it?
It he had had access to it … where did this occur? If at the Tank Museum, when did the access happen?
The importance of these questions is that the Investigation by the Army History Unit concluded that the log books weren’t at the Museum when they took over responsibility.
Prior to this, Mr Cecil, as a representative of the AWM, was on the advisory board of management for the Museum. [Actual title of the body is likely to be different.]
If he had had access to the log book at the Tank Museum at this time (to “transcribe the information”), it shows that the log book WAS at the Tank Museum and narrows down the period during which they went ‘missing’.
The following extract from Part 1 of the Introduction (above) is relevant:
“Once upon a time there was a 1AR Assn Members’ Forum. This was a page on the Assn’s website and members used it to keep in touch and discuss matters relevant to the Assn. Suddenly the Forum was closed. It was explained that it was costing members too much to keep operating. When it was discovered that this was not the case (ie. there was no cost to the Assn), the Forum was reopened.
The topic which was being discussed on the Forum when it was closed was a request for information about the history of the Centurion held by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. This led to a discovery that all the log books for the Centurions at Puckapunyal had mysteriously disappeared from the Tank Museum.
After the Forum was reopened, discussion on the topic continued. Suddenly the Forum was closed again. A number of reasons were given for the closure, all of which turned out to be untrue. One of them was that a post or posts on the Forum had brought the Assn into discredit. No-one was prepared to say what the post was or who had posted it. Misconduct by members was publicly announced as the reason for the closure.
One member lodged a grievance as provided for under the Constitution. He felt that members should be informed as to what their misconduct was and be given the opportunity to defend themselves. He also started a blog to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters.”
‘Oh, what a web we weave …”.
———————————————————————————————————————-
27 July 2019
GOOD NEWS!
50th Anniversary Commemoration of Operation Hammersley
The Blog post for 8 July was:
To their credit, the RAAC Corporation has sought DVA’s assistance to conduct a National Commemoration in February 2020. DVA, however, have declined. The Corporation has requested that the decision be reconsidered. It would be fantastic if such a Commemoration was agreed, given that the principal unit involved has opted not to participate! [Previous blogs had referred to the 8RAR Assn’s commitment to a Reunion on the Gold Coast in February 2020.] Fingers crossed that such an outcome might come about.
But what if it’s not? There are two options that I can see, apart from further lobbying of DVA (others might well see more).
Option 1. Try to convince the battalion to reconsider and be part of a national commemoration. How to do this? Maybe the RAAC Rep Hon Col could to liaise with the Colonel Commandant of the RAR to see if a high level agreement can be reached in terms of a combined National Ceremony. (Alternatively, or as well as, the Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt could ‘talk’ to the Hon Col of the Battalion.)
Option 2. Hold a 50th Anniversary Commemoration for Operation Hammersley at 1 Armd Regt (Adelaide), inviting veterans and delegations from other units involved. This would desirably be held in Feb 20, but could also be held on Cambrai Day 2020.
On 17 July (see Blog post) I met DVA’s National Manager for Commemorations. He informed me that the Commemoration WAS to go ahead!
The 8RAR Reunion is scheduled for the latter part of February, allowing time for both the National Commemoration (possibly around the 17/18 Feb), as well as their reunion.
The arrangements being made to organise a C Sqn 1971 ‘mini-reunion’ to coincide with the Operation Overlord Commemoration in 2021, have been passed on to A Sqn. Maybe a similar get-together for A Sqn 1970 will be organised (?).
———————————————————————————————————————-
26 July 2019
Insults (and What They Tell Us About the Person Behind Them)
“Whinging cretin” … “timid unctuous little officer” …
These are a couple of the insults that have been directed at me publicly.
I’ve been accused of ‘bullying’, because I’ve asked questions related to the regulatory duties of those who hold positions of responsibility on behalf of others. I admire them for doing so, but feel that being a volunteer doesn’t mean foregoing constitutional processes.
I’ve never been accused of insulting others, however. I just don’t believe in doing it (‘if you can’t say something good etc’…). Unfortunately, there is a personality trait abroad which is characterised by a fixation with running others down. When I read RAAC related social media, I’m saddened see examples of some continually belittling others by various means (some quite subtle).
My Blog post from 3 May 2017 is relevant:
Why Do Some People Habitually Insult Others?
“We should be too big to take offense and too noble to give it.”~ Abraham Lincoln.
I know people who continually insults others when presenting their points of view. Why do they do this? The literature is full of various answers, some psychological and others philosophical. I had no idea that this was a subject which was studied as much as it is. It seems that the personality type involved is easily able to be identified.
Some of the observations are:
Mature people can communicate with others without insulting them.
Most people who insult other people are insecure. They think that insulting the person will make them feel better, or they insult the other person to take attention off of themselves and their issues. They pronounce judgments on people they perceive as inferior—which is almost everyone. They only hear what they want to hear.
“When suppressed concerns and feelings, such as lack of self-esteem; self-defeating thoughts and behaviours; guilt; and anger, for example, are not treated or dealt with, the person uses insults to unleash anger, to escape dealing with the pain or trauma experienced or as a way to exert control [over another person] and feel powerful.”
People high on narcissistic* tendencies see themselves as being more important than others and therefore deserving of better treatment, a quality called narcissistic entitlement.
‘* Narcissism is personality disorder is a mental disorder in which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for admiration and a lack of empathy for others.
People with narcissistic tendencies tend to be particularly likely to hurl an insult your way so that they can feel better about themselves.
It is the social hierarchy game that makes insults sting. We are wired so that it feels bad to lose social status and feels good to gain it. That’s why a teasing jibe from a good friend isn’t painful—we haven’t lost status from it—but an unanswered email from our boss or a dilatory response to an invitation can diminish our sense of self-worth. Those playing the social hierarchy game try to score points by insulting others, who respond with counter-insults.
It’s my experience that those who insult others … have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for admiration and a lack of empathy for others; as a result, they pronounce judgments on people they perceive to be inferior. This provides a way to exert control and feel powerful.
——————————————————————————————————————–
25 July 2019
The Missing Centurion Log Books
“Recently, I noted that Bruce Cameron has incorrectly claimed, in the lengthy pre-amble to his daily blog, that ‘Mr Cecil has, or has [had] access to’one of the Centurion log books that Bruce Cameron purports are missing from the Army Tank Museum. That accusation is wrong. “
The Introduction to the Blog explains why it was established. This, to a large degree, relates to the Centurion log books that were found to be missing from the Tank Museum (and the lies that were told in this respect). See ‘Part 1’ (above)’.
One of the ‘goals’ set out in Part 7 was:
‘The identity of the person who holds the logbooks for the Centurions at Puckapunyal would be known, as would the reason for the logbooks not being in Tank Museum where they belong.’
Not long ago, this goal was moved to the ‘pending’ category with the following explanation: (It is now known that Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM, has, or has had, access to at least one of the missing logbooks.)
In terms of background, I knew (from the research involved with ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, that Mr Cecil owned many of the Centurion logbooks. This information came with a caveat, however … I was not allowed to tell anyone. (Having made an agreement, I don’t believe that one should renege on it.)
It transpires that the logbooks for the Centurion tank fleet were disposed of by Defence in three different ways: (i) those for tanks which were purchased by a private buyer, remained with the tanks; (ii) those for tanks which were to be used as hard targets on ranges, were sent to the National Archives; and (iii) those for tanks which were to remain of Defence land, were held by local Defence agencies. (Those for the Centurions at Puckapunyal were held by the Tank Museum.)
Interestingly, in 2007 when Centurion 169056 was moved from Puckapunyal to the AWM in Canberra, Mr Cecil knew that its log book was held by the Tank Museum and arranged for it to be transferred to the AWM in conjunction with the tank.
When the logbooks for all the Centurions remaining at Puckapunyal were found to be missing from the Tank Museum in 2014, I was placed in a difficult position. I knew that Mr Cecil held a lot of log books, but I didn’t know which ones. So I decided to raise the question publicly … did anyone know where the log books were? This created all sorts of ructions, as explained in the Intro above. Subsequently Mr Cecil admitted publicly that he owns many logbooks. He has not expanded on this to say whether or not these logbooks are only from the tanks sold by Defence, or if they include those previously held by the Tank Museum.
To cut a long story short, I came across the following reference in my book. Footnote 55, p121, Volume 1 , ‘Canister1 On! FIRE!’ states: “The logbook for the other dozer, ARN 169106, shows that its modifications were not completed until 5 October 1967. M K Cecil personal communication 24 March 2003.”
ARN 169106 is one of the RAAC’s most significant former AFVs (see below). It is outside the Sgts Mess at the SOA, Puckapunyal. It’s log book should be held by the Tank Museum. Given the info above, it would seem apparent that Mr Cecil “has, or has had access to, at least one of the missing logbooks”. How can he deny this, given the quote above?
ARN 169106. In terms of the RAAC, this Centurion fired the first twenty-pounder round in action (8 March 1968); detonated the first anti-tank mine (22 May 1968); and was the first to be penetrated by an RPG (6 June 1969, Binh Ba). Find the repair of the RPG ‘hole’ when next at the School of Armour. It’s simply a crime that its logbook has been ‘lost’.
PS. Just noticed that someone on one of the RAAC FB pages is appealing to all and sundry in an effort to ascertain the history of a Leopard at the Tank Museum, Puckapunyal. Seems that the log books for the Leopards might have gone AWOL as well!
——————————————————————————————————————-
24 July 2019
Australia’s Multi-Role Combat Brigade (MCB) Organisation: Is it Right?
The Blog post on 3 February 2019 addressed the issues associated with the present arrangements for the allocation and crewing of LAND 400 Phase 3 IFVs. Plan KEOGH amended Plan BEERSHEBA to some extent, but the critical issue remains the same: having three infantry battalions dedicated to crewing IFVs, is not only more expensive, but more importantly, limits the ADF’s operational flexibility. (See extracts Basis of Provisioning and Brigade Organisation, below.)
Now another organisation construct has been proposed. “Plan Beersheba, LAND 400 and a third way” is the title of an article by Jeremy Carpenter, “a freelance journalist who holds a master’s degree in international security from the University of Sydney and has worked on security sector reform in Timor-Leste, focused on community policing, defence policy, transnational crime and youth violence prevention”.https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/land-amphibious/4364-plan-beersheba-land-400-and-a-third-way
The author suggests that the organisation “presents problems for the strategic and operational flexibility of the MCBs standing ready battle group (RBG) formed around one of its infantry battalions, if it is called upon to conduct either low or high-intensity combat operations.
If the RBG was the brigade’s mechanised battalion and is called upon to for low-intensity scenarios, its strategic and operational deployability may constrain its ability to do so, due to the heavy weight of projected LAND 400 AFVs, both for their strategic deployment and tactical mobility in areas lacking the transport infrastructure to support their weight. Conversely, if the RBG was the brigade’s motorised battalion, and deployment into a major combat operation was required, its capacity to execute such operations would be limited by their reduced conventional warfighting capability.”
The solution, he suggests, is a “restructure made possible by standardising both MCB infantry battalions, each equipped with a complement of PMVs crewed by the Royal Australian Corps of Transport (RACT) and by raising organic mechanised infantry elements within the ACR. This would provide the infantry battalions with organic protected mobility, enabling flexibility to be deployed as motorised and/or airmobile infantry as well as allowing for greater strategic and operational deployability. This would be complemented by a restructure of the brigade ACRs along the lines of the Norwegian Army’s Telemark Battalion. This battalion is structured around one armoured squadron, one cavalry squadron, two mechanised infantry companies and a staff and support squadron.
There is some value in this approach, not least of which, is freeing infantry from being restricted to the long-term training required to crew and operate IFVs (and PMVs).
My comment on the ‘Defence Connect’ website was: “The issues raised are well worth the attention. If three infantry battalions are restricted to the role of operating and maintaining IFVs [and PMVs], force structure flexibility is reduced. Another option is for the RAAC to operate the IFVs. Grouping a mech inf element in the ACR is another concept worthy of consideration.”
———————————————————————————————
Blog 3 February 2019: Basis of Provisioning
Three battalions equipped with IFVs means three battalions dedicated to the mechanised infantry role. This is necessary because a vehicle such as an IFV (two-man turret, 30mm cannon, anti-tank guided weapon, 1000hp engine, 35-40 tonne weight) requires a highly trained crew. If this is to occur, career progression must be integral to the mechanised battalion.
Dedicated mechanised units exist in armies such as those of the US, Britain and Germany. These, however, are very different to the ADF … both in terms of manpower and numbers of armoured vehicles, allowing them to maintain units dedicated to a specific operational role. Is Australia in a position to do the same, or is the flexibility to ‘mix and match’, i.e. tailor force composition to specific operational needs, more important?
The IFV is to replace the M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) with a vehicle to provide a capability to accompany tanks onto the objective. When LAND 400 was initiated, APCs were operated by the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC); subsequently they were transferred to the Infantry. Was this the right decision?
If RAAC crews operated the IFVs, training costs would be slashed. No longer would IFV qualification involve an isolated skill set. Commonality in the operation of AFVs would enable conversion courses to be conducted for commanders, gunners and drivers.
Brigade Organisation
Has Plan Beersheba worked out as expected? How does the resulting brigade ORBAT lend itself to our likely operational contingencies? Armour and infantry in 3 Brigade provides an example. Units are: 2 Cav Regt (one tank squadron; two cavalry squadrons); 1 RAR (mounted in PMV Bushmasters) and 3 RAR (mounted in APCs).
It should be possible to form three battlegroups within the brigade. The tank squadron might well be ‘penny packeted’ across these three battlegroups. A more hard-hitting battlegroup would be one in which the tanks were concentrated, ie: 2 Cavalry Regiment HQ: tank squadron, two 3RAR companies (mechanised), plus cavalry troop etc.
No matter how desirable this would be, it leaves the 3RAR battlegroup with no tank support. There is little point in spending $15b to equip an infantry battalion in each brigade with IFVs designed to accompany tanks onto the objective … if there are no tanks available to form the battlegroup. The obvious compromise would be to allocate a half tank squadron to each of the 2 Cavalry Regiment and 3 RAR battlegroups.
It would appear that there are either too few tanks, or too many IFVs to form a balanced force. Ideally, with a mechanised battalion in each brigade, there would be two tank squadrons in the ACR. If a single tank squadron was to be retained in each brigade, ‘balance’ would see the mechanised infantry capability reduced to two companies. This would not be ideal, however, as 3RAR would become a ‘mixed’ battalion with half mechanised. The ‘conundrum’ would be solved if the RAAC were to operate the IFVs.
—————————————————————————————————————————————
23 July 2019
Australia’s Defence Strategy
The Blog for 19 July refers to an article published by the Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI) by Michael Shoebridge (Director of the Defence and Strategy Program). I sent my comments to ASPI and Michael responded as follows:
“Bruce,
Thanks for your comment on the recent articles from Hugh White and others, including me, on what a viable Australian strategy and then defence force might look like.
I think my answer to your overall concern about a proper logical appreciation of our national position is set out in the other article I wrote (at this link) about Hugh White’s book.
In that, you’ll see that I do not think the analysis that Australia will be ‘home alone’ in a dangerous Asia absent American power and presence. Nor do I think Hugh White’s prescription that, were this to happen, Australia should consider regional powers like Indonesia, India and Japan to be potential adversaries and potential partners at times of crisis to be at all a viable or reasonable basis for our strategy or policy.
The logical appreciation of our national position that I hope you’ll see in the two articles I wrote assessing Hugh White’s thoughts is that Australia will be most secure through a strategy of deep alliance with American power, combined with strong partnerships with important regional powers – notably Japan, Indonesia, India and Vietnam. We will need to coexist in a region with obvious Chinese power, however, that power will be constrained by the powers mentioned here, with us working in common interests in this way. That’s a multipolar future, more complicated than a simple two great power world, but it’s a far less apocalyptic world than results from what I see as the flawed analysis in Prof White’s book.
That means that I don’t think we need to be self-reliant as a complete national economy and so ‘not dependent’ on maritime supply lines. I don’t think we could independently secure the supply lines between us and the rest of the world in the face of an attack by a major power like China, but I don’t think it would be good strategy to seek to do this given the advantages to us of working with regional partners on this and other challenges.
Regards, Michael.”
My reply is copied below:
“Hi Michael,
Thanks for responding to my ‘comment’.
I see what you’re saying below, however, I fail to understand how those of us who are not privy to the ADF threat assessment and current contingency plans, can validly seek to influence public perception. I know … democratic rights etc … theoretically, it is the right of each individual to question government policies. I believe that we have to avoid a conspiracy theory related to those in the Government trying to influence public opinion for their own good. ( I responded to two Strategy related articles posted today on John Menadue’s blog … one relates to such a view.)
In terms of strategy … if you reason that we can’t safeguard our supply lines, is diplomacy the only option? Seems to me that the whole concept of a defence force is to provide insurance against the failure of diplomatic means. If we put all our faith in diplomacy, we don’t need a defence force. This is one option for Australians; some, however, might believe that an insurance policy is needed in case diplomacy fails.
Until the former option is considered viable and a government is voted to power accordingly, I believe we must support the ADF (with appropriate open and transparent public oversight).
So … given that the nation considers an ADF is necessary, how can its ‘construct’ be best served by public debate?
I believe that an on-going free and frank exchange of informed opinions can bring about the best outcome.
Best wishes, Bruce”
——————————————————————————————————————–
22 July 2019
Can Australia Defend Itself?
Following from yesterday …. (I know that this theme is a bit turgid for some, but as Arlo Guthrie sang in Alice’s Restaurant “if you want to end war and stuff, you’ve got to sing loudly”.)
The title above is that of an article by Richard Broinowski (a former senior Australian diplomat).
“But in my view, it is a wake-up call for Australians to be aware of our deteriorating strategic situation, the increasingly unreliability of US security assistance, and the need to take a greater effort to get on better with our neighbours through diplomatic means.”
I don’t know enough about the ADF’s current contingency plans (which are at the heart of our defence preparedness) nor the reliability of US security assistance, to comment on those aspects. I do know that Defence measures are only needed when diplomatic means fail.
Where does that leave us?
The current debate seems fragmented and disjointed. Why….? It seems to me that there is a failure to focus on logical appreciation. Following on from …. an analysis of our national interests, the ‘threat’, and associated warning and lead times … one would think that the next consideration would be our comparative advantages. The first of these would have to be our geographical location in terms of distance from possible enemies. Of course, this is both an advantage and disadvantage.
It is a disadvantage if we can’t effectively monitor the sea and air gap under all circumstances and safeguard our lines of supply if we are reliant on them. It is an advantage if a potential enemy’s preparation to mount an attack would increase the warning time available and any such force would be vulnerable when attempting to cross the gap.
The maxim: guard against your weakness and capitalise on your strength, would seem to be applicable. If you are the aggressor, the opposite would apply, ie, capitalise on your opponent’s weakness. Are our surveillance systems adequate and safe against cyber-attack? If the answer is ‘yes’, then we can move on.
Can Australia become sufficiently self-reliant not to be dependent on maritime supply lines? If the answer is ‘yes’, then the solution is obvious. If the answer is ‘no’, then a priority for defence needs becomes apparent.
Why should Australia focus its primary defence resources on defending the sea and air gap, when a potential enemy could simply interdict our supply lines and achieve the same result?
Of course, all the above is stated without any knowledge of the assessed threat and associated warning times … and the ADF contingency plans in place.
——————————————————————————————————————–
21 July 2019
Defence ‘culture’ holding back balanced defence force
My response (following on from 19 July 2019) is as follows:
Dear Andrew
“As for ‘the threat’ these are largely suppositions and premature judgments which on previous experience rarely materialise. We should expect our regional neighbours to be equally as keen to ensure the peace and keep regional conflict within bounds. The military and intelligence community are ceaseless in talking up the threat to ensure its ‘share’ of resources.”
A Defence policy is akin to an insurance policy. If you value your house, you insure it. If it’s built of weatherboard, you expect to pay a higher premium than if it was built of brick. Why? Because the threat to it is greater. How much greater? The community leaves this to the insurance company actuaries to determine. If we don’t agree with their threat assessment, we elect not to have any insurance and bear the risk ourselves.
I suggest that it’s part of the Australian culture (formulated by our collective experience) that insurance is considered a necessary factor in our daily expenses. The insurance companies might well ‘talk up’ the risk, but we’re capable of evaluating it for ourselves … depending on our personal circumstances. The trouble is, one’s sovereign identity is not quite the same as one’s house.
This is a ‘red herring’ of sorts … how would you feel if you had been an indigenous Australian when the first fleet arrived and colonisation commenced? As a nation, we still do not have an empathy with those who endeavoured to defend their family, their land and their possessions. We will not even acknowledge these Australian warriors and their families in the Australian War Memorial.
Some might not have a sense of this injustice, but would they agree that Australia’s “military and intelligence community” are talking up the threat to our country to keep themselves in a job?
I, for one, have more faith in my fellow Australians.
————————————————————————————————————
20 July 2019
Outstanding Achievements in Modelling Making.
Not your ordinary models, mind you … 1/6th scale, radio controlled hull and turret, engine noise, smoke and bang when armament fired; coax sound effects. This Youtube link will astound you: https://youtu.be/XjAjasZmLV8
The Centurion gun tank featured is the work of a former long serving RAC (RTR) member, who went to great lengths to model his tank on one used in Vietnam (part of the reasoning here is that he spent a posting on exchange to 1 Armd Regt). The tank he chose to model was 169064 (22B at Binh Ba and 2A at Hammersley).
With the model Centurion bridgelayer present on the day, he couldn’t resist trying to recreate this photo which he’d seen on the Internet (asking if I knew the tank number):
Chris Sweeney was Tp Ldr of 4 Troop; sqn tech reports (Shane Lovell’s book) show his tanks as 169007 (24A); 169104 (24B); 169041 (24C). 24 isn’t listed for Aug, but before and after it was 169077.
Some years ago, I suggested that the photo be used in conjunction with a plaque adjacent to 169056 at the AWM. (The AWM agreed but had to become copyright owners.)
There is a photo from just before the above was taken, at p479 of Volume 1 of ‘Canister! On! FIRE!) I probably intended to use both in the book, but ended up having to edit out so much, it probably went in favour of the earlier one showing the nature of the gap which had to be crossed.”
“Where the forces would differ to now is in giving up on anything other than sinking ships and shooting down aircraft on their way to Australia, supplemented, perhaps, by attacking bases that support such an endeavour—unless that will make the bases’ owner very unhappy.
That leaves a big vulnerability in the plan. Maritime denial is all about preventing forces from attacking us. None of White’s proposed force structure seems well-placed to protect shipping and aircraft bringing what our economy would need to sustain a conflict lasting more than a couple of weeks.
Fuel’s an obvious example. If we can’t protect shipping against submarine, surface ship, aircraft and missile attack, we’ll run out of fuel in around 25 days. Australia needs to be able to defend its long international supply chains.
White argues the best path is to attack the adversary’s trade, and to stockpile loads of stuff. He pretends that this will be enough in the case of every adversary, as all have trade dependencies. But China could sustain a conflict longer than we could despite Australia’s best efforts to attack its supply lines.
I think he knows his ‘solution’ here is no answer, as he volunteers that Australia ‘could not maintain its sea lines of communication with allies and suppliers’ and this ‘is a reality we have to live with’. It’s a reality to live with and lose by if we adopt these plans. I’m also not sure who these allies are in White’s world.
White’s contention that his force structure proposals could be paid for by a defence budget amounting 3.5% or 4% of GDP is nonsensical. That’s partly because the cost of sustaining capabilities in the much deeper local way he proposes would require a radical re-engineering of the economy and workforce.”
So, where does this leave us? The current debate seems fragments and disjointed. Why is this? It seems to me that there is a failure to focus on logical appreciation. Following on from an analysis of our national interest, the ‘threat’, and associated warning and lead times, one would think that the next consideration would be our comparative advantages. The first of these would have to be our geographical location in terms of distance from possible enemies. Of course, this is both an advantage and disadvantage.
It is a disadvantage if we can’t effectively monitor the sea and air gap under all circumstances and safeguard our lines of supply if we are reliant on them. It is an advantage if a potential enemy’s preparation to mount an attack would increase the warning time available and any such force would be vulnerable when attempting to cross the gap.
The maxim: guard against your weakness and capitalise on your strength, would seem to be applicable. If you are the aggressor, the opposite would apply, ie, capitalise on your opponent’s weakness. Are our surveillance systems adequate and safe against cyber-attack? If the answer is ‘yes’, then we can move on.
Can Australia become sufficiently self-reliant not to be dependent on maritime supply lines? If the answer is ‘yes’, then the solution is obvious. If the answer is ‘no’, then a priority for defence needs becomes apparent.
——————————————————————————————————————–
18 July 2019
C Sqn 1971 ‘Mini-Reunion’: 7 June 2021
Thanks to the 3RAR Assn for taking the lead in organising a 50th Anniversary National Commemoration of Operation Overlord. Moves to hold a whole of 1971 C Sqn get-together in conjunction with it, are taking shape.
So far, those who have indicated that they are keen to receive updates and info re the arrangements include: Doug McDonald, Russell Stewart; Marc Hoskin, Ron Baikie, Brian Agnew, Geoff Stelmach; David Watts; John Scales; Bill Burton; Martin Boyle; Shorty Watson; Russell Bird; Des Thompson; Bo Janic; Baden Jeffery; Dal Crocker; and Stan Hanuszewicz
It would be hoped that the invitation to an informal Squadron dinner on the Sunday night before the National Commemoration, would be able to be extended to both those from 1 Armd Regt in the Standard Party and the NOK of those deceased.
Re the latter, the list has only just started to be compiled. They include (RIP) : Peter Cormack; Roger Kendall; Phil Barwick; Dave Raymond; Andy Haymon (cook); Joe Palucus (Paul Lucas);John Wakefield; Max Colles; Jeff Rassmussen; Ian Goss; Ray Frazer; Bernie Flynn; Lance Clarke; Nev Calliss; Iliya Todorovic ; Andy Anderson; Stan Iry; Andrew McGrath-Kerr; Phil Cotter; Peter Bourke; Warren Hind; Jim de Turt, Harry Percival (RAEME); Peter Hunter (RAEME).
If anyone is able to add any further name to this ever so sad list, please let me know.
Of interest is that 3RAR have arranged for Australia Post to issue a commemorative prepaid envelope in conjunction with the Commemoration. The design is likely to be an infantryman standing next to a Centurion with an Iroquois overhead. The Australian Mint might also issue a Commemorative coin.
——————————————————————————————————————-
17 July 2019
ANZAC Day
The posts on 20 and 21 April 2019 (below) provide the Background.
Tomorrow (17 July) I’ll be attending the National Aged and Community Care Forum meeting organised by DVA in relation to the difficulty in conducting ANZAC Day Commemorative Services in Aged Care facilities … a problem which arises because ANZAC Day is a public holiday and staff at aged care facilities have to be paid ‘double time’.
[Another aspect to the problem is that Christmas Day and Easter Friday and Monday are also public holidays and commemoration is not questioned … ANZAC Day, however, is not perceived to be as significant by the operators of aged care facilities.]
Presently, DVA grant guidelines prevent any funds being used for salaries incurred during commemorative events (or for funds to be used for recurring events such as ANZAC day).
I’ll be proposing that an exception be made for ANZAC Day ceremonies being conducted in Aged Care Facilities; ie. a set amount to be made available on application.
I’ll also propose that DVA develop a suggested ANZAC Day service for Aged Care Facility operators, eg, ‘Prayer, Address, Hymn, Ode … watch the telecast’.
The meeting was very supportive of finding ways to assist aged care facilities to meet the requests of their residents for Commemorative services. A proactive approach was seen to be needed, ie create awareness. To this end, the Aged Care peak bodies will be advised of options and resources open to them in terms of Commemorations. These include:
(ii) DVA also have a dvd which is available to aged care facilities (and anyone else) to help with the conduct an ANZAC Day service
(iii) Wherever possible, both the RSL and Legacy are willing to arrange appropriate transport to move mobility impaired residents to local ANZAC Day services.
DVA are not able to provide grant funding to pay salaries and assist with the cost of annual commemorations such as ANZAC Day. They are, however, able to provide grant funds for significant commemorations. These include the anniversaries with years ending in zero or five. National Commemorations will probably be held around Australia to commemorate the end of the Vietnam War. Grants related to these events would fall into the significant category.
For next year’s ANZAC Day, there would seem to be two options for residents of aged care facilities: (i) arrange for a Commemoration to be held prior to ANZAC Day; or (ii) seek assistance with transportation to a local service.
The advice being distributed by DVA through the aged care peak bodies may help if neither of the above are acceptable (ie. bedridden and of a strong belief that ANZAC Day must be commemorated on 25 April). The best solution would seem to be for aged care operators to seek input from their residents well before ANZAC Day, so as to identify any such cases and attempt to resolve them with the help of the wider community.
——————————————————————————————————————–
16 July 2019
Operation Overlord Commemoration
The following mail was sent off to the RAEME Head of Corps (HOC) today …
Dear Brigadier Freeman,
A National Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of Operation Overlord (Vietnam) is to be conducted by DVA at the Vietnam Memorial, Canberra, on 7 June 2021. It will be similar to the Binh Ba Commemoration (in June this year): https://iview.abc.net.au/show/battle-of-binh-ba-50th-anniversary. A Last Post ceremony will be conducted at the AWM.
As a former member of the RAAC, I was disappointed that there did not seem to be any formal RAEME representation at either the Binh Ba or Coral-Balmoral commemorations.
Because of circumstances that arose during Overlord, my tank troop attacked a strongly defended enemy position by ourselves, ie. without supporting infantry. My troop comprised three Centurions and an ARV. Our plan when contact was initiated was to form a square and saturate our arcs of responsibility with fire (so to capitalise on surprise and maintain the initiative). The ARV had the same responsibility to this end, as each of the tanks.
While members of the tank squadron LAD will be kept informed of arrangements and invited to associated squadron gatherings, I wondered if it would be appropriate for you or your representative to lay a wreath at the Vietnam Memorial (possibly together with a RAEME veteran from the Battle)? If you agreed with this proposal, I would ask that DVA take this into account when planning the Commemoration.
Yours sincerely …
Note: I should have added that ‘RAEME vehicles accompanied tank and APC troops wherever they went throughout the Vietnam War. Action to recover AFVs was made under fire and the dangers experienced by AFV crews were shared equally by RAEME ‘, but one would expect that the HOC would know this.
——————————————————————————————————————–
15 July 2019
Hammersley : Extension of Eligibility
The letter below has been sent off. I suspect, however, that the RAAC Head of Corps (HOC) won’t be allowed to advocate a separate view, other than that which is Defence policy.
This is also the position of the RAAC Corporation, ie. their founding Chairman feels constrained to only advocate within the Defence policy framework.
Interestingly, there is the well-known case where the Special Forces HOC stood up and said that he wouldn’t accept an order not to wear berets (and they were subsequently allowed to, when every other Corps was forbidden to wear them … a demonstration of ‘power’ relationships perhaps, but belittling to others nevertheless).
Will there be a reply? One would like to think so … but past communications would suggest that not even ‘courtesy’ applies in such situations.
RAAC Head of Corps
Dear Sir,
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The attached letter was sent to the then Minister Tehan on 10 September 2017 (copy to you).
The Minister was asked … as he had not previously consulted “those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE)”, if he could ensure that “decisions related to this new submission are made following input from the Heads of these Corps”.
The Minister’s earlier decision not to extend eligibility was subsequently affirmed by his Chief of Staff.
The Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal has undertaken to conduct a review of the grounds for Defence’s advice to the Minister. In preparing for the Tribunal’s Hearing into the matter, can you advise whether or not you were consulted as per the request above.
As a separate request, can you please advise your views in relation to the extension of eligibility.
Many thanks,
———————————————————————————————————————–
14 July 2019
Hammersley Commemoration.
I thought that I’d been able to divest myself of Commemoration matters, but not so it would seem.
As per yesterday, unless someone picks up the ball and runs with it, it’s unlikely anything will get done. I’ve asked the President 1 Armd Regt Assn to represent the Assn’s members, but have not had the courtesy of a response.
So … just get on with it, ie. create a network to contact members of C Sqn 1971 (including NOK of those deceased) and inform them of the Commemoration. Seek expressions of interest in a squadron reunion and act accordingly.
Now these arrangements are possible because of the timeline, ie it’s 23 months until the Commemoration. But what’s the situation re Hammersley? There are only seven months to go and the location of the Commemoration is not known (if one is to be held at all).
Now A Sqn personnel may wish to have the same opportunity that is being presented to those from C Squadron, ie. come together to commemorate 50 years since serving in Vietnam. But time is running out for such arrangements to be made. For all anyone knows, 1 Armd Regt might scheduled to participate in a Forces Command exercise in February 2020.
Jack Chipman and Ben Bowd are fully aware of the situation … is there anything more I should be doing? Not being a member of A Sqn, I don’t have the contacts that I do for my own sqn (C Sqn ’71). I can circulate info re June 2021 … but what about February 2020?
How can a 50th Anniversary of A Sqn’s service in Vietnam go without commemoration? (There won’t be many participants left to commemorate future Anniversaries.)
A brief summary of Operation Overlord is provided below.
The Commemoration will include a Last Post Ceremony at the AWM (related to one of those KIA during Overlord). There will also be a dinner at the AWM that 3RAR is organising, but it’s not clear that there will be space for all ‘supporting arms’ and so some of us are thinking about organising a ‘mini 1971 Reunion’, ie. we’d co-ordinate the names and contact info of those who were interested and suggest an accommodation venue and possibly a dinner venue for 6 June 2021. This would involve RAAC/RAEME etc pers from C Sqn, and also possibly those from other supporting arms. If you’re interested in being put on the info/update list, please let me know (no commitment).
Also, if you’re in touch with others, could you let them know and if they’re interested in being kept up to date, tell them to get in touch.
Thanks to 3RAR Assn Australia Post will be issuing a prepaid/pre-stamped envelope in conjunction with the Commemoration, the design likely to be an infantryman standing next to a Centurion with an Iroquois overhead. I believe that the Mint are also doing a commemorative coin.
—————————————————————————————–
Operation Overlord: Brief Summary
The Battle of Long Khanh was the last Task Force Battle of the Vietnam War; code named Operation Overlord and conducted in Long Khanh – Phuoc Tuy Province borders. Because of the size and nature of the operation the approval of the Australian Prime Minister, The Hon John Gordon, MP was requested and given.
The HQ 1 Australian Task Force was deployed together with the 3rd Battalion and 4th Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment , C Squadron 1 Armoured Regiment, A Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment, 1Task Force Defense and Employment Platoon and all supported by two Field Batteries of 105 mm Howitzers, one platoon of US Army 155 mm Howitzers, an engineer Troop, Helicopters of 9 RAAF Squadron and the US Army and the US Army 2/8 Battalion (US).
A very large force comprising all the fighting elements of 1 Australian Task Force for the last time in the Vietnam War. Approximately 2,500 Australian troops would have been deployed for this operation.
The result was never really judged by body count but two very large bunker systems were discovered and destroyed and the two enemy units, 3/33 NVA Regiment and D445 VC Regiment put to flight. Australian Casualties were 10 killed in action, including a RAAF helicopter pilot and door-gunner, while 24 were wounded. (Courtesy of Peter Scott, DSO; CO 3RAR at the time.)
——————————————————————————————————————–
12 July 2019
Units’ and Unit Associations’ News etc.
A few posts ago, I asked why the RAAC Corporation couldn’t provide a ‘news’ source as per that below (so as to allow former members of the RAAC keep up to date with current events).
Unfortunately, there has been no response. (If anyone has direct links to the Corporation, please pass on.) It’s so easy to be a source of RAAC information and news … but there has to be the Will to be of service to others.
The following are links that I can access. I’ve been banned from four Facebook pages (1AR Assn members Only, 1AR Assn Social Page; 1 AR Past and Present and 3 & 4 Cav Regt Assn) so can’t list those.
Please note. The army.gov.au websites for RAAC units are so out of date it’s pathetic.
Hugh White, the author, is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.
My response is: “Hugh, You have succinctly argued the case for emphasis on ‘sea denial’, as distinct to ‘sea control’. Given that projection of power is as much about economic control, as it is military leverage … where does protection of our sea lanes fit in?
This would seem to be one of Australia’s national interests that the ADF has an obligation to be able to safeguard. Of course, preventing interdiction of supply is not solely a RAN responsibility.
Just wondering where you saw this issue among the pantheon of defence capabilities that deserve debate.”
An article appeared in the ‘Canberra Times’ for 10 July 2019, commenting on Professor White’s arguments as presented in the article above. A quote was included from the Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI):
“Professor White’s plan contained a huge vulnerability – the need to protect supply lines. ‘If we can’t protect shipping against submarine, surface ship, aircraft and missile attack, we’ll run out of fuel in around 25 days’, Mr Shoebridge said.”
Maybe the readership of ‘Armouredadvocates’ is greater than I had thought … then again, maybe it’s just co-incidence (or simply just ‘obvious’ to all).
———————————————————————————————————————-
10 July 2019
Commemorations: My Last Involvement
Operation Hammersley (2020)
I don’t think I can do any more re the Hammersley 50th Commemoration. I think the RAAC Corporation made a mistake in trying to mislead DVA into thinking that a National Commemoration was supported by all units. DVA would be aware that 8RAR were committed to the Gold Coast in February next year. (Reunion accommodation bookings would probably have started to be made last year.)
I doubt that DVA would sponsor a National Commemoration which doesn’t involve the major participant. (It’s interesting to see that DVA have already agreed to a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord in 2021; this, of course, is on the basis of the former CO 3RAR seeking approval and inviting all supporting arms to be involved, ie. an ‘inclusive’ commemoration.
Maybe something positive can be achieved from it all; but I really think it needs Generals Roger Powell and Craig Orme to become involved. Even though it doesn’t involve me in any way, I’ve tried to raise awareness of the urgency of the matter and the need for high level input. (If need be, DVA may well provide a grant for an alternative Commemoration at 1 Armd Regt.) I’ll step aside now and hope that those who can make a difference do so in a truly consultative manner.
Operation Overlord (2021)
My final email …
“Dear Presidents 1AR Assn and 3 and 4 Cav Regts Assn,
Following on from the email below [regarding an application to DVA], I copied to you both the advice from DVA they WILL support a National Commemoration for Operation Overlord (Battle of Long Khanh) in 2021. I have not received a response to either email from either of you.
[The Battle of Long Khanh was the most significant battle that C Sqn 1 Armd Regt was involved in in 1971; it also has particular importance to the then A Sqn 3 Cav Regt.]
Can you please advise whether or not your Assns wish to represent your members and be involved in this National Commemoration. If so, I will forward relevant contact details to the organiser of the Commemoration (who will liaise with you thereafter).”
——————————————————————————————————————–
9 July 2019
‘The Facts of the Incident were Made to Fit the Politics’.
The following extract is from my book ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’, Vol 2, p53; it relates to Operation Hammersley:
“The circumstances under which 11 Platoon D Company (as they were later identified) were first seen, made recognition impossible. For a start, they were on high ground with the sun behind them. To those in the 2 Troop ‘carriers’ 600m away, the figures moving among the rocks on the hill ‘appeared to be wearing black and looked very suspicious indeed’. ‘We continued to observe for some time, until we received clearance from Task Force to engage; we were told that there were no “friendlies” at that grid; this was confirmed twice [by the APC Troop Leader] before we engaged. The blue-on-blue incident resulted in D Company suffering ten WIA.”
The incident attracted considerable media and (as a consequence) political attention. Details of a regrettable saga in which the ‘facts’ of the incident were made to fit the politics, can be found in Hall, Combat Battalion, p. 182. In essence, the location of the infantry was changed when reported to those conducting the investigation. This made it appear that the casualties were caused by enemy fire.
The following link is to an interview conducted with Graham Walker AM, the Adjutant of 8RAR during Operation Hammersley: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C88047. He refers to issues associated with Operation Hammersley (eg. the strategic importance of the Long Hais and political implications of casualties) on Part 2 (counter 36.50 to 45.00).
Of course, we all know that political priorities will trump all else. But where do we stand when our ‘own’ do the same thing?
The RAAC Corporation advised, in a submission to DVA re the Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of Operation Hammersley, that they were representing their constituent member associations, and by extension, ALL units involved in Operation Hammersley. But the 8RAR Assn had a reunion organised on the Gold Coast and had advised the RAAC Corporation that they did not want to participate in a National Commemoration. So, no matter who else the RAAC Corporation was representing, it wasn’t 8RAR. But the letter gave a different impression …
Where is the morality in it all? Can the end justify the means? I, for one, believe not. It seems to me that if you have a corrupt input, then you get a corrupt outcome.
There are those who ‘twist’ the facts to influence a result for the best reasons, ie. they believe so strongly in the issue that they consider all actions, no matter whether or not based on ‘facts’, are justified.
In terms of Hammersley, it’s been argued that the SVN Govt was so convinced by letters of commendation from commanding generals that they proposed an award for 8RAR. As is known now, this is not true (HQ 1ATF proposed the award, not the RVN). Nevertheless, it didn’t stop some from trying to intimidate me into concealing this, by saying that if the ‘truth’ is known, there will no hope for eligibility to be extended to anyone else.
So, where do WE stand? For me … I respond at all times according to the values that I regard as important. Hence … despite the intimidation, I’ve argued for open and honest consideration of the merits of recognising the contribution of supporting arms to the outcome of Operation Hammersley.
With respect to the 50th commemoration of Hammersley, I respectfully recommend to those who hold office representing the RAAC that (i) liaison with the 8RAR Assn be initiated with respect to the possibility of a combined National Commemoration; and (ii) if this is not achievable, to honestly communicate with DVA as to the nature and benefits of a national commemoration (without 8RAR); and (iii) if DVA remains opposed to the support of a national commemoration in Canberra without 8RAR, that a request be made for funding assistance to support a Commemoration at 1 Armd Regt in Adelaide; and finally … if all the above fails, action needs to be initiated NOW to organise a Commemoration (representative of as many of the units involved as possible) at 1 Armd Regt (Adelaide).
———————————————————————————————————————
8 July 2019
Commemorations: Status Report
Operation Hammersley and Operation Overlord involved the most significant battles that A Sqn and C Sqn 1 Armd Regt fought in 1970 and 1971 respectively. The 50th Anniversaries of these battles will occur in 2020 and 2021.
Major battles fought by C Sqn and B Sqn 1 Armd Regt in 1968 and 1969 were those related to Coral-Balmoral and Binh Ba.
National commemorative ceremonies for these were sponsored by DVA in 2018 and 2019. Lobbying by the three infantry battalions involved, contributed to this outcome.
Following an application from the battalion involved in Operation Overlord, DVA have agreed to assist with the organisation of a national commemoration for Operation Overlord in 2021. The battalion has invited supporting arms to attend.
Each year, the battalion involved in Operation Hammersley, conducts a ceremony to mark both the Operation and its overall tour of duty in Vietnam. Those responsible for such matters, have decided that the battalion will not participate any national commemoration, nor do they believe it appropriate for representatives of supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley, to attend their commemoration.
To their credit, the RAAC Corporation has sought DVA’s assistance to conduct a National Commemoration in February 2020. DVA, however, have declined. The Corporation has requested that the decision be reconsidered. It would be fantastic if such a Commemoration was agreed, given that the principal unit involved has opted not to participate! Fingers crossed that such an outcome might come about.
But what if it’s not? There are two options that I can see, apart from further lobbying of DVA (others might well see more).
Option 1. Try to convince the battalion to reconsider and be part of a national commemoration. How to do this? Maybe the RAAC Rep Hon Col could to liaise with the Colonel Commandant of the RAR to see if a high level agreement can be reached in terms of a combined National Ceremony. (Alternatively, or as well as, the Hon Col of 1 Armd Regt could ‘talk’ to the Hon Col of the Battalion.)
Option 2. Hold a 50th Anniversary Commemoration for Operation Hammersley at 1 Armd Regt (Adelaide), inviting veterans and delegations from other units involved. This would desirably be held in Feb 20, but could also be held on Cambrai Day 2020.
Footnote. Both options above could be influenced if the Govt agrees to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, to supporting arms. The resulting publicity could well be a factor in relevant considerations.
———————————————————————————————————————
7 July 2019
Railguns : Something Different
Months and months of trying to correct things which have been done wrongly (or for the wrong reasons) is draining on one’s sensibilities. Surely there must be something out there which can provide a diversion?
This was of interest as 37 years ago I led a small project team which built the first railgun to be fired in Europe. This was a very small-scale demonstration device, based on a design from the Engineering Design Establishment in Melbourne.
In theory, projectiles can be fired at hypervelocity. This has obvious advantages in terms of accuracy and range (though our findings showed that a projectile can strike a target at too high a velocity, ie. its penetrating ability is diminished.
What’s in a Name?
It has been suggested to Defence by ‘some who shall remain nameless’ that Operation Hammersley must be referred to as the Battle of the Long Hais or simply Long Hais (as per ‘Binh Ba’ and ‘Coral-Balmoral’). The latter names, of course, are those given to battle honours awarded for the respective operations. (Operation Hammersley was considered for a battle honour, but the relevant C’tee decided not to award one.) An action in 1971 has been deemed the Battle of Long Khanh … this has been done to designate it as something separate to the wider operation of which it was part. The current Appeal before the DHAAT will continue to refer to Operation Hammersley, as (i) it is by this title that relevant research can effectively be conducted, and (ii) there is no need to separate any one part from the Operation as a whole.
—————————————————————————————————————-
6 July 2019
Why Would You Do It? (ie. Marginalise Contributions Made by Supporting Arms)
The HQ 1ATF proposal (10 Sep 70) for a unit citation to be awarded to 8RAR, refers only to 8RAR. It includes the number of enemy casualties which resulted from 8RAR operations (there is no suggestion that some of these might have resulted from the actions of supporting arms).
The UNSW (ADFA) Interactive Vietnam website provides an account of the Vietnam War based on an analysis of HQ 1ATF contact reports. It can be found at: https://vietnam.unsw.adfa.edu.au/.
Anyone clicking on Battle Map, will be able to navigate to the Long Hais and Op Hammersley. According to the contact reports assembled by UNSW for Operation Hammersley, “most of the enemy cas[ualties] were caused by tank cannister and HE rds”. This must have been realised by those drafting the Citation, but ??
Interestingly, the wording of the citation prepared by the RVN (in response to the 1ATF proposal) refers to “the forces of the 8th Battalion” involved in Operation Hammersley (acknowledging the contribution of the supporting armour and engineers). When the 8RAR History of its tour in Vietnam was published, it included a section which supposedly quoted the “text” of the Citation. Unfortunately, the reference to “the forces of the 8th Battalion”, as per the Vietnamese wording, was changed to read simply, “the Battalion”.
One of the many comments I offered to the AWM (at their request) when the Vietnam Gallery was opened was:
Reference is made to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well…3KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’) … it would seem appropriate to mention them.
How is it that there could be such a ‘fixation’ with 8RAR casualties, with no thought being given to the sacrifices made by supporting arms? AWM staff mentioned to me that the Chairman (who had been the 2IC 8RAR in 1970) ‘vetted’ everything that the AWM did regarding 8RAR.
How is it that there can be such an emphasis on one unit, to the exclusion of all others that provided support … when we’re all in the same Army? We all have loyalty to our own units, but does this mean denying other units dues recognition? Is it a case of … if supporting arms are marginalised, then greater ‘glory’ will be awarded to the main unit (ie. enemy casualty numbers were those achieved ‘solely’ by the main unit)?
Personally, I think that there is an innate tendency to use power that is within one’s reach, for the benefit of those on one’s Christmas Card List. (I’m sure that others could say this much more eloquently.)
Hugh White, the author, is Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.
My response is: “Hugh,
You have succinctly argued the case for emphasis on ‘sea denial’, as distinct to ‘sea control’. Given that projection of power is as much about economic control, as it is military leverage … where does protection of our sea lanes fit in?
This would seem to be one of Australia’s national interests that the ADF has an obligation to be able to safeguard. Of course, preventing interdiction of supply is not solely a RAN responsibility.
Just wondering where you saw this issue among the pantheon of defence capabilities that deserve debate.”
Australia’s Tank Capability
One of Armouredadvocates’ long standing Goals (see Part 7 in the Intro above) is: ‘The RAAC tank fleet would be increased from 59 to the 90 that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons’.
There are suggestions that the Abrams fleet numbers are to be made up to the 90 required to meet operational demands. It seems, however, that there is little substance in this. See following quotes:
“… the other critical element of LAND 907 Phase 2; the essential increase in the size of the fleet”;
“ … the essential increase in the size of the fleet”; and
“… the number of tanks also need to be increased to remove hollowness and restore the balance to the fleet”.
These made me go back into the article looking for something that I’d missed. Nothing there that I could see. Maybe numbers are to be made up, maybe not. The Australian public deserves to know. I’ve asked the editor of DTR what was implied by the author of the article.
——————————————————————————————————————–
4 July 2019
Is it Ever Too Late?
It’s been put to me that it’s too late to be making representations about Operation Hammersley.
Apparently, according to my correspondent, a photo recently appeared on a Facebook page depicting the crew of a Centurion tank in Vietnam. Of the four crewmen, three were deceased post-Vietnam. My ‘critic’ stated that the veterans of more recent wars were more deserving of attention than those from the Vietnam era.
Is this reason not to campaign for appropriate recognition of the sacrifices made by service personnel on behalf of us all?
Appropriate recognition … what does this mean?
It means that if sacrifices were made over and above the call of duty, they should be acknowledged. Action to correct such an injustice is even more valid, if the reason for the failure was a mistake in the military administrative procedure at the time.
Should action to make known the lack of appropriate recognition be limited by the amount of time since the action occurred? If those who deserve recognition have died, should there be no action taken to recognise their sacrifices? I contend that the answer is a resounding ‘NO!’. Furthermore, I contend that veterans of more recent wars would agree with me.
It is partly for this reason the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) was established.
“Before 2008 there was no avenue of review concerning eligibility for Defence honours or awards. The establishment of the Tribunal has changed this. In particular:
An individual is able to directly seek review by the Tribunal about their eligibility[or that of others] for a Defence honour or award, but only after an application has been refused by Defence.
The Government is able to refer general eligibility issues relating to Defence honours and awards to the Tribunal for inquiry and recommendation.”
Obviously, the success or otherwise of cases brought before the DHAAT will turn on issues such as whether or not new evidence has been found, or whether mistakes in previous considerations can be proven.
Herewith my reasons for doing what I can to advance the case for recognition of the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
———————————————————————————————————————
3 July 2019
Operation Hammersley or How History is Remade
The Unit Citation proposal for 8RAR signed by the Comd 1ATF, stated the number of enemy casualties that resulted from 8RAR’s operations; there was no mention that some of these could have been the consequence of the actions of supporting arms …
The UNSW (ADFA) has a detailed interactive website … an account of the Vietnam War based on an analysis of HQ 1ATF contact reports.
Click on Battle map and you will be able to navigate to the Long Hais and Op Hammersley.
The account given is:
Original Incident Report
YS475523, C/8RAR AND ELMS B/3 CAV REGT AND A/1 ARMD REGT CON EST 40 EN WHO FIRED RPG2’S. RES: 1 APC DES, 2 AUST KIA [Hugh Carlyle of 3 Cav], 7 AUST WIA,1 VC KIA (BC), AND 1 PW CAPTURED. Initial contact was made 1045hrs YS475522 with 3 VC and HQ C Coy. 1 VC was captured and revealed that 40 enemy were a short distance away in a bunker system and that there were many anti personnel mines in the area.
Full company attack was launched on located bunker system, with APC and tank support resulting in 1 APC being destroyed by 2 RPGs, 2 men killed and over 7 wounded. The Coy withdrew and arty and air strikes were launched. At 1300hrs C coy attacked again with tank troop leading. This assault fought through the bunker system against little significant opposition but on reaching the far side of the bunker system found that further progress was impeded by a deep creek (YS475532).
At this point the assaulting force was advised that as well as anti-personnel mines and booby traps, the bunker system also was protected by an anti-tank minefield. While the OC considered whether to dismount the infantry, orders were received to break contact and withdraw. While withdrawing (1430hrs) the assault force again came under heavy fire from RPGs and SA from enemy who had re-occupied the bunkers. 1 Aust wounded. At 1500hrs (YS475543) 5 more Aust were wounded by shrapnel.
The assault force withdrew and contact was broken at approx 1520 hrs. Air and artillery fire was then brought to bear on the bunker system until 1830 hrs. At this time a further assault was made by tanks and the HQ APC Tp to recover the APC casualty. This was successfully done by 1900 hrs when the final break with the enemy was made and the contact ended.
8RAR did not return to the bunker system till the morning of 20 February after a B52 strike had been brought down upon the position. During the contact 12 enemy were killed and many blood trails indicating many wounded were found. The system was extensive and was defended by 30-40 enemy (also described as 1 Bn of enemy). 1 tank was hit 8 times by RPGs but remained in action. Another APC was also hit by RPGs. Most of the enemy cas were caused by tank cannister and HE rds. A/7/8 US Arty, B/2/13 US Arty and the 155mm of Dat Do fired in support of C Coy 8 RAR (AWM95 3/6/23.pdf p11 1 Fd Regt Diary)
——————————————————————————————————————-
2 July 2019
Operation Overlord Commemoration
The 3RAR Assn will be conducting a reunion over 16/17 October 2021 in Canberra to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of their tour in Vietnam and the Battle of Long Khanh (Operation Overlord).
The organisers have extended invitations to all Corps who supported them. The CO at the time (1971) turned ninety recently and I think he’s determined to see the 50th and to make sure that supporting arms are not overlooked.
The author, Dr Harley Stanton is the brother in law of the late Flt Officer R W Betts. Dr Harley Stanton will be a guest speaker at the 50th Anniversary Remembrance Service 17th October 2021.
News from the former CO 3RAR: “Hello all, Great news that Australia Post will issue a pre-stamped envelope or prepaid envelope for our 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Long Khanh. Start thinking of a design as we must inject our ideas for the design”. If anyone has any design suggestions, let me know. [I’ve posted the same info/request on the 3 Cav Vietnam Assn website; and I would post on the 1AR Assn and 3&4 Cav Regts sites, however, I’ve been banned from them. See previous posts about communicating information re RAAC matters.]
Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
Video of the 50th Commemoration here: http://www.3rar.com.au/
The first couple of minutes is music, before visual footage commences.
Operation Hammersley Commemoration
Hopefully approval for eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, to be extended to supporting Speaking will be approved before February 2019.
Speaking of which … I’ve said this before, but it deserves saying again. if DVA won’t fund another national commemoration ceremony like BB and C-B …. What is to be done?
Obviously, it is unacceptable that there be no commemoration. If a Plan B is needed, can the Australian Army, unit associations and veterans rise to the occasion?
Apart from a single commemoration at the Vietnam Memorial in Canberra, other options for the ‘8RAR Group’ and its successors, include:
A combined RAAC/RAR/RAE commemoration hosted by 1Armd Regt in Adelaide (8/9 RAR, 1CER sending ‘contingents’);
A combined RAAC/RAR/RAE commemoration hosted by 8/9RAR in Brisbane (1 Armd Regt, 1 CER sending contingents);
Two combined RAAC/RAR/RAE commemorations hosted simultaneously in the above locations (with representative contingents being sent accordingly).
The latter would have the advantage of allowing more veterans to attend, ie. to travel to either of two, rather than just a single location. It would also have the benefit of reducing costs for the units involved. (DVA may well, of course, contribute some funding to assist with unit commemorations.) Hopefully liaison between unit associations will produce a good outcome to honour the bravery and sacrifice of those who participated in Operation Hammersley. Fingers crossed.
———————————————————————————————————————–
1 July 2019
Everyone will be keen for a break from Operation Hammersley (as indeed I am). It deservedly consumes more and more time, however; and I’ll be referring to it again and again. Nevertheless, I’m concerned that this means that other RAAC issues go without attention that they deserve. That below is one of these.
The Role of the RAAC ARES
One of Armouredadvocates’ long-standing Goals included at Part 7 of the Intro (above) is:
“All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.”
This is stated as a counter to the prevailing concept of striping them from any involvement in mobile warfare and consigning them to a purely dismounted (infantry) role … fashionably termed ‘cavalry scout’. Using the Hawkei as a basis for developing armoured reconnaissance tactics and employment has much to commend it.
The extract below is from a paper published by Army’s Cove forum.
Proposal Arming the Hawkei with a mounted Spike LR*or Spike Enhanced Range (ER) is a solution for resolving the issue of rapid employment against an armoured threat in the littoral environment. Hawkeis designated as reconnaissance or screening platforms can be outfitted with the Spike ER, which has a range of 8km. Due to its light weight, the Hawkei can be transported via Chinook from the Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) to reconnaissance objectives beyond the Beach Landing Site (BLS). Simultaneously, Hawkeis mounted with Spike LR and pintle mounted M2 and MK47 AGL will provide immediate armour, firepower and mobility for the assaulting force at the BLS.
To provide integral AA firepower to the Motorised Infantry Battalion, the AA PL should be grown to an AA Company consisting of 3 AA Platoons. Under plan Keogh, the AA PL is equipped with PMVs and the RSS Platoon is equipped with Hawkeis. As reconnaissance and sniper tasks within a Motorised Infantry Battalion would likely entail transportation to a release point, followed by a dismounted infiltration to a Lying Up Place (LUP), I would propose that the AA Platoons should be outfitted with Hawkeis and the RSS Platoon be outfitted with PMVs.
*Spike is an Israeli fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile and anti-personnel missile with a tandem-charge HEAT warhead, currently in its fourth-generation. (Wikipedia)
While the author approaches the topic from an infantry pov, the relevance to RAAC ARES is obvious. It has been decided that the Army’s LAND 400 series of AFVs will be too ‘complicated’ for the ARES to master effectively, this should not mean that they are ignored as far as their heritage of mobile warfare is concerned.
————————————————————————————————————————-
30 June 2019
The RAAC Corporation Inc
What a pity!
With connections to all RAAC units (both ARA and ARES), how well is the RAAC Corporation placed to be the centre of ‘news’ relating to RAAC matters!
But no … the Chairman declines to provide any ‘news’ to the wider RAAC community.
I asked about this many years ago … there was a link on the RAAC Corporation Inc website (http://www.raaccorpltd.org.au/) headed ‘News’. I thought it might be possible to include input from member associations about things happening which would be of general interest.
The result?
The RAAC Corporation changed the heading of the page on its website from ‘News’ to ‘Info’! (The latter being interpreted to mean details concerning DVA’s policies etc.)
So much for any hope of widespread dissemination of ‘news’ to the RAAC family. Best keep them in the dark.
Of course, the background is more grotesque. The RAAC Chairman’s thinking is that all ‘news’ should be disseminated by member associations to their own members. The RAAC Corporation has no role in communicating information about RAAC matters.
So … if you’re not a member of an RAAC Association that is a member of the RAAC Corporation, you don’t deserve to be informed of anything (no matter what personal involvement you might have had in these matters). The RAAC Corporation has access to all the details, but simply refuses to convey them.
The RAAC Corporation could be so much more!
Please may the Executive Council (presidents of member associations) influence the Corporation’s policies for the betterment of the RAAC family as a whole.
Each individual member of the RAAC, whether former or serving, has a right to have their views expressed. Denying that is a denial of democracy and everything that soldiers have placed their lives on the line for. The record to date is that if the RAAC Corporation doesn’t agree with a view held by an individual … simply tell that member’s Association to ban him from their Facebook forum. Of course, because of the hold of the Corporation over its members … its wish is their command! (See post for 27 June.)
How I wish for honesty, truth, and openness in regard to matters affecting the RAAC and its future. (Maybe if an RAAC ‘Community’ Group is established in the ACT (following the failure of the RAAC Corporation’s attempt to establish one), this could become a central point for dissemination of ‘news’ to the wider RAAC family.)
————————————————————————————————————————
29 June 2019
Secrecy and the RAAC Corporation
The Corporation contacted me a couple of weeks ago to ask why I had made an application to the DHAAT to appeal Defence’s refusal to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation to supporting arms, especially as I knew that their submission to Defence was ‘pending’. I knew only of a submission made to Defence in 2017, a month or so after mine to the Minister. Apparently their first submission became lost and they submitted another in 2018. (I knew nothing about this.)
I have always been very open and transparent about every matter that I make representations about. The RAAC Corporation, however, is the opposite. Seems to me that many of those who opt for secrecy, do so to avoid accountability. The email below illustrates the policy of secrecy vs that of consultation.
Email to RAAC Corporation, 4 June 2017
“Re Hammersley … I originally prepared my submission in June 2015. I did so on the basis of it being forwarded from the 1 AR Assn to the RAAC Corporation for further action. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on the 1AR Assn Facebook that: Theaward for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always . The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing. There being no further progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister in February 2017.
As you know, a similar situation existed re my draft submissions concerning the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour and the error with the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1AR Standard. Fed up with a lack of action, I forwarded both proposals to the Minister on an individual basis (having checked with the `1AR Assn Patron that I wouldn’t be upsetting any considerations in-progress). The Minister approved both requests and 1AR is now emblazoning the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour for the first time. I’ve suggested that the Regiment invite Coral Balmoral veterans to the next Cambrai Parade, if that’s to be the first time the ‘new’ Standard is paraded.
All my endeavours have been posted and made known in an open and transparent manner on my daily blog. I fail to understand, therefore, why the RAAC Corporation didn’t contact me before forwarding a new(?) submission about “the bloody thing” to Defence on 30 March 2017 … knowing that I’d already made a submission to the Minister on 28 February 2017.
Anyway … the Minister responded to my submission on 7 May 2017. He was advised by Defence not to approve the extension of eligibility. Given that Defence had had the RAAC Corporation’s new(?) submission for over a month, it has to be assumed that his decision was made taking into account the new(?) arguments put forward.
So where to now? My original strategy (formulated after speaking to the 1RAR guys who successfully gained approval for the extension of eligibility for the unit citation awarded to 173rd Airborne) was to ascertain the reason for the initial decision to reject approval and then focus all effort on addressing that in an appeal. (I made this known when I first forwarded my submission two years ago.) Following the Minister’s response (which I’d anticipated, having spoken to the 8RAR Assn) I have spent days going through all the relevant files at the AWM. You are aware of this as you mentioned that I’ve found the original 1ATF unit citation proposal forwarded to HQ AFV, for forwarding to the FWMAO, for forwarding the RVN JGS (as per the procedure required at the time). This, together with other research material, proves conclusively that the advice given to the Minister was completely false. I am preparing a follow-up submission with supporting documentation in relation to B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 FD Sqn. I provided an update in this regard to the President of the 1AR Assn last week. His response was that the outcome sounded very hopeful.
I am thinking of presenting my ‘appeal’ submission at a meeting with the Minister. Would the RAAC Corporation like to be represented as a part of the delegation?
Finally, last time we ‘spoke’ … I asked if I could see the ‘supporting’ submission that the RAAC Corporation had provided to Defence after I had lodged my submission to the Minister re the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour (see any similarities with the above?). I was concerned because I didn’t know how it would impact on the Minister’s decision (the Chairman of the Corporation stated that he had not seen my submission despite the fact that it had been provided to him in 2015). How could a ‘supporting’ submission be provided if you haven’t seen the original, I asked. The RAAC Corporation declined to allow me to see their submission, so you weren’t able to answer my question. As a result I submitted an FOI request to Defence. The response was that I couldn’t see the RAAC Corporation’s submission in support of mine because:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporations submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporations submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporations ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with exempt matter deleted, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Unsurprisingly, I have sought a review of the FOI decision. I suggested that there will be many more FOI requests from member associations of the RAAC Corporation, once it is known to them that the contents of this document could reasonably be expected to cause them to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation.
Getting back to Hammersely, I guess that the Corporation has its own reasons for again not allowing me to see their submission to Defence. I only hope that the result of the subsequent FOI request is not the same as that re Coral-Balmoral. Please let me know if you wish to be a part of the delegation to see the Minister re the appeal to his decision.”
Footnote: The Corporation were also asked “Would the Corporation care to see my submission informing the Minister that he has been misinformed and misled concerning the matter and providing new evidence supporting the intention being to recognise all those involved in the 8RAR Group with the CGWP Citation… with a view to adding value to it if possible?”
They neither wished to do so, nor be included in any meeting with the Minister regarding the matter (as per request in the email above).
———————————————————————————————————————
28 June 2019
Operation Hammersley.
As mentioned previously, the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) has agreed to conduct a review into the decision by Defence not to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, to A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn (FAE).
The following email has been sent to the President, 8RAR Assn:
“Sorry to bother you, but I think the matter is an important one.
Briefly, the Background: I sought approval from the Minister for eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley to be extended to supporting arms involved in that Operation. Defence advised the Minister that the Citation was for 8RAR’s entire tour in Vietnam, and, as it had been initiated by the RVN, the Australian Govt had no authority to extend the award. Given that all these reasons are invalid (and can be proven to be so), the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal was asked to consider the matter. (By now a copy of the HQ 1ATF’s proposal for 8RAR’s Citation, signed by the Comd 1ATF, had been obtained and passed to DHAAT … previously only an unsigned draft had been located.)
Once Defence have responded to DHAAT’s request made to them to provide evidence for their decision, a public enquiry (or enquiries) will be conducted by DHAAT. During the Hearing(s) the Tribunal will consider evidence from Defence and myself (as the applicant … supported by stakeholders incl the OC and 2IC of the tank sqn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn and 1 Fd Sqn (RAE) Assn and many others). Given the number of casualties suffered by the supporting armour, sappers, and D&E platoon … it would be expected that many families and NOK will attend as well.
An Option. It’s occurred to me that there is an alternative. Rather than a public forum going through the harrowing experiences of those involved, as well as HQ 1ATF’s error in military administration which failed to acknowledge the contribution of supporting arms (the Citation proposal claimed ALL enemy casualties and captured material were as a result of 8RAR’s efforts alone) … the 8RAR Association could advise Defence that it supported the extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for Op Hammersley (but not the Meritorious Unit Commendation for 8RAR’s longer service). If that was done, Defence are unlikely (I would think) to maintain their opposition. While they have a policy of ‘no retrospective awards’, they also allow them if it is shown that an error in administration has been made. (For example, an extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was recently approved, following a DHAAT recommendation, for Australian units which were part of the 173 Airborne Brigade.)
For consideration …”.
—————————————————————————————————————-
27 June 2019
The Dirty Tricks Campaign. PART 2C (What Happened Next?)
This is probably the most bizarre example of the recent Dirty Tricks campaign waged by the RAAC Corporation
I posted on the 3 & 4 Cav Regts Assn FB Page, information that the DHAAT had agreed to conduct a Review and suggesting that B Sqn ¾ Cav Regt (whose OC follows the Assn FB page) might wish to initiate a project to look into the history of Operation Hammersley.
I thought that this is what you do when you receive new information that could effect others (eg. B Sqn personnel could become eligible to wear the RVN CGWP Unit Citation insignia while so posted). This is part of the heritage of the Unit.
I had thought that this was news which should be celebrated.
But what happened?
I’m immediately blocked from the 3 & 4 Cav Regts Assn FB page (and I assume that my post was deleted).F
Why?
The reason I was given, attributed to the President, was “politics!”.
It seems that the RAAC Corporation had decided that I was to be prevented from providing any further information in regards to this matter and had directed their member Assn to delete me from their FB page. It seems that they perceive themselves as the only ‘authorised’ party to make pronouncements.
Why is it so? You’ll have to excuse me if I say that I doubt that it was for the good of the RAAC.
————————————————————————————————————————–
26 June 2019
The Dirty Tricks Campaign. PART 2B (What Happened Next?)
Following the 1AR Assn Facebook posts, I received a response from a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board
It was stated that: “In 2017 and 2018 submissions were made following the proper process in regards to the Redress sought relating to the CGWP awarded to 8 RAR and 161 Battery RNZA in 1970”.
It’s known that submissions were made in 2017 and 2018 (see Part 2A), but what’s this about 161 Bty RNZA being awarded the CGWP [Unit Citation] in 1970?
You can imagine Defence receiving the submissions above, worded along the lines of: ‘the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley; but the only supporting unit to receive it was 161 Fd Bty, RNZA. Other arms also provided support, but have been completely overlooked’.
Trouble is … this isn’t true and no redress in any shape or form is appropriate in relation to 161 Fd Bty RNZA.
The Queen approved the award of the South Vietnamese Presidential Unit Citation [including] the Cross of Gallantry with Palm to 161 Fd Bty RNZA for its six years of service in Vietnam. The Citation was presented during a parade in Vietnam on 8 May 1971.
The Bty would also have been eligible to receive the RVN CGWP Unit Citation as a member of the 1RAR Group, 173rd Airborne. As it had already received the award for its service during this time, the 1RAR representations were irrelevant. Similarly, for this reason, I decided not to enlarge the ‘8RAR Group’ to include them in our submission.
It was also stated that the reason the 1AR Assn C’tee declined to progress my submission to have the eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR extended to supporting arms, was that “At that same time the Committee was under insurmountable difficulty, primarily as a result of claims made by you”.
There were a number of matters affecting the 1AR Assn at the time. The C’tee had lied to members, signed false declarations to have a ‘favourable’ Constitution approved, and initiated a system whereby payments, amounting to $25,000, to an Army unit from a defence manufacturing company (which hoped to secure a multi-billion contact) were ‘masked’ by having them laundered through the 1AR Assn accounts. The latter was in clear breach of Defence regulations, but the C’tee of the 1AR Assn (incorporated in Victoria) stated that they were only bound by Victorian Law.
It seems that I am at fault for having been one of a group of members who raised these concerns, having them investigated and having appropriate changes introduced. If we had allowed the above matters to go unchallenged, then the 1AR C’tee would’ve been supportive of my submission.
Interestingly, I was also informed that the matter was classified as “Honours in Confidence” and that no reference could be made to any information contained in the 1AR Assn submission. This is garbage. The classification ‘Honours in Confidence’ can only be made by the Government. If I, or anyone else, makes a submission to Government … it is open for the originator to circulate their submission as they may wish. If the Government makes decisions in relation to the matter, then an ‘Honours in Confidence’ classification can be placed on their decision.
I was also informed that the 1AR Assn submission “included input from all stakeholders”. I wonder why they weren’t listed.
———————————————————————————————————————
25 June 2019
The Dirty Tricks Campaign: PART 2A (What Happened Next?)
Following on from Part 1 (yesterday) …
I received positive responses from 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, 1 Fd Sqn Assn, and former OC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt.
I didn’t have the courtesy of a response from the President 1AR Assn, but a friend forwarded to me the following post which was placed on three Facebook pages: 1 AR Assn Members Only; 1AR Assn Social; and 1 AR Past and Present (ie. as wide an audience as you could get).
“A formal submission for Operation Hammersley has been submitted (in 2017/18) byPeter Rosemond CSC OAM (1AR ASSN representative) and with the assistance and guidance of Noel McLaughlin, RAAC Corporation. The submission, presented in accordance with laid down procedures, is currently under investigation by Defence Honours and Awards (Army Historical Awards Committee) and a decision still pending, is expected in three (3) or four (4) months.
The active submission has the full support of the current and previous committees and no other submission will be considered as they can possibly jeopardise or adversely impact on the consideration of the in-place submission.
The Association will not support any other submissions, particularly those submitted by individuals. A single line of approach which is the current submission is the only action supported. Keith Meloncelli”
What is said here? The 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation made a ‘formal’ submission, but mine weren’t? My four submissions (two to the Minister, one to the PM, and one to DHAAT) were all ‘formal’, ie. they were made in accordance with appropriate procedure. So why not just say “A submission for …”?
The President states that a submission was made by the 1AR Assn (“in 2017/18”). There is another error here. There was not just ‘a’ single submission made by 1AR Assn, but two submissions. One was in March 2017 (after mine in February 2017) and another in 2018 (after my second in September 2017). I had no knowledge on the 2018 submission until two weeks ago.
He also states that the 1AR Assn submission was “presented in accordance with laid down procedures”. The inference is that mine were not. This is patently incorrect. I would not have received a reply from the Minister and the DHAAT would not have agreed to a Review if they were not.
The President refers to the 1AR Assn submission as the “active” submission. The suggestion here is that my submission is ‘inactive’, however, it was approved by DHAAT on 5 June 2019, three weeks after being received. The DHAAT is currently conducting a Review. What’s ‘inactive’ about this?
The “1AR Assn submission”. What are we talking about here? A 1AR Assn submission was made in March 2017. Apparently, this was held up by a “back log” and another submission was made sometime in 2018. Supposedly the new submission was an updated one. What happened to the 2017 submission? Assuming that the 1AR Assn’s 2018 submission has replaced its 2017 submission, the President states that it has the full support of previous 1AR Assn C’tees. But in 2015 and 2016 the C’tees declined to support a submission to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Op Hammersley (as did the RAAC Corporation).
Any submission (other than that made by the 1AR Assn in 2018) will “jeopardise or adversely impact on the consideration of the in-place submission”. The ‘in-place submission’ … are we talking about the submission that has been approved by the DHAAT and has resulted in a formal Review, currently underway; or are we talking about a 2018 submission (six to eighteen months old, the outcome of which is unknown)? Why will any other submission jeopardise that made by the 1AR Assn? If numerous submissions, based on valid data, are made, there can hardly be anything other than a positive outcome. If one submission made on valid data, is followed by another made on invalid data, then a problem might arise. Is the President saying that because the 1AR Assn submission was made based on invalid data, that no other submission should be made?
“The Association will not support any other submissions, particularly those submitted by individuals.” Why?Are all submissions other than that made by the 1AR Assn, automatically corrupt? Or are all individuals, incapable of putting forward a submission? The answer, of course, is consultation. If an association proceeds in a matter without consulting or informing members, then a ‘confused’ outcome (at best) is assured.
———————————————————————————————————————-
24 June 2019
The Dirty Tricks Campaign. PART 1 (Background)
In 2012 I published a book covering the history of 1st Armd Regt in Vietnam. While researching it, I was dismayed at the injustice resulting from the award of RVN Unit Citation to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, without any acknowledgement of the supporting arms involved.
In 2015 the 1RAR Assn obtained approval for the eligibility for the 173rd Airborne RVN CGWP Unit Citation to be extended to units which made up the Australian component (eg, 1 Troop, A Sqn, 4/19 PWLH). I asked the RAAC Corporation if they would contact the RAR Corp to learn how this was achieved. The RAAC Corp declined and I had to contact the 1RAR Assn myself. They were very helpful and explained how important the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) was in bringing about the approval, ie. Defence was totally opposed to any retrospective award and it was only the DHAAT that had the only authority to correct injustice.
I subsequently drafted a submission to have eligibility for the 8RAR Citation extended to supporting arms. I sent it to the 1AR Assn (for forwarding through the RAAC Corporation). I proposed a motion at the 2015 AGM that the Assn give its support to the matter. The Assn undertook to do this.
In July 2015, the RAAC Corporation advised that they could not become involved as the 3 Cav Assn was not a member of the Corporation. In March 2016, the Chairman reiterated that “The award for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always”. He didn’t want to have anything more to do with “the bloody thing”.
In February 2017, there being no action in relation to the matter, I forwarded my submission to the Minister. The Minister responded to me in May 2017. The submission was not approved. I immediately looked into the reasons given to him by Defence and found them to be false. I prepared a second submission to the Minister accordingly. (All my efforts were open and transparent and made known publicly.)
In June 2017 I was contacted by the RAAC Corporation. I was told that they had made a submission to the RAAC Head of Corps on 31 March 2017 (a month after mine to the Minister … I had no idea). I was further informed that I should not make known my new research about Defence having wrongly advised the Minister, as this could have a negative impact on their submission. (Presumably they had developed a submission which was based on ‘facts’, contrary to what actually had happened.)
I reasoned that, as Defence were privy to the RAAC Corporation submission prior to advising the Minister, and that as it was important that the truth of the matter be known, I would proceed with my ‘rebuttal’ submission, with a copy to both RAAC and RAE heads of Corps. Even though I asked in my submission for the HOC to be consulted, it was again ‘knocked back’, this time for a new reason … which was again totally wrong. I wrote to the Prime Minister (copies to HOC) as a means of ‘redress’, but had no response.
In 2018, I opted to contact the 8RAR Assn and key figures involved in Operation Hammersley. I forwarded them copies of my submissions and relevant research. I hoped that they might support an extension of eligibility, once they had all the ‘facts’. The result was that they supported recognition of supporting arms, but felt that an Australian award was the most appropriate.
Come 2019 (with the 50th Anniversary of Operation Hamersley approaching) I was considering adopting this course. On examination … a new submission to have the Australian Unit Citation for Gallantry awarded to units that supported 8RAR in Operation Hammersley was unlikely to be successful. Then I realised that this was an option open to the DHAAT. (However, given that eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation had been retrospectively extended by recommendation of the DHAAT, to all units in the 173rd Airborne Australian component, RAN Naval Divers etc … precedent meant that this was an unlikely scenario.)
In May 2019, with the support of the former OC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt (1970), the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn and the 1 Fd Sqn (RAE) Assn, I submitted an Appeal Application to the DHAAT. Three weeks later they agreed to undertake a Review of Defence’s reasons for not extending eligibility. I was asked to forward any additional ‘evidence’ not included in the earlier submissions to Defence. I contacted the President 1AR Assn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, 3 and 4 Cav Regts Assn, 1 FD Sqn Assn, and the RAAC Corporation to pass on the info from the DHAAT and ask if anyone had relevant material, if it could be made available for the Review.
What happened next?
————————————————————————————————————————–
23 June 2019
The ‘Lie’ That the Government of the Republic of Vietnam Proposed Awards to Australian Units/ Personnel.
In my second submission to the Minister (rebutting the reasons Defence gave for not extending eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation in response to my first submission) I stated:
Misconception That the CGWP Unit Citation was Proposed by RVN.
Minister Tehan’s advice suggests that the RVN initiated the citation for the Award that was made to 8RAR. This is not the case. The citations for all RVN awards for troops operating as part of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) were proposed by 1ATF. This is best exemplified by the situation in which a soldier has performed well, but not well enough to be eligible for an Imperial award. The sequence of events is well documented in files held by the Australian War Memorial (AWM).
Firstly, the soldier is recommended by his Commanding Officer (CO) for the award of, say, a CGWP. The soldier’s unit drafts a citation and passes it to HQ 1 ATF, who forwards it to HQ Australian Force Vietnam (AFV) in Saigon; who in turn pass it to the Free World Military Assistance Organisation (FWMAO). It is translated into Vietnamese and the FWMAO liaises with the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS).
If the JCS concur, the FWMAO advises HQ AFV that the RVN proposes to award the soldier the CGWP. HQ AFV then advises the soldier via HQ 1 ATF that “The RVN proposes to award you the CGWP”. The soldier is also advised at this time that the Commander AFV has given approval for him to accept the award and has asked that it be approved. Subsequently RVN JGS advise HQ AFV that the award has been approved. HQ AFV request HQ 1ATF to notify the soldier concerned. On average, the time from proposal to approval was three months (a range from two to six months).
In the case of the 8RAR, a copy of the draft citation provided to HQ 1ATF by 8RAR has been located in a file held by the AWM.
—————————————–
I spent some time in the AWM yesterday and I will be advising the DHAAT that examples of the above process are to be found on the following digitised AWM file https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2331453.
These relate to RVN awards to Maj Count and Sgt McFadyen (both RAAC). Approx half way through the file you’ll see the award proposals signed by Comd 1ATF (Brig Henderson) on 30 Nov 70. Adjacent folios are the response from COMAFV to the Chairman FWMAO giving approval for the award process to proceed. The latter are dated 15 Feb 71, two and a half months after the proposal was signed by the Comd 1ATF.
(Interestingly, the award proposals signed by the Comd 1ATF are in exactly the same format as that for 8RAR’s Unit Citation VN Award.)
For anyone who may be of the view that the sham that Defence’s position that the 8RAR Unit Citation was initiated by the RVN Government — should be maintained; may I suggest you reconsider.
—————————————————————————————————————–
22 June 2019
A break from Operation Hammersley. (I’ll have more to say about the ‘dirty tricks’ campaign soon.)
How do You Make Best Use of a Little Bit of Publicity?
This is a question over which I’ve pondered recently. I discussed my thoughts with a few people and decided to try and bring them together in my response to the following question on a public forum:
Well argued (as is to be expected). I’m a Vietnam veteran. I have a little familiarity with the Act, as I had to refer to it when there was a suggestion that the Frontier Wars couldn’t be included as part of the AWM collection because they did not occur overseas. As you know, the Act makes no reference to only commemorating Australians who died defending their country overseas.
The Act does, however, include the requirement for the Memorial to “use every endeavour to make the most advantageous use of the memorial collection in the national interest”. It could be argued that this allows for recognition of not just those who died, but also those who were wounded, on active service. This is where a problem exists as far as veterans are concerned.
I believe that we have excellent soldiers, well trained and with great morale. They’ll do well wherever they’re employed (even if asked to do the same as at the Nek in 1915). The Australian Defence Force embodies a tradition and an ethos which has been built up over many generations. ‘Duty First’ goes without saying. Anything else is unimaginable. While this might seem somewhat trite, I believe that our Nation has been taking things for granted and ‘coasting’ for far too long. It is now time for us all to ‘step up’ in terms of positive support for our servicemen and women.
The key indicator of such support is not the percentage of GDP spent on the Defence budget, but the depth of the Nation’s understanding that our servicemen and women may have to face certain death in defending Australia’s national interests, and, even more importantly, why they would be prepared to do so.
We all have choices which determine our day to day priorities; but how do these compare with the choice faced by soldiers on the battlefield: to jeopardise their life or not?
In my experience and understanding of history, Australian soldiers will generally be prepared to risk their life to save their mate. But are we in danger of assuming that he or she will be prepared to risk their life on behalf of our nation? If they decide to do so (and live), how do they feel when they return home to the overwhelming crisis of decisions made on the basis of: which TV program to watch or which brand of muesli to purchase?
If the deeper understanding I refer to was shared by the nation generally and the AWM in particular, there would be a different emphasis on the nature of commemoration at the AWM. I was one who responded to the AWM’s request for input re future exhibits. I recommended that there be a much greater focus on the soldiers who operated equipment such as tanks, rather than on the technical specifications of the weapons themselves.
In closing, the question I ask of us all, is: Do we deserve the sacrifices which the members of the Australian Defence Force may be called upon to make on our behalf, and does the AWM help us so to do?
——————————————————————————–
There were some interesting follow-on comments to Professor Stanley’s article. The result of which has been to harden my resolve. My idea is to promote the need for a greater public understanding of the sacrifices made by service personnel on active duty. The reason being that the greater this understanding, the greater the empathy and support given when soldiers are being repatriated into civilian life.
I subsequently contacted the new DVA Repatriation Commissioner:
“The one issue that I think was missing from your comprehensive run down on what DVA are doing re repatriation is that of the benefits to be gained by enhancing public awareness and understanding of the nature of operational service. I set out my feelings about this a few says ago on a public forum. The link to the original article and my response are copied below.
It’s my contention that 90% of Australians have no idea that ADF personnel are putting their lives on the line in the theatres they are currently deployed to. If the public were, and if they understood the nature of the commitment being made by service personnel, I believe those being repatriated would be embraced much more supportively by the community. An initiative to bring this about would see Defence and DVA working collaboratively (possibly in conjunction with carefully selected PR consultants).
The Commissioner responded to say:
“DVA is running hard to increase awareness of service and the impacts of that service to the community, as is Defence. A lot of energy is being expended in the strategic communications space developing and producing media products, but as a department we are behind the power curve… as you highlight. Most Australians only think of Veterans and the ADF around Anzac Day. DVA is about to start it’s 3rd year of transformation and one of the key tenants of that program is collaboration, primarily with Defence, but also with other government departments (Health, Social Services, CSC etc.).”
I replied:
“Good news re the strategic communications initiative. A properly constructed public awareness campaign could do much to improve general understanding (and appreciation of) of the sacrifices made by service personnel (which, in turn, would lead to a much more supportive community attitude towards former service personnel). I worked in marketing for many years … if I was involved in the DVA/Defence project, I’d advocate that a survey be conducted of the public’s attitudes towards the ADF and knowledge of deployments in which ADF personnel are currently serving on behalf of the nation. The results would guide the content and nature of the communications products/channels employed.”
Conclusion: I think I have a topic worthy of raising if the opportunity provided by media attention, arises.
———————————————————————————————————————
21 June 2019
Operation Hammersley : A Question of Ethics
Research is conducted. It discovers the truth as to how something was done. An organisation has lodged a submission about the same matter, but without the knowledge of the more recent research. The organisation’s representative asks the researcher not to make known his findings, as it could upset consideration of the organisation’s submission.
If you were the researcher, what would you do? Would you hold back your research findings and allow a submission to possibly be approved (on a false basis) or would you make known your findings and suggest that the organisation amend their submission accordingly?
Blog post from 24 June 2107
Does the Means Always Justify the End?
Primary school principals have to make sure that kids in their schools wear protective headdress when the ultra-violet index gets above a particular point. I asked the CA at the time if, rather than a blanket ban on berets, a trial could be conducted to see if unit COs could operate in the same way. His response was that a trial had already been conducted and it showed that they couldn’t. Others told me that this was not the case.
I sought access to the documents related to the trial (units involved, trial instruction, results etc) under FOI. The request was approved on the basis that this was a valid public interest matter. The FOI outcome was that no such documents were able to be located. Whether they were there and could not be found or no trial was conducted, will ever be known.
I prepared a submission for eligibility for the Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley. I forwarded it to the 1AR Assn, worded such that it could be passed to the RAAC Corporation Ltd for liaison with the Cav and sappers involved to form the basis of a joint submission. Time went by and the Corporation Chairman finally said that he wanted “nothing to do with the bloody thing“*. I submitted it to the Minister as a private individual. A month later the RAAC Corporation lodged their own submission requesting the same thing, this time to Defence.
Ten weeks after receiving my submission, the Minister responded to say that his advice was that eligibility could not be extended. I commenced research into the reason given by the Minister. I came across material which proved that this was completely wrong. All these happenings were posted on the blog.
Soon after, I received a request from the RAAC Corporation … don’t make known what you’ve found in the AWM files as it could adversely affect our submission. What does this mean? Presumably the Corporation had developed a line of argument which was at odds with what actually happened. What are the options?
There would be two. Withdraw the Corporation submission and revise it based on the new evidence uncovered, or press ahead, knowing that the case being advanced was without foundation. The Corporation no doubt had their reasons to opt for the latter. Pity really. I offered to share my follow-up submission to the Minister, but the Corporation had no need for it. I guess they realised that, as Defence had had their submission for six weeks before the Minister responded to me, that the case they had made had already been taken into account. As always, the ethics involved are revealing.
*Note: On 13 June 2019, the 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation Rep told me: “You continue to refer to a simple Australian statement in the every day vernacular of ordinary men as something outlandish. Put simple when a topic is continually raised, one may well refer to it as ‘the bloody thing’. I am in no way offended by this language and given the time absorbed could easily refer to it in the same manner.”
————————————————————————————————————————-
19 June 2019
Operation Hammersley IV
The following is my Blog post on 7 July 2015:
Extension of Eligibility of the CGWP Awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley
The RAAC Corporation’s Position and the Consequences. As it is understood, President 1AR Assn supports the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s view that the Corporation cannot take the lead re the CGWP Submission, because the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation (the Submission seeks to have those who provided support from 1AR, 3 Cav and RAE, acknowledged). The 1AR Assn, therefore, has to advocate the award alone. If unsuccessful, the RAAC Corporation might then offer support.
What’s this mean in terms of the Submission? The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT), where the real power lies in terms of approving the Submission, can only consider it after Defence Honours and Awards (DHA) have ‘knocked it back’. So, 1AR Assn submits to DHA, it is knocked back (as expected) and is resubmitted to DHAAT. If it is knocked back, the new submission, supported by the RAAC Corporation, is submitted to DHA and then, finally, DHAAT. The whole process has been made twice as complicated as it need be, with consequential lessening of its chances of approval (compared with a Submission which is supported by the RAAC Corporation right from the start).
The Lack of Moral Justification for This Position. Part of the RAAC Corporation’s Constitution refers to fostering the interests of the RAAC. The members of 3 Cav Regt who served in Vietnam did so as part of the RAAC. Some are members of the 3 and 4 Cav Regt Association (a member of the RAAC Corporation), some are members of the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association (not a member of the RAAC Corporation), while others are not members of either Association. How petty can we be as former members of the RAAC, to deny to those who fought with 3 Cav Regt during Operation Hammersley,the best opportunity to achieve the recognition that is due to them? Apart from anything else, recognition for them, is recognition for the RAAC. Isn’t this what the RAAC Corporation stands for??
Reason for 1AR Assn’s Acceptance of the Position.Whenever a Director of a Corporation is also the President of one of the Corporation’s own member Associations, there is likely to be a conflict of interest. By simply agreeing to the position of the Corporation Chairman, 1AR Assn is not only a party to denying due recognition of those who served with 3 Cav Regt, but also denying its own members the best chance of due recognition of their gallant efforts.
What Should be Done. The President of the 1AR Assn should step down from his Directorship of the RAAC Corporation and strongly advocate the justification for the RAAC Corporation to support the Submission* (noting in doing so that there is minimal work involved … the Submission is complete, it only needs to be submitted.)
I’m reminded that a number of people sign off emails with the words “Yours in Armour”, how hollow this sounds in light of the above.
*“The Submission” was one I drafted seeking an extension of eligibility. I forwarded this to the 1AR Assn in a format which would allow them to sign a covering letter and forward to the RAAC Corporation. It was this that I submitted to the Minister in 2017 (as it was apparent that there was no other option).
—————————————————————————————————
18 June 2019
Operation Hammersley III
This is an edited version (I’ll address other falsehoods later) of a history of the submission for extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation (as provided on 13 June 2019 by the 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation Rep):
“In 2015 you [ie. ‘me’] presented a narrative of the battle (who did what). [I’ll have more to say about what my submission actually amounted to later, but it certainly wasn’t a narrative of who did what.] The document was considered by the Assn Committee and assistance was sought from within to work on the proposal. I [the Assn’s ‘rep’] initially volunteered.
It became impossible to get the proposal progressed [and] no action was taken until 2017 …, when I [got] progress underway with full blown research. [There’s an inference here that I had not undertaken “full blown research”. More to follow on this.]
I sought Corporation assistance and gained support to format and advise, followed up with creating a submission including input from all stakeholders. The submission …. was forwarded to Army for consideration [but] delayed in a backlog”.
A update of the original submission was presented [to Army] in 2018 including further compelling evidence.”
It would seem that progress was straightforward, harmonious, consultative and co-operative (even if the “I” word was used frequently, something the 1AR Rep had condemned in the past). Just how things should be done. But is it the truth or yet another fabrication?
———————————————————————————————————
The email below to the Chairman RAAC Corporation was quoted in my Blog on 7 June 2015. (what happened as a result, will be posted tomorrow.)
“Recognition of RAAC Involvement in Operation Hammersley 1970.
Dear RAAC Corporation:
As you know, a commemoration is to take place today to mark the 50th anniversary of 1 Troop A Sqn 4/19 PWLH’s arrival in Vietnam. A deployment which earned them not only their place in history, but also the recognition of our Vietnamese Allies with the award of their Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation (CGWP).
Apart from those who were part of the US 173 Airborne Brigade, other Australian units that have been honoured in this way include AATTV, 2 Sqn RAAF, and 8RAR. Unfortunately, the award to 8RAR, like that to 173 Airborne Brigade, did not involve recognition of supporting units. This issue, with respect to the 1RAR Brigade Group, has now been overturned through the hard work of the RAR Association.
The success of Operation Hammersley, for which 8RAR were honoured with the CGWP Unit Citation, was largely dependent of the tremendous fighting spirit of the AFV crews of A Sqn 1st Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt. As per the submission on behalf of the 1RAR Brigade Group, the units supporting 8RAR also deserve recognition. The tank squadron commander, the then Major Jack Chipman, has long called for this.
It will be seen from the extract below, that the Vietnamese clearly intended the citation be awarded to 8RAR and units that provided combat support during Operation Hammersley. Extract of Citation:
“Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.” http://www.vvaa.org.au/8rar.htm
While the recognition of infantry is undoubtedly deserved, unfortunately it has tended to overshadow the efforts of supporting arms which are equally deserving. An example of this was seen in the Vietnam Gallery when it initially opened. The comment below is one of a number that I made at the time (all of which have resulted in changes to the information presented):
“Reference is made to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well…3KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’)…it would seem appropriate to mention them.” The chairman of the AWM C’tee was a former member of 8RAR and I was told that he vetted everything to do with the unit.
Having said all the above, is it possible for the RAAC Corporation to contact the RAR Association to ascertain the process they followed to have Defence Honours and Awards extend the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to the 173 Airborne Brigade to the 1RAR battalion Group under their command … with a view to making a submission for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersely, particularly A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and the field engineers? In closing, I’ve added some below some references to Operation Hammersley in ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’.
Best wishes, Bruce”
(i) “Both the ARVN and the local population had been shown that there was no such thing as a safe haven for the VC. It was important now that the Vietnamese Forces build on the success and prevent the enemy re-establishing themselves. Consideration was given to the award of a Battle Honour to 1st Armoured Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the Royal Australian Regiment for Operation Hammersley. The Committee responsible decided not to recommend this, however.”
(ii) “8RAR were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation. Understandably, there was considerable disappointment among tank and APC crews that their Units’ involvement was not also recognised in this way.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
17 June 2019
Operation Hammersley II
The following communications are self-explanatory
13 June 2019: Email to the President, 1AR Assn :
“Dear President, The letter below covered an application to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT). It has been approved and the Tribunal is to review Defence’s decision.
If the DHAAT overturns it, A Sqn 1 Armd Regt personnel will be able to wear the RVN CGWP unit insignia while so posted.
The 1 AR Assn might like to advise the OC and SSM of this ‘news’. (They, in turn, may like to initiate some further investigation into Operation Hammersley by Sqn personnel to raise awareness of the traditions they carry forward.)
I’ve looked through the Tribunal procedures sent to me and they can call for public submissions (which they did for C-B). They may do this later, but at the moment they’ve asked me to forward any additional evidence.
Can you so inform any members of the Assn who were involved of the current situation and ask if they could send me a statement as to their experience at the time and sense of injustice involved in not being recognised. It seems to me that the greater the weight of evidence, the better.
Speaking of which, can the Assn do up a letter (through me) supporting the Review process as a means of correcting the injustice long suffered by its members etc. Possibly the C’tee could ask Graeme Unmack to draft it, given that he was a participant.
Many thanks, Bruce
PS. The 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn Assns are also preparing letters similar to that mentioned above.
16 June 2019: Post by the President 1AR Assn on the 1AR Social, 1AR Members Only and 1AR Past and Present Facebook pages:
“A formal submission for Operation Hammersley has been submitted (in 2017/18) by … (the 1AR ASSN representative) and with the assistance and guidance of [the Chairman], RAAC Corporation. The submission, presented in accordance with laid down procedures, is currently under investigation by Defence Honours and Awards (Army Historical Awards Committee) and a decision still pending, is expected in three (3) or four (4) months.
The active submission has the full support of the current and previous committees and no other submission will be considered as they can possibly jeopardise or adversely impact on the consideration of the in-place submission.
The Association will not support any other submissions, particularly those submitted by individuals. A single line of approach which is the current submission is the only action supported.”
17 June 2019: Email to the DHAAT.
“Dear Tribunal, Further to my email below … the 1 Armoured Regiment Association made a submission the “Army Historical Awards Committee” in 2018 in relation to Operation Hammersley and the extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. I’ve recently learnt that the Association believes that this submission is still under consideration. Should this be the case and should further time be required by the Army Historical Awards C’tee to reach a decision, I’d be happy if the DHAAT were to allow this process to proceed to completion. Many thanks, Bruce Cameron”
Note:
The President 1AR Assn mentioned in his FB post above (he didn’t have the courtesy or …. to respond to me, the post was copied to me by someone who, unlike me, had access to FB pages concerned) that an earlier submission was lodged by the Assn in 2017. (Apparently this was based on the draft submission I’d provided to the Assn in 2015; a submission they declined to consider or progress at that time.) It appears that Assn’s 2017 submission “became caught up in backlog”, so an updated version was submitted in 2018.
A prerequisite for a submission to be accepted by the DHAAT is for it to have been previously rejected by Defence. DHAAT accepted my appeal following Defence’s decisions not to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation in 2017.
Time to get rid of the taste in my mouth … more to follow tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————-
13 June 2019
Note. There’ll be no further Blog posts until Monday, 17 June (due to attendance at 50th reunion interstate).
Operation Hammersley
The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal has approved the application to review Defence’s decision not to extend eligibility for the RVN CGWP unit citation to A Sqn, 1 Armd, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn. (See application covering letter at Blog post for 29 May 2019.)
I’ve asked the 1AR Assn, 3 Cav Assn and 1 Fd Sqn Assn to do letters of support for the review as a means of correcting the longstanding injustice to their members. I’ve also requested that those personally involved in Hammersley, send me statements of their experience and the sense of injustice they feel.
If Defence’s decision is overturned, veterans would be able to wear the unit citation insignia, while members of A Sqn 1 Armd, B Sqn ¾ Cav and 1 Combat Engineer Regt would also be able to do so while so posted.
The Security of Australia’s National Interests.
The following article in Defence Connect makes a call for increased debate about Australia’s security needs. I support this, but only if such a debate was a rigorous one (rather than simply sabre rattling to boost defence industry). My response in the ‘Comments’ section is copied below.
If the debate keeps focusing on generalities and motherhood statements, we won’t achieve any sort of useful outcome. What is the warning time for a credible threat to Australia’s interests to develop? This is the fundamental premise of the ADF’s existence, ie. its degree of readiness. The time presently at the heart of Contingency Plans, is, of course, classified. But realistic scenarios can be painted and the capability of the ADF to respond, evaluated.
What might constitute threats to our (various) national interests, also differ. But once again, differing scenarios can easily be developed. Only when we start talking in these terms, can we start to understand the degree to which the ADF is appropriately manned, equipped, and trained.
One scenario could be an annexation of Christmas Island by a nation seeking to develop previously untapped oil and gas reserves. What nations could theoretically do such a thing? How much warning would there be of such plans and does the ADF have the capability to respond? If the answer to the latter is ‘no’, does Australia have security ties with allied nations to enable its territory to be defended. If the answer to the latter is ‘no’, should Australia enter into a regional security treaty, such as SEATO used to be?
———————————————————————————————————————
12 June 2019
Minutes for the 1AR Assn Management Committee Meeting: 2 June 2019 (Part III)
“The President also advised that the Association would … continue not to react to incorrect or false information published on the ‘ArmouredAdvocates’ blog.
Incorrect or false information on my Blog?? There has been no input from the C’tee to correct anything at all on the Blog.
Why has there not been an email to ‘ArmouredAdvocates’ to say: “The C’tee informed BRJ Accountants that $19,000 had been received from members as advances on membership fees and furthermore, the C’tee considers that these monies are not able to be spent on Assn matters at this time, as they might have to be returned to the members who paid them’, ie. making it clear that the amount of $19,000 was not classed as Income, but actually as a ‘Liability’? I think the reason is ‘crystal’.
The earlier Blog post below is relevant:
My Blog (26 May 2019)
I was recently told that there was “untrue commentary on [my] blog”.
I responded to say please tell me where this has occurred, as it is my policy (as frequently stated) to immediately delete, correct and apologise for … anything which is incorrect in any way. I was not surprised to receive no response. It is not the first time that this has happened.
I assume that this is because, while it’s easy to say ‘that’s all wrong‘, any such matter will become the subject of further debate. If my commentary was wrong, then this will be made clear and an apology given for any offence which may have resulted. Of course, if my commentary was NOT wrong, then the matter will have been further publicised and highlighted.
There have been two occasions (in the past five years) in which matters have been brought to my attention that were actually wrong, as they were presented on the Blog. In both cases, I immediately thanked the person who brought them to my attention and corrected the posts.
I have now inserted the above policy in bold type in the Introduction (immediately below the details on how to comment).
One of the two corrections that have been made, is copied below from the Blog post of 3 June 2019 …
“CORRECTION
The title for the Blog post on 19 May 2019 was ‘Defence Ethical Relationship Policy and Implementation’.
It included the following: ‘The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that other payments, totalling $35,000, had been received by 1AR Assn from this company and passed on to 1 Armd Regt in previous years’.
This statement was incorrect. It should have read: ‘The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that total payments from this company to 1 Armd Regt amounted to $35,000; of which $25,000 was passed through 1AR Assn’. “
PostScript. I have continually asked the 1AR Assn C’tee to make the Assn’s Constitution available to members vide the Assn website. The C’tee declines to do so. What is it that they feel must be kept hidden from members? It seems to me that the very document which defines the Assn in every respect, ie. the Constitution … must be made available for the members to view at any time they might wish to do so.
————————————————————————————————————————-
11 June 2019
Minutes for the 1AR Assn Management Committee Meeting: 2 June 2019 (Part II)
ITEM 151/18 – Minute 95 of 2018/19 – Life Membership – Reinstatement – President (Mel Meloncelli) advised that a clause included by a previous Committee in a draft of a new Constitution (January 2018) – that would have continued the previous life memberships – was subsequently omitted in a further draft. The final draft of the Constitution had been distributed to all Association members in June 2018 and comments had been received from a number of people. None of those who provided comments observed that the clause continuing life memberships had been omitted. The President further advised that all Life Members are to be formally advised of the current situation, and that the Constitution accepted at the AGM on 14 July 2018 did not provide for their life memberships to be continued. There was further discussion about Perpetual Life Memberships, especially in relation to Life members who may have died. The President moved, seconded Chris Fenton, that all life members be advised accordingly.
The Blog posts below document the questions I’ve put to the President to explain why Life Members were not told that their Life Memberships had been revoked. It’s clear from the above, why he declined to answer … because Life members were NOT informed.
Interestingly, it is stated that “… all Life Members are [now] to be formally advised … ”. How can this be? Are there Life Members or are there not?
Life members were informed that their membership was to be continued. Because they did not notice that this provision had been deleted from a revised draft of the Constitution … they did not raise any concerns and hence their Life Memberships are considered to have been revoked. Is this a Banana Republic? Surely, if a Management C’tee is to delete a provision included in an earlier circulated draft of the Constitution, you bring the changes to the attention of members. Furthermore … if the C’tee intends to revoke Life Memberships from all who hold them, a reason is given for doing so. Of course, if the C’tee wished to do something ‘under the radar’, they simply circulate an amended draft (and not tell anyone about the changes slipped in). Easypeasy.
I commend the Blog posts below.
Blog 12 May 2019 : My Membership of the 1AR Assn
Email to the President yesterday …. I wonder if I’ll receive a response.
“On 1 May 2019 you emailed me to say (inter alia):
At a duly constituted meeting of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc Management Committee held at 1130 hours on 27 April 2019, it was determined that your membership renewal of the Association will be rejected; and
A formal letter will follow, send (sic)registered mail, person to person, as per the initial Notice, and with that formal notification will be enclosed a cheque for the sum of $25 which is a refund of the Membership Fees you deposited in the Association’s bank account on 14 February 2019.
Ten days later, I have still not received the formal notification you said would be sent to me.
I’ve been waiting on this because, when received, I intend to appeal against the rejection of my membership renewal.
You’ll, of course, say that I have no right to appeal, as per the following provision on the Constitution:
No reason need be given for the rejection of an application [for membership] and a decision to reject an application for membership shall be final and binding on all parties.”
You will be aware that I have been a Life Member of the 1AR Assn for some time. Furthermore, the Constitution states that:
“A member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution has his Life Membership continued under this Constitution.”
You’ll also be aware that, as a Life Member I have no need to reapply for membership nor pay membership fees. Why did I do so?
On 11 February 2019, I received a letter from the Secretary. It stated that my “membership was very important to the Association”, particularly as the Association required a “strong and committed membership that provides the Management Committee with feedback (both positive and negative)”. The letter went on to describe all the work that the Association was involved in, and the point was made that every member was important. Although I was a Life Member, I elected to make a voluntary donation in terms of membership fees (why should I be exempt when everyone else is contributing … how petty would it be to stand on my Life Membership status so as to avoid paying fees, if the Assn needed the funds?)
I endeavoured to provide feedback to the C’tee as I’d been encouraged by the Secretary, however, it seems that this may have backfired. Nevertheless, as a Life Member, my membership was never something to be considered for renewal by the C’tee.
It is true … that if I’ve committed a misdemeanour, the Management C’tee can decide to cancel my Life Membership. However, if this is done, I am entitled to appeal (the outcome of which to be decided by a General Meeting).
Please respond to acknowledge my right to appeal and confirm the dispatch of the formal notification of the cancellation of my Life Membership.
Blog 17 May 2019 : My Life Membership of 1AR Assn
Following on from 14 May, the following questions have been asked of the President, Mr Keith Meloncelli:
“I have two questions which I would appreciate you answering as the President, 1AR Assn.
Firstly the ‘Facts’ (as I understand them):
A number of Life Members of the 1AR Assn (including myself) were appointed by the C’tee in recognition of their efforts on behalf of the Assn;
It was later discovered that at the time of their appointment, the 1AR Assn Constitution did not provide for such membership;
When the new Constitution was prepared, Life Members were informed on 5 January 2018 that:
“A member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution has his Life Membership continued under this Constitution”.
You told me on 12 May 2019 that this provision was not included in the Constitution which was approved on 14 July 2019 (I think you mean 2018) and that, as a result, there are presently no Life Members in the 1AR Assn.
It would seem that at some point between 5 Jan 18 and 14 Jul 18, the 1AR Assn C’tee decided to strip Life Membership from those members who had previously been recognised for their significant contributions to the Assn.
I received no notification that my Life Membership had been revoked until your email on 12 May 2019.
The Questions:
(i) Why did the 1AR Assn C’tee decide to renege on the earlier decision that been advised to Life Members that their memberships would be continued? and
(ii) Why weren’t Life Members informed of the new decision to revoke their Life memberships?
Blog 22 May: My Membership of 1AR Assn
“Dear President,
I have today received, and have had to sign for, the registered letter that you referred to in your email of 1 May 2019. As advised previously, I wish to appeal the C’tee’s decision to cancel my Life Membership.
I have not as yet, however, received your responses to these questions:
i) Why did the 1AR Assn C’tee decide to renege on the earlier decision that been advised to Life Members that their memberships would be continued? and
(ii) Why weren’t Life Members informed of the new decision to revoke their Life memberships?
———————————————————————————————————————-
10 June 2019
Minutes for the 1AR Assn Management Committee Meeting: 2 June 2019
Minutes from Previous Meeting (28 February 2019) outstanding issues:
Current situation – Renewal of Membership of Mr Bruce Cameron, MC
“The President (Keith Meloncelli) advised that Bruce Cameron was no longer a member of the Association and had been removed from all communications channels used by the Association. The President also advised that the Association would not answer any correspondence from Bruce Cameron and would continue not to react to incorrect or false information published on the ‘ArmouredAdvocates’ blog. Accusations relating to information that was not provided to the Accountants by the previous Committee are totally false. Reference to ‘well qualified accountants’ who support his position is inflammatory and could not be supported given that those ‘well qualified accountants’ have not had any access to the accounting records of the Association. “
The C’tee continues to ignore the question. At issue is whether or not $19,000 in the Assn’s accounts which can’t be spent because it might have to be returned to members, should be designated as a ‘Liability” (rather than being considered ‘surplus funds’. It’s a simple accounting matter; not something which is inflammatory in any sense.
The background is provided by earlier Blog posts copied below.
18 May 2019 Blog: 1AR Assn Financial Report 2017/18
Letter to BRJ Accountants: “You prepared the attached financial statement.
This was presented to members of the Association at its AGM. The AGM Minutes include the following:
“ITEM 101/18 – Minute 44 of 2018/19 – Term Deposits – After some discussion, led by the Treasurer (Dave Paterson), it was agreed that the Association should retain around $10,000 in its Bank Operating Account and any surplus funds should be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period that provided the best possible interest rate. It was moved by the Treasurer that the surplus funds (around $35,000) be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period of five (5) months at an interest rate of 2.3%. Seconded Russ James.”
As the C’tee did not appear to have any plans for using the surplus funds, I volunteered some suggestions. The C’tee’s response was that: “most of the ‘surplus’ could not be expended for the following reasons:
399 members had paid their membership fees in advance (some until 2024) and this amounted to around $19,000. This money cannot and will not be spent because if anything went radically wrong with the Association, this money should be returned to those members who has paid in advance.
In the near future, somewhere between $8,000 and $10,000 will be advanced to the next Reunion Committee to pay deposits, etc for 2021 Reunion;
The annual operating expenses for the Association run to around $6,000 to $7,000”.
I draw BRJ Accountants’ attention to the fact that $19,000 of the $35,000 surplus, is made up of members’ fees paid in advance … funds that the C’tee acknowledges could have to be repaid.
It seems to me that this means that the Assn has a Liability which must be reflected in its Financial Statement. Not to do so, would seem to be misleading in terms of the financial position of the Assn. (I can only assume that the Assn did not inform BRJ Accountants that the deposits were not all simply ‘Income’.)
When I raised this with the C’tee , I was advised that my suggestion was “patently incorrect”. (I’m now awaiting a letter to formally advise that I’ve been expelled from the Assn.)
Could you please advise whether or not membership fees paid in advance ($19,000), which the Assn regards as possibly having to be returned, should be entered in the Financial Statement as a ‘Liability’?
16 April 2019 Blog: I’ve asked if the C’tee have considered my suggestion re the Association’s financial counting that I made on 30 March 2019 (copied below). I’ve had no response and so have asked these questions:
“Could you please respond to my concern re the $19,000 liability which is not currently shown in the Assn’s accounts. Related questions are:
Has this amendment been made to the Financial statement provided to CAV?;
Will members be informed of the change to the accounts presented to them at the AGM?; and
Will the Assn’s accounting practices be amended in future?
It’s interesting that my situation is relevant here, ie. if my membership is terminated, my membership fees will be refunded. All fees received, therefore, are a financial Liability until a membership application has been approved by the C’tee.
The President has advised in response to the questions above that:
“In accordance with Section 92 of the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (AIRA 2012), the Financial Statements will be prepared to give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the association during and at the end of its last financial year; and In accordance with Section 94 of AIRA 2012, the Management Committee will submit the Financial Statements to the AGM as required.”
I guess that this means that there will be no amendment to the existing financial statement and whether or not any follow-on changes are to be made to the 2018-19 statement will have to be awaited (until the 2019 AGM) to be known. I must admit that I’m surprised a $19,000 re-categorization of members’ funds from “Surplus” to ‘Liability’, is not something which should be immediately communicated to members.
30 March 2019 Blog: Mr President,
I mentioned yesterday that “great progress has been made [in terms of management of the Association in accordance with the Rules governing Incorporated Associations], compared with the situation five years ago; for example, we now have a valid Constitution and a properly set out Financial Statement (though I’ll have more to mention about the latter soon)”.
I’d like to follow up regarding the Financial Statement for 2017-18, before returning to the text of your letter to me.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM state:
ITEM 101/18 – Minute 44 of 2018/19 – Term Deposits – After some discussion, led by the Treasurer (Dave Paterson), it was agreed that the Association should retain around $10,000 in its Bank Operating Account and any surplus funds should be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period that provided the best possible interest rate. It was moved by the Treasurer that the surplus funds (around $35,000) be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period of five (5) months at an interest rate of 2.3%. Seconded Russ James.
As the C’tee did not appear to have any plans for using the surplus funds, I volunteered some suggestions.
The C’tee’s response was that: “most of the ‘surplus’ could not be expended for the following reasons:
399 members had paid their membership fees in advance (some until 2024) and this amounted to around $19,000. This money cannot and will not be spent because if anything went radically wrong with the Association, this money should be returned to those members who has paid in advance.
In the near future, somewhere between $8,000 and $10,000 will be advanced to the next Reunion Committee to pay deposits, etc for 2021 Reunion;
The annual operating expenses for the Association run to around $6,000 to $7,000”.
I draw your attention to the fact that $19,000 of the $35,000 surplus, is made up of members’ fees paid in advance … funds that the C’tee acknowledges could have to be repaid.
This means that the Assn has a Liability which MUST, in accord with accounting principles, be reflected in its Financial Statement. Not to do so is misleading in terms of the financial position of the Assn. (I can only assume that you did not inform BRJ Accountants and Business Advisors P/L that the deposits were not all simply ‘Income’.)
The C’tee is also considering an advance of $8,000 to $10,000 to pay deposits for the next Reunion. While the next C’tee might decide not to have a Reunion, it would still be informative for Assn members to know that the present C’tee has what amounts to a ‘contingent liability’, in mind with respect to these funds.
“Australia’s pursuit of expensive, high-end military capabilities like the $17 billion fleet of Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, $35 billion Hunter Class frigates, $50 billion Attack Class submarines, $5.2 billion fleet of Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicles and $10-15 billion acquisition of a yet to be determined armoured fighting vehicle fleet as part of LAND 400 Phase 3 are all important capability developments, however, such capabilities are useless without adequate manpower.
The ADF serves an important role within Australia’s policy making apparatus and is critical to long-term national security, and while the continued defence budget growth is expected to be widely welcomed by industry, the growing challenges to the Indo-Pacific region are raising questions about whether Australia’s commitment to 2 per cent of GDP is suitable to support the growing role and responsibilities that Australia will be required to undertake as regional security load sharing between the US and allies becomes a reality.
Dr Malcolm Davis of ASPI reinforced this, telling Defence Connect at the Avalon Airshow in late February, “The government aspiration of spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence is simply not enough anymore. We need to look at planning our force structure, our capability requirements and spending on a number of factors, including allied strengths and potential adversarial capabilities, not arbitrary figures.
‘It is time for us to throw open the debate about our force structure. It is time to ask what more do we need to do and what do we need to be capable of doing’.”
Defence Connect’s byline is: “Defence Industry News and Analysis”. In other words, its stakeholders have vested interests in terms of promoting Defence spending. Annoyingly (despite obvious security implications) there is little debate in relation to the actual drivers of defence spending. ie. the assessments made by our operational intelligence staffs and supporting analysts. The Defence of the nation is in their hands. We can have excellent members of the ADF, perfect in the skills required by their employment code, but unless the contingency planning is accurate …all this can be wasted. My response to the article above, is copied below:
“I would hope that the size of the ADF (including Reserves) would be at an optimum level to meet the requirements for ADF Contingency Plans (including sustainment). ADF capability must always be predicated on the basis of threat (like an insurance policy). This, of course, is not only the threat which may exist today, but also that which might exist in the future. Lead times are critical, including the time to acquire intelligence of a threat developing, the time to ‘tailor’ the ADF to meet it; and the time to acquire equipment stocks. It’s the ever-changing Contingency Plans which must be the determinant of ADF capability at any time. It must be recognised that those who are outside this group, could well have vested interests in proposing capability needs.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 June 2019
The Money ‘Laundering’ Saga. (My last post on this … I hope.)
Following on from the 4 June Blog post.
From what I understand … it appears that a $10,000 transfer was made direct to 1AR in 2013. A decision was then made (obviously in conjunction with the 1AR Assn C’tee at the time) to continue making such payments from ‘Rheinmet Sim’, but through the Assn’s ‘books’ … so as to mask the fact that they were coming from a commercial entity that was a contender for a very lucrative contract. Transfers amounting to $25,000 are known (from 1AR Assn records) to have been made in this way.
There is no evidence that Rheinmetall sought to achieve any ‘influence’ re their LAND 400 bid; nor is there any suggestion that any member of 1 Armd Regt or 1 AR Assn was involved in any wrong-doing.
But who knows whether or not this is ‘all’ there is of the matter? That’s the problem! It’s all about perception … which is precisely what Defence regulations seek to prevent happening!!
What I would like to see is for the current 1AR Assn C’tee to publicly (i) acknowledge that improper monetary transfers were facilitated in the past (the complete opposite has been the case very recently, see 4 June); and (ii) state that it is this now realised to be against Defence regulations and will not be allowed to happen again. This has been passed to the C’tee, but I’m not holding my breath.
Re (ii) I’ve suggested previously that the best way to enshrine this is for such a provision to be included in the 1 AR Assn Constitution. (A suggestion which has so far been ignored.)
What really annoys me is that the 1AR Assn C’tee initially said that the Assn wasn’t answerable to any charge of inappropriate behaviour because the Assn is subject to Victorian law, not defence regulations. This was followed by a straight-out denial that $25,000 had been passed through the Assn’s books (a denial which was shown on 4 June to be completely false).
Where is the truth and what’s it mean? I’ve said it before … open and transparent governance is the only way to prevent the perception of something amiss (whether or not it is).
Binh Ba Commemoration (Following on from yesterday)
Speaking of guidons … was this the first time that the Guidon of 1 Avn Regt was paraded in conjunction with those of the RAAC?
(Still think it a pity that a representative of RAEME was not invited to lay a wreath.)
———————————————————————————————————————-
7 June 2109
Paying Compliments.
The Binh Ba Commemoration was well organised and conducted. Congrats to all involved.
What happened when those laying wreaths twice passed the assembled Standard, Guidons, Colours and Banners, however?
One expects that service personnel in uniform would salute the Colours … while, as I understand the Ceremonial Manual, civilians are to turn their heads to acknowledge the Colours, while gentlemen wearing headdress are to remove it.
Some ‘civilians’ correctly removed their headdress and turned their heads … but others, simply passed by without any acknowledgement.
Am I out of order in asking: ‘Please, RSM ceremonial, include the paying of compliments to Colours in the briefing notes for such commemorations’.
Is there a special category of retired personnel wearing military headdress? Seems to me that it might be inappropriate for them to salute, so should they remove their military headdress? Maybe an amendment to the Ceremonial Manual here? The ABC TV footage of the Ceremony is here: https://iview.abc.net.au/show/battle-of-binh-ba-50th-anniversary
Hopefully the RSM of the Army might be able to help:
Dear RSM-A,
I am a retired member of the RAAC. Following the Binh Ba Commemoration yesterday, some questions of protocol have arisen in the context of veterans attending such ceremonies and wishing to pay respect in accord with appropriate procedures.
When a gentleman wearing civilian clothes and a hat, passes Colours/Guidons etc, he removes his hat and does an eyes left/right.
But what happens when the retired person is wearing their old unit beret (probably also wearing medals)?
Should he (i) remove his beret and do an eyes left/right; (ii) keep beret on and salute with eyes left/right; or keep beret on and simply do an eyes left/right.
Supplementary question is: what should such a person do when the national anthem is played: (i) stand, keep beret on and salute; (ii) stand and remove beret; or (iii) just stand.
Your help in answering these questions would be much appreciated.
It is recognised that former service personnel are not subject to the dress/ceremonial manual stipulations, but, even so, most would like to be able to do what is considered the ‘right thing’.
(I’ve had lots of comments re the Chief of Army passing in front of the assembled Colours without saluting …. .)
Note: Prior to writing to the RSM-A, I thought that someone ‘out there’ might know the answer. I made the mistake posting the question on a Facebook page. The majority of responses were very supportive and keen on establishing the correct ‘protocol’, BUT sure enough, there ‘they’ were … the element which regards the raising of any such issue as a criticism and can’t resist vitriolic comments in response. So be it.
———————————————————————————————————————–
6 June 2019
Binh Ba : 50th Anniversary Commemoration (Today)
The following video was produced by the AWM some years ago.
A couple of points … (i) there were actually eleven WIA (eight of whom were tank crewmen) and (ii) most of the footage showing AFVs and inf assaulting was actually taken during the clearance of the neighbouring hamlet of Duc Trung on the following day (7 June).
The footage gives a completely false impression of what happened on 6 June. The AWM are aware of this but as the video has been made, they can’t change the audio without a significant cost. So, it stays as it is.
Another glitch in the audio is that a tank and an ARV are reported to have been fired on by “an RPG as they passed through the village”. But …only the tank had entered the village. It was hit by an RPG, wounding the operator (Peter Chapman). The ARV was short of the village when the strike on 2OE was seen. The ARV stopped. Another RPG was fired at it, but fell short. The ARV turned around and headed back to Nui Dat. (Its radios were U/S, so the contact couldn’t reported other than verbally … which the crew did when they got to the gate at ND.)
In Dogs we Trust.
In 1968, George Hulse was at Balmoral:
“Alert to such a threat, 32Alpha’s crew used their IR equipment to scan the ground across as wide an arc as possible. It was not long before their efforts paid off. Observing a party of seven pushing a Bangalore torpedo through the wire, Sergeant Allen ordered the adjoining tank (Corporal Dennis Britten) to illuminate with white light. Although not quick enough to prevent a gap in the perimeter defences being blown, the retreating sappers were treated to twenty-pounder canister and .30cal at a range of less than 50m. The engagement drew professional praise from a sapper officer [Lt George Hulse] who witnessed it: ‘The entire enemy breaching team was destroyed; had the tank not been there, the outcome would have been a fierce hand-to-hand fight for our forward pits’.” [RIP, Len Allen]
Fifty years later, he, together with Jack Parr, saw the culmination of their sustained efforts, with the award of Unit Citation for Gallantry for the actions at Coral-Balmoral.
In 1971, George Hulse was the initial commander of Dog Wing at the School of Military Engineering.
Forty-eight year later, on 7 June 2019, his book ‘In Dogs We Trust’ will be launched following a memorial service for all Australian military working dog handlers and dogs that have been lost to overseas duty at the RSPCA Campus, Wacol.
From the 5RAR Assn website: “The 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Binh Ba is to be commemorated in Canberra on Thursday 6 June. The commemorative service to be held at the National Vietnam Memorial on Anzac Parade, commences sharply at 2.00 PM and will conclude at 3.00 PM. The ceremony will be broadcast live on ABC TV and streamed on IView”.
I understand that the 1 Armd Regt Standard and 3 and 4 Cav Regt Guidons will be paraded.
50th Hammersley Commemoration
I wonder if DVA will be prepared to fund another national commemoration for Hammersley, along the lines of those for Coral-Balmoral and Binh Ba?
Obviously, it is unacceptable that there be no commemoration. If a Plan B is needed, can the Australian Army, unit associations and veterans rise to the occasion on 18 February 2020?
Apart from a single commemoration at the Vietnam Memorial in Canberra, other options for the ‘8RAR Group’ and its successors, include:
A combined RAAC/RAR/RAE commemoration hosted by 1Armd Regt in Adelaide (8/9 RAR, 1CER sending ‘contingents’);
A combined RAAC/RAR/RAE commemoration hosted by 8/9RAR in Brisbane (1 Armd Regt, 1 CER sending contingents);
Two combined RAAC/RAR/RAE commemorations hosted simultaneously in the above locations (with representative contingents being sent accordingly).
The latter would have the advantage of allowing more veterans to attend, ie. to travel to either of two, rather than just a single location. It would also have the benefit of reducing costs for the units involved. (DVA may well, of course, contribute some funding to assist with unit commemorations.)
Hopefully liaison between unit associations will produce a good outcome to honour the bravery and sacrifice of those who participated in Operation Hammersley. Fingers crossed.
Why is it that there is no open discussion about such things? Why must everything be done ‘behind the scenes’? Seems to me that the Armoured Corps Mafia are still lurking in the shadows.
———————————————————————————————————————-
4 June 2019
Open and Transparent Governance; aka Ethics and Integrity
I have been asked to retract this statement: “The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that total payments from this company to 1 Armd Regt amounted to $35,000; of which $25,000 was passed through 1AR Assn”. (See Blog for 19 May 2019)
Why should I retract? Because I’ve been assured that “$25,000 from Rheinmetall (whichever part) did not go through the Associations books”. 1 AR Assn C’tee, 3 June 2019.
But Financial Statements make it clear that the opposite was the case: In 2014, for example,
Another $10,000 is listed as having been transferred through the 1 AR Assn books “to 1AR (from Rheinmet Sim)” in 2015 and the following year: “$5000.00 [was transferred] from Rheinmetal Sim for D Sqn [1AR]”.
My Blog post for 19 August 2018 (see below) refers to the then President’s assertion that the “Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence”
Was that the reason that the Assn was used to ‘mask’ the transfer of money to 1 Armd Regt, ie. because it (the Assn) was not bound by Defence protocols/regulations?
I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn. Even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, this is clearly in breach of Defence regulations.
One of the reasons given for revoking my Life Membership was the assertion that by highlighting this issue, I demonstrated a lack of commitment to the Assn. My response was that “I believe that there are many [Assn members] who would consider the fact that I took the trouble to raise this matter, shows (instead) my undoubted commitment to the Association”.
There are two options: either be open and transparent, or deny and cover up. As was made clear to the President, the latter leaves no alternative other than to seek a more detailed investigation. This has been done. Hopefully, past cover ups will be replaced by open and transparent governance (as is now happening in the RSL).
As I said on 19 May, “I do not believe that either the 1AR Assn C’tee or Defence personnel knowingly committed any wrong-doing. However, the manner in which the [initial] investigation was handled, has failed to act as a deterrent to prevent the same thing happening again (quite the opposite)”.
————————————————————————————–
Doing the Right Thing [19 August 2018]
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action [an interesting statement as the C’tee informs me that the investigation report was not provided to them] … Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
What are members to make of this? It would seem that a defence of jurisdiction has been mounted, ie. regulations set by the Department of Defence are not applicable to the 1 AR Assn. Surely, we are bigger than this? Surely, it’s a matter of doing the right thing, even if it is not legislated that it has to be done?
What is the point in making it known that no matter what Defence regulations say with regard to ethical relationships with commercial entities, this has no relevance to the Assn? As an Assn comprised of former members of the ADF, one might expect that guidance provided by Defence regulations would help inform decisions made by the Assn (rather than being completely discounted).
———————————————————————————————————————–
3 June 2019
Self-Propelled Howitzers (SPHs).
The June issue of Defence technology Review states that a commitment has been made to purchase thirty Hanwha K9 155mm SPHs.
Following on yesterday’s Blog post … how good is this? Not one or the other, but both an expanded M1A1 (soon to be M1A2) Abrams fleet, but also SPHs.
The capability gap is finally going to be addressed (like the replacement of the ASLAV).
BUT … the devil is in the detail. The SPHs will only be built in Australia if the Hanwha ‘Redback’ is chosen as the IFV to be procured under LAND 400 Phase 3. This is commercial (and political) reality, but can we be assured that operational effectiveness will be the sole determinant? If one is pragmatic, one would have to say: no, we can’t. Australian Industrial Participation will play a large part in the decision making. (some might say that it should be a factor, but not necessarily the deciding factor.)
The blog post for 19 April 2019 is relevant and is copied below.
19 April 2019 : The ADF Concept of Operations : Anti-Armour
Following on from 17 April 2019:
Q: What is the best form of anti-tank defence? A: Another tank … or so the saying goes!
Interestingly, the lead article in the current Army newspaper is an account of the Army’s first live firing of the Smart 155mm round. According to Wikipedia, this is: “… a German 155 mm artillery round, designed for a long range, indirect firetop attack role against armoured vehicles. The SMArt carrier shell contains two submunitions with infrared sensor and millimeter waveradar, which descend over the battlefield on ballutes [parachute breaking device] and attack hardened targets with explosively formed penetrator warheads.
The Army’s FB page states that the successful firing (destroying three Leopard tanks) “indicated the Australian Army was a capable and ready land force”.
So … the question has to be asked: Do we need tanks? Is this why there is no priority being given to the acquisition of the additional 31 Abrams tanks that the Army needs to be able to deploy an effective armoured capability?
Let’s consider the capability provided by the Smart 155mm. The gun crews are static and unprotected. If they were subjected to counter-battery fire or air attack, the capability could not be provided. A tank’s crew, on the other hand, are protected and not tied to a single firing position. (SP 155s would make some difference here, but I believe that this project was scrapped some time ago.)
The artillery mission, of course, requires an ‘observer’ to initiate and control. The necessary information could come from a drone or a satellite; but electronic warfare measures could render these sources inoperative.
The discussion above only goes to reinforce the fact that combined arms operations are the only way to achieve a successful outcome. Artillery fire missions can very successfully channel an enemy advance, denying a possible route and forcing the enemy to adopt a course of action which be to the advantage of a well sited tank force. The fire mission, like well-placed minefields etc, is also likely to cause significant delay, BUT it will not defeat the enemy’s armour completely. Direct fire weapons are needed for this.
The 31 Abrams that the Army is presently ‘missing’ HAVE to be purchased to ensure that the ADF has a viable operational capability.
—————————————————————–
CORRECTION
The title for the Blog post on 19 May 2019 was ‘Defence Ethical Relationship Policy and Implementation’.
It included the following: “The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that other payments, totalling $35,000, had been received by 1AR Assn from this company and passed on to 1 Armd Regt in previous years”.
This statement was incorrect. It should have read: “The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that total payments from this company to 1 Armd Regt amounted to $35,000; of which $25,000 was passed through 1AR Assn”.
———————————————————————————————————————-
31 May 2019
(This will be my last post until Monday … grandtwins’ birthday interstate!)
The Missing Thirty One Abrams
“… planned upgrades and a possible expansion of Australia’s fleet of M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBT) as part of LAND 907 Phase 2 seeks to expand and enhance the combat power of the nation’s armoured corps”.
Lo and behold … just as I wrote the above, the latest edition of Defence Technology Review lobbed into the inbox … and it, an article which said the same thing `
“The Australian Army is moving the plan to enhance and expand its M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) fleet along the approvals process.”
One could be excused for thinking that a press release or media update might have been put out by Defence recently. Reference to an expansion of the Abrams tank fleet was included in both articles, but no details were given … almost a ‘throw away’ line.
Could it be that one of Armouredadvocates’ long standing goals (Intro Part 7: ‘The RAAC tank fleet would be increased from 59 to the 90 that Army state is the minimum number to equip and support three dispersed tank squadrons) might be getting a tad closer to reality?
Background to the need for an expanded fleet was provided over two years ago in this AFR article:
Colonel Anthony Duus, the [then] Australian Army’s Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems, says we may have one of the best tanks in the world, but we have too few, we have the ‘analogue’ models and we do not have the domestic sustainment capacity for the M1 Abrams in the way that the RAAF and RAN sustains its fleets.
The Army’s Plan Beersheba from 2011 – ratified in the 2013 Defence White Paper – stipulates three armoured cavalry regiments, which each contains a tank squadron. Duus says the current Land 8160 phase 1 project will resolve the challenges, although the exact details are still being finalised.
“We see the optimum fleet size for the M1 Abrams fleet as 90,” says Duus. “That’s a return to the fleet size we had with the Leopard but it’s still short of the 110 we had with the Centurion. Ninety is a realistic fleet size to cover three tank squadrons.”
He says when there are three active squadrons, there have to be tanks in maintenance and being repaired, tanks kept as spares, tanks used for training and tanks being used.
“When you have a fleet of twelve submarines, there are only two at sea. It’s the same with these big tanks – you need the right fleet size to generate three squadrons.”
The first task of the current Land project is to “right-size” the fleet to 90, which Duus says is uncontroversial and was acknowledged by the then-Australian government and the US government when the M1 was originally acquired as a foreign military sale.
PS. Following on from yesterday (courtesy RSL NSW)”
“Greg Melick AO RFD FANSCZ SC was elected to the position of National President at yesterday’s National Board meeting.
Greg has had a stellar career in the Army, rising to the rank of Major General and holding positions including Director General Reserves – Army and Colonel Commandant, 1st Commando Regiment.
He currently lives in Tasmania, where he is a Senior Counsel. He is also Patron of Defence Cricket and the Army Museum of Tasmania.
John King, President of RSL ACT, was appointed Deputy National President.”
———————————————————————————————————————
30 May 2019
What’s Happening in the RSL?
The news that the Australian Charities and Not-for-Profit Commission (ACNC) had revoked its decision that RSL Queensland must rectify shortcomings in its governance and compliance processes, was good news. The ACNC was satisfied that RSL Queensland has taken the necessary steps to implement improved practices.
The State President (Tony Ferris) said that “I’m looking forward to moving forward with renewed energy and purpose to rebuild the integrity of the RSL and meet the needs of our Defence family now and into the future.” Integrity … now there’s a word not heard very often these days.He also mentioned making RSL Queensland “more accountable and transparent”, as well pointing out how important ”governance and compliance” was to the future of the organisation.
BUT … then I heard that James Brown had resigned as a member of the RSL National Board. What was this all about? The following statement from Brown explains:
You will have seen that I resigned from the Board of RSL National last week. Rest assured, RSL NSW still maintains our role as a state member of RSL National with responsibility for shaping the National constitution and voting alongside other states at the RSL National annual general meeting. However, we will not be appointing a director to the National Board for the time being.
You will remember that the ACNC issued a finding last year that the RSL National Board had failed to comply with governance standards. I re-joined RSL National’s Board in August 2018 hoping to see an improvement in governance and a stronger national voice for veterans. In November, RSL NSW hosted a productive meeting in Sydney with all the RSL State Presidents to set the strategy and structure for the national office, as well as the work to be done to reform governance issues. After six months, I have not seen sufficient progress in resolving governance issues or financial transparency at RSL National. Indicative of this lack of progress, state delegates rejected the financial statements presented by the national office at the last AGM.
It is tragic that at the very time we need a strong and unified RSL National voice in Canberra, we do not have one. I cannot see value in continuing to spend time and money on National Board meetings when we have so much work to do here in NSW. RSL NSW will look to coordinate and cooperate directly with other RSL states until such time as the national office is reformed, and good governance restored.
It’s no surprise to see governance issues and transparency raised again … this time at the National level.
It seems to me that if everything done in the name of members was open and transparent, correct governance would quickly follow. This doesn’t only apply to the RSL.
——————————————————————————————————————-
29 May 2019
Hammersley Recognition
It’s taken quite some time, but finally the application for review of Defence’s decision not to extend eligibility to supporting Arms involved in Operation Hammersley, has gone off (almost 40 pages).
It will take a couple of days for me to readjust to day to day matters (daily radiation treatment makes demands on time and energy). In the meantime, posts such as the following, are likely to be interest. The covering letter to the Appeal submission is copied below. This will no doubt be of interest to the RAAC Corporation and the 1 AR Assn C’tee (one says the other is responsible, the other says that it’s not a ‘lobby’ organisation). As with all matters raised by Armouredadvocates, openness and transparency are paramount, always.
—————————————————————————–
Dear Sir,
Application for Review of Defence’s Decision Not to Extend Eligibility for the RVNAF CGWP Unit Citation to A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment, and 1st Field Squadron, RAE.
This is a matter which has necessitated a lot of research to understand the circumstances … they are not by any means, straight-forward.
Evidence is provided which leaves no doubt that A Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment, B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1 Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) were part of the “8th Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR) Group” commended by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) for its success during Operation Hammersley in 1970.
But only 8RAR received recognition in the form of the Cross of Gallantry With Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation. Why did the service and sacrifice of the others go unacknowledged?
Defence argue that the CGWP Unit Citation was for 8RAR’s entire twelve months in Vietnam. This is incorrect. The Citation awarded to 8RAR for its tour-of-duty was the Meritorious Unit Commendation. This is not to be confused with the CGWP Unit Citation. The latter is awarded solely for “deeds of valour and heroic conduct”, ie. an outstanding combat action, such as characterised by Operation Hammersley.
The CGWP Unit Citation includes a ‘streamer’ which a unit attaches to the pike of its Regimental Colour. 8RAR’s Streamer is embellished with the words, ‘Minh Dam’. The Minh Dam Secret Zone was the objective breached by infantry, tanks, APCs, and combat engineers during Operation Hammersley. The Streamer does not contain the words ‘Tour-Of-Duty’ or anything similar. Clearly the CGWP Unit Citation relates to the outstanding combat action that satisfies the criteria for ‘deeds of valour and heroic conduct’ — Operation Hammersley!
His Excellency Major General the Honourable Michael Jeffery (an 8RAR company commander in 1970) is unequivocal in stating that the Unit Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley. His statement in included under.
There is also the issue of the involvement of the RVN in terms of awards made to Australian personnel. It will be shown that these awards were initiated, not by the RVN Government (as claimed by Defence), but by the Australian Task Force in Vietnam (1 ATF). A copy of the proposal drafted in August 1970 by 8RAR for its own unit citation is included under. It is here that an error in military administration and resulting injustice, occurs.
Documents are attached which show that tanks, APCs and combat engineers were under command of 8RAR and were part of the 8RAR Battle Group which was acknowledged by the RVNAF for the success achieved during Operation Hammersley. Sub-units that are under command of a major unit are considered to be an integral part of it. The Commanding Officer of 8RAR for Operation Hammersley ‘owned’ the sub-units under his command. These were A Squadron 1 Armoured Regiment, B Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment and elements of 1 Field Squadron RAE. Any citation approved for 8RAR in terms of Operation Hammersley, should have included these sub-units.
That this was not addressed by Headquarters 1 ATF when approving 8RAR’s proposal for a unit citation, demonstrates a remarkable oversight in terms of fundamental military administration and justice. Consequently, 8RAR received a CGWP Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley, while supporting sub-units which were central to its success, did not. This oversight led to some being recognised for courage on the battlefield, while others who were equally brave and selfless, were ignored. The resulting injustice has been, and still is, upsetting for many veterans. This submission seeks to correct this.
Speaking of ‘oversights’, one of the reasons given for dismissing the original application for extension of eligibility, was that the Australian Government did not have authority to do so. However, precedents were established when eligibility for the RVNAF CGWP Unit Citation was extended to both RAN and RAAF units in 2016. There are other matters which support this application for review contained in the submissions under.
Finally, I should say that the 8RAR Association Inc remain of the belief that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s entire tour of Vietnam. The Association agrees that supporting units in Operation Hammersley should be recognised and recommends that an application for an Australian Unit Citation for Gallantry should be pursued. (An application that they would support.)
On behalf of those whose bravery and sacrifice were involved, your consideration of this application for extension of eligibility for the RVNAF CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley is earnestly requested. This matter has been the subject of efforts by veterans over many years. They feel now that, with the 50th Anniversary of Operation Hammersley approaching on 18 February 2020, this might be their last opportunity to achieve justice (albeit retrospectively).
Yours sincerely …
———————————————————————————————————————–
28 May 2019
Hammersley Recognition
I’ve been so caught up in the Hammersley submission, that I completely forgot about the Blog.
Under the “Who is this Application About?” question on the DHAAT application form, the answer given is:
The application concerns the officers and men of A Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment, B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1 Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers. It seeks to correct the injustice resulting from their bravery and sacrifices in supporting 8RAR during Operation Hammersley, not having been acknowledged when 8 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR) alone were awarded the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation. Evidence is provided that these units were part of the “8RAR Group” which were congratulated by the RVN for their success during the Operation. They suffered three killed and thirteen wounded in action. Two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and a tank were destroyed, while another two tanks and four APCs were struck by anti-armour rockets. The 8RAR Association Inc supports retrospective recognition.
The completed application and supporting submissions will be dispatched tomorrow (God willing).
———————————————————————————————————————–
27 May 2019
Victoria Crosses of the RAAC and its Antecedents.
There have been no Victoria crosses awarded to members of the RAAC or former AAC. In terms of antecedents, only one VC was awarded to the LH in the First World War. It should be no surprise, given the nature of operations, that four of the six VCs awarded to Australians for service in the Boer War, were to members of mounted infantry units.
The details below are from the AWM website. Thanks to Major John Baines, RFD (RAAC Historian) for his help with this compilation.
Frederick Bell, 6th Western Australian Mounted Infantry, was a Perth-born volunteer in the first Western Australian contingent of troops sent to South Africa. He took part in some of the early battles. He came home in February 1901, but soon left again as an officer in the sixth contingent. While rescuing a dismounted man during fighting at Brakpan, Transvaal, South Africa, his own horse fell under the combined weight of the two men. Giving his mount to the other rider, he provided covering fire to allow him to escape.
John Bisdee of the 1st Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen [later 12LH], was in an eight-man mounted patrol ambushed by the Boers near Warm Bad, Transvaal, on 1 September 1900. Almost all of the party were wounded, including an officer whose horse had bolted. Bisdee put the officer on his own horse and, despite having been wounded himself, ran alongside under fire until he too could mount up and get away.
Leslie Maygar was born near Kilmore, Victoria, on 27 May 1868. He was farming at Euroa when he volunteered for service with the Victorian Mounted Rifles and served in the South African War. It was during this conflict that Maygar was awarded the Victoria Cross for the rescue of a fellow soldier under heavy fire.
Guy Wylly, 1st Tasmanian Imperial Bushmen, was one of two Tasmanians to win the Victoria Cross in the same action on 1 September 1900. The other was Trooper John Bisdee. Despite being wounded in a Boer ambush at Transvaal, South Africa, he went to the assistance of a wounded corporal, giving him his own horse and then providing covering fire from behind rocks to enable his escape.
Hugo Throssell, a Western Australian farmer, joined the 10th Light Horse at the outbreak of war. He arrived on Gallipoli in August 1915 and survived the regiment’s ill-fated charge at the Nek on 7 August. Throssell was awarded the Victoria Cross for an action on 29-30 August which took place at Hill 60. The 10th Light Horse was brought into an offensive action to extend the front line past Hill 60 in the early hours of the 29th. Throssell and his men became involved in a fierce bomb fight, which continued all night. Throssell was wounded twice but even with his face covered in blood he refused medical help, continuing to shout encouragement to his men.
——————————————————————————————————————–
26 May 2019
My Blog.
I was recently told that there was “untrue commentary on [my] blog”.
I responded to say please tell me where this has occurred, as it is my policy (as frequently stated) to immediately delete, correct and apologise for … anything which is incorrect in any way. I was not surprised to receive no response. It is not the first time that this has happened.
I assume that this is because, while it’s easy to say ‘that’s all wrong‘, any such matter will become the subject of further debate. If my commentary was wrong, then this will be made clear and an apology given for any offence which may have resulted. Of course, if my commentary was NOT wrong, then the matter will have been further publicised and highlighted.
There have been two occasions (in the past five years) in which matters have been brought to my attention that were actually wrong, as they were presented on the Blog. In both cases, I immediately thanked the person who brought them to my attention and corrected the posts.
I have now inserted the above policy in bold type in the Introduction (immediately below the details on how to comment).
Hammersley
My new challenge, one which will be the subject of many coming Blog posts, is to continue the battle for recognition of those involved in Operation Hammersley, and who (apart from 8RAR) have not had their bravery and sacrifice recognised.
——————————————————————————————————————
25 May 2019
My Membership of 1AR Assn
I’ve added a new Part 6 to the Introduction above. What an unbelievable story it is. (Who said that the truth was stranger than fiction?)
Part 6.
The story continues … The final Constitution approved by the then C’tee differed from that which the group of members had drafted. One point of difference was that a clause was inserted which gave the C’tee the right to refuse someone’s application for membership, without telling them why and without giving them any right of appeal. These are the sort of powers that back the governance of a totalitarian regime. A number of members raised objections to this, but their protests were ignored.
The C’tee with whom the group of members had been working to draft the new Constitution had included a provision in the Constitution for ‘existing’ Life Memberships to be continued. The draft sent to members made this very clear. (Background here is that when Life Memberships were originally awarded, there was no provision in the Constitution for this to be done. The revised Constitution included such provision.)
Although I was a Life Member, I received a request to pay membership fees. I did so, thinking that it would be somewhat arrogant of me to say that as a Life Member, I’m not required to do so. Next, I’m advised that as I was deemed to have criticised the C’tee (with my suggestions re continual improvement of due process), I was therefore deemed not to support the Purposes of the Assn as set out in the Constitution.
As a result, my membership would not be renewed. (The basis for and against the supposed criticisms are detailed in Blog posts for March 2019.) Furthermore, I was advised that I would not be entitled to appeal this decision (which, for a disciplinary offence by a member whose m’ship was current, would be granted and heard by a General Meeting of members.)
I said “but I’m a Life Member, I was only applying for membership renewal on a voluntary basis”. Surprisingly, I was told that all Life Memberships had been scrapped, (ie. the provision continuing Life Memberships mentioned above, was deleted from the Constitution by the C’tee, before a vote was taken for approval). I asked why the decision to continue Life Memberships was overturned and why weren’t members informed of this? I have not received a response to either question.
Nevertheless, as the Constitution provides for a Life Member to do, I’ve appealed the decision to revoke my membership. What will the next chapter bring, I wonder?
——————————————————————————————————————–
24 May 2019
Publishing Ethics (and Law)
“The days of stiff upper lips are over”. So someone told me recently … but should I no longer stand up for matters of principle?
If I write an article for a journal, include my own photos to illustrate it, the article is published on-line and someone then copies one of my photos, without my permission, and uses it for his own purposes without any acknowledgement of the source … is this ok? Is it lawful? Is it ethical?
This is what happened to me. Suddenly a photo appears on a Facebook page … ‘Crikey!’ I say; ‘that’s my photo, how did it get on here’? Then I remembered the article I’d written, and, sure enough, back copies of the journal are still available on the Internet. The following is my understanding of the law and ethics involved.
The Law. Firstly, I did not take the photo. It was a photo of me that I had purchased. Therefore, I’m not the ‘creator’, but the item is something that I own. It was included as illustration for an article I wrote. I had permission from the creator to use the image. I was the creator of the article and, therefore, own copyright to the photo that was part of it.
I did not state ‘copyright Bruce Cameron’ at the base of the article. This is not necessary. Copyright automatically flows to the creator (me).
An opposing attitude is: “As far as the photo is concerned, it has been put out into the public arena [in a journal], so in my mind without copyright it is okay to show.
The Ethics. I wrote a book. All photos included in the publication had permission of the creator and I acknowledged this person. Surely anything else would be unethical?
But no permission was sought to publish my photo; not only that, but it was used completely out of context. Maybe the person who utilised it had no idea how to contact the copyright holder and ask permission? It this were to be the case, what would usually happen is that the person who wishes to use the image would cite the source. Not only did this not happen, but the person concerned knew exactly how to get in touch with me to ask permission. So … the protocol that seems to be generally acceptable is: Don’t worry about asking permission,just copy the image and do with it what you like! (A bit like borrowing someone else’s car … just hop in and go!)
Another ethical consideration is that associated with acknowledging those in the image who deserve recognition. I did this in my article … “Although not teaching any classes per se, Colonel Eric Offord, DSO, MBE, gave the staff even greater depth. He had enlisted in 1924, was commissioned into the Royal Tank Corps in 1932, and was CO 46 RTR in Italy in 1943.
Conclusion. I believe the use of my photo, without my permission, is not only unlawful, but unethical and discourteous in the extreme. Shall I take the matter to court? The exercise would involve considerable out of pocket expenses, with little hope of a matching return. I have, however, taken a builder to court on the basis of a matter of principle … and won. Sometimes it’s the only way that principles can be upheld. Who knows … maybe I’ll receive an apology.
The photo taken from this article without my permission, is the one overprinted with the caption “Staff and Students LAIC 1973’. On the FB page, the caption has been removed and the image appears with the tag “Bring your dog to work and wear a skirt day – circa 1970. The Brits sure do like their pets and wearing …..”. With respect to Colonel Offord, some might be interested in this oral history: https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80000861
The reply which I’ve submitted for publication is below …
Dear Dr Palmer,
I am a Vietnam veteran and can say that I fully support your arguments re PTSD. I agree with your contention that “Traumatic memory is not under conscious control …”.
Interestingly, a good understanding of PTSD and its triggers is not always to be found within the veteran community itself.
Sometime ago, I came across a post on a Facebook page which was centred on photograph of a tank showing damage that had been inflicted on it in action. There was no mention of the operation that the tank was involved in at the time, the events that had led to damage, nor what wounds might have been inflicted on the crew. I was commanding the tank at the time.
I asked the author to delete the post, as I felt it was both distasteful and potentially distressing to the crew, to simply show a damaged tank for the apparent purpose of indicating what a mess Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) could look like after being hit by enemy fire. The image was not deleted and I was told to “loosen up”.
The AWM took a completely different approach. Some years previously, a photo of an AFV was included as part of an article in the AWM’s journal ‘Wartime’. I wrote to the Editor and suggested that such an image, completely without context, was inappropriate. By this I meant, that an AFV can’t be considered as an inanimate object separate to its crew … a damaged AFV immediately raises the question about wounds that the crew might have suffered. The Editor responded to say he acknowledged the points I’d made and would change their policy in this regard. (My letter was published.)
So … well done to you in raising the points about PTSD that you have. I’m not completely sure, however, that these translate to an argument against extension of the AWM. As indicated above, I think that the AWM staff can respond appropriately to such issues. (Mind you, I’ve been arguing for some time for corrections to made to exhibit panels in the Vietnam Gallery …such errors can also be the sort of ‘triggers’ you refer to.)
Finally, a couple of ‘typos’ … service personnel who are hurt as a result of enemy action are regarded by veterans as being wounded, rather than injured. PTSD is considered a mental wound. You mention “hundreds of thousands of distressed Vietnam veterans” … I believe that more than 60,000 Australian service personnel served there, together with around 1600 Australian civilians. (The latter, of course, were members of medical teams, media personnel, entertainers and the like. They too served their country and suffer PTSD (though, sadly, are not acknowledged to the same extent.)
——————————————————————————————————————-
22 May 2019
My Membership of 1AR Assn
“Dear President,
I have today received, and have had to sign for, the registered letter that you referred to in your email of 1 May 2019. As advised previously, I wish to appeal the C’tee’s decision to cancel my Life Membership.
I have not as yet, however, received your responses to these questions:
i) Why did the 1AR Assn C’tee decide to renege on the earlier decision that been advised to Life Members that their memberships would be continued? and
(ii) Why weren’t Life Members informed of the new decision to revoke their Life memberships?
Finally, the attached is a short paper by Brig S. White MBE Retd (ex RTR). It examines the reasons that yellow and red were chosen as the Corps colours for the RAC and RAAC. I initiated consideration of this on the 1AR Assn Social page. Given that I cannot access this page anymore, I thought that I should pass it to you. You may wish to forward to HOC for info (‘Ironsides’ possibly?) or use as the basis for a 1AR Assn newsletter article.
Bruce
An extract from the above paper is copied below:
“At the outbreak of the Second World War, all identifying marks on battle dress were prohibited, except for drab shoulder titles worn on slip-on slides. In Sept 1940, however, Army Council Instruction (ACI) 1118 authorised formation patches to identify the parent brigade or brigade group. The ACI also introduced arm of service slips, a thin two-colour strip of material, divided vertically, and worn on the right arm to indicate the wearer’s parent arm or service. The RAC was allocated yellow and red. This is the first authorised association of the RAC with the colours red and yellow but the colours were far from seized upon as a Corps identifier.
Red/yellow as an RAC vehicle indicator during WW2 appears to be a matter of local initiative and was not at this stage enduring. …. Secondly, when 25th Army Tank Brigade was formed at the outbreak of war, it adopted a red and yellow shield, divided vertically, with a black diabolo superimposed, as its formation sign. The Brigade subsequently served with distinction in Italy with 8th Army. 34th Army Tank Brigade was formed in 1941 and subsequently served with “Hobart’s Funnies” in 79th Armd Div. The formation sign was a red shield with yellow diagonal stripe, with a steel gauntlet and mace superimposed. 1st Armoured Replacement Group, Central Mediterranean Force adopted a red and yellow badge, divided horizontally, with the head of Mars superimposed.
These examples suggest an informal and perhaps ad hoc association between armoured units and formations and the “house colours” of yellow and red but their geographic diversity and inconsistency are far from suggesting a common War Office policy was at work. These colours however were unlikely to have been plucked from the ether. Army Dress Regulations, a subject treated by soldiers with considerable gravity, may have been the inspiration.
The RAC was an administrative organisation and never an operational headquarters and was formed by association, not amalgamation. Allegiance to the Corps was at best tenuous and regimental identity usually held precedence over any Corps-wide identity. ACI 1118 appears to be the earliest Army wide reference to the RAC use of yellow and red and may therefore hold the key to the origin of the RAC “house colours”. I’ve found no direct evidence that the use of yellow and red by XIVth Army in the Far East was directed by the War Office and it seems more likely to have been driven in theatre by an HQ familiar with the colours laid down in Army Dress Regulations.”
Note: Given Bruce Scott’s research revealed that the breakdown signal for tanks in the First World War was a red and yellow (diagonally divided) flag … possibly so many of these flags were seen, that the colours became indelibly associated with armour. (Tongue firmly in cheek)
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 May 2019
AWM RAAC Exhibits.
One of the Armouredadvocates goals listed in Part 6 of the Introduction (above) is:
“Information panels re RAAC exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery (AWM) and audio-visual narratives would be correct.”
I was advised by the AWM in 2008 that a moratorium had been imposed on making changes to the Vietnam Gallery. At this stage, about 26 mistakes that I’d advised had been corrected. Further corrections, I was told, would not be made until “a half-life review some years in the future” (in other words, it was taking too many resources to make all the corrections required)
I visited a few days ago to see if the half-life review had been conducted. If it has, I’m very disappointed. The audio-visual for Coral-Balmoral still states that FSB Balmoral was defended by a tank squadron. This is history misrepresented in the extreme. There was only a half (Australian) tank squadron in Vietnam at the time; one troop of which (ie. four tanks, not twenty) helped defend FSB Balmoral. Furthermore, Balmoral was not only defended by “artillery, tanks and air”, but also by APCs (whose firepower and mobility were immensely valuable).
Not to be too depressed by the above, visitors are still being told that Centurion tanks were “nearly impervious to most enemy weapons”.
‘Nearly impervious’ … is such a thing possible? Surely you are either impervious or not?
As far as the Centurion was concerned, tank crewmen knew only too well that their vehicles could be penetrated by RPG2s, RPG7s, 57mm RCLs, 75mm RCLs, and even 12.7mm machine guns. Furthermore, because they were compelled to operate with open hatches, they were vulnerable to sniper fire, shrapnel, and satchel charges. Not always being able to travel off-road, tanks were susceptible to mine attack, something that the enemy exploited to the fullest.
The only weapons that tanks were imperious to were small arms (ie. pistols, rifles and sub-machine guns). The present wording in the Vietnam gallery gives a totally false impression. It is demeaning to tank crews.
Time for a ‘follow-up’ letter to the AWM.
————————————————————————————————————————–
20 May 2019
RAAC History (and How it Becomes Distorted)
Sometime ago, a post on another forum included a picture a tank showing damage that had been inflicted on it in action. There was no mention of what had been happening at the time, nor what wounds might have been inflicted on the crew.
I was commanding the tank at the time.
I asked the author to delete the post, as I felt it was distasteful to simply show a damaged AFV for the purpose of indicating what a mess it looks after being hit by enemy fire. I also explained that the AWM had done this some years previously and I had said the same thing to them (and that I’d received a reply to acknowledge that their use of the photo was inappropriate)
The response that I got from the author was that he refused to believe the AWM would respond to me as they did, and he declined to delete his post. I determined not to contribute to the forum again (I still look at the posts, as many of them are very interesting).
Yesterday, however, I came across a photo of a Centurion in Vietnam, from the same author, with the following caption:
“Tpr …. would have to be one of the most fortunate / luckiest Centurion drivers not to be KIA after detonating a mine during his tour of duty in 68 – 69. I have photos of his damaged Centurion but ‘my’ policy is not to post them on this site. Dont want to upset the PTSD guys. How he survived is beyond me. Still alive today as far as i know.”
How big-hearted he is, not “wanting to upset the PTSD guys”. I find it very hard to comprehend how there can be so many people who ‘just don’t get it’.
Even those who have had military service. Surely there have been so many highly publicised consequences of such failure to understand? Anyway … imagine how upsetting it could have been for what would’ve been the wrong photos to have been posted. The extract from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ regarding the mine incident in which the driver referred to was involved, is as follows:
“ ‘I was in the gunner’s seat …. BOOM!” We stopped instantly; there was smoke and dust; the gunnery gear went haywire; we called to …. our driver; he was ok, just shaken; we got out to inspect the damage,
while a mini-team checked the area.’
The result was much the same as the day before: no serious casualties and relatively minor damage. The tank was towed back to Nui Dat where the crew, including the operator, Trooper …, worked until
well after midnight helping repair the damage.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 May 2019
A letter which follows on from Blog of 23 March 2019 …
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy and Implementation
Background.
The 1 Armoured Regiment Association’s 2016/17 Financial Statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd [1st Armoured Regiment] $5,000.00.”
The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that other payments, totaling $35,000, had been received by 1AR Assn from this company and passed on to 1 Armd Regt in previous years.
In 2016/17, Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400 Phase 2, a $5.2b Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) acquisition project (which they were awarded in 2018).
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy.
Defence guidelines include the following:
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorshipis an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above. All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN)http://www.defence.gov.au/casg/Multimedia/DI(G)_PERS_25-7-9-8615.pdf
An Investigation is Conducted.
A member of the Association, concerned that the masking of such a payment was not only unethical, but could also be illegal, brought the matter to the attention of the relevant area of Defence. He was subsequently informed that an investigation had been conducted and that there was no evidence of any breach of Deference Force guidelines, nor any wrongdoing on behalf of Defence personnel.
Whenever the topic arose, the 1 AR Assn C’tee stated that “there was no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer”.
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action”; and “Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
Was the Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Breached?
It would seem from the above that what happened was quite in order, ie. neither Defence contractors nor Defence associations, should be deterred from doing the same thing again whenever they might wish. Even if there was uncertainty from an ethical viewpoint, incorporated associations are not subject to Defence guidelines (therefore commercial entities could, in theory, continue to ‘mask’ funding payments to Defence through the ‘books’ of associations).
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the unit? Relevant Defence regulations make this clear: donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves even a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. As stated above, in this case the contractor involved was one of two contenders for a multi-billion dollar project (which they were awarded).
Although it would seem clear that Defence’s Ethical Relationship Policy HAD been breached, it appears that the outcome of the investigation absolved the 1AR Assn’s C’tee, Defence personnel and the contractor of being party to any wrong-doing; which, in turn, meant that there was no requirement to amend the Assn’s Constitution to prevent such payments being made again.
How can this be? Channeling funds from a Defence contractor to a military unit via a third- party association, by its very nature, is an act of deception, and therefore must be ‘wrong doing’. Is it not wrong to deceive, particularly when the deception facilitates a transaction that is in breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy?
Interestingly, the Victorian Act under which the 1AR Assn operates, states that “An incorporated association must not …. do any act that is outside the scope of the purposes of the association”. ‘Masking’ payments from one entity to another would seem to be contrary to this provision.
What Should Happen Now?
It is my contention that a perceived Conflict of Interest has occurred, in breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy. I do not believe that either the 1AR Assn C’tee or Defence personnel knowingly committed any wrong-doing. However, the manner in which the investigation was handled, has failed to act as a deterrent to prevent the same thing happening again (quite the opposite).
I ask that:
Firstly, in the interest of open and transparent relationships between Defence contractors and Defence, the investigation be re-examined to confirm that there was no breach of Defence Ethical Relationship Policy. If a breach was found to have occurred, that this be given maximum publicity so that it is made more difficult for the same thing to happen again; and
Secondly, if Defence associations are not subject to the Defence Ethical Relationship Policy, that an examination be made into whether or not there is some means by which associations can be prevented from being used (wittingly or unwittingly) to circumvent this Policy?
CORRECTION
The statement above that “The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that other payments, totalling $35,000, had been received by 1AR Assn from this company and passed on to 1 Armd Regt in previous years”, is incorrect.
It should have read: “The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It was subsequently discovered that total payments from this company to 1 Armd Regt amounted to $35,000; of which $25,000 was passed through 1AR Assn”.
—————————————————————————————————————–
18 May 2019
1AR Assn Financial Report 2017/18
Letter to BRJ Accountants
“You prepared the attached financial statement.
This was presented to members of the Association at its AGM. The AGM Minutes include the following:
“ITEM 101/18 – Minute 44 of 2018/19 – Term Deposits – After some discussion, led by the Treasurer (Dave Paterson), it was agreed that the Association should retain around $10,000 in its Bank Operating Account and any surplus funds should be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period that provided the best possible interest rate. It was moved by the Treasurer that the surplus funds (around $35,000) be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period of five (5) months at an interest rate of 2.3%. Seconded Russ James.”
As the C’tee did not appear to have any plans for using the surplus funds, I volunteered some suggestions.
The C’tee’s response was that: “most of the ‘surplus’ could not be expended for the following reasons:
399 members had paid their membership fees in advance (some until 2024) and this amounted to around $19,000. This money cannot and will not be spent because if anything went radically wrong with the Association, this money should be returned to those members who has paid in advance.
In the near future, somewhere between $8,000 and $10,000 will be advanced to the next Reunion Committee to pay deposits, etc for 2021 Reunion;
The annual operating expenses for the Association run to around $6,000 to $7,000”.
I draw BRJ Accountants attention to the fact that $19,000 of the $35,000 surplus, is made up of members’ fees paid in advance … funds that the C’tee acknowledges could have to be repaid.
It seems to me that this means that the Assn has a Liability which must be reflected in its Financial Statement. Not to do so, would seem to be misleading in terms of the financial position of the Assn. (I can only assume that the Assn did not inform BRJ Accountants that the deposits were not all simply ‘Income’.)
When I raised this with the C’tee , I was advised that my suggestion was “patently incorrect”. (I’m now awaiting a letter to formally advise that I’ve been expelled from the Assn.)
Could you please advise whether or not membership fees paid in advance ($19,000), which the Assn regards as possibly having to be returned, should be entered in the Financial Statement as a ‘Liability’?
Many thanks,
——————————————————————————————————————–
17 May 2019
My Life Membership of 1AR Assn
Following on from 14 May, the following questions have been asked of the President, Mr Keith Meloncelli:
“I have two questions which I would appreciate you answering as the President, 1AR Assn.
Firstly the ‘Facts’ (as I understand them):
A number of Life Members of the 1AR Assn (including myself) were appointed by the C’tee in recognition of their efforts on behalf of the Assn;
It was later discovered that at the time of their appointment, the 1AR Assn Constitution did not provide for such membership;
When the new Constitution was prepared, Life Members were informed on 5 January 2018 that:
“A member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution has his Life Membership continued under this Constitution”.
You told me on 12 May 2019 that this provision was not included in the Constitution which was approved on 14 July 2019 (I think you mean 2018) and that, as a result, there are presently no Life Members in the 1AR Assn.
It would seem that at some point between 5 Jan 18 and 14 Jul 18, the 1AR Assn C’tee decided to strip Life Membership from those members who had previously been recognised for their significant contributions to the Assn.
I received no notification that my Life Membership had been revoked until your email on 12 May 2019.
The Questions:
(i) Why did the 1AR Assn C’tee decide to renege on the earlier decision that been advised to Life Members that their memberships would be continued? and
(ii) Why weren’t Life Members informed of the new decision to revoke their Life memberships?
———————————————————————————————————————
16 May 2019
Climate Change.
I posted today’s Blog soon after lunch, but it’s now no where to be seen. I’ve been told that radiation treatment has side effects, maybe this is one. Again….
I posted the following on another Forum: “Another Letter to the Editor:
In his article ‘PM makes last-minute policy push’ (Canberra Times, May 13, p27) Sean Kelly states that “it is now impossible to argue against the reality of climate change”. The truth of this was brought home to me recently, in an unexpected way.
A friend is moving from an inland location to a coastal city. I suggested to him a seaside suburb that I was familiar with, as a place to consider when buying a house. He surprised me by saying that he had already done so and rejected it. Why, I asked.
He explained that his due diligence involved a number of things, such as reviewing computer images of peak hour traffic congestion to and from his work. While this would’ve been ok, the impact of climate change was not. He reasoned that he and his family would hopefully live in the house for around 30 years and then sell to someone else who had the same expectation.
When he purchased his present house, he studied the flood plain map and determined the likely impact on his property; now he studied the effect of climate change on sea levels and coastal erosion over the next 60 years. It was obvious that the present amenity of the suburb I’d recommended, would be badly affected.”
The following was one of the responses:
My parents-in-law have lived at Mermaid Waters on the Gold Coast for almost 50 years. Fairly recently his house insurance went from about $800 to $4,000+ per annum. The reason given was that they lived on a flood plain. In the entire 50 years that they have lived there they have never witnessed any rising water what-so-ever. Insurance company claimed they were using Council maps
I replied referring to info from a scientist friend:
“Re the insurance premium increases … I’m led to believe that these would make sense if the council had updated their flood maps based on global warming forecasts; as a rule of thumb, 1 in 1000 year floods are becoming 1 in 100 year floods (or even 1 in 10 year floods). In terms of places like WA, the sea level rise shouldn’t be too bad for Perth, but the desertification is quite worrying: marginal farmlands are forecast to become dustbowls. Shades of Tom Joad … “.
I was then taken to task about the scientific basis on which such predictions are based. My response:
“The reason for my first post was simply to share with others, advice as how we should think ahead. I was impressed with my friend’s use of Google to look at traffic flows to and from a place he might live; and even more so to think about the equivalent of flood plain predictions 60 years hence.
Although some may doubt the predictions, we can see that insurance companies are already factoring in this data. Presumably it’ll be affecting real estate prices too. For my friend, he might be able to live happily for 30 years; but what will his insurance be like and will he be able to achieve 30 years capital gain on his investment when he wants tosell. When the paper published my letter, they did so under the heading “Why we need to look ahead”. I think it’s called ‘due diligence’.”
———————————————————————————————————————
15 May 2019
The RAAC’s Red and Yellow Corps Colours: Where Did They Originate? (II)
I’ve a very comprehensive and authoritative response (to the question posed on 13 May 2019) from a friend in the UK.
I must admit that I’d been thinking along the lines of something to be included in the ‘Customs and Traditions of the Army’ (like the story of the white and red cavalry pennons), but it’s good to have the ‘facts’ rather than adding to mythology. I’ve copied an extract below, but can send the full response to anyone interested.
‘British Army Council Instruction (ACI) 231 of 1947 ordered that the use of serial numbers on the Arm of Service (AOS) vehicle plates was to be suspended, except where required in operational theatres. Units were to paint their abbreviated title in black on a white bar above the AOS plate. With ACI 258 of 1949, units were also, at their own expense, permitted to have their badge superimposed on the coloured plate. In general, the colours used during WW2 continued, with a number of exceptions, notably the introduction of a red over yellow diagonal marking for “all RAC units, irrespective of role”.
The origin of the red and yellow colours is most probably a matter of pragmatic selection of a colour combination not used before. I don’t know of any precedent from the Cavalry or RTR which would point to those colours. The “Regulations for the Equipment of the Army Pamphlet No 5 Marking of Vehicles” of Oct 1950 reintroduced the use of numbers overlaid on the AOS sign for units on operations, almost certainly because of the need for operational security. This produced a system where Lulworth vehicles had a red/yellow AOS marking with a white bar above with “RAC Gnry School” in black.
At the same time, a 6 RTR Centurion had a black 59 on a red square for Operation MUSKETEER, the Suez invasion, consistent with operational theatres being allocated discrete AOS markings. There was a further revision in 1962, with for example the corps armoured car regiment allocated serial numbers 101-103 on a red/yellow AOS.
In the late 1960s, a new “Unit Identification Sign” system was introduced, consisting of two numbers, the first giving the discrete formation number and the second the individual unit. By the seventies, the red/yellow colours were widely associated with the RAC but I’m not aware of any formal Army document approving of the colours for anything other than vehicle identification.’
BUT, thanks to Bruce Scott, it seems that an earlier use of the colours related to uniform insignia. The following is part of the new info to hand (from my friend)
“These are Arm of Service Strips introduced I believe in September 1940. At the outbreak of war, all identifying marks on battle dress were prohibited, except for drab shoulder titles worn on slip-on slides. In Sept 1940, ACI 1118 authorised formation patches to identify the parent brigade or brigade group. The arm of service strips date from this time and I suspect the ACI might give a clue to the origin of the colours. Note that the RAC was formed by association not amalgamation, which means that regimental accoutrements and customs prevailed over the corps identity. The arm of service strips were first intended for “orphans” such as the 79th Armoured Division. You’ve already commented that the Reconnaissance Corps stood apart. The key to this might therefore be the ACI. I still suspect that the choice of colours has no historical basis but was simply a choice of available colours. The RAC colours clearly weren’t plucked out of the ether in 1947 as I previously said in connection with the vehicle marking scheme but date from a WW2 dress regulation. We progress……”.
Interestingly the shoulder ‘flashes’ were known as ‘mudguards’ in the British Army, Also the colours were reversed for the Armoured Airborne Squadron, ie. yellow lettering on red background. More to follow.
————————————————————————————————————————–
14 May 2019
My Membership of the 1AR Assn (IV)
I hardly know where to start. I’ve received a response from the President, 1AR Assn, to my email copied on the Blog post of 12 May. There are a number of issues to consider.
(i) The reason that I haven’t received formal notification of cancellation of my membership: “… members of the Management Committee are volunteers, the majority are in full-time employment, some are required to travel for work purposes and Committee members live in geographically dispersed locations. These factors lead to administrative issues in the processing of formal documentation …”. I was also informed that no timeline had been given to me re my formal notification (therefore I shouldn’t anticipate early advice).
(ii) The reason that I wasn’t required to sign for the registered letter informing me of the need to respond to allegations necessitating the cancellation of my membership: I was advised that “Unless Australia Post removed the notice from the Registered Post Envelope and placed it in another, your statement [that I wasn’t required to sign for delivery] is false. I personally sent the notice in a registered post envelope with requested person to person delivery and have the receipt as evidence. If Australia Post did not make you sign for the registered post delivery, they have taken money without delivering the services paid for and requested.’.
It turns out that Aust Post have a caveat re ‘person to person’ delivery… ie. it will be done, except if: It is impractical for us to deliver to the addressee (this is at Australia Post’s discretion). So, the President’s letter was left in my letter box (presumably as I was out to lunch and it was too much trouble to come back). My point in raising this was to ensure that when a time deadline applies for response, you ensure that delivery has been made as expected. I suggest that this requires a signature from the recipient (as can be requested from Australia Post).
(iii) The confusion about feedback. I said that I’d received a letter from the Secretary stating that my “membership was very important to the Association”, particularly as the Association required a “strong and committed membership that provides the Management Committee with feedback (both positive and negative)”. The President responded to say that: “As often evidenced in your postings on ArmouredAdvocates, you have a tendency to omit sentences and words – from material written by others – to imply entirely different meanings from that originally intended. In your email) you have omitted the words, ‘on all planned activities and future directions’ immediately after (both positive and negative)”.
So, the 1AR Assn only welcomes feedback from members about planned activities and future directions. No feedback is welcomed in regard to decisions made on behalf of members about anything else. What a pity!
(iv) Natural Justice and Procedural Fairness for Members. The President informs me that“It has been noted in the past that you have selectively published (on ArmouredAdvocates) excerpts from Association correspondence to depict the Association in a poor light. There is evidence as recently as yesterday on ArmouredAdvocates where you state: ‘The reason that an application for membership of the 1AR Assn is denied by the C’tee must be made known to either the applicant and or members’.”
Presently the C’tee is able to deny an application for membership (or renewal of membership) without giving any reason to the applicant nor allowing any appeal. This is manifestly an abuse of power by the C’tee and a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness for the applicant. I can’t imagine that any right minded person could contend otherwise.
(v) Right of Appeal. The President has advised: “Whilst you do not have a right to appeal against the decision, made by the Management Committee on 27 April 2019, you do have the right – as do all other personnel – to write (or email) to the Management Committee to review the decision made on 27 April 2019.” How is any member seeking renewal of his membership or a person apply for membership for the first time, able to be aware of the right to seek a ‘review’ of the C’tee’s decision? There is nothing in the Constitution about this. Natural justice is denied (once again)
(vi) Life Membership. The President has advised: “Your Life Membership was not cancelled by the decision made by the Management Committee on 27 April 2019. All life memberships were effectively extinguished as the Association has never had a valid constitution that provided for life memberships.”
By way of background … although Life memberships were awarded to members for their contributions during the early days of the Assn, there was no provision for this in the Constitution at the time. When the Constitution was revised, the then committee included the provision that “A member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution has his Life Membership continued under this Constitution”. This provision was subsequently removed without members being specifically informed (or their approval sought). Members who have previously been recognised for their efforts on behalf of the Assn have been stripped of this recognition. It seems that this is acceptable to the present C’tee (indeed it seems that it might well have been their idea).
(vii) The Confusion about THE Constitution. I have asked numerous times for a copy of the Constitution to be made available for members to access via the Assn webpage. This request has been denied. There are various versions of the Constitution which have been sent to members. One states that if a member’s application for renewal of membership is not approved, he is to be informed “by letter as soon as possible”. Another version states that membership fees are to be returned, while this is not included in a different version. Please make a copy of THE Constitution available to members to refer to.
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 May 2019
The RAAC’s Red and Yellow Corps Colours: Where Did They Originate?
I noticed recently that it was the 80th Anniversary of the formation of the Royal Armoured Corps. (The RAC was formed from the Royal Tank Corps; the RTC, in turn, having been formed from the Tank Corps in October 1923; with the Tank Corps having been formed in July 1917.)
For some reason, this brought to mind a question which I’ve never been able to answer: Why is the RAAC Corps Colour Patch red and yellow? It obviously has nothing to do with the ‘death before dishonour’ motto attributed to it.
It would have made sense for the colours allocated to the RAC to be connected with those of the British cavalry, given the brown, red, green tricolour was to be linked to the RTR. But the cavalry colours were traditionally red over white. (The Polish cavalry carried lances with red and white pennons when they were encountered by the British forces at Waterloo and the colours were adopted thereafter.)
Interestingly, there is an exhibit in the AWM which might help with the answer. It is a signalling flag recovered from a knocked out British tank in 1918. It is red and yellow. See: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C157747. Following up on this, I see that semaphore flags are traditionally red over yellow (for ease of … being seen?).
For a moment, I thought that the colours might be related to the reference to early tanks as His Majesty’s Land Ships. But then I saw that the International Maritime Flag red and yellow flag is for ‘man overboard’.
So my best effort is to link the RAAC Corps Colour Patch to the Semaphore signalling flags used by tank crews during the First World War. (As a former OC Radio Wing, I think that this is quite appropriate.) Can anyone improve on this possible explanation?
—————————————————————————-
Since publishing the above on various forums, there have been a number of responses. In particular, the following is a link to fascinating paper (located by Bruce Scott): http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/37085/. It deals with the development of communication between tanks in WWI. I’ve copied the link for info SOA … seems to me that many lessons are still relevant today.
Other points made were that the colours are actually ‘red and gold (rather than yellow)’ and another motto attributed to the colours was ‘blood on sand’. No-one can give a reason for the choice of these particular colours, however. Stop press: Recent input is that the red and yellow flag used in WWI indicated that the tank had broken down and it should be passed by.
PS. I wonder if the RAAC Corporation/HOC sent good wishes to the RAC on its Anniversary?
————————————————————————————————————————–
12 May 2019
My Membership of the 1AR Assn (III)
Email to the President yesterday …. I wonder if I’ll receive a response.
“Keith,
On 1 May 2019 you emailed me to say (inter alia):
At a duly constituted meeting of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc Management Committee held at 1130 hours on 27 April 2019, it was determined that your membership renewal of the Association will be rejected; and
A formal letter will follow, send (sic)registered mail, person to person, as per the initial Notice, and with that formal notification will be enclosed a cheque for the sum of $25 which is a refund of the Membership Fees you deposited in the Association’s bank account on 14 February 2019.
Ten days later, I have still not received the formal notification you said would be sent to me.
I’ve been waiting on this because, when received, I intend to appeal against the rejection of my membership renewal.
You’ll, of course, say that I have no right to appeal, as per the following provision on the Constitution:
No reason need be given for the rejection of an application [for membership] and a decision to reject an application for membership shall be final and binding on all parties.”
You will be aware that I have been a Life Member of the 1AR Assn for some time. Furthermore, the Constitution states that:
“A member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution has his Life Membership continued under this Constitution.”
You’ll also be aware that, as a Life Member I have no need to reapply for membership nor pay membership fees. Why did I do so?
On 11 February 2019, I received a letter from the Secretary. It stated that my “membership was very important to the Association”, particularly as the Association required a “strong and committed membership that provides the Management Committee with feedback (both positive and negative)”. The letter went on to describe all the work that the Association was involved in, and the point was made that every member was important. Although I was a Life Member, I elected to make a voluntary donation in terms of membership fees (why should I be exempt when everyone else is contributing … how petty would it be to stand on my Life Membership status so as to avoid paying fees, if the Assn needed the funds?)
I endeavoured to provide feedback to the C’tee as I’d been encouraged by the Secretary, however, it seems that this may have backfired. Nevertheless, as a Life Member, my membership was never something to be considered for renewal by the C’tee.
It is true … that if I’ve committed a misdemeanour, the Management C’tee can decide to cancel my Life Membership. However, if this is done, I am entitled to appeal (the outcome of which to be decided by a General Meeting).
Please respond to acknowledge my right to appeal and confirm the dispatch of the formal notification of the cancellation of my Life Membership.
Bruce”
————————————————————————————————————————
11 May 2019
1AR Assn : Members Need to be Able to Review ALL C’tee Decisions
Following on from yesterday, I’ve added the following goal to my list (see Part 6 above):
The reason that an application for membership of the 1AR Assn is denied by the C’tee must be made known to the applicant and members; the applicant must have the right of appeal.
ANZAC Day : Accessible Commemoration
The last post before my wife and I left for the UK (21 April 2019) included a letter to DVA. Their informative response is copied below. I have passed to the Presidents of the TPI Assn and DFWA (as well as RSL National) for their info.
Dear Mr Cameron
Thank you for your correspondence of 19 April 2019 concerning funding support to conduct Anzac Day services in aged care facilities.
The Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) commends your efforts in looking to address a need for ceremonies to cater for those without the mobility to attend public services, and we support making commemoration accessible for all members of the community.
DVA is aware that some aged care providers choose not to host commemorative events on public holidays for their residents, however other providers do; this is a decision for individual operators.
In terms of grant funding, you are correct that the Saluting Their Service (STS) Commemorative Grants Program is designed to support projects which preserve Australia’s wartime heritage and involve the Australian community in a wide range of commemorative activities.
Unfortunately, the Grant Opportunity Guidelines for the Community Commemorative Grants (CCG) category of the STS program excludes funding for a) recurring events or activities such as Anzac Day except where it is a significant anniversary, and b) salaries / wages incurred during a commemorative activity. However you may like to have a look at the funding criteria to see if you wish to apply for funding for commemorative activities in a different form.
The Grant Opportunity Guidelines have more information about the grant funding criteria, and can be found on the Community Grants Hub website at www.communitygrants.gov.au. The guidelines by which the program is governed were developed after extensive consultation with ex-service organisations and the veteran community.
You may also wish to explore the Australian Government’s whole‑of‑government grant information system, GrantConnect at www.grants.gov.au. This website provides a simple and effective service for all potential grant applicants to find and access grant opportunities and related grant documents from DVA and other Commonwealth departments. Anyone can sign up to receive notification of new Commonwealth grant opportunities as they are released.
We also raised this with the Health Providers Partnership Forum (HPPF) and DVA’s National Aged and Community Care Forum (NACCF). The NACCF has a focus on the policy direction of aged and community care and has a range of members from Ex-service organisations, including a representative from Aged Care providers. The NACCF Secretariat has advised it will place this topic on an agenda for discussion at the next meeting, which is scheduled for 17 July. If there are outcomes from this which we are permitted to share, we will pass them back to you, and should you wish to follow up yourself, the NACCF can be contacted at Aged.CommunityCareForum@dva.gov.au
I hope this information is of assistance. Thank you for taking the time to write.
Community Engagement Section, Department of Veterans’ Affairs
—————————————————————————————————————
10 May 2019
Natural Justice and the 1AR Assn: A Dichotomy?
‘… and so he sits down to write’. As these words passed through my head, I wondered if they had been prompted by some famous author from the past. Surprisingly, Google is silent on the subject. So here I am … no famous mentor to guide me.
The extract below is from the 1AR Assn Constitution. It provides the basis upon which my membership was terminated.
“The Management Committee may consider and approve an application for membership after it receives:
the application for membership; and
the appropriate membership fee for the application; and
due diligence on the application has been conducted and completed.
The Management Committee must on completion of the [due diligence processes] decide whether to accept or reject the application.
The Secretary of the Association must, as soon as practicable after the Management Committee decides to accept or reject an application, give the applicant a written notice of the decision.
No reason need be given for the rejection of an application and a decision to reject an application for membership shall be final and binding on all parties.”
There are two points here which will be of interest to anyone interested in natural justice:
No reason need be given for rejecting someone’s application; and
The decision made is final and binding. ie. not subject to appeal.
These provisions were added to the draft Constitution provided to the C’tee by a group of members (including me) who were committed to ensuring that the 1AR Assn was governed on a sound basis. It was argued when these provisions were first seen, that such draconian powers meant that governance could never be open and transparent. (Blog post for 17 March 2019 refers.) This was of no importance to the C’tee, however, and the amended Constitution was enshrined accordingly.
But there is more …
The Kangaroo Court in Action. If the C’tee had wanted to expel me for wrong doing while I was a member, a Disciplinary C’tee would have had to be formed to consider my misdemeanour. I would be asked to present my case and a decision would be made. I could appeal this decision and a general meeting of all members would have to be called to decide the outcome. What if a C’tee didn’t want to chance this? Easy … just wait until I apply to renew my Life Membership, then reject it. No need to give any reason … no opportunity for any appeal in which members would have a vote. Ultimate power in the hands of a C’tee, while members themselves are completely disenfranchised.
What an utter disgrace! Trouble is … those responsible will probably sleep soundly tonight.
———————————————————————————————————————-
9 May 2019
The Late Trooper Phil Barwick
Why is it so? Why do some have different views of the world than others, even though they might all have been ‘brothers in arms’? It seems as if there are two camps … those who seek to serve others and those who seek to serve themselves. One of the former, is Bill Burton.
The story about the efforts made by him to ensure that the display featuring Phil at the Gunnedah Water Tower Museum was complete, was referred to in the Blog posts of 17 Jan and 15 Apr 19.
On Anzac Day 2019, everything came together, as told here:
The Curator of the Museum had this to say about Bill:
“I was so delighted to meet you Bill, you must have been amazing officer in the Army.
I really appreciate your support and the fact that you drove all the way down here for ANZAC Day, it meant so much to us and the family. The fact that someone who personally knew Phil in that dreadful wartime era was very special.
One of my former work colleagues went to school with Phil and she was delighted to hear about his medals being restored. This what she wrote on Facebook: “What a beautiful thing to do. I went to school with Phil. l have great admiration for him and his beautiful family. Thank you, Bill Burton.”
Bill, in turn, made the following observations about the Curator (which are worthy of reprinting here).
“On Thursday, every time I looked around, I’d spot you in a different place, chatting with officials, visitors or friends, fetching chairs (thank you again Marie) running cups of cold water to those in need, and there were plenty of them.
In this world, as you most probably already know, there are ‘lifters’ and ‘leaners’. During my life-time, I have met them all, at one time or another; and consider myself an expert on the recognition of both. Marie, I have you firmly cast as one of life’s ‘lifter’s’. If it were in an Australian Defence Force situation, I would also rate you as having highly developed and a naturally occurring flair forleadership.
Similar in many ways to ‘lifters’ and ‘leaners’, there are leaders such as you, who are born leaders. The there is another form of leadership, where the masses always follow the leader, simply out of idle curiosity! As I looked around the Museum inside and out, on Thursday afternoon, I saw evidence of where you had already been, organising, setting-up in advance, paying attention to detail etc.
Many peoplehave trouble defining leadership and ask what is leadership? A simple definition is that: leadershipis the art of motivating a group of people to act towards achieving a common goal. Oh! How I would have liked a team of you in my tank squadron all of those years ago – we would have been absolutely unbeatable.”
————————————————————————————————————————
8 May 2019
My 1 AR Assn Membership (II)
The Minutes of 1AR Assn Management C’tee meeting on 27 Apr 19 have now been distributed to members. The only item on the agenda was that related to whether or not my membership would be renewed (see Blog 6 May). The Minutes included the following:
“Due Diligence – Renewal of Membership Mr Bruce Cameron, MC
a. President – The President thanked everyone for their attendance and indicated that considering the matter for discussion, it was important that as many as possible were able to attend.
b. President – advised that Mr Bruce Cameron, MC has responded to all 14 Show Cause Issues over a period of time as well as publishing his responses on his personal blog (ArmouredAdvocates) over a similar period of time.
c. President – asked for comments from those at the meeting. A number of people expressed their opinions both for and against the renewal of Mr Cameron’s renewal of membership. After a period of approximately 35 minutes the discussion was brought to a close.
ITEM 143/18 – Minute 90 of 2018/19 – it was moved Keith Meloncelli, seconded Gary Frost that the renewal of membership for Mr Bruce Cameron, MC would be rejected and that he be formally notified. Eleven members voted in favour of the motion and one (1) member abstained.”
Interestingly, members were not informed why I was found unsuited to be included in their ranks. I wonder what the President would say if a member was to ask for the C’tee’s reasons for their decision? (Presumably the voting figures are quoted by the President in order to indicate that it was an almost unanimous decision. Of course, it wouldn’t make any difference to the outcome if the figures had been 6 to 5.) So be it.
The Election
Having missed most of the election campaign with my absence OS, I submitted the following letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times:
“The election is almost here and there are some candidates who endeavour to identify what it is that is important to those in their electorates. I have not, as yet, had the chance to meet those who seek to represent me. If I was to have the opportunity, I would mention the following …
There are many policy announcements which relate to the maintenance of our way of life in economic terms, i.e. increases in company profits and returns to shareholders, continual improvement in business efficiency, and market expansion. But what about the micro side of our life …how do you feel when you pass a person begging on the street? He or she, may or may not be, homeless … but that’s beside the point.
When a candidate for the Federal Parliament seeks to represent us, how is it that Commonwealth and Territory jurisdictions interact in relation to local issues? Will the Candidate seeking our vote feel any responsibility for the person begging?
If so, will they see the remedy in terms of improved company profits or will they ensure that the next Government, of which they may be a part, will guarantee that any Australian who finds themselves having to beg in the street, will not be not abandoned because of gaps between Federal and Territory Government responsibilities? “.
———————————————————————————————————————–
7 May 2019
Waiting … Waiting …. (II)
Following on from yesterday, when I reported on (i) below …
“When I left for the UK on 21 April, I was awaiting advice on three matters, whether or not:
(i) I was to have my 1AR Assn membership renewal refused;
(ii) the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) would release the RAAC Corporation’s submission supposedly in support of mine for the Coral Balmoral battlehonour to be emblazoned; and
(iii) the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) would approve the submission made to them with respect to myself.”
OAIC Decision
The following advice was waiting for me on return:
“As previously advised, this matter has now progressed to a decision by the Information Commissioner. I would be grateful if you would please advise the OAIC whether you wish to be de-identified in this decision by close of business on 8 May 2019. If you wish to be de-identified, you will be assigned a two-letter pseudonym as has been the practice in previous IC review decisions. [see https://www.oaic.gov.au/freedom-of-information/foi-decisions/ic-review-decisions/]”.
I responded to say that I could see no reason for a pseudonym to be used.
DHAAT Decision
The applicant (not me) has not received any advice as to the Tribunal’s recommendation as yet.
It will be seen from the regulations governing the Tribunal that no such advice can be provided until the Minister has made a decision regarding the recommendation given to him by the Tribunal.
(1) The Tribunal must give the applicant and the Secretary a copy of its decision on the review of a reviewable decision as soon as practicable after it has made the decision.
(2) Subrule (1) does not apply if the Tribunal’s decision includes a recommendation in relation to the Victoria Cross for Australia or the Victoria Cross.
(3) If the Tribunal’s decision includes a recommendation in relation to the Victoria Cross for Australia or the Victoria Cross, the Tribunal must give the applicant and the Secretary a copy of the decision as soon as practicable after the outcome of the recommendation has been determined.
At the hearing it was stated that a decision is likely to be made known within two months. Almost three months have now elapsed. I’ve been told informally that the matter is with the Minister’s Office. It’s also been suggested to me that, as the Government ‘caretaker’ provisions are currently in place, no decision will be announced until after the election.
When I left for the UK on 21 April, I was awaiting advice on three matters, whether or not:
(i) I was to have my 1AR Assn membership renewal refused;
(ii) the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) would release the RAAC Corporation’s submission supposedly in support of mine for the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour to be emblazoned; and
(iii) the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) would approve the submission made to them with respect to myself.
I will report on each of these in turn, starting today with ….
1AR Assn Membership (I)
Some time ago, I received a letter from the President asking to show cause as to why my membership should be renewed. Fourteen matters were specified and I was required to respond to each of them. This I did and the responses can be seen in the Blog posts for 14 – 31 March 2019.
Surprisingly, the President (in an email during my absence) has deemed that these responses “did not address the issues raised”. (I wonder what the issues were that they thought I had addressed?) Furthermore, my “publicly published responses continued a pattern of behaviour that remains unacceptable”. Given that Armouredadvocates was established to promote open and transparent decision making in RAAC matters, I find it interesting that I am denigrated for making known my responses to charges laid against me.
In addition to the above, I “exacerbated [my] position during the period of the Show Cause Notice by publishing additional material (on ArmouredAdvocates) which was, and remains, patently incorrect”. I assume that the matter being referred is that relating to the 2017-2018 Financial Statement (see Blog on 30 March 2019). I have had no advice that the error I drew attention to was ‘patently incorrect’ … despite having clearly stated that I would immediately withdraw, correct and apologize for any inaccuracy included in any Blog post. (Well qualified accountants have supported my concern about the failure to disclose funds which should have been designated as a liability on the asset sheet.)
As a result of the above, I’ve been deemed as unsuitable to be a member of the 1AR Assn.
The President stated in his email that I will receive a formal letter. This hasn’t arrived as yet, however, I’ve sent the following email to him:
“I have just returned from a two week trip. I have not received your letter as yet, as I asked Australia Post to hold my mail whilst I was away.
I understand that I am not presently a member of the 1AR Assn, however, I write to repeat a suggestion for the betterment of the Assn (not to criticize the C’tee).
You state below that “A formal letter will follow, send [sic] registered mail, person to person, as per the initial Notice …”. I cannot speak about the most recent Notice, however, I can say that the initial Notice was NOT sent registered mail, person to person.
It was for this reason that I wrote to you after I received it. It was sent as a registered letter to my home address, this meant that it had only to be delivered …I did not have to sign for it.
I brought this to your attention so as to help improve the Assn’s procedures. The letter required me to respond by a particular date; if this was not done, the C’tee would assume that I had no response to make and would act accordingly.
My concern was that if I had been away, as I was for the past two weeks … I would not have had the opportunity to reply and the C’tee could have acted on a completely false basis. I would like to repeat my earlier suggestion, ie. if a letter is to be sent to be member which requires his or her action within a particular time-frame, don’t assume that he/she will receive it on delivery … send it registered mail with a signature required on receipt. Such a procedure will afford members the benefit of natural justice (as I would assume the C’tee would wish.”
PS. I spent two days travelling (with little sleep) returning from the UK. Finally got to bed to recover from the jet-lag … finally got to sleep …. when, the telephone rang: “Hi, This is Nicole from the National Broadband Network …” @#!%$$!!!
————————————————————————————————————————–
21 April 2019
NOTE: This will be ‘Armouredadvocates’ last post until 6 May 2019. (We’re off tomorrow to the UK to visit our son and his family in Witney, near Oxford.
———————————————————————————————————–
ANZAC Day II
Following on from yesterday, I’ve written to DVA as below:
“Dear DVA,
With ANZAC Day almost with us, I write with respect to what I believe is DVA’s Community Commemorative Grants Program.
My interest in this was sparked by the following story regarding the author’s sister:
“She has recently moved into aged care. Intellectually acute, she has major medical problems and limited mobility. She persuaded other residents that they should hold an ANZAC day remembrance ceremony in the institution. Nothing grandiose, just some appropriate songs and readings to continue the tradition of remembering the fallen. She encountered resistance from management. They said she could not hold the proposed ceremony on Thursday 25th April (ANZAC day). My sister replied that you celebrate ANZAC day on ANZAC day. Management explained that they would have to pay staff additional wages to work on a public holiday!” https://johnmenadue.com/garry-everett-worse-things-than-dying/
I was surprised that, when discussing this with another veteran, the circumstances were not uncommon:
“For many years local RSL has collaborated with local nursing/aged care home to hold an ANZAC Day service. Usually one or two RSL members attend and officiate, however with more rules and red-tape throughout the year RSL members have declined to attend this year. Not sure if it will continue but if not, then the decision is placed at the feet of management of the home. The point about paying staff to work on a public holiday is to ensure they have adequate carers to move those of limited mobility and of course, they have to be paid for a minimum of 4 hours at double time.”
I have researched the information about Community Commemoration Grants on the DVA website. I see that there might be two options … the Nursing Home applies for a grant or the Home enters into an agreement with the local RSL and the RSL applies. The latter would seem to be the more appropriate course, looking a previous grants that have been made.
On the other hand, it seems as if this could be a topic for discussion by DVA’s Health Providers’ Partnership Forum in conjunction with Aged Care Association Australia (and possibly the RSL National Congress).
Could you please advise if DVA would be interested in supporting Remembrance Ceremonies at Aged Care facilities (providing certain criteria are met). Given the aging nature of Australia’s population, it would seem that there will an increasing need for ceremonies to cater for those without the mobility to attend public services.
If DVA were to view the matter positively, could let me know how it should be progressed and in any way that I (or ESOs) might be able to help.”
———————————————————————————————————————
20 April 2019
ANZAC Day
Just read an article, parts of which I’ve copied below:
“In Eric Bogle’s haunting song: “And the band played Waltzing Matilda”, there is the heart-wrenching line sung by the young soldier who has just had both legs blown off by a Turkish bomb. He sings …”and when I saw what it had done, well I wished I was dead. Never knew there were worse things than dying”.
Part of another verse is also referred to: “So they gathered the crippled, the wounded, the maimed, and they shipped us back home to Australia. The legless, the armless, the blind, the insane; those proud wounded heroes of Suvla. As our ship pulled into Circular Quay, I looked at the place where my legs used to be, and thanked Christ no one was waiting for me, to grieve to mourn and to pity.”
Later, the author related a story about his sister:
She has recently moved into aged care. Intellectually acute, she has major medical problems and limited mobility. She persuaded other residents that they should hold an ANZAC day remembrance ceremony in the institution. Nothing grandiose, just some appropriate songs and readings to continue the tradition of remembering the fallen. She encountered resistance from management. They said she could not hold the proposed ceremony on Thursday 25th April (ANZAC day). My sister replied that you celebrate ANZAC day on ANZAC day. Management explained that they would have to pay staff additional wages to work on a public holiday!
I responded to the author as below:
“Thank you for a thought-provoking article. The words in Eric Boggle’s song reminded me of what it means when we say “We WILL remember them!”. This resonated especially, as I’d recently researched the inscription of the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM (which I walk past every day).
For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription and the Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’.
I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this and the responses I received included:
“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her”.
“Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations. BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
From the above, I reasoned that “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore” does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world that these young men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
19 April 2019
The ADF Concept of Operations : Anti-Armour
Following on from 17 April 2019:
Q: What is the best form of anti-tank defence? A: Another tank … or so the saying goes!
Interestingly, the lead article in the current Army newspaper is an account of the Army’s first live firing of the Smart 155mm round. According to Wikipedia, this is: “… a German 155 mm artillery round, designed for a long range, indirect firetop attack role against armoured vehicles. The SMArt carrier shell contains two submunitions with infrared sensor and millimeter waveradar, which descend over the battlefield on ballutes [parachute breaking device] and attack hardened targets with explosively formed penetrator warheads.
The Army’s FB page states that the successful firing (destroying three Leopard tanks) “indicated the Australian Army was a capable and ready land force”.
So … the question has to be asked: Do we need tanks? Is this why there is no priority being given to the acquisition of the additional 31 Abrams tanks that the Army needs to be able to deploy an effective armoured capability?
Let’s consider the capability provided by the Smart 155mm. The gun crews are static and unprotected. If they were subjected to counter-battery fire or air attack, the capability could not be provided. A tank’s crew, on the other hand, are protected and not tied to a single firing position. (SP 155s would make some difference here, but I believe that this project was scrapped some time ago.)
The artillery mission, of course, requires an ‘observer’ to initiate and control. The necessary information could come from a drone or a satellite; but electronic warfare measures could render these sources inoperative.
The discussion above only goes to reinforce the fact that combined arms operations are the only way to achieve a successful outcome. Artillery fire missions can very successfully channel an enemy advance, denying a possible route and forcing the enemy to adopt a course of action which be to the advantage of a well sited tank force. The fire mission, like well-placed minefields etc, is also likely to cause significant delay, BUT it will not defeat the enemy’s armour completely. Direct fire weapons are needed for this.
The 31 Abrams that the Army is presently ‘missing’ HAVE to be purchased to ensure that the ADF has a viable operational capability
———————————————————————————————————————-
18 April 2019
THE WALER
Just in the past couple of weeks, I’ve seen references to “Whaler” and Walter”. Both were in the context of being the mis-spelling of Waler. The following quotes from Wikipedia are self-explanatory:
The Waler is an Australian breed of riding horse developed from horses that were brought to the Australian colonies in the 19th century. The name comes from their breeding origins in New South Wales; they were originally known as “New South Walers”.
It was originally considered only a “type” of horse and not a distinct breed. However, as a landrace bred under the extreme climate and challenging working conditions of Australia, the Waler developed into a hardy horse with great endurance even when under extreme stress from lack of food and water. It was used as a stockman‘s horse and prized as a military remount.
In Australia’s two wars of the early 20th century—the Second Boer War and World War I—the Waler was the backbone of the Australian Light Horse mounted forces. It was especially suited to working in the harsh climate of the Sinai Peninsula and Palestine, where it proved superior to the camel as a means of transporting large bodies of troops.
The name, of course, was a ‘shoe-in’ to be selected as that to be used for the Project to build a family of light AFVs in Australia. A selection of ‘thoughts’, from various authors, about the Project … are listed below. Many good men gave their all for its success; however, it was not to be.
Project WALER
“In 1980 the Army resolved to develop in Australia an advanced technology light armoured vehicle to replace the M113 in the 1990s. Consortia of Australian firms and overseas affiliates were formed to tender for project definition and technical studies to be funded by Defence. When the stage had been reached where actual development could begin, the project (Project Waler) was shelved by the Defence Department. The commercial groupings were disbanded.”
“The project attracted 14 companies’ responses in 1981. By 1982, three company’s [sic] were contracted to conduct cost and feasibility studies for vehicle concepts. These were- Evans Deakin; ESAMS and Goninan companies. It was estimated that over all cost for these vehicles would be in the range of A$500 million, with the first vehicle entering service in 1995. … design concepts offered significant technology advances in terms of hull design, armour, engine, suspension and weapons options.
But as per usual with Australian defence projects increasing costs added to the Waler’s own demise In 1985 Kim Beazley (Defence Minister) indefinitely postponed the development of Waler, due to the doubling of the projects cost.”
“Project Land 106 has turned into the biggest disaster. I suspect the real reason why its [not] being continued with is that DoD does not want another Seasprite disaster being admitted to. The problem is, as with so many defence related projects some very poor thinking is behind it. It was sold as an “upgrade project” which was intended to be “minimal cost”. The result has seen a massive cost blowout and the vehicle buy has been, as a consequence cut in half. I used to work for a company that designed and built the pilot milling machine for the hulls.
Waler was simply too expensive for the ADF. It would have compounded many of the problems that the M113 project has had. As it would have been the first major AFV project attempted in over 50 years downunder, like the Collins class it would have had problems. The numbers to be purchased would have been too small for economies of scale and therefore per unit, very expensive. We’d have been better of purchasing M2 Bradleys/Warriors/Marders/etc. from overseas. “
“The cancellation of Project Waler had a lot more to do with the divergent strategic outlooks of the Australian DoD and the Australian Army rather than cost and complexity. The then defence minister was keen on reducing Australia’s exposure to the Cold War and was sold on a crazy idea of restructuring the armed forces to defend Australia from an invasion. This meant the Army was slashed and funds transferred to building ships and airbases to defend against a fantasy threat.
While it is pretty hard to predict the success of the project it would have a significant advantage over the contemporary M113 upgrade in being a project designed for the capacity of Australian industry and from a clean sheet rather than the importation of an upgrade package from an aftermarket vendor in Germany. One would also hope that in the late 1980s the less overwhelming nature of project management bureaucracy would enable problems to be addressed and dealt with far better than they are today.”
“The integration of the Main Battle Tank capability … has realised a fully manned and equipped integral Armoured Cavalry Regiment [ACR] in the 7th Brigade”.
Brigadier A Hocking CSC, ‘Ironsides’ 2018
Fully equipped??
A tank squadron comprises four tank troops, each of four tanks, plus two tanks in sqn HQ, ie 18 tanks. The Australian Army has three ACRs, each with a tank squadron … that’s 54 tanks. How many tanks does Australia have? Fifty-nine! If all ACRs were “fully equipped”, there would be shortfall of 31 tanks. This would mean that no training could be conducted at either the School of Armour or RAEME Training Centre; furthermore, there would be no repair/servicing pool to enable tanks to be withdrawn from training commitments for urgent repairs or major servicing. As ‘Armouredadvocates’ has highlighted over and over, the Army has previously stated that 90 tanks is the minimum number required to meet the requirements of three widely dispersed ACRs/tank squadrons.
So, when Brig Hocking refers to “fully equipped”, what does he actually mean? Is he referring to the 18-tank squadron organisation above, or to four troops of three tanks; or three troops of four tanks, or three troops of three tanks … or is he simply referring to something he imagines in the 7th Brigade, without any consideration to the Army’s readiness overall?
The undesirable effect on tank crews of transferring their tanks from ‘resetting’ brigades to ‘ready’ brigades has been addressed previously. Tank crews must have access to their tank for twelve, not eight, months of the year.
The Commander 7th Brigade also refers, in his Ironsides article, to BG [Battlegroup] Warhorse and Exercise Hamel (the ‘proving’ exercise for the ‘Ready’ Brigade). It seems that the Battlegroup was commanded by CO 2 Cav Regt and comprised a tank squadron, a mech inf coy from 6RAR and an inf coy from the Indiana National Guard (recon troops may have been part of the BG as well). The exercise appears to have been very successful. See https://www.dvidshub.net/news/282978/100-year-anniversary-australian-and-us-forces-join-up-exercise-hamel
BUT … the ADF’s operational capability is one which must be able to be sustained for off-shore operations.
Can the ‘Ready’ Brigade’s ACR tank squadron be deployed and sustained, while at the same time the Army’s tank fleet is meeting the needs of the ‘readying’ brigade and maintaining the necessary output of fully trained crewmen?
The ADF MUST increase its tank fleet from 59 to 90 tanks. This MUST be a priority in terms of equipment acquisition and budgetary allocations.
PS. There was no mention of any procurement intention as far as the ‘missing’ 31 Abrams were concerned, in the latest Royal Australian Armoured Corps journal, Ironsides.
———————————————————————————————————————–
16 April 2019
1AR Assn
In early Feb 19, I received a notice from the 1AR Assn advising that membership fees were due. I transferred my $25 accordingly.
A month later, 10 Mar 19, I received a letter from Mr Meloncelli asking me to show cause as to why my membership should be approved.
I was informed that I had until 10 April to do this and, if I did not, “a decision will be taken without further reference [to me]”. I was also advised that I should consider myself ‘lucky’, as “the Management Committee is not required to issue this type of notice and has the discretion absolutely, to accept or reject and (sic) application for membership”.
My attempt to show such cause involved emails to Mr Meloncelli from 14-31 March. They can be read in the blog posts under (NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL I-XVII).
I now await my ‘fate’. While doing so, I’ve asked if the C’tee have considered my suggestion re the Association’s financial counting that I made on 30 March 2019 (copied below). I’ve had no response and so have asked these questions:
“Could you please respond to my concern re the $19,000 liability which is not currently shown in the Assn’s accounts. Related questions are:
Has this amendment been made to the Financial statement provided to CAV?;
Will members be informed of the change to the accounts presented to them at the AGM?; and
Will the Assn’s accounting practices be amended in future?
It’s interesting that my situation is relevant here, ie. if my membership is terminated, my membership fees will be refunded. All fees received, therefore, are a financial Liability until a membership application has been approved by the C’tee.
Many thanks …”.
The President has advised in response to the questions above that:
“In accordance with Section 92 of the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (AIRA 2012), the Financial Statements will be prepared to give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the association during and at the end of its last financial year; and
In accordance with Section 94 of AIRA 2012, the Management Committee will submit the Financial Statements to the AGM as required.”
I guess that this means that there will be no amendment to the existing financial statement and whether or not any follow-on changes are to be made to the 2018-19 statement will have to be awaited (until the 2018 AGM) to be known. I must admit that I’m surprised a $19,000 re-categorization of members’ funds from “Surplus” to ‘Liability’, is not something which should be immediately communicated to members.
————————————————————————————
Mr President, (30 March 2019)
I mentioned yesterday that “great progress has been made [in terms of management of the Association in accordance with the Rules governing Incorporated Associations], compared with the situation five years ago; for example, we now have a valid Constitution and a properly set out Financial Statement (though I’ll have more to mention about the latter soon)”.
I’d like to follow up regarding the Financial Statement for 2017-18, before returning to the text of your letter to me.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM state:
ITEM 101/18 – Minute 44 of 2018/19 – Term Deposits – After some discussion, led by the Treasurer (Dave Paterson), it was agreed that the Association should retain around $10,000 in its Bank Operating Account and any surplus funds should be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period that provided the best possible interest rate. It was moved by the Treasurer that the surplus funds (around $35,000) be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period of five (5) months at an interest rate of 2.3%. Seconded Russ James.
As the C’tee did not appear to have any plans for using the surplus funds, I volunteered some suggestions.
The C’tee’s response was that: “most of the ‘surplus’ could not be expended for the following reasons:
399 members had paid their membership fees in advance (some until 2024) and this amounted to around $19,000. This money cannot and will not be spent because if anything went radically wrong with the Association, this money should be returned to those members who has paid in advance.
In the near future, somewhere between $8,000 and $10,000 will be advanced to the next Reunion Committee to pay deposits, etc for 2021 Reunion;
The annual operating expenses for the Association run to around $6,000 to $7,000”.
I draw your attention to the fact that $19,000 of the $35,000 surplus, is made up of members’ fees paid in advance … funds that the C’tee acknowledges could have to be repaid.
This means that the Assn has a Liability which MUST, in accord with accounting principles, be reflected in its Financial Statement. Not to do so is misleading in terms of the financial position of the Assn. (I can only assume that you did not inform BRJ Accountants and Business Advisors P/L that the deposits were not all simply ‘Income’.)
The C’tee is also considering an advance of $8,000 to $10,000 to pay deposits for the next Reunion. While the next C’tee might decide not to have a Reunion, it would still be informative for Assn members to know that the present C’tee has what amounts to a ‘contingent liability’, in mind with respect to these funds.
————————————————————————————————————————-
15 April 2019
Gunnedah Water Tower Mural: ANZAC Day
The following link provides info re an ‘opening’ ceremony at 3pm.
The Museum honours the late Phil Barwick (DOW, C Sqn 1 Armd Regt).
One of Phil’s friends, Bill Burton, has worked with his family to acquire and mount all Phil’s medals, ACB etc in a specially made display case. This will be unveiled on ANZAC Day.
The original mannequin display featuring Phil’s uniform, only included the medals Phil had been issued with on return from Vietnam. In his case, there were three additional medals that he/his NOK was eligible to receive retrospectively.)
Isn’t it great how an association forged in combat continues on to ensure that sacrifice and service are not forgotten. Seems to me to be appropriate to repeat this post from some years ago. In Phil Barwick’s case, I believe the reference to His Name is particularly appropriate in terms of all the things he could have achieved.
Their Name Liveth for Evermore
Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield.. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:
“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her”.
“Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore” does not only refer to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world that these young men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
——————————————————————————————————————–
14 April 2019
BINH BA : 50th Anniversary Commemoration
The Blog on 8 April 2019 asked (among other things) … “Given his role and contribution to the Battle, it would be not be very appropriate if Brian Sullivan MC MG’s widow and children were to be specifically invited and afforded ‘VIP’ status”.
To their credit, the organisers have acknowledged their oversight and the matter has been addressed.
Some extracts from the COF account of Binh Ba are copied below:
“The employment of tanks when the use of both their firepower and artillery support were restricted, highlighted another aspect: their vulnerability. The fact that three tanks had been penetrated and eight crewmen wounded was well appreciated by the squadron as a whole. The penetration of Munsell’s tank a few weeks before, following on from that of Sergeant Swarbrick’s tank earlier in the year, made the vulnerability of Centurions to RPGs, frighteningly clear. Coupled with the two drivers recently killed in mine incidents, it took a brave and determined crew to take on the enemy day after day.”
“ ‘[29 This is] 21 Roger. Sunray of that callsign [22Bravo] is wounded. Sunray of this callsign is wounded lightly. I can carry on … Over’. Having witnessed the RPG strike on 22Bravo, Sullivan turned to his left to see where it had come from; just in time to glimpse another rocket at the moment of firing – this time at him! He instinctively threw himself forward; at the same time pushing Trooper Kevin Jaenke, his operator, out of the way, and yelling at De Vere: ‘Duck!’ Sullivan was incredibly lucky. The RPG’s tail fins grazed his shoulder and the back of his head, before it detonated against the wall of the adjacent house, spraying both he and DeVere with shrapnel and debris. Prior to De Vere returning to his ‘carrier’, he and Sullivan agreed to make use of hand-signals to assist communications.”
“ ‘21, This is 22Bravo. We’ve got a lot of casualties here. Wait. Out.’ Despite suffering fragmentation wounds and injuries to his eyes, 22Bravo’s operator (Hay) was amazingly lucky. The jet traveled ‘diagonally across the top of the main armament [behind the mantlet], going through a good deal of steel in doing so, and then came into the turret. I was clearing a jam in the .50 cal machine gun and it came across the front of my face.’ As had happened on other occasions, the RPG penetration left its mark on everyone in the turret. Matuschka, the gunner, received fragmentation wounds to the chest and arms, while Bennier’s earlier wounds were compounded by more shrapnel.
“As had happened to Chapman earlier, 21Charlie’s operator, Trooper Max Dale, received multiple fragmentation wounds (as well as damaged ear drums). On this occasion, the crew commander was also struck by spall; Bennett suffered serious wounds to the left of his body (leg, buttock, and eye). It was not immediately realised that Trooper Roy Dodd, the gunner, had also been hit, albeit not as badly as the others. Fortunately, Trooper Ray Collins, unharmed in the driver’s compartment, was able to keep the tank going. “
“Drivers have a unique perspective on such actions. Arthur was no exception:
‘I know Jock gave the house a good going over, for his hot .30cal empties were cascading down the front of the mantlet and landing in the collar of my ‘flak jacket’. I was not wearing a shirt and got a burnt neck as a consequence. During the middle of the action, I was ducking up and down every time I heard a canister or armour piercing [round] being loaded (you didn’t have to worry about HE); trying to remove Jock’s hot shells from my neck with one hand and holding my 9mm pistol in the other, just in case.’ “
“Captain Gerry McCormack, ADC to the COMAFV, recalls a memorable moment at the weekly senior officers’ briefing held at General Abrams’ HQ in Saigon. The US briefing officer reported that a company of about 100 NVA had occupied the village of Binh Ba in III Corps area and that the Aussie Task Force had accounted for around 96 KIA and two prisoners. General Abrams stopped the briefing, turned around to Hay, and, in his slow American drawl, said: ‘Say Bob, y’all keep that up and we’ll all be out of a job!’ ”
———————————————————————————————————————–
13 April 2019
Aid to the Civil Community Recognition
The floods in Townsville have passed from the news screens and front pages … hopefully recognition will be forthcoming in the Queen’s Birthday Honours. I wonder if any unit award might be in the offing for 2 Cav Regt (or 3 Bde)? (Surprisingly, there does not seem to be a unit conspicuous service commendation in the Australian Awards system.)
A statement issued by Brigadier Winter (former CO 1 Armd Regt), following the worse of the major part of the relief operation is copied below. Of course, the effects will be long lasting, both for those impacted and for those involved in providing assistance. What a great effort. I wonder what messages of support the RAAC Corporation sent to the RAAC members involved (including the Commander) … making sure that those filling the sandbags and helping evacuate stranded families knew that they were in our thoughts?
It’s situations like this which makes one wonder how well prepared we are to offer support for those doing it tough (and their families). Seems to me that little gestures can be significant.
Maybe the RAAC Corporation could offer to host a BBQ following the next Cambrai Day/Beersheba Day parade? (There would be many former and serving RAAC members who would be prepared to contribute to the cost, I’m sure.)
————————————————————————————-
Brigadier Scott Winter, AM, Commander of Townsville’s 3rd Brigade, has released a statement after defence personnel assisted during the flood disaster.
“Joint Task Force 658, made up of units from around Townsville and supported by the whole Defence Organisation, had the privilege to support the Townsville City Council during the unprecedented rain event over the last month. “We worked closely together in all stages of the flood effort to prevent damage to houses and protect our community and the people within it.
I wish to express my gratitude to the soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers and Officers for their service. I am extremely proud of all the JTF has achieved, grounded in the knowledge that there is still work to be done, and that our sister JTF 646 remains engaged in providing support to our west. “I also wish to thank members of the SES, QPS, QAS, QFS and Townsville City Council disaster relief coordinators for their efforts throughout these demanding days.
The Australian Defence Force is privileged to be part of such a great team. “The fine work our soldiers performed, in close cooperation with, and under the direction of the Emergency Services was exemplary. The risks we took in conducting evacuations over a 24h period in dark, wet and chaotic conditions is testament to the capability of our junior leaders. “I am not surprised by the high standard of our efforts; however, we should not take this for granted.
That our soldiers and leaders had the discipline to put the welfare of our community first, often while their own homes were flooded and families evacuated is an example of selfless devotion to our duty. “The longer-term work of rebuilding our community is off to a good start. There have been long, hot and difficult days while we have helped the Townsville community to stand back up. “We remain part of a strong community.
————————————————————————————————————————-
12 April 2019
Protected Amphibious Vehicle
As previously mentioned, with a reduction in numbers for LAND 400 Phase 3 (IFV), Defence has stated that the acquisition of 50 Protected Amphibious Vehicles (PAV) is being considered (within the same project funding).
There are some interesting project related questions here … for example, will an IFV manufacturer that also produces a PMV in the same family, be preferred over a an IFV manufacturer that doesn’t? What relationship will a PAV have vis a vis other AFVs in the Army’s inventory? Will deployment of PMVs over the beach in an amphibious landing be an infantry or RAAC capability?
Six years ago, Andrew Davies (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) postulated that “…joint amphibious operations up to and including the complex and dangerous business of service protected evacuations in the face of violent opposition and substantial civil disturbance are sensible things for the government to prepare the ADF to do, but I’m unconvinced of the cost benefit beyond that.” (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/amphibiosity-how-much-is-enough/)
In terms of ‘beyond that’, what’s being referred to is opposed over the beach landings. Andrew Davies’ position here was explained in an earlier paper in 2013: “Our land forces have the capability and capacity to do many things that will add to the security of the region and help in times of dire need. But they won’t have the scale, firepower or air cover for decisive amphibious combat operations in any serious conflict”.
In response to the question at the start, it’s of interest that Rheinmetall promotion for its LAND 400Phase 3 IFV contender states that it can also offer:
“A protected amphibious-variant Lynx which will enhance the amphibious capability and survivability of the Australian Army when deploying from the Canberra Class LHDs and other large amphibious warfare ships.”
Is this a chicken and egg scenario, ie: ‘There is some money in the budget, how can it be best used?’; or ‘We need an amphibious AFV, where can we find the funding’?
Why is there no information available, in terms of current contingency planning, on the way in which the ADF would conduct an opposed amphibious landing?
———————————————————————————————————————-
9 April 2019
Note: This will be the last post until Friday 12 April (on the road again).
Binh Ba Commemoration (2019) III
When 8RAR submitted a proposal for the Battalion to be awarded a Vietnamese Unit Citation, it was stated that 8RAR had been responsible for all the enemy casualties resulting from Operation Hammersley. This, of course, is one view. Another is that the fire support from tanks, APCs, arty and RAAF should be acknowledged for helping achieve the outcome that resulted. Understandably, 8RAR were awarded the Unit Citation and the tank squadron which led the assault on the enemy position was ignored (and continues to be so, even today).
It should not be any surprise, therefore, to read the 5RAR Association’s view that”
“Binh Ba was one of the major operations of the war, working with the local Vietnamese forces and responding to their call against an enemy force which had long been using Binh Ba for resupply and transit purposes. The battle accounted for 91 VC K.I.A., for the loss of 1 member K.I.A. and eight W.I.A.” https://rarnational.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/51-TT-Mag-Apr-2019-1.pdf
Seems that the tanks and APCs could not have had any real part in the action …. interestingly, there were actually eleven Australian WIA, eight of whom were tank crewmen.
Brigade Organisation etc
According to the 2017 Concept for Employment of Army’s Combat Brigade:
“Army must possess a force able to deploy rapidly to austere areas whereupon they are capable of immediately commencing decisive land combat operations…. Army’s ability to effectively operate in an urban, littoral and highly lethal land environment is an absolute imperative for successful close combat. Army must be adequately protected, armed and mobile to function against these threats”.
This statement says a lot! The Cove discussion re the IFV prompted the following post:
“As someone studying international relations and focusing on strategic studies, this subject and question is of immense interest and frustration to me. I’d just like to add though that I take no issue with us having heavy main battle tanks, and have been doing my own light amateur level reading on the employment of tanks in the Pacific theatre and Vietnam and I have no quarrel with us deploying a contingent of tanks to support infantry in our primary strategic environment.
I just question the logic and most of all the feasibility and strategic worth of us deploying a whole armoured battalion of infantry in 40 ton IFVs overseas. I know I’m an amateur, but I reckon we’d be better off with more tanks and just a better, slightly heavier version of our current M113AS4s instead of some 40 ton behemoth.”
My response was as follows:
“Here’s my first quick attempt. Happy to discuss/review any of your ‘papers’ … Rationale for Army’s Current Force Structure. This should be possible in a few words ….
To start … the three multi-purpose brigades operate on a force rotation cycle: one ‘resetting’; one ‘readying’; and one on ‘ready’ stand-by. We should, therefore, consider the structure of the latter.
The structure is not ‘fixed’, however. There is currently consideration being given to a ‘reinforced’ ready brigade for some contingencies. These are likely to involve operations within nations in Australia’s region of interest. Potential enemies are known to be equipped with portable weapons having devastating power. Response plans are likely to involve an initial lodgement force, followed by a sustainment force. The former must be capable of achieving immediate fire superiority. Consequently, the ready brigade force structure must include a capability of providing assured direct fire support to dismounted infantry. The tank/IFV/ recon structure is capable of this. The best organisation, however, is presently in debate.
———————————————————————————————————————-
8 April 2019
Binh Ba 2019 Commemoration II
Arrangements for the Commemoration are set out in the attached. (Posted on the 1AR Assn FB page by Colin Toll.) Well done to those involved in the planning and to those who will support the Commemoration itself.
It is very pleasing to see that points made by ‘Armouredadvocates’ re the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration have been given consideration for the Binh Ba Commemoration: viz:
A wreath will be laid at the AWM in memory of the service and sacrifice of the 1 Armd Regt (incl RAEME? see below) personnel who participated;
The SSM B Sqn 1 Armd Regt will “probably”(?) be the bearer for the Armd Regt Standard; and
No ‘commemorative’ lapel badge linking Australian veterans with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam communist party will be ‘issued’ to those attending.
I have some further reflections, however.
Would it not be a good thing for the current OC B Sqn 1 Armd Regt to jointly lay the wreath with Colin Toll … so to cement the ‘past’ and ‘present’ within the Heritage of 1 Armd Regt;
The Distribution List for the info regarding the commemoration includes those that ‘Armouredadvocates’ had previously mentioned, ie. 9 Sqn RAAF, 161 Recce Flt, and 1 Field Sqn Associations … however there is no mention of any RAEME association. One imagines, that it was presumed that RAEME personnel will be informed via the 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Assns. This is a bit of a long bow, however. RAEME deserves to be a distribution addressee in its own right. (The ‘RSM RAE’ is included in the distribution, why not the ‘RSM RAEME’?) The info re the Commemoration has been forwarded to one RAEME contact accordingly;
The lack of recognition/involvement of RAEME is disturbing. Craftsmen intimately supported both tanks and APCs. It is to be hoped at the bare minimum that the cards to accompany the wreaths will acknowledge their bravery and sacrifice. But why not a more ‘visible’ acknowledgement? Why is there no official RAEME representation? Why is the RAEME HOC/RSM not invited as Official Guests? RAEME are not eligible to be accorded battlehonours, however, this does not mean that the significance of their support should not be formally recognised; and
Given his role and contribution to the Battle, it would be very appropriate if Brian Sullivan MC MG’s widow and son were to be specifically invited and afforded ‘VIP’ status
————————————————————————————————————————-
7 April 2019
Binh Ba 2019 Commemoration I
Two Blog posts from last year are copied below. It seemed as if the 50th Commemoration hadn’t been placed on the Forward Agenda. An initial reluctance to discuss anything has turned into what appears will be a well organised event. Even so … one can’t but wonder why such occasions are not the subject of early and widespread consultation with veterans, and consultation between the ESOs primarily involved.
One would hope that there is a schedule of ‘Coming Events’ shared between the HOC; RAAC Corporation; and unit associations and their members.
Rather than any such schedule being ‘Confidential’, it would be wonderful if it could be made known publicly. In this way, everyone who might wish to do so, could offer input.
Tomorrow: The way things have panned out.
—————————————————————————————-
Binh Ba 50th Anniversary Commemoration (8 June 2018)
What will happen on 6 June 2019? Anything?
Will 1 Armd Regt commemorate the 50th Anniversary of one of its Battlehonours?
Will the 1AR Assn hold its AGM in conjunction with a dinner in commemoration?
Will the RAAC Corporation liaise with DVA, the AWM, 1AR Assn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, and 5RAR to co-ordinate a commemoration?
Planning should have commenced already. It could start with the 1AR Assn seeking feedback from its members as to what they think should happen.
————————————————–
I asked Colin Toll, as member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board …“will the Corporation be liaising with DVA, the AWM, 1AR Assn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, and 5RAR to co-ordinate a 50th Anniversary Commemoration next year? (Planning really needs to start now should this be contemplated.)”
Colin’s reply was:
“First, I am no longer a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board. I have, however, been asked to adopt a hull down position on radio silence just in case I can be of help in some way. And, I am more than happy to do that. In relation to BB 50 years on next year my personal thoughts are that a commemoration similar to CB this year should happen. There has been some informal conversations about the issue. I understand that DVA had funds for such commemorations in the 100 years of ANZAC, that is, 2014 to 2018. So we may have some issues there to overcome. But, we do need to get running on this issue.”
I’ve passed the above onto the Secretary 1AR Assn and asked that he inform the C’tee accordingly.
Extract from COF re Binh Ba: “The employment of tanks when the use of both their firepower and artillery support were restricted, highlighted another aspect: their vulnerability. The fact that three tanks had been penetrated and eight crewmen wounded was well appreciated by the squadron as a whole. The penetration of Munsell’s tank a few weeks before, following on from that of Sergeant Swarbrick’s tank earlier in the year, made the vulnerability of Centurions to RPGs, frighteningly clear. Coupled with the two drivers recently killed in mine incidents, it took a brave and determined crew to take on the enemy day after day.”
Stop Press: There have been recent developments; more about these tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————————-
Binh Ba 50th Anniversary Commemoration II (9 June 2018)
Following on from yesterday, the Chairman RAAC Corporation advises (on the 3 Cav Forum) that:
“Colin [Toll} will be the main B Sqn 1AR POC and will liaise with his BB veterans”
Hopefully Colin would’ve been aware of this, but sadly this was not the case: “Oh! That is news to me…. Where did you hear that?”
“Comms, should we get funding approval, will be strictly via email or phone between myself [Chairman. RAAC Corporation] and the heavy lifters (Dallas and Colin), other specific cc addressees and the Commemorative Committee.”
Surprisingly Ray De Vere is not named as one of the 3 Cav “heavy lifters”.
“ the President of the Repat Commission Maj Gen Mark Kelly requires a formal submission seeking funding approval, to be lodged. That has been done.”
The RAAC Corporation has been asked if the formal funding request for BB Commemorations submitted by the Corporation, was made in conjunction with 5RAR? If not, what consultation has occurred with them?
,
From DVA: It is vital to have regard to the fact funding has not yet been approved. The reality is, we’ll just have to wait out until word comes down from Higher, regarding funding. I personally do not anticipate that occurring much before 11/11/18 being the 100th anniversary of the end of WW1 and I guess that might signal the termination of funding for the Anzac Centenary.
The RAAC Corporation has been asked, if funding post the 1918-2018 Anniversary is not approved by DVA, whether any fall-back position been considered by the RAAC Corporation/5RAR?”.
Debate is good, but it can’t be allowed to be one-sided. I’ve copied my response below. (John Menadue’s Blog goes to well over 100 times more recipients than my Blog, so hopefully the message of responsible Defence planning and provisioning gets out there … .)
Hi James,
Congratulations in contributing to this important debate (which deserves to be much more robust than it is at present).
I gather that you have no idea as to what is involved in developing and maintaining the Australian Defence Force’s contingency plans. It is these, of course, which form the basis of ADF training objectives. Once the plan is developed, it has to be kept up to date and modified as circumstances change. The Australian shipping register, for example, provides details of maritime assets which might have to be commandeered in time of defence emergency. This data may underpin a contingency plan.
The contingency plan that British forces utilised when the Falkland Islands were invaded, specified the importance of integral air defence. So it was that this capability was deployed (and utilised to protect British ground forces).
If the ADF seeks to procure a ground based integrated air and missile defence system, it’s because this is a capability required by contingency plans, formulated to defend Australia and its interests.
When Australia deployed forces to Iraq, it was not able to support them with its own armour. General Cosgrove said that this was because the AFVs would be “aging orphans”. In fact, the tanks could have been supported from Europe. The real problem was that electronic interoperability had not been maintained. The ADF has learnt from this and the air defence system to be acquired will enable the ADF to deploy either in its own right, or as part of a multinational force.
To say that the need for this capability is nonsense, is really saying that the relevant contingency plans are nonsense. Although this is a different argument altogether, it is one worth debating. This is much more difficult, however, than simply criticising a single military capability that the ADF considers necessary.
——————————————————————————————————————-
5 April 2019
The FOI Saga III
Following on from the 2 April post … the OAIC contacted me to say that a provisional decision had been made not to release the document. My response was as follows:
“Dear …. You invited me to provide any submission I may wish to make in response to your decision that disclosure of the document in question would be contrary to the public interest.
I would like to address your reasons for coming this decision.
My submission is set out below. (Am I right in assuming that if the OAIC upholds the decision not to release the document, my next appeal is to the Admin Appeals Tribunal?)
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————-
Background.
Defence initially provided the following reasons for not disclosing the document:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
On appeal, Defence stated the primary reasons were:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
When OAIC asked Defence to provide further justification, Defence provided two NEW reasons for not releasing the document:
If I was to see it, I would know who wrote it; and
“Exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
OAIC informed Defence that this was not adequate justification. Defence responded to say:
“As stated … in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
OAIC informed Defence that this had nothing whatsoever to do with the document under consideration. More time was allowed for Defence to consult a ‘third party’. Defence then contended that:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
The OAIC Case Officer’s Position
As the case officer, you believe that “disclosure of the document could reasonably be expected to have a substantial adverse effect on the Department’s operations since:
disclosure may influence whether Ex Serving Organisations make voluntary submissions to the Department in future which could ‘reasonably have an adverse effect on Defence’s ability to conduct, manage and perform its functions and working relationships with ESOs in the future’ including with respect to determinations on Defence honours and awards, and
disclosure may influence membership of Ex Serving Organisations and could ‘affect the integrity and efficacy of the Department of Defence’s internal working relationships with ESOs’ which could affect the Army’s administration of the welfare of serving personnel and transition of personnel to civilian life.
In the Case Officer’s opinion, arguments for and against release of the document are:
In Favour. In this case, the following public interest factors favour disclosure of the document:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Against: In this case, the following public interest factors weigh against disclosure of the document:
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice an agency’s ability to obtain similar information in the future
disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals, and
disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the management function of an agency.
The Applicant’s Response
Defence, in conjunction with the RAAC Corporation, have provided twelve different reasons that supposedly justify not releasing the document in question. In a process of rejection, followed by provision of more time, after more time, for Defence to reconsider … OIAC have rejected nine of these reasons. Turning to what’s left:
Will Defence have difficulty in obtaining similar information in the future if the document is released? I wrote to the Minister; the Minister’s Office asked for Defence’s position; Defence asked the RAAC Corporation what their position was; the RAAC Corporation provided this information to Defence. The Minister approved my (two) requests. The RAAC Corporation refuses to allow anyone to see their submission (maybe it was positive, as the RAAC Corporation claim; maybe it was negative). If the document was to be released, would, say, the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation or the 1 Field Squadron RAE Association, withhold information that Defence requested from them because of it?
Of course NOT. Integrity is crucial to their membership. A document written by their Executive on behalf of their members, would be made available to their members so requested. How could it not be, if the association had any integrity? I can obtain statements to this effect from a range of ESOs if need be.
Will an individual or group of individuals be harmed by release of the document? Defence have previously stated that the “welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy”. This is a very definitive statement; not ‘may be placed in jeopardy’, but “will be placed in jeopardy’. Presumably it is the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation who is being referred to. It was he who stated that he’d prepared a submission for Defence supporting mine to the Minister, but without “having read anybody else’s including yours!”. As advised earlier, I can’t imagine that anyone could author a supporting submission, without reading the submission that it was supporting. Of course, if the submission was opposed to, rather than ‘in support of’, this could explain why release of the document could affect the author’s welfare (having stated the opposite).
But is this justification for not releasing the document? If I was being sentenced and stated that if I was sent to jail, I would kill myself … should the Judge take this into account? Of course, not … if His or Her Honour did, there wouldn’t be anyone in jail.
Will disclosure of the document prejudice the management function of an agency? The ‘agency’ in question is the Department of Defence. Defence has 65,000 employees. Is their management likely to be affected by the release of a document supporting an application to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs for a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours and a correction to an error on a unit’s Standard? The opposite is much more likely. As the Case Officer has stated:
disclosure would promote the objects of the FOI Act including by informing the community of the government’s operations, revealing background or contextual information that informed a government decision and enhancing scrutiny of government decision-making, and
disclosure would advance the fair treatment of individuals and other entities in accordance with the law in their dealings with agencies.
Conclusion. I ask that the OAIC consider the above.
My response to that immediately above is as follows:
“Hi Levon,
I finished my article by saying that “Finally, the decision time for LAND 400 Phase 3, not only involves the best contender, but also the best way in which to incorporate the IFV into the Army’s force structure and operational planning. This is a matter which must be debated rigorously”. You refer above to “Cameron’s argument” and “his thesis”. I was not presenting an argument one way or the other, but calling for rigorous debate because of the importance of the issue.
If one is to spark a debate, one has to provide a morsel or two for others to get their teeth into. For example, I stated that if “RAAC crews operated the IFVs, training costs would be slashed. No longer would IFV qualification involve an isolated skill set. Commonality in the operation of AFVs would enable conversion courses to be conducted for commanders, gunners and drivers”.
You’ve come back and said that “The cost argument is invalid in the sense that it takes more personnel to ostensibly do the same thing the mechanised battalions have done since inception and, more importantly, Cameron offers no actual evidence to support his claim”. If we were to be debating, your team would not thank you for this. Training a soldier from scratch to operate a complex weapons system is much more expensive than converting a gunner who is already trained in operating a very similar AFV mounted cannon. This proposition does not need to be qualified in actual dollars and cents … it is readily apparent.
Your team would also be disappointed that you find the need to personalise your argument; ie. “Cameron is ostensibly saying …”; “Cameron’s sole source of evidence …”; “Cameron seems to be advocating …”; “the myths Cameron perpetuates”; etc etc. A debate focuses on the issues, not the person presenting them. This is because it is much easier to argue on a personal basis; than it is to tackle the issues themselves.
Let’s look at the matter of flexibility: “Cameron’s premise on flexibility appears based on the notion that Army would definitively require a designated infantry unit to leave an IFV behind for some other operational requirement”. This is NOT what I put forward. I said: “If RAAC crews were to operate the IFVs, three infantry battalions would not have to be designated for the mechanised role only; allowing a focus on infantry skills and normal career progression. ADF flexibility would be enhanced accordingly …”. My proposition was that, because of the complexities involved, the crew of an IFV have to be solely devoted to that skill set; they cannot be transferred ‘willy-nilly’ between non mech battalions and mech battalions and maintain an appropriate level of competency. If the RA Inf were to crew the IFV, three battalions would have to be dedicated to this role. This obviously reduces the Army’s flexibility in deployment terms.
“If it were to be higher risk …there are three other infantry battalions in other Brigades available to employ first”. This is an amazing statement in the context of ‘flexibility’. Only one of the battalions is in the ‘Ready’ brigade! How can battalions in the ‘Readying’ and ‘Reset’ phases be employed first?
Recruiting Pool. It was stated that “Recruiting targets would be restricted by requiring a third of all RA Inf to meet the same aptitude standards as RAAC. The response was that: “the notion that there may not be the aptitude for infantry crews to operate an IFV is fundamentally false – there is more evidence for it than against in so many recent case studies. Casual statements from social media offered as evidence are unhelpful at best.”
The Cove’s Facebook contributors might be a little annoyed here. Fact is that you have to pass a certain aptitude assessment to fly a helicopter. The same applies to selection for operating a complex AFV. This is not a notion; it is fact. The more stringent the criteria becomes, the smaller the recruitment pool becomes. Fact.
Finally, I have to say I totally disagree with the assertion that I advocate the “sacrifice of integration by farming it off to another corps on the premise that they would do it better and leave the infantry unit to focus on the lower risk task”. I have served both as an infantryman and as an AFV crewman and appreciate the risks associated with both roles. I would never refer to one or the other in terms of greater or lesser risk (and I’m surprised that others would do so).
There are some major issues involved in the Army’s force structure and operational planning as they relate to IFVs … let’s ‘tease’ them out by an even more rigorous debate (hopefully involving others who care enough to enter into it).”
———————————————————————————————————————
3 April 2019
LAND 400 Phase 3 (IFV)
Contenders. Saw a reference in a Journal recently which suggested that the Israeli Namer (based on the Merkava tank chassis) was a contender. The German Puma was also mentioned in this regard
Neither of these AFVs, however, are contenders. It turns out that the article was taken from a Defence magazine (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/australia/land-400-3.htm). It appeared on Google in Sep 2018, so you might think it was up to date. Sadly, everything has to be cross checked these days.
Numbers. ‘Armouredadvocates’ has raised the issue of IFV numbers quite a few times. Originally, the target was 450 IFVs and 17 Manoeuvre Support Vehicles. It was apparent that this would provide a mech inf capability for four battalions, not three. Army, through the Defence Technology Review (Feb 19) has advised that the initial number was based on a 41-man platoon, rather than 33 as now. This means a reduction to 411 IFVs, plus 17 MSV.
The question was raised as to why there had been no reduction in the budget allocated for the project. Army advises that consideration is being given to including 50 Protected Amphibious Vehicles.
The RAAC: A Status Update.
In the latest Ironsides, the RAAC Representative Hon Col (Maj Gen Roger Powell) expressed some dismay, stating that he remains “curious about the profession of arms’ deep structure values and beliefs when it comes to the practice of manoeuvre [warfare]”. He queried the mindset of “professional colleagues” with respect to the conduct of mounted combat; ie. the understanding of the fundamentals of the indirect approach and the value of speed and surprise in terms of offensive action.
The RAAC seems to be hastening slowly. The RAAC ARES seems to have been saved from the ignominy of a completely dismounted role. A compromise seems to have been negotiated whereby both protected mobility and cavalry scout roles are to be fulfilled. Hopefully now adequate training will be provided after years of saying that the Bushmaster was a truck which had no place in the RAAC.
This compromise ids a long way from what is really needed, ie. a platform such as the Hawkei whereby RAAC ARES units can develop and practice the essential skills of mobile warfare in keeping with their heritage.
What of the ACRs? The Army has 59 Abrams … back in 2017, the “first task of the current Land [8160] project [was] to ‘right-size’ the [Abrams tank] fleet to 90, which …. was acknowledged by the then-Australian government and the US government when the M1 was originally acquired as a foreign military sale”.“… the optimum fleet size for the M1 Abrams fleet as 90″; “… when there are three active squadrons, there have to be tanks in maintenance and being repaired, tanks kept as spares, tanks used for training and tanks being used”. (https://www.afr.com/news/special-reports/defence-and-national-security/armys-plans-for-more-and-better-tanks-20170303-guqamb).
There is no provision that can be seen in forward budgets to acquire the additional 31 tanks. Does that mean that we have each squadron with four troops of four tanks and no repair pool … or do we have three troops of four tanks or four troops of three tanks per squadron?
Is the lack of progress in this space a result of the dismay expressed above?
Sadly, there was no mention of additional Abrams in the Budget just announced. The Australian Defence Magazine addressed the issue of fleet size in an article last year.
“When training and operational requirements are considered, does the ADF have the critical mass to train the Joint Land Force and deploy a credible tank capability on operations?
In light of the Canadian experience and Australia’s similar individual and collective training approach, it is questionable whether the ADF’s M1 fleet is sufficient to enable it to deploy and sustain a tank squadron on operations for a prolonged period. For the present, the small fleet size is and will remain a significant constraint on the ADF unless a cost effective method can be developed to acquire sufficient vehicles to provision the operational and training forces as well as a robust sustainment pool. Without a ‘right sized’ fleet the ADFs tank capability will face even greater challenges as it continues to age.”
I recommend the above article. It provides a comprehensive outline of the perilous situation our mounted combat capability is in. A situation which will only get worse as long as our Abrams fleet size remains at 59.
——————————————————————————————————————-
2 April 2019
The FOI Saga Part 2 (Following on from yesterday.)
Defence Tries a New Tack (or Two). Defence’s FOI Review and Guidance Section finally informed the (OAIC), inter alia, that:
“As stated below in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
Defence Honours and Awards alerted FOI Review that Mr Cameron has a separate matter relating to recognition as an individual due to go to hearing on 13 February 2019. This may be of interest to the Information Commissioner before making a decision relating to the request to release this submission. “
How could this possible? It seems that the ‘Third Party’ has misled Defence by referring to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeal Tribunal’s (DHAAT) consideration of an application to award the Unit Gallantry Citation to those units involved in the Battles of Coral and Balmoral. This has absolutely nothing to do with my submission seeking review of the number of battlehonours that could be emblazoned by units (and asking that an error on the 1 Armd Regt Standard be corrected). Nevertheless, Defence contacted the DHAAT and sought advice with regard to matters related to the public release of a submission made to them.
Not only that, but Defence was informed that I was to appear before the DHAAT with respect to an application made by a witness to an incident, for me to awarded the Victoria Cross. The inference seems to be that my seeking release of the submission might have something to do with my appearance before the Tribunal. IIs it possible that Defence were hoping that I would be given access to their submission to the OAIC … thereby enabling a decision to be rreached on a totally false premise?)
As soon as the OAIC copied me Defence’s reasons (above) for denying access to the submission, I was able to contact them and explain that somehow Defence had confused two separate issues and concocted a completely false and totally unrelated justification for not releasing the submission. I also contacted Defence direct to ask that they inform DHAAT of Defence’s mistake in saying that I was seeking release of a submission to the Tribunal.
Even More New Reasons for Denying Access. After going back to the drawing board, Defence advised the OAIC that release should be withheld for the following NEW reasons:
The welfare of an individual would be placed in jeopardy and Defence considers welfare to be of the highest priority, including mental health;
Formal responses to Tribunals on behalf of the ESO could be jeopardised;
The submission contains the personal intellectual property of a third party and there is strong public interest in protecting this;
The ‘third party’ has objected to the release of specific personal information.
Every document authored by someone obviously contains his/her intellectual property. How can this amount to grounds for making it exempt from FOI? If it did, no document could be released. How can a submission to a Government Minister contain personal information which would warrant it not being released. Personal details such as address etc, can simply be blanked out. As far as formal responses to Tribunals are concerned, the submission in question has nothing whatsoever to do with any Tribunal.
Is it possible that a person can say, ‘if this document is released, it will harm mywelfare’ and for that to be a reason for not doing so? No, of course not. If it could, no document would be released because anyone can make this claim. (It’s like a person who tells a magistrate that if he’s sent to jail, he’ll kill himself. Does the judge take this into account when sentencing? Of course, not … if he did, no-one would be in jail.)
Present Situation.
On 29 March 2019, the OAIC advised that they were reviewing all the material on the file with a view to progressing this matter. They are to provide me with a more substantive update shortly. Heaven knows how many taxpayers’ dollars have been wasted … and to what end? What are the ‘secrets’ that have to be protected at all costs?
———————————————————————————————————————
1 April 2019
The FOI Saga Part 1 (Simply Unbelievable; But Sadly All True, Despite the Date)
Background. In 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. I had hoped that the 1AR Association, together with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Corporation (RAACC), might take the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1Armd Regt approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the other units involved.)
After years of inaction, in February 2017 I personally wrote to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, asking that the current limitation imposed on emblazoning Vietnam battle honours on unit colours etc, be reviewed. (I also requested that he approve a correction being made to the Theatre Honour emblazoned on the Standard.) The RAACC subsequently posted messages on social media sites advising that it had made a supporting submission.
I thanked the RAACC Chairman and asked if the Corporation’s submission was any different to mine. The Chairman responded to say: “I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours!”.
I was surprised at this, as I had automatically assumed that anyone preparing a supporting submission, would refer to the content of the submission that they were supporting. (Additionally, my submission had been available publicly since it was posted off.)
I then asked if I could see the Corporation’s submission, so as to know how it compared with the information I provided to the Minister. Surprisingly, the RAACC Chairman refused to allow me to see the submission the Corporation had made in support of mine (no reason was given).
I was concerned that, if my submission was not approved, it might be because of information presented by the RAACC. I therefore wrote to Defence to “seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the RAACC submission made in support of my request to Minister Tehan”.
Interestingly, not long after the FOI request, messages were posted on social media proclaiming that the Corporation’s submission had been successful. “As we all know Noel Mc Laughlin [Chairman, RAAC Corporation] has done some pretty outstanding work in his submission setting out the grounds for justification of the emblazonment of the Battle Honour Coral-Balmoral on the Regiment’s Standard. It is fine work by a very dedicated man to both our Corps & Regiment”. Soon after, I received a letter from the Minister approving both my requests.
The FOI Submission. My FOI request was refused by Defence for the following reasons:
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
Absolutely incredible! If the opinions of individuals from within the RAAC Corporation were to be made known publicly, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Corporation would be harmed and the Corporation’s membership would be affected. Is it possible … that the RAAC Corporation wrote to the Minister to advise that the provisions of the Ceremonial Manual (restricting battlehonours to two per campaign) should be adhered to and my submission to have the five for Vietnam allowed, should be denied?
I appealed against Defence’s decision. Defence rejected my appeal, stating that
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
How can disclosure of a supporting submission to a Minister, harm an organization to the extent that RAACC member associations would refuse to continue to support the Corporation? What could the submission possibly contain to have this effect? Of course, there is also the fact that supposedly disclosure of material in the submission would harm individuals. How can this be, unless, of course, they are found not to have been honest in statements attributed to them.
In June 2017 I appealed to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner(OAIC) on the following basis:
There are essentially two reasons given for not releasing the document
It contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
Release of the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
These reasons raise the question as to what sort of opinions are these that are being referred to? It seems that if the views of individuals of the Executive of the RAAC Corporation as expressed in the document, were to be made public, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Corporation would be harmed. Presumably these are opinions which are damaging to Defence in some way.
There is a conflict of interest involved here. The Department of Defence has decided that views presented to the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs have to be kept hidden from public disclosure for the sake of the RAAC Corporation’s relationship with it. Presumably this also accounts for Reason 2 above, ie. if the RAAC Corporation’s members were to become aware of the Executive’s opinions as expressed to a Government Minister, they would think less highly of the Corporation which represents them. Surely the Department of Defence cannot rule on a matter in which self-interest is involved.
If the opinions of the Executive of an incorporated body, as put to a Minister of the Commonwealth, cannot be released to someone possibly affected by them, then the FOI Act has failed in terms of its purpose of providing the Australian community access to information held by the Government.
The initial response provided by Defence to OAIC included two NEW reasons for not releasing the document. The first was that, if I was to see it, I would know who wrote it (how could this be, unless it was a copy of my own submission?). If this was not puzzling enough, release was also denied on the basis that “exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers.
In January 2019, the OAIC informed Defence that a stronger justification was required. Defence again requested more time to respond, as they had to contact a “third party”.
The incredible true story continues tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————
31 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XVII
Mr Meloncelli,
Now that I’ve responded to the fourteen Serials that you formulated to demonstrate my lack of commitment to the 1AR Assn, I will continue to address the issues you raise in the body of your letter. The second of these ….
You state that I’ve not provided the C’tee with “the opportunity for an open and honest counter comment” [to matters that I’ve raised on my Blog].
This is absolute garbage! My Blog clearly states the following:
“To comment, move the cursor to a point level with the ‘date circle’, on the RH side of the post. This should illuminate a red rectangle which will enable a comment to be posted. The comment won’t remain verbatim’, as each Blog Post is a separate publication (with the earlier one being removed). Comments which contribute to the issue at hand will, however, be acknowledged and very likely quoted in the next day’s Post (which will remain in the running archive).”
Furthermore, I have continually made it clear that if I say something on the Blog which is incorrect, I will immediately withdraw it and apologise. I think I’ve needed to do this twice in approx. 2500 daily posts.
Of course, if there was anything for which you wished to make an ‘open and honest counter comment’, you could always have emailed me or telephoned (details are available on the 1AR Assn database). You could even have posted something on the 1AR Assn Members’ Only FB page.
Following on … you state that I’ve used “false and misleading statements, inferences of dishonesty, inappropriate comparisons, false accusations innuendo , disparaging comments about 1AR Assn C’tee members who are still serving our country”. Please provide evidence of this, I will explain accordingly.
You also state that I’ve used “false and misleading statements, inferences of dishonesty, inappropriate comparisons, false accusations innuendo , disparaging comments about 1AR Assn C’tee members [now retired]”. Please provide evidence of this, I will explain accordingly.
Penultimately, you state that I’ve failed to comply with the Code of Conduct for the Internet. I think I’ve responded to all matters related to this in terms of your accusation serials 1 to 14. If not, please advise and I’ll respond accordingly.
Finally, you emphasise that you have the “discretion absolutely, to accept or reject” my application for membership. You didn’t mention that you also have the discretion absolutely to do this without informing me or anyone else of your reasons for doing so.
I will maintain my right to my belief absolutely that this is an abuse of power vested in itself by the C’tee of an Incorporated Association … something which should never be allowed to happen.
In ending … I’d like to quote the National President DFWA in saying that no ESO or association “will survive and be able to deal with the issues of the coming generations of veterans, if they remain fearful of being challenged through constructive criticism“.
He adds: “we should never be fearful of, or reluctant, to criticise that which we value”. (‘Comaraderie’, Vol 50, No1, 2019)
Bruce Cameron
———————————————————————————————————————–
30 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XVI
Mr President,
I mentioned yesterday that “great progress has been made [in terms of management of the Association in accordance with the Rules governing Incorporated Associations], compared with the situation five years ago; for example, we now have a valid Constitution and a properly set out Financial Statement (though I’ll have more to mention about the latter soon)”.
I’d like to follow up regarding the Financial Statement for 2017-18, before returning to the text of your letter to me.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM state:
ITEM 101/18 – Minute 44 of 2018/19 – Term Deposits – After some discussion, led by the Treasurer (Dave Paterson), it was agreed that the Association should retain around $10,000 in its Bank Operating Account and any surplus funds should be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period that provided the best possible interest rate. It was moved by the Treasurer that the surplus funds (around $35,000) be invested with the Bendigo Bank as a Term Deposit for a period of five (5) months at an interest rate of 2.3%. Seconded Russ James.
As the C’tee did not appear to have any plans for using the surplus funds, I volunteered some suggestions.
The C’tee’s response was that: “most of the ‘surplus’ could not be expended for the following reasons:
399 members had paid their membership fees in advance (some until 2024) and this amounted to around $19,000. This money cannot and will not be spent because if anything went radically wrong with the Association, this money should be returned to those members who has paid in advance.
In the near future, somewhere between $8,000 and $10,000 will be advanced to the next Reunion Committee to pay deposits, etc for 2021 Reunion;
The annual operating expenses for the Association run to around $6,000 to $7,000”.
I draw your attention to the fact that $19,000 of the $35,000 surplus, is made up of members’ fees paid in advance … funds that the C’tee acknowledges could have to be repaid.
This means that the Assn has a Liability which MUST, in accord with accounting principles, be reflected in its Financial Statement. Not to do so is misleading in terms of the financial position of the Assn. (I can only assume that you did not inform BRJ Accountants and Business Advisors P/L that the deposits were not all simply ‘Income’.)
The C’tee is also considering an advance of $8,000 to $10,000 to pay deposits for the next Reunion. While the next C’tee might decide not to have a Reunion, it would still be informative for Assn members to know that the present C’tee has what amounts to a ‘contingent liability’, in mind with respect to these funds.
As I mentioned yesterday … “any organisation which cannot tolerate constructive criticism will eventually wither”. I hope that you might be able to accept the above as a value adding suggestion, rather than a criticism (for which I should be expelled from the Assn).
PLEASE NOTE: My final response to Mr Meloncelli will be published tomorrow. Thereafter my fate rests with the Management C’tee. I’ll be disappointed if they decide to cancel my membership, as I believe that I can continue to add value to the 1AR Assn and its endeavours. I won’t harbour any recriminations if they do, however, as I’m sure that they’ll do what it is they believe to be right.
——————————————————————————————————————-
29 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XV
Mr President,
Now that I’ve responded to the fourteen Serials that you formulated to demonstrate my lack of commitment to the 1AR Assn, I will begin to address the issues you raise in the body of your letter.
Firstly, you say that a number of members of the 1AR Assn Management C’tee question why I would want to renew my membership to an association that, in my opinion, is lacking in openness, transparency and honesty.
Is this a real question? Why did you and other C’tee members volunteer to take over from previous C’tees that had dishonestly misled members and brought the Assn into disrepute? Surely it was not for self-agrandissement nor for inclusion on your CVs. Surely you thought you could make a positive contribution in terms of the Purposes of the 1AR Assn?
It is the same for me. Would it surprise you to know that I hold the 1AR Assn in the highest regard? Why? Because it has the potential to help those who have served/are serving in 1 Armd Regt who might need it. Those who crew tanks in battle are the most under-acknowledged of all who serve. Why do I campaign for a silver ACB (or other ‘symbol’) to recognise their sacrifice and service? Simply because no-one else is prepared to do so. This is also why I campaign to have to the unique factors associated with operating AFVs recognised in terms of the mental health effects on crews, even during training.
This, of course, is why I’ve spent so much time endeavouring to ensure that the Assn doesn’t end up like the NSW RSL or the Vic TPI Assn. And great progress has been made, compared with the situation five years ago; for example, we now have a valid Constitution and a properly set out Financial Statement (though I’ll have more to mention about the latter soon). Furthermore, Minutes of C’tee meetings are made available to members and a coffin drape will soon be available to the NOK of those who wish to use it. I have praised those involved in achieving these things (though you have chosen to ignore this).
This is a process of continual improvement (as it should be). It is a fragile thing, however, and it will cease (and even go backwards) if membership is made dependent on a “Yes, Sir!’ being given to everything that is done in the name of members without consultation with them. Any organisation which cannot tolerate constructive criticism will eventually wither.
In my response to your accusation at Serial 3, I explained that the Goal of operating in a completely open, transparent and honest manner would be moved from the category of ‘Pending’ to that of ‘Crossed off the List’ when the C’tee rescinds the power that it has given itself to deny a person’s membership without any reasons being made known (even to the person him/herself) and when the Minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs (including Financial Statements) were made available to members.
———————————————————————————————————————-
28 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XIV
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the last of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
Your Serial 14 takes exception to Point 7 in my Blog post of 29 Nov 19 (below). You take this point out of context and ignore my compliment to the C’tee regarding the development of Communications Strategy. You explain that the reason that personal insults and other derogatory material are able to be published on the 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook page is that once the moderator has approved the original post, members are free to say whatever they wish. I have stated that it is my belief that discussion should be limited to those things (including constructive criticism where applicable) that add value to matters of relevance to the 1AR Assn. Allowing members to say anything, no matter how derogatory, when discussing a FB topic (albeit an ‘approved’ one) can only be divisive. Personal attacks should not be tolerated in any form. (I can provide numerous examples of this.)
In terms of being open and transparent, it would be great if the C’tee could publish comments from members (in response to the C’tee’s request) re a 1AR Assn Communications Strategy (or is it possible that my suggestions below were the only ones received?).
Bruce Cameron
———————————————————————————————————
Communications (29 November 2018)
To their credit, the 1AR Assn C’tee have encouraged members to provide suggestions that would assist with the development of a Communications Strategy
My suggestions are the following
Relationship Between 1AR Assn Facebook and 1 AR Assn Website for C’tee Communications. I believe that it is necessary to have a clear policy as to how the C’tee is to use each of these communications channels. Take ‘News’ for example … the RAACA NSW uses their Website to inform members re recent happenings eg. a report was given in relation to the RAAC Corporation AGM shortly after it was held. (The 1AR Assn is yet to inform members). A report of this type would seem to be too large for a Facebook post. Once members are aware of the role of the Website and FB, they will be able access one or the other as needed.
Timeliness. Following on from the above … a Communications Strategy which informs members of matters which affect them and/or were of interest to them, in a timely manner, would be highly desirable.
Ability for Members to Make Suggestions. I believe that one of the fundamental communications links between a C’tee and its members, is that which enables members to make suggestions. This should be possible, together with C’tee responses, on an open and transparent basis (for obvious reasons). The Members’ Forum which used to be a facility of the 1AR Assn Website, was an ideal basis for this interaction. (On this note, I think that members ‘suggestions’ should not automatically be regarded as ‘criticisms’ …an association which is able to benefit from the suggestions from members, is an association which will be long lived.)
Ability to Comment on C’tee Proposals. I believe that one of the (other) fundamental communications links between a C’tee and its members, is that which enables members to comment on proposals being considered by the C’tee … before they are enshrined in ‘law’. For example … suppose that a C’tee was considering introducing a measure whereby they had the right to accept or reject a former 1 Armd Regt’s application for membership without any reason being made known to the applicant (or other members).
Minutes of C’tee Meetings. It is to the credit of the present C’tee that they have made minutes of their Meetings to members. This is something which has long been sought by members.
Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGM. Members’ funds are used to pay for membership of the RAAC Corporation. It follows that members should be entitled to read the Minutes of the Corporation’s AGM (so as to understand what the Corporation is doing on behalf of the Assn’s members). This has been denied by previous C’tees.
Courtesy and Dignity. For a long time, 1AR Assn member communications have been characterised by personal insults and innuendo (as exemplified by all the FB posts regarding this topic). It would be wonderful if on-line communications (FB and Website) could be moderated so that they were limited to discussions which added value to matters of relevance to the 1AR Assn.
————————————————————————————————————————————————-
27 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XIII
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the thirteenth of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
Your Serial 13 is really just an extension of Serial12. You state that by reposting my comment from 10 August, on 11 December, that I’m guilty of bullying the 1AR Assn Management C’tee.
The statement concerned is:
“Thanks for your advice that ‘The feeling of Committee members was that [I was] using the retirement of an illustrious member of the Corps [by saying, ‘Hopefully the RAAC Corporation will mark this occasion appropriately’] to score political points, and this was not considered acceptable’.
How does this accusation come about? I repeated the C’tee’s advice which has been given to me … surely this cannot be bullying?? (One would think that if the C’tee’s advice was valid that they would welcome as many repetitions as possible.) Surely, the 1AR Assn C’tee is bigger than this?
Why did I repost my Blog from 10 August? Because the Commander Forces Command had just been farewelled in a Leopard!!! I was drawing attention to the issue of marking such occasions appropriately.
My position in relation to the broader aspects was set out in response to Serial 11.
RSL Queensland …
Thanks to the Contact Newsletter (and Ray Payne) for circulating this:
“I will start to update the RSL NSW Facebook page on occasions to give you a more detailed sense of what I and the Board do on a daily and weekly basis – please check it here.”
Isn’t this a great idea … the President and C’tee Using FB to communicate with members and keep them up to date with things that are happening!
——————————————————————————————————————–
25 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XII
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the twelfth of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
Serial 12 involves my Blog post for 11 December 2018. I’ve copied it:
———————————————————————————————–
Showing Respect and Appreciation
I’ve copied below the Blog post for 10 August 2018. In the second part, I explained that I had been banned from the 1AR Assn Facebook page because I’d suggested that the retiring RSM-A should have been given more of an RAAC style send off, eg. possibly being driven away from AHQ in an ASLAV.
Well done to all involved! (As is obvious, I think that the former RSM-A also deserved equivalent thoughtful planning. If the RAAC Corporation has no schedule of such retirements, I think they should consider one.)
My comment on the FB post re General McLachlan’s retirement: “What a disappointment that he will not now be either CA or CDF. A great leader in all respects. One hopes that the Army/Government tried as much as possible to secure his on-going service to the nation. (There are, of course, always personal reasons which trump anything else.) Good to see his departing ‘carriage’ … no less than was deserved.”
The good news first. The C’tee of the 1AR Assn have copied the Minutes of their first C’tee meeting to members. How good is that? I’ll have to amend the ‘To Be Achieved List’ set out on the Blog a week or so ago. The C’tee have also published ‘policies’ for the running of the Assn. These are not the same as By-Laws (in that there is no regulation that they have to be approved by members) … but it seems that members’ approval is to be obtained. If any provide ‘feedback’ via the Members’ Only FB page, … be careful, there could be a ‘sting’ in the tail (see below). Postscript. It seems that Assn policies are not to be circulated to members for feedback/approval … the Minutes of the recent C’tee meeting shows policies (eg. Internet communications) being approved by the C’tee in isolation.
BANNED!!
Email to the Secretary, 1AR Assn (yesterday):
“Thanks for your advice that ‘The feeling of Committee members was that [I was] using the retirement of an illustrious member of the Corps [by saying, ‘Hopefully the RAAC Corporation will mark this occasion appropriately’] to score political points, and this was not considered acceptable’.
As a result of the C’tee’s view, I have been blocked for the 1AR Assn FB pages. (I have no idea what the reference to “political points” refers to.)
May I say in response, I find it difficult to understand how an RAAC RSM-A’s retirement is first advised to everyone vide the Army Newspaper. I would have hoped that prior to the event, the RAAC Corporation would have informed member associations and arranged, either directly or through the RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel, to participate in his farewell. What about the RSMs of the RAAC units in which he had served, being surprise guests at the ‘official’ farewell ceremony. What about an ASLAV to transport him from the front of Russell Offices ‘into retirement’?
This is the equivalent of the Chief of Army we’re talking about. How many resources go into the staging of CAs’ farewells?
BUT, none of this was to be … though I understand that the former RSM-A he will be included with others who have retired after 20 years+ at the next Corps Conference Dinner at the SoA.
Isn’t it within us to do something special for those who have served the Corps in an exemplary manner?
For consideration, and action if appropriate, by anyone who can make a difference.
—————————————————————————————————————-
Mr President,
You’ve advised me that renewal of membership is in jeopardy because I did not include in my Blog that part of the reason that I was banned from the 1AR Assn Facebook page was because I had reinserted the sentence “Hopefully the RAAC Corporation will mark this occasion appropriately’” after the Secretary had censored it and that I also repeated the post on the 1AR Assn Social FB page. Have I really sinned with these acts?
I explain my call for the RAAC Corporation to do more in this respect above. I was really pleased when the retiring Forces Commander was subsequently farewelled in a Leopard and the departing CO SOA was farewelled in a Centurion. I explain my reasoning above with respect to the fact that such gestures should not be confined to officers. To my mind, the senior NCO of the Australia Army deserves no less and I should not be prevented from saying so.
Bruce
——————————————————————————————————————-
24 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL XI
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the eleventh of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
I stand accused of having to have my membership terminated because you don’t believe the following email by the Secretary was intimidatory: “Unlike some individuals the Association ensures it has the detailsfrom ADF Records prior to publishing incorrect information on a former member of the Regiment.”
The back ground is provided in my Blog post of 13 January 2019 …
Intimidation: As Bad as Personal Insults.
One of the [Armouredadvocates] Part 6 ‘Goals’ is: ‘No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults and derogatory language in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion. This regretful aspect has been much reduced of late; however, I realise now that I didn’t make the ‘goal’ as wide as it should be. I have amended it as below.
No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open.
I had forgotten ‘intimidation’. Attempts at this occur all too often.
Last year I saw mention of the passing of a former member of 1 Armd Regt on another website, I asked the C’tee (by email): “Do you also have information regarding the passing of ….”? If the response was “No”, then I would have sent the info I was aware of.
I received the following response: “Unlike some individuals the Association ensures it has the detailsfrom ADF Records prior to publishing incorrect information on a former member of the Regiment.”
———————————————————————
I can assure you Mr President, that I felt an attempt was being made by the Secretary to intimidate me … initially I thought that I must be mistaken, that the website on which I’d seen the death notice must have got it wrong. The Secretary wasn’t interested in receiving any information, so that must be the answer. BUT it wasn’t wrong! The member had passed away as per the notice on the other site. Was the Secretary suggesting that I was the “individual” who had got such information wrong previously?
The Secretary now states that the funeral details for the person were made known to members immediately they were received. My point is that earlier advice re the member passing away could have been provided if the Secretary had not responded as he did.
The remainder of the Serial 11 repeats matters which have been addressed at Serials 7 and 8.
Before I forget ….
Would it be possible to post 1AR Assn policies on the Assn website. As I explained when asking for the Constitution to be so posted, this would allow members to access these documents, rather than trying (often unsuccessfully) to find them if old email listings?
Your demand for me to respond to your letter by 10 April (or forego my membership) was sent by registered post. If I’d been away (as I will next month) it could have sat in my letter box (or at the PO) for three or four weeks. I suggest that if a deadline is involved for response, that not only is the letter registered, but also a signature be required. Knowing that the addressee’s received something is very different to knowing that it’s reached his letterbox (or the nearest PO).
———————————————————————————————————————
23 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL X
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the tenth of these reasons is copied below:Mr President,
I’ve just noticed that Serial 10, like Serial 9, relates to Serial 6. This time you’ve taken issue with the last para of the Blog post published yesterday, ie: “I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn and, even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, is clearly in breach of Defence regulations”.
You accuse me of “implying that the present Management Committee has breached Defence Regulations”. You state that “this is not the case … and as previously pointed out, the Association is not subject to Defence regulations”.
Fact is that my statement obviously applied to the C’tee responsible. There is no doubt that Defence regulations were breached by the 1 AR Assn (and I’m happy to seek the confirmation of the Defence Inspector-General that this was the case). You make light of the fact by saying that such Regulations don’t apply to the Assn.
There has been a call that the requirement for Assn funds to be used only for the Purposes of the Assn should be incorporated in to the Constitution. You have opted not to do so. There has been a call for the present C’tee to apologise to members for the fact that prior to their appointment, Assn funds were used for non-Assn Purposes. You have opted not to do so.
I believe that both the ‘calls’ above are in the best interest of the Assn … reinforcing the integrity of the management C’tee in the eyes of members. I ask that you reconsider your position in this respect.
——————————————————————————
Some Good: News, But Why Did it Take So Long and are Insignia to be Presented?
Background is provided by my Blog post for 22 May 2018:
Unit Citation for Gallantry: Coral-Balmoral
I’ve been challenged by the RSM SoA/VP 1AR Assn to make positive comment re the UCG presentation. I responded as follows:
Presumably there will a parade at some stage, during which, serving members of C Sqn will be presented with the UCG insignia (original members could be invited to attend to be presented with their insignia as well. One hopes that it will not be a matter of Australia Post and Q store issue (but who knows?). Of course no presentation/mail out of the insignia can take place before the OC C Sqn has been presented with his.)
The tradition of WO2s holding the position of SSM, carrying the Guidon/Standard goes back way before your 34 years. The RAAC, is I believe, the only Corps in which this happens. The AAAvn Guidon is carried by a subaltern, as are the Colours of all RA Inf battalions.
What I would like to see is a statement to the effect that ‘all effort was made to arrange for C Sqn to be in charge of the Standard when the Squadron’s streamer was affixed to it, but this was not possible because ….’. Depending on the reasons given, I would be more than happy to say ‘Well done for trying!’.
But what’s the situation re B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt? Do members of the Squadron charged with responsibility for the 3 Cav Guidon, wear the insignia of the UCG?
If so, one would hope that a parade as above will be held and eligible members of A Sqn 3 Cav might be invited. Of course, if that was the case, no-one can be presented with/mailed to with the insignia until OC B Sqn 3/4 Cav is presented with his.
————————————————–
Finally, nine months later, the RACC has advised that authority has been given for “members of B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt of the UCG for Coral-Balmoral (less Federation Star) on their uniforms in perpetuity. That means every member posted to B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt will be entitled to wear that award for the duration of their posting”
Will the current OC be formally presented with his insignia first (as per Defence protocol)?
Will a presentation parade be held by SOA (with 3 Cav veterans invited) or will serving members simply collect insignia from the Q Store (akin to veterans having received theirs via Australia Post).
STOP PRESS: It seems that a parade was held at SOA a couple of days ago!
——————————————————————————————————————
22 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL IX
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the ninth of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
Your Serial 9 is a follow-on to Serial 6 in response to the donations by Rheinmetall to 1 Armd Regt ‘through’ the 1 AR Assn to avoid an audit trail. You refer to this statement: “Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal”, but your actual accusation is beyond comprehension, ie “The author of the comment to the left was made by yourself in an email to a previous secretary ….”??
Leaving this aside, I copied the first part of my post of 27 January 2019 below. You’ll see that the offending quote comes from a 9 June 2018 Blog post.
You say that my continual reference to ‘illegal practices’ demonstrates my lack of commitment to the Association. Firstly, I did not say “illegal practices” as you can see below. Secondly, I believe that there are many who would consider the fact that I took the trouble to raise this matter, shows (instead) my undoubted commitment to the Association.
You have the report by the Army Fraud Investigation Unit … why not release it to members of the Assn? There are clear breaches of Defence Regulations (as pointed out in my response to Serial 6), but the C’tee has decided to make it clear that the Assn is not bound by these Regulations. This will be one of the reasons that I will take this matter to the Defence Force Inspector General, if need be. Was that the reason that the Assn was used to channel money to 1 Armd Regt, ie. because it was not bound by Defence protocols/regulations?
————————————————————————————————-
Are we Doing Enough to Maintain Openness and Transparency (and Avoid the Perception of Conflict of Interest)? (27 January 2019)
An article appeared in the Canberra Times a couple of days ago, an extract from which is copied below:
“A Defence spokesperson said the department staff must ensure that gifts, hospitality or sponsorship do not give rise to conflicts of interest. But Defence gift registers are not published. Last year [2018] The Canberra Times revealed Defence staff had received $490,000 in gifts, sponsorship and hospitality over the preceding four years, mainly from weapons companies”. https://www.smh.com.au/national/public-servants-keep-perk-details-secret-20190123-p50t79.html
A quote from that original story states that:
The Defence Department refused to release the details of some meetings with industry representatives, citing the damage such information could do to the “international relations of the Commonwealth”. Details of a “finger-food” event with a Finnish organisation were redacted for this reason, as were the details of a lunch with an unnamed outfit from Peru, a “cocktail reception” with Swiss representatives, and a lunch with someone from Kenya
The blog post from 19 August 2018 is relevant. It is copied at the end.
Personal story: While working with a government agency tasked with introducing strategic planning to industry, I accepted an invitation to join some consultants for dinner. I agreed but insisted that I pay for my meal etc. I duly did this, but wished (in retrospect) that I had known in advance how expensive the restaurant was that they had selected!!
On another occasion, I was offered an incentive to provide details of a project. The official response when I reported the conversation was incredible … I was interviewed in a way which made me feel as if I’d done something wrong. I complained (formally) and received an official apology … but it was obvious that there was something amiss with the ‘culture’ at the time [anyone treated as I was could be excused for not reporting any such future incidents.]
Doing the Right Thing [19 August 2018]
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action; and
Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
What are members to make of this? It would seem that a defence of jurisdiction has been mounted, ie. regulations set by the Department of Defence are not applicable to the 1 AR Assn. Surely, we are bigger than this? Surely, it’s a matter of doing the right thing, even if it is not legislated that it has to be done?
What is the point in making it known that no matter what Defence regulations say with regard to ethical relationships with commercial entities, this has no relevance to the Assn? As an Assn comprised of former members of the ADF, one might expect that guidance provided by Defence regulations would help inform decisions made by the Assn (rather than being completely discounted).
My Blog post of .9 June 2018 refers:
Creating a Culture of Openness and Transparency or Being Vexatious?
A comment was made in relation to the drafting of the new 1AR Assn Constitution that “Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal”.
One possible follow-on from this was to ensure that the Constitution clearly stated that the C’tee must not use the offices of the Assn for anything other than the Assn’s Purposes as set out in the Constitution
The C’tee’s response was “It is now understood that the findings of the Army Fraud Unit are that there is no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer. Continued reference to ‘illegal acts’ is considered vexatious”
I have not seen the “the Army Fraud Unit findings” and I take offence at the allegation of being vexatious.
I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn and, even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, is clearly in breach of Defence regulations.
———————————————————————————————————————-
21 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL VIII
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the eighth of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
I see now that Serial 8 is actually a continuation of Serial 7, in particular, this portion of my 5 February Blog post:
“No response was received. I now see from Facebook, however, that the ADF Records verification policy prior to any notification, is no longer being followed. (Sometimes a record of service ‘eulogy’ will be sought from ADF Records; but on other occasions they could well be the last to be informed.) One has to wonder about the ‘holier than thou’ attitude previously adopted by the 1AR Assn. Why do it?”
You raise three “blatantly false elements“ in the above. Firstly, you say that a Record of Service ‘eulogy’ is ALWAYS requested from ADF Records by the 1AR Assn (rather than ‘sometimes’ as I’d said). I must admit, I’m surprised. I’d been thinking that you’d only do this if requested by NOK, so what does the Assn do with them? Few of the Vale notices refer to Record of Service details.
Secondly (and this is where I become further confused) you say that “ADF records verification was only ever required where there was some doubt of the details of the deceased”. But directly above, you say that the Assn always requests them. Which is correct?
Thirdly, you say that “ADF records is contacted as soon as we have sufficient information to identify the person concerned”. Back to square one.
At Serial 7, the Secretary said that “Unlike some individuals the Association ensures it has the details from ADF Records prior to publishing incorrect information on a former member of the Regiment”. I referred to this as taking a ‘holier than thou’ attitude, ie. there are obviously some individuals doing something wrong in the eyes of the Assn; something that the Assn itself would never do.
I stand by the concern I expressed. If, as I understood it from the Secretary’s statement above, the Assn did not inform members of the death of another member until it has details from ADF Records, the time delay could cause difficulty in allowing members to express their condolences in a timely manner. I do not think that this concern can be interpreted as “muck-raking”.
KEEPING ON ONE”S TOES (Earlier Today).
(Initiative tests are employed to rate candidates to suitability for military service, especially at institutions like RMC.)
The Situation: You hear that a breakage in water lines has meant that water is escaping at an alarming rate into your neighbours’ backyard, possibly causing substantial damage to foundations etc. You don’t have their telephone number. The boundary between the two properties is delineated by a 2.5m wall. What do you do?
Action Taken:
(i)Ran to front of house and rang doorbell/knocked. No answer.
(ii) Ran to the two side gates … but found them securely locked.
(iii) Tried to find the water meter/tap to the block … but had no luck.
(iv) Got ladder and assessed whether or not it was possible to scale side gates/fence … pointed ‘arrows’ along the top made this a difficult course to pursue.
(v) Decided to try and find the water/tap again … found it, but couldn’t turn the tap.
(vi) Decided to look at the wall dividing the two properties and assessed that if I dropped the ladder over the wall and lent it against the other side, I would be able to climb over and use tree branches to help me down the ladder … given that this was a ‘touch’ difficult, decided to grab pliers and screwdriver and try to turn water tap.
(vii) The tools weren’t necessary … the tap just needed for one end of it to be pushed DOWN (definitively non-intuitive) to allow the other end to turn; the water was turned off.
(viii) Was that IT? What would happen if the neighbours came home and couldn’t work out why they had no water?
(ix) Decision: Leave a note on front door. But what if they drove home and entered through the garage and didn’t open the front door?
(x) Decision: Leave a note wedged into the garage door to tell them to look at the note on the front door.
Who might’ve got to the solution more quickly? Did some up and coming ‘smart arse’ know how to turn off such a 1950/60s water tap? Would I’ve gained entry in such a competitive field? Probably not … but such is life.
———————————————————————————————————————————
20 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL VII
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the seventh of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
Serial 7 accuses me of two offences. The first relates to the fact that in the 5 February Blog post below, I revealed the Secretary’s email address (“in direct contravention of the Code of Conduct”). You will be aware, of course, that the email addresses of all C’tee members are published publicly on the 1AR Assn website. Is this really a reason not to approve my membership?
The second offence comes as a result of seeing (on another website) that a member had died. I asked the Secretary if he had information about this. I received a response from the Secretary which is copied below. I could not believe that the 1AR Assn would wait on a response from ADF Records before informing members about a fellow member’s passing. In my accusation notice, I’m informed that the Management C’tee finds it hard to understand why I would wait for six months before raining the matter. This is explained in my post, ie. I’d seen information posted about deaths which meant that the 1AR Assn C’tee was no longer following the policy of waiting for ADF Records info before advising details of a members’ passing.
I’m also accused of suggesting that there was a significant delay in the notice of a member dying. This is rubbish. As is clear from my post, I was concerned that a policy of waiting for ADF Records advice (as stated by the Secretary) could result in members being unaware of deaths and missing funerals. [The Secretary’s advice below, made me think that the notice of this member’s passing was incorrect … but it wasn’t.]
————————————————————————————–
5 February 2019 Deceased Members
Last year, I heard that a member of the 1AR Assn had passed away. I asked the C’tee if they had details (if not, I was going to pass on the info I had regarding the deceased member). The response I received was the following:
Unlike some individuals the Association ensures it has the details from ADF Records prior to publishing incorrect information on a former member of the Regiment. [I’m sure that this is not meant to imply that the 1AR Association ever publishes incorrect information.]”
I felt that it was incredible that such a delay might mean that colleagues would not be able to informed of details in a timely manner. Therefore, I asked:
Dear Secretary, Surely the 1AR Assn will not wait for advice from ADF Records before passing funeral details to members? Can you confirm a different policy will now be put in place?
No response was received. I now see from Facebook, however, that the ADF Records verification policy prior to any notification, is no longer being followed. (Sometimes a record of service ‘eulogy’ will be sought from ADF Records; but on other occasions they could well be the last to be informed.) One has to wonder about the ‘holier than thou’ attitude previously adopted by the 1AR Assn. Why do it?
———————————————————
STOP PRESS: Congratulations to Don Spinks (RAAC).
DVA Press release ….
“FOR the first time, a former Regimental Sergeant Major of the Army has been appointed as the new Repatriation Commissioner with outgoing Commissioner Major General Mark Kelly AO, DSC completing his appointment on 30 June this year.
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Darren Chester today announced Mr Don Spinks AM, who recently retired from the Australian Defence Force with almost 40 years’ experience, had been appointed as the new Repatriation Commissioner and as a Member of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission for a period of five years from 1 July 2019.
“Mr Spinks is highly qualified and well-respected, has an impressive military career serving on multiple overseas deployments and has capably represented the concerns and views of soldiers to the Chief of Army and senior leadership over a lengthy period,” Mr Chester said.”
——————————————————————————————————————-
19 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL VI
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the sixth of these is copied below:
Mr President,
Serial 6 refers to a statement that I published on my Blog on 11 February 2019 (which is shown in full below). Although the statement is not mine, I’m accused of “allowing it to be published”; thereby providing justification for not renewing my membership. Do you really want to debate the Law associated with the freedom to publish?
The matter relates to Rheinmetall’s donations to 1 Armd Regt which were ‘hidden’ from an audit trail by being passed through the 1AR Assn accounts. I’m happy to take this matter, particularly the former 1 AR Assn President’s view that “the [1 AR] Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence [thereby facilitating circumvention of Defence ethics guidelines]” … to the ADF Inspector-General.
I believe that this is one of those matters worthy of ‘dying in a ditch’ for. The fact that I haven’t taken it to this extreme, is due to my concern not to further damage the standing of 1 Armd Regt and 1AR Assn (and that of those who may have thought that they were doing the right thing).
Bruce Cameron
PS Mr Baikie’s response: “If they used the word “comparison” , it’s just another example of them manipulating what a person has said to suit their own ends. I was not comparing the Rheinmetall transactions with “action by bank executives” at all. I was simply pointing out that the banks, as institutions, acknowledged wrongdoing. 1ARA, in my opinion, should have done the same. I accept that the current committee have no need to apologize as they were not involved (except perhaps one). It was clearly the wrong thing to do as per Defence policy and a tweek to the Constitution might ensure it doesn’t happen again”.
————————————————————————-
Are we Doing Enough to Maintain Openness and Transparency (and Avoid the Perception of Conflict of Interest)? II [11 February 2019]
Ron Baikie has offered the following insightful comment on the earlier Blog post:
“Hello Bruce,
I read your blog of 27 Jan 2019 regarding donations and gifts to Defence and the particular donations passed through the books of the 1 Armoured Regiment Association (1ARA) to the 1st Armoured Regiment (1AR) on behalf of Defence contractor Rheinmetall.
The supposed finding of ‘no wrong doing ‘ is quite curious. The very act of channelling funds from a Defence contractor to a military unit via a 3rd party civilian association, by its very nature, is an act of deception and therefore must be “wrong doing”. If not, why do it?
Is it not wrong to deceive, particularly when the deception facilitates a transaction that appears to be in breach of Defence Instruction pertaining to gifts? For example, Defence and the Private Sector’s ‘An Ethical Relationship’ states “If a supplier wishes to provide an individual or a team in Defence with a low value gift, it should be given openly and should not be offered at a time that could raise general concerns about conflict of interest (such as during a tender or a contract negotiation period).”1
As far as 1ARA is concerned and the comment “Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.” This is correct, however, the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Victorian Law) states under Prohibited Transactions, unauthorised acts etc, that “…An incorporated association must not …. do any act that is outside the scope of the purposes of the association. In fact, acting outside the scope and purposes of the Association is grounds for the Supreme Court to wind up the Association. One would think that acting on behalf of a Defence contractor to disguise payments from that contractor to an Australian military unit is way outside 1ARA’s scope and purposes.
There are many unanswered questions regarding this matter, but the biggest from the point of view of members, is why did the Association’s management not acknowledge that the action was wrong; by all accounts, unlawful, and take specific action to satisfy members that such conduct will not occur again by enshrining such an undertaking in the Constitution? We have just seen bank executives apologize and acknowledge wrong doing but the 1ARA committee seem unable to do the same, even when they were not personally involved.
I doubt I’ll be invited to renew membership with this particular Association but that’s of little concern as I had no intention of doing so anyway. I thoroughly enjoyed my brief time in the Army, but like the National Servicemen of that era, it was a brief passing experience … one we’ll never forget. Many friendships were forged and they’ll remain, that’s of most importance.”
Are we Doing Enough to Maintain Openness and Transparency (and Avoid the Perception of Conflict of Interest)? [27 January 2019]
An article appeared in the Canberra Times a couple of days ago, an extract from which is copied below:
“A Defence spokesperson said the department staff must ensure that gifts, hospitality or sponsorship do not give rise to conflicts of interest. But Defence gift registers are not published. Last year [2018] The Canberra Times revealed Defence staff had received $490,000 in gifts, sponsorship and hospitality over the preceding four years, mainly from weapons companies”. https://www.smh.com.au/national/public-servants-keep-perk-details-secret-20190123-p50t79.html
A quote from that original story states that:
The Defence Department refused to release the details of some meetings with industry representatives, citing the damage such information could do to the “international relations of the Commonwealth“. Details of a “finger-food” event with a Finnish organisation were redacted for this reason, as were the details of a lunch with an unnamed outfit from Peru, a “cocktail reception” with Swiss representatives, and a lunch with someone from Kenya
The blog post from 19 August 2018 is relevant. It is copied at the end.
Personal story: While working with a government agency tasked with introducing strategic planning to industry, I accepted an invitation to join some consultants for dinner. I agreed but insisted that I pay for my meal etc. I duly did this, but wished (in retrospect) that I had known in advance how expensive the restaurant was that they had selected!!
On another occasion, I was offered an incentive to provide details of a project. The official response when I reported the conversation was incredible … I was interviewed in a way which made me feel as if I’d done something wrong. I complained (formally) and received an official apology … but it was obvious that there was something amiss with the ‘culture’ at the time [anyone treated as I was could be excused for not reporting any such future incidents.]
———————————————————–
Doing the Right Thing [19 August 2018]
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action; and Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
What are members to make of this? It would seem that a defence of jurisdiction has been mounted, ie. regulations set by the Department of Defence are not applicable to the 1 AR Assn. Surely, we are bigger than this? Surely, it’s a matter of doing the right thing, even if it is not legislated that it has to be done?
What is the point in making it known that no matter what Defence regulations say with regard to ethical relationships with commercial entities, this has no relevance to the Assn? As an Assn comprised of former members of the ADF, one might expect that guidance provided by Defence regulations would help inform decisions made by the Assn (rather than being completely discounted).
My Blog post of .9 June 2018 refers:
Creating a Culture of Openness and Transparency or Being Vexatious?
A comment was made in relation to the drafting of the new 1AR Assn Constitution that “Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal”.
One possible follow-on from this was to ensure that the Constitution clearly stated that the C’tee must not use the offices of the Assn for anything other than the Assn’s Purposes as set out in the Constitution
The C’tee’s response was “It is now understood that the findings of the Army Fraud Unit are that there is no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer. Continued reference to ‘illegal acts’ is considered vexatious”
I have not seen the “the Army Fraud Unit findings” and I take offence at the allegation of being vexatious.
I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn and, even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, is clearly in breach of Defence regulations.
Background:
The Assn’s 2016/17 Financial statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd $5,000.00. The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It turned out that there had been at least three other similar payments received by the Assn and passed on to 1 Armd Regt.
Assessment:
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the Unit? Relevant Defence regulations are set out below. It is clear that donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. In this case Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400, a multi-billion dollar AFV acquisition project (which they were awarded).
I recommend that the C’tee consider all aspects of this matter when informing members. In doing so, may I suggest that trying to bring about a culture of openness and transparency is a lot different to being vexatious. An apology would be welcomed.
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Document
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
“If a supplier wishes to provide an individual or a team in Defence with a low value gift, it should be given openly and should not be offered at a time that could raise general concerns about conflict of interest (such as during a tender or a contract negotiation period).”
Defence Instruction Concerning Gifts and Sponsorships
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorship is an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above
All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN).
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the fifth of these reasons is copied below:
Mr President,
Serial 5 asks if I have any evidence of the disparaging comments that were “supposedly” made when I stated the following: “I recall one of the present C’tee was very disparaging about me a while back ‘he’s one of those people who think that Members should be consulted about everything!’. My reason for thinking along these lines is that I believe that those people that policies and procedures affect, should not only have the right of comment, but also the ability to add value to the policies and procedures. Maybe the opportunity to comment will be available when the associated By-Laws are developed (?)”.
(It should be noted that this follows on from my statement that: “The 1AR Assn C’tee is to be congratulated for compiling comprehensive ‘Policies and Procedures for Funerals, Commemorative Services and Vale Notices”.)
Before going to the evidence, we have that word “supposedly” again; this time used by yourself. Did I say that I “believed” that one of the C’tee had stated …? No, I clearly indicated exactly what had been said using inverted commas. So not ‘supposedly’ stated, but ‘actually’ stated.
Who said this? The Secretary. Why did he say it? The Blog following post by me refers …
“Rule 16 states that a prospective member has to pass ‘a fit and proper person test, as established by the Association from time to time, to verify their eligibility‘. The C’tee have advised, in response to a query, that the test does not have to be agreed by members generally; ie. the C’tee themselves can decide on the test (and change it whenever they wish) and use it to bar a prospective member, with neither explanation nor justification.”
Now I’m not one for singling out individuals. To my way of thinking, the response to me was not that of the Secretary speaking for himself, but rather, the Secretary speaking for the C’tee as a whole. Because I’d had the temerity to raise such an issue, the Secretary thought it appropriate for the C’tee to categorise me as “one of those people who think that Members should be consulted about everything!”.
Is quoting something the Secretary said, grounds for not renewing my membership?
———————————————————————————-
1 AR Assn Website: Commanders’ Diaries
Mr President,
While I’m responding to the unfounded accusations levelled against me, I wonder if you could find some time for acknowledgement of a little of the work I’ve done on behalf of the Assn. I refer to the Commanders’ Diaries (please correct ‘Commander’s Diaries’) at https://www.paratus.org.au/commander-s-diaries
I went to the AWM for months … I requested relevant files .. I transcribed entries from Commanders’ Diaries … I subsequently prepared a synopsis which made it easy for a reader to understand what had happened (without having to access a map to locate grid references etc). I transcribed, edited and typed every word of every entry of every day over the four years involved. I sent these ‘summaries’ to the then Webmaster in order to provide an easily accessible database that would be of benefit to the 1AR Assn members.
Could you please provide the following acknowledgement at the ‘header’ of the Commanders’ Diaries:
The 1AR Assn C’tee would like to thank Bruce Cameron for his time and effort in transcribing the actual Commanders’ Diaries (which he accessed in the AWM) into a more ‘readable’ format (eg. replacing grid references with FSB names/locations near towns etc). His dedication to preserving the history of 1 Armd Regt is part of the reason he was made a Life Member of the 1AR Assn
PS. I would like to congratulate those C’tee members involved on the way that they have enhanced the Commanders’ Diaries entry on the website.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————————————–
17 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL IV
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the fourth of these is copied below:
Mr President,
Serial 4 doesn’t accuse me of anything. It simply points out that my statement that “Supposedly these Minutes were distributed to all members of the Association. (I think I might have overlooked the email or was missed out … I requested a copy from the Secretary.)” implies that there is some doubt as to whether the Minutes were distributed.
When I asked the Secretary, he wasn’t sure either. See following email:
The Policy and Procedures for Funerals, etc were issued as Annexes D and E respectively to the Minutes of the Management Committee meeting held on 8 Dec 2018. I believe that these were distributed to all members of the Association.
He didn’t say that the Minutes had been sent out, only that he “believed” they had. If he had said that they had been sent out, I would have not used the word ‘supposedly’.
You have cleverly quoted instances in which I accessed the Minutes electronically two months previously. I said above that I might have overlooked the email; you’ve shown that I had actually forgotten it. (The original query was not actually related to the Minutes themselves, but one of the Annexes attached to it.) Congratulations.
But is this really a valid reason for not renewing my membership?
LAND 400 Phase 3: IFV (RA Inf or RAAC?)
Previous blog posts have dealt with potential problems associated with the current model for deployment of the IFV. This culminated in publication of an article, intended to spark debate, in Army’s Professional Education journal, ‘The Cove’. See https://www.cove.org.au/adaptation/land-400-phase-3-a-case-for-review/
As will be seen from the comments, that interest was, indeed, kindled.
It turns out that Army has a version of The Cove on Facebook. The was used by an RA Inf officer training in the US, to publish a very detailed follow-up to my article. See
There is only one comment about this you’ll when you open the article. Interestingly, this is from an RAAC person who states that it is a well thought out rebuttal to my article. Heavens above … how you have a rebut a call for debate? Fortunately other members of the Army family have given the matter some deeper thought and posted some very insightful comments on the Facebook page. I particularly like this one”
Eamon MalcolmBruce Cameron that’s what you very clearly and effectively stated in your pieces and the point this writer ignores. You can’t be a Dismounted LSW Operator one week, then jump into a turret the next, then go back to the LSW role and expect your skills at either to be top shelf. This gets more and more relevant as you progress. An infantry section commander can’t be expected to command a 21st century, world class AFV if he isn’t a full time crew commander. It just isn’t realistic, but this author seems to claim it’ll be fine.
He can do it, however, if his trade is ECN 344 Armoured Infantry, rather than 343 (344 is obviously just a made up ECN). This article ignores that point completely and focuses on a lot of cliches.
I replied as follows:
Bruce Cameron Hi Eamon, I believe (second hand) that Army is actively considering this issue … it’s just a pity that those involved are not prepared to inform the debate. Maybe it was ever thus? A good point was made below regarding recruiting aptitude levels. If inf were to be swapped between mech and non-mech battalions, all inf would have to meet the aptitude level now required for the RAAC.
———————————————————————————————————————
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL III
Following on from below. (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice).
My response to the President in relation to the third of these is copied below:
Dear President,
Serial 3 states that Armouredadvocates’ aspirational Goal (see Note 1 at end) that ‘The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned’ should be “backed up with facts and/or examples that relate specifically to the current Management Committee”
It should be noted here that the above Goal was moved to the ‘Pending’ category after the present C’tee decided to make Minutes of Management C’tee meetings available to members and provided a partial summary of RAAC Corporation AGMs.
To move this Goal to the Crossed off the List Category (see Note 2) the 1AR Assn would have to: (i) give reasons to a person denied membership or membership renewal by the C’tee and (ii) release Minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs. These matters are discussed below.
Reasons for Denial of Membership. This matter was discussed last year in a Blog post. It is copied below.
1AR Assn Draft Constitution states, Rule 30 (1), that: “The membership of a personceases on resignation, expulsion or death.”
This would seem right and proper, ie. “expulsion” would be a consequence of disciplinary procedures which are stipulated in the Constitution …. action taken in this respect being made known and justified to members.
BUT … there is another reason that that membership of a person can cease, which is contained elsewhere in Constitution. Rule 19 states that
(2)” A renewal of membership shall be treated by the Management Committee in the same manner as an application for membership including due diligence”; and
(4:) “A decision to reject a renewal of membership shall be final and binding on all parties”.
So … a person applies to join the Assn; they meet the requirements; are accepted by the C’tee; and pay their m’ship fees. The C’tee has stated that when their m’ship comes up for renewal they MAY be “invited … to pay membership fees for the next period of time”.
We now have a situation whereby a member who has not been subject to any disciplinary action, may or may not be invited to rejoin, and, if they are, may or may not have their application approved. As with refusing an initial application for membership, the C’tee does not have to give any reason for their decision.
It would seem that there are, in effect, two disciplinary C’tees; an ‘official’ one appointed to investigate an offence and an ‘unofficial’ one, ie the Management C’tee, acting in this capacity, to consider whether or not to approve a person’s membership renewal. In the case of the ‘official’ disciplinary action, actions have to be justified; in the case of the ‘unofficial’ c’tee … they do not.
Is this fair and just?
The ‘secret’ powers (in the sense of the power to take action which does not require reason or justification to be given to either those directly affected or members generally) granted to the C’tee by the Constitution, do not stop as per the above.
Rule 16 states that a prospective member has to pass “a fit and proper person test, as established by the Association from time to time, to verify their eligibility”. The C’tee have advised, in response to a query, that the test does not have to be agreed by members generally; ie. the C’tee themselves can decide on the test (and change it whenever they wish) and use it to bar a prospective member, with neither explanation nor justification.
Surely, the 1AR Assn does not need such draconian ‘secret’ measures and can operate on an open and transparent basis whereby reasons are given to members for decisions which are made on their behalf.
Minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs As mentioned above, the C’tee has decided to advise members of matters that they (ie. the C’tee) consider that 1AR Assn members need to know. Why is such censorship necessary? Membership fees for the RAAC Corporation are paid using members’ funds. Why should members not be entitled to full disclosure of the matters discussed in meetings at which they are formally represented. An example of such non-disclosure, was provided very recently. The manager of RAAC Overwatch provided a briefing on the organisation and how it assists former and serving RAAC personnel at a RAAC Corporation AGM. No record of the meeting was provided to Assn members; hence no-one (incl c’tee members) had any idea as to its role and method of operation.
NOTE 1: Armouredadvocates’ aspirational Goals refer to the things that, in an ideal world, would apply to RAAC personnel (in my opinion). There are presently 31 goals outstanding; eight goals ‘pending’ final achievement; and 21 goals ‘crossed off ‘(ie. achieved).
NOTE 2: With respect to Armouredadvocates Goals, it should be noted that the following are now in the ‘Crossed off the List’(ie. achieved) category:(i) Those former 1AR members who desire to do so, can use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin; (ii) The 1AR Assn now has a valid Constitution approved by members; (iii) Minutes of the last 1AR AGM were published without any defamatory material; and (iv) Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings are now being made available to members.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
15 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL II
Following on from 13 March 2019 … (I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice). My response to the President in relation to the second of these is copied below:
“Serial 2 states that the Armouredadvocates’ Goal that “the Purposes of the 1AR Assn [should] include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal [should] be enacted by the C’tee”, is false and misleading because reference to such things is made in the 1AR Assn Constitution.
It should be noted here that the Goal was moved to the ‘Pending’ category after the new Constitution was endorsed. Prior to that (according to the 1AR Assn RAAC Corp rep) assns that were members of the RAAC Corporation had decided that they did not have the resources to provide welfare support. It should also be noted that the Armouredadvocates’ Goal was for welfare assistance to be included as one of the ‘Purposes’ of the Assn as set out in the Constitution (rather than being included in sub-rules).
Earlier this week the C’tee advised members that “the current Management Committee (elected in July 2018) have examined a number of issues associated with the provision of services related to welfare, health and well-bearing and determined that our Association does not have the expertise, experience, personnel or financial resources or indeed the wherewithal to take on such a considerable and risk-filled role”.
It would seem that I should move the Goal back to being an aspirational objective.
Another point to note is the Goal refers not only to the desirability of welfare assistance being one of the Assn’s ‘Purposes’, but also something that is actually enacted by the C’tee. To this end, I noted that the Charter of the RAAC Overwatch states that “it is the welfare structure that sits behind and supports RAAC Corps/Sqn groups and friends’ networks”. Furthermore, it provides all types of welfare support to former and serving RAAC personnel; thereby strengthening and complementing the activities of these groups.
It’s reasonable to expect, as I did, that Corps and Sqn groups (eg. 1AR Assn) would have close and on-going contact with an organisation which provided an RAAC specific welfare structure that sits behind the 1AR Assn C’tee. [It’s even more reasonable when the RAAC Overwatch Charter is posted on the RAAC Corporation website and the Manager of RAAC Overwatch provided a briefing at a RAAC Corporation AGM.]
I asked two questions: (i) has RAAC Overwatch been effective since it was established and (ii) how can a person in need of assistance contact them? I believe the answers to these questions will provided info which in the best interests of 1AR Assn members.
I had hoped for a response along the lines of: ‘the 1AR Assn C’tee has been working very closely with RAAC Overwatch to meet the welfare needs of 1AR Assn members. There have been several incidents where the well-being of serving and former RAAC personnel have been improved. If anyone knows of someone in need of help, or they are in need themselves, they should contact the C’tee in the first instance. They will facilitate contact with Overwatch Australia and, through them, RAAC Overwatch’.
Was this what happened? No. Rather than the RAAC Overwatch standing directly behind the C’tee, it seems that the neither the C’tee, nor members knew anything about RAAC Overwatch. Because of this I asked RAAC Overwatch if it could prepare a short spiel suitable for RAAC Assns to use to inform their members about how it operates. Now the Secretary has posted a diatribe from the RAAC Overwatch Manager stating that he is “pissed off with the questions that have been asked”. Information is provided by him re those who select the Overwatch C’tee; those who are on the Overwatch C’tee; the qualifications he has; and the sacrifices he has made. No details are provided about how RAAC Overwatch works with the 1AR Assn C’tee, nor how to contact them. These were the only questions I asked.
Is this really something which justifies the Assn not renewing my membership? I would have thought that the more members who are concerned about the welfare of their colleagues, the better for the Assn.
Stop Press: The NSW State Rep has just advised that: “A couple of weeks ago I was contacted by Overwatch to help a fellow 1AR member who was in a bit of a hole, with a few phone calls the matter is on the way to being resolved, (provided DVA does its job) some good news at last.”
I’m confused. Can you please explain if the 1AR Assn is to provide welfare support or not. Should 1AR Assn be contacted by Overwatch to advocate on behalf of a member, or vice versa?
NOTE. I think I might be like a lot of members, I did not print out and keep a copy of the 1AR Assn Constitution when it was sent out prior to the AGM. Can the Constitution be made available for the information of members by placing on the 1AR Assn website. This would mean that the references to specific sub-rules as you have made, would be able to be reviewed by members.
NOTE 2. ‘Armouredadvocates’ Goals refer to the things that, in an ideal world, would apply to RAAC personnel (in my opinion) There are presently 31 goals outstanding; eight goals ‘pending’ final achievement; and 21 goals ‘crossed off ‘(ie. achieved).
IFV: RAAC or RA Inf?
My article in The Cove has sparked some great debate. It’s a pity I’ve got to focus on the stuff above at the moment (my limited time could be so much better employed). I’ll try to do a summary of the arguments on Sunday. In passing … I particularly liked the comment below (as the author had correctly seen the potential problem):
“Bruce Cameron that’s what you very clearly and effectively stated in your pieces and the point this writer ignores. You can’t be a Dismounted LSW Operator one week, then jump into a turret the next, then go back to the LSW role and expect your skills at either to be top shelf. This gets more and more relevant as you progress. An infantry section commander can’t be expected to command a 21st century, world class AFV if he isn’t a full time crew commander. It just isn’t realistic, but this author seems to claim it’ll be fine. He can do it, however, if his trade is ECN 344 Armoured Infantry, rather than 343 (344 is obviously just a made up ECN). This article ignores that point completely and focuses on a lot of cliches.”
———————————————————————————————————————
14 March 2019
NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR MEMBERSHIP RENEWAL
I’ve just received a letter from the President 1AR Assn calling on me to show cause as to why my membership of the Assn should be renewed. Fourteen reasons are given in support of this Notice. My response to the President in relation to the first of these is copied below:
“Thank you for your registered letter of 8 March 2019. I welcome the opportunity you’ve provided to me. I’ll try to respond to the points you’ve made as I get a chance (and would be happy to receive your further considerations of them as the matters might be decided).
At Serial 1 you state that that Armouredadvocates’ Goal that … donations[should] be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise ‘to assist the Association’s endeavours’, is totally false as this can be done now.
I donated to all the proceeds from the book I wrote to the 1AR Assn. An extract from the book explains that “The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours”. (Page x, Vol 1).
The donation was returned to me by the C’tee and a legal firm was appointed (using members’ funds) to inform me that my donation could not be accepted for this purpose as it created a ”constructive obligation” on the part of the C’tee. I am unaware of any advice that this is no longer the case. My subsequent request for the basis as to what constitutes an ‘acceptable’, as distinct to an ‘unacceptable’, donation, to be made known to members…. has gone unanswered.
The Minutes of the last AGM stated that the Assn’s income derives from sponsorships and members’ fees. I asked what sponsorships were involved and suggested that ‘donations’ be added as a source of income. I was informed that sponsorship was incorrect as a source of income. I have not seen any amendment re ‘donations’ as an accepted source of income.
If donations are now acceptable, can they be accepted to ‘assist the Assn’s endeavours’? If so, why was my donation, provided for this purpose, returned? Why was I informed that it was illegal for the 1AR Assn to accept a donation for this purpose?
CENTURION ‘FACTS’
The following image and was posted on an RAAC FB page recently:
The caption was: “Centurion Rounds as used in Vietnam”. –
It turns out that yellow is the colour which designated HE, olive drab is purely for camouflage. Interesting … isn’t it?
—————————————————————————————————————
13 March 2019
2/14 Light Horse Regiment (QMI)
Progress in another Armouredadvocates’ Goal: “2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provided good access to training areas (and suitable housing and schooling for families)”.
The way things seemed initially after the formation of the 2/14 ACR … all AFV training would have to be undertaken at Shoal Water Bay Training Area. There was even a proposal that tanks might be kept at Rockhampton to minimise the travel. This was considered a possibility, given the expansion of SWBTA to facilitate training by the Singaporean Armed Forces.
Located about 200km from Brisbane, Wide Bay is near Fraser Island. There has long been a military training area at the adjacent Tin Can Cay. Wide Bay is less than one third of the distance to Shoalwater Bay.
Denigrating Others
Sometimes some people put others down deliberately (couldn’t we do without them); sometimes they do it unknowingly.
The following image {owner Sandy Tocock] and caption appeared recently on a FB page:
“His last recovery job in Vietnam – he was flown out in a chopper from the Dat to take over the job because his replacement wasn’t ‘up too it’. [He] had 3 days left ‘in country’.”.
What’s the inference here? ‘Not up to it’ could mean that he was unwell; in this context, however, it suggests that he wasn’t good enough. This is my description of events in ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’ … it suggests quite a different explanation:
“The predicament was not one welcomed by the commander of the ARV supporting 1 Troop at the time. Because [the normal crew commander] was due to return home in three days’ time and his replacement had not yet arrived, a temporary crew commander had been brought in from 102 Field Workshop (Vung Tau). Unfortunately, although very knowledgeable in terms of RAEME tasks generally, he had little experience in complex recovery situations.
In the case at hand, the recovery was complicated by the fact that it had occurred near an ARVN post, the approaches to which were mined. This meant that the option of positioning the ARV off the road to achieve an angled pull was ruled out. Furthermore, towing the tank parallel to the road only served to tip it more. “
———————————————————————————————————————
12 March 2019
Some Good News: Ha Go Tank Crew Number
A couple of us have been taking the AWM to task for some time over the description of the Japanese Ha Go tank as having a crew of four. (There are numerous blog posts over several years below).
Rod Ward has just come across the AWM restoration team’s report … it states the crew as being ‘three’ and describes their roles..
A couple of us former tankies have been corresponding with the AWM for some time, arguing that the term “crew” refers to those who actually operate the AFV from inside.
(We believe that the AWM reference comes from the naming of a fourth man who acted as a guide in front of the tank when needed, or possibly a spare crewman.)”
One step forward …. my follow up email:
Following on from the message below … I thought the Fact Sheet might have just been an oversight, so I checked the data given by the Ha Go exhibit itself.
Unfortunately, like the Fact Sheet, it states that the Ha Go had a crew of four. Fingers crossed that this might be able to be corrected in the near future.
I believe that the information ‘boards’ in the Galleries are now able to be corrected quite easily (whereas previously it seemed that this info was set in concrete). Well done. AWM!
As a result of the above, the related Armouredadvocates’ goal [The Japanese Ha Go tank exhibited at the AWM would be described as having a crew of three (rather than four)] has been moved to Pending. Hopefully it won’t be long before it gets moved to ‘Crossed off the List’.
Centurions
Following on from 9 March ….
The above image (owner unknown, pity as it’s a great photo) appeared recently on a FB page with the caption: “Exercise at Singleton in 1962. – Mk 3. .50 Cal Ranging Gun added much later. (Mk 5/1)
To reiterate:
(i) a Centurion Mk 3 became a Mk 5 when the Besa coax was replaced by a Browning .30, and a .30cal AA mg was added (necessitating additional ammunition and therefore, a rearrangement of internal ammo stowage;
(ii) a Centurion Mk 5 became a Centurion Mk 5/1 when it was uparmoured on the glacis plate; and
(iii) a Centurion Mk 5/1 became a Centurion Mk 5/1 (Aust) when the RMG and IR were added, The is an unofficial designation as Australian Cents were the only ones in the world armed with 20 Pounder/RMG.
———————————————————————————————————————-
11 March 2019
Members’ Welfare Funds Put to ‘Good’ Use?
Many things have happened since this TPI Vic Inc Committee of management Briefing Paper was circulated publicly. See: file:///C:/Users/user/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/Content.Outlook/HT4KRTDV/TPI%20Victoria%20Inc.%20CoM%20BRiefing%20Paper%20No.002.2019%20(002).pdf.
The extracts below (just the tip of the iceberg) explain how things can go so wrong when Management is not open and transparent as far as members are concerned. Remember that this an organisation established to provide welfare assistance to those Totally and Permanently Disabled.
1. I was invited to the E J Whitten Foundation AFL Grand Final Lunch at Docklands last year by a mate 1100 people attended, at another table was the President and committee members of the TPI Association Vic, a table of 10 cost $3245 or $324.50 a head.
We have found out since that the HQ TPI Vic paid for the lunch out of Members welfare funds, this has also been confirmed by the Treasurer of the TPI Association Vic Mr Shane Turner. It was a five hour extravaganza hosted by Sam Kekovich.
One member of the committee who attended the lunch is believed to have paid back the cost of the lunch to the TPI Association Vic, this is significant in that at least one member out of the 10 that attended the lunch of Red, White Wine, Crown Lager, including a three course meal with Cheese and Biscuits to finish off, has a conscience and realized that he and the others had spent TPI welfare members funds enjoying a great piss up.
It was also mentioned at the Special meeting that one of the members that attended the E J Whitten lunch was not a member of the TPI Association Vic, where he fitted in and why he was paid for out of TPI Members welfare Funds is unknown at this time.
Is this the correct way to expend Members welfare funds! I am sure ordinary members would had never heard about their attendance at this lunch, it would had never been reported about in CHINup and it most likely would have been hidden under Expenses or Donations in the Yearly financial report.
What else has been going on regarding the funds of the TPI Association Vic that has not been reported to the members, only a Forensic audit will reveal the true situation?
2.. The President Mr John Poland attend[ed] a conference in Hawaii, which the TPI Association Vic paid for, this also included the use of the TPI President Corporate credit card at a popular well-known restaurant. Members at the Special general meeting were unaware that the President had attended the conference, as the President to their knowledge had not reported back to members regarding the outcome of the conference.
Ms Pat McCabe OAM President TPI Federation Australia has confirmed that she also attended the Hawaii conference with Mr Poland. Ms McCabe has confirmed that she paid for all here own expenses to attend the Conference.
The ex-service community have recently had RSL NSW, RSL National and now this. The 1AR Assn is now on the right track after hard questions were asked (and members denigrated for doing so). To any c’tee members of RAAC Assns reading this … please don’t ‘close down’ discussions resulting from members’ questions about management of their Assn (eg. does the 1AR Assn have ‘a welfare structure that sits behind it and supports it, providing all types of welfare support to former and serving Assn members; thereby strengthening and complementing the activities of the 1AR Assn’?.
Bullying
Following on from recent posts … the person who claims to have been bullied whilst I was seeking info re the RAAC Overwatch , has stated that part of his qualification for doing so was that “[he] was ranked third out of eight officers (7 ARA) in the ROBC [Regular Officers’ Basic Course]”.
Last month, while appearing as a ‘witness’ before the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, I provided the following information:
Was it a hard thing to do, i.e. putting your life in jeopardy? Yes. But it was the right thing to do and there was no alternative. I was not married and had no children. Would that have made a difference? It would have made it harder, but would not have changed my decision. I believe that I would have lost not only my self-respect, but also the respect of my loved ones … if I had not have done what was right.
How does what happened, make you feel today? I get annoyed when people carry on about mundane matters as if they were the most significant things that could affect their lives. They lack any sense of real importance, yet feel that they have the right to impose their views on others. They fail to understand that there is a greater good beyond things that affect one’s own person.
Interpretations of Respect
Following on from the above, I guess it all comes down to the way one person ‘interprets’ something said to or stated about another.
The following post has just appeared on the 1AR Assn FB page:
Anthony Soutar Bruce, modern medicine astounds me. Here you were are while back so ill that you could not attend the Assn AGM in Canberra and now you are able to travel to Alice Springs. Well done on you remarkable recovery and I hope the travel to Alice isn’t to taxing on you. Well done and best of luck in your long travels!
Obviously, in the mind of the 1AR Secretary it is neither insulting nor sarcastic and wouldn’t be offensive to me. Yet the Secretary knows full well that travel has nothing to do with my medical condition. Having suffered a brain haemorrhage, I have no trouble travelling. The difficulty comes when I arrive. If I was to attend a meeting where I had to constantly defend my views to a hostile audience, my injured brain wouldn’t tolerate such pressure. I can explain in my own time, using a keyboard, but constant challenges and demands for responses in real time would simply overload the circuitry. Consequently, I pick and chose where I go and what I do. If I can make it to Alice Springs to commemorate the life and service of someone I fought alongside, I will endeavour to do so.
——————————————————————————————————————-
10 March 2019
THE RIGHT OF REPLY (RAAC OVERWATCH)
“This topic (RAAC Overwatch) has been deleted because of the erroneous claims and misleading statement made by Bruce Cameron. Denigration of welfare oriented groups will not be countenanced. Russ James, Secretary 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc.”
The above is part of a FB post by the Secretary 1 AR Assn. I responded with the two ‘posts’ below. These, however, have been withheld. So much for any right of reply. (It seems that it’s alright for the Secretary to state whatever he likes (true or not); as he has the power of veto over any reply.)
The Charter of RAAC overwatch states that it is the welfare structure that sits behind and supports RAAC Corps/Sqn groups and friends’ networks. It provides all types of welfare support to former and serving RAAC personnel; thereby strengthening and complementing the activities of these groups. It’s reasonable to expect, as I did, that Corps and Sqn groups (eg. 1AR Assn) would have close and on-going contact with an organisation which provided an RAAC specific welfare structure that sits behind the 1AR Assn C’tee. [It’s even more reasonable when the RAAC Overwatch Charter is posted on the RAAC Corporation website and the Manager of RAAC Overwatch provided a briefing at a RAAC Corporation AGM.] I asked two questions: (i) has RAAC Overwatch been effective since it was established and (ii) how can a person in need of assistance contact them? I’ve now been accused of “bullying”, as a result. If ‘bullying’ equates to asking questions which some people find hard to answer … then I’m guilty. I don’t apologise. I believe RAAC former and serving members are all the better served by knowing the answers.
I’ve just had a long chat with Steve Mateljan about RAAC Overwatch. (Steve is the manager/co-ordinator for matters involving RAAC personnel.)
Despite the impression given by the Charter, there is no separate [formal organisation] nor contact for the RAAC Overwatch. Should there be an RAAC serviceman in need of assistance, the contact is Overwatch Australia. Who goes to assist in the first instance, will be whoever is available in the relevant location (RAN,RAAF or Army). [Thereafter, the RAAC network will do what it can, mainly dependant on location, to provide Corps related one to one support.]
Overwatch is not an emergency response organisation (police, ambulance etc are the services here). Overwatch is a follow up (or preventative body)
Apparently RAAC Overwatch has been in touch regularly with RAAC Associations [including 1AR Assn], however, it would seem that relevant info has not been widely disseminated.
I’ve asked for, and Steve has undertaken to provide, a brief information notice suitable to be placed on the FB pages/websites of RAAC organisations. In the meantime … 1800 699 2824 for Overwatch Australia
————————————————————————————
9 March 2019
RAAC OVERWATCH
Finishing off … the RAAC Overwatch Charter states that it is the welfare structure that sits behind and supports RAAC Corps/Sqn groups and friends networks. It provides all types of welfare support to former and serving RAAC personnel; thereby strengthening and complementing the activities of these groups. It’s reasonable to expect, as I did, that Corps and Sqn groups (ie. Assns) would have close and on-going contact with this supporting welfare structure. As mentioned yesterday, the Charter gives a misleading impression of the role and operation of RAAC Overwatch. It turns out to be part of Overwatch Australia which creates Service/Corps support networks (eg. RAN, RAE etc). I think it would be a good thing for the Charter to be revised to more clearly explain how Overwatch/RAAC Overwatch work. Having said this … apparently RAAC Overwatch gave a presentation at a RAAC Corporation AGM. This is further reason for Minutes of RAAC Corp AGMs to be distributed to members of RAAC Assns.
Last word … well done to all the volunteers at Overwatch. They receive some funding through a commercial sponsorship. There would seem to good reason for the RAAC Corporation to help with the creation of a “welfare Structure that sits behind and supports RAAC Corps and Sqn groups”.
PS. I believe that I’ve been accused of “bullying” in trying to understand the situation. If ‘bullying’ equates to asking questions which some people find hard to answer … then I’m guilty. I don’t apologise. I believe RAAC former and serving members are all the better served by knowing the answers.
2018 Ironsides (Annual RAAC Newsletter) III : “The Centurion Mk3”
Another email …
Dear Curator,
The Australian Army Tank Museum and RAAC Memorial’s article in Ironsides refers to the Centurion Mk3 in its collection.
What does it mean for this reference to be correct? What can the visitors to the Museum expect to see in relation to this exhibit?
I understand that Australia’s first 60 Centurions were Mk3s (subsequent tanks were built to Mk5 standard prior to delivery). The Mk3 tanks were all subsequently upgraded to Mk5/1 (Aust) standard. This involved uparmouring, replacing the 7.92mm Besa coax mg with a .30cal Browning; fitting a .30cal AA mg (‘comds’ mg); drilling out the turret to fit a .50cal RMG; reconfiguring the internal ammo stowage to enable extra mg ammo to be carried; and fitting IR equipment and a 100gal fuel tank..
To convert a Mk5/1(Aust) tank back to Mk3 standard would require (amongst other things); filling in the RMG aperture in the turret; replacing the mantlet cover; removing the comd’s mg and bracket; replacing the coax Browning with a Besa; removing the glacis plate uparmouring; fitting a Type A barrel; refitting the driver’s long range hood bin; removing the IR basket etc and all Vietnam mods (incl 100gal fuel tank).
Was the article correct in referring to a Centurion Mk3?
Many thanks ….
It would be a great thing for the AATM to show both a Mk3 Centurions and a Mk5/1 Centurion; thereby demonstrating the changes (and the reasons for them) which took place during the period that the Cents were operated by the RAAC. Unfortunately, I don’t think that this is the intention. (I believe that because the tank was a Mk3 when delivered, the Curator thinks that it should continue to be so designated.)
Speaking of Cents ….
Thanks to Rod Ward for alerting me to this photo of my tank up on the Horseshoe in 1971 (taken by ‘Bluey’ Dennis, shown on T&TA FB Page). Interestingly, this was not the first time that a tank squadron had included a ‘5 Troop’. During the Second World War tank troops were numbered sequentially, like infantry platoons.
———————————————————————————————————————————
8 March 2019
The RAAC ACT ‘CHAPTER’
According to the RAAC Corporation Chairman, the Rep Hon Col suggested to him a few years ago that it would be good to have a ‘chapter’ of the RAAC Corporation in Canberra (the lack of such a ‘body’ having been noticeable for some time). The Chairman subsequently dismissed the RAAC Corporation Chapter idea and stated that an ACT Branch of the 1AR Assn would be established.
Unfortunately, there was no consultation with Black Hats in the ACT re what they might like by way of a representative RAAC body. Working on the basis that ‘build it and they’ll come’, everyone was informed that a get-together was to be held at a local pub. Few people attended. The 1AR Assn Rep for the ACT resigned soon after. (1AR Assn members in the ACT are now listed on the books of the NSW Rep.)
It occurs to me that it wouldn’t be too hard to do a survey to find out what sort of body ACT Black Hats might like, what sort of functions they would like organised, etc etc. Based on this input, it wouldn’t be too hard to organise a body capable of meeting the needs of the majority of Black Hats. Obviously, a branch of the 1AR Assn would not be a suitable representative body for all. If a Black Hat body was created, it may or may not wish to be a (fee paying) member of the RAAC Corporation. It’s formation, therefore, would be independent of the Corporation.
Is an independent ACT Black Hat Assn feasible? I guess anything’s possible if membership fees are not involved, ie. a co-ordinating structure could be set up which used a data base to keep in touch with all Black Hats, seek their views on gatherings that they would like to be held (and those that they would not like to be held) and do basic ‘event management’ on a self-paying basis. The whole structure could be held together via emails, telephone, and a ‘newsletter’ giving early warning of possible activities, putting out calls for input and interest, etc. A number of ‘C’tee’ members (‘functionaries’) would be necessary to share the workload and keep everything going if someone was away for a trip or in hospital etc.
‘Members’ would include serving as well as retired RAAC personnel (there are a lot of the former in Canberra). A function which used to occur regularly was that in which cadets graduating into RAAC from RMC were presented with their lanyards by the Rep Hon Col. Retired Black Hats were invited and made welcome. It doesn’t happen anymore.
Now, if a body based on membership fees was necessary (for whatever reason) … would it be possible to form an ACT ‘sub- branch’/chapter of the RAACA NSW? This brings into play financial accounts, audits, AGMs etc … but some of the regulatory requirements would be eased (working on the same Constitution, for example). Maybe there are advantages for RAACA (NSW) in terms of increasing membership, combined functions etc. Food for thought ….
RAAC OVERWATCH
Interestingly, RAACA NSW (like the 3 Cav Assn) have never heard of RAAC Overwatch (hence they’d not been able to refer anyone should there have been a need to do so). Those I contacted that had commented on my post on the 1AR Assn FB page, had also never heard of RAAC Overwatch (until they saw my post). It goes without saying, that neither they, nor the 1AR Assn C’tee could provide contact info. Why am I interested?
During research for my book I came in contact with many RAAC Vietnam Veterans. Some had significant health problems. One I became so concerned about, I contacted staff at a hospital where I know he received treatment. Too late. He died at his own hand. The idea of RAAC Overwatch seems like a good one, but how can it be of any use if it’s cloaked in secrecy … with no means of contact in an emergency?
I’ve just made another call to Overwatch Australia. This time I got through and was able to ask for contact info for RAAC Overwatch. My number was taken and I was told that the appropriate person would call me back. More to follow.
Stop Press 1: The Secretary 1AR Assn has just put up a post on the Assn FB page ….he states that he rang Overwatch Australia and asked to speak to someone from RAAC Overwatch. This didn’t happen (for whatever reason) and he spoke only with an Overwatch Australia person. During the course of this, it was explained that “although Overwatch knows the number of a missed call their protocol stipulates that they should not ring back as they (Overwatch) do not know who made the call”. This presumeably is to explain why I wasn’t called back. BUT, I actually left a message, explaining who I was and the reason for my call. So we still don’t have contact details for RAAC Overwatch which is “the welfare structure that sits behind and supports the RAAC Corps, squadron groups and friends networks.
On another note … I just lost a friend by virtue of insisting that we (former officers) have an obligation to assist those we served with in case of need. If RAAC Overwatch doesn’t help in this regard (or doesn’t help in emergencies) then we need to know so that we don’t waste time and go straight to Lifeline
STOP PRESS 2:
I’ve just had a long chat with Steve Mateljan about RAAC Overwatch. (Steve is the manager/co-ordinator for matters involving RAAC personnel.)
Despite the impression given by the Charter, there is no separate contact for the RAAC Overwatch. Should there be an RAAC serviceman in need of assistance, the contact is Overwatch Australia. Who goes to assist in the first instance, will be whoever is available in the relevant location (RAN,RAAF or Army).
Overwatch is not an emergency response organisation (police, ambulance etc are the services here). Overwatch is a follow up (or preventative body)
Apparently RAAC Overwatch has been in touch regularly with RAAC Associations, however, it would seem that relative info has not been widely disseminated.
I’ve asked for, and Steve has undertaken to provide, a brief information notice suitable to be placed on the FB pages/websites of RAAC organisations. In the meantime … 1800 699 2824 for Overwatch Australia.
————————————————————————————————————————————–
7 March 2019
RAAC OVERWATCH
Simply unbelievable. I’ve put a backlog of posts on hold, so as to address this issue straight away.
The Charter for RAAC overwatch was posted on the RAC Corporation website three years ago. It can be read at
In essence, RAAC Overwatch is a not-for-profit organisation, modeled on Overwatch Australia. Not being able to find out anything about it on Google, I posted a request on the 1AR Assn Facebook page asking if anyone knew how it was going in terms of assistance to RAAC members in need. (The 3 Cav Regt Assn had never heard of it, hence, there had never been any referrals)
My post received a range of comments, quite a few vitriolic. The C’tee of the 1AR Assn had no idea how to contact the RAAC Corporation. I rang and left a message with Overwatch Australia, asking for info about RAAC Overwatch. My call was not returned.
I was puzzled as to how an organisation like RAAC Overwatch could perform as per its Charter, if no-one was able to get in touch to seek assistance. This led me to wonder whether or not the concept had been a good idea, that had never got off the ground. \
Next thing, my post was deleted and replaced by the following message:
This topic (RAAC Overwatch) has been deleted because of the erroneous claims and misleading statement made by Bruce Cameron. RAAC Overwatch is alive and well and has done an enormous amount of work in relation to the health and well being of RAAC Members. Just because one member is having some difficulty in contacting the Group dos not mean that the group does not exist and therefore should be terminated. This has nothing to do with the RAAC Corporation or the 1AR Association. The support provided by RAAC Corporation is moral support only – that is ‘well done chaps, keep up the good work. Denigration of welfare oriented groups will not be countenanced. Russ James, Secretary 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc.
What erroneous claims? What misleading statements? What denigration? (I guess Mr James has his own reasons, for the things he says … I just hope not to fall to this level.)
Surely an organisation set up to assist former and serving RAAC members, should be right at the forefront of those who might become aware of RAAC personnel in need (eg. 1AR Assn C’tee), as well as those who themselves might be in need of assistance. When I posted a follow-up to the message above, asking for contact information to be made available … my request was deleted.
What’s it all mean? It means that there is an organisation established to assist RAAC personnel in need, but no-one is prepared to say how those in need can contact it (that’s a ‘secret’).
Seems to me that it’s a bit like the comment: “This would be a great hospital, if it wasn’t for the patients”.
What happens if someone wishes to volunteer to help RAAC Overwatch? Too bad … it’s a closed shop? Would you not think that, before supporting any organisation that is intended to help those in need, you’d want to ensure those involved in providing help are appropriately qualified and/or have appropriate support to call on, and are volunteering their efforts for the right reasons?
Just look at the situation that TPI Victoria has got itself into by not being open and transparent.
Supposedly there is no financial assistance being given to RAAC Overwatch (of course the RAAC Corporation Financial Report is not available to verify this). But why shouldn’t a body designed to assist RAAC personnel in need, receive financial support (donations)? The 1AR Assn reported if had $35,000 of “surplus funds” One would think that the RAAC Overwatch, in theory, would be a deserving recipient of a donation to help with their work. (The 1AR Assn has since stated that the $35,000 is not ‘surplus’, but required for the operation of the Association.) I can’t help but wonder why the RAAC Overwatch doesn’t want anyone to know how to contact it.
————————————————————————————————————————————–
6 March 2019
2018 Ironsides (Annual RAAC Newsletter) II
Following on from yesterday, another email:
Dear Major Hooper,
Congratulations on producing another great Ironsides (in the tradition of PB).
Just one question … did you write the article on Coral-Balmoral?
If you did, I fear that you might have incorporated some false information.
As an example, the attack on the enemy position on 30 May has been described by the TF Commander at the time, as a “most impressive example of tanks operating in support of infantry in trouble”. Fact is that the APCs did not assault the enemy position (as per the article), the tanks did.
Also there is no mention of the role that the tanks played in the Defence of Balmoral (one of the most courageous and decisive actions of the Vietnam War) . This is hard to fathom in the RAAC annual newsletter.
I could understand it if an article appearing in the general public domain had been reprinted, but not if this was something that you’d drafted yourself.
It might be a worthwhile for next year’s Ironsides … to ask participants in the actual battles (a few of whom are copied above) to contribute accounts of their experiences, as the basis for a follow-up article. Many thanks ….
Not having had a response, I emailed the Head of Corps:
Dear Brigadier,
As HOC, I feel that you will be interested in the email below.
I’d be happy to list the matters that should be addressed before this account is incorporated into the Corps history. Best wishes …
Some other matters:
(i) Is it the Combat Arms Training Centre, or Combined Arms Training Centre?
(ii) Unfortunate typos: “RSM Arm” (Colonel-in-Chief); Saini (Peninsula), scares (of their service), Quins Post (HOC), “where backloaded”, “The Whalers taken to the Boer War”.
(iii) “Image of Centurion tank from the Battle of Coral-Balmoral” (The tank has a roadwheel mounted on the glacis plate.)
(iv) “Exercise Predators Run with 1ACR”. Is 1ACR now an approved Regimental title, or should the correct reference be ‘1st Armoured Regiment’?
(PS. Sadly, there has been no response to either of the above emails.)
————————————————————————————————————————————
5 March 2019
2018 Ironsides (Annual RAAC Newsletter)
A couple of emails resulting from the recent Ironsides (just published):
First:
Dear Capability and Sustainment Group Communications (DOD),
LAND 400 Phase 2 CRV has been described as a “3 Billion plus contract” awarded to Rheinmetall … in the 2018 Edition (just published) of the RAAC Journal IRONSIDES (Editor Maj G T Hooper CSM, School of Armour, Puckapunyal).
As this is an AFV to be employed by the RAAC, credibility is automatically attached to the article.
I thoroughly support your undertaking “to strongly oppose the misinterpretation that seems to accompany the rhetoric – that the cavalry scout capability does not require mounted training and platform support. I would argue that the Commander FORCOMD Directive57-17 was an attempt to clearly articulate and direct how this capability gap would be addressed, however, regrettably it has not been implemented with the weight many ARES RAAC members had hoped for”.
In the little bit of advocating that I do re RAAC matters (https://armouredadvocates.wordpress.com/), one of my objectives has been: “All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare”.
I believe that MajGen McLachlan’s strong belief was that RAAC units should be equipped with a crew served platform which enabled RAAC mobile warfare skills to be kept alive and practised. I hope that it was not this issue that led to his recent resignation.
Well done again for advocating such an important matter for the RAAC,
The Cove article re LAND 400 (IFV) continues to attract comments.
The most recent followed on from that which was the subject of the 1 March Blog. It was:
“What vessels could Australia requisition in 2019? Let alone taking into consideration of the tonnage, crane and deck considerations!
Australia would have to rely on Coalition or civilian vessels to provide a credible combat sized force of the L400 fleet. Australia cannot do it with our own assets in 2019.”
My response was:
Dear ….,
It is civilian vessels that I was referring re the Vietnam and Falklands examples.
If it is being done as one would expect, one of the responsibilities of those charged with managing the ADF’s contingency plans … is to keep up to date, a data base with specifications of all vessels on the Australian maritime register.
Your concerns may well be justified, however. I saw in this weekend’s Australian that there was an article questioning Australia’s liquid fuel reserve policy. It was suggested that this is a strategic weakness which an enemy would be quick to exploit.
It seems to me that a national security strategy results from an assessment which is determined by the priorities allocated to a mix of quantitative evaluations and subjective judgements.
I would’ve thought that the availability of maritime assets and liquid fuel reserves would be matters which could be determined quantitatively; the applicable lead times and necessary duration, however, are subjective judgements based on available intelligence.
All these matters are obviously classified; the methodology itself, however, should be in the public arena.
It’s only when this is the case, that public confidence can be assured.
PS. If only more people would speak out about such things and a robust debate could evolve. There are so many matters which deserve to be on the public agenda. Thank goodness that The Cove is prepared to publicize arguments for and against; what a pity the RAAC Corporation is not prepared (or not allowed) to do the same.
————————————————————————————————————————————–
3 March 2019
LAND 400 Ph 3 IFVs/Current Brigade Structure
My Cove article certainly seems to have sparked some debate (which is what it was intended to do).
I responded to the comment (posted on 27 February) as below:
“The value of these matters being robustly discussed, is (I believe) to be seen in the recent production of the draft Concept of Employment (CONEMP) for a Reinforced Combat Brigade (RCB). I gather this is something which might underpin some Contingency Plans.
Our concerns about the present brigade structure’s lack of flexibility in forming balance battlegroups, might be addressed by the ORBAT proposed for the reinforced brigade. The reinforced brigade deployed on Ex Talisman Sabre in 2017 included an additional 2300 personnel. This would suggest that a heavily augmented HQ would’ve been required.
I doubt that the RCB envisaged would be anywhere as large, however, one would expect that significant improvement would be made to the limited battlegroup Comd & Control options presently available.”
Where did I learn about the concept of a deployable Reinforced Combat Brigade? … from the latest Ironsides (the brief on 3 Brigade provided by Brigadier Winter).
We can deduce from the above, that the current brigade organisation, is not necessarily the ORBAT of a brigade response force to be deployed in terms of contingency plans. Rather, it’s a convenient all corps grouping to fit in with the force rotation cycle (ie. Plan Beersheba).
It’s a pity, it seems to me, that Defence PR is not more forthcoming in terms of informing the general ‘hoi polloi’. One becomes concerned about an apparent shortcoming … he digs and digs and a little more info emerges, indicating that it’s not quite as bad as it seems. Why not be more open and transparent in the first place, thereby allowing the public to have more confidence in the command/management system?
————————————————————————————————————————————
1 March 2019
There will be no Blog post tomorrow (commemoration in Sydney to attend). A double ‘dose’ is offered below.
Strategic Mobility
The following comment is one of those posted with respect to my LAND 400 Phase 3 (IFV) article.
Australia has no ability to conduct strategic movement of a Bde sized IFV/AFV/MBT fleet. It simply doesn’t have the assets or experience required for such a movement.
Loading a M1A1 or two onto a C-17 does not equal strategic mobility of a fleet of vehicles. It might have ticked a box for readiness; however, does not equate to a viable option to the government in a near peer conflict.
How many of these vehicles can we load onto a LHD? The answer is very few…
I believe the Government is in the process of procuring a Defence of Australia fleet of vehicles. Too big, heavy and expensive to leave Australia. Definitions of ‘Koalas’
My response was as follows:
Dear ….
I think there is a need to step back a little and consider the sorts of things that strategic planning involves. Contingency planning staff are working at this very moment to update existing plans and develop new ones … in accord with the changing strategic environment. These plans are sometimes tested in exercises (though participants are unlikely to be aware that this is what’s happening).
For example, Plan Ambrose was Australia’s contingency plan for a contribution to be made to a South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) response force.in the early 1960s. Exercises Nutcracker and Icebreaker were designed to test the plan (though this was not publicly stated). At one stage, the tank squadron on the Ambrose ORBAT was on seven days’ notice to move; weapons were issued accordingly. Plan Hammerhead was developed soon after. This involved a possible deployment to South Vietnam.
In terms of strategic mobility … not just ADF assets are involved. For example, follow up Centurion tanks were deployed to Vietnam using a freighter which had been requisitioned by the RAN. (There will often be an initial lodgement force and a sustainment force.) Similarly, British troops deploying to the Falklands, did so using a number of commercial vessels.
The point you raise is a very valid one. The question, however, should be: Has the Contingency Plan for an ADF response force correctly factored in the shipping tonnages, loading crane capacities and deck loadings associated with the ADF’s AFVs?
“9 Platoon (PL) Charlie Combat Team (C CT) is mounted in four new Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), acquired under Project Land 400. With three crew and six mounted combatants in the back of each section (SECT) vehicle and PL Headquarters (HQ) in rear of the trail vehicle, the PL is making good time across the scrubby ground in the middle of the moonless night. In each IFV the Crew Commander (CREW COMD), Driver (DVR) and Gunner (GNR) all wear the new Integrated Digital Helmet Systems (IDHS), part of the Integrated Digital Soldier System (IDSS). The IDSS is in turn integrated into the Generic Vehicle Architecture (GVA) of the IFV (but generic across the entire ADF combat vehicle fleet including the Boxer CRV, Thales Bushmaster and Hawkei, SupaCat Nary, Rheinmetall MAN Trucks and Mercedes G Wagons). The remaining six members of the SECT (and PL HQ) in the rear of each IFV are also wearing the common IDSS.
The IFV is completely buttoned down (sealed) and the drivers are all steering heads up, absorbing the view of the country ahead through the Heads-Up Display (HUD) Augmented Reality (AR) visor view via the see through retractable ballistic and laser protected visor of their Combat Helmets. The AR is currently generated by the IFV external sensors (cameras), allowing 360o visibility from the IFV, almost as if the vehicle shell itself doesn’t exist, as the DVR turns his head left and right to gauge vehicle spacing distance. The IFV’s Health & Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) is displayed as simple icons in the left of his HUD, with vehicle speed and navigation aids as icons on the right side. As the DVR casts his head to the left and right, the elliptical symbol in the bottom of the visor view rotates, bringing up red (enemy), blue (friendly) and green (neutral) icons as his view aligns with them. The other three vehicles appear as blue icons in the bottom of the ellipse, the next navigation way point (WP) as green and a suspected enemy (EN) location 1400m away as a red icon.
With the voice command “Thermal”, the helmet system responds to the Application (App) command, bringing up the thermal image (TI) view of the terrain ahead, which is immediately overlaid on the digital colour night vision that currently presents in the retractable visor. He can see a cooler line of terrain up ahead and indicates his interest to the Platoon Commander (PL COMD), who is seated in the rear of the IFV. His voice commands are crisp and clear regardless of external noise, emanating from the In the Mouth (ITM) transceiver clipped to his upper molar. The ITM provides a direct bone link to his inner ear, enabling him to hear “inside his head” and enunciate “inside his mouth”, free from any external (to his mouth) noise. His transmissions go via Near Field Magnetic Induction (NFMI) to his neck loop and onto to his Push to Talk (PTT) switch system.
“Boss, can you give us a look down view of the patch at 1 o’clock, about 500m ahead? Looks like a creek or defile?” The PL COMD, who is sitting in the rear of the IFV with the other members of PL HQ, all with the same HUD/AR enabled IDHS, grunts his assent. He directs the Reconnaissance (Recce) Corporal (CPL) sitting next to him to launch the new Gen X Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) mounted in an external compartment of the IFV.”
“Some elements of strategic policy, such as capital acquisition, training and preparedness levels, logistics holdings, and resupply systems, can be evaluated quantitatively. How much investment is enough, where, when and how might or should the military be used, and the relationship between offensive and defensive priorities, are always disputed and make great demands on decision makers’ subjective judgements. Judgements that are always at the mercy of contingency.”
I think Mike could be right, ie. there are the quantitative aspects (I’d referred to) and the judgemental aspects. Then again …maybe both are elements of an Assessment.
This was my response:
Hi Mike,
Initially I thought you were right on the money … separating quantitative
evaluations from subjective judgements. You posit that “Judgements are always at the mercy of contingency”.
On reflection, I’m of the belief that quantitative evaluations and subjective judgements are both elements of strategic assessments.
You’ve said that defining national interests should be done by considering a range of factors.
I’d like to suggest that national interests are defined by assessing a combination of quantitative evaluations and subjective judgements, ie. such assessments are the outcome of the priority allocated to a range of evaluations and judgements.
I acknowledge your point, however, that not all matters can be quantitively evaluated. A judgemental factor looms large in these assessments.
It’s a worry that Hugh White stated not so long ago that those responsible (even graduates from the relevant tertiary courses) to make such decisions … aren’t qualified to do so.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
27 February 2019
Before reading the following … bear in mind that today’s multi-role brigades are all to have a full mechanised (IFV) battalion , but only a single tank squadron. To be able to create a ‘balanced’ org, ie. two battlegroups of a tank squadron and two mech inf companies. there is a need for two tank squadron in at least the ‘ready brigade’. To put this in perspective, the project cost of an IFV is $35m, three times the cost of a tank.
LAND 400 Ph3 IFVs
Another comment on my article in The Cove … Blog,3 February. (Highlighting is mine)
“A thought provoking read Mr Cameron. Firstly I agree with your argument about ”penny-packeting” armour and a lack of an additional Tank Squadron at Brigade level. Battle Grouping might not achieve the same amount of concentration that it is intended to do. It would be prudent for the Brigade to use the full tank squadron at their Main Effort or as a reserve and as you have identified the Infantry BG would miss out… or would it? having the greater firepower provided by the IFV that is organic to the organisation would mitigate some of the perceived risk.
Additionally, I know the APC squadron that operated as part of Australian Task Force in Phouc Tuy was a success story. However, I can speak from experience that when we were using Standard Infantry Battalion/ACR structure in 2014 there was some unpleasantness with the force structure. Loading was difficult as an infantryman – as you would pack everything expected for full dismounted movement as you were unsure when you would lose APC support. Sure “Fight Light” is a dominating concept amongst RAINF and all commanders attempt to follow this. But when the platform is organic to the organisation you simply don’t have that problem. Whilst the RAAC crews were good and had excellent work ethic, sometimes, in my opinion, it’s better to have an infantryman in the turrent and on the radio as you prepare for a stopdrop. Lots of successful countries manage to employ infantry as the vehicle crew – UK Armoured Infantry, US Mechanised Infantry and Bundswehr Panzer Grenadiers as you mentioned (albeit PGs are seen as different from infantry and armour). Now the argument could continue on whether RAINF follows a path of developing a specialist Armoured Infantry capability where gunnery and specialisation of personnel occur (seeing qualified soldiers/officers remain in the mech line of employment) or a more generalised approach is followed where soldiers and officers could be employed in either type of battalion. That debate is currently ongoing within RAINF.
Also my final point – IFV = INFANTRY Fighting Vehicle. The evolution of this type of vehicle was to support dismounted forces with greater firepower and protection. When looking at a 6-person section/squad by itself it would seem limited. BUT the 6-person section/squad and an IFV is a complete organism. They fight hand in hand. Also vehicles are never employed alone, therefore you can guarantee that an additional section is likely able to support that 6-person section. Some terrain would limit freedom of manoeuvre (specifically close country and urban terrain) But there are good examples of this threat being challenged. One that comes to mind is during the second Battle of Fallujah in 2004 where a US Army mech Task Force (TF 2-2) became instrumental in the predominately US Marine light infantry based clearance through the city.
My opinion is that IFVs will be employed within the battalions and that’s the right decision to make. It will mean hard training, lots of lessons learnt, and also help from our RAAC colleagues, but in the end will make us a more potent force.”
———————————————————————————————————————————-
26 February 2019
More Thoughts About the Order of Precedence
Following on from 22/23 February….
When I asked the question about the RAAC Order of Precedence, I was informed by a former WO1 Ceremonial that I had too much time on my hands and I should mow the neighbour’s lawn.
[Little does he know how little time I have on my hands … which is why I asked the question on a forum, rather than doing my own research.]
When I (I have to use the ‘I’ word as I could not interest anyone else to do anything) asked the Minister to correct the Vietnam Theatre Honour mistake on the 1AR Standard, I referred to what the uproar would be like in Britain if the dates for Waterloo were wrong on a Colour of one of the Guards Regiment. I asked him why Australians shouldn’t be similarly offended when dates for conflicts in which sacrifices were made, were wrongly recorded in the most sacred of places. He must have agreed, as the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1AR Standard is now correct.
The Order of Precedence of Regiments used to be important to avoid confusion when forming up for battle. It does not have the same importance today, simply a matter of heritage, tradition and esprit de corps. (I have to be quick … the lawn mower awaits.) I, personally, feel that it is a sad day when heritage, tradition and esprit de corps mean nothing.
Anyway … enough of all that, we know that the Order of Precedence for RAAC Regiments published by Defence is wrong. Will there be enough enthusiasm for it to be corrected, or will things stay the same to the end of time?
————————————————————————————————————————————
25 February 2019
Operational Analysis
The following is a link to a significant article concerning operational lessons learnt:
Well done. I have no knowledge of the lessons you refer to in today’s military environment, but I can’t help but wonder whether or not you’ve highlighted these by default, ie. there is no formal system within the ADF to examine actions, formulate lessons learnt, and ensure that appropriate feedback is received by those responsible for modifying procedures accordingly.
A simple example of the failure in this respect: during Vietnam … the enemy’s mine development progressed to the stage whereby they appreciated that the most vulnerable part of an AFV was the top; hence they deployed mines which were initiated by tracks/wheels on the ground, but detonated explosives sited above the AFV and intended to impact the turret crew.
Pause … think of Puckapunyal, where AFV crews were being trained, the traditional lesson plan emphasised the need for all crew members to look out for anything suspicious on the ground in front of them. Was this changed? No. The Armoured Centre had received no information about elevated mines. Why?
There was no effective system of Operational Analysis at the time. Whether or not lessons were learnt depended on individuals. As we know, the absence of a formal system of reporting lessons learnt and taking action accordingly, can be measured in lives lost. Are you aware of such a system today and are you confident that the lessons you have identified will result in improved training?
———————————————————————————————————————————-
24 February 2019
LAND 400 Ph3.
An interesting comment on my ‘summary’ of matters related to the IFV acquisition (Blog 3 February, subsequently published in The Cove … Army’s Professional Military Education ‘journal’):
“My concern is if the infantry keep hold of the IFV after its initial entry into service and not let its ownership revert to the RAAC.
Given the likely contenders for the platform, the infantry will soon have the same or very similar capability to the incoming CRV. Will this inevitably lead to the CRV having to justify its use on the battlefield? With the infantry likely being able to conduct the same reconnaissance tasks and then move into an assault once tank support has moved up, will there be a need in the future for dedicated armoured cavalry?
It is hopeful to think that the RAAC will take ownership of the platform, given its complexity, the wealth of manoeuvre knowledge already within the corps and the previously established and successful career model of RAAC; however, we must consider the possibility that the infantry may want to take on more and more of the fight, given their vehicles capability to be more than just a battlefield taxi.”
Precedence of RAAC Regiments.
Following on from yesterday … I posted the following on the 1 AR Assn website:
“I believe the following to be the case:
The order of precedence was originally created to avoid confusion when Armies were forming up on the battlefield. Regiments were initially designated by numbers. The numerical sequence determined the precedence. In peacetime, it is the order of parading from right to left.
Re the RAAC ,,, ARA Regiments first, then ARES; regiments first, then squadrons; lowest numbers before higher ones. It might also be that heavy regiments precede light regiments.
I think the order of precedence on the Defence website (above) might be wrong and should be
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Cavalry Regiment
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry)
‘B’ Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment
1st/15th Royal New South Wales Lancers
4th/19th Prince of Wales’s Light Horse Regiment
12th/16th Hunter River Lancers
‘A’ Squadron, 3rd/9th Light Horse (South Australian Mounted Rifles)
‘A’ Squadron, 10th Light Horse.”
If 3 Cav was reformed, it would come after 2/14 QMI.
Bruce Scott confirmed the above with the following post:
According to AMR 68 (2):
Units of the Army take precedence as follows:
(a) the units of the Permanent Forces have precedence over the units of the Reserves;
(b) the units have precedence according to the order of their numerical succession;
(c) if units are not included in a numerical succession, the units have precedence according to the order in which the Commands to which they belong are specified in the instrument appointing Commands.
From: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2005C00883
My response was: “Thanks Bruce. The precedence currently shown by Defence is very confusing. It all fits into place, however, when the 2/14 QMI and B3/4 are given their right precedence as ARA units/sub-units. Maybe the RAAC Corporation could whisper in the ear of the Corps RSM (?).
PS. I subsequently deleted the post on the 1AR Assn Facebook page … it was a simple question, yet attracted all sorts of inane responses. So be it ….
———————————————————————————————————————————-
23 February 2019
Royal Australian Armoured Corps
‘When you google ‘Royal Australian Armoured Corps’ do you get anything which portrays the future of the RAAC and the role it must fulfil in the defence of Australia? Do it … you’ll quickly see what I mean. Why is this so?
It seems to me that there is no public advocacy on RAAC matters. Maybe this is as it should be, ie. all advocacy must be behind closed doors … so as not to ‘frighten the horses’.
I’ve been told that during the ‘60s, there was what was described as the Black Hat Mafia; this comprised of a group of WOs who believed that they had an obligation to influence the nature and character of the RAAC (for its own good). They were not identified publicly, but ‘everyone’ knew who they were, ie. the power behind the throne.
Although this has largely died out, there is still an element which favours ‘secret’, rather than ‘open and transparent’ discussion. This element also holds the view that consultation should not be as wide as possible, but limited solely to those ‘in the know’. There are others, however, who believe that the widest possible consultation is the best means of value adding to achieve the best outcome.
I once got a job after being asked in the interview what I knew about industrial democracy. I said that the Army was the most democratic of all organisations … it forms teams, consults them; informs them of progress; provides details of the final plan; and seeks feedback on its implementation. I guess that I was a tad idealistic.
‘A’ Squadron, 3rd/9th Light Horse (South Australian Mounted Rifles)
‘A’ Squadron, 10th Light Horse
I wonder on what basis this order is determined? I asked this question on the 1AR Assn Social Facebook page. Mr C M Fenton OAM (as he has asked me to refer to him) provided this useful insight: “Chris FentonYou have too much time on your hands Bruce, get out of your house and go and do something worthwhile like mowing the neighbours [sic] lawn.”
Interestingly, Mr Fenton was awarded the OAM “In recognition of service to the Australian Army as the WO Ceremonial Headquarters 2nd Military District”. One might have thought that, with this background, he might know the answer (or at least have an interest). Mr Fenton is now the 1AR Assn delegate to the RAAC Corporation AGMs. If the order of precedence was wrong … I don’t suppose that he would want anything to do with correcting it.
———————————————————————————————————————————–
22 February 2019
LAND 400 Phase 3:
Following on from yesterday and 19 February 2019, there was a very quick comment to my article on The Cove. I’ve copied my response below.
Hi Dave
In response to your question, “How does the ADF plan to get these large, heavy and expensive combat vehicles to the theatre of operations?”, I offer the following …
Dr Joyo Sanyal from the Australian Army’s Research Centre (AARC) states in a recent article on the Land Power Forum that Australia has NO national security strategy.
This means that there are no agreed national security objectives (the determinants of security strategy). These are not hard to identify … things such as the lead time for identification of an imminent enemy threat; lead times and stockpiling policy to ensure self-reliance if Lines of Communication were cut; size of ready reaction force based on threat assessment; response time for deployment of ready reaction force; lead time for deployment of sustainment force; nature and size of agencies for deployment of ready reaction force (air/sea etc).
So, the Australian Army is equipped with large and heavy (expense has nothing to do with transportability) AFVs to provide direct fire support to infantry. The characteristics of these vehicles are those deemed essential in terms of defeating the enemy seen to pose the most likely threat to our Nation.
You ask a very valid question. Do we have appropriate contingency plans to ensure our national security. Dr Sanval would suggest not. I disagree. Until recently there was a troop of Abrams tanks on stand by for deployment to Afghanistan. I happened to be visiting 1st Armoured Regiment when the Brigade Commander ordered a readiness inspection. I was impressed, not only with the professionalism shown by the tank crews, but also by the proficiency demonstrated during the drills to load the tanks aboard Globemaster aircraft at Darwin airport. I think we’re in good hands in terms of deployment contingencies.
The Things You See on RAAC Websites!
Caption: “Mike Cecil – looking for log books”.
The image (and caption) was posted by Rodger Tocock. (Whatever floats your boat …I guess.)
This, along with many other photos on the website, was not attributed in terms of the copyright owner. I think I know who took the photo, and, if I were responsible for the Website, I’d advise Rodger to seek permission before publishing other people’s photos. It is the Website that bears responsibility for copyright breaches, ie. allowing such photos to be posted.
———————————————————————————————————————————-
22 February 2019
Grand Strategy
Sometime ago, I wrote about the national security objectives which should be the determinants of our security strategy. These are not hard to identify … things such as the lead time for identification of an imminent enemy threat; lead times and stockpiling policy to ensure self-reliance if Lines of Communication were cut; size of ready reaction force based on threat assessment; response time for deployment of ready reaction force; lead time for deployment of the sustainment force; nature and size of agencies for deployment of ready reaction force (air/sea etc).
Following on from yesterday, Dr Joyo Sanyal from the Australian Army’s Research Centre states in an article on the Land Power Forum that there is NO national security strategy::
“But how does one determine adequacy [of defence preparations] when there is no national strategy that is the product of a whole-of-government initiative and which can be implemented in a coordinated manner? The absence of a strategy also has implications for strategic policy decision-making and challenges arising from deficiencies inefficient, timely, and effective command, control, and communication systems and processes. A comprehensive national security strategy that moves beyond tactical and operational issues, and takes a holistic and whole-of-government view, is necessary now more than ever” https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/blog/strategy/a-national-security-strategy-for-australia-part-2-the-whole-is-more-than
Can this be true, or is it just a throw away line to help make a good article?
Reflecting on such matters, the following post from 15 October 2017 reflects on the sort of things that contingency planning has to address.
—————————————————————————————
The post below could have been entitled ‘The Role of the Media in the US/Korea Conflict’, however I decided to encompass a broader context in order to encourage readers to think about what might lie behind the ‘news’ reports we receive.
How Would the US Launch a Pre-emptive Strike on North Korea? : A Hypothetical Analysis.
What Has Happened Already?
Korean/US ‘Agents’ would have been inserted into North Korea some time ago to blend with the population and feed-back information. Potential offensive action could also be on their agenda. It is unlikely that US Special Forces would be deployed in advance in a covert role, as any capture would sound the alarm. There could be a plan for their deployment in conjunction with the first strike, however.
Cyber warfare would have to be a major element in the strategy. Given the reliance that all nations place on electronic command and control systems, one would think that satellites would have a role in disrupting military communications and electronic guidance systems. It would be surprising if North Korea’s computer systems had not already been infected with ‘sleeper’ viruses … waiting for the command to activate them. Of course, any military power would be aware of this and have a back up system … which would also have been targeted by the US. Cyber sabotage will have been practised for some time, so that the effectiveness of different techniques is well known. North Korea’s ability to protect its electronic systems could decide the outcome.
Grounds for double bluff scenarios will have been established. For example, if the explosion of earlier North Korean missile launches was due to US cyber sabotage, the success of recent launches might have been a result the US creating a false sense of security in the North Korean regime.
Accurate Intelligence will be key. Are the North Korean missile silos actually ‘hidden’ or only thought to be? The correct identification of Targets to be hit in the first strike is obviously vital. These would include: nuclear research facilities, missile silos, command and control headquarters, air defence control systems and weapon systems, airports and air traffic control facilities, transport and power infrastructure, and ammunition and fuel stockpiles.
Psyops strategy suggests that it would be advantageous to have the media report that attacking North Korea’s missile systems would be very difficult for the US, while also emphasizing the ability of North Korea to inflict casualties on South Korea which the US would not be able to prevent. Furthermore psyops ‘messages’ would predict that even if Kim Jong-un was killed, the leadership would not be disrupted (thereby inferring that he would not be a target). The US will use the media to achieve its own ends (this article could be part of such a strategy).
Logistics would be one of the most critical elements, particularly the availability of ammunition stocks, fuel supplies and medical facilities. This support will have been built up slowly over time and will already be in place with back-up contingency plans.
Evacuation of civilians from US and allied nations would have commenced. The US can’t afford to show their hand by initiating evacuation plans immediately prior to a strike.
What is Happening Now?
Cyber warfare and intelligence gathering is on-going. US Navy vessels (including submarines and aircraft carriers) are rehearsing deployment into the region. US Air Force aircraft are similarly rehearsing flight paths and timings. Logistics stocks continue to be amassed (not necessarily in their final positions).
The South Korean military continues to undertake a number of ‘routine’ exercises near the border in preparation for attack by North Korea. (For this reason, the Chinese proposal that North Korea stop nuclear testing if US/South Korea stop military exercises close the border, will never be agreed to by the US.)
Civilians from US and allied nations continue to leave North Korea.
What Will Happen Immediately Prior to a Strike?
The critical element is the deception plan. A ‘situation’ has to be created to get North Korea to ‘look the other way’. This could be where an ally such as China or Japan has a role to play. Then again, it could be a ‘political’ crisis in the US in which the attention of the country (and the world) is focused on some matter involving the President’s private life.
South Korean military forces deploy near the border on the pretext of a routine exercise. (The activity will repeat that which has happened many times before and will not, therefore, suggest anything unusual.)
US submarines and surface ships deploy close to their attack positions.
What Will Happen in the First Strike?
The cyber warfare plan would be initiated and North Korean command and control systems would be disabled. Missiles fired from US submarines and aircraft would hit pre-determined targets.
US Special Forces might be deployed to undertake specific tasks. This would occur simultaneously with the first strike, at the same time that additional anti-missile defence systems would be moved into pre-determined positions along the South Korea border.
The North Korean leader will be a primary target and timing of the first strike could well be dependent on a public engagement that he will be attending. (Of course, the ‘figure’ seen at such events might not be the actual North Korean leader.)
What Will Happen in the Follow Up Strikes?
US aircraft would constitute the follow-up strike force, with missiles being launched from stand-off positions immediately the first strike has been completed. These aircraft would be flown from aircraft carriers and/or bases in the region.
It would be expected that one of North Korea’s first responses would be to target Guam. The US Navy would help provide an anti-missile shield and ships would be on station accordingly. An equal priority target for North Korea would be Seoul. The effectiveness of the deployed missile defence system, plus air strikes against North Korean artillery positions, will be critical.
What Will Happen in the Aftermath?
Planning has not reached this point.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
20 February 2019
Latest 1AR Assn Newsletter (Another great edition by Peter Lukeis, Editor)
I was interested to read that: “A document outlining the Association’s attitude to the provision of services (welfare, health and well-being) provided by Ex-Service Organisations and Groups for Veterans, Ex Service people and their families is to be finalised at the next Management Committee meeting”.
I wonder if that will address the “procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn”. See Blog for 16 February 2019 below.
Plan KEOGH
I mentioned Plan KEOGH a few days ago. This covers the restructuring of the multirole brigades, transferring APCs to the infantry and equipping each ACR with two cavalry (recon) squadrons. I also made reference to the Defencetalk forum which I came across recently. See https://www.defencetalk.com/military/
An interesting comment was posted on DefenceTalk recently:
“They will tweek and muck around with Beersheba/Keogh for a good 10-20 years, and then change to some other plan and tweek that until they realize that it doesn’t work either.
I really feel sorry for armoured corps ATM [At The Moment], they are being screwed around in ways I didn’t think were possible.”
Which raises the question … who is standing up for the interests on the RAAC?
Armouredadvocates has previously raised the fact that the RAAC Corporation will not advocate any matter which is not endorsed by the Head of Corps.
Given that the HOC is compelled to support AHQ/Defence policies, this means that there is no means by which matters which are in the best interest of the RAAC, can be made known and advocated. [Interestingly, a previous HOC made the point that the RAAC Corporation is ‘outside the tent’ and can advance views independent of the ‘System’.]
The origin of all this goes back to the approval for the formation of the RAAC Corporation and a perceived need to ensure that it did not digress from the views of the hierarchy.
————————————————————————————————————————————————-
19 February 2019
Miscellaneous
Thanks to Contact Magazine for these two stories:
Merger of Command and Staff College and Centre for Strategic Studies.
One has to wonder to what degree he will found responsible for the matters raised on 13 February 2019
LAND 400 Phase 3 IFV
The summary of my concerns re the IFV (see 3 February 2019) is to be published today in The Cove, see: https://www.cove.org.au/.
This website is the forum for those responsible for Forces Command’s Professional Military Education. This is exactly what I had hoped for, ie. for there to be a robust debate as to whether or not the RAAC should operate the IFVs (among other things).
Australian Army Research Centre (AARC)
Here’s something I didn’t know about (probably just one of many). Details re the AARC can be found here (together with a disclaimer):
This is how the Defence Historical Honours Review Board (DHHRB) advised the Defence Honours and Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) how they rated the basis for my MC. Apparently, this had been decided during a discussion around the table (which comprised an informal ‘Merit Review’).
The Applicant to the Tribunal (Stan Hanuszewicz) asked how they would describe a ‘weak MC’. The answer was that this would be something more akin to an mid.
There was an inference that a VC is awarded for a specific action, rather than a period involving a number of heroic actions. This, of course, is not the case …see, for example, the British awards for Leonard Cheshire and (most recently) Bryan Budd.
I had to send a follow-up email to the DHAAT and DHHRB after the Hearing (see blog for 14 February)
It’s interesting how such awards are viewed by others who haven’t had similar experience. Soon after Operation HERMIT Park had ended, a senior officer flew in … saying something to us like ‘It must feel good giving them a real punch on the nose’. (This presumably was from Leadership 101: How to Raise Morale’.) I said quietly to the Squadron Commander, present at the time … “he just doesn’t understand”. The OC nodded. [We’d just lost three crewmen very seriously wounded and had another wounded who remained on duty.]
When my MC award was announced, I was attending a training course at Watsonia Barracks in Melbourne. I was told to be in the Mess at 5.30pm when a TV crew would be present. Again, they just didn’t understand. The image they were under was that you see on British WWII movies when a fighter pilot receives an award for downing enemy aircraft. I wasn’t prepared to enter into ‘high fives and slaps on the back and ‘For he’s a jolly good fellow’. Unsurprisingly, they didn’t broadcast any footage on the News.
I was at a dinner once when those present were all compelled to tell a joke. When it got to my turn, I simply said: ‘I stopped telling jokes on 25 June 1971’. Nobody knew how to respond and the next person was asked to tell his joke.
Going back to the start … those who categorise an award as ‘a very strong military cross’ (or in any other such way), have no idea what they’re saying.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
17 February 2019
DHAAT Hearing (13 February 2019).
One of the ‘Talking Points’ I’d prepared for the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) Hearing, is the following:
“An Army unit is not a group of individuals …everyone is connected to everyone else. Training and operational experience brings everyone together to the point at which each one depends on the other. A unit, therefore, comprises an integrated body in which there are few distinctions between those within it.
A tank crew is a very close-knit group, (as is, for example, an infantry section). What one person does, reflects what everyone else is doing or would have done in their place.
An award to a member of a tank crew is an award to the rest of his crew and his troop as a whole. It reflects the dangers that all those in his unit were subjected to. This encompasses not just other tank crews, but also members of repair crews and administrative personnel who provide the support which allows the tanks to close with and engage the enemy. The bravery and sacrifice of Australian AFV crews has not been adequately recognised to date.”
Another one was:
“I acknowledge that just about all soldiers who move forward in action against the enemy, do so in the knowledge that there is a possibility that they will be killed. When a unit or sub-unit assault an enemy position, however, they so according to drills practised during training and with supporting fire. I consider my circumstances to have been different. I don’t regard myself as being any braver than the infantryman who stands up to confront the enemy … however, I was not acting under orders nor following a drill I had practised in training; neither was I acting spontaneously. I had to deliberately think through all aspects of what I was about to do and the potential consequences for those for whom I was responsible. I thought that there was a very real possibility of being killed, but it was the right thing to do and there was no option.”
Two personal perspectives:
“Was it a hard thing to do, i.e. putting your life in jeopardy? Yes. But it was the right thing to do and there was no alternative. I was not married and had no children. Would that have made a difference? It would have made it harder, but would not have changed my decision. I believe that I would have lost not only my self-respect, but also the respect of my loved ones … if I had not have done what was right.
How does what happened, make you feel today? I get annoyed when people carry on about mundane matters as if they were the most significant things that could affect their lives. They lack any sense of real importance, yet feel that they have the right to impose their views on others. They fail to understand that there is a greater good beyond material things.
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
16 February 2019
Policies and Procedures for Funerals, Commemorative Services and Vale Notices.
Armouredadvocates’ ‘Goals’ (directly above this blog post) include the following:
The 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by 1 AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
[Pending] The 1AR Assn would have a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
The 1AR Assn C’tee is to be congratulated for compiling comprehensive ‘Policies and Procedures for Funerals, Commemorative Services and Vale Notices’. These were included as Annexes D and E respectively to the Minutes of the Management Committee meeting held on 8 Dec 2018. Supposedly these Minutes were distributed to all members of the Association. (I think I might have overlooked the email or was missed out … I requested a copy from the Secretary.)
The policies and procedures have been “approved and implemented”. It’s interesting that the members aren’t included in the consultation/approval process. I recall one of the present C’tee was very disparaging about me a while back “he’s one of those people who think that Members should be consulted about everything!”. My reason for thinking along these lines is that I believe that those people that policies and procedures affect, not only should have the right of comment, but also have the ability to add value to the policies and procedures. Maybe the opportunity to comment will be available when the associated By-Laws are developed (?).
Work in Progress? There is no reference in the policies and procedures above, to the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn. Nor is there any reference to “a coffin drape being made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals”. Re the latter, there is mention of the C’tee organising the transport of a Regimental Flag for use at funerals if requested … but no reference to a coffin drape(a large version of the flag made to cover a coffin) being made available.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
15 February 2019
Are we Doing Enough to Maintain Openness and Transparency (and Avoid the Perception of Conflict of Interest)? III
The National President and Secretary agreed to a meeting with a delegation from the Vietnamese Community in Australia at the National RSL HQ in Canberra. When the bus carrying the delegation was en-route from Melbourne, we were advised that anyone attending the meeting had to have their own personal liability insurance. Even more startling news was to come.
The President suddenly advised that the meeting was cancelled as it was subject to a police investigation. When I contacted the RSL’s National Secretary, he explained that violence had been threatened by the Vietnamese and the matter was being investigated by the police. The Vietnamese delegation denied threatening violence. When I contacted the ACT Police, they said nothing had been reported to them and there was no investigation.
The Vietnamese delegation arrived at the RSL and were met by those of us from Canberra who disagreed with the RSL’s proposal. The meeting was moved to my place (nearby). Thanks to Ian MacPherson (Daily Telegraph) there was quite a bit of publicity. The RSL subsequently withdrew their proposal.
The things that occurred simply stunned those of us who had been convinced of the ethical behaviour of military personnel, especially senior ones (even after they had retired). That bubble was burst well and truly!
Footnote: At the NSW RSL Congress last year, branch reps were asked to vote on a proposal whereby Branches would transfer their financial holdings to the State RSL HQ, which, in turn, would allocate funding for the day to day running of the Branches. This ‘asset strip’ was emphatically defeated by the State Congress.
14 February 2019
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal
How did it go?
Details pertaining to tank combat and Corps history, were revealed as never before. What a pity there was no representative present from the HOC. As they say … yesterday’s warriors, yesterday’s history.
Those I discussed the presentations with afterwards, felt that a strong case had been made in support of the award and that Defence had offered little to rebut it.
The outcome, of course, will depend on quasi technical/legal interpretation of the regulations. The Chair of the Tribunal impressed everyone with his fair and impartial demeanor.
I’ve copied my opening address below.
Mr Chairman, Members of the Tribunal, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I wish to express my appreciation to everyone who has contributed to bringing us together today, especially Mr Hanuszewicz whose efforts I’m in awe of (both in and out of uniform). There is another person, however, who’s a party to these events and whose deeds must be mentioned: Peter Cadge.
A fitter and turner, three months older than me, he was called up for National Service. He had been in Vietnam for just over two months, when he was sent to replace another tank driver who was injured during the course of an assault on an enemy position. Peter would’ve had no idea what was happening, just that he was needed urgently. He wasn’t deterred from jumping into the driver’s compartment of a strange tank with a strange crew.
Shortly after, when he received major head wounds, he also wasn’t deterred from doing what he thought was the right thing; all around him the tank was burning, yet his immediate thought to was to get up out of his driver’s compartment (exposing himself to enemy fire) to make sure that the rest of the crew were ok. He was deservedly Mentioned in Dispatches (mid). The subsequent story of his family’s support, his determination not to be defined by his wounds and his struggle to rehabilitate himself, deserve to be applauded.
I suffered a brain haemorrhage in 1989 which affects my memory. There are some things about the events of 25 June 1971, however, which are crystal clear. I will mention these should you wish me to do so.
Thank you.
There was one matter which I felt had to be addressed in retrospect. I’ve copied my email below.
Dear DHAAT Executive Officer
Many thanks for all your work in organising things today.
I’ve read fact Sheet 3 and I know that the Tribunal is under no obligation to consider submissions, once the Hearing is complete.
In the ‘wash up’ today, however, Defence asserted that if the Hermit Park incident had not occurred, there would be little justification for my award of the MC.
The Chairman had earlier asked my opinion of these actions but I didn’t realise the significance of his question and so did not attempt to explain what was behind the citation’s wording. I was intending to respond at the end, but the hearing protocol prevented me doing so. Can you please pass the following info to the Tribunal members, as I believe that my actions have been falsely represented (or misunderstood or both) by Defence. It is my contention that each of the three actions mentioned, in themselves, was deserving of recognition (rather than just being ‘padding’ for the award of the Military Cross.
My citation, for example, states that “At the request of the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Cameron moved his tank forward to crush a bunker from which enemy fire was being received”. This occurred during Operation IRON FOX. The infantry were unable to extract a wounded soldier because of heavy fire from an enemy bunker. What’s not mentioned in the citation is that the radio traffic was so intense that I could not identify where the bunker was. The only option was to talk to the platoon commander (Byrne) directly. The following extract is a quote from the platoon commander (in Jungle Tracks, McKay): “I remember Bruce Cameron getting out of his tank or attempting to get out the first time and an RPG-7 whistled past his ear and down he went again. Eventually, he got out and jumped down and spoke to me on the ground and so that was excellent”. It was open to me to let the radio traffic diminish until there was space to get clear directions … without exposing myself to enemy fire. I elected not to follow this course, however, as it was my belief that the infantry casualty was in need of urgent medical assistance. I was fired at getting out of the turret (and it’s my recollection that I was fired at getting back in). This, I believe, warrants greater recognition, other than being considered as just something to make up the right number of words in a citation for something else.
Now … what of Operation OVERLORD? The citations states “Second Lieutenant Cameron was deploying his tank troop to give support to an infantry company when the troop was engaged by fire from an enemy bunker system. He immediately gave orders for his troop to launch an attack against the well defended bunker complex. In the course of the attack, Second Lieutenant Cameron was wounded by the heavy fire which the enemy was directing against the troop attack. His determined leadership and swift action forced the enemy’s withdrawal from the forward bunkers and contributed greatly to the defeat of the entire force”.
Was there justification for recognition, or was this further ‘padding’?
My tank troop was occupying a cut-off position. An infantry platoon was contacted by a much larger enemy force (from 33 NVA Regt). The platoon commander knew the situation was dire and called on the radio say “Get in here, Bruce … we need you”. Usually tanks don’t operate by themselves, but have infantry for close -in protection. I decided that there was no time to arrange this and we headed toward the infantry. Nobody knew at the time how large the enemy position was (1000m x 1000m; huts; bunkers, kitchens; training facilities) and it was a surprise when we soon struck the perimeter of the position (the infantry were under fire on the opposite side). My troop attacked. We established fire superiority and advanced. There were so many bunkers that we didn’t have enough ammunition to fire into them all (they wouldn’t collapse under the weight of the tanks and we didn’t want to leave bunkers behind us which might contain enemy). The technique we adopted was to throw grenades into the bunkers as we passed. The enemy continued to resist, however. The commander, 3/33 NVA Regt Heavy Weapons Company, was very brave … standing up in front of our tank and firing his AK47. The burst struck the commander’s .30cal machine gun I was firing and my face was peppered with shrapnel. This turned out to be a planned diversion, drawing our attention away from another soldier who fired an RPG 7 at the back of our turret (it didn’t explode, however, as the rocket was fired too close to us and its arming distance hadn’t been reached). We later discovered that we’d run over the enemy officer and his AK47 (the magazine of which was loaded with ‘dum dum’ ammunition). Supporting troops eventually joined and the engagement lasted for about eight hours.
The actions of my tank crew and my tank troop deserve better than being considered ‘padding’ in the context of Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War. I know that there was no offence meant by the Defence representatives, however, I really believe that they should more fully inform themselves of such matters, before making ‘light’ of their significance I would appreciate if this email could be passed not only to the Tribunal members, but also the Defence representatives themselves (from whom I’d hope to hear back).
While there’ll be no post tomorrow; hopefully that on Thursday 14 February will be able to give a positive account of what happened.
I have no idea as to what part I’ll take in the proceedings. All contact has been with Stan Hanuszewicz (who nominated me).
I haven’t had any contact with the Tribunal, nor have I been asked to provide any info.
Stan has passed on a request from DHAAT for me to be present as a ‘witness’.
This might be a first for the DHAAT, ie. a third party (neither the member nor his family) has nominated someone else for an award.
———————————————————————————————————————–
11 February 2019
Are we Doing Enough to Maintain Openness and Transparency (and Avoid the Perception of Conflict of Interest)? II
Ron Baikie has offered the following insightful comment on the earlier Blog post:
“Hello Bruce,
I read your blog of 27 Jan 2019 regarding donations and gifts to Defence and the particular donations passed through the books of the 1 Armoured Regiment Association (1ARA) to the 1st Armoured Regiment (1AR) on behalf of Defence contractor Rheinmetall.
The supposed finding of ‘no wrong doing ‘ is quite curious. The very act of channelling funds from a Defence contractor to a military unit via a 3rd party civilian association, by its very nature, is an act of deception and therefore must be “wrong doing”. If not, why do it?
Is it not wrong to deceive, particularly when the deception facilitates a transaction that appears to be in breach of Defence Instruction pertaining to gifts? For example, Defence and the Private Sector’s ‘An Ethical Relationship’ states“If a supplier wishes to provide an individual or a team in Defence with a low value gift, it should be given openly and should not be offered at a time that could raise general concerns about conflict of interest (such as during a tender or a contract negotiation period).”1
As far as 1ARA is concerned and the comment “Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.” This is correct, however, the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 (Victorian Law) states under Prohibited Transactions, unauthorised acts etc, that “…An incorporated association must not …. do any act that is outside the scope of the purposes of the association. In fact, acting outside the scope and purposes of the Association is grounds for the Supreme Court to wind up the Association. One would think that acting on behalf of a Defence contractor to disguise payments from that contractor to an Australian military unit is way outside 1ARA’s scope and purposes.
There are many unanswered questions regarding this matter, but the biggest from the point of view of members, is why did the Association’s management not acknowledge that the action was wrong; by all accounts, unlawful, and take specific action to satisfy members that such conduct will not occur again by enshrining such an undertaking in the Constitution? We have just seen bank executives apologize and acknowledge wrong doing but the 1ARA committee seem unable to do the same, even when they were not personally involved.
I doubt I’ll be invited to renew membership with this particular Association but that’s of little concern as I had no intention of doing so anyway. I thoroughly enjoyed my brief time in the Army, but like the National Servicemen of that era, it was a brief passing experience … one we’ll never forget. Many friendships were forged and they’ll remain, that’s of most importance.”
————————————————————————————————————————-
10 February 2019
LAND 400 Phase 3 IFV
Following from yesterday (re the above) ….
On 3 February 2019, I posted my summary of the LAND 400 Phase 3 situation. If I’d been aware of the two matters below … I’d have referred to them, but my conclusion would remain the same.
Firstly, Plan KEOGH
Tucked away in the 1 Armd Regt Facebook page posts is this reference: “…as the Regiment builds a second Combat Recon Vehicle Squadron in line with the Plan KEOGH Combat Brigade restructure”. [Where does KEOGH come from? See quote from the Defence Webpage at the end.]
Not having heard of Plan KEOGH, my attention was drawn immediately. The shortcomings that I’d referred to in the Brigade structure on 3 February were being addressed! Ever hopeful … it was not to be. I saw another reference which inferred that, as a result of Plan KEOGH, “Plan Beersheba was dead…”. This, too, is misleading.
Plan Beersheba is a force generation cycle, nothing more. It remains in place, unchanged. Unfortunately, Plan KEOGH is simply the ‘old’ restructuring: two cav squadrons in the ACR and M113AS4s/PMVs to infantry. The shortcomings I’d referred to in the present Brigade structure (ie. limitations on the formation of battlegroups)… remain.
I hadn’t taken into account the ‘light’ AFVs included in the Abrams squadron establishment. It makes sense for these to be tracked, ie. IFVs. The initial LAND 400 number was 450 plus 17 manoeuvre Support Vehicles (MSVs). This changed to 400 all up (the number I refer to in my ‘paper’). It has been justified as 411, plus 17 MSVs.
Colonel Eustace Graham Keogh was the founder of the Australian Army Journal. Enlisting in the AIF underage, he sailed with the 3rd Reinforcements of the 1st Australian Wireless Signal Squadron in 1916 at the age of 17 years and 2 months and serving as a driver during the Mesopotamian campaign. He served again during WWII as a Major in the 2/24th Infantry Battalion back in the Middle East during the campaigns in Greece, Crete and Syria, and later in New Guinea. After the war, and various staff and training roles, he was given the task of editing, publishing and distributing the Army Training Memorandum – a training journal. He later re-organised it into the Australian Army Journal and was its first editor in 1948.
The aims of the AAJ included the stimulation of thought and the encouragement of the study of military thought and to provide a basis of an Australian military literature where officers were encouraged to contribute ‘short, crisp articles of about 1000 – 1500 words’. So proficient was he that his role experienced ‘mission creep’ and soon he was writing lectures, speeches, and other special articles for the journal as well as a number of books.
Colonel Keogh contributed greatly to Army studies and research. The position of visiting chair is named in his honour.
———————————————————————————————————————–
9 February 2019
The AWM’s Obligation to Those Who Die As a Result of Their Service After the End of the Prescribed Period of the War.
Following on from yesterday ….
The Australian War Memorial is offering a new way to engage with the stories of our nation through a series of podcasts focused on the impact of war on individuals, their families, and our society.
“As human beings we learn best when sharing stories that open a world of possibility beyond our own lived experiences,” Memorial Director Dr Brendan Nelson said. Listen to the first episode.
However, I’ve copied two contributions below. They relate to the matters I raised in my short paper.
Note the reference to the “Mech Sgt” and the “Mech Cpl”. What’s this means in terms of structure … a small contingent of specialised inf manning the vehicles, with dismounts being rotated through and retaining a traditional inf skills career structure? Of course, the ‘specialist inf’ crews are RAAC personnel by a different name (and at a greatly increased cost).
More to follow tomorrow.
I don’t think it’s so much that, it’s mainly just the technical skills needed to operate, maintain and sustain the mechanised capability. The infantry just don’t have anything in their career structure to develop that. For example, to get promoted to sergeant, every RAAC corporal has to complete a course that makes them a technical expert in either gunnery, driving and servicing, or communications for their respective vehicle. That means every SNCO and WO in a Regiment can run courses, run ranges, provide SME advice etc. The whole RAAC career structure is organised to provide the individual and collective competencies required to sustain the armoured capability. It takes a lot of resources and effort to do so.
The infantry just don’t have that, as their career structure is designed to develop the equivalent dismounted skills. Obviously. Until something similar is developed for the mechanised capability, the infantry just won’t be able to generate and sustain the technical skills necessary to operate the IFV. The current process, where individuals go on a course, maybe use the skill for a year or two and then get promoted/post out and the skill set is lost, isn’t going to cut it. It never did cut it, really.
I should also point out, the infantry fought to get this capability back. There was a lot of advice provided by the armoured corps pointing out the complexity and what the opportunity cost would be, but they still wanted it. I think now it’s just starting to sink in exactly what has to change to make this viable.
The six dismounts are broken into two 3-man fire teams, and will operate the same way the two four-man fire teams used to, obviously with just one less member. The commander will always be with the main effort, so if the main effort is dismounted then the commander will also dismount. In that case the vehicles will generally be commanded by the mech corporal or mech sergeant. The exact ways to go about this are very technical and depend on unit SOPs.
————————————————————————————————————————-
8 February 2019
This is Good, But There’s a Long Way to Go.
Extracts from a recent Government Press Release:
“A number of unmarked graves of First World War veterans who died after returning from the war will be commemorated under a two-year pilot program announced today by the Federal Government.
Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Darren Chester made the announcement saying the Unmarked Graves of the First World War Program will provide funding to help ex-service organisations, community groups and individuals properly acknowledge veterans’ service at their place of rest.
“This program is an important step in ensuring every veteran who died after the First World War Armistice is remembered for their service and I would like to encourage communities right across Australia who are aware of unmarked graves to consider making an application.”
An estimated 331,800 personnel deployed during the First World War, of which over 60,000 were killed or are listed as missing in action. This leaves approximately 271,800 service men and women who returned to Australia at the cessation of hostilities, of which approximately 137,000 were wounded.
“Sadly some of those who returned from the Great War ended up estranged from their families and may have struggled with day-to-day living,” Mr Chester said.
“We know that many were buried in unmarked graves across the nation.”
A previous Blog post in keeping with this theme is copied below:
The AWM: Recognising Those Who DOW After the War has Ended (9 October 2018)
I’ve been lobbying for some time to affect a change from a focus on those who are listed on the Roll of Honour (ie. died during the War), to acknowledge all those who die from their wounds after the prescribed period of the War (as well as those whose wounds become apparent after that date). To their credit, the AWM is now also thinking along these lines (probably nothing at all to do with my lobbying). The response below is from the Office of the Director, AWM. (Reference is made to a ‘ticker’, this comes from the following suggestion I made:
“Unfortunately, all the information currently provided by the AWM relates to the numbers killed during the prescribed periods of Wars. Would it not be appropriate for the Redevelopment Project to address this ‘other’ aspect of the Memorial’s function? I believe, for a start, that it is essential that the numbers of deaths from wounds after the end of the prescribed period should be highlighted (with the Information Panels being amended as the numbers continue to grow). Would this not focus the attention of visitors to the AWM, ie. to see the numbers of those who have died from wounds experienced in conflicts such as Vietnam, Afghanistan etc, ‘tick over’ before their eyes.
From AWM, 5 October 2018:
“To your second point the Memorial honours all those who have served through means other than simply the Honour Roll or Commemorative Rolls. We tell the stories of all who served through our exhibitions, education programs, publications, sculpture gardens, ceremonies and more. Our displays also share with visitors that the cost of war isn’t limited solely to casualties suffered during a defined period.
The Memorial is working to expand the way it represents these true costs of war today and within the proposed expansion. Earlier today for example our new special exhibition “After the War” opened. This exhibition examines the consequences of war, from the Boer War to today, including facts such as the 60,000 Australians who died in the 10 years following the First World War as a result of wounds, gassing or other issues from their time in service. It also examines the impact on soldiers and their families of serious injuries, PTSD and other ailments for years after their service has ended.
The Memorial also has other initiatives that are intended to highlight the true cost of war. Our Vietnam Medical Legacies Project will explore the long term costs, including post-war deaths, of service in the Vietnam War in a volume to be published next year. The Memorial is also working on a new monument for the ‘cost of war’ that recognises that the cost wartime service extends far beyond the names listed on the Roll of Honour.
I hope that this provides some comfort that the Memorial does indeed acknowledge the fuller cost of war beyond just those who die during a conflict.
Your comments, along with all the other feedback we have received, will be provided to Council for their consideration in relation to the development.
I have also passed your email to the team who are doing the very early gallery design work to raise the concept of a ‘ticker’ with them so they can see if such a display would be feasible (notwithstanding the technical issues relating to working out the number of deaths) within the broader concepts they are working on for the proposed additional space. Such a display would , to my mind at least, sit well alongside the proposed ‘live feed’ from Defence showing what our soldiers, sailors and airmen are doing to defend the nation on any given day.”
Postscript: Sadly … the recent announcement (above) fails to focus attention on those who died as a result of the wounds they suffered (after returning home). No history book will ever record this number … neither for the First World War nor any subsequent War.
——————————————————————————————————————————
7 February 2019
FOI (Following on from yesterday)
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner was, I believe, going to release the document to me. BUT, after the months of totally false information provided to them, Defence have suddenly found new reasons to deny access. I expect to see the new justification soon. The ideal of open and transparent governance is but a dream (or so it seems….).
Aid to the Civil Community.
Everyone who has been ‘reacted’ to help with flood/bushfire relief will understand what the 2 Cav Regt blokes are now going through. They, and the rest of 3 Brigade involved in the flood relief, are commanded by Brig Scott Winter, former CO 1 Armd Regt.
A Joint Task Force has been formed, based around 3 Brigade. (Not much of this in the media down here in Canberra.)
What a contrast: 26 Jan parade photos and all that comes after! (Talk about gender equality!) How good it is to see local businesses offering free meals to emergency services personnel.
The Chinooks flying bladders bring back heaps of memories (albeit water, rather than petrol).
Best wishes to all those affected by the floods and those tasked with relief efforts.
As always … it’s not just operational service which makes you proud of what our guys in uniform do.
———————————————————————————————————————–
6 February 2019
FOI
Who’s responsible for the amazing debacle described below?
In the 8 January 2019 blog I included the following ‘Update’:
While I was wondering (yesterday) what to focus on in the first post of the Blog, I was rung by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. I was informed that Defence had requested more time to respond to the OAIC’s proposal to release the RAAC Corporation’s supporting submission to mine re the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour. Defence claimed that they had to contact a “third party”. Abbreviated background was provided in the 6 December 2018 Blog (copied below). More detailed background is at the Blog for 10 October 2018.
This matter has been running for two years! One has to wonder about the resources spent (wasted) on it. Two Government Departments ‘going to and fro’, an incredible amount of SOA HOC Cell/Defence HQ time, and an ESO which could have better employed its resources on behalf of its members. Previous justification for not releasing the RAAC Corporation submission was that, if this happened, members of the Corporation would no longer provide their support to it.
Another argument was that if the submission was released, I would know who wrote it (how could this be, unless it was a copy of my own submission?). If this was not puzzling enough … release was also denied on the basis that “exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers. These were just three of Defence’s reasons for not allowing the submission to be released … just some of the ones that I rejected. (The OIAC agreed with me.)
Let’s hope that 2019 brings an open and transparent approach to all RAAC matters.
What’s Now Happened.
In denying access to the document I sought, Defence’s FOI Review and Guidance Section informed the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), inter alia, that:
“As stated below in the further information the 170 submissions linked to the Public Inquiry were not released publicly. Defence Honours and Awards would contact the owner of each submission for approval to release each submission. In this instance [the third party] has requested Defence not to release the submission under the FOI application.
Further Submissions to support Defence’s decision to deny access to the Document
Defence sought further advice from the Defence Honours and Awards in regards to the Tribunals Report and Submissions in relation to the “Inquiry into unit Recognition for service at he Battles of fire support bases Coral and Balmoral”.
Though the Inquiry was released publicly (attached for your information) the 170 Submissions received were not publicly available due to the sensitivity of some of the information in the submissions. If the Tribunal chose to publicly release these submissions they would seek permission from each submitter to ensure they authorise the public release. The Tribunal has in previous cases released submissions but has not done so for this case.
Defence Honours and Awards alerted FOI Review that Mr Cameron has a separate matter relating to recognition as an individual due to go to hearing on 13 February 2019. This may be of interest to the Information Commissioner before making a decision relating to the request to release this submission. “
The above is obviously of concern to me in that at no time did I seek access to a submission made to DHAAT (my request was for a copy of a document provided to the then Minister for Veterans’ Affairs; nothing whatsoever to do with DHAAT). It follows that everything raised with DHAAT by the Defence FOI Reviews and Guidance Section, has no foundation at all. I am particularly puzzled by the advice given to the OAIC that the Information Commissioner might be interested to know that I was making an FOI request about a DHAAT submission when I was to soon appear before that same Tribunal. The inference is that the two matters are be linked in some way (to the benefit of me).
I have asked that the Defence FOI Reviews and Guidance Section to inform DHAAT of the mistaken basis for their enquiry to DHAAT. I wounder if this will happen or if I’ll have to write to the Minister?
STOP PRESS: Defence FOI Review has been in touch with DHAAT and the matter has been sorted out. DHAAT advise that the members of the Tribunal to consider the application involving me have no knowledge of the FOI matter and associated misunderstanding on the part of Defence.
————————————————————————————————————————
5 February 2019
Deceased Members
Last year, I heard that a member of the 1AR Assn had passed away. I asked the C’tee if they had details (if not, I was going to pass on the info I had regarding the deceased member). The response I received was the following:
Unlike some individuals the Association ensures it has the details from ADF Records prior to publishing incorrect information on a former member of the Regiment. [I’m sure that this is not meant to imply that the 1AR Association ever publishes incorrect information.]
I felt that it was incredible that such a delay might mean that colleagues would not be able to informed of details in a timely manner. Therefore, I asked:
Dear Secretary, Surely the 1AR Assn will not wait for advice from ADF Records before passing funeral details to members? Can you confirm a different policy will now be put in place?
No response was received.
I now see from Facebook, however, that the ADF Records verification policy prior to any notification, is no longer being followed. (Sometimes a record of service ‘eulogy’ will be sought from ADF Records; but on other occasions they could well be the last to be informed.) One has to wonder about the ‘holier than thou’ attitude previously adopted by the 1AR Assn. Why do it?
————————————————————————————————————————–
4 February 2019
Moving Tanks Between ACRs to Make up for the Lack of Numbers
It was stated on the 1 Armd Regt Facebook on 16 October 2018 that:
“T2 inserted into AO LION (Cultana West & East) as part of 1 BDE Ex PRED RUN during Sept 18, the first to conduct live fire in Range West. T2 Phase 1, sees immediate maintenance being conducted on the newly receipted M1A1s from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (QMI). Special thanks go out to our fellow Tank Sqn’s in providing additional heavy armour platforms. As part of battle preparation, the Sqn conducted an LFAST practice to ensure their platforms hit target and also conducted formation rehearsals.”
In order to participate at an appropriate level in the 1 Brigade exercise, tanks had to be moved from Townsville and Brisbane to Adelaide. As is well known, the Army is short at least 30 Abrams. The blog post on 15 December 2018 quoted an extract from an article in the Australian (26 May 2018):
“Sometimes overlooked in the excitement about new ships, submarines and wheeled vehicles is that the Australian Army will spend about $2.5 billion on improving and expanding its heavy-armour capability. This consists of improvements to the existing 59 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs) and the purchase of additional vehicles based on the same chassis for armoured assault bridging and breaching tasks. It is also possible that more MBTs will be acquired, which might take the total pool of vehicles to about 90.”
This, of course, was wishful thinking. The Blog for 15 August 2018 provides some additional background:
Three ACRs : Three Tank Squadrons?
I won’t repeat all the background from previous Blog posts, just a couple …
The Blog on 8 July 2018 reported “What a difference a single word can make. One of the media reports about the recent Ex Diamond Strike referred to 7 Bde testing its newly procured Abrams tanks. The Australian Army has finally purchased the additional Abrams needed to overcome the capability gap! Fantastic … or too good to be true? Sadly, other media reports did not support this story. They used the phrase “7 Brigade’s newly acquired” tanks. One report nailed it: “the tanks recently relocated to 7 Brigade”.
On 11 February 2018, the Blog stated: “Thirty additional tanks have been identified by Army as being needed to equip three ‘common’ brigades and their meet their repair pool needs. Three ACRs, geographically dispersed, each with a tank squadron, is very different to the ‘model’ that existed when the tanks were purchased, ie. two squadrons co-located as part of a single regiment. It seems that Army’s bid to acquire the tanks needed to equip three ACRs has been put on the backburner. The case has been argued on the Blog before … becoming a proficient tank squadron is a full-time job. You can’t move tanks between brigades depending on their Plan Beersheba state of readiness and expect to achieve ‘instant’ readiness levels.
On 4 October 2017, the Blog made the point that: “Current Abrams fleet numbers (59) were based on a single armoured regiment with two tank squadrons. The ORBAT has changed, however. We now have three ACRs, with a tank squadron each. Even with each squadron restricted to three tank troops, the present fleet is too small to provide for SOA, RTC, and repair pool need (exasperated because of the new geographical spread involved
Sleight of Hand? Another Blog post argued that: “It used to be that a tank squadron comprised four troops, each of four tanks. With cost savings being paramount, there is an argument for having three troops, each of four tanks. Of course, should the need to train commanders to exercise control over sub-units be seen to be important… you could go back to four troops, each of three tanks. There are arguments for and against both groupings. If you’re not watching carefully, however, you could end up with three troops, each of three tanks (a reduction of five tanks per squadron). Lose one tank from a troop and you lose a viable tactical entity; lose one troop from a three troop tank squadron and you lose a viable tactical entity.
The Situation Today: A “full tank squadron” is now deployed with 2/14 QMI ACR (7 Brigade). BUT no additional tanks have been procured. So, what options were adopted? Move tanks between ACRs depending on their degree of readiness under Plan Beersheba, reduce the number of tanks in tank squadrons; or reduce repair pool holdings and extend downtimes?
Smoke and mirrors … but at what cost in terms of training proficiency, readiness capability, and tank crewmen’s lives?
————————————————————————————————————————-
3 February 2019
LAND 400 Phase 3: A Need for Review. (As mentioned yesterday.)
Request for Tender (RFT)
The RFT for LAND 400 Phase 3 (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) was recently released. Industry has until 1 March 2019 to respond with respect to the provision of 400 IFVs, including seventeen Manoeuvre Support Vehicles (MSVs). The forecast cost is $15b.
There has been a good deal more questioning about this project, than there was for LAND 400 Phase2, Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV). A contract for the supply of 211 CRVs was recently signed, with a budgetary provision of $5.2b.
Some of the questioning related to the number of IFVs to be procured to equip an infantry battalion in each of the three multi-purpose brigades. Surprisingly, 450 IFVs, plus 17 MSVs, were initially called for. This would have been sufficient for four battalions, plus training and repair pools. (No mention has been made publicly as yet of a reduction in project cost.)
Other queries in the Defence press have related to the need for the IFV at all, together with concern about its capability being over-specified. The arguments, on balance, have come out in support of both the vehicle and its level of protection (hence weight), armament, etc.
Those suggesting that the opportunity cost was not justified, had hoped that the RFT might have been delayed until after a Force Structure Review. This is not to be … but that does not mean that the operational concept for the IFV should not be debated robustly.
Basis of Provisioning
Three battalions equipped with IFVs means three battalions dedicated to the mechanised infantry role. This is necessary because a vehicle such as an IFV (two-man turret, 30mm cannon, anti-tank guided weapon, 1000hp engine, 35-40 tonne weight) requires a highly trained crew. If this is to occur, career progression must be integral to the mechanised battalion.
Dedicated mechanised units exist in armies such as those of the US, Britain and Germany. These, however, are very different to the ADF … both in terms of manpower and numbers of armoured vehicles, allowing them to maintain units dedicated to a specific operational role. Is Australia in a position to do the same, or is the flexibility to ‘mix and match’, i.e. tailor force composition to specific operational needs, more important?
The IFV is to replace the M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) with a vehicle to provide a capability to accompany tanks onto the objective. When LAND 400 was initiated, APCs were operated by the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC); subsequently they were transferred to the Infantry. Was this the right decision?
If RAAC crews operated the IFVs, training costs would be slashed. No longer would IFV qualification involve an isolated skill set. Commonality in the operation of AFVs would enable conversion courses to be conducted for commanders, gunners and drivers.
Brigade Organisation
Has Plan Beersheba worked out as expected? How does the resulting brigade ORBAT lend itself to our likely operational contingencies? Armour and infantry in 3 Brigade provides an example. Units are: 2 Cav Regt (one tank squadron; two cavalry squadrons); 1 RAR (mounted in PMV Bushmasters) and 3 RAR (mounted in APCs).
It should be possible to form three battlegroups within the brigade. The tank squadron might well be ‘penny packeted’ across these three battlegroups. A more hard-hitting battlegroup would be one in which the tanks were concentrated, ie: 2 Cavalry Regiment HQ: tank squadron, two 3RAR companies (mechanised), plus cavalry troop etc.
No matter how desirable this would be, it leaves the 3RAR battlegroup with no tank support. There is little point in spending $15b to equip an infantry battalion in each brigade with IFVs designed to accompany tanks onto the objective … if there are no tanks available to form the battlegroup. The obvious compromise would be to allocate a half tank squadron to each of the 2 Cavalry Regiment and 3 RAR battlegroups.
It would appear that there are either too few tanks, or too many IFVs to form a balanced force. Ideally, with a mechanised battalion in each brigade, there would be two tank squadrons in the ACR. If a single tank squadron was to be retained in each brigade, ‘balance’ would see the mechanised infantry capability reduced to two companies. This would not be ideal, however, as 3RAR would become a ‘mixed’ battalion with half mechanised. The ‘conundrum’ would be solved if the RAAC were to operate the IFVs.
The Number of Dismounts
IFV characteristics are justified on the basis of enabling them to accompany tanks onto an enemy objective. Having done so, the critical issue then becomes the co-ordination between mounted and dismounted elements. Fire support from the IFV is particularly important with only six dismounts per vehicle. In 2016 the number of dismounts was eight … why the reduction?
A 2013 RAND study examined the size of the mechanised infantry squad in the US Army:
“Ultimately, as the Bradley design evolved, the resulting IFV carried only six dismountable soldiers in the passenger space and three non-dismounting crew members. The decision to make this change, however, was based more on budgetary and political considerations than on tactical considerations or historical precedence.
“ … the result was that fire and maneuver by dismounted infantry squads became much more difficult to execute in mechanized infantry units. Importantly, the Army quickly recognized that the Bradley was not ideal as a dismounted infantry support vehicle.”
“While the support provided to dismounted infantry by a heavily armed fighting vehicle does provide some justification for weakening the dismounted squad’s independent fire and maneuver capability … this comes at the cost of reducing the dismounted infantry’s inherent flexibility, particularly in complex terrain. In such situations … such as fighting in urban areas, the vehicle may not be able to provide effective fire support to maneuvering dismounted soldiers, so the problems associated with squads that are too small become more evident.
Current operational thinking sees the IFV, the dismounts and the vehicle crew working hand in glove when assaulting the objective. This scenario obviously requires two commanders … at platoon level, one on the ground and one mounted (in charge of the four IFVs). Who has overall command? Will it be one or the other, or will it depend on the circumstances? Are the IFVs there to support the dismounts or vice versa?
The degree of difficulty is increased by the lack of vision available to the dismounts inside the IFV. Exiting ‘blind’ places them at considerable disadvantage Given that the IFV commander can see the battlefield and has considerable firepower at his disposal, it would seem logical for the infantry to operate in support of the IFV, ie. protect the vehicle from enemy anti-armour weapons (the traditional role of ‘panzer grenadiers’
Conclusions
If RAAC crews were to operate the IFVs, three infantry battalions would not have to be designated for the mechanised role only; allowing a focus on infantry skills and normal career progression. ADF flexibility would be enhanced accordingly and training costs slashed..
The present brigade organisation does not facilitate ‘balanced’ battlegroup organisation. There are ways to address this.
Limiting IFV dismounts to six is known to create difficulties for fire and manoeuvre on the ground.
Finally, the decision time for LAND 400 Phase 3, not only involves the best contender, but also the best way in which to incorporate the IFV into the Army’s force structure and operational planning. This is a matter which must be debated rigorously.
————————————————————————————————————————-
2 February 2019
Battlegroup Formation in the Australian Army.
The post on 23 January referred to the problems associated with the current brigade organisation … as far as the formation of battlegroups was concerned. The post on 31 January referred to the amazing comprehensiveness of Australian Army Doctrine.
These subjects deserve further attention.
LWD 3-0-3 Formation Tactics 2016 makes it clear that the brigade is “unit of action” and that brigade commanders orchestrate the manoeuvre of battlegroups (comprised of combat teams)
LWD 3-3-4 Employment of Armour 2016 states that the deployment of an armoured cavalry regiment “provides a battlegroup HQ, three armoured combat teams and the necessary logistics to support the regiment”.
All, it would seem, would be answered by LWP -G 3-3-14 Battlegroup and Combat team Handbook. Unfortunately, this is “yet to be published”.
So how is 2 Cavalry Regiment (3 Brigade) to form three armoured combat teams from within its own resources? It has to be assumed that one cavalry squadron will be deployed to provide brigade reconnaissance and flank security, leaving a tank squadron and a cavalry squadron … the nucleus of two combat teams only. Furthermore, there is no infantry to create a ‘balanced’ combined arms force. The fighting component of any 2 Cav Regt combat team is limited to tanks.
It would seem that published Army doctrine is out of date (in the same way that published Army PR info is out of date (see yesterday’s blog).
The limitations imposed by LAND 400 Phase 3 and the current brigade organisation will be examined in detail tomorrow.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
1 February 2019
Getting it Right II
An email I sent to Defence Media about fundamental errors in Defence public information was copied on the 24 January 2019 Blog post. The following response was received from the Directorate of Communication, Army Headquarters:
Dear Mr Cameron,
Thank you for your email which has been passed on to me to look into. I note that a few of the suggestions below appear to be from different sections of the Army website. To ensure that I don’t miss anything, do you mind sending me a list of the URLs and sections of the page that need review? I appreciate your time and effort.
My response was a follows:
I should explain that I’m a former RAAC member and I find it difficult to accept when official information presented to the public is so wrong. I can’t imagine what affect it has on Recruiting.
It’s not just the RAAC … it’s all across the Army public info. Just Google 1st Armoured Regiment, for example, you will find an Army site which states that “1st Armoured Regiment is part of 1st Brigade and based at Robertson Barracks, Darwin”. This is not correct.
I believe that DPR has to bite the bullet and bring its public on-line info up to date (I was alerted to this situation when a defence magazine published an article which was completely false as regards the details of a Brigade. When I contacted the editor, he explained that he had sourced his info from the Defence website and had assumed that it was correct.
I think that this is something that needs to be passed ‘up the line’, but obviously that’s your decision.
There’s been no response from the Directorate of Communication, Army Headquarters, so far.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
31 January 2019
The Art and Science of Tactics in the Face of Technological Change
Army ‘Doctrine’ is more comprehensively documented now than ever before. Most of the manuals are available on-line, eg ‘Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0 (Operations); LWD 3-0-3 (Formation Tactics)
There is also a second level of manuals, eg. Land Warfare Procedures General LWP-G 7-7-5. Does this relate to, say, infantry minor tactics? For those unfamiliar with the current publications, you can be excused for not knowing that it’s the old ‘Drill Manual’. (See: https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/publications/doctrine-army-doctrine).
Don’t get me wrong … there’s nothing amiss with such a well-ordered hierarchy of doctrinal publications; just as long as the ‘theory’ doesn’t get in the way of the implementation. Should we be concerned as to what comprises the ‘Art’ of tactics, as distinct to what comprises the ‘Science’ of tactics? Of course not, … unless it impedes, rather than enhances, the implementation of tactics.
Let’s examine the horse and the cart. We have an enemy (or an anticipated enemy); so, we develop a strategy to contain and/or defeat him. The strategy dictates the force structure required; it follows that it’s to be implemented by our armed forces employing tactics (which are developed in response to factors such as the enemy’s weapons’ technology, strength and morale).
It’s these tactics (and to some degree, the strategy) that determines the characteristics of the weapons to be procured to equip the Army. (Of course, if the Army is already fully equipped with up to date weaponry, the force structure and tactics might have to be modified in accord with existing equipment).
Although the strategy might stay the same, technological change is always going to be a factor in determining the feasible force structure at any particular time. Although equipment procurement aims for an outcome which enables winning tactics to be employed with the force structure at the time … compromise of some sort will be inevitable.
Following on from yesterday, the comments below (on another Forum) are from two different people, in relation to my Australia Day post:
“I can only find two references directly involving the army, both in response to indigenous actions and certainly not battles. The bulk of the incidents were between the natives and settlers, militia and mounted police (many of whom were indigenous and prone to violence).”
“I would hate to see the AWM become a battle ground for the left and right of politics in relation to recognising the battles, wars, fights, massacres, murders and killings that was part of the colonisation of this country”.
There is obviously a lack of knowledge surrounding what happened. Do Aboriginal warriors deserve a place alongside other Australian soldiers at the AWM, or not? There is the often made argument that the AWM Charter does not allow this … it doesn’t hold water, however, there is nothing to stop the AWM commemorating the bravery and sacrifice of indigenous Australians in protecting their families, land and possessions against the attacks of 18th/19th century military/police forces and colonial settlers.
But what now of the other argument … that the ‘clashes’ which make up the Frontier Wars are over-rated (nothing more than skirmishes, perhaps) and don’t deserve to be considered in the same context as actions fought by Colonial or Commonwealth defence forces?
Here are some quotes from historians regarding the Frontier wars:
“Major research has confirmed evidence of at least 250 massacres across Australia during the time of frontier conflict between Indigenous groups and settlers. Indigenous communities have long called for better recognition of the so-called Frontier Wars and historians say this project adds weight to their appeals. Hundreds of evidence sources have been used to map the killing of tribes in frontier times. Discussion is building around how Australia should remember these massacres.”
“The evidence is there. Intrepid Australian historians began opening the whitewashed ‘Pandora’s Box’ of frontier history from the early 1970s. At the start of the 21st century it really is time to acknowledge that Australians fought one another for this land. The fact that it was the original Australians versus the newcomers should not preclude this recognition, even if neither side necessarily perceived themselves as ‘Australians’.
The war was long-lasting, extremely bloody and in the latter part of the 19th century, particularly one-sided; but the same traits that are promoted as admirable and deserving of respect during other military conflicts were nevertheless present. Nit-picking about whether the combatants wore uniforms and fought in a recognised European fashion is merely a red-herring, It denies the tenacity of the original Australians’ fight for their territories and the fact that they saw their conflict with the new settlers as a kind of war; a war that they lost, and for which they paid a very heavy price indeed. But then, what are Anzac and Gallipoli about?
Surely by acknowledging the frontier wars one is merely being more truly inclusive of all Australians. By not acknowledging the frontier wars, national institutions are confirming the colonial ideologies that underpinned the frontier violence as well as the denialism accompanying them and giving weight to the survival of these perceptions.
Recognition of the frontier wars does not detract from or in any way denigrate the role of our past servicemen and women in the 20th century. In fact it gives credence to our often quoted ideals of ‘a fair go’: honesty, egalitarianism, self-reliance and resourcefulness, along with a cheeky sense of humour. Recognition can only add to our sense of national integrity.
The Australian War Memorial proclaims that: “Anzac Day goes beyond the anniversary of the landing on Gallipoli in 1915. It is the day on which we remember Australians who served and died in all wars, conflicts, and peacekeeping operations. The spirit of Anzac, with its human qualities of courage, mateship, and sacrifice, continues to have meaning and relevance for our sense of national identity.”
It therefore seems both logical and balanced to include remembrance of those who died in the frontier wars. These were perceived by settlers at the time as a series of warlike conflicts and they are similarly regarded as such by most recent scholars and by contemporary Aborigines in general today.
So it behoves us all to abandon the partial and exclusivist attitudes of the 20th century, to embrace the truth about our history, and to begin to remember the frontier wars on Anzac Day.”
There have been some comments (on another forum) about my Australia Day Blog.
I referred to the fact the AWM has used the argument that its Charter limits it to commemorating Australians who were killed while serving ‘overseas’ or while part of ‘formed units’, to say it is unable to commemorate those killed in the Frontier Wars.
The AWM Act was mentioned in respect to this … pointing out that there is no such limitation imposed on the Australians the AWM has an obligation to commemorate.
One correspondent responded to say that: “The fact is that the Australian War Memorial Act 1962 does not “reference to the Australian Army, nor ‘formed units’, nor Australians ‘deployed overseas’”. But it does [refer to] ‘active service’ [which] means active service in war or in war-like\operations by members of the naval, military or air forces of the Commonwealth, or of any naval or military force of the Crown raised in Australia before the establishment of the Commonwealth”
That would seem to mean that the AWM does not have a responsibility to commemorate Indigenous Australians. BUT the correspondent has not been completely accurate with his quotes from the Act.
The definition of ‘active service’ states that it means “active service in war or in warlike operations by members of the Defence Force”. Indigenous Australians were certainly on active service in protecting their families, land and possessions. But were they part of the “Defence Force”?
Here in lies the ‘trick’ … the correspondent suggests that because they weren’t part of a naval or military force of the Crown raised in Australia before the establishment of the Commonwealth … they can’t be commemorated by the AWM.
BUT a word has been omitted. The definition in the Act states that reference to “Defence Force includes any naval or military force of the Crown raised in Australia before the establishment of the Commonwealth”.
So it ‘includes’ … it is not limited to!!!
Those who were drafting the Act realised that the AWM had a responsibility for commemorating those killed while serving in Colonial Forces (though the AWM played this down for many years).
It has been left open by the law makers, for ‘Defence Forces’ to be further defined as including those Indigenous Australians involved in defending their rights over land against military, police or settlers in the 18/19th Centuries (in the same way that those involved in Peacekeeping missions have been so recognised recently).
———————————————————————————————————-
28 January 2019
What Does it Mean When Someone Says “Don’t Mention My Name”?
A comment on a Blog post is received and the sender says something along the lines of ‘I don’t mind you using this, but don’t mention my name’.
Everyone has the right to remain anonymous, but it seems to me that there are two reasons for this caveat: either they don’t want to be associated with the position that they’ve enunciated, or they don’t want to be associated with my Blog and/or me.
Is there an ethical question here? I believe there is.
A couple of years ago, two well-known members of the RAAC used their reputations in an attempt to achieve outcomes by intimidation. ‘Between you and me’, one of them said … following up with withering insults. The other followed up the caveat, ‘Don’t circulate this under my name’ (or words to that effect) with totally false statements about an important matter. Both of these cases were dealt with by making the content public, while not divulging the names of the originators.
Of course, there are other potential reasons for not wanting to be named … e.g. what if the originator wanted to destabilise a situation by offering up an argument which he knows to be false.
This publication will not deal in matters raised by someone who is not prepared to be named. If someone attempts to use anonymity for ANY reason, their name will be published.
Bottom line: Don’t communicate with Armouredadvocates unless you are prepared to be named and stand behind your communication! I believe anything else would be unethical … both for the contributor or the publication.
——————————————————————————————————————–
27 January 2019
Are we Doing Enough to Maintain Openness and Transparency (and Avoid the Perception of Conflict of Interest)?
An article appeared in the Canberra Times a couple of days ago, an extract from which is copied below:
“A Defence spokesperson said the department staff must ensure that gifts, hospitality or sponsorship do not give rise to conflicts of interest. But Defence gift registers are not published. Last year [2018] The Canberra Times revealed Defence staff had received $490,000 in gifts, sponsorship and hospitality over the preceding four years, mainly from weapons companies”. https://www.smh.com.au/national/public-servants-keep-perk-details-secret-20190123-p50t79.html
A quote from that original story states that:
The Defence Department refused to release the details of some meetings with industry representatives, citing the damage such information could do to the “international relations of the Commonwealth“. Details of a “finger-food” event with a Finnish organisation were redacted for this reason, as were the details of a lunch with an unnamed outfit from Peru, a “cocktail reception” with Swiss representatives, and a lunch with someone from Kenya
The blog post from 19 August 2018 is relevant. It is copied at the end.
Personal story: While working with a government agency tasked with introducing strategic planning to industry, I accepted an invitation to join some consultants for dinner. I agreed but insisted that I pay for my meal etc. I duly did this, but wished (in retrospect) that I had known in advance how expensive the restaurant was that they had selected!!
On another occasion, I was offered an incentive to provide details of a project. The official response when I reported the conversation was incredible … I was interviewed in a way which made me feel as if I’d done something wrong. I complained (formally) and received an official apology … but it was obvious that there was something amiss with the ‘culture’ at the time [anyone treated as I was could be excused for not reporting any such future incidents.]
———————————————————–
Doing the Right Thing [19 August 2018]
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action; and
Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
What are members to make of this? It would seem that a defence of jurisdiction has been mounted, ie. regulations set by the Department of Defence are not applicable to the 1 AR Assn. Surely, we are bigger than this? Surely, it’s a matter of doing the right thing, even if it is not legislated that it has to be done?
What is the point in making it known that no matter what Defence regulations say with regard to ethical relationships with commercial entities, this has no relevance to the Assn? As an Assn comprised of former members of the ADF, one might expect that guidance provided by Defence regulations would help inform decisions made by the Assn (rather than being completely discounted).
My Blog post of .9 June 2018 refers:
Creating a Culture of Openness and Transparency or Being Vexatious?
A comment was made in relation to the drafting of the new 1AR Assn Constitution that “Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal”.
One possible follow-on from this was to ensure that the Constitution clearly stated that the C’tee must not use the offices of the Assn for anything other than the Assn’s Purposes as set out in the Constitution
The C’tee’s response was “It is now understood that the findings of the Army Fraud Unit are that there is no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer. Continued reference to ‘illegal acts’ is considered vexatious”
I have not seen the “the Army Fraud Unit findings” and I take offence at the allegation of being vexatious.
I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn and, even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, is clearly in breach of Defence regulations.
Background:
The Assn’s 2016/17 Financial statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd $5,000.00. The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It turned out that there had been at least three other similar payments received by the Assn and passed on to 1 Armd Regt.
Assessment:
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the Unit? Relevant Defence regulations are set out below. It is clear that donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. In this case Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400, a multi-billion dollar AFV acquisition project (which they were awarded).
I recommend that the C’tee consider all aspects of this matter when informing members. In doing so, may I suggest that trying to bring about a culture of openness and transparency is a lot different to being vexatious. An apology would be welcomed.
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Document
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
“If a supplier wishes to provide an individual or a team in Defence with a low value gift, it should be given openly and should not be offered at a time that could raise general concerns about conflict of interest (such as during a tender or a contract negotiation period).”
Defence Instruction Concerning Gifts and Sponsorships
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorship is an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above
All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN).
Why Can’t We All Be ‘Just’ Australians? (Also see ‘Correction’ at end).
An article in September 2018 in the Australian Spectator decried reference to the Frontier Wars being included in a short history of the Australian Army. The thrust was that the Australian Army didn’t fight in the Frontier Wars. This, of course, is self-evident, given that the Australian Army came into being on 1 March 1901. https://www.spectator.com.au/2018/09/our-army-did-not-fight-frontier-wars/
Part of my Blog post from 12 August 2018 is copied at the end. This, in turn, was a copy of a submission to the AWM in response to a request for input re their redevelopment project.
Based on subsequent communication with the AWM the following ‘facts’ are apparent:
The functions of the Memorial are [inter alia]: To maintain and develop the national memorial referred to in subsection 6(1) of the Australian War Memorial Act 1962 as a national memorial of Australians who have died:(i) on or as a result of active service; or(ii) as a result of any war or warlike operations in which Australians have been on active”.
There is no reference to ‘formed units’, nor Australians ‘deployed overseas’. The AWM has responsibility for commemorating all Australians who have died as a result of their efforts to defend their country (whether during a conflict or after). This, without any doubt, includes indigenous Australians who fought to protect their families, their land and their belongings.
Should the AWM Council try to define ‘Australians’ as everyone OTHER than indigenous peoples. There would be mayhem; but that is exactly what’s happening!
————————————————————————————-
The ‘Second’ relates to the service of indigenous Australians in defending their country. [from 12 August 2018]
Australian service personnel died on Australian soil while defending their country against the Japanese in 1942. Indigenous Australians died when resisting British troops and others wanting to colonise their land. What is the difference?
The sacrifice of those killed in Darwin and Sydney is commemorated in the AWM; the sacrifice of indigenous Australians is not. But both were trying to protect their families and deny the right of the invader to take their land.
So WWII service personnel killed while defending their country can be recognised, but others cannot. It has to be acknowledged that the place of the AWM is commemorate Australian service personnel on active duty, so the spirits of civilians who died in Darwin and Sydney cannot be guarded by the AWM; but what of indigenous warriors? They were not part of ‘formed units’ as the term is applied today, however, they were in every other sense … soldiers protecting their families, land and possessions against an invader.
As a former serviceman, I cannot begin to imagine the bravery of indigenous warriors opposing the ‘might’ of 18/19th Century military and police forces. But they did! They stood firm and resisted attacks. To my thinking, these ‘soldiers’ are just as much (if not more so) entitled to have their spirits guarded by the AWM, as is the case with service personnel from the Colonial Wars, Federation, and onwards.
I dream of the day in which I could stand on the steps of the AWM on Anzac Day, alongside an indigenous Australian … both of us, paying respects to our forebears.
For those who are tasked with setting the course of the AWM’s future, please give consideration to embracing not only indigenous Australians who have served in ‘formed units’ since Federation, but also those who previously defended our country with all the bravery and sacrifice that we acknowledge in their successors. The example set by the actions of these ‘warriors’ in defending their lands, is something that all Australians can be proud of (the AWM has a role in making this known). It’s to be hoped that such selfless defensive efforts will never be required again.
CORRECTION.
In the Blog post on 24 January 2019 I commented that the RAAC Corporation had stated that “The RAAC is the senior arms Corps within theArmy”. I felt that this was wrong it being my belief that “The RAAC was actually the senior Corps within the Army”.
Paratus Derek has advised that that the “Corps of Staff Cadets [CSC] has precedence over RAAC”. I know that he’s right. But how should we describe the RAAC’s ranking? When the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) was formed it was fifth in precedence (after Staff Corps, CSC, Instructional Corps, and the LH. (Hopkins). Only the CSC remains in the original order of precedence (the AAC now being the RAAC).
The point I was trying to make is that, as far as I’m aware, Corps are not listed in seniority in terms of whether or they are ‘Arms’ or ‘Services’. Indeed, the Instructional Corps was second in seniority. I think the order of seniority is indicative of the date of a Corps’ formation (the CSC was formed in 1911). It could well be the AAC (and therefore the RAAC) was considered the successor to the LH.
Possibly this description would fit the bill: ‘The RAAC is the senior Corps within the Army, after the Corps of Staff Cadets’.
————————————————————————————————————————–
25 January 2019
Tank Training Areas.
We know that 1 Armd Regt has been relocated to Adelaide so as to be in proximity to a training area that is available all year round; but what of 2 Cav Regt and 2/14 QMI LH Regt? The latter, being based in Brisbane, have possibly the biggest challenge to gain quick and convenient access to a suitable training area..
During 2018, the media focussed on the possibility of compulsory land acquisition at the Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWBTA). The driving force here was an agreement with Singaporean Armd Forces for a joint training facility. It appears that the heat has gone out of this particular ‘fire storm’ (see below):
According to the Capricornia Chamber of Commerce in August 2018, “The [Australia-Singapore Military Training Initiative] ASMTI-Facilities Project aims to increase training to 14,000 Singaporean personnel in Australia for 18 weeks annually by the end of 2026. The project involves constructing new and upgrading existing facilities and infrastructure at SWBTA to support training activities of the SAF. This project will provide opportunities for local businesses to provide support and services. Up to $2.25bn will be invested in Central and North Queensland over the life of the initiative.”
But what of the practicalities of this arrangement. How feasible is it for 2/14 QMI to move to SWBTA and back whenever training is required? Would it be a better proposition for AFVs to be based at Rockhampton with crews rotating between Brisbane and SWBTA to meet training needs? There has been no public debate about this (as far as I’m aware).
It seems that 3 Brigade will have access to a much larger training area as well (thanks to the Singapore agreement). In December 2018, Contact magazine advised that: “Assistant Minister for Defence David Fawcett said Defence had exchanged contracts with willing sellers to acquire sufficient land to establish a new military training area near Greenvale, west of Townsville”.
It’s a disappointment that debate about such matters is so restricted. One has to wonder who is driving the Agenda … and for what purpose?
————————————————————————————————————————–
24 January 2019
Getting it Right!
A slightly amended Blog from 15 January 2018 is copied below. The mistakes still exist a year later. I’ve drawn this to the attention of Defence Media (again).
Is it any wonder that Public Relations get it wrong, however, when we ourselves are just as bad. The following quotes are from the RAAC Corporation website:
The RAAC is the senior arms Corps within theArmy. (It is actually the senior Corps within the Army);
Units of the RAAC include tank regiments; reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel-carrier regiments. (Units of the RAAC are actually confined to armoured cavalry regiments and light cavalry regiments)
…the Abrams is Australia’s main battle tank (MBT) and equips 1st Armoured Regiment – the ASLAV is …. used in the armoured reconnaissance role with 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment. (Actually, all units named are equipped with both Abrams and ASLAVs.)
The RAAC is equipped with the M113AS4. (Actually the RAAC is not equipped with the M113AS4).
——————————————————————————————————-
Defence Websites : RAAC Armoured Vehicle Crew Regiment (ACR) or Fake News? (15 January 2018)
The following extracts are from the Defence and Defence Jobs websites. Is there any wonder that there is some confusion in the public arena as regards defence matters?
I wonder what response I’ll get when I draw this to the attention of Defence media? [The response was that Defence PR would seek the advice of the RAAC HOC to correct the matters I raised … I guess one or the other (or both) might be still working on it.]
RAAC Role
RAAC units are able to participate in a range of operations including armoured mobility to infantry …NO, this is an infantry task
Units of the RAAC are equipped with … M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC). NO, these vehicles have been reassigned to infantry.
Locations:
1st Armoured Regiment is based at Robertson Barracks, Darwin … NO, 1st Armd Regt based at Chauvel Lines, Adelaide.
2nd Cavalry Regiment (1 Brigade) is based in Darwin, Northern Territory … NO, 2 Cav Regt is part of 3 Brigade and is based in Townsville.
Units.
The Armoured Vehicle Crew Regiments are Army Reserve units … NO, no such regiments exist.
The Armoured Vehicle Crew Regiment (ACR) provides Army the core element of its high-end war fighting capability through the provision of armoured protection, mobility and firepower on the battlefield … NO, ACR is the acronym for Armoured Cavalry Regiment. The ACRs do not provide armoured mobility, this is an infantry role.
Equipment.
Currently the ACRs are equipped with the M1A1 Abrams tank (M1A1), the Australian Light Armoured vehicle (ASLAV) CRV and M113AS4 APC … NO, ACRs are not equipped with M113AS4 APCs, these are operated by the infantry.
—————————————————————————————————————-
23 January 2019
2 Cav Regt in All its Glory!
In looking for ‘good news’, I came across the following two videos.
It’s so easy to look at how well everything is progressing, and, as a result, miss to underlying problems.
Part of the Blog post from 11 January 2019 is copied below. Leaving aside the issues related to the IFV, there appear to be real problems associated with the Brigade structure. It has to be assumed that one of the 2 Cav recon sqns will be committed to brigade reconnaissance/flank security. The restriction that a single tank squadron imposes on the ability to form battlegroups is discussed below.
One scenario is that there will no alternative other than to penny packet the tanks to battlegroups under command of the infantry. 2 Cav Regt HQ will be left to command the brigade recon.
——————————————————————————————–
Brigade Organisation
Has Plan Beersheba worked out as expected? How does the resulting brigade ORBAT lend itself to our likely operational contingencies? Armour and infantry in 3 Brigade provides an example. Units are: 2 Cav Regt (one tank squadron; two cavalry squadrons); 1 RAR (mounted in PMV Bushmasters) and 3 RAR (mounted in APCs).
It should be possible to form three battlegroups within the brigade. The tank squadron might well be ‘penny packeted’ across these three battlegroups. A more hard-hitting battlegroup would be one in which the tanks were concentrated, ie: 2 Cavalry Regiment HQ: tank squadron, two 3RAR companies (mechanised), plus cavalry troop etc.
No matter how desirable this would be, it leaves the 3RAR battlegroup with no tank support. There is little point in spending $15b to equip an infantry battalion in each brigade with IFVs designed to accompany tanks onto the objective … if there are no tanks available to form the battlegroup. The obvious compromise would be to allocate a half tank squadron to each of the 2 Cavalry Regiment and 3 RAR battlegroups.
It would appear that there are either too few tanks, or too many IFVs to form a balanced force. Ideally, with a mechanised battalion in each brigade, there would be two tank squadrons in the ACR. If a single tank squadron was to be retained in each brigade, ‘balance’ would see the mechanised infantry capability reduced to two companies. This would not be ideal, however, as 3RAR would become a ‘mixed’ battalion with half mechanised. The ‘conundrum’ would be solved if the RAAC were to operate the IFVs.
———————————————————————————————————————–
22 January 2018 (I’m not sure what happened to 21 January)
Clarity in Communication
Following on (in a way) from 20 January … quotes from the 1AR Assn AGM are listed below. When queried with the C’tee … the responses provided are in italics.
The purpose in highlighting this relates to the fact that material published in Minutes of a meeting is generally considered to an accurate statement of fact. If this is not the case, I believe that the C’tee should incorporate an explanatory note; for example, if it is stated a portion of the Assn’s income comes from sponsorships and the C’tee knows that this is incorrect, a note should added, lest members be misled.
—————————————————————————————————–
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM state that:
1. The Patron. “The patron should not be approached to intervene in matters where there is, or could be, a conflict of interest with their chosen employment”
Could the C’tee please advise what the Patron’s chosen employment is and what sort of matters might pose a conflict of interest.
Management Committee Response: There is nothing contained within the ‘own rules’ constitution that obliges the Association to advise anyone of the employment of the Patron. In addition, it is not feasible to consider the many hundreds of situations that could pose a conflict of interest.
Sponsorships. The Assn’s income is derived from “membership fees, sponsorships and the sale of items through the Association Q Store.”
Could the C’tee please explain what the ‘sponsorships’ are that contribute to the Assn’s income?; and
Management Committee Response: This comment was made by the previous President in his verbal report to the AGM. The comment was made prior to the election of the current Management Committee therefore you should direct the questions to the previous President.
(ii) Do these ‘sponsorships’ meet with the criteria set by the Department of Defence, or is this not considered relevant as the Assn is only subject to Victorian Law (as also stated in the Minutes)?
Management Committee Response: The Management Committee does not have any knowledge of either existing or proposed sponsorships.
(iii) Should ‘donations’ not also be included as a source of the Association’s income?
Management Committee Response: The present Management Committee did not write the verbal report presented by the previous President It is an Annex to the Minutes of the AGM. Any attempt to modify a verbal report made by the previous President would be akin to re-writing history as in George Orwell’s, ‘1984’!
Donations. “… any future donations would be accepted without conditions”.
When I donated monies earned by book and its research to the 1AR Assn, I did so on the basis explained in the Author’s Note at the start of the book:
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours.”
The Assn’s accountants considered that this “created a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds”. The Assn employed solicitors Gabbedy, Milson, Lee, to advise me that I must not make any further donations because of this. (Interesting there was no record in the last Financial Statement of payment to this legal firm for acting on the Assn’s behalf … I guess they were ‘friends’ of the then C’tee.)
Could the C’tee please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement?
Management Committee Response: It is suggested that Mr Cameron take this issue up with the previous President. The current Management Committee is to enter into discussions with potential donors prior to acceptance of any significant donation.
———————————————————————————————————————–
20 January 2019 (I’m not sure what happened to 19 January)
The Flip/Flop Phenomenon is not confined to Politicians.
…. but where do Ethics come in?
The 1 AR Assn C’tee stated that “At the Management Committee meeting last evening (31 Aug 2108), the Management Committee reinforced our attitude that the Association is not a lobby group and will not lobby on behalf of individuals and others”.
This position was adopted following the request copied below (ie. would the Assn support a study being undertaken into the unique stress factors experienced by AFV crews.
Despite the policy statement, the following post was made on the 1AR Assn Social Facebook page on 17 January 2019:
Russ James {Secretary] “Request all DFRDB recipients, please join ADFRA {Australian Defence Force Retirees Assn] and get involved in fixing the adjustment in real terms to your pension, that should have been implemented with the 2014 Fair Indexation Bill. Please on forward to your networks. Links to the ADFRA website and registration form were included.
The Secretary has been asked, given that the C’tee has stated that the 1AR Assn is not a “lobby organisation”, if the Assn changed its policy in this regard? (No answer has been received as yet.)
———————————————————————————————————————
Dear Secretary,
As you know, there is a problem with the health of former service personnel and those taking their discharge today. It seems to me that, in relation to RAAC personnel, there are some unique circumstances which have not been taken into account.
Would the RAAC Association support a study being undertaken along the lines proposed below?
Thank you, Bruce Cameron
The Stress Experienced by AFV Crews on Active Service
Purpose.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to some of the factors which may have affected the mental health of Armoured Corps Vietnam veterans, in order to better anticipate the needs of future veterans separating from the Service.
Human Factors in General.
When considering the performance of an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its capability, such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
These factors are taken into account of when choosing between two contenders for a particular combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident they feel, eg. whether or not they are likely to suffer anxiety in any of its forms when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that identifying these is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. To complicate matters, man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
Morale.
There are two main determinants of the degree to which AFV crewmen feel ‘comfortable’ in terms of their survivability. Foremost is their confidence in the overall superiority of the system in which they are a part (ie. their commanders at all levels, their battle grouping, and their equipment) … vis a vis the enemy. Following from this, is their confidence regarding the provisions which have been made for their individual protection.
What happens, however, when a loss or reversal in combat is suffered (eg. an AFV is penetrated, causing crew casualties). It is understandable that confidence in the superiority of the overall system is reduced, while provisions for individual survivability are also called into question.
Matters Affecting Confidence in Individual Survivability
All military training is conducted on the basis that it equips service personnel with skills superior to those of the enemy. This means that AFV crewmen are confident in meeting their responsibilities when under fire. They know that their fellow crew members are similarly trained and they will support each other.
When the enemy demonstrates that they possess an equivalent ability, AFV crew have to accept that their vehicle could be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon or severely damaged by an anti-tank mine, leading to a catastrophic ammunition fire. Apart from the obvious anxiety of being wounded or killed at any time, the following matters are some of those which become particularly important:
Being able to exit the AFV quickly if it is ‘knocked out’ or experiences a fire (particularly important for someone like a tank gunner who does not have direct access to the outside);
Knowing that the vehicle fire-fighting system will always operate immediately and effectively;
Being assured of the fire/flash retardant capability of crew combat clothing;
Being kept informed of what is happening beyond the AFV itself and not being forced to imagine the possibilities;
Being able to maintain contact with other crew members and not put in a situation of feeling isolated and alone (as can happen when the inter-communication system fails) and
Knowing that medical support will ensure that all wounded will immediately receive life-saving treatment and evacuation.
Loss of confidence in any of these areas will significantly increase the anxiety and fear that comes with the stress of battle. Should information overload occur in this digital age, the situation will be exasperated.
Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
One definition of PTSD is a particular set of reactions that can develop in people who have been through a traumatic event which threatened their life or safety, or that of others around them. It is generally recognised that it is not only the experience of a single traumatic event which can generate these reactions, other stressful situations (especially if repeated over and over) can have the same effect.
Conclusion.
AFVs, by definition, operate at the forefront of operations against the enemy. Even if a crewman does not directly experience a traumatic event, being enclosed in a vehicle which could be penetrated by an enemy rocket or detonate an anti-tank mine at any time, gives rise to stressful feelings associated with being wounded or killed, being trapped inside an AFV and burnt to death; and/or being abandoned in a disabled vehicle on the battlefield. These thoughts are often made worse by a lack of communication with other crew members, feelings of isolation, and a constant uncertainty about what is happening around him.
There are unique factors which impact on the stress experienced by the crews of AFVs on active service. These must be taken into account when any assessment is made of their mental health.
———————————————————————————————————————
18 January 20198
Following from yesterday re Bill Burton’s great work on behalf of others …. the Blog post from 11 June 2018 is copied below. (For those who haven’t got one already, there are still some cds available!)
The Black Beret and a Silver Badge.
Just in case the following post was missed on the 1 AR Assn Members’ Only FB page a couple of months ago, it’s copied below.
“What’s he see when he turns off the light?
How much more pain will be due in his life?
Isn’t it enough that he fought for what’s right?
What does he see when he closes his eyes?”
This refrain (which will stay with you once you hear it) is from a song by Natalie Atkins on a cd just released in time for the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration. Natalie is the daughter of John ‘Shorty’ Atkins, tank crew commander in Vietnam. She wrote the song for her father.
The song backs the The Black Beret and a Silver Badge, which is an adaptation of the Ballard of the Green Beret, originally devised at Nui Dat by Bill Burton and John Atkins. With help from the AWM and permission from Barry Sadler’s NOK, it has been recorded with the aim of raising funds for two ‘seeing eye’ or ‘assistance’ dogs for veterans of recent conflicts who need them.
Our Aim is to raise sufficient funds, to be able to sponsor a ‘Guide Dog’ or an ‘Assistance Dog’, or both, for at least two wounded ‘Diggers’, either servicemen or women. Maybe one person suffering blindness or sight impairment, and maybe another, suffering some form of debilitating war neurosis. The nature of the illness is of no consequence in the overall scheme of things. The gift could well be two ‘Guide Dogs’ or two ‘Assistance Dogs, it will depend entirely on where the need is most required.
Who knows maybe ten dogs will be able to be provided (heavens knows we all wish they weren’t needed).
Well done to Bill for his efforts in bringing this project to fruition. The best contact to order is bill.burton19@bigpond.com
—————————————————————————————————
17 January 2019
The Late Phil Barwick
I can’t refer to this as a ‘good news’ story, however, I believe it to be a ‘good’ story.
The following article meant a lot to many former members of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt (1971): ‘GUNNEDAH Water Tower Museum has a new display featuring Vietnam veteran, the late Phillip Gregory Barwick’. (Independent, 13 January 2017)
Bill Burton noticed that the mannequin’s uniform ‘only’ carried the two Vietnam medals and was missing the other three that Phil had become entitled to (plus the Army Combat Badge). As well as correcting the ribbons, Bill has arranged (in conjunction with Phil’s family) for a display case for his medal set. He explained that this was being “… on behalf of Phil’s comrades and friends in his troop and Squadron during 1970/71”.
Email from Bill re progress in this … below.
“… all of Phil Barwick’s Medals have arrived and I forwarded them to his brother Warren in Gunnedah, before Christmas. I bought a Silver Armoured Combat Badge and sent that as well, I explained the story behind the ‘Silver Armoured’ Combat Badge versus the ‘Bronze’ Army Combat Badge to Warren,
. I’ll let you know when the Court Mounting is completed and send you a photo … it looks as if the Local [Gunnedah] council is now going to pay for a first class mural to be painted on the wall of the Water Tower Museum. Marie Hobson (Curator) is as really happy.”
Finally … wouldn’t it be good to be able to see the Tamworth Film and Sound Archives’ #2739 ‘The Phil Barwick Guide Dog Story’.
———————————————————————————————————–
16 January 2019
Ceremony: Unit Citation for Gallantry (Coral-Balmoral)
The following comment was received from a reader after yesterday’s Blog post:
“Re your blog today about presentation of UCG to members that were actually there at the time … for me and I reckon probably a lot more, it wasn’t handled well at all. For us to receive the insignia in the mail was insulting. I don’t know why it couldn’t have been presented to veterans by their local member of Parliament.”
Neither do I.
The Blog post from 26 May 2018 is copied below.
————————————————————————————————–
Unit Citation for Gallantry: Coral-Balmoral
The RAAC Corporation had informed those veterans eligible, to apply for their insignia via the Defence on-line application form
While there may or may not be a parade to present insignia to members of the serving squadrons (if B Sqn 3/4 Cav members are eligible, given that they are custodians of the 3 Cav Guidon) it would appear that there’s no alternative to original members receiving their insignia in the post. The Chairman of the Corporation has been asked to confirm if this is the case, however, he has not responded as yet.
Video of Last Post Ceremony at the AWM on 13 May 2018 is at
I can’t comment as I don’t know the reason … it just seems at odds with wreaths being laid to acknowledge inf, gunners, sappers, and sigs involved in C-B (not all these Corps lost men, but they still honoured the sacrifices that were made by everyone) … that there was no RAAC wreath laid.
How good it was to see the current CO 1RAR lay a wreath together with the CO 1RAR at the time of C-B. Where was the current OC C Sqn? Was it not possible for he and Bern Sullivan to lay a wreath together? Maybe the RAAC HOC and a representative of A Sqn 3 Cav could have done the same.
Seems to me that there is a lack of leadership evident in some matters. A lack of understanding of things that go beyond mere symbolism.
The lapel pins showing the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam’s flag crossed with that of Australia should not have been regarded a ‘commemorative’ pin and plans made to hand them out with tickets. A representative of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt should have been carrying the Standard when it was affixed with the Unit Citation awarded to C Sqn.
Surely a formal presentation could be offered as an alternative to mandatory mailing out of insignia?? Not everyone would be able to attend a parade in Adelaide, however, RAAC Unit COs/OCs around the country could make presentations. All that would be required is for recipients to indicate on their applications that they want their insignia forwarded to the HOC Cell (who could then forward to units).
—————————————————————————————————————————–
15 January 2019
Unit Citation for Gallantry: C Squadron 1 Armd Regt
In search of ‘Good News’, I came across the following Facebook post:
Yesterday the Regiment conducted a parade to issue the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG) to members of C Squadron. C Squadron,1st Armoured Regiment was presented the UCG in May 2018 due to the gallantry demonstrated in the battles of Coral and Balmoral during the Vietnam War. “
This was ‘good news’. Armouredadvocates blog posts for 30 May and 22 May 2018 are copied below. There were many others associated with the appalling lack of ‘ceremony’ associated with the award of the UCG for Coral Balmoral. Firstly, no insignia should have been presented before the OC C Sqn at the time, and the current OC, had been presented with theirs’ (protocol stipulated by Defence . This didn’t happen.
There is something demeaning receiving an award in the post. In another blog I had proposed a means by which retired members of the RAAC could be presented with their insignia at formal ceremonies around the country (eg. for some, at regional RAAC ARES parade nights). Of course, this was too much to contemplate (especially given that the 1AR Assn is not prepared to ‘lobby’ in regard to such matters).
What happened? Original Coral-Balmoral veterans received their insignia through the post. Why couldn’t, for goodness sake, those who would be present at the 1AR Cambrai Day Parade receive theirs’ then (another suggestion made in a Blog)?
Anyway … good news; members of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt didn’t have to go to the Q Store (as seemed likely at one stage), instead they were presented with their insignis on a formal parade held for that purpose. Well done OC C Sqn 1 Armd Regt!!
———————————————————————————-
30 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry : Coral- Balmoral
Email to Defence Honours and Awards, cc RSM-A [for “CO” , read ‘OC’ in this instance.]
“The Defence Honours and Awards Directorate has made the following determination re the UCG: “The actual citation is a warrant presented to the unit. Insignia are worn by individuals to denote their membership of a unit that has been awarded a citation. Personnel cannot be issued with the insignia until the authorised unit representative, normally the CO, has been formally invested with the citation”. http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Hon-Decs/Gall-Dist/Unit-Citation-Gallantry.asp
I think this a very commendable policy, however, the present wording leads to some confusion. The point is that there will always be two ‘Cos’ … the one who commanded the unit at the time of the action for which the UCG was awarded, and the one who is that CO’s current successor.
I would have thought that most symbolic formal investiture would be that of the commander at the time, but was this the intent of Defence Honours and Awards direction?
Could you please advise. I’m aware that UCG insignia are currently being issued to those veterans of Coral-Balmoral. In terms of C Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment, however, there has been no formal investiture of either ‘CO’.
22 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry
I’ve been challenged by the RSM SoA/VP 1AR Assn to make positive comment re the UCG, I responded as follows:
Presumably there will a parade at some stage, during which, serving members of C Sqn will be presented with the UCG insignia (original members could be invited to attend to be presented with /mail out of the insignia can take place before the OC C Sqn has been their insignia as well). One hopes that it will not be a matter of Australia Post and Q store issue (but who knows?). Of course no presentation/mail out of the insignia can take place before the OC C Sqn has been presented with his.)
The tradition of WO2s holding the position of SSM, carrying the Guidon/Standard goes back way before your 34 years. The RAAC, is I believe, the only Corps in which this happens. The AAAvn Guidon is carried by a subaltern, as are the Colours of all RA Inf battalions.
What I would like to see is a statement to the effect that ‘all effort was made to arrange for C Sqn to be in charge of the Standard when the Squadron’s streamer was affixed to it, but this was not possible because ….’. Depending on the reasons given, I would be more than happy to say ‘Well done for trying!’.
But what’s the situation re B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt? Do members of the Squadron charged with responsibility for the 3 Cav Guidon, wear the insignia of the UCG?
If so, one would hope that a parade as above will be held and eligible members of A Sqn 3 Cav might be invited. Of course, if that was the case, no-one can be presented with/mailed to with, the insignia, until OC B Sqn 3/4 Cav is presented with his.
————————————————————————————————————————
14 January 2018
A Couple of Miscellaneous Matters
RAAC Corporation Website states that “Greg Nicholas (Interim) – VIC (1AR Assn)” is a member of the RAAC Council.
Of course, Greg was the President of 1AR Assn until last year’s AGM. He was replaced by Keith Meloncelli.
The new C’tee includes Chris Fenton as the Delegate to the RAAC Corporation (ie. he attends the meetings and reports back to the Association … supposedly).
So who is the Director of the RAAC Corporation representing the 1AR Assn?
RAAC Corporation Branch/Chapter for ACT–based Black Hats.
In 2015, the RAAC Corporation stated that “Following a series of meetings with
Maj Gen Roger Powell, Maj Gen Mike Krause and the now RSM-A Don Spinks OAM, the Corporation was asked to look at the viability or otherwise of establishing a Sub-branch or Chapter for ACT-based serving RAAC members and former members living in the area. The proposal for a sub-branch is to enable serving RAAC members and former ACT-based members to have a more formalised grouping for social and commemorative events. This is something that has sadly been lacking in the ACT for a long time”.
Three years later … there is still no such Branch/Chapter. Is this because RAAC members and former members in the ACT were not asked what their views were on this proposal? Surely anyone considering such a proposal would invite the views of potential members and proceed accordingly. Plans developed without consultation are doomed to fail,
Honorary Colonel 2/14 QMI LH Regt
Why is it taking so long to appoint an Honarary Colonel for 2/14th?
This was the question posted by the Blog on 1 December 2018. The Blog went on the say: “The previous Hon Col, Brig Maurie Meecham AM, finished his tenure in April 2017. Surely the earlier policy ‘kerfuffle’ whereby, in order to save money, Army did away with honorary colonels being appointed on a unit basis … has not raised its meanspirited head again?”.
The December newsletter of the Assn makes no mention of it, however, the home page of Assn website now announces that
“Brigadier (Retd) Steve Salmon has been appointed Honorary Colonel of the Regiment” [and Patron od the Association].
Many congratulations to Brigadier Salmon!
Tomorrow’s Blog: It was a bit of good news with Brigadier Salmon being appointed as Hon Col, 2/14 QMI LH Regiment. Can I find some more ‘good news’?
—————————————————————————————————————
13 January 2019
Intimidation: As Bad as Personal Insults.
One of the Part 6 ‘Goals’ (see above) is: ‘No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults and derogatory language in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion. This regretful aspect has been much reduced of late; however, I realise now that I didn’t make the ‘goal’ as wide as it should be. I have amended it as below.
No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open.
I had forgotten ‘intimidation’. Attempts at this occur all too often.
Last year I saw mention of the passing of a former member of 1 Armd Regt on another website, I asked the C’tee (by email): “Do you also have information regarding the passing of ….”? If the response was “No”, then I would have sent the info I was aware of.
I received the following response:
“Unlike some individuals the Association ensures it has the details from ADF Records prior to publishing incorrect information on a former member of the Regiment.”
[Interestingly, this is a little ambiguous … though I’m sure the author wasn’t suggesting that the Assn publishes incorrect information.]
Obviously, I thought that the information I had seen must’ve been wrong … but IT WASN’T.
It turned out that the person I was inquiring about, had, in fact, passed away. The opportunity was lost to inform members in a timely manner (the ‘Vale’ notice being placed on the 1AR Assn webpage some time later).
Surely the 1AR Assn will develop a system so that reports of deceased members can be verified without having to go through Defence Records. After all, the purpose of advising such information in a timely manner is to ensure that those who might wish to attend a funeral etc, can do so.
————————————————————————————————————————–
12 January 2019
Strategic Guidance and Force Structure
‘Defence Connect’ advises that:
“Defence is placing greater emphasis on a co-ordinated and programmatic approach to Army’s biggest project ever. A new Armoured Vehicle Division will be created to consolidate large programs like LAND 400, LAND 907 – Main Battle Tank Replacement and LAND 8160 – Enhanced Gap Crossing Capability into a programmatic ‘mega project’.”
All very good, BUT … the central ‘problem’ is not with the management of the procurement projects, it’s with the decision-making stage beforehand. We have, for example, LAND 907 Phase 2 (Upgrade to Abrams) and LAND 8160 (Armoured bridging and beaching capability), BUT nowhere is there provision to procure the additional 30 Abrams needed to enable the ACR tank squadrons to be properly equipped and supported.
LAND 400 Ph3 (IFV) is intended to procure a vehicle capable of accompanying tanks onto the objective. Rather than a balanced force structure, we have a situation in which there are too few tanks and too many IFVs.
How in goodness name, did such a situation come about? Surely there are a few good people in Defence who are prepared to stand up and be counted … men and women who are prepared to point out the shortcomings involved in these policy decisions.
On second thought, it’s too much to ask. They would be putting their careers on the line (and their families’ welfare). The problem lies with the hierarchical nature of the Department of Defence. There is no provision (let alone recognition) for independent thinking. Unless this changes, and open and transparent debate is encouraged … wrong decisions will continue to be mixed with the right ones
A Story in Six Parts. (This provides an introduction and background to the Blog, which follows below on a daily basis.)
Once upon a time there was a 1AR Assn Members’ Forum. This was a page on the Assn’s website and members used it to keep in touch and discuss matters relevant to the Assn. Suddenly the Forum was closed. It was explained that it was costing members too much to keep operating. When it was discovered that this was not the case (ie. there was no cost to the Assn), the Forum was reopened.
The topic which was being discussed on the Forum when it was closed was a request for information about the history of the Centurion held by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. This led to a discovery that all the log books for the Centurions at Puckapunyal had mysteriously disappeared from the Tank Museum.
After the Forum was reopened, discussion on the topic continued. Suddenly the Forum was closed again. A number of reasons were given for the closure, all of which turned out to be untrue. One of them was that a post or posts on the Forum had brought the Assn into discredit. No-one was prepared to say what the post was or who had posted it. Misconduct by members was publicly announced as the reason for the closure.
One member lodged a grievance as provided for under the Constitution. He felt that members should be informed as to what their misconduct was and be given the opportunity to defend themselves. He also started a blog to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters.
While the grievance process was underway, members were informed that the Assn’s Constitution had to be changed. This was duly done, disciplinary provisions being extensively strengthened. The member who had submitted the grievance was now found to be guilty of misconduct under the new Constitution. He was expelled from the Assn and his grievance went unheard.
Part 2
Service in the military, no matter what capacity, inculcates a commitment to doing ‘the right thing’. This became obvious when a group of members banded together to lodge a grievance to protest at the lack of natural justice provided to the member who had been expelled. While preparing this they noticed that actions taken against the member were not in accord with the Assn’s Constitution.
Delving into this more deeply, they discovered that the process required to change the Constitution had not been followed. Furthermore, the reasons given to members for having to change it were not correct. The group sought advice from Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), the authority for associations incorporated in that State). The outcome was that the Constitution was declared to be invalid, as were actions taken on the basis of its provisions.
The group of members who had brought about this outcome, asked for an apology from those who had misled members as to the reasons for changing the Constitution. This was not forthcoming. Not long after, the President and other committee members resigned. The new President and Committee spent $960 of members’ funds to get an independent legal opinion re the Constitution.
The findings confirmed the view of CAV that the Constitution was invalid. Furthermore, any member adversely affected by it was entitled to take action against the Association. The member who had been expelled was reinstated. He agreed not to seek an apology so as to avoid causing any divisiveness in the association.
The new C’tee examined the original Constitution and found valid reasons for changing it, eg. the CAV’s default ‘Model Rules’ are ok for a State based association, but have limitations as far as a national organization is concerned. A proposed draft was sent to members. The group which had taken action against the now invalid constitution saw that the required process was still not being adopted (by oversight).
Bringing this to the attention of the C’tee stirred up something of a hornets’ nest among some members of the Assn. Social media went into a frenzy, accusing ‘constitutionalists’ of forcing younger members to leave the association because they had become fed up with “rules and BS” which mean nothing to them.
This is a recognized situation within many ex-service organizations. At least one PhD thesis is being compiled on the subject of maintaining the interest of younger members. The C’tee have been put in touch with the author. As one member of the ‘constitutionalists’ has stated, however, the Constitution is the members’ contract with their association. It must be got right, both for the members’ and Association’s sake. There is no other option. Those donating their time and energy to help the C’tee ensure the Constitution is a valid one, should be thanked, not persecuted, by the wider membership.
Part 3
The C’tee decided to withdraw what would’ve been an illegal constitution if the draft had been approved by members. A new draft constitution is now being prepared by the members group (who have invested immense time and energy in the matter), incorporating the changes desired by the C’tee, but based on the CAV Model Rules. (It seems that the earlier draft may have been based on the NSW Department of Fair Trading Rules, which are different to those required of an association incorporated in Victoria).
The Assn AGM was held on 8 July 2017. It augured well for the Assn that there are a number of members who are prepared to stand for the vacant C’tee positions. There was hope that a valid and well thought through Constitution would soon be able to be presented to members for approval.
Part 4
A powerful ‘clique’ gathered at the AGM, intent on installing ‘their men’ in a number of C’tee positions. They addressed the AGM, venting their spleens … the person who had been expelled and reinstated, was described as a bully and a coward, “a bad apple who needs to be cut out”. The clique’s candidate for President referred to the need to clear out “disruptive” elements in his pre-election speech. Once a new Constitution was finalised, the findings of the original disciplinary hearing would simply be enforced again. The ‘clique’ didn’t attend the 1AR Birthday Dinner on the evening of the AGM … they gathered instead at a local hotel. The retiring Vice President expressed his disgust at this on social media
It has subsequently been discovered that considerable irregularities occurred in the conduct of the AGM: in particular, there were enormous discrepancies with proxy voting; the numbers of votes stated in the AGM Minutes were 30% more than figures given at the meeting to those attending; membership records were inaccurate and wrongly disallowed at least one member from voting; a person addressed the meeting, described as a “financial Affiliate Member”, but there is no provision for affiliate members in the Constitution; another ‘member’ addressed the meeting, but there is no mention of him in the list of those attending; and the financial statement was not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, it did not cover the whole FY and did not disclose the reasons that funds had been expended.
All irregularities with respect to the Constitution have been brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response has been received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past 12 months.)
It is to be hoped that governance provisions as required by law can be enacted so that the Assn will be able move ahead with its good work looking after former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt.
Part 5
Much of the new (2017) C’tee’s time was taken up with governance matters which had been long in the making. A firm of accountants were appointed to set up an accounting system to better enable the Assn to managed its financial transactions. Interestingly as a part of this, advice was given to the C’tee that my donations made for the purpose of “assisting the Association’s endeavours”(stated publicly in the Author’s Note to my book), had “created a constructive obligation in respect to the donated funds”.
Supposedly this meant that the funds could only be used as I stipulated. Of course, nothing was further from the truth … which is proven by the fact that I had no knowledge of the use of the funds to purchase either a TV set for D Squadron in South Australia, or building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club. Both purposes I fully supported. Nevertheless, a firm of lawyers was employed to tell me not to make any further donations. I asked what I had to do to make an acceptable donation, but received no response.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM stated that “… any future donations would be accepted without conditions”. The present C’tee is soon to consider the question: “Could the C’tee please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement?
Despite the above, the financial status of the Assn has been moved onto a sound foundation with stringent controls. This is a major step forward. The fact that the Defence Fraud and Investigation Unit conducted an investigation might have been an additional spur to this end.
The other step required was that of putting in place a valid and relevant Constitution. The hard work of a group of dedicated members, especially Ron Baikie and Geoff Stelmach, paid dividends. The draft Constitution prepared by them, with some amendments, was approved by members at the 2018 AGM.
One of the amendments inserted by the then C’tee was that which stated that just because you served in 1 Armd Regt, this no longer made you eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. Previously you were automatically eligible and would only cease to be a member if you were to be in breach of disciplinary provisions. Overnight, the C’tee has given itself the power of veto on their own terms. Now, if you apply to join (or renew your membership) and the C’tee does not consider you ‘suitable’, then your application is not approved. There is no definition as what “suitable” means in the eyes of the C’tee.
Interestingly, I was not able to attend the AGM for health reasons. I explained this to those who demanded on-line, that I attend. Immediately following the AWM, a series of photos appeared on the 1AR Past & Present FB page of a placemat with my name on it at various places within the AGM venue, coupled with the question: “Where is he?”. I complained to the new C’tee about the humiliation of a handicapped person. The President responded to say that the C’tee could not do anything with respect to inappropriate behaviour on the FB page outside their control.
At its second C’tee meeting the following policy was adopted: “Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog or a face book page with privacy settings, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, may result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary SubCommittee to examine and report on the behaviour.
I assume that the behaviour described above would be considered to be ‘inappropriate’. So it seems that the two 1AR Assn members behind the post, escape a review by a Disciplinary Sub-Committee (and I miss out on receiving an apology). Was it not ever thus?
Part 6: The Ideal World
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have to draw attention to.
This would mean:
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and all ACRs, SoA, and RTC, would have access to an adequate repair pool.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provided good access to training areas (and suitable housing and schooling for families).
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults, derogatory language, or intimidation, in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to Defence’s ‘official’ position.
The Japanese Ha Go tank exhibited at the AWM would be described as having a crew of three (rather than four).
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense.
Information panels for exhibits in the Vietnam Gallery (AWM) and audio-visual narratives would be correct
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the First Australians who lost their lives defending their families, land and possessions, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including in school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
A system of Operational Analysis (OA) would be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience, which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise ”to assist the Association’s endeavours”.
The 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by 1 AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
RAAC related technology exhibits at the AWM would not focus entirely on the technical aspects of the vehicles/equipment, but also would incorporate the human dimension, ie. the roles of (and stress associated with) the crew operating AFVs in combat.
ADF and DVA medical procedures would take account of the unique stress factors associated with operating AFVs in combat (and in training) when assessing the mental health of serving and former RAAC personnel.
RAAC personnel would be able to wear an AFV crewman’s badge following initial qualification as an AFV crewman and until no longer qualified.
ADF personnel would be able to wear dress embellishments which indicated the number of times they had been WIA and deployed on active service in a particular conflict.
The Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) to to be introduced under LAND 400 Phase 3 would be operated by the RAAC.
Oral history interviews would be conducted with those who have crewed the different tanks used by the Australian Army, so that their experience might be recorded before they all pass away (and only the tanks are left).
Pending …
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege.
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour.
The Purposes of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’) and this goal would be enacted by the C’tee.
The person who holds the logbooks for the Centurions at Puckapunyal would be known, as would the reason for the logbooks not being in Tank Museum where they belong. (It is now known that Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM, has, or has access to, at least one of the missing logbooks.)
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’.
No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults and derogatory language in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The 1AR Assn would have a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned.
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which provided effective rapid and hard hitting firepower
Crossed off the List:
Those former 1AR members who desire to do so, can use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
The 1AR Assn now has a valid Constitution approved by members.
Minutes of the last 1AR AGM were published without any defamatory material.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings are now being made available to members.
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral are now entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry.
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
The C-B Battlehonour has been emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard have been corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modeled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
The LAND 400 Phase 2 timetable is on track, despite the anticipated delays associated with a change in the Minister for Defence. (This means that the capability gap that would have resulted from a delay in the replacement of the ASLAV, has been avoided.)
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal advocated by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
The holder of the Centurion logbooks for the tanks sold by Defence is now known publicly. (Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM).
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
DVA withdrew the lapel pin comprised of crossed Australian and Socialist Republic of Vietnam flags which the RAAC Corporation advocated be worn at the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
Attention is now given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
The National Archives/AWM have acknowledged that a mistake made, for example in an After Action Report, CAN be brought to the attention of those who refer to the original documents in order to better understand what happened.
Peter Best would receive just and compassionate treatment from Immigration authorities
————————————————–
The blog continues below, the story remains unfinished. ‘Doing the Right Thing (#I, below) lists daily Blog posts from April 2017 to 11 June 2016.) Earlier day by day posts follow below that.
To comment, move the cursor to a point level with the ‘date circle’, on the RH side of the post. This should illuminate a red rectangle which will enable a comment to be posted.
———————————————————————————————————————
11 January 2019
IFVs : Do we Know What We’re Doing?
Copied below is an article that Defence tell me they are keen to publish to encourage discussion about the role and employment of IFVs.
I make no bones about it … I’m lobbying for a rigorous debate on the subject. It seems to a pity that there a few options for this. The 1AR Assn has stated categorically that they will not support lobbying by any member, no matter the subject or potential benefit to the RAAC. This means that the C’tee will not forward a paper such as that below, to the RAAC Corporation and the issues raised cannot be considered when a briefing on the ‘Corps Today’ is given at the AGM (see yesterday’s Blog post).
Seems to me that exactly the same fear of free and open discussion that impeded equipment enhancement before and during Vietnam … continues to today in some quarters.
LAND 400 Phase 3: A Need for Review.
Request for Tender (RFT)
The RFT for LAND 400 Phase 3 (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) was recently released. Industry has until 1 March 2019 to respond with respect to the provision of 400 IFVs, including seventeen Manoeuvre Support Vehicles (MSVs). The forecast cost is $15b.
There has been a good deal more questioning about this project, than there was for LAND 400 Phase2, Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV). A contract for the supply of 211 CRVs was recently signed, with a budgetary provision of $5.2b.
Some of the questioning related to the number of IFVs to be procured to equip an infantry battalion in each of the three multi-purpose brigades. Surprisingly, 450 IFVs, plus 17 MSVs, were initially called for. This would have been sufficient for four battalions, plus training and repair pools. (No mention has been made publicly as yet of a reduction in project cost.)
Other queries in the Defence press have related to the need for the IFV at all, together with concern about its capability being over-specified. The arguments, on balance, have come out in support of both the vehicle and its level of protection (hence weight), armament, etc.
Those suggesting that the opportunity cost was not justified, had hoped that the RFT might have been delayed until after a Force Structure Review. This is not to be … but that does not mean that the operational concept for the IFV should not be debated robustly.
Basis of Provisioning
Three battalions equipped with IFVs means three battalions dedicated to the mechanised infantry role. This is necessary because a vehicle such as an IFV (two-man turret, 30mm cannon, anti-tank guided weapon, 1000hp engine, 35-40 tonne weight) requires a highly trained crew. If this is to occur, career progression must be integral to the mechanised battalion.
Dedicated mechanised units exist in armies such as those of the US, Britain and Germany. These, however, are very different to the ADF … both in terms of manpower and numbers of armoured vehicles, allowing them to maintain units dedicated to a specific operational role. Is Australia in a position to do the same, or is the flexibility to ‘mix and match’, i.e. tailor force composition to specific operational needs, more important?
The IFV is to replace the M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) with a vehicle to provide a capability to accompany tanks onto the objective. When LAND 400 was initiated, APCs were operated by the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC); subsequently they were transferred to the Infantry. Was this the right decision?
If RAAC crews operated the IFVs, training costs would be slashed. No longer would IFV qualification involve an isolated skill set. Commonality in the operation of AFVs would enable conversion courses to be conducted for commanders, gunners and drivers.
Brigade Organisation
Has Plan Beersheba worked out as expected? How does the resulting brigade ORBAT lend itself to our likely operational contingencies? Armour and infantry in 3 Brigade provides an example.. Units are: 2 Cav Regt (one tank squadron; two cavalry squadrons); 1 RAR (mounted in PMV Bushmasters) and 3 RAR (mounted in APCs).
It should be possible to form three battlegroups within the brigade. The tank squadron might well be ‘penny packeted’ across these three battlegroups. A more hard-hitting battlegroup would be one in which the tanks were concentrated, ie: 2 Cavalry Regiment HQ: tank squadron, two 3RAR companies (mechanised), plus cavalry troop etc.
No matter how desirable this would be, it leaves the 3RAR battlegroup with no tank support. There is little point in spending $15b to equip an infantry battalion in each brigade with IFVs designed to accompany tanks onto the objective … if there are no tanks available to form the battlegroup. The obvious compromise would be to allocate a half tank squadron to each of the 2 Cavalry Regiment and 3 RAR battlegroups.
It would appear that there are either too few tanks, or too many IFVs to form a balanced force. Ideally, with a mechanised battalion in each brigade, there would be two tank squadrons in the ACR. If a single tank squadron was to be retained in each brigade, ‘balance’ would see the mechanised infantry capability reduced to two companies. This would not be ideal, however, as 3RAR would become a ‘mixed’ battalion with half mechanised. The ‘conundrum’ would be solved if the RAAC were to operate the IFVs.
The Number of Dismounts
IFV characteristics are justified on the basis of enabling them to accompany tanks onto an enemy objective. Having done so, the critical issue then becomes the co-ordination between mounted and dismounted elements. Fire support from the IFV is particularly important with only six dismounts per vehicle. In 2016 the number of dismounts was eight … why the reduction?
A 2013 RAND study examined the size of the mechanised infantry squad in the US Army:
“Ultimately, as the Bradley design evolved, the resulting IFV carried only six dismountable soldiers in the passenger space and three non-dismounting crew members. The decision to make this change, however, was based more on budgetary and political considerations than on tactical considerations or historical precedence.
“ … the result was that fire and maneuver by dismounted infantry squads became much more difficult to execute in mechanized infantry units. Importantly, the Army quickly recognized that the Bradley was not ideal as a dismounted infantry support vehicle.”
“While the support provided to dismounted infantry by a heavily armed fighting vehicle does provide some justification for weakening the dismounted squad’s independent fire and maneuver capability … this comes at the cost of reducing the dismounted infantry’s inherent flexibility, particularly in complex terrain. In such situations … such as fighting in urban areas, the vehicle may not be able to provide effective fire support to maneuvering dismounted soldiers, so the problems associated with squads that are too small become more evident.
Current operational thinking sees the IFV, the dismounts and the vehicle crew working hand in glove when assaulting the objective. This scenario obviously requires two commanders … at platoon level, one on the ground and one mounted (in charge of the four IFVs). Who has overall command? Will it be one or the other, or will it depend on the circumstances? Are the IFVs there to support the dismounts or vice versa?
The degree of difficulty is increased by the lack of vision available to the dismounts inside the IFV. Exiting ‘blind’ places them at considerable disadvantage Given that the IFV commander can see the battlefield and has considerable firepower at his disposal, it would seem logical for the infantry to operate in support of the IFV, ie. protect the vehicle from enemy anti-armour weapons (the traditional role of ‘panzer grenadiers’
Conclusions
If RAAC crews were to operate the IFVs, three infantry battalions would not have to be designated for the mechanised role only; allowing a focus on infantry skills and normal career progression. ADF flexibility would be enhanced accordingly and training costs slashed..
The present brigade organisation does not facilitate ‘balanced’ battlegroup organisation. There are ways to address this.
Limiting IFV dismounts to six is known to create difficulties for fire and manoeuvre on the ground.
Finally, the decision time for LAND 400 Phase 3, not only involves the best contender, but also the best way in which to incorporate the IFV into the Army’s force structure and operational planning. This is a matter which must be debated rigorously.
——————————————————————————————————
10 January 2018
The following is a copy of an email to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) re an article in their newsletter, The Strategist:
Comment on ‘Infantry fighting vehicles will complete Australia’s armoured forces’ (Strategist 21 November 2018)
Congratulations to ASPI for running an article on the IFV (LAND 400 Phase 3) in Strategist. The perception behind the following comment by Declan Sullivan is to be commended: “The replacement of the M113 with the new IFV will have a significant impact on the future of Australia’s armoured forces and how they’re used.”
Unfortunately in this quote and a number of other places in the article, Declan has got his ‘facts’ wrong. To start … there are numerous references to the “M113”. This vehicle has never been part of the Australian Army’s AFV fleet. It is a petrol engine APC, operated in that configuration for a short time by the US Army. It was quickly replaced by the M113A1, a diesel engine variant. It was this that was purchased by the Australian Army.
The APC currently being used by the Australian Army is the M113AS4. This AFV is different to the M113A1 in almost every respect. If the ADF is to deploy on operations tomorrow, it will provide a greatly enhanced operational capability (albeit one which, in turn, needs to be replaced in keeping with advances in the weapons available to likely enemy forces).
Declan states in The Strategist that: “The army operates three main types of armoured vehicles, two of which are being replaced under LAND 400. The ASLAV is the most lightly armoured of the three, and has been in service in Australia since the mid-1990s. It is due to be replaced from 2020 by the Boxer combat reconnaissance vehicle. Australia’s medium-armoured vehicle is the M113,
The purchase of such a platform follows the consolidation under Plan Beersheba of different armoured platforms into mixed ‘armoured cavalry regiments’, clearly demonstrating a desire within the army to develop an effective combined arms force. Without IFVs, Australia cannot develop such a force.”
It is wrong to state that the ASLAV is more lightly armoured than the M113AS4 and to suggest a three tier Australian Army AFV construct based on armour protection. Information available on Google states that:
ASLAV: The all-welded steel hull protects the crew from small arm fires and shell splinters. The add-on armour fitted on the vehicle provides all-round protection against projectiles of up to 14.5mm. The add-on armour over the frontal arc protects the vehicle from 30mm projectiles.
M113AS4: The hull of the M113AS4 is all-welded aluminium armour which provides protection against firing of small arms and shell splinters. The armour of the M113AS4 was upgraded with add-on ceramic armour to provide 360° protection against weapons of 14.5mm caliber. The hull was also reinforced with additional protection against landmines and IEDs blast. The troops compartment floor is fitted with spall liners based on the German Army IBD Modular Expandable Armour System.
In the extract above, Declan refers to “mixed armoured cavalry regiments [ACRs] as being essential to the development of an effective combined arms force. Without IFVs, Australia cannot develop such a force.”
Once again, I think he has missed the mark. The ACRs used to be comprised of APCs, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and tanks. The APCs are now operated by the infantry [as is the intention re the IFVs].
There are a number of reasons to raise concern about the introduction of the IFVs, as presently planned. I believe these to be:
RA Inf or RAAC crews for IFVs (RA Inf crews restricts three battalions to mechanised infantry role only);
Brigade organisation (it doesn’t allow balanced battlegroups to be formed); and
Number of dismounts (the six presently specified restricts fire and manoeuvre on the ground)
——————————————————————————————————————–
9 January 2019
Mushrooms
The most recent Blog post re the 2018 RAAC Corporation AGM was on 20 December 2018 (copied below). Earlier background was posted on 21/22 November 2018.
The information about the AGM provided to members of the 2/14 QMI Assn includes the following:
“The Directors [of the Corporation] have been diligent making representations to all levels of Government on our behalf; (and)
“Topics discussed during the meeting included … a briefing on the Corps to-day”.
I don’t recall either of these matters being included in the info provided to 1AR Assn members. What representations to Government were made by Directors on our behalf (did we have any say?); what’s happening in the Corps today? Why do members have to be kept in the dark?
Why does the C’tee have to assess what they believe is of relevance to members and delete reference to any other matters?
Why not simply have the Minutes agreed by all attendees and release them in full to association members?
—————————————————————————————–
[20 December 2018] The Same Meeting : What a Difference a Synopsis Makes
The synopsis of the 2918 RAAC Corporation AGM provided by the 1AR Assn and RAACA NSW reps were very different. The 1AR Assn Secretary recently advised that the C’tee will consider the Minutes and inform members of the matters they think are relevant. The following matters (reported by RAAC NSW) were considered of no value in terms of being passed onto 1AR Assn members.
“Roger Powell gave a report on progress of a proposal for a mounted statue of General Chauvel in Melbourne. The statue to be sculpted by Louis Laumen who did the excellent work on the NBWM in Canberra”.
“The reports revealed our associations are beset by two problems, geography, and the need to remain relevant to the meeds of younger former and serving soldiers. Geography is a greater problem for the ARA unit associations where soldiers are gathered from all over the nation and tend to gravitate back to where they grew-up when they complete their service. Reserve units have a geographic base with association supporting WW2 veterans who were also recruited in specific areas. A number of strategies to address these issues were discussed. An approach that removed perceived financial barriers to serving and recently separated soldiers and a friendly proactive approach to those who may be experiencing issues.
“There was a degree of concern expressed about having a tank squadron in each ACR, former tank soldiers stated it would be better to concentrate the skill set and ensure the best tank squadron could be deployed when required.”
“Reserve units will continue with the dual role of training cavalry scouts and providing protected lift capacity to those elements of the infantry regular and reserve without integrated lift capability. The cavalry scouts will be pre-allocated to regular ACRs and deployed should the ACR be on either exercise, or a combat. Jim Gillett in his report indicated 12/16 LH (HRL) had split its training between squadrons with Caboolture squadron taking on the lift training role, the Hunter Valley Cav Scout training. The important point emphasised was that crews for PMVs used in lift and light vehicles used in Cav Scout training will be trained in the vehicle minor tactics essential for protection when moving vehicles in a combat situations; and effective vehicle husbandry to ensure resources are ready when needed.”
This Blog was established to provide a forum by which RAAC matters could be discussed in an open and transparent manner. It’s disappointing that the actual Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGM are not considered suitable for passing on to 1AR Assn members.
———————————————————————————————————————
8 January 2019
‘The Truth, the Whole Truth …’.
I’m going to have to swear the oath at the Honours and Awards Tribunal next month.
But I mustn’t get ahead of myself … Happy New Year to all readers! May it bring to you all, that which you hope for.
With thanks to Mr Google (and Scotland):
A guid New Year tae ane and a’,
An mony may ye see!
An durin aw the years tae come,
O happy may ye be!
An may ye ne’er hae cause tae murn,
Tae sigh or shed a tear!
Tae ane and a’, baith great and sma,
A hertie, Guid New Year!
FOI Update
While I was wondering (yesterday) what to focus on in the first post of the Blog, I was rung by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. I was informed that Defence had requested more time to respond to the OAIC’s proposal to release the RAAC Corporation’s supporting submission to mine re the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour. Defence claimed that they had to contact a “third party”. Abbreviated background was provided in the 6 December 2018 Blog (copied below). More detailed background is at the Blog for 10 October 2018.
This matter has been running for two years! One has to wonder about the resources spent (wasted) on it. Two Government Departments ‘going to and fro’, an incredible amount of SOA HOC Cell/Defence HQ time, and an ESO which could have better employed its resources on behalf of its members. Previous justification for not releasing the RAAC Corporation submission was that, if this happened, members of the Corporation would no longer provide their support to it.
Another argument was that if the submission was released, I would know who wrote it (how could this be, unless it was a copy of my own submission?). If this was not puzzling enough … release was also denied on the basis that “exposure [for wrong-doing] of one member of an organisation” would lead to concern in other organisations run by volunteers. These were just three of Defence’s reasons for not allowing the submission to be released … just some of the ones that I rejected. (The OIAC agreed with me.)
Let’s hope that 2019 brings an open and transparent approach to all RAAC matters.
———————————————————————————————————–
[6 December 2018] Freedom of Information Request: Progress Report
“As we all know Noel Mc Laughlin [Chairman, RAAC Corporation] has done some pretty outstanding work in his submission setting out the grounds for justification of the emblazonment of the Battle Honour Coral-Balmoral on the Regiment’s Standard. It is fine work by a very dedicated man to both our Corps & Regiment”. 1AR Assn Facebook page, 19 Mar 17.
The RAAC Corporation wrote a supporting submission to my Ministerial re the limitation of battle honours to two per theatre. The Minister responded to my submission to say that the number has now been changed to ten (allowing the Coral-Balmoral battle honour to be emblazoned).
Sadly, the Corporation Chairman will not allow me to see his submission. Incredibly, he states that even when preparing it (having been asked by Army if the Corporation supported my proposal), he said that did not refer to the submission I sent to the Minister (which had been provided to the Corporation when drafted two years ago and has been publicly available ever since). The Facebook exchange is copied below:
Bruce Cameron That’s great Noel. Was the [RAAC Corporation] submission any different to mine?
Noel Mc Laughlin I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours.
An FOI request was initiated, seeking to see the RAAC Corporation’s supporting submission (thereby being able to acknowledge the Chairman’s “outstanding work”). Almost two years later the process is still going … fortunately, it’s now nearing the ‘end point’.
——————————————————————————————————————–
21 December 2018
This will be the last post for 2018 … Merry Christmas to everyone!
Next post 8 January 2019
Retrospective Awards
I attended the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeals (DHAAT) hearing into whether or not those units that took part in the Battles for Coral and Balmoral, deserve to be awarded the Unit Citation for Gallantry. The Department of Defence stated that they would never approve an award being made retrospectively. When asked by the Chairman how Defence reconciled its position with acceptance of those awards that had been made, the response was that the Minister has the final say and we respect his decision.
I was staggered. I researched Defence’s position and made a submission to the DHAAT. It turns out that Defence have no authority to deny retrospective awards, there is nothing in the Letters Patent which gives them this power. If Defence wish to bring such a ruling into force, they must first amend the Letters Patent. Defence can maintain their position, but it is their opinion only (whoever ‘they’ happen to be).
In speaking with Defence officials subsequently, they told me that they felt entitled to argue their position and that no amendment to the Letters Patent would be made … so as to allow for retrospective awards when there a case of maladministration which could be proven.
Looking into views concerning retrospective awards more generally … I find a that common reason for opposition is that related to today’s values being superimposed on those of the past. It is argued that gallantry awards are, in fact, peer awards, ie. awards recommended by those who served under the same conditions and dangers as the recipient.
There is a substantial difference, therefore, between retrospective awards being made to those who are able to testify based on their personal experience (and substantiate the testimony of others) and retrospective awards being made to those who, together with their contemporaries, are long dead. Awards made on the basis of contemporary evidence, such as that for Coral-Balmoral, enhance (rather than demean) the Awards system.
There will always be many acts of the highest gallantry which will go unrecognised. This should not stop cases being brought forward in which the evidence of witnesses can be evaluated.
Note: The author has something of a ‘vested’ interest in this matter.
——————————————————————————————————————-
20 December 2018
The Same Meeting : What a Difference a Synopsis Makes
The synopsis of the 2918 RAAC Corporation AGM provided by the 1AR Assn and RAACA NSW reps were very different. The 1AR Assn Secretary recently advised that the C’tee will consider the Minutes and inform members of the matters they think are relevant. The following matters (reported by RAAC NSW) were considered of no value in terms of being passed onto 1AR Assn members.
“Roger Powell gave a report on progress of a proposal for a mounted statue of General Chauvel in Melbourne. The statue to be sculpted by Louis Laumen who did the excellent work on the NBWM in Canberra”.
“The reports revealed our associations are beset by two problems, geography, and the need to remain relevant to the meeds of younger former and serving soldiers. Geography is a greater problem for the ARA unit associations where soldiers are gathered from all over the nation and tend to gravitate back to where they grew-up when they complete their service. Reserve units have a geographic base with association supporting WW2 veterans who were also recruited in specific areas. A number of strategies to address these issues were discussed. An approach that removed perceived financial barriers to serving and recently separated soldiers and a friendly proactive approach to those who may be experiencing issues.
“There was a degree of concern expressed about having a tank squadron in each ACR, former tank soldiers stated it would be better to concentrate the skill set and ensure the best tank squadron could be deployed when required.”
“Reserve units will continue with the dual role of training cavalry scouts and providing protected lift capacity to those elements of the infantry regular and reserve without integrated lift capability. The cavalry scouts will be pre-allocated to regular ACRs and deployed should the ACR be on either exercise, or a combat. Jim Gillett in his report indicated 12/16 LH (HRL) had split its training between squadrons with Caboolture squadron taking on the lift training role, the Hunter Valley Cav Scout training. The important point emphasised was that crews for PMVs used in lift and light vehicles used in Cav Scout training will be trained in the vehicle minor tactics essential for protection when moving vehicles in a combat situations; and effective vehicle husbandry to ensure resources are ready when needed.”
This Blog was established to provide a forum by which RAAC matters could be discussed in an open and transparent manner. It’s disappointing that the actual Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGM are not considered suitable for passing on to 1AR Assn members.
STOP PRESS!!
The following has been moved from ‘Pending’ to ‘Crossed Off the List’ (see Part 6 above).
Peter Best would receive just and compassionate treatment from Immigration authorities.
Following a Federal Court ruling, the Minister for Immigration’s decision has been overturned and Peter has been released from Villawood to spend Christmas at home (at last), Thank heavens for the Rule of Law and those who appreciate fairness and compassion on a human scale.
———————————————————————————————————————–
19 December 2018
Surplus Funds and ‘The Vision’
The last 1AR Assn C’tee report informed members that the Assn had $35,000 “surplus” funds (ie. funds additional to the required working capital).
There is a need to ensure that the Association can always pay any claims which might be raised against it that are greater than the coverage of its insurance policies.
Having ensured this, however, is it the right thing just to responsibly invest the ‘surplus’ to earn even more money and increase the surplus?
Presumable some of the Assn’s surplus comes from donations. Hopefully it was wasn’t for money donated for specific things (like ‘005’), as such donations can’t be accepted as they lead to ‘constructive obligations’. (Full chapter and verse about that are contained in previous blog posts, ie.a donation made for ‘the purposes of the Association’ had to be returned to the donor).
Hopefully the 1 AR Assn has a vision for the future of the Assn, ie an agreed goal to which accumulated funds from members’ fees and donations will be used.
The Secretary has been asked:
“A quick question … does the C’tee have any plans for the $35,000 in “surplus” funds?
I don’t know if ideas have been canvassed, but if not … some thoughts are:
reduce membership fees;
make a donation to the Chauvel Foundation…see Major General Powell’s presentation at the RAAC Corp AGM (no mention in the 1AR Assn synopsis);
liaise with the Regiment re the possibility of commissioning a commemorative trophy (eg. Coral-Balmoral); and
sponsor member of the 1AR C’tee to visit the UK to liaise with the RTR Assn C’tee and gain info re their ideas.”
——————————————————————————————————————–
18 December 2018
The Latest re LAND 400 Phase 3 (IFV)
Everyone has been very quiet recently re LAND 400 Phase 3. There are reasons to believe that Army knows that it hasn’t thought through all the issues (and they are wide ranging). I’ve written a paper which Defence is considering publishing. This addresses the three main issues:
RA Inf or RAAC crews for IFVs (RA Inf crews restricts three battalions to mec inf role only);
Brigade organisation (it doesn’t allow balanced battlegroups to be formed); and
Number of dismounts (the six presently specified restricts fire and manoeuvre on the ground)
I believe that robust discussion about these matters is needed to avoid another decision like that which allocated the role of dismounted cavalry scouts to the RAAC ARES (and a few others I could suggest) … with no debate, ie. making it a ‘fait accompli’..
There’s no been much in the Defence press recently. The Defence technology Review’s November issues reported that Germany’s Puma would not be a contender. http://defencetechnologyreview.realviewdigital.com/?iguid=7366de0a-6145-490b-87a5-2fe10889019d#folio=9 This is unsurprising, given that it is equipped with a remotely controlled turret (rather than a manned one, as required by the LAND 400 specs). Nor did it really want to be in competition with Rheinmetall’s KF41 Lynx.
The Pacific Defence Reporter provided the following confirmation that the Hanwha ‘Redback’ will be a contender … even though it can accommodate eight dismounts. Could this be a game changer?
“…. the K-21 is still in production, Hanwha, the RoK Army and – perhaps most importantly – the government Agency for Defense Development (ADD) – have started work on its replacement, the K-31. The version that will be offered for Australia has the marketing name REDBACK. In essence, this will have an empty weight of 36 tonnes and a combat weight of around 40 tonnes. The standard configuration will have a crew of three and carry six fully equipped soldiers with ease – or eight dismounts with some changes to their internal layout.
The monument commemorates the past, present and future personnel who have served in the 1st Armoured Regiment.
Front Inscription
1st Armoured Regiment Association Memorial: Dedicated to the past, present and future crewmen of 1st Armoured Regiment. The tracks are representative of the strength of comradeship and the support gained through teamwork. The crew is always stronger than the individual. The Centurion tank track (left) symbolises the past deeds and the Leopard tank track (right), represents present and future deeds.
———————————————————————————-
Thinking about this Memorial, I asked the Secretary 1 AR Assn ….”Who is responsible for its maintenance?”.
The Secretary responded to say that:
“There are over 400 memorials located within the grounds of the Repatriation Hospital at Heidelberg, Victoria. These are managed and maintained by the Grounds Staff at the hospital. The Manager is also responsible for notifying interested parties when anniversaries and/or events are being planned. Visitors to any of these events are able to provide feedback to the Manager over the condition of the various plaques and memorials”
He also mentioned that the last Newsletter included photos of a Coral-Balmoral Commemoration at Heidelberg during which Bob Kennard and John Brooker laid wreaths. (Herman Harberts and Doug Blackney also attended.). I am unsure if this was organised by the 1AR Assn Victorian Rep..
Anyway … given the clever thinking behind a Centurion (representing past crews) and Leopard (present and future crews) track links being incorporated in it, might the Assn consider including an Abrams track link as part of the Memorial.
The Secretary advised that the idea would be considered at the next C’tee Meeting.
As I write this, I wonder … on 8 July 2019, Doug Blackney will be 90. Would it not ne a great thing for 1 AR Assn (Vic) to organise a b’day ‘party’ for him, (A few weeks a go I organised an 90th b’day celebration for an RAAC member here in Canberra … It was greatly appreciated by the b’day person (a surprise he wasn’t expecting) plus all those who attended (an opportunity to pay their respects and catch up with old friends).
I’ve emailed the Secretary for his thoughts on this.
——————————————————————————————————————–
16 December 2018
“I Can’t See a Problem With it”!!
On 1 November 2018, two photos were posted on a FB site under the heading “RPG damage from SVN”
The photos were of the tank I was commanding when my driver was wounded by RPG shrapnel. (One even clearly showed my name and that of my driver.) The remaining posts on the FB page in relation to this, are copied below:
Was this Phil Barwick Cent?
Some things you don’t forget. Drove a lady to see Phil in hospital with a load of troopers on a free running pass. At the parade in Sydney Phil thanked us for that visit. Years later it was still crystal to both of us. RIP Phil. Cheers
I remember Phil as a lad in Tamworth
Fond memories of a great guy. [It was NOT the tank in which Phil Barwick was WIA]
Bruce Cameron The Cent pictured is ARN 169056. It is now outside the AWM in Canberra. The driver, PeterCadge, was severely wounded on 25 June 1971 during Operation Hermit Park. I would counsel against showing photos of damaged AFVs like this (ie. out of any sort of context) Chances are that they could trigger a PTSD episode in one or more of those who may see them and who might have lasting memories of what happened. Interestingly, the AWM used to use photos of battle damaged AFVs to create an ‘effect’ in their promotional material. They have ceased doing this after I pointed out how intensely painful it would’ve been for the parents of a M113A1 driver WIA in the vehicle.
Sorry but I have to agree to disagree. If that thought process was adopted the AWM in Canberra would have to have a clean out ! The post was placed without a cynical comment as is sometimes the case. I cant see a problem with it. Thanks for your comment. I dont agree with it but I appreciate your input.
Mate you are so right
Trev, as always, spot on.
Is this what I think?
As in ?
Uncle Wayne.
Maybe for some. Not for me. Take care.
One should not white wash the history of battles (Warts and all) as its bound to repeat it’s self again as hard as it is. I as with many other’s were in very close proximity of the contact above and still remember it vividly. Thanks for sharing it so as to not forget the crews and others on that fateful day.
My Feelings.
I was distressed to see the photos posted, purely as representative of the damage caused to 1 Armd Regt tanks by enemy anti-tank weapons. Only one of those posting comments, knew what I was trying to say (“Maybe for some. Not for me”). Clearly, the poster of the photos and the others commenting, had never been in action during which one of the men they commanded (and were responsible for) was wounded. Every day I think about what I should have done differently. I don’t need photos to be bandied about to bring this to mind. Nor do I need to be reminded that the images are lurking in the depths of the FB page.
I asked, unsuccessfully, for the photos to be deleted. [That request and the response subsequently has been deleted.] So be it … everyone is entitled to their view about such matters.
I’d almost forgotten all this, when the person who had posted the pictures, did a final post before heading off on holidays. In it, he said “… sadly I’ve managed to upset a few people [including Mr Bruce Cameron MC]”.
I emailed in reply to say: I wonder if you might care to explain to readers why [you offended me], ie. ‘you posted a graphic photo of my tank showing the damage caused when it was struck by an RPG, wounding the driver; I asked that it be taken down because of the distress caused to those involved by being reminded of the incident in this way. The request was refused”. I guess it’s symptomatic of the reason that PTSD is not understood by the wider population.
The response to my email states (inter alia) that “Had I known of your feelings regarding them [the photos] they would have been removed immediately”. Interestingly the FB page at the time included the following post from me: ““I was the crew commander when the tank was hit by the RPG. You may not see a problem with the images as presented, but I do. I think that I have the right to ask that you delete the post”.
As they say, truth is in the mind of the beholder.
——————————————————————————————————————
15 December 2018
The Missing Thirty Abrams
An extract from an article in the Australian (26 May 2018):
“Sometimes overlooked in the excitement about new ships, submarines and wheeled vehicles is that the Australian Army will spend about $2.5 billion on improving and expanding its heavy-armour capability. This consists of improvements to the existing 59 M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBTs) and the purchase of additional vehicles based on the same chassis for armoured assault bridging and breaching tasks. It is also possible that more MBTs will be acquired, which might take the total pool of vehicles to about 90.”
As has been repeated by Armouredadvocates for some years, Defence has clearly stated that the change for a centralised tank regiments to the present three geographically dispersed tank squadrons, requires an additional 30 tanks to make the organisation viable.
The following piece makes it clear that tank numbers are also down in another way:
Has Plan Beersheba worked out as expected? How does the resulting brigade ORBAT lend itself to our likely operational contingencies? Armour and infantry in 3 Brigade provides an example.. Units are: 2 Cav Regt (one tank squadron; two cavalry squadrons); 1 RAR (mounted in PMV Bushmasters) and 3 RAR (mounted in APCs).
It should be possible to form three battlegroups within the brigade. The tank squadron might well be ‘penny packeted’ across these three battlegroups. A more hard-hitting battlegroup would be one in which the tanks were concentrated, ie: 2 Cavalry Regiment HQ: tank squadron, two 3RAR companies (mechanised), plus cavalry troop etc.
No matter how desirable this would be, it leaves the 3RAR battlegroup with no tank support. There is little point in spending $15b to equip an infantry battalion in each brigade with IFVs designed to accompany tanks onto the objective … if there are no tanks available to form the battlegroup. The obvious compromise would be to allocate a half tank squadron to each of the 2 Cavalry Regiment and 3 RAR battlegroups.
It would appear that there are either too few tanks, or too many IFVs to form a balanced force. Ideally, with a mechanised battalion in each brigade, there would be two tank squadrons in the ACR. If a single tank squadron was to be retained in each brigade, ‘balance’ would see the mechanised infantry capability reduced to two companies. This would not be ideal, however, as 3RAR would become a ‘mixed’ battalion with half mechanised. The ‘conundrum’ would be solved if the RAAC were to operate the IFVs
A brigade with a mechanised battalion requires two tank squadrons to be able to form ‘balanced’ battlegroups.
The other option is to reduce the number of IFVs to two mechanised companies per brigade (crewed by the RAAC) and use the money saved to purchase the 30 Abrams needed to allow three tank squadrons to operate independently.
“But good history can never be preoccupied with forgetting. Its core business must always be the preservation of memory”.
Well said. It’s the value of the memory, I believe, which is often overlooked. I was dealing recently with a military situation in which the ‘facts’ were distorted at a high level to fit the political demands at the time. This meant that an investigation was not conducted into what had happened … an assessment which could have identified failures in the ‘tactical procedures’ at the time, which could have prevented the same thing happening again. What price ‘votes’ when they are counted in soldiers’ lives?
You mention that Chauvel wrote, “There are a few ‘incidents’ in the Australian official history. I would miss out anything about the Surafend affair. It should never have been mentioned in the Australian Official History and has been long forgotten in Australia.”
This is interesting in light of the General Sir Harry Chauvel Foundation, https://www.chauvelfoundation.com/ which highlights the “the values and integrity that Sir Harry displayed throughout a life dedicated to public service”. Sir Henry was a man of his time. Today, we would hope that matters which cross the boundaries of the rule of law will be made public for the benefit of the community as a whole. Human frailties run deep however.
In 1970 an infantry battalion drafted a proposal for an award to be made to it. Many of the enemy casualties claimed had been the result of the efforts of supporting arms. The award proposal made no mention of them (the supporting arms may as well not even have existed).
Today’s ethical standards are more robust; partly because, I believe, calls for openness and transparency are more stringent than ever before.
————————————————————————————————————-
13 December 2018
Australia’s Defence Preparedness: Just Right?
What are the ADF’s 2019 Key Performance Indicators (ie. in management jargon, the things that the Minister Secretary, CDF and Service Chiefs are to be assessed on in terms of their national security responsibilities)?
Assessments of threat, lead times, and industry capability, determine the size and structure of our standing and reserve forces, as well as the size and nature of stockpiling of defence related resources, stores and ammunition.
The latest Defence White Paper provides the background, but what are the key objectives that result from this strategic guidance? I suggest that some of them would be:
Australian intelligence gathering capability must be certain of detecting preparations to attack Australia at least twelve months before they could be implemented;
The ADF should be capable of deploying and sustaining a brigade (including tanks) to a location on mainland Australia, within two months of the notice to do so;
The ADF should be capable of deploying and sustaining a brigade (including tanks) to an overseas location in our region, within three months of the notice to do so;
The ADF should be capable of deploying and sustaining a battlegroup (including tanks and supporting elements) to any location within Australia or overseas within one month of the notice to do so.
——————————————————————————————————————-
12 December 2018
Army’s Operational Structure II
In the example 3 Brigade battlegroup organisation set out in the Blog for 9 December (see below), the tank squadron was split across the three battlegroups. Of course, a more hard-hitting battlegroup would be one in which the tanks were concentrated, ie:
2 Cav Regt HQ: tank squadron, two 3RAR coys (mech), plus cav troop etc.
No matter how desirable this would be, it leaves the 3RAR battlegroup with no tank support. There is little point in spending $15b to equip an inf battalion in each brigade with IFVs which are designed to be able to accompany tanks onto the objective, if there are no tanks available to form the battlegroup..
The only compromise would seem to be to allocate a half tank sqn to each mech inf battlegroup, ie:
2 Cav Regt HQ: two tank troops, two 3RAR coys (mech); and
3RAR HQ: two tank troops, two 3RAR coys (mech).
It is clear that either: (i) there are two few tanks; or (2) there are too many IFVs. Ideally, with a full mech battalion in each brigade, there would be two tank squadrons in the brigade ACR.
Retaining a single tank squadron, would see the mech inf capability reduced to two coys. This would not be ideal as 3RAR would be a mixed battalion, ie half leg inf and half mech inf. The ‘conundrum’ would be solved if the RAAC were to operate the IFVs.
Footnotes.
It seems that interest is being generated by the posts on this subject (ie. LAND 400 Ph 3 and its implications). Let’s hope that there might be some rigour in the overdue debate;
I’m to appear before the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal on 13 Feb 19 in relation to a submission made (by a witness to an incident) for me to me awarded the VC. I believe the process will be that the Tribunal conducts hearings with those directly involved. If, as a result, there is a need to call for expanded hearings, then that will be done (but, in truth, I don’t know the workings of the DHAAT in this regard). I mention this, not because I want to big note myself, quite the opposite. I mention it so that there will be no suggestion that this is something that was done ‘behind closed doors’. (I know that there are a few people only too willing to challenge my motives for doing things.)
———————————————————————————————————————————————-
11 December 2018
Showing Respect and Appreciation
I’ve copied below the Blog post for 10 August 2018. In the second part, I explained that I had been banned from the 1AR Assn Facebook page because I’d suggested that the retiring RSM-A should have been given more of an RAAC style send off, eg. possibly being driven away from AHQ in an ASLAV.
Well done to all involved! (As is obvious, I think that the former RSM-A also deserved equivalent thoughtful planning. If the RAAC Corporation has no schedule of such retirements, I think they should consider one.)
PS. My comment on the FB post re General McLachlan’s retirement: “What a disappointment that he will not now be either CA or CDF. A great leader in all respects. One hopes that the Army/Government tried as much as possible to secure his on-going service to the nation. (There are, of course, always personal reasons which trump anything else.) Good to see his departing ‘carriage’ … no less than was deserved.”
The good news first. The C’tee of the 1AR Assn have copied the Minutes of their first C’tee meeting to members. How good is that? I’ll have to amend the ‘To be Achieved List’ set out on the Blog a week or so ago. The C’tee have also published ‘policies’ for the running of the Assn. These are not the same as By-Laws (in that there is no regulation that they have to be approved by members) … but it seems that members’ approval is to be obtained. If any provide ‘feedback’ via the Members’ Only FB page, … be careful, there could be a ‘sting’ in the tail (see below). Postscript. It seems that Assn policies are not to be circulated to members for feedback/approval … the Minutes of the recent C’tee meeting shows policies (eg. Internet communications) being approved by the C’tee in isolation.
BANNED!!
Email to the Secretary, 1AR Assn (yesterday):
“Thanks for your advice that ‘The feeling of Committee members was that [I was] using the retirement of an illustrious member of the Corps [by saying, ‘Hopefully the RAAC Corporation will mark this occasion appropriately’] to score political points, and this was not considered acceptable’.
As a result of the C’tee’s view, I have been blocked for the 1AR Assn FB pages. (I have no idea what the reference to “political points” refers to.)
May I say in response, I find it difficult to understand how an RAAC RSM-A’s retirement is first advised to everyone vide the Army Newspaper. I would have hoped that prior to the event, the RAAC Corporation would have informed member associations and arranged, either directly or through the RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel, to participate in his farewell. What about the RSMs of the RAAC units in which he had served, being surprise guests at the ‘official’ farewell ceremony. What about an ASLAV to transport him from the front of Russell Offices ‘into retirement’?
This is the equivalent of the Chief of Army we’re talking about. How many resources go into the staging of CAs’ farewells?
BUT, none of this was to be … though I understand that the former RSM-A he will be included with others who have retired after 20 years+ at the next Corps Conference Dinner at the SoA.
Isn’t it within us to do something special for those who have served the Corps in an exemplary manner?
For consideration, and action if appropriate, by anyone who can make a difference.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
10 December 2018
Army’s Operational Structure.
Has Plan Beersheba worked out as expected?
As we know, it’s a force regeneration cycle (not a force structure). At any time: one brigade is ‘training’, one brigade is ‘preparing’ and one brigade is on operational stand-by.
But how does our brigade ORBAT lend itself to our possible operational contingencies? Let’s look at armour and infantry in 3 Brigade in Townsville, Relevant units (that close with and engage the enemy) are:
2 Cav Regt (one tank sqn; two cav sqns);
1 RAR (mounted in PMV Bushmasters) and
3 RAR (APCs).
The LAND 400 IFVs being procured will replace the APCs in terms of being able to accompany tanks onto the objective.
Part of the reason advocated for the Armoured Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to include two cav sqns was that insufficient reconnaissance capability for brigade operations was able to be provided by the single cav sqn in the previous ORBAT. .
Theoretically, working with four inf coys per bn, it should be possible to form three battlegroups within the Brigade. What would these look like (given that one cav sqn would be fully committed to brigade frontal and flank recon)?
Battlegroup 1: 2 Cav Regt HQ, two tank troops; two cav troops; two 3RAR coy (mech), and one 1RAR coy (PMV);
Battlegroup 2: 3RAR Bn HQ: one cav troop; one tank troop; two 3RAR coy (mech) ; one 1 RAR coy (PMV); and
Battlegroup 3 (Reserve?): 1RAR HQ, one cav troop; one tank troop; two 1RAR coys (PMV).
One can’t but wonder whether or not ‘brigade operations’ were really in the mind of those making the decisions at the time. Maybe the two cav sqn per ACR organisation was simply an means of maintaining RAAC numbers when forced to give up manning of APCs/IFVs. Maybe the org was simply for command/administrative efficiency?
If one was to sit down and propose the best ORBAT for the Army to enable it to be flexible enough to undertake a range of different operational commitments … I wonder if it would include three battalions of infantry confined to IFVs
The CV9030 infantry fighting vehicle was developed by BAE Systems Hägglunds of Sweden specifically for the export market.
The basic CV9030 chassis is similar to the CV9040 that is in service with the Swedish Army.
To meet the specific operational requirements of the Royal Norwegian Army the CV9030N has a number of improvements including a more powerful Scania diesel engine and the installation of a new BAE Systems Hägglunds two-man power-operated turret armed with a stabilised 30 mm ATK Gun Systems Company Bushmaster II Chain Gun (or, in the CV9040, a 40m cannon).
With a weight of around 35 tonnes, one has to wonder whether or nor the protection requirements would be achieved (compared to the approx. 40 tonnes of other contenders).
The eight dismounts ‘enter and leave via a large door in the rear’. Interestingly, the CV9030 is “provided with a single vision block with associated firing port in the centre.”
I wonder whether or not contenders with eight dismounts will be discounted; or is it possible that contenders with both six and eight dismounts could be considered? With only two contenders being selected for trials, a vehicle with eight dismounts would have to be very good in all other respects.
But the Ajax IFV has been rejected by the British Army for the role that the LAND 400 IFV is to fulfil. The Warrior 2 IFV is to equip the British Armoured Infantry Brigades and the Boxer IFV, their Strike Brigades. Not surprisingly, all is not as it seems.
The vehicle being put forward by GD as a contender for LAND 400 Ph 3 is a very different beast to the Ajax … so different, it’s designated Griffin III. Only the hull, it would seem, has any links to Ajax.
The original Griffin was designed as an armoured fire support vehicle, equipped with 120mm gun. Griffin III’s armament has been scaled back to a 50mm cannon and room has been found for six dismounts. Interestingly, the cannon has an automatic loader. At 40 tonnes, it should meet all the protection requirements for our new IFV.
Ok … I’ve solved my dilemma. Why was there no info available as the turret configuration for the Griffin III? I was wanting to confirm that it was a two turret … but now I understand.
It’s an unmanned turret! This sets the Griffin up as a contender for the US Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) … see November post.
While Rheinmetall has the inside running as far as LAND 400 Ph 3 is concerned (because of commonality advantages with Ph 2 CRV) there might be another contender that has an outside chance. More tomorrow.
Footnote. It seems that Griffin III is not the configuration to be proposed as a contender for LAND 400 Ph 3. (Which is unsurprising as the phase 3 specs call for a manned turret.) It seems that the Ajax variant will be equipped with a 30mm two man turret. Also of interest … it has been suggested that the UK might ditch the warrior upgrade in favour of the Ajax IFV. Things are certainly ‘dynamic’ to say the least.
——————————————————————————————————
7 December 2018
The Australian Army of the Future.
LAND 400 Ph 3 will determine the Australian Army’s operational capability for decades to come. It is instructive to compare this with the planned ORBAT for the British Army
Four brigades make up the base organisation: two Strike Brigades and two Armoured Infantry Brigades.
A Strike Brigade comprises:
One regiment of Ajax in the reconnaissance role
One regiment of Ajax in the ‘medium armour’ role
Two battalions of mechanised infantry in the Boxer IFV
An Armoured Infantry Brigade comprises:
One Challenger 2 MBT armoured regiment,
Two Warrior 2 IFV armoured infantry battalions. (Warrior’s cross-country performance enables it to accompany Challenger in mounted attacks.)
A clear distinction has been made in the roles of the two types of brigade … this results in less protection and firepower, but greater mobility, for the Strike Brigade IFVs … compared to those in the Armoured Infantry Brigades.
Warrior 2 is not far off being ready to be introduced into service. The upgrade includes a stabilised 40mm cannon and a new turret (which impinges more on internal hull volume); provision for modular armour is also made; and a new situation awareness package is included.
The original Warrior (30mm turret) carried seven dismounts. The section commander was also the vehicle commander. He dismounted with the others on the objective, leaving the gunner to provide fire support and command the empty vehicle. Reduced internal volume in Warrior 2 means that there is only space for six dismounts.
The operational requirements for LAND 400 Ph 3 seem to marry well with those of Warrior 2. This is unsurprising, given that their roles are the same, ie. to accompany tanks onto the objective. There is a BUT, however.
Given the composition of the UK’s Strike Brigades, they have flexibility to deploy a more mobile force, either in conjunction with the Armoured Infantry Brigades, or in its own right in differing operational scenarios.
The Australian Army seems to be putting all its eggs in the one basket. Fingers crossed that it’s the right one.
———————————————————————————————————————-
6 December 2018
Freedom of Information Request: Progress Report
“As we all know Noel Mc Laughlin [Chairman, RAAC Corporation] has done some pretty outstanding work in his submission setting out the grounds for justification of the emblazonment of the Battle Honour Coral-Balmoral on the Regiment’s Standard. It is fine work by a very dedicated man to both our Corps & Regiment”. 1AR Assn Facebook page, 19 Mar 17.
The RAAC Corporation wrote a supporting submission to my Ministerial re the limitation of battle honours to two per theatre. The Minister responded to my submission to say that the number has now been changed to ten (allowing the Coral-Balmoral battle honour to be emblazoned).
Sadly, the Corporation Chairman will not allow me to see his submission. Incredibly, he states that even when preparing it (having been asked by Army if the Corporation supported my proposal), he said that did not refer to the submission I sent to the Minister (which had been provided to the Corporation when drafted two years ago and has been publicly available ever since). The Facebook exchange is copied below:
Bruce Cameron That’s great Noel. Was the [RAAC Corporation] submission any different to mine?
Noel Mc Laughlin I wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours.
An FOI request was initiated, seeking to see the RAAC Corporation’s supporting submission (thereby being able to acknowledge the Chairman’s “outstanding work”). Almost two years later the process is still going … fortunately, it’s now nearing the ‘end point’.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
5 December 2018
The IFV Debate:
“Incompatible Requirements Made it Difficult to Combine Lethality, Survivability and Squad Capacity in One Vehicle.”
The RAND Corporation’s analysis of the US Army’s IFV squad size conundrum was referred to yesterday. An extract from the paper’s Conclusion is copied below …
“While the support provided to dismounted infantry by a heavily armed fighting vehicle does provide some justification for weakening the dismounted squad’s independent fire and maneuver capability—the vehicle provides covering fire while the dismounted soldiers maneuver—this comes at the cost of reducing the dismounted infantry’s inherent flexibility, particularly in complex terrain. In such situations, such as fighting in urban areas, the vehicle may not be able to provide effective fire support to maneuvering dismounted soldiers, so the problems associated with squads that are too small become more evident.
APC doctrine, on the other hand, is designed less to support the mounted maneuver fight. Rather, APCs are meant to carry infantry squads relatively close to where they are needed as dismounted fighters while providing some protection from indirect fire and direct small arms fire during the movement. To incorporate a passenger compartment large enough for nine to eleven dismounts, the APC has typically traded off mobility, armor, and large weapons.
In essence, the U.S. Army has, to date, been unable to field a vehicle that combines the passenger capacity of the APC with the lethality, survivability, and mobility of the IFV. However, the Army’s struggle to develop effective dismount tactics for Bradley units [six dismounts]continues to reinforce the need for such a vehicle.”
The more I look into LAND 400 Phase 3, the more I’m puzzled by the requirements specified. It seems to me that the fundamental premise as to how the AFV is to employed has to be examined more robustly. I contend that, if this is done, the outcome will be for an IFV with a minimum of eight dismounts, operated by the RAAC.
—————————————————————————————————————
4 December 2018
IFV Dismount Numbers
The following quote is from a Rand Corporation study:
“One of the reasons for different squad sizes is the constraints imposed by the IFVs or APCs that are used to transport and support the squads. In the case of the German Army, two different squad sizes are used: nine personnel for light infantry, and seven in the case of panzergrenadiers, which are organic to armored units. The smaller squad in the case of the panzergrenadiers is due to the carrying capacity of the older Marder or new Puma IFV. (https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR716/RAND_RR716.pdf)
In 2016, the Australian Defence Magazine stated that: “According to the [LAND 400 Phase 3] RfI brief, the ideal solution would be a tracked and turreted vehicle with high levels of protection, mobility commensurate with the Abrams M1A1 main battle tank, and the ability to lift an eight-strong infantry section.
Why was the requirement for the LAND 400 Ph 3 IFV changed to six dismounts after 2016?
Another RAND study examines the squad size conundrum in the US Army.
“Ultimately, as the Bradley design evolved, the resulting IFV carried only six dismountable soldiers in the passenger space and three nondismounting crew members. The decision to make this change, however, was based more on budgetary and political considerations than on tactical considerations or historical precedence. Commonality with the Cavalry Fighting Vehicle—being developed in parallel—drove the budget considerations. Budget savings in the post-Vietnam Army were an important selling point with Congress. In addition, important members of Congress were enamored enough with the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile that the Army decided to integrate that space-hungry weapon system into the Bradley design.
Prevailing operational concepts and supporting doctrine for mechanized or combined arms operations generally supported these decisions, but the result was that fire and maneuver by dismounted infantry squads became much more difficult to execute in mechanized infantry units. Importantly, the Army quickly recognized that the Bradley was not ideal as a dismounted infantry support vehicle. Shortly after the Bradley was fielded the Army began new IFV development. The Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (FIFV) concept of the 1980s Armored Modernization effort was intended to carry nine dismountable infantrymen. More recently, the IFV that was part of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the XM1206, would also have carried nine soldiers in the passenger compartment.”
This is Rheinmetall’s description of the SAS provided in the Lynx (a contender for LAND 400, Phase 3):
Situational awareness: The commander and gunner both have access to the Stabilized Electro Optical Sight System/SEOSS, a digital TV – IR optical system with an integrated laser range finder and fire control computer. In the fighting compartment, displays provide the crew with a seamless 360° panoramic view. Rheinmetall’s Situational Awareness System (SAS), featuring automatic target detection and tracking, enhances the hunter-killer capability and minimizes crew reaction time. Emerging threats can be swiftly engaged with Lynx’s main or secondary armament. Laser warning sensors and the Acoustic Sniper Locating System (ASLS) likewise form part of the sensor suite. A combat management system and intercom for tactical communication round out the array of on-board equipment.
Silly me … when I first saw the term SAS in the context of an IFV, I thought it referred to a means by which the dismounts could be made aware of the terrain into which they would have to leave the IFV and confront the enemy. But NO … the Lynx SAS provides nothing of the kind.
Many other Armies have opted for IFVs with unmanned turrets. Interestingly, it seems that the IFV dismounts in these vehicles will have better situational awareness, than those in the LAND 400 Ph 3 (manned turret) contenders. The sensors and cameras required to enable to an unmanned turreted IFV to operate, mean that ‘take offs’ for the dismounts can give them reasonable awareness of the external situation.
Let us hope that the tactical consequences of IFV dismounts exiting their IFV ‘blind’ on the objective … have been fully assessed.
Sorry about harping on this topic (more to follow tomorrow), but I’m not sure that the decisions to have an IFV (i) with six dismounts and (ii) operated by the Inf … would pass the ‘Pub Test’.
“Tenders will close in first quarter of 2019, after which six months of initial evaluations are expected to result in an announcement of a shortlist of two. The chosen pair will then sign a Risk Mitigation Activity (RMA) contract.
The RMA is scheduled to start in third quarter 2020, with each contender supplying three vehicles for up to 15 months of trials to assess performance, lethality, survivability, and integration with the Australian environment. Unlike Phase 2, trials will commence with mine blast testing to assess occupant survivability.
The government will announce the winner some time in 2022. Initial operating capability (IOC) will be achieved in 2024-25, and final operating capability (FOC) in 2030-31.
Defence says it wants a total of 467 vehicles – 312 in IFV configuration, and the remainder in a mix of eight other variants, including command, joint fires, combat engineers, ambulances, and manoeuvre support vehicles.
Comment: It is my understanding that that total number of vehicles to be procured under LAND 400 Phase 3 is now 400 (467 was the initial project number).
“In an industry brief in September 2016, Defence spelled out its basic requirements for the new IFV – a tracked vehicle with a turret, the capacity to carry eight soldiers, high level of protection and mobility, and mature technology with a robust growth path. At that stage there were seven potential contenders, all indicating their willingness to build wholly or mostly in Australia.”
Comment: The current requirement is for a vehicle with a crew of three and six dismounts (possibly a change linked to the requirements for the future US Army IFV replacement … see below).
“An IFV exists to transport a group of soldiers, typically an infantry section or smaller, across the final 300 metres of the battlefield, protecting against artillery and gunfire, and armed with offensive and self-defence weapons.”
Comment: Is this really the role of the IFV?? Armour protection and defensive weapons are obvious requirements … but what about offensive weapons such as ATGW?
Rheinmetall’s Lynx KF41 is the most modern of the IFV designs in a small field to be considered under LAND 400 Phase 3. It was officially unveiled at Eurosatory in Paris in June, with Rheinmetall personnel demonstrating how it could be reconfigured from IFV to Command variant in eight hours, then back again.
The KF41 is a big vehicle – 34 tonnes in basic configuration, rising to 48 tonnes for the configuration with the main armament and highest level of protection. In comparison, the Australian M113AS4 weighs up to 18 tonnes while the US Bradley weighs up to 31 tonnes.
Though Rheinmetall has a long history of IFV design – its Marder, introduced in 1971 is regarded as the world’s first true IFV – Lynx is an all-new design, drawing lessons from Marder, from its successor Puma, and from the recent evolution of conflict.
Lynx has a crew of three and can accommodate six dismounts with all their equipment, or up to nine dismounts in the long wheelbase version. Australia has specified a high level of protection whatever new vehicle is chosen. It should be able to withstand 30mm munitions, RPGs, a 10kg mine, and an unspecified capability against EFP.
That high level of protection requires a much heavier vehicle than past APCs and IFVs. The Boxer CRV, which was deemed to provide better occupant protection than AMV35, has a maximum mass of 38 tonnes, compared with 13 tonnes for the ASLAV it will replace.
Footnote:
Comment on another website:Sounds like an abortion of an idea. Really, Six dismounted Infantry in Support of a driver and vehicle commander??! Come on now! Gee…what could go wrong… The ADF needs to stop reducing the Infantry section and put in place a IFV that can accommodate a full eight to nine man section.
My Response:To pick up on the dismount numbers … companies vying for LAND 400 Phase 3 also hope to be contenders for the US Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle ‘OMFV’ project. I’m not kidding re Optional manning, ie. the concept is that when the dismounts leave the vehicle, it would be remotely controlled to provide fire support. Like us, the US only require six dismounts. Not everyone agrees, however. Two on the contenders for LAND 400 Phase 3 provide for 8-9 dismounts. I have great respect for the LAND 400 project team, but I do think that the role (and therefore the operational requirements) of the IFV need wider discussion..
—————————————————————————————————————————–
1 December 2018
Miscellaneous
John Ainsworth (1947-2018)
Catering Officer, 1ATF. One of nature’s gentlemen has left us. If only we had more time and the ability to re-connect and remember the times we shared.
Army Newspaper.
Dear Editor,
On Page 9 of Army News Edition 1433, you refer to the “Colours of 1 Armd Regt”.
This is obviously an oversight, as 1 Armd Regt is the only unit in the Australian Army to carry a Standard (rather than Colours). Possibly the difference between Colours, Guidons and Standards might be worth consideration as the subject for an article in a future Army News.
AFV Crewman Personal Weapon
The following goal has been moved to the ‘Pendingcategoryf Part 6ove):
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which provided effective rapid and hard hitting firepower
It seems that at least one F88C (shortened version of the AusSteyr F88) is available for Abrams crew to use to supplement their 9mm pistol when they dismount. The 9mm pistol, however, remains the issued personal weapon. Armoured crewmen deserve better. The 70 year old weapon weapon was unsatisfactory in Vietnam and it is unsatisfactory now.
How to Reinforce ‘Lessons learnt’.
The Army History Unit stated some years ago that “It’s very easy to get someone to write a list of lessons learnt; what is much more difficult is getting someone to open the book and read them”.
Work is being done on ways in which lessons from Vietnam (and other conflicts) can be kept in the forefront of soldiers’ minds today. The following ‘lesson’ is recorded in ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’:
Scenario: You are a platoon commander travelling in IFVs. Moving parallel to a track (with a patch of open ground big enough for a helo LZ, adjacent), one of the vehicles detonates an IED and one of the dismounts is wounded. What is the sequence of actions you should follow?
Solution: All the tactical procedures for securing the area should be listed, ditto medical treatment, contact report and ‘Dustoff’ request (or whatever it’s called today). How many students designated the nearly open ground as the Dustoff LZ?
Heritage: In the incident which occurred in Vietnam, the enemy had targeted both the APC and the helicopter. The detonator for the anti-helicopter IED was positioned in a tree … vanes were rotated by the air turbulence caused when the helicopter came in to land. This movement completed the electrical circuit. The helicopter was a ‘write-off’. (The site for the anti-tank IED had been chosen because of the proximity of a Dustoff LZ.)
Lesson: There will rarely be enough time to secure and check the ‘obvious’ LZ completely. Better to transport the casualty to an alternative LZ if possible.
Honorary Colonel 2/14 QMI LH Regt?
Why is it taking so long to appoint an Honarary Colonel for 2/14th?
The previous Hon Col, Brig Maurie Meecham AM, finished his tenure in April 2017.
Surely the earlier policy ‘kerfuffle’ whereby, in order to save money, Army did away with honorary colonels being appointed on a unit basis … has not raised its meanspirited head again?
————————————————————————————————————————–
30 November 2018
John Scales’ 80th.
A dinner was held at a Vietnamese restaurant in Canberra on the evening of 26 November to celebrate the 80th birthday of John Scales. Fourteen people were present (some travelling considerable distance): the ‘toast’ to John follows ….
“Today is an important day … no more so than for someone who this morning, after four weeks, was able to declare that today is ‘Free Willy’ Day. I know that’s a bit cryptic, but I had to start somewhere.
Remember the days when the Best Man at a wedding reception got up and read out all those bogus telegrams making the bride and groom’s families perish from embarrassment, but amusing everyone else? Well … I won’t be going there (apart from reading one about John’s experience with the ‘knacker-cracker’ … if there’s time at the end).
What I WILL be doing is trying to stand in for those who can’t be here. While all pass on their best wishes to John, there are some comments worthy of being mentioned separately.
Barrie Wade told me not to make John laugh too much, as the other diners will think that a bomb’s gone off (I gather Barrie has memories of John’s raucous laughter in the Mess); Rod Ward wanted John to be served a Vinh Thanh beer to conjure up memories of 47 years ago, ie. put ice in a hot glass and pour hot beer over it.
Roger Tingley, a distinguished member of the Armoured Corps, shared a memory about his time as a new soldier in a recruit training battalion. I need to digress here and mention that John graduated from OCS Portsea in December 1960, along with Alan Hutchinson who’s here tonight. I assume that they were accommodated in nearby rooms at Portsea (where you got to know people really well) as Alan later asked John to be his best man.
Getting back to Roger Tingley, he was in the platoon commanded by the newly commissioned Second Lieutenant John Scales. Roger’s comment to me was that it was “because of John’s example, that I elected to join the Armoured Corps”;
Bill Burton first met John at 4/19 PWLH in 1962. He asked me to remind John of the time (many years later) spent feeding “ant lions” in the sand outside John’s tent at Nui Dat. (John can explain what ant lions are if anyone wishes to consider an alternative dining experience.) Bill also sent a cd to be passed on. In 1968 there was a popular song titled the Ballard of the Green Berets. Bill and another tank commander (Shorty Atkins) made a cassette tape based on this and titled ‘Black Beret and Silver Badge’. Shorty’s daughter, Natalie, subsequently became a well-known country singer. When it was discovered that a copy of the Vietnam cassette had ended up in the Australian War Memorial, a project was initiated to re-record the Black Beret adaption with the aim of raising funds to purchase comfort dogs to help wounded veterans from Afghanistan. Bill wanted you to have a copy.
Among others who would be here if they could, are David Watts, Lloyd Sawyer, Brian Agnew; Jack Leggett; Ron Baikie; Denzil Bourne; Chris Stephens, Bob Snape, and Peter Goldman. Peter asked me to mention that one of the Legacy widows he helps look after, is Helen Bourke (the late Peter Bourke was our squadron commander in Vietnam; John was his 2IC).
Finally, Lionel Bailey asked that I pass on his congratulations on your award of the OBE. I was completely wrong footed and sent Lionel a response to say that I didn’t think that John had been awarded the OBE. Lionel explained that John would be eligible tonight … so it is that I’d like to present John with the OBE … for those who aren’t aware of its significance, I refer to the Over Bloody Eighty award!
————————————————————————————————————————-
29 November 2018
Communications
To their credit, the 1AR Assn C’tee have encouraged members to provide suggestions that would assist with the development of a Communications Strategy
My suggestions are the following
Relationship Between 1AR Assn Facebook and 1 AR Assn Website for C’tee Communications. I believe that it is necessary to have a clear policy as to how the C’tee is to use each of these communications channels. Take ‘News’ for example … the RAACA NSW uses their Website to inform members re recent happenings eg. a report was given in relation to the RAAC Corporation AGM shortly after it was held. (The 1AR Assn is yet to inform members). A report of this type would seem to be too large for a Facebook post. Once members are aware of the role of the Website and FB, they will be able access one or the other as needed.
2, Timeliness. Following on from the above … a Communications Strategy which informs members of matters which affect them and/or were of interest to them, in a timely manner, would be highly desirable.
Ability for Members to Make Suggestions. I believe that one of the fundamental communications links between a C’tee and its members, is that which enables members to make suggestions. This should be possible, together with C’tee responses, on an open and transparent basis (for obvious reasons). The Members’ Forum which used to be a facility of the 1AR Assn Website, was an ideal basis for this interaction. (On this note, I think that members ‘suggestions’ should not automatically be regarded as ‘criticisms’ …an association which is able to benefit from the suggestions from members, is an association which will be long lived.)
Ability to Comment on C’tee Proposals. I believe that one of the (other) fundamental communications links between a C’tee and its members, is that which enables members to comment on proposals being considered by the C’tee … before they are enshrined in ‘law’. For example … suppose that a C’tee was considering introducing a measure whereby they had the right to accept or reject a former 1 Armd Regt’s application for membership without any reason being made known to the applicant (or other members).
Minutes of C’tee Meetings. It is to the credit of the present C’tee that they have made minutes of their Meetings to members. This is something which has long been sought by members.
Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGM. Members’ funds are used to pay for membership of the RAAC Corporation. It follows that members should be entitled to read the Minutes of the Corporation’s AGM (so as to understand what the Corporation is doing on behalf of the Assn’s members). This has been denied by previous C’tees.
Courtesy and Dignity. For a long time, 1AR Assn member communications have been characterised by personal insults and innuendo (as exemplified by all the FB posts regarding this topic). It would be wonderful if on-line communications (FB and Website) could be moderated so that they were limited to discussions which added value to matters of relevance to the 1AR Assn
My response (below) has been published on the Pearls and Irritations website.
“During pre-Vietnam training in Australia, tank crews were required to wear specially designed tanksuits. These were required to be worn with the sleeves rolled down, whenever a crewman was on a tank, because of the possibility of fire. They were made with reinforced internal straps over the shoulders which meant that if a crewman collapsed inside the turret, the straps could be used to assist those above in lifting him out.
When the tanks were deployed to Vietnam … the tanksuits were too hot to be worn. Infantry jungle greens were issued instead. These had no reinforcing to assist the extraction of a wounded crew member (as had to happen on a number of occasions). Not did they provide any protection in the case of fire.
Because the Australian Army has a ‘can do’ attitude, nothing was done to provide alternative protective dress for tank crews.
What should have happened, if the Army had acknowledged its ‘duty of care’, was that flame retardant, reinforced for evacuation and suitable for SE Asian climatic conditions, tanksuits should have been procured.
The availability of these should have been known in advance. If stocks were not held in Australia, contingency planning for operations outside Australia, should have identified sources and lead times for procurement.
This level of preparedness comes at a cost. There are other examples whereby lives of service personnel were placed at risk because of the cost cutting measures imposed by the Government. Will cost minimisation continue to dominate ‘duty of care’ for the lives of service personnel on active service?
——————————————————————————————————————————-
27 November 2018
The General Chauvel Statue
The report on the 2018 RAAC Corporation AGM published by RAACA (NSW) states that:
“Roger Powell gave a report on progress of a proposal for a mounted statue of General Chauvel in Melbourne. The statue to be sculpted by Louis Laumen who did the excellent work on the [National Boer War Memorial] in Canberra”.
“Roger Powell”, of course, refers to Major General Roger Powell, AM (Retd), RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel
The extract above is, of necessity in reporting on wide ranging meeting, a very brief one. Background is as follows:
General Powell has recently been appointed as an ambassador for the General Sir Harry Chauvel Memorial Foundation: “The Foundation was recently delighted to appoint Major General Roger Powell as an Ambassador. Roger has a wealth of experience in senior leadership positions, with an ongoing influence over domestic and international strategic decision-making”.
What is the Memorial Foundation?
“The Chauvel Foundation is a not for profit Australian Charity. Its purpose is to promote, support and inspire service to the community by building public awareness of the attributes, dedication and accomplishments of the Australian Light Horse and their greatest commander, General Sir Harry Chauvel.
Through three programs that bring this culturally significant heritage into public view, the Foundation will lead all Australians to building a stronger nation through community engagement and to recognise those who currently espouse the values and integrity that Sir Harry displayed throughout a life dedicated to public service.”
The “three programs” are:
The Light Horse Legend: Past and Present
The Foundation’s online Light Horse Anthology enables people to share stories, search for information, and bring the legend to life. Contributors include family descendants, school students, currently-serving soldiers and professional historians. .
The Sir Harry Chauvel Award
The Foundation is considering a series of awards to recognise the qualities and efforts of General Sir Harry Chauvel: resilience; civilian and military leadership; arts; and the indigenous contribution to Australian society.
The Sir Harry Chauvel Memorial Artwork
Renowned Melbourne sculptor Louis Laumen’s equestrian maquette of General Sir Harry Chauvel was unveiled in October 2017. Louis Laumen’s bronzed bust of Sir Harry was presented to the Shrine of Remembrance on 25 September 2018. The life-sized statue is planned for completion by 2025.
Comment:
One of General Chauvel’s granddaughtesr said recently that: “… as a member of the General Sir Harry Chauvel Foundation, my role is to encourage people to research the history of their Light Horsemen ancestors or local heroes and bring their stories home to the families and communities from which they came.
It seems that there might be a link between the General Sir Harry Chauvel Memorial Foundation, the General Sir John Monash Foundation and the Spirit of Australia Foundation.
Finally … in reference to the blogs of the previous two days, it’s interesting that society seems to have no interest in researching historical matters in living memory. It is only after generations have passed that the achievements of forebears become significant. I venture that there would have been little interest in recording the experiences of light horsemen through personal interview, in the same way that there is little interest today in recording the experiences of WWII tank crewmen by personal interview.
————————————————————————————————————————-
26 November 2018
Recording Our Heritage Before it is Too Late. III
“Daddy, what was it like to be a crewman in a Churchill tank that the 1St Armoured Regiment operated when it was first formed? Was it very different to what it’s like in tanks you serve in today?”
“We’ll never know son … all the Churchill crewmen are now dead. There was a proposal to record their experiences some years ago, but nobody was really interested in all that old stuff”.
The email sent to the Temora Aviation Museum and the General Manager’s reply (see yesterday) were copied to the Australian Armour and Artillery Museum.
The situation was explained as below:
“I’ve just learnt that the Army Tank Museum, Puckapunyal, is fully committed to its relocation project and does not have the resources to conduct interviews.
It appears that the last opportunity to record the experiences of the crews of Australian WWII tanks, is about to be lost. It’s just possible, however, that if interested stakeholders were to act together in a joint project, some measure of Australia’s military history involving AFVs might be able to be preserved.
I would imagine that considerable commonality might exist in terms of integrating interviews into audio visual displays associated with tanks and aircraft and Temora could assist in such endeavours.
I have copied this email to the RAAC Association (NSW) which is quite likely the only means left of making contact with former crewmen of WWII tanks.
Your response to the above concept would be most appreciated.
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————————————————-
25 November 2018
Recording Our Heritage Before it is Too Late. II
Following on from yesterday, the email below and its response are relevant:
Email 1: Dear President, Temora Aviation Museum:
I’m wondering if the info below resonates as far as aircraft crews are concerned?
I’m a former tank (Centurion) crewman who served in Vietnam. Among submissions to the AWM re their Redevelopment Project recently, I raised concern that AFV exhibits were presented on a solely technological basis:
“I believe that there is an opportunity to provide better understanding as the combat experience of AFV crews. Displaying a tank is one thing, making known what it was like to be a crew member fighting the vehicle during combat … is something else entirely”.
Some years ago, I tried to get the Australian Army Tank Museum to record the experiences of WWII tank crews (Matildas, Grants etc) with the idea that visitors could stand in front of a tank, press a button (or listen to headphones) and gain an idea as to what it was like to be a crewman in the tank. If the audio conversations were based on a common set of factors, such as internal noise, temperature, communications etc; effect on crew of cross country movement; external visibility; ability to perform crew functions … then improvements (or not) achieved through technological advance/design improvements might also become evident. Unfortunately, the attitude at the time was that Museum visitors are “interested in vehicles, not people”.
In the intervening years, the last serving crewmen for some of Australia’s WWIII era tanks have died. The only thing that exists to represent their experience are salvaged versions of the tanks themselves. Unfortunately these tanks don’t speak. I’ve asked the Army History Unit to consider the possibility that such a project could be initiated before all crewmen of WWII AFVs have passed on.
It occurred to me that operating a tank in action has mny similarities with crewing an aircraft in action. Do you know of any project to record the oral histories of the crews of RAAF’s inventory of aircraft (before there is no-one left with such experience)?
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
Email 2: Hi Bruce,
I could not agree more with your thoughts regarding telling the stories of the veterans who flew our aircraft, or in your case the, operated the tanks.
The Temora Aviation Museum initiated such a project about 10 years ago, this is called the Unsung Heroes Project you will find more information on our website at https://aviationmuseum.com.au/unsung-heroes/
To date we have recorded more than 550 veteran interviews, currently these interviews can be viewed at the Museum and we are currently investigating who the entire collection can be viewed by the general public via a website. This is a huge project but one that we are working through with the time and resource we have available.
If you go to our website you will be able to watch just a few of the interviews that have been professionally edited into a videocast and podcast. We have also integrated many of the interviews into audio visual displays that can be viewed whilst visiting our Museum.
Kind Regards Peter Harper General Manager Temora Aviation Museum
More to follow on this subject tomorrow. Note: The link to Temora’s project and what they’ve achieved is recommended viewing..
———————————————————————————————————————————–
24 November 2018
Recording Our Heritage Before it is Too Late.
Armouredadvocates has made a couple of submissions to the AWM re their Redevelopment Project, One of the matters raised was a concern that AFV exhibits were presented on a solely technological basis:
“I believe that there is an opportunity to provide better understanding as the combat experience of AFV crews. Displaying a tank is one thing, making known what it was like to be a crew member fighting the vehicle during combat … is something else entirely. There is a fallacy abroad that members of tank crews were protected from enemy fire and, therefore, their experience should not be portrayed as explicitly in closing with and engaging the enemy, as that of infantry. Of course, nothing is further from the truth. I believe that the Australian armoured experience should be represented not just by AFVs [and their technical characteristics], but also by a well-informed and engaging interpretation of what it was like for AFV crews fighting inside them.
Interestingly, exhibits at the Imperial War Museum (London) have been described in similar terms: “Much of the Imperial War Museum’s displays are technology-focused, especially in the museum’s Large Exhibits Gallery. Here, guns, tanks and aircraft are displayed clean and undamaged, presenting a sanitised version of war, which emphasises technology rather than the context in which the objects were used, the people who made and used them, and the effects they had on their intended targets. The artefacts’ captions concentrate on their technical details.” https://www.jcms-journal.com/articles/10.5334/jcms.7013/”
Some years ago, I tried to get our Tank Museum to record the experiences of WWII tank crews (Grants, Matildas etc) with the idea that visitors could stand in front of a tank, press a button (or listen to headphones) and gain an idea as to what it was like to be a crewman in the tank. If the audio conversations were based on a common set of factors, such as internal noise, temperature, communications etc; cross-country ride characteristics; external visibility; ability to perform crew functions … then improvements (or not) achieved through technological advance/design improvements might also become evident. Unfortunately, the attitude at the time the suggestion was made, was that visitors are “interested in vehicles, not people”.
The Army History Unit has been asked if a project such as that outlined above, could be initiated before all crewmen of WWII era AFVs have passed on.
PS. The photo above is of an exhibit at the Tank Museum, Bovington, UK. The designer attempted to present the tank in a way which would complement a list of technological characteristics. She “… was trying to put the Mk 1 tank into its context of how to overcome the advantages of the defence in positional warfare. The exhibit took on a life of its own and it expanded to give the viewer an experience of the whole journey from Recruiting Office to the Front Line. The final denouement when you enter the German trench and are confronted with the Mk 1 towering over you is very powerful still. It was designed in the mid-nineties and yet is still fresh”.
————————————————————————————————————————
23 November 2018
Legacy’ & Heritage
Yesterday’s post mentioned the ‘divide’ between young and old in terms of the reasons for joining regimental associations. I believe that this ‘divide’ runs more deeply.
A couple of years ago, I suggested that the Centenary of Cambrai warranted a special acknowledgement by the 1 Armd Regt and 1AR Assn. Re the former, I suggested that possibly pasr COs and RSMs might like to contribute to something which would become part of the heritage of 1 Armd Regt for the next 100 years. I emailed those whose emails I had. There was a positive response from some (eg. possibly something which would be a ‘living’ part of the Regiment’s on-going history, eg. a development scholarship for a deserving member); there was an apathetic response from many; and a few were dismissive (eg. “I don’t need you or anyone else to tell me how to spend my money!”).
With respect o the 1AR Assn, I suggested the possibility that some of the donated royalties from my book could be used to sponsor a member of 1 Armd Regt and a member of 1AR Assn to attend the Cambrai Centenary Commemoration in France (the requirement being that on their return they presented their experiences to the members of their 1 Armd Regt ‘family’). This proposal didn’t proceed because my donated royalties were returned to me as they were considered to place a ‘constructive obligation’ on the Assn as to the manner of their use (this is nonsense … as has been recounted here previously).
Why difference does any of this make in the overall scheme of things?
I reflected on this when I looked at the image sent to me under the heading ‘Cambrai Greetings’ … see below 20 Nov 18. When will the heritage of 1 Armd Regt mean as much to its former members, as that of the RTR obviously means to its former members?
Obviously, the service history of the RTR is so much greater … but is this the only factor?
It seems to me that military culture between British and Australian Armies is ‘chalk and cheese’. That’s not to say that one is better than the other … just that they’re very different.
There is more to be gained, however, by embracing the heritage of the British Army units with which we have affiliations, compared to the option of dismissing it. I referred to this in 2017 when lobbying the Minister to have the error on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard, corrected: “This might not seem an important matter. Imagine, however, if the Standard for the British Household Cavalry was to be found to bear the Battle Honour ‘Waterloo 1816’ (instead of ‘Waterloo 1815’). There would be national outcry in the UK and the Standard would be immediately re-emblazoned correctly. Why should the service of the Household Cavalry be any different to that of the 1st Armoured Regiment? When lives are placed on the line, the bravery and courage of those involved is just the same.”
The view which is currently abroad, ie. that the 1AR Assn exists to promote camaraderie between former members is a valid one; but what value should be placed on the alternative, ie. the 1 AR Assn exists to (i) assist former members as needed, (ii) promote camaraderie, and (iii) foster the heritage of 1 Armd Regt. It’s one thing to state such a goal, it’s another thing entirely to implement it.
—————————————————————————————————————————-
22 November 2018
RAAC Corporation AGM : 12/13 October 2018 Part 2
Thank you to the RAACA NSW Branch for their report on the RAAC Corporation AGM. Aspects of the AGM discussions have been reported on over the past few days. The last of these relates to the extract below:
“The reports revealed our associations are beset by two problems, geography, and the need to remain relevant to the meeds of younger former and serving soldiers. Geography is a greater problem for the ARA unit associations where soldiers are gathered from all over the nation and tend to gravitate back to where they grew-up when they complete their service. Reserve units have a geographic base with association supporting WW2 veterans who were also recruited in specific areas. Soldiers join an association so they can find solace with the people with whom they served, spent their youth and sacrificed for their country. All are having a degree of difficulty with youth relationship. A young person is less than likely to associate with those as old as their grandparents.”
The generational divide experienced by ESOs has been the subject of many posts. The reason advanced for younger members joining an Association is significant. Younger members of the 1AR Assn have stated in the past that they joined to share stories and have a good time. This is in stark contrast with the reason given by older members, ie. to form a body capable of keeping in touch with fellow members and providing assistance to those in need. There are ways of harmonising such disparate interests, however, first the divide must be recognised.
Armouredadvocates has previously suggested that a survey of members to identify the range of things that members wanted from their Association, however, this idea has gone through to the keeper. The RAAC Corporation discussion is a step in the right direction.
Sadly, good ideas often flounder because of a lack of commitment to follow through with change management. Take, for example, the decision that RAAC personnel crewing Bushmaster vehicles must be trained in tactical employment (19 November post) … how will this be turned from a good idea/resolution to implementation? The RAAC Corporation has stated that it will not become involved in matters not supported by the RAAC Head of Corps. So, if the RAAC wants to maintain the position that it’s role encompasses AFVs only (and the Corps considers the PMV to be a ‘truck’) then implementation is not possible (no matter how good the proposal and how mant Corrrporation members support it).
The RAAC Corporation is akin to all other organisations … unless meetings include Action Plans, then, no matter the merit of the discussion, it serves no purpose.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
21 November 2018
The RAAC Corporation AGM (12/13 October 2018)
I’ve moved the following Goal (see Part 6 above) to the ‘Pending’ category:
‘The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege’.
Background here is that the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation, Mr C M Fenton. OAM) was of the opinion that members of the 1AR Assn had no entitlement to be provided information about the matters discussed at the RAAC Corporation AGM (which he attends). The former C’tee agreed and so the only recourse for anyone who wanted to know why the 1AR Assn contributes annually to the RAAC Corporation, was for them to refer to the reports provided by other Associations to their members.
The 2018 RAAC Corporation AGM was conducted on 12/13 October. The last 1AR Assn C’tee meeting was held on 2 Nov, with Minutes being circulated on 8 Nov. It was stated then that the report of the RAAC Corporation was still in draft. The Secretary has since advised that:
“The Minutes from the RAAC AGM were received after the last 1ARA Committee Meeting. The minutes from the RAAC AGM will be released after the Management Committee has considered the Minutes and approved the Minutes, or parts thereof, for release.”
It’s interesting that other Associations have ‘News’ pages on the websites and use this facility to keep members informed. It’ll be interesting to see whether or not the 1AR Assn Communications Strategy takes the same approach.
Tomorrow: The problems that beset the RAAC Associations, as identified at the RAAC Corporation AGM.
———————————————————————————————————————
20 November 2018
A photo from a former RTR CO:
…
LAND 400 Phase 3 (IFV).
Many posts have made recently regarding the decision that the new IFVs should be manned by the infantry. Readers will be familiar with the issues raised, including that of career progression within the RA Inf Corps (anyone unfamiliar only has to scroll down).
Following on from yesterday … two days of fresh air blowing through the window in a row!! (Someone with a catheter in place for three weeks and another week to go, could get carried away.)
An extract from the RAACA NSW account of the RAAC Corporation AGM (12/13 October) is copied below:
“Changes within the corps, with the Regular Infantry being integrally mobilised utilising the M113AS4 and PMV fleet as a precursor to the arrival of the MICV, and the imminent arrival of the Boxer Cavalry Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs) were discussed. Infantry mobility is facing the same issue as it did when 5/7 RAR was mechanised in that the ECNs for Driver and Crew Commander do not form part of an Infantry soldier’s career progression, making it difficult to fill these roles. “
Now it can only be hoped that the operational aspects (as discussed in detail in previous posts) will also be acknowledged by the RAAC Corporation. There is no doubting the fact that the IFVs should be operated by the RAAC!
More about the RAACA AGM tomorrow.
—————————————————————————————————————————
19 November 2018
Hallelujah! Hallelujah!
The Bushmaster (Protected Mobility Vehicle) Recognised by the RAAC.
Armouredadvocates has advocated for years, that RAAC personnel required to crew Bushmasters should be trained to levels of competency approved by the SoA. While the RACT is responsible for driver training competencies, there is no training package agreed for crew commanders, as this role does not exist within the RACT (ie. all PMVs operate under command of ‘packet’/convoy commanders). When RAAC personnel are providing protected lift, however, the tactical situation is very different (ie. not simply a road convoy). Not only is their safety at risk if inadequately trained, so too is that of passengers and others in the vicinity. A Bushmaster which overturned during an RAAC ARES night move some time ago, was blamed on inadequate training.
The SoA has denied responsibility for conducting this training, as (supposedly) the Bushmaster is not a vehicle operated by the RAAC. Armouredadvocates has constantly pointed out the the RAAC ARES operate the vehicle. The RAAC/SOA position has been that the PMV is not an AFV but a transport vehicle; the RAAC does not want to embrace the PMV, so as to maintain a strictly ‘AFV only’ role for the Corps. In the last edition of Ironsides, the Corps RSM reiterated that the Bushmaster is not operated by the RAAC. This, of course, is incorrect; if the RAAC is to maintain the ‘AFV only’ policy, then Commander 2 Div has to be disallowed from tasking RAAC ARES units to provide protected lift capability.
What a breath of fresh air it was to read the RAACA-NSW account of the RAAC Corporation AGM held in October. An extract is copied below:
“Reserve units will continue with the dual role of training cavalry scouts and providing protected lift capacity to those elements of the infantry regular and reserve without integrated lift capability. The cavalry scouts will be pre-allocated to regular ACRs and deployed should the ACR be on either exercise, or a combat. Jim Gillett in his report indicated 12/16 LH (HRL) had split its training between squadrons with Caboolture squadron taking on the lift training role, the Hunter Valley Cav Scout training. The important point emphasised was that crews for PMVs used in lift and light vehicles used in Cav Scout training will be trained in the vehicle minor tactics essential for protection when moving vehicles in a combat situations; and effective vehicle husbandry to ensure resources are ready when needed.
So … I’ll move the following ‘Goal’ to ‘Pending’ (see Part 6 above), but will it be moved to the ‘Crossed off the List’ category?
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour.
As ever, statements made are not always followed up with action; will the SoA accept responsibility for tactical training of RAAC Bushmaster crews? (This has always been the RACT position; ie. their role is to train for use of the PMV as made by the RACT, other Corps who operate the vehicle in different circumstances are responsible for appropriate training.)
Will this continue to be a ‘them’ and ‘us’ demarcation which will continue to put the lives of RAAC personnel (and others) in danger?
More on the RAAC Corporation AGM tomorrow.
———————————————————————————————————————-
18 November 2018.
Balancing the Books: LAND 400
LAND 400 Ph 2 was announced as providing 225 Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs) for a project cost of $5.2b. When the contract with Rheinmettal was recently signed, however, only 211 vehicles were mentioned.
The stated intention for the $15b LAND 400 Ph3 project is to equip an infantry battalion in each of the three multi-purpose brigades. Surprisingly, the initial number of vehicles specified was 450 IFVs, plus 17 MSVs. Simple arithmetic indicated that this was sufficient to equip four battalions, plus provide for training and repair pools. The total number to be procured has since been reduced to 400 (although more than a ten percent reduction in vehicle numbers, no mention seems to have been made of an equivalent reduction in project cost.)
Some commentators have suggested that the reduction in vehicle number for Ph2, was because the Boxer was the preferred contender and reducing the number was easier that requesting a funding increase or negotiating a cost reduction with Rheinmettal. It could also be that the ‘moduality’ of the Boxer enabled the same flexibility at a reduced number.
It has been asked before … why isn’t disclosure about such matters much more open and publicly transparent; rather than allowing rumours to develop?
———————————————————————————————————————————————-
17 November 2018
LAND 400 Phase 3 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
I’ve been spending a lot of time recently examining the trade offs between the RA Inf and the RAAC operating the IFV. Arguments came out in favour of the latter.
I was just reading the latest Defence Technology Review, when I noticed that the version of Lynx KF41 being offered as a contender by Raytheon and Rheinmetall, provides seating for nine dismounts. Three more than the LAND 400 requirement!
Why would this be done? Volume under armour is the principle factor associated with an AFV’s weight. Protection levels could be increased so much more if only six dismounts were to be catered for. I noted that the possible BAE contender also made provision for eight dismounts.
Why? Why? Then I translated ‘OMFV’ … Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. Optionally?? This is one element of the US NGCV (Next General Combat Vehicle) program. The same companies bidding for LAND 400 Phase 3, are also bidding for the US NGCV (OMFV).
It is the ultimate intention of the US to have an IFV which is able to be remotely controlled to provide fire support, when the inf inside dismount. At that point, six dismounts plus the crew will provide the necessary fighting capability on the ground. Until the crew are able to dismount in this role … it seems that provision might be being provided for 8-9 dismounts (rather than just six).
I have a feeling that the precise arrangement for LAND 400 Ph3 IFV manning and command and control (both while mounted and on the ground) has been left undefined because, at this stage, there are too many unknowns as far as allied armies and their decisions re IFV capabilities are concerned. In an ideal world this would not be the case, however, ….
———————————————————————————————————————-
16 November 2018
LAND 400 Phase 3: Infantry Fighting Vehicle (V)
I have posted about the IFV and the RAAC/RA Inf aspects, many times recently. Some journals carrying my posts, have done so intermixed among their other posts, hence the ‘continuity’ has not been the same as on this Blog.
I’ve responded to some comments as below:
Thanks all for comments. These blog posts were a series written on a day by day basis … there are, I think, five more parts. Rather than writing a fully argued and researched article, I was trying to progressively develop ‘thoughts’, which I hoped would lead to value added discussion. I’ve amended the IFV composition to 3 crew plus six dismounts in coming posts (of course 3 + 8 is still on the table as far as the contenders are concerned). Xxx, the really important discussion is coming up …presumably the section commander is located in the turret while moving and dismounts on the objective: does he also command the IFV on the move?; who replaces him when he dismounts … a spare IFV commander or a spare gunner? I try to address these questions, particularly as far as pl comd and pl sgt are concerned, in coming posts. (Note; I’ve seen the world from an inf POV and an RAAC POV, but not from a mech inf POV.)
Thanks all for comments! As mentioned above under Part 3 (above). my purpose is to generate discussion. (As an aside when I went for a job interview after the Army, I was asked what I knew about Industrial Democracy. I said that I’d just left the most industrially democratic job in the world. In the Army, I explained, before developing a plan, the advice of those who best knew the ‘ground, enemy etc’ would always be sought; when the plan was finalised, everyone would be informed in detail as to their part in it; after the plan had been executed, all those involved would be asked for their feedback. I got the job.) To me, consultation is everything.
Interesting comments (this is what ‘discussion’ is all about):
“I’ve heard Bruce Cameron’s musings from other former RAAC personnel. We’re in agreement.
“Couldn’t agree more, all the diggers in mechanised battalions want nothing to do with mech ‘if I wanted to do this, I would have joined cav’. Meanwhile, the hierarchy is flapping ‘mech is the future, you need to embrace it’ … when nobody wants anything to do with vehicles. Makes you think, if only there was a corps in the army that was dedicated to crewing armoured fighting vehicles”.
This bloke has had the same sook 3 times. Infantry are finally getting a real IFV he wants black caps driving them.
PS. If anyone wants an ‘inside’ into prostrate ‘things’, let me know … happy to pass on my experiences.
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
13 November 2018
Note. No posts on either 14 or 15 November as I will be in hospital following complications re prostate surgery (bugger!)
The 8RAR Friendly Fire ‘Cover Up’.
On 18 February 1970, during Operation Hammersley:
“[CO 8RAR’s] plan was for B Company 8RAR (Jeffery) to occupy the southern most cut-off postion, 3700m south east from the encounter which had just occurred. Unfortunately, a breakdown in communications meant that neither B Company nor 2 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav were aware that D Company (Peck) had arrived at the nearer cut-off position (1200m to their south-east), while they were in action. The inevitable happened at 3.57pm as B Company, less 4 Platoon who had gone on ahead, were deploying south-east in 2 Troop’s APCs.
The circumstances under which 11 Platoon D Company (as they were later identified) were first seen, made recognition impossible. For a start, they were on high ground with the sun behind them. To those in the 2 Troop ‘carriers’ 600m away, the figures moving among the rocks on the hill ‘appeared to be wearing black and looked very suspicious indeed’. ‘We continued to observe for some time, until we received clearance from Task Force to engage; we were told that there were no “friendlies” at that grid; this was confirmed twice [by the APC Troop Leader] before we engaged. The blue-on-blue incident resulted in D Company suffering ten WIA.
Friendly fire incidents (or Blue on Blue as they are sometimes termed) were not uncommon in Vietnam This particular incident attracted considerable media and (as a consequence) political attention. Details of a regrettable saga in which the ‘facts’ were made to fit the politics, can be found in the history of 8RAR in Vietnam (Hall, Combat Battalion, p. 182). Initially, the Acting Commander, 1ATF stated that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation. He was overruled, however, by the Minister for the Army. Extracts from the subsequent investigation, which placed the enemy at the scene of the friendly fire incident, are listed below:
“It is impossible to determine how many of the 11 Platoon casualties resulted from friendly fire”
“…the enemy engaged 6 Pl B Coy from an area located close to the 11 Pl [D Coy] block”;
“The overloaded state of the command [radio] was …” [a factor is causing what happened]; and
“At the time there was both friendly and enemy fire being directed at 11 Pl D Coy”;I
In an effort to conceal what had actually happened, the HQ 1ATF investigation ‘shifted’ the location of an enemy contact which involved 4 Pl B Coy at 1615hrs (almost 3km away), to near the site of the 11 Pl D Coy contact (1557hrs). As Hall observes in the 8RAR History, “it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that many of the errors [in the investigation] were deliberate”. This is confirmed by the then OC of D Company, who, when told that the 1ATF investigation stated that his men had been fired on by the enemy, exclaimed: Bullshit … that is bullshit! There was no such thing! That is something dreamt up by someone trying to skedaddle out of something”.
The outcome meant that there was no investigation into what really happened, ie. no-one looked into the system of recording locations on the 8RAR battle map (esp the timeliness of updates), This, in turn, might have prevented valuable lessons being learnt; thereby preventing the same thing happening again.
Step back! Given the unthinkable nature of the above (for anyone who believes in the ethics of our military brotherhood), is it somewhat more understandable that the same system of possibly misguided loyalty allowed HQ 1ATF to submit a recommendation for a RVN unit citation for 8RAR (the citation drafted by 8RAR) which claimed an enemy : friendly force casualty ratio which included enemy casualties actually due to supporting arms. (Surprisingly, this ratio separated out 8RAR casualties due to mines as this number was “not due to direct enemy action” … I find this a disturbing distinction to make.)
All of the above might be able to be understood (to some extent) if, when made known, those who could … stepped in the make amends. The Department of Defence, RA Inf HOC and 8RAR Assn will not do so, however. They claim that only 8RAR is entitled to the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley. No-one is disputing the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation awarded to 8RAR simultaneously for their ‘whole’ tour of duty (despite being drafted three months prior to the Battalion’s departure).
The DOD have a standing policy that they will not approve retrospective awards, so no surprises there; it was expected that the RA Inf HOC would have passed submissions to the 8RAR Assn, but they didn’t … hence no surprises that the DOD position is followed; now we come to the8RAR Assn. They were unaware of the situation, so copies of all submissions etc were sent to the President. After consideration, there was no change; ie, the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty (not just op Hammersley). [Interestingly, the CGWP Unit Citation can only be awarded for heroic conduct and valour while in combat with the enemy … Op Hammersley was the only example of this quoted in the citation for 8RAR’s Meritorious Unit Commendation!]
Where to from here? Up until now, ‘due process’ had been allowed to run its course, ie. two submissions to the Minister and a submission to the Prime Minister. Having done this, the path is now open to the Defence Force Honours and Appeals Tribunal. This is an independent body and so public awareness as to their process of consideration is not be inappropriate. The extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley has been under the radar until now …. be prepared to be for a campaign to highlight things that are just, as well as pointing out things that are unjust.
————————————————————————————————————————-
12 November 2018
Extension of Eligibility re Hammersley (RVN CGWP Unit Citation)
Email to the President, Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia
Hi
It was good meeting you at the Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) gathering in Canberra recently.
I thought that I’d mention to you something which appears on the VVAA website and which will soon be the subject of consideration by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) and the AWM.
The subject is the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation which http://www.vvaa.org.au/8rar.htm states was awarded to Eighth Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment.
The fact is that 8RAR received two awards: the Meritorious Unit Commendation (for distinguished service over a prolonged period) and the Cross of Gallantry With Palm Unit Citation (“for deeds of valour or heroic conduct in combat with the enemy”)
The Citation quoted at http://www.vvaa.org.au/8rar.htm is that for the combined awards. The Official History of the Vietnam War ‘Fighting to the Finish’, p813) states that 8RAR was awarded the “RVNAF Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation”
The following quote from the AWM website is relevant: “The battalion [8RAR] was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry With Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamese Government for its involvement in Hammersley”. (https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/U53503)
The confusion is likely to have stemmed from the fact that 8RAR drafted its own citation proposal for the RVN award (all such awards had to be forwarded by units to HQ 1ATF who on-forwarded them to 1ATF, Saigon). The approval sequence thereafter involved Free World Force HQ, RVNAF Joint Staff HQ etc.
The 8RAR Officer drafting the Citation may have taken into account that AATTV had just been/was soon to be, awarded the US Meritorious Unit Commendation and the RVN CGWP Unit Citation (two separate awards from two different countries.) The 8RAR Award proposal (surprisingly found on the ‘AATTV Award’ file in the AWM) described the Battalion’s first nine months of operations. Many of the activities related to non-combat roles such as civil affairs etc. There was no RVN award which could encompass both awards made to the AATTV.
In response to the 1ATF proposal, the RVN Joint Staff seems to have devised a plan to merge two awards into one, ie, the Meritorious Unit Commendation, including the CGWP Unit Citation … in order to be able to make the presentation requested. (There is no doubt that a presentation was asked to be made prior to 8RAR’s departure from Vietnam … hence the award proposal being drafted in August 1970, prior to 8RAR’s scheduled departure in October 1970.)
It would be greatly appreciated if the VVAA could amend its website info to reflect that of the Official History as quoted above. There is a blockbuster book in this story. I might write it myself, but I’d much prefer the 8RAR Assn to support our submission to the DHAAT for eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley.
(Email copied to President 8RAR Association.)
————————————————————————————————————————–
11 November 2018
LAND 400 Phase 3: Time for Decisions is Here.
Recently I posted several articles re LAND 400 Phase (the IFV) … see 2 November post et al. The following ‘summary’ has been sent to two major defence related publications. At least one will run with it.
“The Request for Tender (RFT) for LAND 400 Phase 3 (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) was recently released. Industry has until 1 March 2019 to respond with respect to the provision of 400 IFVs, including seventeen Manoeuvre Support Vehicles (MSVs). The forecast cost is $15b.
There has been a good deal more questioning about this project, than there was for Phase2, Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV). A contract for the supply of 211 CRVs was recently signed. The Government’s budgetary provision is $5.2b.
Some of the Phase 3 questioning related to the number of vehicles to be procured by Defence. The stated intention is to equip an infantry battalion in each of the three multi-purpose brigades. Surprisingly, the initial number of vehicles specified under Phase 3 was 450 IFVs, plus 17 MSVs. Simple arithmetic indicated that this was sufficient to equip four battalions, plus provide for training and repair pools. (Although more than a ten percent reduction in vehicle numbers, no mention seems to have been made of an equivalent reduction in project cost.)
Other queries in the Defence press have related to the need for the IFV at all, together with concern about its capability being over specified. The arguments, on balance, have come out in support of both the vehicle and its level of protection (hence weight), armament, etc.
Those suggesting that the loss of the opportunity cost was not justified, had hoped that the RFT might have been delayed until after a new Force Structure Review. This is not to be … but that does not mean that the operational concept for the IFV is well thought through and should not be changed from here on.
Currently, three infantry battalions equipped with IFVs equates to three battalions dedicated to the mechanised infantry role. This is necessary because an Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) such as the IFV (two-man turret, 30mm cannon, anti-tank guided weapon pod, 1000hp engine, 35 tonne weight, .50cal remote weapon station) requires a dedicated crew. If this is to occur, career progression must be integral to the mechanised infantry battalion, ie. it would not be possible to interchange skills and employment tactics between traditional infantry and mechanised units.
The model of dedicated mechanised infantry units exists in armies such as those of the US, Britain and Germany. These, however, are very different to the ADF … both in terms of manpower and AFV numbers. They can afford to maintain units dedicated to a specific role. Is Australia in a position to do the same, or is the ability to ‘mix and match’, ie. tailor force composition to specific operational needs, more important?
Land 400 Phase 3 is intended to provide a replacement for the M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC). When the project was proposed, APCs were operated by the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC); subsequently they were transferred to the Infantry. Was this the right decision?
IFV characteristics are justified on the basis of enabling them to accompany tanks onto an enemy objective. Having done so, the critical issue then becomes the co-ordination between mounted and dismounted elements of the IFV force. One way of addressing this issue is for the infantry Second in Command (2IC) to remain mounted and to command the fire support from the IFVs. This is not necessary, however, if RAAC crews command the vehicles.
If the Organisation for Battle (ORBAT) was to revert to that which existed, until recently, for over 60 years, three inf battalions (a substantial component of the Army’s strength) would not have to be designated for the mechanised role only; allowing a focus on traditional infantry skills and normal career progression for all members. ADF flexibility would be enhanced accordingly.
Another factor is that training costs would be slashed. No longer would IFV qualification involve an isolated skill set. Commonality in AFV operation (tank, cavalry and IFV) would enable conversion courses to be conducted for crew commanders, gunners and drivers. Some initial employment courses would still be required, but not nearly as many.
The decision time for LAND 400 Phase 3, not only involves the best contender, but also the best way in which to incorporate the IFV into the Army’s force structure and operational planning.
The RVN Unit Gallantry Citation Presented to 8RAR (But Not to Their Supporting Arms) Part 2
Evidence in support of the fact that the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley alone (thereby constituting an administrative error in that supporting arms were not also deemed eligible for the same award.
1. His Excellency, Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, stated in a speech at the 2008 Annual Dinner of the Royal Australian Regiment Association (QLD Divison) that “3 RAR and D Company, 6 RAR proudly wear the United States Presidential Unit Citation, 1 RAR the United States Meritorious Unit Citation: and in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palm earned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”. (Note. Major General Jeffery was a company commander with 8RAR during Operation Hammersley.)
2. Australian War Memorial Unit History for 8RAR: “The battalion was awarded … Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamese Government for its involvement in Hammersley. (https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/U53503)
3. 8/9 RAR Unit History. Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR. The streamer award to 8 RAR as recognition of their involvement in the Minh Dam operations (as per,Appendix 4 to Annex H, Chapter 6) is to be attached to the Regimental Colour of 8 RAR whenever it is paraded. 8/9 RAR carries the Queen’s and Regimental Colours of both 8 RAR and 9 RAR. The ‘Minh Dam’ Streamer of the award of the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry is permitted to be carried on the pike of 8 RAR’s Regimental Colour… .(http://www.rar.og.au/documents/8-9RARHistoryComplete.pdf)
4. Dr Bob Hall, the author of the 8RAR Vietnam History (and a platoon commander during Operation Hammersley): “It seems to me only logical that the other units that were involved should also be recognised including the Armoured Regiment and the Cav Regiment people, and the field engineers who also did a stirling job during the operation. The operation would have been very different had we not had the armoured and engineer support we had.
Confusion: Meritorious Unit Commendation MUC) s CGWP Unit Citation: What’s That?
On 22 October 2018, the President, 8RAR Association asked:
“I am at a loss as to where the Meritorious Unit Citation comes in. Where is there any reference to this? Is it an award by the now defunct South Vietnam Government or is it the Award under the current Australian Honours and Awards? If there is any reference to the award being granted to 8 RAR I would appreciate a heads up as to its location.”
The answer is provided in the Official History (Fighting to the Finish, p471): “On 29 October, 8RAR became the only Australian battalion to be awarded a South Vietnamese Meritorious Unit Commendation when Lieutenant General …. presented the award to Lieutenant Colonel O’Neill at a battalion parade at Nui Dat”.
Interestingly, the photo caption from a detailed account of 8RAR’s operations in the Long Hais (Operation Hammersley) states that 8RAR were presented with the CGWP unit citation for Op Hammersley (http://www.taylor.id.au/charlie.htm)
Left:
Commanding Officer 8 RAR Lt Col K. O’Neill accepts the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Citation from ARVN Lt Gen Do Cao Tri for the Bn’s efforts in the Long Hai’s during 1970.
This confusion is clarified later in the Official History: “The RVNAF [RVN Armed Forces] Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR by … , 24 October 1970”. (Fighting to the Finish, p813.)
Conclusion. The evidence is overwhelming … 8RAR were presented with the Meritorious Unit Commendation for their remarkable tour of duty and CGWP Unit Citation for their remarkable efforts during Op Hammersley. Let us hope that those who are in a position of influence, have the grace to acknowledge the service and sacrifice of the supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley and lend their support to the submission to the DHAAT to this end.
———————————————————————————————————————
9 November 2018
The RVN Unit Gallantry Citation Presented to 8RAR (But Not to Their Supporting Arms)
“The Government of South Vietnam appreciated that the achievements of 8RAR were so significant throughout its tour of duty that they presented the Battalion with the RVN Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation in recognition of this, just prior to its departure from Vietnam in .”
The statement above is what the 8RAR Association, RA Inf Head of Corps, Defence Honours and Awards Directorate, and (hence) the Australian Government believe to be true. Because of this, they will not support eligibility being extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley. The errors in the supposed ‘facts’ are listed below. Some might well ask, why bother in setting the record straight and having all those who contributed to the outcome, acknowledged for their sacrifice and bravery? Answer … my self-respect.
Errors in Fact:
The Government of South Vietnam did NOT initiate the award to 8RAR. The citations for all RVN awards for troops operating as part of the 1st Australian Task Force (l ATF) were proposed (had to be proposed) by 1ATF. (On average, the time from proposal to approval was three months (a range from two to six months). 8RAR proposed its own award. The proposed citation was drafted by 8RAR in August 1970, and the award was presented on 24 October 1970 (seven days before the Battalion departed Vietnam). In describing the success of its operations, 8RAR included total casualties for each operation, making it seem the Battalion alone was responsible for them (of course many casualties in many operations were the result of offensive action by supporting arms). Interestingly, in highlighting the ‘them’ and ‘us’ ratio, 8RAR separated out the Battalion’s casualties caused by mines “as these were not the result of direct enemy action”.
The RVN Award Made to 8RAR was for its Entire Tour of Duty. The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs was advised by Defence Honours and Awards (letter 7 May 2017) that “On 24 October 1970, the contribution made by the 8th Battalion throughout its tour of duty in Vietnam, from 28 November 1969 to 3l October 1970, was recognized by the awarding of the Citation”. (Being ‘picky’, an award for service which ended on 31 October, could hardly be made on 24 October.) Of more significance is the fact, as mentioned above, that 8RAR drafted its own award proposal in August 1970, describing “nine months of almost continuous contact with the enemy”. This was the latest date (see above) for an award to be approved and presented prior to the Battalion’s departure from Vietnam.
The RVN CGWP Unit Citation was Awarded to 8RAR for its Entire Tour of Duty. The CGWP Unit Citation is awarded to either individuals or units who perform deeds of valour or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy. Only one such action is detailed in 8RAR’s citation, that for Operation Hammersley, conducted by “the forces of the 8th Battalion,1st Australian Task Force”. It follows that Operation Hammersley provided the justification for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation.
8RAR was Only Presented with the RVN CGWP Unit Citation. The Official History of the Vietnam War (‘Fighting to the Finish’,p813) states that 8RAR was awarded the RVNAF Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation”. The Meritorious Unit Commendation (MUC) and CGWP Unit Citation are two separate awards. The MUC is awarded to a unit for meritorious performance during a complete tour of duty. It can be assumed that this is reflected in the citation by references to civic action projects such as assisting “the local population to reconstruct their houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc“. It follows that the wide range of activities undertaken by 8RAR during the first nine months of its tour (when 8RAR submitted the proposal for its award) provided the justification for the MUC.
Tomorrow: Evidence in support of the fact that the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley alone (thereby constituting an administrative error in that supporting arms were not also deemed eligible for the same award.
————————————————————————————————————————-
8 November 2018
Who will you be thinking about during the silence this Armistice Day?
I’ll be thinking about those who are adorned with the mantle of making the world a different place to that in which competition between nation states led to the loss of so many innocent lives.
The same thing has happened over and over in the years since and every tomorrow seems destined to herald the Last Post. I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
In my despair, I think of the birth of my children. How is it that such wondrous things can occur in a world which is so conflicted? I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
Elections will be held next year, a chance for everyone’s voice to be heard. I will seek out the candidate who promises to safeguard my grandchildren’s future. Is everything now safe for our future generations? I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
My thoughts will end in despair at the outlook for the future; in frustration at the inability of those who are adorned with the mantle of leadership to do so; in anger at the misrepresentations made by those seeking my vote. What qualities are required of the person to lead our nation at such a time? I know the answer, but who will listen to me?
——————————————————————————————————————
7 November 2018
Immigration Law (Forum Discussion) Following on from yesterday:
Justice Delayed is ….
The following was posted on a Forum:
“Bruce I am 100% with you the way this man is being treated it is a bloody disgrace we as an association should do something about. Bruce come clean and tell us what was he convicted of.”
My response is copied below:
“I believe that ‘alleged’ (see PS below) crimes are like ‘alleged’ girlfriends, they are not for others to reveal. He is not being deported because of his crime per se (ie. there is no regulation which states that someone who is guilty of his offence must be deported). There is, however, a regulation which states that someone who is not an Australian citizen who commits an offence, must be deported. He has paid his penalty to society for something he may have done as a consequence of PTSD; which he suffers as a consequence of being conscripted and putting his life on the line for what he thought was his country.
Peter Dutton wanted to deport him to ensure that Australia’s Immigration laws are seen to be a deterrent. There is no end of people who have stated that what he supposedly did was completely out of character. He is wanted back in the community in which he lived. The time he has been ‘imprisoned’ in Villawood, amounts to a much much greater penalty than that associated with his offence. He endured it, because, if he just accepted the Ministerial direction, his family’s life of fifty years would have to be abandoned and would be meaningless.
The bottom line is that there has never been any justifiable basis for him to be deported (other than providing a ‘showcase’ for the Minister’s toughness.) The Federal Court has ruled that this is the case.
PS. The ‘offence’ was never proven, as he was wrongly advised to plead guilty because the offence was at the very low end of the scale and would only incur home detention (if anything). This option had the advantage for him of limited publicity. The ‘evidence’, therefore, was never tested. There is a strong case to suggest that if he had pleaded NOT guilty, the matter would not have been proven. This is a subject as astounding as anything you’ve seen on ‘Australian Story’ (as you may do one day). There are some members of our brotherhood who claim to know the charges against him. I can say categorically, that they have only one end of the stick … nevertheless, they deny him any support. If anyone was to be deported, top of my list would be those ‘hyenas’ who prey on others’ misfortune.”
———————————————————————————————————————-
6 November 2018
Immigration Law (Forum Discussion)
The following story has a parallel that we all should be aware of …
A baby comes to Australia with his parents; grows up and is conscripted for Vietnam (RAAC); is decorated for gallantry; suffers from PTSD; as a result, commits an offence; completes the penalty; is deported to NZ (his parents never took out citizenship); appeals the decision; spends four years in Villawood because of the lengthy nature of such proceedings; his requests for support are rejected by RAAC ex-service organisations (fortunately he has character references from his family, the community in which he lived and worked and his treating doctors).
Finally … two weeks ago, the Federal Court upheld his latest appeal.
The process is not yet over, but it seems possible that he might be able to spend next Christmas with his family.
It is encouraging to see that the rule of law can compensate for a deficit of compassion and a surfeit of self-interest, currently in our midst,
———————————————————————————-
He was/is a DVA client. The advocates involved (from VVA, I think) were great (but, of course, this is the stuff of specialist immigration professionals).
Was Villawood like a jail ?… he had to be taken in handcuffs to the PTSD specialist and his guards had to remain in ‘earshot’. The doctor said that he couldn’t treat his patient in these conditions … ‘too bad’ was the response.
This is not the first time that Minister Dutton’s edict in relation to him has been ‘thrown out’. When it happened previously (as now) a new submission had to be made for the visa to be reinstated. Some of us were concerned that while this was being processed, he might have been illegally held in Immigration detention. Unfortunately, it turns out that this is not the case (detention in such circumstances is the norm).
Initially, his military service was not part of his submission. This was seen to be a shortcoming and he was encouraged to include full details, including a copy of his Citation. The then 1AR Assn C’tee were asked to provide these on ‘official’ letterhead. They declined. Paradoxically, the RAR Corporation were most helpful.
There are some major lessons here. When the tale is finally told (ABC Story or Peter FitzSimons , perhaps?), it will serve an important function in terms of making our society more understanding of the circumstances of veterans.
Postscript. A former senior RAAC member, with influence in the area involved, was asked if he could make representation on behalf of the person concerned. He declined. Later feedback indicated that those in such positions should not be placed in situations where there was a conflict of interest. Imagine …. The Federal Court is in session and a person of distinction takes the stand: ‘Your Honour, I cannot speak in the capacity of my official position, however, as a veteran who has had the honour to lead to Australian soldiers into combat, I would like to make you aware of the outstanding military service on behalf of his country that the man before you has provided …. (Pigs might fly.)
Reader’s Comment:
On a similar thread; I, like so many of you was born O/S. Hong Kong, a British Colony. I came out at age 10 on Mum’s passport. I classed myself as Australian, even learnt the lingo. When I joined The ARA I thought I became an Australian. Went to SVN in 67 and signed another document then stating I was an Australian citizen. Returned to SVN in 70 and signed more citizen docs. Discharged in 71 and joined A/Res. I got a letter in 84 from our government stating unless I became an Australian citizen, I would have to terminate my service. I saw bloody red and told ’em to stick it up their collective clackers. I know there are a lot of our blokes with the same story.
Response by me:
I know a little about these things … coming from HK, you were a British subject; living in Australia you became an Australian resident; as such you were eligible to be conscripted.
If your parents had migrated from Germany, for example (ie. Herr Frisk), you would have been classed as an ‘Alien’. Aliens had to become Australian citizens before they could be conscripted. There is one ‘famous’ case of this process not being followed … the person concerned was conscripted, served in Vietnam, was recommended for a gallantry award. As approval for award was being finalised, it was realised that the Queen could not make such an award to an ‘Alien’. The person concerned became an Australian citizen as a result of a ceremony conducted in the field in SVN.
It’s simply amazing how ‘history’ becomes ‘history’.
I received an email today, mentioning the UGC which had been awarded to units involved in the battles surrounding FSBs Coral and Balmoral. The inference was that the Citation has been a Department of Defence initiative.
Of course, nothing is further from the truth. Defence’s position is to NOT support retrospective awards, EVER!-. Credit for the ‘initiative’ was due entirely to two veterans, George Hulse and Jack Parr.
A post from last year is copied below:
Dear Ms …
As the Director of Defence Honours and Awards, Admiral Griggs (acting Chief of the Defence Force) appointed you his representative in relation to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal’s (DHAAT’s) Inquiry into recognition for unit service at the Battles of Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral.
In his letter to the DHAAT of 1 September 2017 (attached) he states that Defence does not support the retrospective awarding of unit citations such as the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG), for units which served prior to 1991 (the year this award was introduced) because it “would be inappropriate to apply contemporary criteria to military activities which occurred almost half a century ago”.
As a matter of public interest, can I ask why?
If the contemporary criteria used to determine what is and what is not extraordinary gallantry today, cannot be used to make the same determination in respect to acts which occurred 50 years ago … changes to the criteria must have occurred over the intervening period. How then, is today’s definition of what constitutes extraordinary gallantry, different to that used 50 years ago?
In a unit context today, one would assume that collective action which involved an extremely high level of risk to lives in achieving an objective or in saving the lives of others, would be central to the concept of gallantry. Holding firm in the face of attacks by overwhelming numbers of enemy that had breached defences (or were about to breach defences), steadfastness in dire and/or desperate situations, outstanding and sustained bravery/performance which turned the tide of battle and influenced the result, would also seem to qualify in this regard.
Would the same criteria not have been used to assess gallantry 50 years ago (and for centuries before that)?
In October 2007, the then Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia His Excellency Major General Michael Jeffery presented the UCG to 4RAR (Commando) for gallantry in action during operations in Afghanistan in 2005/06. He referred to some of the characteristics of those receiving the award as being “initiative to a marked degree, physical and moral courage; personal and group discipline, and composure under pressure”.
If it is contemporary criteria that are described in the paragraphs above, can you please explain why it is inappropriate to apply them to military activities which occurred 50 years ago?
Another post from last year (a submission to DHAAT) re the lack of legal standing for Defence’s position is attached at CBLegal
———————————————————————————————————————————-
4 November 2018
The Battle of Binh Ba : How Might Things Have Been Different?
“I was sitting on top of the ARV’s winch house reading a ‘stick’ book …”. RAEME Vehicle Mechanic (VM), ARV Callsign 8 Delta, 6 June 1969.**
On 5 June 1969, 4 Troop, B Squadron, 1 Armoured Regiment, were supporting 6RAR/NZ on an operation north of Nui Dat. One of its tanks had lost engine power and another had gunnery problems. The plan was for a replacement tank and an Armoured Recovery Vehicle (ARV) to link up with 4 Troop the following day. The tank with engine problems would be recovered by the ARV and they would be accompanied on the return to Nui Dat by the tank with faulty gun control equipment. (4 Troop would still be a viable tactical entity, with three tanks.)
The tank squadron Light Aid Detachment (LAD) worked through the night. The ARV had only just arrived in-country and had to be serviced and equipped. Unfortunately, an intermittent fault with the radio harness could not be fixed.
Decision 1: Proceed as is on 6 June, don’t worry about taking a manpack radio in case the ARV’s radios fail and contact with the accompanying tank is necessary.
The replacement tank and the ARV set off as soon as the low level morning reconnaissance flight along the road had been completed.
Decision 2:The VM aboard the ARV decided not to keep a lookout for signs of enemy, electing instead to read a paperback.
Decision 3: The ARV commander allowed him to do so.
What effect were these three decisions to have on subsequent events?
It was around 7.15 am when the two Centurions approached the village of Binh Ba. Given that the VM was reading a book, there was no opportunity for him to notice anything unusual about the things happening in the village. He got his head out of his book, however, in time to see: “a group of about seven ARVN soldiers [who] were heading on foot away from the village and waved [us] down. They were pointing at the village and yelling “VC, VC!!”
Without any radio communication, the ARV was unable to warn the tank.
“As we started off again, I heard shooting-small arms fire-and stood up to see where it was coming from … It was at this moment that a loud dull thump came from ahead of us. I looked towards [the tank] and saw a huge black ball of smoke come from the left side of the turret. The tank came to a halt. We also stopped about 100 metres behind.”
The “thump” was the sound of an RPG detonating against the turret of the tank. The operator was wounded and collapsed in such a position that the turret could not be traversed. The tank proceeded as fast as it could to the ARVN post (Duc Thanh) 3km past Binh Ba. The RPG had knocked out its radios and a report about the enemy presence in Binh Ba was not able to ne made until Duc Thanh was reached.
The VM fired his rifle, but it jammed after the first round; nevertheless, this is proudly claimed as “the first shot for our side” in the Battle of Binh Ba. The ARV turned about and drove back to Nui Dat, alerting B Sqn 1 Armd Regt and Task Force HQ, when it arrived.
Conclusion.
If the crew member of the ARV had been keeping a ‘look out’, he may have detected enemy preparing to engage the tank ahead and may have seen the ARVN members withdrawing from the village sooner. This might have enabled the ARV to warn the tank ahead (eg. by firing a burst from the ARV’s .30cal).
If the ARV had been carrying a ’25 Set’ because of the intermittent fault with its fitted radios, the crew would have been able to warn the tank ahead of enemy in the village (and HQ 1ATF of the same, much sooner than occurred). This alert might have been in sufficient time to prevent the operator being wounded.
Because of the decisions made above, the possibility of preventing a tank crewman being wounded was never able to be realised. Nor was the opportunity for 1ATF to react to the enemy’s presence in Binh Ba much earlier than actually happened. Earlier call out of the 1ATF ready Reaction Force would have reduced the enemy’s preparation time and might have prevented some of the casualties incurred during the Battle.
Postscript. Astounded as I was about the admissions made in the VM’s story, I phoned the then RAEME Hon Col to alert him to this tarnish on his Corps’ reputation. He felt quite differently … this was all just part of the character of the RAEME soldier!!
**The quotes above are taken from the RAEME Know How website http://www.raeme.info/opsarv28d.php. The article (and its mistakes) were reprinted in the 1AR Assn Newsletter, Centurion.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
3 November 2018
“RPG Damage Vietnam”
The above was the caption to two photos showing a battle damaged Centurion tank in Vietnam posted on a FB page.
One reader asked: “Is this Phil Barwick’s tank?”.
I posted the following reply:
The Cent pictured is ARN 169056. It is now outside the AWM in Canberra. The driver, Peter Cadge, was severely wounded on 25 June 1971 during Operation Hermit Park. I would counsel against showing photos of damaged AFVs like this (ie. out of any sort of context) Chances are that they could trigger a PTSD episode in one or more of those who may see them and who might have lasting memories of what happened. Interestingly, the AWM used to use photos of battle damaged AFVs to create a ‘war effect’ for their promotional material. They have ceased doing this after I pointed out how intensely painful it would’ve been for the parents of the driver of the M113A1 in a photo in their newsletter, to stumble across this … their son was KIA.
The person who posted the photos on FB responded to say: “Sorry but have to agree to disagree. If that thought process was adopted the AWM in Canberra would have to have a clean out ! The post was placed without a cynical comment as is sometimes the case. I cant see a problem with it. Thanks for your comment. I dont agree with it but i appreciate your input.”
Others contributed: The blokes on the 3 Cav Facebook page have placed photos of their damaged Carrier from time to time from Viet Nam and no one has made a comment, no one re PSTD. And as Bruce would know they have done this also on the 3 Cav forum with out any one saying not to.
“Don’t look at the post People have a right as has been done before to display our history. I am sorry but if it offends you then block the author.”
Thankfully: “Out of respect for the crews. No words can describe the carnage. I believe RAAC had the highest casualty rate of all Corps in SVN. We don’t need to see battle damaged tanks and APCs. Thanks.”
I pointed out that: “I was the crew commander when the tank was hit by the RPG. You may not see a problem with the images as presented, but I do. I think that I have the right to ask that you delete the post”.
Given that it seems unlikely that the originator would delete his post out of respect for the crew, I provided the following responses:
“Re the statistics … You’re right. The rating comes from an analysis I did quite a few years ago … looking at the per capita incidence of casualties on a Corps by Corps basis (for combat units). Field engineers suffered the second highest casualty rate (from memory). I guess, to be strictly correct: ‘The RAAC suffered the highest per capita casualty rate for Australian combat units in Vietnam’.
“Re the AWM …they published a photo of a knocked out M113A1 in their Wartime magazine. There was no caption … the image was purely to give ‘effect’ (or ‘atmosphere’) to a story about the Vietnam War (nothing to do with the APC). I pointed out that in any situation in which an AFV is damaged in combat, the central issue that should come to mind is the fact that it was involved in a military operation and the vehicle’s crew had bravely put themselves in harm’s way to contribute to its success. Their suffering from wounds received and/or the suffering of their family is on-going. The AWM agreed and elected not to use such photos out of context, and, when they did use them, to include captions explaining the circumstances and crew casualties”.
Re “looking away” … good point. I have asked to be removed from the FB page.
To top it all off … I’m accused of trying to “whitewash history”. (Heaven help me.)
Summary: (I’ll keep it simple. )
Photographs were posted on a FB page for no other purpose than to show damage to a Centurion tank caused by an RPG strike (and to create, by extension, an image of the likely effect on the crew).
I was in the tank when it was hit. My driver was horrendously wounded. I lifted him down to the ground.
I found the sudden appearance of the photos distressing and asked that they be deleted.
The originator declined to do so. I decided to leave the FB group.
By contrast … the tank itself is now outside the AWM. The Memorial’s marketing staff decided to create a snow dome featuring a modal of the tank with ‘cartoon eyes’.
I explained to the AWM Director that the wounded driver and his family continue to suffer extensively today and that it was inappropriate to commemorate the service and sacrifice of the crew of this particular tank (and others) in this way. Dr Nelson was sympathetic to the distress that could be caused and withdrew the item from sale.
Question: It’s been put to me that no-one else has any concern about the photos. (To be correct, I think this should be ‘no-one else has said that they have concerns about the photos.)
Leaving this aside; Should distress felt by just one veteran suffering from PTSD, caused by the posting of photos showing the damage inflicted on his tank, be sufficient reason for the photos to be deleted from a public forum … or should the veteran’s request simply be dismissed because people who have no idea as to what happened, feel empowered to do so?
I must admit, I thought that we were a more mature society in terms of the manner in which we manage such things. There will be few people who are distressed by the photos and the manner in which they are displayed (possibly no more than the crew themselves). With respect to the latter, is it not they who should be able to advise as to the suitability or otherwise of the manner in which images of the devastation that was inflicted upon them, are displayed? It seems that others, ie those who were not present at the time, have usurped this power.
—————————————————————————————————————————
2 November 2018
LAND 400 Phase 3: Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IV)
Before considering the RAAC option, a couple of points re the IFV (II) post on 32 October.
Without having seen the characteristics required for the LAND 400 Ph3 contenders (they don’t seem to be available, unlike for Ph 2), it is assumed that;
(i) Both IFV comd and dismount commander/gunner can operate the turret cannon;
(ii) there will be no firing ports, nor vision blocks;
(iii) a hatch will be available for at least some dismounts to use;
(iv) when closed down, dismounts may be able to view an electronic vision display operated by the IFV or dismount commander; and
(v) an FO or MFC may travel in the platoon HQ IFV (which will be a ‘Command” IFV variant).
The IFV Platoon (With RAAC Crew).
In this model, it is assumed that the pl comd, pl sgt and two of three dismount section comds would occupy the gunner’s position in the turret. The RAAC gunner would assume his position once the infantry dismount. In terms of organisation
RAAC: Four IFV comds (sgt plus three cpls); four IFV gunners; four IFV drivers and a spare IFV crew comd (cpl) … thirteen in total
RA Inf: Pl comd, pl sgt, medic, radio operator, three dismount sections (Cpl plus five) … twenty two in total.
Overall, total numbers (35) come to one more than the inf crew option. This is because the pl sgt is now able to dismount.
Advantages. RAAC crewing offer the following advantages:
(i) As stated previously: the critical issue is the co-ordination between mounted and dismounted elements when attacking. An experienced commander is now available to control the IFVs in a fire support/manoeuvre role. This allows the pl sgt to support the pl comd and/or command a half platoon tactical group when dismounted. The combat strength of the dismounted force is increased.
(ii) Three inf battalions do not have to be designated for the mechanised role only; allowing a focus on traditional infantry skills and normal career progression for all members. ADF flexibility is enhanced.
(iii) Training costs would be slashed. No longer would IFV qualification involve an isolated skill set. Commonality in AFV operation (tank, cav and IFV) would enable conversion courses to be conducted in qualifying crew commanders, gunners and drivers. Some initial employment courses would still be required, but not nearly as many.
Absence of Support for Proposals Seeking to Benefit All?
The following question was posted on the 1AR Assn Social FB page:
“Why don’t we have some visual way of indicating when a veteran has served more than once in an area of conflict?”
I was the only one who responded (copy below):
“Good idea. Unfortunately, history is not on your side.
The late Nev Modystack put up a great submission for an armoured crewman badge, ie. recognition of attaining trained AFV crewman status (similar to the RA Inf Steyer ‘readiness’ badge).
Despite overwhelming support at the soldier level and NCO level, the proposal withered through lack of ‘higher’ support. Unfortunately, cost is a major factor in such matters. After massive lobbying for an Armoured Combat badge (which was granted in the form of an Army Combat Badge), Defence deemed that it was a dress embellishment and NOK of someone KIA would not, therefore, be eligible to receive it on their relative’s behalf. This was a cost saving measure and Defence were embarrassed into changing the policy.
Another proposal which has been denied repeatedly, is the reintroduction of wound stripes (or the equivalent). As thelate Jim de Turt commented, after WIA, the next highest designation is KIA. Even a very simple version of the Purple Heart would come at a cost.
The other factor in all this, is that representative organisations are very wary of using their resources to lobby on their members’ behalf.** No matter how good a proposal is, if there is a cost involved, it will be opposed by Government.
Having said all of the above, I’m sure that a coalition of veterans’ organisations could combine to bring about change.”
**Recently, the 1AR Assn C’tee stated that they would not support lobbying efforts on the part of members acting individually. Subsequently the 1AR Assn Citee was asked if it would support submissions to Defence for (i) RAAC personnel to wear a silver version of the Army Combat Badge and (ii) a study to be undertaken into the unique stress factors related to crews of AFVs in combat; and to the AWM, for the RAAC experience in combat to be represented not just by AFVs, but by an well informed interpretation of what it was like for AFV crews fighting inside them. The C’tee’s response to all proposals was that that “the Association is not a lobby group and will not lobby on behalf of individuals; furthermore, “ the Management Committee is not prepared to act as lobby group”. As justification for this position, it was stated that there was no provision for lobbying in the Constitution. [t is the right of the C’tee to adopt this stand, as it is the right of members to challenge it, should they wish to do so.]
Interestingly, the question quoted at the start (above) was also posted on the T & TA Facebook page. There have been (so far) seven comments, including one which advised that members who serve on UN forces wear a number on the relevant ribbon which designates the number of times they have been deployed in that capacity. What a good idea. Imagine the combat experience that would be reflected if the ADF were to do the same thing, eg. the service of all those who have been deployed multiple times to Afghanistan.
Back to LAND 400 Ph3 tomorrow.
————————————————————————————————————————————–
31 October 2018
LAND 400 Phase 3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (II)
Following on from yesterday … what would the Australian mechanised infantry platoon look like if it was manned by the RA Inf?
The example IFV is 35 tons, 1000HP engine, tracked, 30mm cannon, two man turret, .50cal RWS, ATGW pod, and six dismounts (with limited, if any, visibility).
It would be normal to assume four IFVs per platoon (ie. platoon HQ and three inf dismount sections.) Another consideration here might be the ability to operate in two mounted sections. This would allow two vehicles to support the other two forward in fire and movement, as well as enabling a half platoon to dismount to be supported by their IFVs, with the other half platoon in reserve, Should such an organisation be adopted, the grouping within IFVs would need to be adjusted.
This consideration will be based on the platoon HQ and three inf section model.
The critical issue is the co-ordination between mounted and dismounted elements when attacking. One option is for the platoon commander to take charge of dismounted elements and the platoon sergeant to command the mounted vehicle crews. The pl sgt, therefore, commands one of the IFVs. If the pl comd is to dismount to lead the ground force, he cannot be a vehicle commander. He needs awareness of the terrain, however. One option is for the pl comd to travel in the gunner’s position in the pl HQ IFV. A ‘spare’ gunner would travel internally and take over from the pl comd when he dismounts.
In terms of organisation … we have a need for three IFV comds (cpls) and one IFV comd (sgt); a pl comd; four IFV gunners and four IFV drivers. In terms of dismounts there would be eighteen (six per IFV) … each section would be commanded by an NCO (l/cpl or cpl). Also in the Pl HQ IFV would be the pl comd’s signaller, a medic, and a spare IFV copmmander.
Conclusion: Organisation for the mech inf pl (RA Inf) ) would be; pl comd; pl sgt; seven NCOs (l/cpl/cpl) and 25 ptes. Total: 34 pers.
Tomorrow; the org for the mech inf pl (RAAC and RA Inf)
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
30 October 2018
LAND 400 Phase 3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles
The blog on 12 October raised the following issues:
How are the IFVs to be crewed? They’re equivalent to a light tank in every respect. Will infantry simply move from tactical dismounted field skills to crew duties in a 30mm turret/driver of a 40tonne AFV? It would seem that not all infantry will be trained to operate IFVs, ie there will be a core group with a new employment code: IFV Crewman. Will they have a career path? ?
I went on to say: “May I be excused for suggesting that the (40 tonne, 1000HP, 30mm cannon, ATGW, 50cal RWS) IFVs should be operated by the RAAC”.
The following comment was received:
“I’m interested in why you think we should change the target audience operating the IFV in the future noting US army operate Bradley using Infantry, the German army operate Puma using Infantry and the Brits operate Warrior using Infantry. Serviceability issues are not enough as vehicle husbandry is a skill and mindset that can be taught. Considering the way the platform will be employed why would you change it? It’s not going to happen without an increase to the overall size of the Army even if you can convince people it’s a good idea.”
My response was to say: “The relative sizes of these other armies have to be kept in mind; ie. US, 1,030,000 men and 45,000 AFVs; UK, 110,000 men, 5600 AFVs; Germany+, 186,000 men, 5050 AFVs. [Australia: 30,000 men, 684 AFVs.] These Armies are large enough to have specialised units, eg mechanised regiments with integral reconnaissance and tank/inf support. These units would train for specific roles and tasks and would provide coherent career paths accordingly.
The Australian Army doesn’t have this luxury. We have to mix and match and tailor forces for specific operations. Can the RA Inf afford to designate three battalions as mechanised infantry in which traditional infantry field skills take second place to mobile warfare in AFVs? I feel that, given the size of our Army, we would be better served by IFVs being operated by the RAAC. Preventing three battalions from being deployed on operations in which AFVs are not to play a major role, would be a waste of our limited resources”.
————————————————————————————————————————–
29 October 2018
I was a bit optimistic about being back to ‘normal’ by today … however there is one post which is very easy to make.
Part 6 The Ideal World (See Intro above)
It gives me great pleasure to move the following goal to the ‘Pending’ section:
Peter Best (mid) would receive just and compassionate treatment from Immigration authorities.
The Federal Court has found in his favour. The saga is not over yet, but hopefully it won’t be too long before the goal is able to be moved from ‘Pending’ to ‘Crossed Off the List’.
All that those who supported Peter were seeking, was justice. This has been denied to him over many years. As a former member of 1 Armd Regt, he might have hoped for more support from ‘official’ sources. (As an example, the then C’tee of the 1AR Assn was asked to simply provide a statement re his military service; they sided with the unjust implementation of immigration policies and declined to do so.) Others in positions to help, simply looked the other way … a brave man was left to fight for just treatment (no leniency of any kind was being sought by him) almost on his own.
It is encouraging to see that the rule of law can compensate for a deficit of compassion and a surfeit of self-interest, currently in our midst,
Hopefully, when the story is told in years to come, lessons on how our fellow veterans should be treated, will help bring about change.
It seems to have been the right thing to query the number of IFVs; the Defence Technology Review reports that an amended total of 400 vehicles is now being sought under LAND 400 Ph 3, down from the 467 vehicles previously stated (450 plus 17 Manoeuvre Support Vehicles).
Interestingly … the armament is now specified to be 30mm for commonality with the CRV. This means that the 40mm turret initially proposed by Hanwha Redback is no longer in the running.
Also … I’ve been referring to a $30m ‘mini-tank’ per infantry section of 10 men; apparently the standard section size is now nine (hence the stipulated three crew and six dismounts).
I really hope that the Army will be open and transparent with regard to (i) the thinking re crew training and career progressions vis a vis the rest of the RA Inf; and (ii) tactics for command and control once the objective has been reached and the dismounts are on the ground.
With respect to the former …I understand that infantry M113AS4 crews are being trained at the SoA. If the IFV is to continue to be crewed by infantry, it seems likely that the SoA will continue to be responsible for training. Presumably, at some point, inf personnel will be qualified as instructors and help run the Mech Wing. This provides something of a career path, with the Wing eventually being all infantry instructors. No matter how you look at it, however, the inf career progression is either mechanised or non-mechanised (which used to be infantry and armour).
It seems to me that the arguments for the Army, rather than the RAAF, to operate troop carrying helicopters, is a lot different to that for the Infantry, rather than the RAAC, to operate troop carrying ‘mini-tanks’.
Forced Leave of Absence
Off to hospital on Thursday (25th) … stay tuned, however, next Blog Monday (29th).
My memory has been jolted by a recent photo on the 1AR FB page … could the Battle of Binh Ba have had a different outcome?
Also to be discussed is something I raised a few days ago, what are the potential battlegroup groupings, within the current multi-role brigade structure, able to support (i) a brigade operation with cav providing forward reconnaissance and flank security and (ii) an operation not involving the brigade as a whole??
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
23 October 2018
Armour in the Australian Army : Is There Something Wrong?
On 12 October, I made the first of a series of posts under this heading (ie. the one above).
The central point I was trying to make in the first post is reflected in this extract:
“How are the IFVs to be crewed? They’re equivalent to a light tank in every respect. Will infantry simply move from tactical dismounted field skills to crew duties in a 40mm turret/driver of a 40tonne AFV? It would seem that not all infantry will be trained to operate IFVs. So, there is a core group who are trained at a greatly expanded School of Armour … they will have a new employment code: IFV Crewman. Do they have a career path?
Maybe … but how do you compare someone with six years as a field infantryman and someone with six years as an IFV crewman?
I concluded by saying: “May I be excused for suggesting that the (40 tonne, 40mm cannon, ATGW, 50cal RWS) IFVs should be operated by the RAAC”
I thought the following comment by Mitchell Curry was very perceptive
“Whatever we buy the employment model we are working on will fail.
AFVs require much attention to detail and is a career path on their own; training a handful of grunts to be crew and then hoping they stay in long enough to pass on the tiny amount of knowledge they’ll gain in their one year stint as crew members is suicide.
In 20 years we will end up with mech SGTs and WOs that only spent maybe 2-3 years on the car in total because Infantry is allowing them to rotate back to their core role between AFV positions.
As any 3rd world army will tell you, it’s not enough to buy something armoured, you need highly capable crew, otherwise highly capable dismounts will rip it to shreds.”
I don’t know anything about Mitchell, but I can’t add much to his view.
Is this why the 5/7 RAR battalion mechanisation trial was abandoned, only being continued in the form of mechanised company?
For years now, Armouredadvocates has been advocating for the RAAC to accept responsibility for training Bushmaster crews. The official response has been that the RAAC does not operate these vehicles (see latest Ironsides … Corps RSM Comments).
Of course, as has been repeatedly pointed out, this is simply not correct.
The latest 4/19 PWLH Plumes newsletter states, for example, that “At present the Regiment has 9 x PMVs and crews at EX Jacka, conducting training with all Brigade units in preparation for Ex Talisman Sabre next year”.
Why is the matter important? The RAAC has a duty of care in relation to the training standards stipulated for members of the RAAC who crew vehicles operated by the RAAC. We have a situation in which RAAC personnel are crewing a vehicle which the RAAC says that it is not responsible for, ie. the RACT has responsibility for Bushmasters.
BUT … the RACT states that those Corps that operate Bushmaster in ways that are different to the RACT (ie. as transport vehicles in convoys under the commander of packet commanders) are responsible for training crews. The difference in operating techniques are extreme, eg in RACT usage, there is no such position as a crew commander.
It has been claimed that RAAC ARES units are operating Bushmasters under 2 Division arrangements which are not Army policy. RAAC train Bushmaster crews at unit level … so what’s the problem? The problem is that the RAAC has not prepared competency standards for Bushmaster crews (as it has for all other AFVs). Why is this? The RAAC views the Bushmaster as a truck and not an AFV, therefore doesn’t believe that it is its responsibility to set down the standards that RAAC Bushmaster crews must reach to be qualified as driver or crew commander.
BUT … how can the RAAC absolve itself, in all conscience, from responsibility when a Bushmaster rolls during a night move with an RAAC ARES unit. The unit CO stated that the accident was due to poor training. A vehicle accident occurred at Shoalwater Bay earlier this year. Casualties had to evacuated by helicopter. If details have not been covered up, they have certainly not been made public. When asked if a Bushmaster was involved, the response was no comment.
It is Armouredadvocates’ view that if RAAC units are operating Bushmasters to provide protected mobility to infantry in tactical settings, the RAAC must exercise its duty of care and prepare crew competency standards as a basis for training and proficiency certification at unit level.
———————————————————————————————————————————————
21 October 2018
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation (Hamersley)
Good news! I’ve emailed Jack Chipman to say that “I believe that there might have been a breakthrough re the extension of eligibility. Can’t tell you the story at the moment, but the next few weeks should tell”.
Regrettably, it seems that there might have been some inadvertent errors involved in previous endeavours to bring this matter to a just consideration. (All will be revealed.)
Menu.
Can’t post more at this time as I’m hosting (and cooking) a seafood lunch tomorrow.
Crab (blue swimmers) on toast for starters; entre is a selection of scallops baked with herb breadcrumbs; oysters with sour cream and caviar; oysters baked with honey and bacon; main is seafood mornay (prawns/salmon. orange roughy); etc etc Wish me luck!
I was proven correct when I picked the contender, on the basis of operational capability, that would be selected for Phase 2 prior to the selection process … can I do it again?
BAE Systems: CV 90; but has not yet decided as to whether to submit a contender;
Hanwha AS21 Redback: 40mm cannon, 8 dismounts
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS): Based on the British Ajax series of vehicles, the Ajax IFV configuration is still to be finalised.
Without going into the characteristics of the contenders … given the Australian Industrial Participation investment associated with Phase 2 (and the Lynx’s proven capability), it would seem that the Rheinmetall IFV is a no-brainer to be selected. (I’ll return to a selection based on operational capability a little later.)
Note: Whether it’s of relevance or not, is for others to judge; but, according to the 1AR Assn, over the past few years, Rheinmetall has ‘donated’ at least $20,000 to 1st Armoured Regiment (via the 1AR Assn accounts so as to ‘mask’ the source of the funds). The process has bypassed Defence regulations regarding ‘gifts’ to Army units from commercial companies bidding for Defence contracts. One has to wonder why this has been done.
Armour in the Australian Army: Is There Something Wrong? Postscript
“ … a medium tank with troop carrying capacity…”. (The Australian)
This series of posts started out as a means of sparking a discussion on whether RAInf or RAAC should crew the IFVs. It led to an examination of the crew duties required by the new IFV (LAND 400 Ph3) and on to the way in which the vehicle will be used when it closes with the objective; the principle reason for its level of armour protection, hence its weight and tracks rather than wheels. (The protection level had initially been accepted, given the lethality and proliferation of hand -held anti-tank weapons today.)
As the subject was examined, one had to wonder if there was another question: is the organisation of Australian Army’s three multi-role brigades, as it should be? Given that each ACR has only one tank squadron, how are battlegroups to be formed? Are we looking at two tank troops and two mechanised infantry companies; or three tank troops and mech company? There would be no problem forming combat teams to deal with minor enemy objectives, but this is obviously not why the Army’s most expensive procurement project ever is underway.
With two cavalry (reconnaissance) squadrons to command, the ACR CO will be hard pressed to command both a battlegroup and brigade recon. Presumably, responsibility for the latter would go the Brigade HQ. So, is the emphasis on heavily armoured IFVs, predicated on the basis of large scale major operational commitments against well-equipped and highly organised enemy?
If an enemy at the lower end of the scale was contemplated in terms of contingency plans, one might have thought that the UK model of having the flexibility to mix and match battlegroups would be desirable. Is it a surprise that the UK have adopted this model? Possibly not, if they believe that the breakdown of European nation states might be their most likely commitment.
As at the start … food for thought?
A quote from the Australian newspaper: “The army has always preferred a tracked solution for Phase 3 because these vehicles are more like medium tanks with troop-carrying capability and so tend to have better levels of protection and manoeuvrability than their wheeled competitors, such as the Boxer.”
18 October 2018
Armour in the Australian Army: Is There Something Wrong? Footnote
When Australia chose the Rheinmetall Boxer for LAND 400 Ph 2 (ie. the Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle version), the British Army, as a result, opted for the Boxer as its MIV. Extracts from UK media are copied below:
“3 April 2018 – The British Ministry of Defence announced on March 31st that it will re-join the Boxer-programme. With this, the United Kingdom, which played a major role in the vehicle’s design, development and testing from 1999 to 2004, has taken the first step to become one of the major Boxer-User-Nation.”
“The MOD conducted a comprehensive market analysis of Mechanised Infantry Vehicles in-service, entering service and in development. The analysis was guided by the British Army’s requirements and how best to deliver them. The Boxer delivered on protected mobility, capacity, flexibility, utility and agility.”
“The Defence Select Committee heard that a German-led consortium has almost certainly won the contract to build about 500 “mechanised infantry vehicles”
“These eight-wheeled ‘Boxer’ vehicles will equip highly mobile ‘strike brigades’ which will be the centrepiece of the British land warfare in the future.
The Brits have opted for a wheeled MIV which will sit between the air deployable light forces and the heavy armoured forces. In effect, they will have two MIVs: Ajax family (tracked) to accompany tanks, as well as their wheeled ‘Boxer’ MIV. (Ajax can also take the place of tanks to provide fire support for the Boxer.) This flexibility is not available to the Australian Army. We have opted to put all our eggs into the tracked, heavily armoured, fire support capable, IFV.
Is this the right decision? Should we also be considering a mix of IFV types? (It’s not too late.)
The email below and its response are self-explanatory. In my view, I believe that a ‘well done’ is due to the AWM (and I’ve said so):
Dear Redevelopment Team,
“After the War is an exhibition exploring the personal stories of hope, loss,and love of ordinary Australians whose lives have been altered by war, from those who have served to loved ones left behind. Take an intimate journey through the personal costs and consequences of war, unfolding over 100 years from 1918 to 2018.” (AWM Website)
I visited the exhibition today and I congratulate the AWM for respecting the AWM Act 1980 (below) in commemorating not only those who died during the prescribed period of a war, but also as a result of their wounds thereafter.
AWM Act 1980: “1) The functions of the Memorial are: (a) to maintain and develop the national memorial referred to in subsection 6(1) of the Australian War Memorial Act 1962 as a national memorial of Australians who have died: (i) on or as a result of active service; or (ii) as a result of any war or warlike operations in which Australians have been on active service; “
My feedback is that I thought that the exhibition focused too much on the letter of the Act, ie. I felt it dealt primarily with the dead and their NOK.
The AWM Act 1980 makes no mention of commemorating those who have served in war and are still living (they may or may not have been physically wounded, but all carry the scars of their experience).
May I suggest that those planning the redevelopment of the AWM give consideration to those veterans who are scarred by their war experience (and their families).
I’ve personally struggled with the Question: ‘What do you say to a dying mate?”. Would it be possible for the AWM’s Redevelopment Team to consider the Question: ‘What do you (the AWM) say to those veterans who continue to struggle with their experiences from war?’.
At the moment, I don’t think that this idea has been on the radar.
————————————————————————————
Seems to me that the AWM have become leaders, rather than followers, as far as the narrative is concerned. The response from the Director’s Office is below:
“The Memorial’s redevelopment team has what we refer to as the Memorial’s role in the ‘therapeutic milieu’ firmly in mind during the design process. Whilst the plans are far from final at this very early stage the intent is to create dedicated spaces for veterans and their families to pause and contemplate their service and the Memorial is considering ways to incorporate counselling and other support services on site as well.
The Memorial has also implemented support programs such as the ‘Soldiers in Residence’ program that supports ADF personnel injured our wounded who are transitioning back to work or the Napier Waller Art Prize for veterans and serving personnel.
The Memorial is also working on plans for programs such as a ‘PTSD friendly’ after hours tour for veterans. This program will involve working with ADF personnel and veterans and the medical professionals supporting them to provide a tour that will have lower lighting levels, the sound to displays that some veterans find confronting turned off and be conducted as a private tour with no other visitors in attendance. The intent is to allow them the time and space necessary to deal with their emotions and stresses during the tour at their own pace whilst ensuring they are able to see that their experiences are recorded here for the nation to better understand.
The Memorial’s primary purpose remains remembering and explaining the Australian experience of war but the Council and the Director, Dr Nelson, are aware of the evolving role the Memorial has in the ‘therapeutic milieu’ and continues to work with the ADF, DVA and veterans’ groups to provide support for all those who have served.
Again, your correspondence has been passed to our redevelopment team for their direct consideration as well.”
Armour in the Australian Army : Is There Something Wrong? Part 5
A couple of points from previous Parts: (i) I understand that the amphibious battalion in Townsville is actually under the command of HQ I Div (not 3 Bde); and (ii) I referred to IFV crews being training at a greatly expanded Infantry Centre; crew training at present is conducted at the School of Armour … whether this is to continue and the SoA expanded to provide the long term capability, is to be seen.
The real question being posed is that of suitability of the present IFV contenders, for the role in which Contingency Plans see them being employed.
Interestingly, the Musorian tactics (ie. the tactics of the fictitious enemy, the capability of which is used as a basis for Australian Army training) state that “when an infantry Coy dismounts from its APC, the vehicles move 100 to 200 m to the rear of the infantry and provide fire support”.
The Australian Army, on the other hand, see the IFV, crew and dismounts operating as an integrated team and having a greatly superior capability. This concept sees the dismounted infantry and the vehicle crew working hand in glove when assaulting the objective. This scenario obviously requires two commanders, one on the ground and one in the vehicle. Who is in charge overall? Will it be one or the other, or will it depend on the circumstances? Will there be any question as to who commands while the IFV is moving? It would seem logical that the vehicle commander is in charge, however, there has been heated argument about this in the past.
A second (and related ) question is whether or not the IFV is there to support the dismounted infantry or vice versa. (Note. LAND 400 requires the IFV to have the capacity to carry six dismounts.)
The degree of difficulty is increased by the lack of vision available to the commander of the dismounts while in the IFV. If the infantry are to assault the enemy position, with the empty IFVs providing fire support, they are at a disadvantage if they exit the vehicle ‘blind’. Given that the IFV commander can see the battlefield and has considerable firepower at his disposal, it would seem logical for the infantry to operate in support of the IFV, ie. protect the vehicle from enemy anti-armour weapons (the traditional role of ‘panzer grenadiers’). The other factor in support of this argument, is that the dismounted mechanised infantry platoon is much smaller (24 men) than the non-mechanised platoon (33 men).
The more one looks at it, the more the IFVs are to be used to conduct mounted warfare. Indeed, if this was not to be the case, there would be an enormous waste of money. The end result, if the present intention for the infantry to operate the AFVs goes ahead, is that infantry will have been granted a new role and the RAAC will be divested of one.
Given that the dismounts are likely to support the IFV when fighting through the objective, would it not make more sense for the RAAC to crew both the tanks and IFVs during operations? Overall command of the combined arms force should be vested in the best commander, no matter his Corps.
————————————————————————————–
Comment from D Simpson ( paratusderek@gmail.com) re the above post: “Army has a new doctrinal enemy and has done for some time, more research required from you. Perhaps research DATE (decisive action training environment) to bring you into the contemporary environment”.
This is an interesting comment, given that the quote was taken from the following Australian Army Manual (note date)
AUSTRALIAN ARMY
LAND WARFARE PROCEDURES – GENERAL
LWP-G 7-5-5
TRAINING ADVERSARY
Armour in the Australian Army : Is There Something Wrong? Part 4
Does it not seem strange that the Australian Army’s most expensive equipment procurement project ever, $15b’s worth, is to provide 450 medium tanks to equip four infantry battalions with one per section of ten men?
The German Army of the Second World War used the term ‘Panzer-Grenadier’ to describe infantry units that supported tanks. Very different thinking now drives the British Army’s organisation. The European battlefield of the future is now seen as one in which rapid advances of more than 100km per day will be commonplace.
The units that travel these distances will be required to engage enemy front-line forces. It is obviously not feasible for light cavalry to conduct such operations; nor can heavy armoured units be expected to travel as quickly as needed over such distances … ergo, the new ‘Strike’ formations.
Here we have infantry integrated with medium armoured vehicles (aka IFVs). These will be units that can break free from traditional ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ constraints … units that can travel quickly across country and deliver a powerful punch (even deal with the enemy’s ‘heavy’ elements) when they arrive. The British Army intends to procure 800 of these AFVs (referred to there as MIVs) which which have much greater mobility than main battle tanks and can almost equal their firepower
For some time in the UK there has been a distinction between armoured infantry and mechanised infantry. The latter are essentially infantry as we know them, ie. transported in APCs with the intention of dismounting before the objective; armoured infantry, however, have much better protected AFVs to allow them to close with the objective itself. An enormous amount of effort has gone into developing tactics for armoured infantry.
The Australian Army is about to purchase 450 IFVs to equip four armoured infantry battalions. But these are to be used to operate in conjunction with MBTs, not seize the initiative in operations separate to them. Are the design specifications for LAND 400 Phase 3, therefore, appropriate?
Does the Australian Army really require a $30m IFV to equip each section in four battalions? If these vehicles are justified on the basis of their ability to conduct independent operations, is not the RAAC the best qualified to conduct mobile warfare?
Armour in the Australian Army : Is There Something Wrong? Part 3
How does a mechanised infantry battalion work?
Let’s start with a single IFV … three crew (driver, gunner and commander), plus eight dismounts. So this is an infantry section, three IFVs plus the platoon HQ IFV. It is assumed that the section commander is also the IFV commander, as is the platoon commander.
The concept of the IFV is that it is able to accompany Abrams tanks onto an enemy objective. What happens at this point? The tanks pursue the retreating enemy or defend against a counter-attack; the IFVs dismount their troops to secure the position.
Does the IFV commander dismount to command his section? If he does, presumably there is a spare IFV/section commander among the dismounts. If the section commander/IFV commander needs to remain in the IFV to control supporting fire, presumably the spare commander dismounts to command the infantry section on the ground.
One would imagine that a mechanised battalion has its own career progression, separate to a non-mechanised battalion, ie. you start off as a dismount, promoted to dismount section commander, then become an IFV driver, gunner, crew commander; then platoon sergeant etc etc.
But wouldn’t it be much more effective, if the inf sections dismounted and came under command of their platoon commander …basic infantry tactics then occurred, with fire support from the AFVs being provided by AFV crews, ie. RAAC personnel.
How do you integrate basic RAAC tank* skills, D&S, gunnery crew commanding etc, with infantry fieldcraft, to make them a single employment code? If this is not possible and it’s necessary to have two separate employment codes … why not have ECN Infantry and ECN Armour; allowing the two arms to specialise in and develop their respective strengths?
Is it possible that we are to see another failure in terms of planning, similar to that which allowed the RAAC ARES to be relegated to a dismounted role (as the new AFVs are too complex for them to operate)? How incredible is the thinking here? Turn ARA infantry into RAAC personnel and ARES RAAC personnel into infantry. Why not allocate relatively easy to operate vehicles such as HAWKEI to the RAAC ARES to enable them to develop reconnaissance skills and allow them to integrate with ARA cavalry squadrons (not only as ‘dismounts’).
*PS. The IFV in the British Army is referred to as a ‘medium tank’.
———————————————————————————————————————————————
13 October 2018
Armour in the Australian Army : Is There Something Wrong? Part 2
For those interested in Army’s most expensive acquisition ever … LAND 400 Phase 3 ($15b) is intended to provide 450 IFVs and 17 MSVs (manoeuvre/mobility support vehicles). What is the basis for the 450?
Let’s work on a three rifle coy/four pl peacetime model per inf battalion and start with one bn per bde to be equipped with IFVs. Four IFVs per pl, amounts to 48 vehs; when we include three CHQ (three vehs each incl two command variant); three coy echelons (four cargo variants each) spt coy (ten vehs); tech spt (nine repair & recovery variants),) and BHQ (five vehs), we have a total of 93 IFVs per bn; three bns equals, 279 IFVs. Inf Centre, RTC and repair pool requirements brings the total to 350. But, with approx. 100 IFVs per battalion, 450 IFVs provides for four battalions.
Is the intention to equip one battalion in 1 and 7 Bdes and two battalions in 3 Bde? (3 Brigade has three battalions, but 2RAR has an amphibious role.)
What if the ACR organisation was one tank sqn, two cav sqns and one mech inf sqn? This would meet the organisational needs for 1 and 7 Bde. What of 3 Bde?
The breadth of command for an ACR CO with a tank sqn, two cav sqns and two mech inf sqns, would be stretched to the extreme. But what if a cav sqn and a mech inf sqn were to be grouped separately. So, 3 Bde would comprise an ACR, ACR (-), two inf bn (mech), and one inf bn (amphibious).
One difference between this and the current intention (or so it seems) is that the IFVs would be operated by the RAAC (as APCs used to be). The other difference is that the structure would offer greatly enhanced operational benefits (while also being much more cost efficient).
————————————————————————————————————
12 October 2018
Armour in the Australian Army : Is There Something Wrong?
Let’s look at the situation …. we have 59 Abrams tanks. Less than a regiment’s worth.
We might have been able to get away with this while 1 Armd Regt was located in Darwin (ie. concentrated in the same location) … but now we have tank squadrons located in Adelaide, Townsville and Brisbane (Plan BEERSHEBA). Some years ago, the Army assessed that the tank fleet needed to be increased to 90 to provide for the new force structure, repair pools etc.
One might think this would be a priority, BUT …
In the Australian Army tanks exist to support infantry. The inf now operate their own APCs; AFVs which are to be replaced by Infantry Fighting Vehicles. The project cost is around $15 billion for 450 IFVs.
It might seem expensive in the context of an APC replacement. The IFV is a very different beast however …along the lines of 1000HP, 40 tonnes, two man 40mm turret, 50cal RWS, 7.62; two pod ATGM launcher and eight pax. The expenditure on IFVs is three times that of the ASLAV replacement (211 Boxers at $5.2billion).
How are the IFVs to be crewed? They’re equivalent to a light tank in every respect. Will infantry simply move from tactical dismounted field skills to crew duties in a 40mm turret/driver of a 40tonne AFV? It would seem that not all infantry will be trained to operate IFVs. So there is a core group who are trained at some greatly expanded School of Infantry … they will have a new employment code: IFV Crewman. Do they have a career path? Maybe … but how do you compare someone with six years as a field infantryman and someone with six years as an IFV crewman?
May I be excused for suggesting that the (40 tonne, 40mm cannon, ATGW, 50cal RWS) IFVs should be operated by the RAAC.
Meanwhile …. we have an urgent need for 31 more Abrams; should we be placing greater priority on three independent mechanised infantry battalions, over and above independent three tank squadrons?
Tomorrow: How should the ACRs be organised?
——————————————————————————————————————-
11 October 2018
Wouldn’t it be Nice?
I’ve copied the post from 24 April 2016, below for background.
Recently there’s been discussion on another forum about registration/identity plates ‘souvenired’ from Centurions when they were to be sent for disposal. This was plate in the driver’s compartment which listed the tank’s manufacturing details, ARN, and major repairs. (A bit like a permanent log book.)
So now we have Centurions in Museums and private hands with no log book and quite possibly, no registration plate. Wouldn’t it be good if such items were returned to Centurions that have been renovated and/or are on public display. There is a tank, for example, at the Moama RSL, 169044. (Photo below from Moama’s dedication ceremony). The club went to great lengths to restore it. The registration plate of 169044 may or may not be in it, but it’s log book is with Mr M Cecil, a former employee of the AWM. Would it not mean so much more if these items were to be reunited with the tank, rather sitting on a shelf somewhere else?
__________________________________________
24 April 2016 : The Nature of the Person with the Cent Log Books (aka Edward Kelly)
A post on the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum post around August 2014 asked if anyone had info re the Centurion that the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum had recently purchased. This started a search for the log books to help provide this info. I asked Tim Vibert, the person who bought the Cents disposed of by Defence) what had happened to them. He said “I sold them [the log books] to a private collector as a job lot on a confidential basis”.
Tim was asked if he could pass a message to the collector to tell them about the Museum’s request and ask if info about the tank’s service history could be provided (even on a ‘confidential’ basis). In the absence of any response, it was assumed that the Museum had not received any information to support their exhibit. It was thought disappointing that the owner of the log books would not contribute to Australia’s military history in this way.
This example was recently quoted when speaking to the Defence agency responsible for disposing of M113A1s. It was pointed out it would be desirable not to allow the log books of the M113A1/AS4 fleet to end up in the hands of an anonymous private collector. (It is pleasing to be able to say that Defence are very much aware of the heritage value of the AFV log books.)
The private collector now saw red and posted all sorts of insults about me on the 3 Cav Forum under the name of ‘Edward Kelly’. The Cairns Arty and Tank Museum became aware of this and contacted me recently. It appears that they did receive information about their Centurion in August 2014. The Museum Manager who had initiated the request on the 1AR Assn Forum was unaware of this, only learning of it as a result of the chatter on the 3 Cav Forum. Everyone at the Museum was very busy at the time and unfortunately no-one was advised about the info received. This was an oversight by the Museum, but the story doesn’t end there.
It turns out that the whole affair was the result of the private collector’s own making. In one of his 3 Cav posts he tells Edward Kelly what happened when I emailed Tim Vibert to ask (not “demand”) what had happened to the log books:
“When he started the charade by demanding the name of the person Tim had sold the log books to, we decided to tell him it was confidential (read for that ‘none of your business’). He’s been thrashing about making unfounded accusations and erroneous statements about log books ever since.”
So it appears that the log books weren’t sold on a ‘confidential basis’ at all; this was a fabrication decided upon to frustrate the search for information about the Cairns Museum’s tank via the 1AR Assn members’ Forum.
What a different outcome it would’ve been if the response had been ‘the owner of the log books wishes to protect his identity, but will pass on information about the service history of ARN 169052 to the Museum’. I hope the private collector derived lots of pleasure seeing me “thrashing about” trying to help in the quest to establish the history of the Cairns Museum’s Centurion.
How do things stand at the moment re the log books? It seems that while the identity of the private collector remains ‘confidential’, he is prepared to assist owners of Centurions with log book info re the tank that they own. There appears to be private network whereby these people are able to communicate with the private collector (as they own a tank they have information to trade). What about anyone else doing historical research? They may or may not be lucky. One has to assume that ‘Ed Kelly’ wants to pick and choose those with whom he shares Australia’s military history.
Of course, we still have the question as to where the log books that disappeared from the Tank Museum ended up and who made a complaint on a ‘confidential’ basis about the tone of a post which resulted in the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum being closed down. The whereabouts of the log books was being discussed at the time and the President has declared the ‘offending’ post to be secret. Possibly the Kelly gang again?
The ultimate irony is that Ned wants me to apologise for not knowing that the private collector had given info about 052 to the Museum in August 2014: “Didn’t notice an apology for getting the ‘refusal to provide the Cairns Museum’ posts wrong for the last what, 20 months? An apology would be appropriate to PC, don’t you think? Both here and on your AA blog”.
11 October 2018. Footnote. We now know that Mr Cecil has at least one of the logbooks from the tanks at Puckapunyal. He has not responded to requests as to how he came to have it, nor what other of the logbooks from the Puckapunyal (Defence) tanks that he holds.
—————————————————————————————————————————————
10 October 2018
Due Process and Freedom of Information (FOI)
I’ve copied the Blog post from 26 May 2017 below. It explains the background. It does not, however, explain how protracted this matter became. The points below are some of those I’ve provided in response to Defence’s argument that I should not be allowed to see the submission that was made in support of that which I provided to the Minister. The final outcome (of the FOI appeal process) is expected soon.
(v) My Interest is Not Relevant? Defence has argued that “there is little public interest in this issue” and that what there is would be greatly outweighed by the perceived breach of trust should the document be released. Isn’t this exactly what the FOI legislation is intended to prevent, ie the agency concerned claiming that it can’t release any information because this would be seen to be a breach of trust, the consequences of which would outweigh the public interest. The public interest is my interest. I am a member of an Association which is a member of the RAAC Corporation. The submission made to Defence was made on behalf of members; I am one such member. Is it not intended that the FOI legislation allows for a single member of the public, who feels that he has been wronged by a document that the Government holds, to seek its release. To use a defence of ‘breach of trust’ for not releasing a document, would seem to be contrary to the intent of FOI legislation.
(vi) The False Defence of Confidentiality. This has been raised frequently in the context that discussions between Army and ESOs “are conducted with an expectation of a level of confidentiality, often due to the sensitive nature of the welfare topics”. But my FOI request is to see a public document, one submitted to the Government in support of an earlier submission that I had made to a Minister … there are no welfare issues involved. Is not the very defence of “confidentiality” by Governments, the very reason the FOI legislation exists? This might be accepted if matters of ‘national security’ or personal privacy were involved … but this is patently not the case.
(vii) Alternative Scenario. The Minister responded to my submission, advising that he had approved my requests. What if he had not given his approval and it was because something in the RAAC Corporation’s supporting submission to Defence was wrong? I would have no idea as to the basis on which the decision was made. If Defence refused to release the supporting submission, an abuse of process would be perpetuated, ie. grounds for appeal, would, in effect, be denied.
(viii) The Benefits of Open and Transparent Government. If openness and transparency in government procedures are demonstrated, Defence’s administration of welfare and personnel policy would benefit as a result of increased community input; benefit would also flow to the management of welfare support to units and the level and quality of advice provided by ESOs. An increase in volunteers prepared to work with ESOs is also likely to result.
(ix) A Single Member of Government Does Not Constitute Government as a Whole. Defence argues that the “document was submitted directly to a specific Defence member … implying that … there is no expectation that it be disclosed publicly”. So, if the Chairman of a company wanting to make a donation to the Liberal Party in return for certain ‘favours’ by government, wrote directly to the PM … this could not be subject to FOI action? Yet another example of the extent to which Defence is grabbing at straws in its defence of this matter
(ix) Protecting Someone Guilty of Wrongdoing. Defence argues that the “exposure of one member of one organisation could be expected to generate concern within all organisations that are voluntarily staffed”. Excuse me? We should not do anything which would bring to light wrongdoing, because this could make others think twice about doing the same thing? If there was one single reason for releasing the document, I think that this would have to be it. Covering up wrongdoing can only be expected to lead to further wrongdoing.
—————————————-
26 May 2017: FOI Request.
Background is provided by the 5 April 2017 blog post. In essence, I asked to see a copy of the submission made by the RAAC Corporation in support of mine seeking approval for the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1AR Standard. Surprisingly, the Corporation stated that they had not seen my submission, yet they had prepared another submission in support of it (which I was not permitted to see).
The FOI Decision
My FOI request to see the RAAC Corporation’s submission has been refused because the Accredited Decision Maker is satisfied that:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with “exempt matter deleted”, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
How can disclosure of a supporting submission to a Minister (a public document), harm an organization to the extent that RAAC member associations would refuse to continue to support the RAAC Corporation? What could the submission possibly contain, to have this effect?
I have requested a review of the decision. (As they say … sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.)
———————————————————————————————–
9 October 2018
Consultation
Congratulations to the 1AR Assn C’tee for putting out an update to members of things that have been actioned since the last AGM. This was done vide Facebook and email. (The latter being necessary as a result of a number of members being vehemently opposed to ‘social media’.)
One has to wonder what the relationship is between use of the 1AR Assn website and 1AR Assn Facebook, in terms of communicating with members.
RSL Queensland seem to have an effective policy in this respect. They have a regular newsletter which they send out by email and use for updates on policy and activities. An extract from the latest is copied below.
RSL Runner [Newsletter]: Edition 10, October 2018 As our State President Tony Ferris noted in his recent From the President blog post, the revised Constitution is beginning to take shape. The Constitution Working Party spent two days recently discussing the draft document. This included reviewing more than 80 suggestions made by our members. Each suggestion was given due consideration, and most were implemented. A draft version of the Constitution will be available for perusal and discussion on the 2018 Constitution page of our website soon.
They also have a very comprehensive website and use this for discussion of policy matters. See https://www.rslqld.org/.
Perhaps there’s a model here that the 1AR Assn could adopt (either completely, or in part).
PS. The RSL Qld website includes links to relevant ESOs, with a short outline about their core function. Given the RAAC Corporation’s decision that ‘they’ (ie. the member associations of the Corporation) don’t have the resources to offer welfare services (despite the HOC’s request for the RAAC family to act as one in this regard) … the ‘Charter’ of the RAR Association copied below is interesting. (One former 1AR Assn C’tee member was very vocal in stating that the 1AR Assn exists to promote camaraderie only and if a member needs welfare assistance he simply tells them to go to the RSL.)
————————————————————————-
“RAR AssociationSupports past and present infantry servicemen who have served in or are currently serving in an Infantry Battalion of the Regiment through social activities, promoting the health and welfare of members and a ‘care watch’ program to watch over sick members or their family members. RAR also have Welfare Support Officers who are knowledgeable of legislation and connect members with relevant ESOs to help them.”
——————————————————————————————————————-
9 October 2018
Apologies … it seems that my post for yesterday was attacked by gremlins and did not appear as it shoud’ve. I’ve copied it below (and will hold today’s post until tomorrow.)
The AWM: Recognising Those Who DOW After the War has Ended.
I’ve been lobbying for some time to affect a change from a focus on those who are listed on the Roll of Honour (ie. died during the War), to acknowledge all those who die from their wounds after the prescribed period of the War (as well as those whose wounds become apparent after that date). To their credit, the AWM is now also thinking along these lines (probably nothing at all to do with my lobbying). The response below is from the Office of the Director, AWM. (Reference is made to a ‘ticker’, this comes from the following suggestion I made:
“Unfortunately, all the information currently provided by the AWM relates to the numbers killed during the prescribed periods of Wars. Would it not be appropriate for the Redevelopment Project to address this ‘other’ aspect of the Memorial’s function? I believe, for a start, that it is essential that the numbers of deaths from wounds after the end of the prescribed period should be highlighted (with the Information Panels being amended as the numbers continue to grow). Would this not focus the attention of visitors to the AWM, ie. to see the numbers of those who have died from wounds experienced in conflicts such as Vietnam, Afghanistan etc, ‘tick over’ before their eyes.
From AWM, 5 October 2018:
“To your second point the Memorial honours all those who have served through means other than simply the Honour Roll or Commemorative Rolls. We tell the stories of all who served through our exhibitions, education programs, publications, sculpture gardens, ceremonies and more. Our displays also share with visitors that the cost of war isn’t limited solely to casualties suffered during a defined period.
The Memorial is working to expand the way it represents these true costs of war today and within the proposed expansion. Earlier today for example our new special exhibition “After the War” opened. This exhibition examines the consequences of war, from the Boer War to today, including facts such as the 60,000 Australians who died in the 10 years following the First World War as a result of wounds, gassing or other issues from their time in service. It also examines the impact on soldiers and their families of serious injuries, PTSD and other ailments for years after their service has ended.
The Memorial also has other initiatives that are intended to highlight the true cost of war. Our Vietnam Medical Legacies Project will explore the long term costs, including post-war deaths, of service in the Vietnam War in a volume to be published next year. The Memorial is also working on a new monument for the ‘cost of war’ that recognises that the cost wartime service extends far beyond the names listed on the Roll of Honour.
I hope that this provides some comfort that the Memorial does indeed acknowledge the fuller cost of war beyond just those who die during a conflict.
Your comments, along with all the other feedback we have received, will be provided to Council for their consideration in relation to the development.
I have also passed your email to the team who are doing the very early gallery design work to raise the concept of a ‘ticker’ with them so they can see if such a display would be feasible (notwithstanding the technical issues relating to working out the number of deaths) within the broader concepts they are working on for the proposed additional space. Such a display would , to my mind at least, sit well alongside the proposed ‘live feed’ from Defence showing what our soldiers, sailors and airmen are doing to defend the nation on any given day.”
————————————————————————————————
6 October 2018
Correcting Mistakes in History
I’ve copied the post from 25 May 2017, below.
It resulted from a discussion about directions in relation to Long Tan. One person referred to “south” and another said “no, it was north”. It turned out that Adrian Roberts had made a mistake in his After Action Report (as can easily happened, given the circumstances in which AAR are written) and had referred to south when it should have been north (or vice versa). This could lead to considerable confusion for those studying the Battle, or so it seemed to me.
I asked the AWM if a notation could be placed on the file to explain. The response was a resounding ‘No’ … the Archives Act would not allow this under any circumstances. Not being one to accept such bureaucratic idiocy … I emailed the National Archives as below.
Lo and behold … there is a way of alerting researchers, historians etc to a known error in a manuscript. I’ve forgotten exactly what the mechanism was … I think it involved placing a notation on the catalogue entry for the file/document.
Morale of the story: if something is patently stupid, persevere and logic will eventually prevail. Heaven help us if no-one is prepared to stand up against mindless decisions, whether they be made by governments or anyone else
———————————————————————————————
Email to National Archives follows. It relates to a matter in which the AWM states that it can’t provide a notation on a file to advise that something is known to be wrong.
Dear NAA, Many thanks for your response.
“The Archives Act prohibits the alteration of records over 25 years old (section 26 of the Act), and it does not provide a right of amendment or correction.”
I guess my next step is to seek an amendment to the Archives Act. I presume I do this through the Attorney General. If you can offer any other advice as to how to initiate an amendment to the Act, I’d be very grateful if you could provide this.
I acknowledge that the Act prevents any correction or amendment to records more than 25 years old. What I am proposing is an appended notation to a record. This notation could link to a separate record where the originator of the original certifies that he made an error in writing it and offers explanation.
As you know, there is public interest involved here. Say the original record related to the Maralinga Atomic Tests and the originator (someone involved with the Tests) realised that he had made a mistake in writing the record. Correcting this might be of immense public benefit. Are we saying that it is impossible to make any correction? Presumably the originator can always make a new record … what I’m proposing is a means by which a link is made between the new and the old records. If this cannot be done, the ability to serve the public interest is denied.
I appreciate that the possibility of someone wanting to ‘dress up’ or fraudulently correct his original record is always present. This could be limited if a ‘stat dec’ was used as the basis for any new record.
I will forward my proposal to the Attorney General is you think that is the best course to follow. Your advice is appreciated.
—————————————————————————————————-
5 October 2018
Atomic Tank
I’ve copied the post below from 20 July 2017.
Centurion Tank 169041 was positioned at the site of a British atomic test. Events after that are described here:
After time at 1st Armd Regt (Puckapunyal and Vietnam) and Armoured Centre, the tank was at 1 Arms Regt (Darwin) and is now in Adealide. Is there still residual radiation? It was previously classed as safe for crews to operate, but how much has understanding of radiation and its effects advanced since then?
There was concern about the effects of the radiation from the gunner’s traverse indicator (with the gunner almost sitting on top of it). The radioactive materials used in the traverse indicator have long been discontinued.
In light of today’s scientific knowledge, if a review was to be conducted of the documents held by the School of Armour in relation to ARN 169041, would there now be grounds for compensation?
—————————————————————————————–
20 July 2018. DVA Initiative: Too Little, Too Late?
The July edition of the DVA e-news advises that:
“As a result of a 2017–18 Budget measure, Gold Cards will be provided to both the surviving Australian participants of the British Nuclear Test (BNT) program in Australia, and Australian veterans who served as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) during the occupation of Japan immediately following the Second World War.
The measure will also provide this healthcare coverage for affected pastoralists, Indigenous people and other civilians determined to be within the same vicinity as the participants of the BNT.
In many cases, people will be automatically issued a Gold Card under this measure. However, those who cannot be identified from DVA records as either a BNT or BCOF participant will need to lodge a claim for the Gold Card.”
Well done to the RAACA (NSW), John Haynes in particular, who have been lobbying for the BCOF gold card for years. One might be thought of as being cynical, to say the initiative is not going to cost the Government very much, given the few veterans of either BCOF or BNT still alive (probably even less, if any, Indigenous people present at the time).
There is, of course, the long-standing claims that have been rejected, concerning the health consequences for RAAC crewmen exposed to the residual radioactivity associated with the tank (ARN 169041) that was placed at ground zero for one of the blasts. There is a large file on this at the School of Armour. A number of RAEME personnel were also exposed.
—————————————————————————————————————-
4 October 2018
Following on from the post on 25 September 2018, the following email has now been sent to the AWM:
Dear AWM,
The Vietnam Gallery
When the Vietnam Gallery opened 10 years ago, veterans were asked to provide feedback. This initiative facilitated considerable value-adding since being made to the information panels. Without checking every separate one, I can point to at least 26 suggestions of mine that have been incorporated.
Despite this, there are three points which continue to be of concern to veterans. These are set out below.
Bravery of Tank Crews
In two places in the Vietnam Gallery, it is stated that Centurion tanks were “nearly impervious to most enemy weapons”. In context, this gives the impression that crews were safe inside the armour protection of their tanks. Of course, the opposite was the case (this is borne out by the literal meaning of the words, ie. “nearly Imperious” means, in fact, not impervious. The armour of Centurion tanks was able to be penetrated by all enemy anti-armour weapons (RPG 2 and RPG 5, 57 RCL and 75 RCL).
Given that crews were unable to close their hatches, they were vulnerable to sniper fire and satchel charges. The 100gal petrol tank on the rear of the Centurion was vulnerable to HMG fire. The main weapon used by the enemy against tanks was the mine. With the tank ammunition stowed on the floor, it was not long before the enemy incorporated RPG warheads into mines to fire upwards, penetrate the floor armour and set off an ammunition fire.
Australian tank crews knew that at any time their tank could detonate a mine, or, taking the lead in assaulting enemy defences, be penetrated by an RPG. At no time were they buoyed by the thought that their tanks were “nearly impervious to most enemy weapons”. Their bravery was magnificent, confronting the enemy day in day out, knowing that their tanks were very vulnerable to many of their weapons.
It is suggested that the following wording is much more suitable: Despite their armour, Centurion tanks and their crews were vulnerable to many enemy weapons, particularly mines.
The Battle of Binh Ba
One of the AWM photos (BEL/69/0382/VN) used in the ‘Timeline’, carries the caption “[troops] approach village of Binh Ba on the second day of the battle”. The is incorrect. The troops shown are approaching the hamlet of Duc Trung. The caption for the actual AWM photo is now correct, but no amendment has been made to the Timeline. While the Battle of Binh Ba itself, involved fighting in an urban setting, the photo and incorrect caption give a completely false impression of the significance of the battle. One way of avoiding this confusion, would be for the Timeline to state: ’Approaching the hamlet of Duc Trung, near Binh Ba, on the second day of the Battle’.
Recognition of APCs Involved in the Battles of Coral and Balmoral
The Information Panels for the Battles of Coral and Balmoral make no mention of the defensive fire support provided by the APCs of A Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment. The impression is given that infantry defending both FSBs were “aided by air support, tanks and artillery fire”.
The audio-visual narrative states that, for the second attack on Coral, the infantry were aided by “artillery and air support”. Of course, the defence was boosted considerably by the firepower of the APCs. This was especially important in the absence of tanks at that time. (The AV narrative has been corrected to acknowledge the firepower of the APC Troop present during the defence of FSB Balmoral.)
Three regiments were awarded the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’: 1st Armoured Regiment, the Royal Australian Regiment and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. The involvement of only the first two Regiments, however, is acknowledged by the present wording of the Information Panels in the Vietnam Gallery.
It would be greatly appreciated if amendment to the Information Panels could be considered. Confirmation of the importance of APCs in these Battles can be provided by the Military History Section.
PS. What a day yesterday was. It started with me nearly being kicked off the bus to Sydney. My name couldn’t be found on the passenger list. After much tearing of hair, it was found that my name had been recorded as ‘Cameron Bruce’ and they were only looking under surnames starting with ‘B’.
————————————————————————————————-
2 October 2018.
The RAAC Corporation Ltd. (ACN 156 250 958)
Following on from my Post on 30 September … which stated:
The RAAC Corporation Ltd is a public not for profit company limited by guarantee. It was registered in 2012. I believe that such companies are required to submit annual financial statements, however, ASIC records only list three documents being lodged … the last in 2014 and none of them a financial statement. If this is a shortcoming, is it the fault of ASIC or the RAAC Corporation?
I now understand that a company such as the RAAC Corporation Ltd does not have to lodge a current financial report, or even have financial governance audited. Furthermore, such companies don’t have to prepare a Directors’ Report or even notify members of annual reports.
The governance regulations for the company arrangement RAAC Corporation has entered into, would seem to be much less burdensome than those for an Incorporated Association, such as the 1AR Assn.
In this respect, if the 1AR Assn was to receive a $10,000 grant from DVA, the manner in which it was spent would have to be set out in the Assn’s annual financial statement provided to the regulator (which is available to all members). Not so for the RAAC Corporation … no financial statement to either the Regulator or members.
The difference would explain why, prior to the last AGM of the 1AR Assn, those involved in the Corporation were authoritatively quoting elements of the Corporations Act, as if was applicable to an Incorporated Association (which is not the case).
One imagines that DVA are responsible for accounting for the expenditure of its grant in terms of taxpayer accountability.
NOTE: No Blog tomorrow … short hospital visit (but long trip to Sydney).
———————————————————————————————————————–
1 October 2018
AWM Functions.
Email to AWM:
“Dear ….
Many thanks for your reply regarding my suggestions to the Memorial Redevelopment Team. I appreciate your time and the detail you have provided. Congratulations to the AWM for its commendable initiatives regarding indigenous Australians and those wounded while on active service.
Based on what you’ve said, however, there are two matters that I’d like you to ask the Memorial to consider.
Firstly, “The Council adheres to Charles Bean’s vision and concept of the Australian War Memorial honouring the service of the men and women of Australia’s military forces deployed on operations overseas on behalf of the nation”.
I’ve done a search of references regarding Charles Bean’s vision and concept for the AWM and I can’t find anything that refers to only honouring those “deployed on operationsoverseas”. It is my understanding that he envisaged the Memorial as a place to honour soldiers (and nurses) of the 1st AIF. This vision has evolved with time, but I can find no reference to the Memorial’s commemorative function being limited to those who served overseas. Indeed, I understand that the actions of those service personnel who helped defend Sydney and Darwin against Japanese attack during the Second World War are commemorated by the AWM.
Could you confirm that the AWM Council is of the view that the AWM is restricted to honouring service personnel who were deployed overseas and does not have a requirement to honour equally those who involved in the defence of attacks against Australia itself, i.e. those deployed on our shores at the time.
Secondly, “The Memorial’s charter and mission are to tell the story of the Australian experience of war and peacekeeping as defined by the Australian War Memorial Act, 1980.”
I’ve gone to the 1980 Act and I see that it states that: The functions of the Memorial are [inter alia]: To maintain and develop the national memorial referred to in subsection 6(1) of the Australian War Memorial Act 1962 as a national memorial of Australians who have died:(i) on or as a result of active service; or(ii) as a result of any war or warlike operations in which Australians have been on active”. The 1962 Act contains the same provision.
You said that the AWM has a plaque in the Commemorative area dedicated to those who were wounded and that a temporary exhibition is to be held soon to further acknowledge these returned soldiers. I see from the above, however, that the AWM’s function is to honour not only those who died during the prescribed period of a war (Ie. on active service, as per the Roll of Honour), but also those who died later as a result of wounds received during the war.
I understand that the AWM does not even know the numbers of soldiers who have died from the wounds they received as a result of their active service. Given that this is the case, how can the AWM achieve this aspect of its Function?
Unfortunately, all the information currently provided by the AWM relates to the numbers killed during the prescribed periods of Wars. Would it not be appropriate for the Redevelopment Project to address this ‘other’ aspect of the Memorial’s function? I believe, for a start, that it is essential that the numbers of deaths from wounds after the end of the prescribed period should be highlighted (with the Information Panels being amended as the numbers continue to grow). Would this not focus the attention of visitors to the AWM, ie. to see the numbers of those who have died from wounds experienced in conflicts such as Vietnam, Afghanistan etc, ‘tick over’ before their eyes.
Schoolchildren are currently taught that the cost to their country of a War is the number of killed and wounded at the end of the prescribed period, ie. 521 for Vietnam. Hundreds of Vietnam veterans have died of their wounds after the prescribed period. It is the AWM’s Function to honour them, but the AWM isn’t even aware that their deaths have occurred (and are occurring today). As I said in my original email: “The cost to the nation of its involvement in a war must not be defined by the numbers of those killed at the end of the prescribed period for that conflict”.
Could you please advise how the AWM proposes to achieve, in the long term, its Function of honouring those who have died, not only during, but also as a result of, their active service. I can name many from my Unit who died as a result of their service. Not only are they not on the AWM Honour Roll, but also they are not represented in any permanent context in the AWM (despite the requirement of the AWM Act 1962/1980 to honour them).
Note. I know the difficulty is that of determining whether or not someone died as a result of their wounds or from other causes. If they have been wounded, DVA should be able to advise if death was from wounds received on active service. This is the challenge faced by the administrators of the US Vietnam Wall … they have been able to overcome the difficulties and continue to do so because of the importance to them to honour those who died on behalf of the nation/
Thanks again for your consideration,
———————————————————————————————————————–
30 September 2018
General …
I’ve just finished drafting an outline for an episode of the ‘Australian Story’. It deals with an RAAC matter.
Suffice to say, not a lot of time to focus on other issues. What things that I’m concerned about are at the fore-front of my mind at the moment? The following will be discussed in coming days:
(i) On 6 August, my access to the 1AR Assn Facebook pages was blocked … because I suggested that it would be appropriate (after learning of his retirement in the Army Newspaper) for the RAAC Corporation to contribute to a fitting farewell for the last RSM of the Army, an RAAC member. (We have all sorts of ceremonies when a Chief of Army retires, why not something like an ASLAV to drive the departing RSM-A from AHQ and/or current RSMs from his former RAAC units being brought to AHQ to be part of the send-off.) The 1AR Assn Secretary has not responded to my inquiry as to why my access continues to be blocked.
(ii) The RAAC Corporation Ltd is a public not for profit company limited by guarantee which was registered in 2012. I believe that such companies are required to submit annual financial statements, however, ASIC records only list three documents being lodged … the last in 2014 and none of them a financial statement. If this is a shortcoming, is it the fault of ASIC or the RAAC Corporation?
(iii) .The AWM information panels include incorrect information, even after this being brought to their attention. This can be very misleading for anyone trying to understand the circumstances involved, eg. the Japanese Ha Go tank is said to have had a crew of four (with two men in the turret) … there were, however, only three in the crew. Another example relates to Binh Ba …a photograph taken the next day during the assault on Duc Trang across open ground is said to be the attack on Binh Ba.
(iv) An request under FOI for information denied by the RAAC Corporation, is about to be finalised and I am expecting the withheld material to soon be released.
————————————————————————————————————–
29 September 2018
Value Adding re AWM Exhibits.
Following on from 26 September 2018 … “just to emphasize that feedback given to the AWM can make a difference. The results of a number of suggestions are shown below. Before (B) was as initially stated on the Information Panel, After (A) is as it is now”
i. (B) The Australian casualties at Binh Ba are given as 1 KIA and 8 WIA. (A) The casualties are now referred to as ‘1 KIA and 10 WIA (most from the tank crews)’.
ii. (B) “In 1952, British tanks [at 1st Armd Regt] were replaced with Centurions”. (A) ‘In 1952, the Churchills were replaced by Centurions’. [The point being that both the Churchill and Centurion were British tanks.]
iii. (B) “The full strength of the tank squadron was not “26 tanks”. It was 20 tanks (including two dozers); six tanks were held by the Detachment 1 Forward Delivery Troop (a separate 1ATF unit)”. (A) The information is now correct.
iii. (B) FSVs were “more heavily armed”. (A). ‘FSVs were more heavily armed than the M113A1’.
iv. (B) FSV crews were “seconded from 2 Cavalry Regiment and posted on strength to 3 Cavalry Regiment“. (A) FSV crews were ‘seconded from 2 Cavalry Regiment and posted to 3 Cavalry Regiment’.
v. (B) “The listing of RAEME units that served in Vietnam is inconsistent (for example, 1 Armoured Squadron Workshop is listed under ‘Armoured Units’, but 1 Field Squadron Workshop is listed under ‘RAEME Units’ (not Engineer units). (A) The listing is now consistent.
vi. (B) “Ordnance units also seem to be confused as per the above: 1 Armoured Squadron Workshop Stores Section is listed under ‘Armoured Units’, but 106 Workshop Stores Section is listed under ‘Ordnance Units’.” The listing is now consistent.
vii. (B) “4/19 PWLH Prince of Wales Light Horse”. (A) 4/19 Prince of Wales’s Light Horse.
viii (B) 3 Cav Regt (as distinct to 1 APC Sqn) is described as being in Vietnam from 1966. (A) now ‘…from 1967’.
ix. (B) 2RAR participated in Op PINNAROO. (A) Now ‘… 2RAR/NZ participated’.
x. (B) One exhibit is that of a slouch hat issued to a soldier on enlistment in 1967. The Rising Sun badge on it has the Kings Crown. This would seem surprising, given that it was replaced with the Queen’s Crown badge in 1966. (A). A note is now included to say that ‘This is the first badge issued to … and two other [Rising Sun] badges were subsequently worn’.
xi. (B) The AWM Encyclopedia shows incorrect figures for those who served and those who became casualties. (A) The Encyclopedia figures are now correct.
xii. (B) “The Agent Orange panel refers to the 1985 Evatt Royal Commission finding Agent Orange “not guilty”. It goes on to state that Vietnam Veterans are still seeking compensation. Should the information end here?”. Disappointingly, information about Agent Orange has been removed (too controversial perhaps?)
xiii. (B) The touch panel [in the Vietnam Gallery] is incredibly hard to operate …”. (A). The screen is easy to operate.
Note. Other suggestions were made, but I’ve not had the opportunity to check these as yet. I know that some were not incorporated (as is the AWM’s right). This is a ‘work in progress’, however, as leaving some of the ‘mistakes’ gives a completely false impression to anyone interested in understanding what happened, eg. describing a photo of the assault on Duc Trung as being that of the attack on Binh Ba, the day before. (One was across open ground, the other involved close combat in an urban setting.)
I said that I could not find any grant given to the RAAC Corporation and referred to an earlier Post in which I’d stated that: “I had thought that Mr Fenton’s travel costs to attend the AGM were paid for by the Assn, but he tells me that his “traveling expenses were paid by DVA through a grant to The Corporation”. (It was, nevertheless, a tax payer funded trip and one would think that a report to members was the least they could expect.)”.
A new DVA grants listing has now been published: “25 Sep 2018 9:00 AM AEST – Chester Media Release – Funding for National Ex-Service Organisations”.
It turns out that there are a number of different DVA grants and that that awarded to the RAAC Corporation comes within the category of ‘National Ex-Service Organisations’. The Corporation has again been successful with $10,0000 being awarded “to assist with travel to conduct representational activities” (the same as that awarded to the RAR Association).
Interestingly, the grant to the RAAC Corporation was included with those for electorates in Queensland. A check with ASIC revealed that the RAAC Corporation’s registered office is located in Brisbane (Petrie Terrace) … see below:
Name: THE RAAC CORPORATION LIMITED
ACN: 156 250 958
Registration Date: 14/03/2012
Next Review Date: 14/03/2019
Status: Registered
Type: Australian Public Company, Limited By Guarantee
Locality of Registered Office: PETRIE TERRACE QLD 4000
Regulator: Australian Securities & Investments Commission
Why Petrie Terrace? It turns out that ASIC require all companies to nominate a contact address for notices to the sent to them. Captain Adele Catts is the Museum Manager for the Army Museum, South Queensland. The Museum is located at Victoria Barracks, Petrie Terrace, Brisbane. This is the Registered Address of the RAAC Corporation Ltd (c/- Capt Catts). One would have expected that the Secretary would be the nominated contact for ASIC, but maybe there are advantages in being a public company with a registered address in Queensland.
The RAAC Corporation and RAR Corporation are both classed as ex-service organisations for the purpose of the grants. While this is the case with the RAR Corporation (ie. it represents only the unit associations), the RAAC Corporation has a dual role: “The RAAC Corporation Ltd was created to provide a greater and more co-ordinated voice for all RAAC units on the ORBAT together with their respective Regimental Associations”.
Interesting that the RAAC Corporation is the voice for all RAAC units on the ORBAT, all well as RAAC associations. I had always thought that the Head of Corps was the voice of RAAC Units on the ORBAT. Obviously there was seen to be a need for greater and more co-ordinated representation than provided by the HOC.
———————————————————————————————————————-
27 September 2018
Their Name Liveth for Evermore
Nearly every day I have cause to pass by the Stone of Remembrance at the AWM. For some reason, today I wondered why the inscription states ‘Their Name Liveth for Evermore’ and not ‘Their Names Liveth for Evermore’. The latter would seem to be more correct grammatically and also more correct in terms of referring to all the names of the fallen.
I was dimly aware that Rudyard Kipling had recommended the inscription, as he had also recommended ‘Known Unto God’ for the headstones of unidentified soldiers buried on the battlefield.. The Internet informed me that the inscription comes from “Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore”, which, in turn, is from Ecclesiasticus (King James version of the Bible).
So … ‘their bodies’, but ‘their name’. One would think that there would have to be a reason, otherwise it would be ‘their bodies’ and ‘their names’. Is it because everyone is known unto God by one name (or am I thinking of ‘One Nation unto God’).
Given that this is a scholarly (rather than religious) question, I asked if any of those I knew had an insight into this. The responses I received included:
“Probably a more personal message, your loved one will be remembered, not as a mass of people but him or her”.
“Could refer in the collective sense to those sacrificed.”
While I believe both of these suggestions are correct in their own way. I decided to refer to original text. This is what I discovered:
There are men who have lived a full life and reached their potential. They married and “left a name behind them” when they died. This ‘name’ was not only the family name, but also the basket of achievements that they had accomplished, thereby building a reputation. Through their descendants, “their praises might be reported” to future generations.
BUT … there are other men who “have no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them”.
Their name, the one encompassing their life’s achievements (the one that they did not have the opportunity to leave behind as the legacy of old men) will live on as if they had never died in their youth. People “will shew forth their praise” in the absence of any descendants to do so. These were not men “renowned for their power” or “rich men furnished with ability”. “But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten”.
Conclusion: “Their Name [that] Liveth for Evermore” refers not only to the name that they received at birth, but also to the achievements, reputation, and place in the world that these men and women could have earned should they have had the opportunity to live a full life.
————————————————————————————————–
26 September 2018
Value Adding re AWM Exhibits.
Just to emphasize that feedback given to the AWM can make a difference. The results of a number of suggestions are shown below. Before (B) was as initially stated on the Information Panel, After (A) is as it is now.
i. (B) “APCS were vulnerable to machine gun fire and grenades” (A) ‘ APCs were vulnerable to mines, rocket propelled grenades and machine gun fire’.(See note)
ii. (B) “Splinter teams travelled on APCs and tanks during operations”. (A) ‘Mini teams travelled on …’.
iii. (B) “The SLR clip was found at …”. (A) ‘The 7.62mm link clip comes from an M60 GPMG …’.
iv. (B) There were no information panels to provide details re either the M113A1 or damaged 20pdr barrel. (A) Information panels are now present.
v. (B) Visitors were not informed about the presence of a Centurion tank outside the AWM, nor the connection between this and the damaged barrel. (A). This information is now provided.
vi. (B) “ … riding on the back of a Centurion tank.” (A) ‘…riding on the back of an ARV.’
vii. (B) No warning was given re the sudden flashing lights and loud noises associated with the start of a helicopter light and sound exhibit. (A). Warning is now provided.
viii. (B) An information panel stated that when the enemy acquired the RPG 7, Centurions and APCs could be penetrated … inferring that the RPG2 could do neither. (A) The panel now states that that the RPG2 was “replaced by the Type 67 (the Soviet RPG 7) rocket launcher”. There is no longer any reference to relative vulnerability of the Centurions and APCs.
ix. (B) Centurions “provided fire support for infantry patrols and protection for Nui Dat”. (A) Centurions ‘proved invaluable in providing greater firepower to support troops involved in close contact with the enemy’.
x. (B). The casualties during Operation Hammersley were 8 KIA and 16 WIA. [There was no mention of the 3KIA and 13 WIA suffered by armour and engineers]. (A). Casualties are stated as ’11 KIA and 59 WIA’. [The WIA figure is thought to be a typo, ie. 59 instead of 29 and the AWM will be informed.]
xi. (B) “520 died”. (A) ‘521 died’. [Now that the number of Australian service personnel who lost their lives serving their country during the prescribed period of the Vietnam War is correct, attention can be renewed in respect to the terminology ‘died’. The 521 lost their lives as result of enemy action, accident, illness, unable to be recovered, ie. ‘missing’, their own hand, and murder. ‘Killed’ is not correct, nor is ‘died’.]
xii. (B) The audio-visual narrative stated that the infantry at Balmoral “were supported by artillery, tanks and air”. (A) The infantry were supported by a “combination of fire from tanks, APCs, artillery and air power”.
xiii. (B) [The RAAF Caribou crew] were injured when hit by ground fire. (A). ‘[The RAAF Caribou crew] received facial cuts from glass fragments … hit in head by the remnants of a bullet’.
Note. It is acknowledged that APCs are also vulnerable to satchel charges, RCLs and snipers, however, my point was that references to “grenades”, has a very different meaning to ‘rocket propelled grenades’.
—————————————————————————————————————-
25 September 2018
Draft of an email to the AWM … pending consultation with 3 Cav guys.
Dear AWM,
Recognition of APCs Involved in the Battles of Coral and Balmoral
When the Vietnam Gallery opened 10 years ago, veterans were asked to provide feedback. This initiative facilitated considerable value-adding being made to the information panels.
One point that was raised, continues to be of concern to veterans, however.
The Information Panels for the Battles of Coral and Balmoral make no mention of the defensive fire support provided by the APCs of A Squadron, 3 Cavalry Regiment. The impression is given that infantry defending both FSBs were “aided by air support, tanks and artillery fire”.
The audio-visual narrative states that, for the second attack on Coral, the infantry were aided by “artillery and air support”. Of course, the defensive fire was boosted considerably by the firepower of the APCs. This was especially important in the absence of tanks at that time. (The AV narrative has been corrected to acknowledge the firepower of the APC Troop present during the defence of FSB Balmoral.)
Three regiments were awarded the Battle Honour ‘Coral-Balmoral’: 1st Armoured Regiment, the Royal Australian Regiment and the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. The involvement of only the first two Regiments, however, is acknowledged by the present wording of the Information Panels in the Vietnam Gallery.
It would be greatly appreciated if amendment to the Information Panels could be considered. Confirmation of the importance of APCs and their crews in these Battles can be provided by the Military History Section.
Many thanks ….
———————————————————————————————————————-
24 September 2018
Part 6: Operational Analysis III
Yesterday’s post referred to ‘drills’ and described an example (from operations in Vietnam) in which the enemy anticipated the drill that would be followed when a suspicious object was seen on a road being used by a tank troop.
Another example from 1ATF in Vietnam was doubly successful for the enemy. APCs moving parallel to a track (so as to avoid mines) came to a point where the jungle limited options for movement. The enemy correctly predicted what the APCs would do. The mine caused horrendous casualties … the vehicle was a write off. ‘Dustoff’ was called.
The helicopter saw a suitable LZ. As it was putting down, an explosion occurred. The enemy had anticipated the place which would be used as an LZ and positioned a mine which would be activated by air turbulence. The helicopter was a write off.
The IRA also capitalised on predictability. During the ‘Troubles’, a train was high-jacked, crew thrown off and driven to a siding where it was left. A month later the same thing happened. By sheer co-incidence, the helicopter pilot flying in the response commander was the same one who had been tasked for the previous incident. Just as he was about to land (in the same place he had landed previously), a sixth sense suddenly warned him and he immediately pulled up and landed elsewhere. A remotely controlled mine was later located in the LZ he had used previously. The IRA had assumed that a different pilot would select the same LZ (hence the reason for the first train high-jacking … to observe where the helicopter would land).
The Army used to use tactical drills for all situations (and it probably still does). Trouble is … a drill means predictability and any army which is predicable is going to suffer casualties.
Despite the experience of three tank squadrons in Vietnam, the last squadron still practised drills time and time again (the aim being to instinctively react in a set way when a particular thing happens*). Never was there mention that these tactics would be predicable to the enemy and would be used to their advantage. If it had been in place, a culture of Operational Analysis would have emphasised: DON’T BE PREDICABLE!!!
I wonder if tank tactics today are predicable? Do defile drills still exist? Is there any awareness of the danger of predictability?
*Sure … it can be important to have a set procedure to follow to avoid confusion, but this must not be so mindless that the enemy can take advantage.
——————————————————————————————————————-
23 September 2018
Part 6: Operational Analysis II
Following on from yesterday …if there had been a culture of OA in Vietnam, a means of dealing with suspicious objects without endangering anyone, would have been identified.
Consider a tank troop moving along a sealed road. The driver of the lead tank sees a suspicious object in the middle of the road to his front. The troop stops. The troop leader could decide to go off road and by-pass the object. But that might be exactly what the enemy wants. An anti-tank mine, which would be much more easily concealed off-road, could be positioned in anticipation of this.
It’s decided to follow the ‘drill’ and the engineer mini-team is sent forward. The sappers reach the partially buried object and begin to prod around it. Next moment there is a massive explosion. Both engineers are casualties. What happened?
The enemy had anticipated two things: the ‘drill’ and the use of bayonets. It was expected that the sappers would be sent forward, so a booby trap was set. When they prodded the near the object with their bayonets, they pierced two sheets of flywire, making a circuit, which detonated the explosive.
If a culture of OA had been in place, metal bayonets would never have been used as prodders. The change to plastic took much longer than it should have. I wonder if bayonets are still used as prodders today?
If a culture of OA had been in place, the troop leader would have had another option. He could have removed the ‘canister’ from a canister round, loaded the case and fired at the suspicious object. The force of the blast would have exposed whatever was there, quite possibly rendering it safe at the same time. (The tank would, in effect, be acting like a gigantic ‘Wheelbarrow’ EOD ‘robot’.)
I wonder what the ‘drill’ is today?
Obviously. it would be great if a drone was able to fly in front of the tanks and clear the route. This will not always be possible, however.
———————————————————————————————————-
22 September 2018
Part 6: Operational Analysis
One of the goals listed in Part 6 (above) is: “A system of Operational Analysis (OA) would be introduced which would ensure that the failure to quickly identify, report, and learn from operational experience which happened in Vietnam, would never be repeated.”
In Vietnam, Centurion tanks carried Canister, APCBC, and HE (smoke also for a short time). HE was only used during training for engaging long range targets (as it was sometimes in Vietnam). However, most operations were in very close country with visibility limited to 100s of metres (often much less). What was the arming distance for a 20pdr HE projectile? The question had never arisen in training It weren’t important … or was it?
At least one occasion occurred in Vietnam in which HE was fired and detonated much closer to the muzzle than the crew commander had expected. A crew commander in a subsequent squadron, wanted to use HE to engage a target 300-400m away. The problem was that he would be firing through a number of jungle vines, saplings etc. At what distance did the 20pdr HE round become armed? If it was detonated above ground by a sapling, would the minimum safety distance for an ‘airburst’ be greater than that for a round impacting a normal target (ie. with the blast being thrown forward)?
If the ‘System’ had failed before tanks were deployed, it was a double failure once they were on operations in close country, and a triple failure if nothing has been learnt from that experience today.
M1A1 Abrams in the RAAC use the M830A1 HEAT instead of an HE round. What is the arming distance? Unclassified sources simply state that the round won’t detonate until it has traveled a “safe distance down range”. This is given as 30m in some places and 11-30m in others. Of course, if Australian crews were to use the round during operations in jungle or urban terrain … they’d know the arming distance, wouldn’t they?
It’s one thing to look at overall systems, it’s another entirely to examine the individual parts in detail. Detailed and timely OA is essential at the unit level … not an undertaking in which reports are gathered, indexed and put on shelves, but something at the heart of everything that happens. What was allowed to happen with respect to tank operations in Vietnam is an indictment on military procedures and the culture that was responsible.
More the follow. (I wonder if anyone will get in touch to advise the arming distance for the M830A1 HEAT round … I would be really pleased if they were to do so.)
PS. Of course, the other part of OA is doing something about the shortcomings identified. if we wanted an explosive round which could be used to engage targets in close country, beyond the effectiveness of canister and MG … it might well be possible to order a batch of ammunition with an increased arming distance.
—————————————————————————————————————
21 September 2018
Parliamentary Briefing: Human Rights in Vietnam II
The Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) briefed parliamentarians at Parliament House on 19 September 2018. A number of MPs spoke at the start. Many, including Bill Shorten, referred to the contribution that the Vietnamese Community had made to Australia in 42 years.
Following on from yesterday …
There were about 80 Vietnamese Australians present, with representatives from nearly every State (including WA). Religious leaders also attended. I was surprised at first, that there were eight ALP MPs present, but only single Liberal and Greens members. I soon realised that this was related to the size of Vietnamese communities within federal electorates. Nevertheless, I was disappointed that the human rights issues and related policy matters did not attract a wider cross section of parliamentarians.
The human rights abuses described as commonplace in Vietnam today, were horrific … moving some to tears. (A separate briefing was given to some MPs in private … I can’t imagine what atrocities were detailed during this.)
China’s Role in Vietnamese Affairs.
I was surprised that:
Chinese naval vessels are preventing Vietnamese fishing boats operating in Vietnamese water;
The Vietnamese ‘cyber security’ (read Internet monitoring) laws recently enacted are an exact copy of China’s legislation;
Chinese oil rigs are operating inside Vietnamese waters; and
The China has recently been granted 99 year leases on three stretches of land along the eastern coast of Vietnam.
Examples of Human Rights Abuses.
These included:
Numerous incidents of human rights protesters dying in custody;
The trial of one environmental protester lasted 15mins, with the verdict taking 40mins to read out (sentenced to 20 years jail)
There is no religious freedom, the Communist Party controls everything, especially any religious activity.
Church land is seized and assets confiscated.
Conclusion. I applaud Bill Shorten who stated that any government to government negotiations between Australia and Vietnam (eg. trade deal) must be predicated on tangible and sustained improvements in human rights. This was exactly what we said when the National President of the RSL proposed an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam. By all means seek closer ties, but do so on the condition of improved human rights, especially for former ARVN soldiers and their families. (This was too much for the RSL and Admiral Doolan scrapped his proposal. Interestingly, the idea probably came from veterans visiting Vietnam and meeting former VC … little did the visitors realise how much such meetings are ‘orchestrated’.)
—————————————————————————————————————–
20 September 2018
Parliamentary Briefing: Human Rights in Vietnam
The Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) briefed parliamentarians at Parliament House yesterday (19 September 2018). A number of MPs spoke at the start. Many, including Bill Shorten, referred to the contribution that the Vietnamese Community had made to Australia in 42 years.
One MP referred to visiting a school in her electorate, where the headmaster took her aside to recount a story.
The school gave all new pupils a copy of the book ‘The Very Hungry Caterpillar’. One of the new student’s parents could speak very little English. Her father worked on a processing line and each lunch hour he asked one of his friends to read him the book.
The father didn’t understand either the words or the story … but over time, he memorised the book. He then ‘read’ it to his daughter every night. One of the reasons the integration of the Vietnamese Community into Australian society had been so successful was the importance they placed on education.
I’ll post an account of the Briefing tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————
19 September 2018
The Missing Centurion Logbooks II
The post copied on yesterday’s Blog was that of 24 April 2016. The posts from the two days before that are copied below. ‘What a web we weave, when first we try to deceive….’. Why bring the integrity of the 1AR Assn into disrepute like this? What was being covered up?
I doubt that that question will ever be answered. The location of the logbooks which should be held at the Tank Museum, however, is up to Mr Cecil.
(I’m attending a briefing at Parliament House this morning about human rights in Vietnam … this post will be late as a consequence.)
——————————————————————————————————–
22 April 2016
The Shame of the Centurion Log Books.
Why is there so much ‘secrecy’ surrounding the whereabouts of the Cent log books?
The log books for the 105 Cents sold by Defence were on-sold to a private collector on a ‘confidential’ basis.
Log books for the Cents at Puckapunyal have mysteriously disappeared.
The 1AR Assn Members’ Forum was shut down as a result of a complaint about the ‘tone’ of a post. The disappearance of the log books from the Tank Museum was being discussed at the time. The complaint was made to the President of the Assn on a ‘confidential’ basis and the identity of the complainant and details of the offending post are ‘secret’.
Someone believed to be the ‘private collector’ has posted messages on the 3 Cav forum under the name ‘Ed Kelly’ inferring that he/she is being victimized.
Why does the private collector who purchased the log books not want to reveal his/her identity?
Could it have something to do with their purchase? It seems that there was nothing illegal associated with this. Of course, one might expect that the log books should remain with their respective tanks, thereby ensuring that their service history is known to those who buy them. (Fortunately, this is happening with the M113A1s being disposed of by Defence.)
Could it be that they don’t want to make themselves available to others who seek information about specific tanks? This could mean responding to numerous requests. The up-side, however, would be to make a positive contribution to the RAAC’s history.
Could it be that they’re writing a book and wish to keep everything ‘under wraps’ during their research?
Could it be that they wish to be selective in who they choose to discuss Cent related matters with? Or is it just a money-making exercise?
It is of course a free world. Not everyone will think it right, however, that part of a nation’s military history can be subject to the whims of a single person.
————————————————————
23 April 2016
Log Books (Still)
The private collector who owns the vast majority of Centurion log books has appeared on the 3 Cav website. He reads this blog, but can’t post a comment here as that would mean that his identity would have to be revealed.
He was a reader of the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum and was aware of the request posted on that Forum for information about the Centurion acquired by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. His position, however, was that this was nobody else’s business (but his own). It seems that he is the person who complained about the ‘tone’ of a post on the Forum at this time. His complaint was made ‘in confidence’ to the President 1AR Assn. Who knows what influence he had/has over the President … as we know the Forum was closed and all reasons were classed as ‘secret’.
My post on the 3 Cav Forum is copied below:
What if all the log books for surviving Spitfire aircraft were in the hands of a private collector? Discovering who flew them, whether or not they were involved in the Battle of Britain, whether they were damaged by enemy fire etc, was only possible at the whim of an anonymous person. If you knew someone who knew someone and you made a very polite request (or offered enough money), ‘he’ might deem you acceptable to receive some of his largesse. Then again, he might not.
What is the attraction for the collector? One would imagine that it’s all to do with absolute power (as he’s said, it’s nobody else’s business). He has made himself the sole authority on a particular subject and can grant ‘audiences’ as he pleases. Being anonymous allows him to set the agenda. If everyone knew who he was and how to contact him, then there would be public conjecture about his motives in agreeing or not agreeing to share his ‘wealth’.
Fortunately this appears to be the only case of the documentary history of an almost complete fleet of military vehicles being vested in a single individual. Of course, it was not what Defence intended. The log books accompanied the AFVs when they were sold, as you would expect. (If you buy a second hand car, it is very comforting to have its log book.) Defence assumed that the person on-selling the tanks would be passing on its log book. One would think the tank would be worth more with its log book, but it’s a free market and he private collector obviously offered sufficient inducement to offset this.
How is Australia’s military history best served? Undoubtedly, having all the log books held by National Archives and accessible to all, would be ideal. Owners of the vehicles could acquire copies and former crews, history researchers, and associations, could read them. The worse possible situation would be for a single anonymous person to own them and ‘lord over’ their content.
————————————————————————————————————————–
18 September 2018
The ‘Missing’ Centurion Log Books
There have been a number of developments since the post copied below.
Firstly, the person who purchased the logbooks for the tanks Tim Vibert bought from the Army, was a former AWM employee, Mike Cecil.
I knew that Mr Cecil had some log books but I didn’t know either how many or for which tanks. The thing is … when he showed me his ‘shelf’ of log books, he asked me not to tell anyone that he had them. (Which I didn’t, prior to he himself making this public. He also asked me not to divulge other matters, and I have not done so.)
If we assume that the info he provided from logbooks quoted in footnotes in my book, were from logbooks that he holds … then he has at least one of the logbooks missing from the Tank Museum (that for ARN169106, which stands in front of the Sgts Mess at SoA).
This was not a tank sold to Mr Vibert, but one of a number retained by Defence and held at Puckapunyal. These logbooks were supposed to be held at the Tank Museum. When Cent ARN 169056 was transferred to the AWM in 2008, Mr Cecil know that the logbook was at (or supposed to be at) the Tank Museum (and it was, or supposedly was). The logbook was apparently transferred to the AWM with the tank (the logbook is certainly at the AWM now.) [Mr Cecil had had a long connection with the Tank Museum while employed by the AWM.]
The Army History Unit conducted an investigation into the missing logbooks, but could find no evidence that they were held by the Tank Museum at the time that the AHU took over responsibility for all such museums.
It appears that Mr Cecil was the person who made a secret complaint to the then President of the 1AR Assn about the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum. This blog was started when the Forum was suddenly closed down and members were lied to about the reasons why. The disappearance of the logbooks from the Tank Museum was being discussed on the Forum at the time of its closure. (Why would the 1AR Assn President do such a thing, ie. initiate an action which disadvantaged members, while informing them that he couldn’t tell anybody why the action was necessary.)
Mr Cecil reads this Blog. The following questions were asked of him in the post on 21 August 2018:
Do you have the logbooks for the above Centurions [ie. those for the Centurions held at Puckapunyal, including the Tank Museum]?
If so, how did you come to acquire them?
If not, do you know who does have them?
No response has been received as yet.
————————————————————————————————
The Nature of the Person with the Cent Log Books, aka Edward Kelly. (24 April 2016)
A post on the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum post around August 2014 asked if anyone had info re the Centurion that the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum had recently purchased. This started a search for the log books to help provide this info. I asked Tim Vibert, the person who bought the Cents disposed of by Defence) what had happened to them. He said “I sold them [the log books] to a private collector as a job lot on a confidential basis”.
Tim was asked if he could pass a message to the collector to tell them about the Museum’s request and ask if info about the tank’s service history could be provided (even on a ‘confidential’ basis). In the absence of any response, it was assumed that the Museum had not received any information to support their exhibit. It was thought disappointing that the owner of the log books would not contribute to Australia’s military history in this way.
This example was recently quoted when speaking to the Defence agency responsible for disposing of M113A1s. It was pointed out it would be desirable not to allow the log books of the M113A1/AS4 fleet to end up in the hands of an anonymous private collector. (It is pleasing to be able to say that Defence are very much aware of the heritage value of the AFV log books.)
The private collector now saw red and posted all sorts of insults about me on the 3 Cav Forum under the name of ‘Edward Kelly’. The Cairns Arty and Tank Museum became aware of this and contacted me recently. It appears that they did receive information about their Centurion in August 2014. The Museum Manager who had initiated the request on the 1AR Assn Forum was unaware of this, only learning of it as a result of the chatter on the 3 Cav Forum. Everyone at the Museum was very busy at the time and unfortunately no-one was advised about the info received. This was an oversight by the Museum, but the story doesn’t end there.
It turns out that the whole affair was the result of the private collector’s own making. In one of his 3 Cav posts he tells Edward Kelly what happened when I emailed Tim Vibert to ask (not “demand”) what had happened to the log books:
“When he started the charade by demanding the name of the person Tim had sold the log books to, we decided to tell him it was confidential (read for that ‘none of your business’). He’s been thrashing about making unfounded accusations and erroneous statements about log books ever since.”
So, it appears that the log books weren’t sold on a ‘confidential basis’ at all; this was a fabrication decided upon to frustrate the search for information about the Cairns Museum’s tank via the 1AR Assn members’ Forum.
What a different outcome it would’ve been if the response had been ‘the owner of the log books wishes to protect his identity, but will pass on information about the service history of ARN 169052 to the Museum’. I hope the private collector derived lots of pleasure seeing me “thrashing about” trying to help in the quest to establish the history of the Cairns Museum’s Centurion.
How do things stand at the moment re the log books? It seems that while the identity of the private collector remains ‘confidential’, he is prepared to assist owners of Centurions with log book info re the tank that they own. There appears to be private network whereby these people are able to communicate with the private collector (as they own a tank they have information to trade). What about anyone else doing historical research? They may or may not be lucky. One has to assume that ‘Ed Kelly’ wants to pick and choose those with whom he shares Australia’s military history.
Of course, we still have the question as to where the log books that disappeared from the Tank Museum ended up and who made a complaint on a ‘confidential’ basis about the tone of a post which resulted in the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum being closed down. The whereabouts of the log books was being discussed at the time and the President has declared the ‘offending’ post to be secret. Possibly the Kelly gang again?
The ultimate irony is that Ned wants me to apologise for not knowing that the private collector had given info about 052 to the Museum in August 2014: “Didn’t notice an apology for getting the ‘refusal to provide the Cairns Museum’ posts wrong for the last what, 20 months?
Why is this a matter of interest? The following two previous Blog posts help explain (see ‘Conclusion’ at the end.)
6 April 2018: What’s Important?
Recently, the 1AR Assn Facebook pages have been full of comments about what the Assn stands for.
Mr Fenton: “Unit Association’s do not have the logistics, money, resources, training or willing members [to look after serving and ex serving members]. Unit Association’s should be able to refer there (sic) members to the RSL”. [Apparently this is what the unit associations agreed at the last RAAC AGM … according to Mr Fenton, the 1AR Assn rep. But members aren’t provided with Minutes, so we’ll never know.]
Mr Soutar: “I get a few [members] asking me about gold cards but usually point them to the local RSL!”.
I responded to Mr Soutar to say: I suggest you refer to the register of qualifications of 1AR Assn members in your area as a first step; if there are none that you can refer the person seeking help to … you contact other ESOs such as DFWA and, VVAA,, as well as the RSL. Some people will be more qualified to help than others. The important thing is to follow the process through, so that the person who approached you for help doesn’t find himself/herself left in the gutter.(Could it be that not all State Reps have a list qualifications their members have which they are prepared to use for the benefit of the Assn?)
10 April 2018: RAAC Corporation.
In the 6 April post I asked Mr C M Fenton OAM, who is the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation, if he could please explain what was decided at the last RAAC Corporation AGM and what the Corporation has done since then?
He has responded to say:
“It is up to The Association to pass that information down to their membership which I believe was done through the Association’s News Letter.”
Unfortunately, Mr Fenton seems not to have read the Assn’s great newsletters. His belief is mistaken, no report has been provided.
I had thought that Mr Fenton’s travel costs to attend the AGM were paid for by the Assn, but he tells me that his “traveling expenses were paid by DVA through a grant to The Corporation”. It is, nevertheless, a tax payer funded trip and one would think that a report to members was the least they could expect. I explained that it was my contention that his attendance was on behalf of the members of the Assn.
Mr Fenton rejected this as “the ‘Association’ is the member to the Corporation, not the Association’s members”. Furthermore: “I am the link between The Corporation and The Association, not to its members”. I find it had to understand that anyone could disassociate an association from the members that comprise it. However … stranger things have happened.
I summarised the ‘toing and froing’ on the Facebook site:
Here’s a summary: You were paid by DVA to attend the last AGM of the RAAC Corporation (Oct 17). You prepared a report and gave it to the 1AR Assn C’tee. The C’tee decided not to release your report to members of the Assn. I’ve copied an extract from another Assn’s report to its members re the same AGM. I imagine that our Assn feels the same re those separating from 1 Armd Regt [ie. a willingness to assist as much as is possible]?.
It’s hard to acknowledge the excellent work being done by the Corporation if we can’t be told about it. You’ve said that you can’t do anything about this. So I guess that that’s that then.
Conclusion.
As far as I can see there is nothing included in the list of DVA grants for monies given to the RAAC Corporation or for monies given to any organisation to pay for the transport and accommodation of representatives to attend meetings of any ex-service organisation.
This seeming anomaly would be quickly resolved if the Minutes of the RAAC Corporation AGMs and Financial Statements were readily available either on the RAAC Corporation website or by being made available by member associations. (Herein lies another Part 6 goal.)
——————————————————————————————————————–
16 September 2018
Part 6: Berets and Plumes
One of the goals listed in Part 6 (above) is:
“Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense”.
The 1 AR Assn (and hence the RAAC corporation) don’t want to have anything to do with the matter; hence I’m compelled to go it alone. The following email was sent to Corps RSM on 11 September 2018:
“Congratulations on your appointment as Corps RSM
I write about something that you may or may not consider to be important in the wider scheme of things.
Most of those I’ve approached previously, have taken the view that ‘they can afford for it, why should any change be made’.
I submit that it’s not about whether or not a trooper’s salary is so generous that he can be expected to pay, but about the principle involved … is it the right thing to expect them to pay?
I encountered the same disregard of principle when I advocated for the NOK of those who were KIA to be eligible to receive the Army Combat Badge on behalf of their deceased loved one. (The Defence position was that the ACB was a dress embellishment and therefore someone who was KIA was not able to wear it and so it would not be issued … this would save money.) The RSM-A at the time helped me bring this mean-spiritedness and injustice before those who couldn’t just ignore it … the policy was changed and many NOK have since been presented with ACBs in very moving ceremonies.)
The matter that I wish to bring to your attention is that which requires RAAC troopers et al, to pay for berets and plumes.
I recently wrote to the Minister for Defence about the seemingly mean-spirited policy of requiring RAAC personnel to pay for their berets. The response received advised that all members are proved two slouch hats (the official headdress) at public expense, complete with Corps specific embellishments … berets are optional, however, and must be purchased using Uniform Maintenance Allowance (UMA)
It could be argued that berets are not optional for soldiers when they are ordered to wear them. Leaving that aside, RAAC specific embellishments for hats, KFF, include emu plumes. Despite what the Minister stated, these have to be purchased at members’ expense.
I replied pointing out that the Manual governing allowances states that UMA is to maintain uniforms in good condition (not to purchase new items) and that ARES members do not receive UMA.
The Minister for Defence Personnel responded to say that soldiers are required to purchase items which are not compulsory, but are nevertheless ‘required’; and UMA is provided to cover this. It was acknowledged that ARES members do not receive UMA … that was just too bad.
——————————————————————————————————
15 September 2018
Part 6 : Assistance to Members
One of the goals mentioned in Part 6 (above) is:
“The By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.”
It might be thought that this was self-evident as the Purposes of the 1AR Assn, as per the Constitution, include:
“(4) promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependants and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve;
(5) provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.”
Surprisingly, Mr C M Fenton OAM (the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation) stated recently that all members of the Corporation passed a motion at an AGM to state that they did not have the resources to provide welfare support to their members and that those in need of assistance would be passed to organisations such as the RSL that do have the resources.
How does this stand vis a vis the Purposes of the 1AR Assn (above)? It seems to me that the relationship between the RAAC Corporation motion, the Purposes of the 1AR Assn (as per the Constitution) and the intentions of the current C’tee … needs to be clarified. (This is due, in part, because members of the 1AR Assn receive neither a copy of the Minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs, nor any report from Mr Fenton.)
The Blog post below from 18 June 2018, is relevant (posted after the RAAC Corporation motion):
What Would I Like to See Characterise the 1AR Assn?
Question. If candidates for the 1AR Assn C’tee were to be asked to state their ‘platforms’, what would I vote for?
Answer. This is what I would say:
(i) A commitment to Openness and Transparency in all things, eg. Minutes of C’tee Meetings made available to members; and financial statements circulated for consideration prior to AGMs;
(ii) A Program of Work, with priorities, for the coming year… established with the agreement of members;
(iii) Emphasis on Consultation with Members, eg. if an initiative is to be introduced, or changes made to the Constitution, members are asked for their views and input at the earliest possible stage;
(iv) A system of Communications Between C’tee and Members established so that members at any time might ask questions or make suggestions and be assured of receiving responses from the C’tee’;
(v) A system of Communication Between Members established so the members might freely discuss ideas for the betterment of the 1AR Assn and its endeavours;
(vi) A clear Policy Regarding Donations be established so that there is no confusion as to was is, or is not, an acceptable donation to the Assn;
(vii) A Commitment to Help Former or Serving Members who require assistance to manage their personal circumstances (rather than simply referring them to the RSL as agreed by RAAC Corporation members).
(viii) A Continuation of the Good Projects initiated by past C’tees; such as awards to 1 Armd Regt soldiers/students of merit and gift packs to those on operations.
————————————————————————————————————-
14 September 2018
Part 6: By-Laws
Following on from yesterday ….
Ideal World Goal: “The 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.”
The Secretary recently advised members vide the 1 AR Assn Members Only FB page that there were a certain number of members who believed that any decision made by the C’tee had to be approved by the Assn as a whole (or words to the effect).
I can’t access the 1AR Assn Members ‘Only FB page as a result of being banned for calling on the RAAC Corporation to ensure that the last RSM-A was provided with a farewell fitting to a member of the RAAC who had performed in an exemplary manner in that role. (I won’t comment further.)
There are a number of ‘goals’ specified in Part 6 (above) which relate to ‘By-Laws’, the definition of which in the Constitution is:
“By-laws means the By-laws approved by members at a general meeting of the Association”.
So that would seem to take care of that.
However, it seems that the current C’tee might wish to introduce a number of ‘policies’, rather than By-Laws. These policies are ones which do not have to be approved by members.
Why would you do it? Why would a C’tee seek to introduce procedures to deal with a range of important matters without referring such proposals to members?
Why would a C’tee want to circumvent members’ approval?
————————————————————————————————————–
14 September 2018
Part 6: Donations to 1 AR Assn
Part 6 has been added above. This was previously buried below and has been ‘elevated’ to keep it in the forefront of considerations. Posts, starting today, will sometimes refer to these issues.
When I donated monies earned by book and its research to the 1AR Assn (about $10,000), I did so on the basis explained in the Author’s Note at the start of the book, ie. “to assist the Association’s endeavours.”
The Assn’s accountants considered that this “created a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds”. The Assn employed solicitors Gabbedy, Milson, Lee, to advise me that I must not make any further donations because of this. (Interesting there was no record in the last Financial Statement of payment to this legal firm for acting on the Assn’s behalf … I guess they were ‘friends’ of the then C’tee.)
I asked the C’tee if they could please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement?
Management Committee Response: “It is suggested that Mr Cameron take this issue up with the previous President. The current Management Committee is to enter into discussions with potential donors prior to acceptance of any significant donation”.
So … maybe my donation did not create a ‘constructive obligation’. One might think that the C’tee would want to know the criteria for this, before they entered into discussions with any other donor. Maybe the solicitors and accountants had been wrongly advised?
Part of the funding was used to purchased material for the Mick Rainey MM Club, and another part to purchase a TV for the ORs of D Sqn. I thought that was exactly the reason I donated the money. I suggested to the C’tee that funds might also be used to send a deserving member from 1 Armd Regt and another from 1AR Assn to the Centenary Anniversary of the Battle of Cambrai in France. This was a suggestion only, not in any sense, a demand. Of course, this didn’t happen, my donation was returned in full, and I don’t believe anyone attended the Cambrai commemoration.
I wouldn’t mind if the C’tee had the ‘balls’ to say … we don’t like you and won’t accept your donation to help with our endeavours as an Assn. But to seemingly ‘invent’ a quasi-legal/accounting reason and then demand that no further donations be made … is the stuff of ‘disappearing’ tank logbooks and circumventing Defence protocols related to the acceptance of ‘donations’ from commercial firms bidding for a Defence contract.
————————————————————————————————
12 September 2018
If Things Are Not Right … Should we Try to Fix Them?
Some representative associations hold the view is that they are not “lobby organisations”. To lobby, even on behalf their members, is not part of their place in the order of things. Even if the purpose was to overturn a ‘wrong’ which had been done to their members … the response would be that it is not their role to ‘lobby’ in any capacity for any reason. (Interestingly, I don’t regard writing a letter to a MP as lobbying … I think of it as a democratic right.)
It used to the case that soldiers were issued with items of uniforms that they had to wear. RAAC soldiers today have to wear berets and have to have plumes on their slough hats; neither berets nor plumes are issued … soldiers have to purchase them.
I recently wrote to the Minister about the seemingly mean-spirited policy of requiring RAAC personnel to pay for their berets. The response received advised that all members are proved two slouch hats (the official headdress) at public expense, complete with Corps specific embellishments … berets are optional, however, and must be purchased using Uniform Maintenance Allowance (UMA)
It could be argued that berets are not optional for soldiers when they are ordered to wear them. Leaving that aside, RAAC specific embellishments for hats, KFF, include emu plumes. Despite what the Minister stated, these have to be purchased at members’ expense.
I replied pointing out that the Manual governing allowances states that UMA is to maintain uniforms in good condition (not to purchase new items) and that ARES members do not receive UMA.
The next response was that soldiers are required to purchase items which are not compulsory, but are nevertheless ‘required’; and UMA is provided to cover this. It was acknowledged that ARES members do not received UMA … that was just too bad.
It seems that something is not right, and worse still, no-one is prepared to ‘stand up’ in this respect.
With no representative body prepared to address this matter, I’ll write to the Corps RSM and the Reserve Forces Council as the next step.
I’m not holding my breath, but due process has to be followed. (I’m reminded of arguing the case for the Army Combat Badge to be provided to the NOK of those KIA … you get there in the end with a bit of persistence.)
———————————————————————————————————-
11 September 2018
The Well-Being of Members of the RAAC (Former and Present)
Following on from yesterday …
I had a quick and positive response from DVA. Part of which said:
Re Stress Factors: this is important, and Defence/DVA are currently working on improving the Transition Process for discharging members, especially for those 1500 or so personnel who involuntarily leave Defence each year on medical or administrative grounds. Defence has prime leadership in this Transition space.
I was given the email address for the Defence manager with responsibility for this. I emailed him as follows:
Dear ‘Director General’.
DVA has suggested that you might be interested in the factors that I had identified that relate to causes of anxiety in those separating from the Army who served in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps. (See my short paper below: ‘The Stress Experienced by AFV Crews on Active Service’).
I interviewed numerous Vietnam veterans during research for my book ‘Canister! On! FIRE! : Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’. Many of them were still troubled by factors specifically related their duties as crew members in tanks or APCs. This was confirmed when I consulted with veterans today.
One, whom I’d not interviewed previously, explained that he was still troubled by the extent of wounds inflicted on an enemy soldier by his APC armament. This reminded me of my own tank driver who was worried that he had reversed over an Australian infantryman when he saw an arm caught up in one of the tank’s tracks. I added, therefore, “Coming to terms with the nature of the wounds inflicted on the enemy by the enormous firepower of AFVs” to the list included in the paper.
Not all causes of stress that I’ve identified are confined to combat. There are many which relate equally to the training environment. Should AFVs be employed on active service again, however, these same factors are likely to impact on the crews involved and be relevant when they take their discharge.
I believe (as someone without any medical qualifications) that it could well be instructive for the health care of ADF members and former members, if the stress factors related to their employment in combat (and training for combat) were to be identified and made available to those conducting health assessments.
Many thanks for your consideration ….
PS. I had to laugh … DVA also suggested that “this is something that you and/or your ex-Service Associations might like to independently raise with ….”.
Needless to say, I won’t be contacting the 1AR Assn or RAAC Corporation; but have passed on to another ESO who I believe may help co-ordinate matters.
——————————————————————————————————-
10 September 2018
The Role of Representative Service Organisations
The 1 AR Assn C’tee recently advised that:
The purposes of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc (as contained in the approved ‘own rules’ constitution) do not include any obligations for the Association to lobby external organisations on any matter, or to support any other individual who wishes to lobby on particular issues.
One of the Purposes of the 1AR Assn specified in the Assn’s Constitution is to:
“Promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependants and next of kin ….”.
Despite this ‘Purpose’, the 1 AR Assn C’tee deemed that the following matter is of no relevance and they will not support my efforts to raise it for consideration (hence my having to pursue it alone).
Email to DVA:
“My interest relates to the fact that different ADF employments (eg. infantry, tank crew, submariners etc) must give rise to stressors which are unique to the those individual circumstances.
It occurred to me if these factors were known by medical practitioners who were assessing members on their separation from the ADF or treating them afterwards, it could help them to better understand the issues which most affect their mental health. If this was the case, these factors could be assembled into a generic set (eg. confidence in one’s commander), coupled with those specific to particular employments. This could be made easily accessible using the ADF and medical computer systems.
The ‘paper’ below refers to the experiences of members of Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) crews in Vietnam. For consideration as appropriate …”.
I might be losing it (even more than I knew), but surely something aimed at helping with the treatment of the mental health of 1 Armd Regt personnel who are separating from the Service or who have already separated, is directly related to the welfare and well-being of members of the 1 AR Assn, their dependents and NOK?
Obviously not. I’d ask for an explanation of what constitutes “welfare and well-being”, in the eyes of the C’tee, but I think it might be a ‘request too far’.
Interestingly …the RAAC Head of Corps recently called on the “whole RAAC familiy” to come together to assist those members and former members whose well-being required it.
Postscript. I asked the 1 AR Assn C’tee if they would care to take forward a response to the AWM (who have asked for submissions re a forthcoming major redevelopment) about the need top better portray AFV exhibits, not only as just items of technology, but also from the human perspective of those who crewed and operated them.
The response was the same, ie. this has nothing to do with the Purposes of the Assn and we will not support any lobbying in this respect. BUT … doesn’t more accurate portrayal of the service and sacrifice of members of the Assn, contribute to their well-being? Obviously not.
9 September 2018
What a Great Perspective!
The post below is courtesy of the Centurion Tank Appreciation Society. It might be that the only reason it appeared was because of the tank in the background. When I read the in-coming CO’s message, however, I thought it deserved to stand in its own right.
To me, it represents all the things that are good about leadership in the Army and the responsibility that goes with it. I wish Lt Col Mark Baker the very best for his on-going career.
“Hello, I’m Lt Col Mark Baker and today I succeed Lt Col Dave Bickers as the Commanding Officer of 22 Engineer Regiment.
I’d like to welcome back those of you who have been on leave and I’m sure you’re returning re-freshed and ready to take-on the challenges which lie ahead. To those of you who have recently returned from a successful operational deployment in Estonia or excellent training in Canada please enjoy your well-deserved leave, and to those of you currently on exercise in Thetford good luck over the following weeks.
I’d especially like to introduce myself to the wider regimental family; to the wives, husbands, partners and parents of those serving in the Regiment, and to the institutions, organisations and members of the local community; your support and the support we can offer you is a vital element of a healthy regiment.
It’s a great honour to have been selected to serve and lead this regiment as commanding officer. Over the next few years I look forward to being part of a team continuing to deliver and develop close-support engineer excellence, and ensuring the Regiment remains a diverse and inclusive organisation in which you are proud to either serve, support or continue your association.
I look forward to meeting as a many of you as possible in the forthcoming weeks and months.”
———————————————————————————————————-
9 September 2018
Congratulations to the 1AR Assn C’tee.
Part 5 above used to refer to the following:
I was not able to attend the AGM for health reasons. I explained this to those who demanded on-line, that I attend. Immediately following the AWM, a series of photos appeared on the 1AR Past & Present FB page of a placemat with my name on it at various places within the AGM venue, coupled with the question: “Where is he?”. I complained to the new C’tee about the humiliation of a handicapped person. The President responded to say that the Assn would do nothing (including making an apology) with respect to inappropriate behaviour on a FB page outside their control.
I raised the following question for consideration at the recent C’tee Meeting:
Part of the C’tee’s new governance policy (Annex C to C’tee Meeting Minutes) is that:
“Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour.”
Why does this policy not ALSO apply to a facebook page?
To their credit, the C’tee amended the policy to read:
“Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog or a face book page with privacy settings, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, may result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary SubCommittee to examine and report on the behaviour.
I assume that the behaviour described at the top would be considered to be ‘inappropriate’. So it seems that Messrs Souter and Fenton, those behind that post, escape a review by a Disciplinary Sub-Committee (and I miss out on receiving an apology).
Was it not ever thus?
7 September 2018
Policies Involving Ethics, Principles, and Doing the Right Thing :
The Secretary’s Response: Point 6
Background: I asked the Secretary if he could “please explain why you would tell someone [a friend] ‘to go running off’ to me? I consider this offensive”.
Points regarding his response have been considered in Blog posts for 2 to 5 September A final point is considered here.
Another quote from the Secretary’s response to me
I consider that people who either conspire or collude, to create a situation that did not actually exist, to be offensive in the extreme. Perhaps civil litigators would have a better idea of the actions that could be taken against the individuals who were involved in this fabrication of false evidence. It would also be interesting to know what offences may have been committed under the federal Telecommunications Act.
A second reference to ‘colluding’ and ‘litigation’. But …as I haven’t colluded with anyone, why on earth should I be intimidated by references to ‘offences committed’, or ‘civil litigators’? The innuendo here is staggering and can’t accepted without challenging the (implied) allegations … as I have done in the preceding posts.
In his email to me, the Secretary also raised matters in relation to other people … I have no idea about these matters and offer no comment.
Now here we enter into another issue. Although I advised him that I’d respond to his email “point by point”, he has informed me that “The President are of the one opinion [sic] that this matter is closed! “.
Is this ok? Send a member an email alleging all sorts of things in relation to their character, and when told that the member would respond to “point by point”, then state that the matter is CLOSED. Surely everyone has the right of reply?
————————————————————————————————————–
6 September 2018
The Secretary’s Response: Point 5
Background: I asked the Secretary if he could “please explain why you would tell someone [a friend] ‘to go running off’ to me? I consider this offensive”.
Points regarding his response have been considered in Blog posts for 2, 3, 4 and 5 September A further point is considered here.
Part of the response
“In relation to litigation, you should be aware that all emails between various parties, involved in a dispute, are subject to discovery. In general terms, this means that a judge or magistrate may order one or both parties to produce emails that are relevant to a particular matter. In 1995, in the NSW Supreme Court, Justice Sackville ordered Telstra to retrieve all their emails from backup magnetic tapes over a period of approximately five (5) years. It cost Telstra around $20 million to find just three (3) emails in an action launched by British Telecom. Even though many hundreds of thousands of emails had been destroyed by individual users, all the corporate emails were located on servers managed by email providers. The same situation exists today – that is individual users – such as you and me – can delete their emails, but there are a number of copies located on a variety of servers managed by email providers. All of these may be ‘discovered’ under a court order. Why do I need to tell you this? Because if there is any evidence of collusion between individuals on a particular matter, those emails may be located regardless if they have been deleted or not by individual users.”
So, I’m being informed of the above, because the Secretary is concerned that I may have colluded with others “on a particular matter”. I’m not just being ‘informed’, however. There is an inference of intimidation involved which is clear in the way it is stated. But to what end?
My emails can be recovered by the Courts, even if I delete them. So, am I to be intimidated into stopping sending emails? If I was, there would have to be something that I was afraid that could be incriminating if recovered from one of the “variety of servers managed by email providers”.
But I don’t mind if anyone looks at my emails, whether or not they’ve been deleted. I will stand behind them. I’ll also apologise, if in some unintended way, I’ve caused offense to someone. It seems, however, that this not the mantra of the Secretary (which is what this series of posts is all about.)
But, somewhat more interestingly, what might I have been colluding about? What sort of secret agreement might I have been involved in? Is this why the members’ group involved in drafting the new [“my”] Constitution, was mentioned earlier? (See Point 4 yesterday.) Of course not! The whole purpose of redrafting the Constitution was to create a document which met the regulatory requirements … as well as providing natural justice in terms of governance powers and members’ right. The final draft was prepared in conjunction with the President at the time and was the basis of the document subsequently approved by members. Hardly a secret agreement.
5 September 2018
Policies Involving Ethics, Principles, and Doing the Right Thing : The Secretary’s Response: Point 4
Background: I asked the Secretary if he could “please explain why you would tell someone [a friend] ‘to go running off’ to me? I consider this offensive”.
Points regarding his response have been considered in Blog posts for 2, 3 and 4 September A further point is considered here.
As mentioned yesterday (in relation to the “derogatory comment” aspect) … the Secretary included the following in his response:
“From a number of emails that were inadvertently sent to a number of current committee members, it is abundantly clear that there was a distinct pattern of email behaviour between yourself and seven (7) or eight (8) of your supporters in relation to your proposed constitution, as well as derogatory comments about the members of the previous committee (brown shirts, Stalin and not worthy to wear the black beret). It is clear that someone in your email sharing group who is not, or was not, aware of who was on their BCC list.”
To clarify … I sent emails to a number of others about the 1 AR Assn Constitution. Is this an offence? Is my behaviour being brought into question because there was a “distinct pattern” to these? If it is, I plead guilty. I sent emails to others and they responded to me; they sent emails to me and I responded to them. If this distinct pattern of emails is an offence of some sort ,please explain.
The main issue, however, is the imputation that I was responsible for a draft 1AR Assn Constitution which was in some way disadvantageous to the Assn and there were seven or eight others who should also be criticized for supporting me in this respect.
What a load of garbage!! As most members of the 1AR Assn will know, a draft Constitution was advocated by a previous C’tee. This was found to be invalid. A number of members banded to-gether to propose a draft Constitution which would meet regulatory requirements. This was never “my constitution” and those involved were never supporters of “me”. All those involved worked together for the good of the Assn … their draft (with some amendments) has been approved by members.
One might think that the Management C’tee would thank them.
———————————————————————————————————
4 September 2018
Policies Involving Ethics, Principles, and Doing the Right Thing : The Secretary’s Response, Point 3
Background: I asked the Secretary if he could “please explain why you would tell someone [a friend] ‘to go running off’ to me? I consider this offensive”.
Points regarding his response have been considered in Blog posts for 2 and 3 September. A further point is considered here.
The Secretary included the following in his response:
“From a number of emails that were inadvertently sent to a number of current committee members, it is abundantly clear that there was a distinct pattern of email behaviour between yourself and seven (7) or eight (8) of your supporters in relation to your proposed constitution, as well as derogatory comments about the members of the previous committee (brown shirts, Stalin and not worthy to wear the black beret). It is clear that someone in your email sharing group who is not, or was not, aware of who was on their BCC list.”
So, just to get this right … some people emailed others and copies of these emails went to unintended recipients, including current C’tee members. This is not unusual … it happens all the time (says he, somewhat red faced).
Apparently, however, someone (who supposedly I know or whose emails I receive) has made derogatory comments about members of the previous C’tee … calling them “brown shirts, Stalin, ‘not worthy to wear the black beret’.
If this was so, is it alleged that I approved of this? It appears that this is the case (as it is ‘my’ email sharing group) and I totally refute the imputation. You only have to go back some months on the 1 AR Assn FB page, where Mr Soutar attempted to publicly humiliate me with a reference to Hitler (a post that was acceptable in terms of the 1 AR Assn FB Admins).
Supposedly, I have an “email sharing group”. I refute this also. I send emails to many people, including a number of so called ‘groups’. If the Secretary wishes to belittle me in relation to supposed derogatory comments on emails, let him make these comments known, so that they can be seen in context. I will stand by whatever I wrote (or apologize if I’ve made an unintended mistake).
I’ll address the other ‘point’ from the quote above, tomorrow.
————————————————————————————————
3 September 2018
Policies Involving Ethics, Principles, and Doing the Right Thing: The Secretary’s Response, Point 2
Following from yesterday …
In my email to the Secretary, I said: “Surely, you realise that what you say as ‘Mr James’ has to be seen to be the same view you hold as the Secretary, 1AR Assn?”
The Secretary’s response to me stated that:
“If you cannot make a distinction between Russ James the individual and Russ James the Secretary, then you also have a problem.”
Let me see if I can get this right. There are times when you are Secretary of the 1AR Assn and times when you are not. As an example, you might be Secretary when we are in your ‘office’ and not the Secretary at all other times. But this might not be right as you might be filling in a Lotto entry in your ‘Office’. So the delineation is more like, you’re the Secretary when you’re thinking like the Secretary and not the Secretary at all other times.
How would this work for other holders of public office. Take the PM, he could do whatever he likes and say whatever he likes when he’s not in the PM ‘groove’. Of course, this wouldn’t really work, because no-one would know what mode the PM was in and if he wanted to disown something he said, he could just say ‘I wasn’t speaking as the PM, I was just being Scomo (and Scomo, the individual, can’t be held accountable, only Scomo, the PM).
So now Mr James states that I have a problem because I can’t differentiate between the two Mr Jameses … one the Secretary and the other ‘Not the Secretary’. I wrote to the Secretary’s email address and received a response from the ’Not the Secretary’s’ email address …does this say something? Presumably Mr James was in the Secretary groove when he opened the email, but moved to the ‘Not the Secretary’ mode when he answered it. This is the ultimate convenience for public officials … being able to be asked a question in an elected capacity and answer it in a non-elected capacity.
I’m sorry … I could make a distinction the Secretary and the individual, but it isn’t along the lines you have proposed. My distinction would be that anything to do with the 1AR Assn is dealt with as the ‘Secretary’ and anything done in a private capacity ’eg. filling in a Lotto coupon’ is dealt with in a ‘Non-Secretary’ capacity.
It is my belief that any matters related to the 1AR Assn that are dealt with by the person who is the Secretary, are always dealt with by him in that capacity. I sent an email to the Secretary about a 1AR Assn matter and received a response from the ‘Non-Secretary’. I don’t believe I have a problem by raising my concern in this respect
P.S. A note from the Secretary … I’m accused of “escalating” that matter, ie. an issue being dealt with in a ‘Non-Secretary’ capacity, is increased in importance, if it is referred to the Secretary. Although a response from the Secretary was requested, this could not be made because of respective levels of importance (which the Secretary allocates).
————————————————————————————————
2 September 2018
Policies Involving Ethics, Principles, and Doing the Right Thing:
The Secretary’s Response, Point 1
The Secretary of the 1AR Assn emailed a friend about a matter related to the Assn, saying:
“End of Story – Finis – go running off to Bruce so that he can copy some of my response on ArmouredAdvocates”.
When I learnt of this, I emailed the Secretary, asking
Can you please explain why you would tell someone ‘to go running off’ to me? I consider this offensive.
His response to me said, in part, “I do not particularly care what you consider to be offensive”.
Did I read correctly? The Secretary of the Assn is saying that he doesn’t care what a member considers to be offensive; at a time when the C’tee is considering a policy regarding what to do about inappropriate behaviour by members on the Internet.
Surely what is and what isn’t considered offensive is at the heart of any such policy? One would hope that what is considered offensive to ordinary members will be taken into account, as well as what is considered offensive to members of the C’tee.
The C’tee has recently approved provision within the Constitution to deny former members of 1 Armd Regt becoming members of the 1AR Assn, if the C’tee considers them unsuitable. Members have no idea as to what makes them suitable or unsuitable in the eyes of the C’tee. Presumably the C’tee is now to implement a policy based on what is, or is not, offensive in their eyes only.
——————————————————————————————
1 September 2018
Stress Suffered by RAAC AFV Crews.
The 1AR Assn has been asked:
As you know, there is a problem with the health of former service personnel and those taking their discharge today. It seems to me that, in relation to RAAC personnel, there are some unique circumstances which have not been taken into account. Would the RAAC Association support a study being undertaken along the lines proposed below? This is to be discussed at the next C’tee Meeting
Whether or not with the support of the 1AR Assn/RAAC Corporation, I will be developing the draft below. If anyone can contribute, please do.
—————————————————————————–
The Stress Experienced by AFV Crews on Active Service
Purpose.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to some of the factors which may have affected the mental health of Armoured Corps Vietnam veterans, in order to better anticipate the needs of future veterans separating from the Service.
Human Factors in General.
When considering the performance of an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its capability, such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
These factors are taken into account when choosing between two contenders for a particular combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident they feel, eg. whether or not they are likely to suffer anxiety in any of its forms when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that identifying these is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. To complicate matters, man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
Morale.
There are two main determinants of the degree to which AFV crewmen feel ‘comfortable’ in terms of their survivability. Foremost is their confidence in the overall superiority of the system in which they are a part (ie. their commanders at all levels, their battle grouping, and their equipment) … vis a vis the enemy. Following from this, is their confidence regarding the provisions which have been made for their individual protection.
What happens, however, when a loss or reversal in combat is suffered (eg. an AFV is penetrated, causing crew casualties). It is understandable that confidence in the superiority of the overall system is reduced, while provisions for individual survivability are also called into question.
Matters Affecting Confidence in Individual Survivability
All military training is conducted on the basis that it equips service personnel with skills superior to those of the enemy. This means that AFV crewmen are confident in meeting their responsibilities when under fire. They know that their fellow crew members are similarly trained and they will support each other.
When the enemy demonstrates that they possess an equivalent ability, AFV crew have to accept that their vehicle could be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon or severely damaged by an anti-tank mine, leading to a catastrophic ammunition fire. Apart from the obvious anxiety of being wounded or killed at any time, the following matters are some of those which become particularly important:
Being able to exit the AFV quickly if it is ‘knocked out’ or experiences a fire (particularly important for someone like a tank gunner who does not have direct access to the outside);
Knowing that the vehicle fire-fighting system will always operate immediately and effectively;
Being assured of the fire/flash retardant capability of crew combat clothing;
Being kept informed of what is happening beyond the AFV itself and not being forced to imagine the possibilities;
Being able to maintain contact with other crew members and not put in a situation of feeling isolated and alone (as can happen when the inter-communication system fails) and
Knowing that medical support will ensure that all wounded will immediately receive life-saving treatment and evacuation.
Loss of confidence in any of these areas will significantly increase the anxiety and fear that comes with the stress of battle. Should information overload occur in this digital age, the situation will be exasperated.
Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
One definition of PTSD is a particular set of reactions that can develop in people who have been through a traumatic event which threatened their life or safety, or that of others around them. It is generally recognised that it is not only the experience of a single traumatic event which can generate these reactions, other stressful situations (especially if repeated over and over) can have the same effect.
Conclusion.
AFVs, by definition, operate at the forefront of operations against the enemy. Even if a crewman does not directly experience a traumatic event, being enclosed in a vehicle which could be penetrated by an enemy rocket or detonate an anti-tank mine at any time, gives rise to stressful feelings associated with being wounded or killed, being trapped inside an AFV and burnt to death; and/or being abandoned in a disabled vehicle on the battlefield. These thoughts are often made worse by a lack of communication with other crew members, feelings of isolation, and a constant uncertainty about what is happening around him.
There are unique factors which impact on the stress experienced by the crews of AFVs on active service. These must be taken into account when any assessment is made of their mental health.
—————————————————————————————————————————
31 August 2018
Guess what? Just received the following comment: “I have placed responses here before but nothing gets posted? I have time to waste right now so I will try again”. The response: “Don’t bother. Neither my readers nor I are interested in what you do when you want to waste time. Matters related to the betterment of the RAAC are never a waste of time!”.
The RAAC Corporation : Truth and Honesty
To cut a long story short … I made a submission to the Minister for the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard and for the Vietnam Theatre Honour to have the dates corrected.
The Minister’s office got the letter; sent it to Defence; Defence got the letter and sent it to Army; Army got the letter and sent it to 1 Armd Regt; 1 Armd Regt got the letter and asked the RAAC Corporation if they supported the proposal. The RAAC Corporation made a submission in support of mine.
I asked the Corporation if I could see their submission, they said ‘No!”. I submitted an FOI application, as I believed that withholding such material was unjust (what would the situation be if my submission was not approved because of something incorrect in the Corporation’s statement, supposedly ‘in support’?).
On 19 March 2017, it was stated on the 1AR Facebook page on that:
“As we all know Noel Mc Laughlin [Chairman, RAAC Corporation] has done some pretty outstanding work in his submission setting out the grounds for justification of the emblazonment of the Battle Honour Coral-Balmoral on the Regiment’s Standard. It is fine work by a very dedicated man to both our Corps & Regiment“. The following question/response resulted:
Bruce CameronThat’s great Noel. Was the submission any different to mine?
Noel Mc LaughlinI wouldn’t know – not having read anybody else’s including yours.
Meanwhile …the FOI process grinds away. Defence justify their latest refusal to provide a copy of the document, in part, as the basis that:
“Ex-service organisations (ESO) are formally recognised by Army as demonstrated in Chief of Army Directive 19/2014 detailing the relationship between Army and ESOs in providing support for wounded, injured and ill soldiers that are still serving and in the process of transition to the civilian life. Many ESOs maintain an informal arrangement with Army to provide welfare support to unit members, and in some cases, are provided the use of vacant office space in support of their work. Many of the ESOs have similar charters as the third party to this request. ESOs are managed by volunteers. The exposure of one member of one organisation could be expected to generate concern within all organisations that are voluntarily staffed.”
Interestingly, at the most recent RAAC Corporation AGM, a motion was passed that member associations did not have the resources, particularly trained members, to provide support to ‘wounded, injured and ill members (or soldiers)’. It was agreed that in these circumstances, personnel in need of welfare assistance would be passed on to the RSL. (I have argued against this policy.)
Defence also makes the point that the “exposure of one member of one organisation could be expected to generate concern within all organisations that are voluntarily staffed”. Excuse me? We should not do anything which would bring to light wrongdoing, because this could make others think twice about doing the same thing? If there was one single reason for releasing the document, I think that this would have to be it. Covering up wrongdoing can only be expected to lead to further wrongdoing. (Of course, it would be even worse if exposing something done really well was to cause concern amongst others.)
Defence also argues that the “document was submitted directly to a specific Defence member [presumably the 2IC 1 Armd Regt who had asked the RAAC Corporation if they supported my submission to the Minister]… implying that … there is no expectation that it be disclosed publicly”. So, if the Chairman of a company wanting to make a donation to the Liberal Party in return for certain ‘favours’ by government, wrote directly to the PM … this could not be subject to FOI action?? Yet another example of the extent to which Defence is grabbing at straws in its denial with respect to this matter.
Why does the RAAC Corporation refuse to release a submission made to Defence on behalf of those it represents? I am one of those. Why am I prevented from seeing representations made on my behalf? How could it be, that doing this would result in “exposure” of a member of the RAAC Corporation executive and this would create concern among other members [that they might also be ‘exposed’]? What is it, that has to be kept secret?
——————————————————————————————————
31 August 2018
What’s my Relationship with Mr Cecil? Part II
Following on from 28 August 2018 ….
As described, I wasn’t told about ‘Mud & Dust’, but the Acknowledgements in the book thank me for my help, Suffice to say, I was very disappointed at being knowingly misled by Mr Cecil.
Supposedly, I was “helping” with the research and contributing to the accuracy of the material in the book (which I didn’t know anything about) … therefore, any inaccuracies, especially as regards AFVs, are partly my fault.
I looked at the book and, with respect to the AFV aspects, in particular … was astounded! If, as clearly implied in the publication, I had been consulted … I would have given differing advice regarding about 66 AFV matters and 46 matters more generally.
A few examples of the AFV aspects are:
p98. “Centurion bridgelayer cs 98D”. The callsign of the tank bridgelayer was 92D (as is shown on the vehicle in the photo).
p100. An impression is given that the Centurion’s UK radios were incompatible with the APC 46/49 installations, in the same way that they were incompatible with the infantry 25 set. This is not correct. Tanks were able to communicate with the APCs because the more recent 46/49 sets had both and old and new ‘squelsh’ setting, whereas the 25 set did not
p104. It is stated that the tank squadron organization in Vietnam comprised three troops of four tanks. As well as being factually wrong (i.e. the official organization was four sabre troops of four tanks), no mention is made of the three tanks per troop order by the task force commander during 1969-70, nor the five tank troop organization adopted in 1971.
p104. “…in November [1968]…the ARVs…carried the callsigns 8B and 8D”. This is not correct. At that time the callsigns were 38B and 38D. (C Sqn LAD became operational on 1 Nov 68; 8B and 8D were the earlier callsigns of the vehicles with 1 Armd Sqn Wksp.)
p113. “ARN 169104 survived an RPG attack in February…”. This description understates the fact that during the attack, the tank was penetrated by three RPG rounds which wounded all the crew, set the tank on fire and forced it to be abandoned.
p125. It is stated that Centurions could push a path through the thickest jungle. Of course, this is not correct. Had it been so, reaching infantry pinned down in front of enemy bunker systems would have been relatively easy. An appreciation of the enormity of what was achieved by tank crews in attacking enemy positions, requires an understanding that the enemy sited his bunker systems in the areas of jungle which were most inaccessible to tanks. Tactics developed accordingly, including guidance from the air (if available).
p136: “…the last tank of C Sqn…to pass the dias in August 1971″. In fact, it was the only tank to pass the dias.
A few examples of the more general matters;
p13. “R&R : Rest and Recreation”. Rest and Recuperation is the formal meaning of the abbreviation.
p18. “1ATF [had] responsibility for securing an entire province”. As the second task Force Commander stated: ‘1ATF did not, as is often supposed, have responsibility for the security of the populated areas of Phuoc Tuy. That responsibility rested squarely on the shoulders of the Province Chief’.
p29: “The Australian Government declared on 30 March that the Australian force was to be reduced by 650 personnel…”. The declaration was actually for a reduction of 1000 personnel, 650 Army and 350 RAAF/RAN.
p53. “…the enemy quickly rolled over the 1RAR Mortar Platoon area and into 102 Fd Bty’s position.” The wording suggests a total capitulation of the Mortar Platoon. As is well known, the position was restored by the determination of the inf to hold ground and fight on, calling for arty fire support as well as Spintex to be fired over their heads. Suggest more appropriate wording would be : ‘…the enemy managed to penetrate the 1RAR Mortar Platoon area and reached 102 Fd Bty’s position.’
p68. ‘…during Operation Toan Thang II in May 1968’. Operation TOAN THANG II took place during the period 13 June—18 July 1968.
p89. “… causing severe injuries, if not death.” The effects of enemy action on Australian soldiers are correctly referred to as ‘wounds’, not injuries.
p105. “1 Fd Sqn had developed two mine roller systems…”. It was, in fact, 1 Fd Sqn Wksp that designed and developed the mine roller systems.
p170. The reference to “MAT” should be MATT. 1ATF employed Mobile Advisory and Training Teams; whereas the US employed Mobile Advisory Teams, MATs. (See also abbreviations at p13.)
Conclusion:
So, where do we stand? I’ve been misled and lied to, and, as a result, the history of the RAAC and the service and sacrifice of its AFV crews have been misrepresented. In my view, there is nothing worse. I think that this pretty well sums up my feelings. I’m not surprised that the AWM does not hold a copy of ‘Mud & Dust’ on its Reference shelves.
——————————————————————————————————–
30 August 2018
Rules of Engagement Etc.
The following article was posted by Greg Lockhart on John Menadue’s Pearls and Irritations http://johnmenadue.com/greg-lockhart-tearing-down-our-heroes/
My comment is as below.
Hi Greg,
Well done in addressing this matter.
While researching a book I was writing about Vietnam, I cast widely. One of the publications I read contained a very confronting account. It was about a night ambush. A wounded enemy soldier could be heard moaning; the HQ was radioed and the response was; ‘Don’t bring back any prisoners!’. Following these orders, the “entire ambush party stood up and emptied their magazines into the body of the wounded soldier”.
To make matters worse, the Foreword was written by a serving senior Army Officer. He stated that the book upheld the finest traditions of the Australian Army.(I like to think he wrote his introductory piece without reading the book itself.) But, at face value, the actions described (ie. a clear abuse of the Rules Of Engagement,ROE) were condoned at a very high level in the public arena.
What do I do? This was an account of unlawful killing (an offence for which I believed there is no statute of limitations). The telephone book had a number for a Defence Whistle-blower hotline. I rang, but they don’t deal with such things, this was a matter for police. So I wrote to the Minister.
Of course, by now I had started to receive pressure from those in the Unit involved … I was supposedly bent on denigrating their reputation. The names of very senior officers were mentioned. To their credit, once I provided copies of the letters I’d written to the Minister, my motivation was accepted and supported.
The published account was such that the Minister had no option other than to have the incident investigated with a view to laying charges, if substantiated. The outcome was that the author had ’embellished’ what had happened, for the sake of greater impact in his book.
How to achieve something positive from all this? I wrote to the Minister again and asked for assurance that ADF training related to the Geneva Convention and ROE were adequate. His response was that a check had been made and training was considered to be appropriate.
What started out as high-level support for an apparent operational failing, which could have cast a slur on all Australian soldiers who served in Vietnam, was investigated and the reputation of Australian soldiers found to be valid. The training of our soldiers today was also confirmed to be appropriate. If the incident had happened as described, however, I believe that we’d all be culpable if our response was to ignore it and do nothing.
I think the above suggests that some soldiers might give accounts of things which actually happened on operations and some might give accounts of things which didn’t happen, although they believed/said they did. All such accounts, if breaches of ROE, need to be investigated without any bias one way or the other. Only then will the reputation of Australian soldiers be able to be maintained.
So where do you stand? Is ADF training adequate?
In my case, it was. During a tank night ambush in Vietnam two enemy were seen approaching (that is, two pairs of legs were seen through the very ‘ordinary’ starlight scopes provided at the time). Rules of Engagement such that we could not engage unless the enemy were positively identified (taken to mean, carrying weapons) … so what do we do? Count Down … Three, Two, One: Switch On! The order related to the tank searchlights which had been set up prior to the ambush.
I don’t know who got the biggest shock, us, or the largest buck deer anyone could imagine! (The four legs turned out to be attached to one animal, albeit a big one).
——————————————————————————————-
28 August 2018
What’s my Relationship with Mr Cecil?
This question has arisen following the blog posts on 25/26 August 2018.
During most of my writing of the story of Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam, Mr Cecil was helpful (he was an employee of the AWM at the time). I acknowledged this at the start of the book.
Towards the end, however, he became somewhat distant. He explained that he was working on a “secret project that he was even allowed to tell his fellow staff members about”. I accepted this and continued to pass photographs and other material to him that I thought might be useful for the AWM.
Given that he was the Curator of Military Heraldry and Technology, I also passed on to him items like my uncle’s WWII RAF collar stud with hidden compass and a collector’s selection of ‘made safe’ ammunition from WWI and later. I didn’t receive an official receipt. I trusted him to pass them on for the benefit of the AWM. I now know that I should’ve received an AWM ‘receipt’.
It turned out that his secret project was a book being undertaken by him in his AWM role about ‘vehicles’ used in Vietnam. (It was published under the title ‘Mud & Dust’.) The reason for becoming ‘distant’, was I believe, that the Director of the AWM told him not to have anything more to do with me, as I had been advocating persistently for corrections to be made to RAAC related matters in the Vietnam Gallery. Examples of these are:
The narrative states that “Balmoral was occupied by soldiers of 3RAR and a tank squadron”…this should be ‘soldiers of 3RAR and a tank troop’.
It is stated that APCs were vulnerable to machine gun fire and grenades. Presumably the reference to grenades was meant to be RPGs. It would be better to say: ‘APCs offered very little protection against anti-armour weapons such as RPGs.
The caption accompanying a weapon display states that when the enemy acquired the RPG7, Australian tanks and APCs could be penetrated. This infers that the RPG2 could do neither. This is incorrect. The RPG2 could penetrate APCs and Centurion tanks; the latter, anywhere other than the front of the hull and [front of the] turret.
Part II soon.
———————————————————————————————————————————–
27 August 2018
See ‘Part 5’ above (just added).
———————————————————————————————-
26 August 2018
It’s the Detail That’s Important.
Question 1: Why is the following quote and footnote from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’(COF) so important?
“While all of the tanks deployed to Vietnam were supposed to have been fully upgraded, one of the dozers [169079] was not fitted with RMG/IR. With only one dozer in the tank squadron for the Ambrose Contingency Plan, the new Establishment for Vietnam (which included two dozers) might have come as a surprise.”
Footnote: “The logbook for the other dozer, ARN 169106, shows that its modifications were not completed until 5 October 1967″. M.K. Cecil, pc, 24 March 2003. This could explain why the crew commanders, Sergeants Bob Snape and Graeme Millington, were required to remain at Bandiana right up until the last minute to help prepare their vehicles.
Answer: Because it shows that the logbook for the most significant Centurion in terms of 1 Armd Regt’s operational service might not have been lost. Mr Cecil either had it, or had access to it, in 2003. It was supposed to have been held in the Tank Museum; but along with all the other logbooks for Centurions at Puckapunyal … it later ‘disappeared’. We now know that Mr Cecil had referred to it before it supposedly vanished. It’s to be hoped that he will help with the search for it (and the others) … see yesterday’s blog.
Question 2: Why is Centurion ARN 169106 (now located outside the Sgts Mess at SoA) significant?
Answer: It was the first tank from 1 Armd Regt RAAC to fire a main armament round in action; the first tank to detonate an anti-armour mine; and the first tank to be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon. Quotes from COF provide background:
8 March 1968: “Not long after, with the vegetation becoming thicker, [Sergeant Bob] Snape sensed movement close at hand. He immediately traversed and ordered his gunner, Trooper Des Mahar, to fire canister. This was a speculative engagement, designed to pre-empt a possible ambush. While no sign of enemy was revealed, the incident was significant historically: the first tank round had been fired in action by 1st Armoured Regiment, RAAC, since being raised on 7 July 1949.”
22 May 1968: “There was no doubt that the blast was a powerful one. Lance Corporal John Panton, travelling directly behind in 3ZeroDelta, recalls ‘a roadwheel going up into the air well above the dust cloud’. Should the running figure have been a VC, using the commander’s machine gun to engage him, was not an option for McConnell: the ammunition belt for the commander’s .30cal machine gun had been thrown into the air by the blast. He was now wearing it around his neck. Informing those in other vehicles was also impossible, that is, until the radios were retuned.
6 June 1969: “Trooper Peter Chapman, 2ZeroEcho’s operator, was standing on his seat looking out over the top of the turret, when he heard small arms fire raking the side of the tank. He immediately dived into the turret to prepare the guns for ‘action’. That instant, an RPG penetrated the turret directly above him.
[I wonder how many of us even know about the RPG strike, let alone have looked for it when we passed the tank?]
————————————————————————————————-
25 August 2018
The Accusations
Mr Soutar, a member of the 1 AR Assn, has recently posted on a Facebook site that I “triedto destroy Tony Crook’s [The then President of the 1AR Assn] military & civilian careers with accusations of the theft of log books from the museum”; “An investigation was conducted which found him [Crook] not guilty and I don’t have the courage to apologise”; and “I’m a FUCKING IDIOT and no-one is prepared to stands [sic] up to [me] and, hold [me] to account”.
The Facts:
I did NOT accuse Mr Crook of the theft of log books from the Tank Museum. I stated that it had been reported that the log books had gone missing from the Museum while he was a member of the Museum C’tee, but there was no evidence for this (ie. whether or not he was ever a member of the C’tee or if he was, that the logbooks disappeared during that period). The Army History Unit considered that the disappearance of the logbooks was significant and that an investigation should be conducted. As I’d stated, there was no evidence that Mr Crook had been responsible in any way, so it was no surprise that the investigation did not reach any such conclusion. If the investigator had wanted to do so, I could’ve been asked who it was that reported the matter. I wasn’t and it seemed that the investigation was rightly focused on matters related to inventory and record keeping at the time.
We now know that Mr Cecil had, or had access to, one of the missing logbooks in 2003. Mr Cecil was, at that time, an employee of the AWM. He had been appointed to provide advice to the Tank Museum C’tee and so visited Puckapunyal frequently in that capacity. (Interestingly, his wife, a fantastic artist, was commissioned to do the portraits of contemporary RAAC personnel in the Messes and Museum.) This arrangement whereby the AWM advised re the management of the Museum changed when the Army History Unit became responsible for all Army museums. The investigation (above) found that the logbooks were not present when they took over.
The questions, as asked of Mr Cecil on the blog a couple of days ago, are
Do you have the logbooks for the above Centurions [ie. those at Puckapunyal which should be in the Tank Museum]?
If so, how did you come to acquire them?
If not, do you know who does?
Mr Cecil and Mr Crook would have been well acquainted. They may or may not have been friends. When Cent ARN 160056 was transferred to the AWM from Puckapunyal in 2008, Mr Cecil said that the logbook was in the Tank Museum* and arranged for it to be transferred to the AWM..
When the subject of the missing logbooks was raised on the Members’ Forum in 2015, the Forum was quickly shut down. Mr Crook stated that a formal complaint had been made, but he was not at liberty to say who had made it or what it was about.
There is a lot more to the ‘story’ than that referred to above. If Mr Soutar wishes to rake over this point by point, I’m prepared to do so. He should be aware, however, that the matters involved bring no credit to either the 1 AR Assn or a number of individuals.
An associated matter is to be considered at the next 1AR Assn C’tee Meeting …
“1AR Assn policy states that:’Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour.’ Why does this policy not also apply as follows:’Inappropriate behaviour on a private Facebook page, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour?’.”
Defence acted appropriately when the Centurion fleet was disposed of. Logbooks stayed with their vehicle, as with a car when it is sold (this is recognised to increase its value). The logbooks for tanks used as range targets went to Australian Archives (those for tanks which had been used in Vietnam, went to the AWM). Log Books for tanks retained by Defence stayed with the tanks, ie, logbooks for the tanks at Puckapunyal were held by the Museum, logbooks for the Cents at Bandiana went with them. In keeping with this arrangement, the logbooks for tanks sold privately, went to the purchaser of the tanks (these were later bought in a bulk lot by Mr Cecil),
———————————————————————————————
24 August 2018
The Ideal World
(The following post from 19 July 2018 has been updated.)
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have to draw attention to.
This would mean:
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which provided effective rapid and hard hitting firepower.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and have access to an adequate repair pool.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provided good access to training areas and suitable housing and schooling for families.
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour.
No-one on RAAC related or personal social media would use personal insults and derogatory language in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to Defence’s ‘official’ position.
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege.
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense.
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
First Australians who defended their families, their land and their possessions against those who endeavoured to colonise Australia by force, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the First Australians who lost their lives defending their families, land and possessions, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including in school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’.
Attention would be given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
Peter Best would receive just and compassionate treatment from Immigration authorities.
Pending …
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned.
The 1AR Assn would have a valid Constitution approved by members.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise as they consider best.
Those former 1AR members who desired to do so, could use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
Having obtained permission for the above from 1AR, the 1AR Assn would pay to have a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
The objectives of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’).
The 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/distinguished former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/distinguished former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
Crossed off the List:
Minutes of the 1AR AGMs would be published without any defamatory material.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings would be made available to members.
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral are now entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry.
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
The C-B Battlehonour has been emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard have been corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modelled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
The LAND 400 Phase 2 timetable is on track, despite the anticipated delays associated with a change in the Minister for Defence. (This means that the capability gap that would have resulted from a delay in the replacement of the ASLAV, has been avoided.)
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal supported by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
———————————————————————————————-
23 August 2018
Matters to be Considered at the Next 1AR Assn C’tee Meeting.
The Minutes of the 2018 AGM state that:
The Patron. “The patron should not be approached to intervene in matters where there is, or could be, a conflict of interest with their chosen employment”
Could the C’tee please advise what the Patron’s chosen employment is and what sort of matters might pose a conflict of interest.
Sponsorships. The Assn’s income is derived from “membership fees, sponsorships and the sale of items through the Association Q Store.”
Could the C’tee please explain
(i) What the ‘sponsorships’ are that contribute to the Assn’s income?; and
(ii) Do these ‘sponsorships’ meet with the criteria set by the Department of Defence, or is this not considered relevant as the Assn is only subject to Victorian Law (as also stated in the Minutes)?
(iii) Should ‘donations’ not also be included as a source of the Association’s income?
Donations. “… any future donations would be accepted without conditions”.
When I donated monies earned by book and its research to the 1AR Assn, I did so on the basis explained in the Author’s Note at the start of the book:
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours.”
The Assn’s accountants considered that this “created a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds”. The Assn then employed solicitors Gabbedy, Milson, Lee, to advise me that I must not make any further donations because of this. (Interesting there was no record in the last Financial Statement of payment to this legal firm for acting on the Assn’s behalf … I guess they were ‘friends’ of the then C’tee.)
Could the C’tee please explain why a donation made “to assist the Association’s endeavours”, (i) is not considered a donation made ‘without conditions’; and (ii) what wording does a donor have to use to meet this requirement?
—————————————————————-
The above matters are in addition to questions concerning (i) whether the Assn will support a submission for RAAC personnel to wear a silver Army Combat badge to designate their unique role in closing with and engaging the enemy on the battlefield, (ii) confusion surrounding the policy whereby disciplinary action is to be taken against anyone who behaves inappropriately on a personal blog, but this is not to done if they behave in the same way on a personal FB page, and (iii) whether the Assn will support a submission to the AWM as part of the feedback they have requested for their major redevelopment plans … to describe the experiences of AFV crews in battle, rather than just concentrating on technology items for their own sake.
Hi Mike, You say that: “Moreover, not one Australian civilian death is attributable to combat since the end of World War 2.”
It’s interesting re the meaning of ‘attributable to combat’. For the AWM’s Roll of Honour, you are included if you were a member of the ADF who died during the prescribed period of the war. The 521 Australian casualties include those who died, for example, from disease, or in a car accident on R&R. If Cathy Wayne (Australian entertainer killed during a performance for troops in Vietnam) had been an ADF member, her name would be on the RoH. The same would apply to the Australian journalists killed covering the war. (The names of Australian civilians who died serving their country are recorded in the Commemorative Roll in the AWM).
I think you were referring to Australians living in Australia, but even then we have, for example, the Ananda Marga bombing in 1978. It’s a fine line to say that civilian deaths caused by a terrorist bomb are not combat related, but those resulting from Japanese aircraft bombs are.
I faced such a dichotomy today at the AWM. Australians who died defencing their country, their people and their way of life, against Japanese invasion during WWII, are honoured at the AWM. Indigenous Australians’ forebears who did the same in opposing colonising forces, are not. Why? Because the AWM Act refers to commemorating ‘formed units’. This is a stroke of the pen for the Minister to amend the Act. Will we see this done before the AWM’s major redevelopment? I hope so
I received the following response:
Bruce, Thanks for the comment and I hope the Minister acts expeditiously. My reference was wikipedia.
Keeping accurate and complete historical records is one way of recognising sacrifice and paying respect. This applies in all cases including indigenous casualties.
But the point I was trying to make was that Australians today, and it seems experts in particular, do not understand civilian casualties in the way Yemenis, Iraqis, Syrians, Afghans do for experience, or even Vietnamese and Koreans remember. This seriously affects the willingness of experts to prepare for war rather than peace and has inoculated the general population to the risks. Regards, Mike
*Mike Scrafton is a former senior Defence executive, former CEO of a state statutory body, and former chief of staff and ministerial adviser to the minister for defence.
———————————————————————————————-
21 August 2018
The Missing Centurion Logbooks.
Some time ago the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum sought information about the history of the Centurion that it had purchased. In the course of trying to find out about this, it was discovered that the logbooks for all the Centurion vehicles at Puckapunyal had gone missing from the Tank Museum.
Not long before, one of the tanks located on the SoA parade ground (ARN 169056) was relocated to the AWM. A request was made for its logbook to accompany it and this was done. Following up the Cairns Museum request, the Tank Museum was asked if it held the logbooks for the other Cents at Puckapunyal (as should have been the case) … the Museum said that it could not find any other logbooks.
While conducting research for the story of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, Mr Mike Cecil showed me a shelf containing Centurion logbooks. There were a lot (I had no idea which tanks they were from). He told me not to tell anyone that he had them. (I understood this was because he didn’t want to have to answer a lot of requests for info about different tanks.)
So, the tank Museum logbooks have gone missing … what could I do openly? I decided to ask the person who had purchased the Centurions that were disposed of by Defence. He said that the logbooks for the tanks he had sold had been bought in a bulk lot by a ‘collector’ on a confidential basis. Someone else advised subsequently that the purchaser was wanting the logbooks for reference in order to write a book.
Interestingly, the 1 AR Assn Members’ Forum was closed at this time. The reasons given turned out to be false. One reason was that a formal complaint had been made about one of the topics. Members could not be advised what the topic was or who had made the complaint. The discussion continued on another RAAC Forum. Mr Cecil had been watching the posts and he joined the discussion using an alias; this further confused the issue. (He subsequently acknowledged that he was having a bit of fun at our expense.)
This backfired and later he admitted that he was the purchaser of the ‘bulk lot’ of Centurion logbooks. (He was banned from that Forum when his ‘prank’ was uncovered.) Interestingly, as an employee of the AWM, he had much earlier been appointed to assist with the governance of the Tank Museum.
Mr Cecil reads this blog … three questions to him (should he chose to answer):
Do you have the logbooks for the above Centurions?
If so, how did you come to acquire them?
If not, do you know who does?
STOP PRESS!!! While looking something up in my book, I came across the following footnote:
“55. The logbook for the other tank dozer, ARN 169106, shows that its modifications were not completed until 5 October 1967. M. K. Cecil, personal communication, 24 March 2003”. This would indicate that Mr Cecil either had the logbook, or had access to it. The questions remain.
—————————————————————————————————
20 August 2018
The Response; and What I had expected.
An extract from my email to the Secretary”
“Immediately following the AGM, the 1 AR Past & Present FB page posted images which ridiculed me for not attending … a printed place mat with my name was photographed in various places accompanied by the question: ‘Where is he?’ Mr C M Fenton OAM is noted as suggesting that I’d forgotten it was on … ha ha (knowing as he did, that my memory had been adversely affected by my stroke). Mr Soutar stated that one of his friends had also had a stroke (that “almost killed him”) and yet he still attended. The inference was clear and I was further belittled.”
An extract from an email to me from the President in response:
“We will manage our facebook pages within the intent of our new code of conduct until it is voted on, and following but, we will not apologise for the conduct of people even if they are members or not on what they post on the internet outside of our control.”
I had expected that the response that I would receive would be something along the following lines:
Thank you for your email. We have viewed the post you refer to and agree that it is totally inappropriate. We have counselled the Assn members involved and hope that never again will members of our Assn use the Internet to humiliate others (let alone other members)! The post involved is even more reprehensible as it supposedly originates from the venue of the Assn AGM.
It will be interesting to see what the outcome is from the next C’tee meeting to the following question which is to be considered by it:
Part of the C’tee’s new governance policy (Annex C to C’tee Meeting Minutes) is that:
“Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour.”
Why does this policy not also apply as follows:
“Inappropriate behaviour on a private Facebook page, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour. ?
———————————————————————————————-
19 August 2018
Doing the Right Thing
In his address at the 2018 AGM in July, the outgoing 1AR Assn President stated that:
“[During the past year] the C’tee co-operated with a Department of Defence Fraud Control and Investigation Unit investigation. Their investigation has been completed with no further action; and
Members should note that the Assn is subject to Victorian Law and not jurisdiction exercised by the Department of Defence.”
What are members to make of this? It would seem that a defence of jurisdiction has been mounted, ie. regulations set by the Department of Defence are not applicable to the 1 AR Assn. Surely, we are bigger than this? Surely, it’s a matter of doing the right thing, even if it is not legislated that it has to be done?
What is the point in making it known that no matter what Defence regulations say with regard to ethical relationships with commercial entities, this has no relevance to the Assn? As an Assn comprised of former members of the ADF, one might expect that guidance provided by Defence regulations would help inform decisions made by the Assn (rather than being completely discounted).
Background is provided by my Blog post of .9 June 2018:
Creating a Culture of Openness and Transparency or Being Vexatious?
A comment was made in relation to the drafting of the new 1AR Assn Constitution that “Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal”.
One possible follow-on from this was to ensure that the Constitution clearly stated that the C’tee must not use the offices of the Assn for anything other than the Assn’s Purposes as set out in the Constitution
The C’tee’s response was “It is now understood that the findings of the Army Fraud Unit are that there is no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer. Continued reference to ‘illegal acts’ is considered vexatious”
I have not seen the “the Army Fraud Unit findings” and I take offence at the allegation of being vexatious.
I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn and, even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, is clearly in breach of Defence regulations.
Background:
The Assn’s 2016/17 Financial statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd $5,000.00. The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It turned out that there had been at least three other similar payments received by the Assn and passed on to 1 Armd Regt.
Assessment:
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the Unit? Relevant Defence regulations are set out below. It is clear that donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. In this case Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400, a multi-billion dollar AFV acquisition project (which they were awarded).
I recommend that the C’tee consider all aspects of this matter when informing members. In doing so, may I suggest that trying to bring about a culture of openness and transparency is a lot different to being vexatious. An apology would be welcomed.
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Document
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
“If a supplier wishes to provide an individual or a team in Defence with a low value gift, it should be given openly and should not be offered at a time that could raise general concerns about conflict of interest (such as during a tender or a contract negotiation period).”
Defence Instruction Concerning Gifts and Sponsorships
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorship is an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above
All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN).
“Those who have put their life on the line for their mates and their country, and those who have been prepared to do so in the past and those who are prepared to do so today, know only too well that the highest ideal in our society is that of ‘doing the right thing’.”
This above was the part of the Introduction to a Statement to Disciplinary Appeal Hearing, that I made on 9 July 2016. [The appeal was rejected, but the original ‘charge’ was subsequently found to have been unlawful and the disciplinary action reversed.]
On 4 August 2018, the following question was posed in an email to me:
“Having just watched a programme on the Somme, I still cannot understand how, on the sound of a whistle, troops climbed out of their trenches into the face of German machine-gun fire, and almost certain death. Can someone please explain? Could that happen in this day and age?”
I responded as follows:
“I believe that they did it because it was the right thing to do. I also believe that those serving today will do the right thing if needed.”
The above was the post on 18 August 2o16. As things have happened and evolved, I’m forced to review my thoughts at that time. I have no doubt that our soldiers today are every bit as good, in terms of motivation, discipline and bravery, as those who took on the enemy on 18 August 1966.
I am concerned, however, that such a principled view is no longer the core motivation for those who set the agenda and inform the wider community within which we live and interact.
PS. I note that former GG, Major General the HonourableMichael Jeffery, AC, AO (Mil), CVO, MC (8RAR Coy comd at Hammersley) was at the Canberra Ceremony today, together with the current GG. Hopefully they might have had time to discuss extending eligibility for 8RAR’s GCWP Unit Citation with 8RAR’s 2IC at the time, Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross AO MBE (who is aware of the submission that has been made).
Some years ago, I was a member of the 10th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment. Each year the Battalion would conduct a commemorative parachute descent at Arnhem, where 10 Para were dropped during WWII: “Of the 582 men of the battalion who landed on 18 September, 92 were killed, 404 became prisoners of War and 96 were evacuated.”
A friend told me that he had once been caught in a gust of wind [during one of the commemorations] and was blown into a car park … but it was “ok” he said, “I landed on a VW”.
I had no idea about the late Lord Carrington’s part in the events until now (taken from Google) …
Tanks take 18-hour break 11 miles from Arnhem
The burning question of Market Garden though remains Captain Peter Carrington’s and his great Grenadier Guards’ tank break. Eyewitness 82nd Airborne Captain Moffatt T. Burriss recounts the words of General Horrocks, in charge of the tank reinforcements of XXX Corps, promising the collected Allied commanders, poised to take the penultimate Nijmegen bridge. “My tanks will be lined up in full force at the bridge, ready to go, hell-bent for Arnhem. Nothing will stop them.”
Instead, once Burriss and his men had taken the bridge, Horrocks, now with a clear run to Arnhem, ordered his men to take an 18-hour break, by which time Frost’s men at Arnhem Bridge had been defeated, and the battle was lost.
Historians and soldiers have argued, and will continue to argue, over why Horrocks’ depleted Corps of tanks, at least 100, failed to make that final 11-mile cruise to Arnhem on the evening of Wednesday 20th September, 1944.
Not enough ammunition, we are told. Well, one tank that did make the trip on its own through Lent and out the other side was described by its commander Sergeant Robinson pumping “round after round” into a lone German assault gun, then moving further up the road to do the same into Lent church from which unholy fireball a company of SS Panzer Grenadiers were observed to scatter in disarray.
Darkness, making it impossible for anti-tank guns to sight and range, might be the perfect cover for a tank advance and Lloyd Clark reveals in his 2008 book Arnhem, “Jumping the Rhein, 1944 and 1945,” that Horrocks “was a great advocate of the night tank attack.” Even Colonel Frost points out how vulnerable the German soldiers were at night. According to the maestro, “They had one major weakness in that they did not relish fighting by night… then was the time to advance on them, to bypass them, to do what one wanted.”
Not enough infantry is another excuse given for the halting of the tanks, but Horrocks had the crisp 130th Brigade of the 43rd Infantry Division twiddling their thumbs just south of Nijmegen, which he appears to have forgotten about. Not only that, scores of 82nd Airborne paratroopers that had taken the Nijmegen bridge were leaping up onto, and on one occasion even into, British tanks, expecting to accompany them on the 20-minute ride to Arnhem.
Then there was the “boggy terrain” of the lowlands which meant the tanks would have to stick to the mostly elevated dyke roads. No problem, according to German General Heinz Harmel, who insisted later that he had no forces to block the way and the British had made a big mistake staying put. “If they had carried on it, would have been all over for us,” he told the author of “It Never Snows In September: The German View of Market Garden,” former British Army Colonel Robert Kershaw.
Having taken the Nijmegen bridge, Captain Moffatt Burris was the first to arrive at Captain Carrington’s Sherman tank, parked triumphant but motionless by the north ramp. When urged to head north to relieve the British Airborne at Arnhem, Carrington refused to budge, saying his orders were to “stay here and wait for the infantry.”
When I interviewed Moffatt Burriss, he testified: “I cocked my tommy gun, pointed it at his head and said, ‘Get down that blankety-blank road before I blow your blankety-blank head off.” Carrington explained politely that Captain Burriss surely didn’t expect him to obey orders of a foreign officer, but then, Burriss says, Carrington “ducked into his tank and locked the hatch” so, as Burriss recalls, “I couldn’t get at him.”
Over the subsequent hour-and-a-half in-between the Nijmegen bridge and the little town of Lent that evening, a succession of ever higher-ranking American Airborne officers turned up to have a word with Captain Carrington in his tank. “Why aren’t you going?” demanded Capt. Burriss’ CO, Major Cook. Half an hour later 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment’s Colonel Tucker arrived, telling Carrington: “Your boys are hurting up there at Arnhem. You’d better go. It’s only 11 miles.” Just before dark, around 8pm, the top US officer, General Gavin himself, arrived and told Carrington: “If they were my men in Arnhem we would move tanks at night, we would move anything at night to get there.”
Carrington was after all, just following orders. His divisional commander, Major General Allan Adair, who commanded the Guards Armoured Division in which Carrington served as a captain, left only a sketchy memoir of the battle. (Adair spent much of the post-war years as Yeoman of the Guard, ceremonial bodyguard to the monarch. In the 1960s and 1970s, he took up the less ceremonial office of Deputy Grand Master of the United Grand Lodge of Freemasons.)
Tank corps commander General Brian Horrocks, who was ultimately responsible for the 18-hour halt at the crucial point in the battle, is rumored by some, including military publisher Christian Bace, to have left a letter with another military publisher Leo Cooper, only to be opened after he died. According to Leo’s wife, the novelist Jilly Cooper, Horrocks’ letter is a complete mystery. Either it was lost, or it never existed at all.
———————————————————————————————–
16 August 2018
AWM Redevelopment
Following on from 14 August (below):
Interesting innovation at the British Army Museum which suggests that representing the experience of an AFV crewman is not completely out of the question …
“IED Alley is a corridor in the museum which has been artfully designed so as to replicate a village street in Iraq, complete with a few hidden IED spots. IED, of course, means Improvised Explosive Device, that dreaded modern incarnation of the booby trap which, perhaps more than any other weapon, has come to represent the nature of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. I doubt whether the general public is even aware of how profoundly unsettling this small, contrived space in the museum can be to soldiers who have encountered the actual thing in real life – upon stepping into that exhibit a veteran instantly finds himself recognizing the suspicious objects, the blind spots, and the dead ground that in another time and place would mean that something terrible and deadly was lying in wait, very close by. It was not an exhibit I lingered in for very long.”
Seems to me that one way would be vide those headphones used in art galleries. The sound (and possibly visual) sequence could depict the cacophony of noise (engine, tracks, guns, radio, explosions etc) with individuals relating their personal experiences as an overlay.
I’ve suggested to the 1 AR Assn that they give thought to raising the idea with the RAAC Corporation for a submission to the AWM to consider how to better portray the human side of operating AFVs in battle, rather than concentrating on purely technological aspects.
Another quote from the above article: “The cloister-like sterility of a museum can present a one-dimensional depiction of war, but most of the reality of the experience is necessarily lost in the distillation.”
This view is mirrored in another paper:
It has been argued that by presenting weapons as pieces of technology, their original context is made less apparent. In other words, this masks the fact that they were devices used or at least designed to kill people. Raths (2013) described the exhibition of tanks at Germany’s Tank Museum, Munster. Large numbers of fully restored tanks were displayed in neat rows without a trace of their former fates in battle. Textual interpretation was offered only in terms of their technical details. Raths argued that this method of display allowed visitors to forget that the tanks were ‘built by human beings, were filled with human beings and were used against human beings’. He commented that this ‘sterile’ method was a way of masking the horrors of war with technical fascination and this made it difficult for visitors to see these objects from other perspectives.
I won’t repeat all the background from previous Blog posts, just a couple …
The Blog on 8 July 2018 reported “What a difference a single word can make. One of the media reports about the recent Ex Diamond Strike referred to 7 Bde testing its newly procured Abrams tanks. The Australian Army has finally purchased the additional Abrams needed to overcome the capability gap! Fantastic … or too good to be true? Sadly, other media reports did not support this story. They used the phrase “7 Brigade’s newly acquired” tanks. One report nailed it: “the tanks recently relocated to 7 Brigade”.
On 11 February 2018, the Blog stated: “Thirty additional tanks have been identified by Army as being needed to equip three ‘common’ brigades and their meet their repair pool needs. Three ACRs, geographically dispersed, each with a tank squadron, is very different to the ‘model’ that existed when the tanks were purchased, ie. two squadrons co-located as part of a single regiment. It seems that Army’s bid to acquire the tanks needed to equip three ACRs has been put on the backburner. The case has been argued on the Blog before … becoming a proficient tank squadron is a full-time job. You can’t move tanks between brigades depending on their Plan Beersheba state of readiness and expect to achieve ‘instant’ readiness levels.
On 4 October 2017, the Blog made the point that: “Current Abrams fleet numbers (59) were based on a single armoured regiment with two tank squadrons. The ORBAT has changed, however. We now have three ACRs, with a tank squadron each. Even with each squadron restricted to three tank troops, the present fleet is too small to provide for SOA, RTC, and repair pool need (exasperated because of the new geographical spread involved
Sleight of Hand? Another Blog post argued that: “It used to be that a tank squadron comprised four troops, each of four tanks. With cost savings being paramount, there is an argument for having three troops, each of four tanks. Of course, should the need to train commanders to exercise control over sub-units be seen to be important… you could go back to four troops, each of three tanks. There are arguments for and against both groupings. If you’re not watching carefully, however, you could end up with three troops, each of three tanks (a reduction of five tanks per squadron). Lose one tank from a troop and you lose a viable tactical entity; lose one troop from a three troop tank squadron and you lose a viable tactical entity.
The Situation Today: A “full tank squadron” is now deployed with 2/14 QMI ACR (7 Brigade). BUT no additional tanks have been procured. So, what options were adopted? Move tanks between ACRs depending on their degree of readiness under Plan Beersheba, reduce the number of tanks in tank squadrons; or reduce repair pool holdings and extend downtimes?
Smoke and mirrors … but at what cost in terms of training proficiency, readiness capability, and tank crewmen’s lives?
On 12 August I posted my email to the AWM re two matters that I believe should be considered. Below, I set out a separate rationale related to the portrayal of Australian armoured operations ….
I believe that there is an opportunity to provide better understanding as the combat experience of AFV crews. Displaying a tank is one thing, making known what it was like to be a crew member fighting the vehicle during combat … is something else entirely.
There is a fallacy abroad that members of tank crews were protected from enemy fire and, therefore, their experience should not be portrayed as explicitly in closing with and engaging the enemy, as that of infantry. Of course, nothing is further from the truth.
I believe that the Australian armoured experience should be represented not just by AFVs, but also by a well-informed and engaging interpretation of what it was like for AFV crews fighting inside them.
Interestingly, exhibits at the Imperial War Museum (London) have been described in similar terms:
“Much of the Imperial War Museum’s displays are technology-focused, especially in the museum’s Large Exhibits Gallery. Here, guns, tanks and aircraft are displayed clean and undamaged, presenting a sanitised version of war, which emphasises technology rather than the context in which the objects were used, the people who made and used them, and the effects they had on their intended targets. The artefacts’ captions concentrate on their technical details.” https://www.jcms-journal.com/articles/10.5334/jcms.7013/
I have emailed the Tank Museum (Bovington, UK) to ask their advice as to how to portray the experiences of those who crewed tanks in battle. Happy to put forward any ideas anyone might have along these lines.
—————————————————————-
Some quotes to emphasis the extent of the misunderstanding of the vulnerability of AFVs, and therefore, the bravery of their crews, follow. That immediately below was one of many in response to the AWM’s request for feedback re the (then) new Vietnam Gallery:
“The caption accompanying a weapon display states that when the enemy acquired the RPG7, Australian tanks and APCs could be penetrated. This infers that the RPG2 could do neither. This is incorrect. The RPG2 could penetrate APCs and Centurion tanks; the latter, anywhere other than the front of the hull and [front of the] turret.”
I expanded on this in a later letter to the AWM Director (2008):
“Those responsible for the new galleries deserve much credit for all they have achieved. There is one aspect, however, that I would like to mention to you. In writing my book on the history of Australian tank operations in Vietnam, I frequently come across a myth that the Centurion tank was immune to enemy direct fire anti-armour weapons. The impression created by this myth is one of tanks pushing through the jungle, their crews ‘cocooned’ safely within their armour. Of course, the opposite is the case.
The armour thickness of the Centurion was: turret front, 152mm; turret side, 115mm; hull sides, 20-50mm. Enemy weapons were able to penetrate armour as follows: RPG7, 320mm; 75 RCL, 235mm; RPG2, 175mm; 57 RCL, 110mm. The result is that Centurions were vulnerable to all anti-armour direct fire weapons, particularly the RPG7 and 75mm RCL.
A quick check of my draft shows that Centurions were penetrated by RPGs through the front of the turret at least three times (five crew WIA); four times through the side of the turret (six WIA); and once through the side of the hull (three WIA). Of course, the enemy did not have to penetrate the armour to temporarily ‘knock out’ a tank. Inadequate optics and ventilation meant that crews could not ‘close down’ in the jungle. This led to another ten crewmen being WIA as a result of shrapnel.” [Of course, mines were an additional threat which were dealt with separately]
An extract from the Epilogue to my book (which applies even more so to APCs and APC crews):
“An information panel in the Australian War Memorial’s Vietnam Gallery refers to Centurions as ‘being nearly impervious to most enemy weapons’. This creates a false impression. Tank crewmen knew only too well that their vehicles could be penetrated by RPG2s, RPG7s, 57mm RCLs, 75mm RCLs, and even 12.7mm machine guns. Furthermore, because they were compelled to operate with open hatches, they were vulnerable to sniper fire, shrapnel, and satchel charges. Not always being able to travel off-road, tanks were susceptible to mine attack, something that the enemy exploited.
A tank is more than just an armoured vehicle, however. Having closed with the enemy, it is the crew who bring its guns to bear. It is their spirit and determination to achieve fire superiority at the point of battle, despite the risks, that is at the heart of armoured warfare. Rather than being immune to enemy fire, Centurions achieved success through the bravery and boldness of their crews and the shock action which resulted. The RAEME crews and RAE miniteams who accompanied them displayed equal courage in putting themselves in harm’s way on behalf of their Country.
—————————————————————————————————
13 August 2018
Code of Conduct for the Internet : What’s it all Mean?
Re my Blog post on 11 August … will I be disciplined by the Assn? Was it inappropriate behaviour … or was it balanced ‘reporting’?
There are some contradictions in what the C’tee has said. The Secretary has advised (see below) that disciplinary action will be taken as a consequence of inappropriate behaviour on a private blog, but has said nothing about inappropriate behaviour on a private FB page (such as the 1 Armd Regt Past and Present FB page on which I was insulted by Messrs Soutar and Fenton vide photos taken at the last AGM).
Dear Secretary,
I see that part of the C’tee’s new governance policy (Annex C to C’tee Meeting Minutes) is that:
“Inappropriate behaviour on a private blog, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour.”
Why does this policy not also apply as follows:
“Inappropriate behaviour on a private Facebook page, where access rights cannot be controlled or influenced by the association, is likely to result in the appointment of an association Disciplinary Sub-Committee to examine and report on the behaviour. ?
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
The President has stated that the Assn will not apologise for inappropriate behaviour on private FB pages, suggesting that the Assn will not take disciplinary action in such cases either.
Dear President,
The question is not whether the Assn will apologise for the conduct of people even if they are members or not on what they post on the internet outside of our control; but whether the Assn will take disciplinary action as a result of the conduct of people even if they are members or not on what they post on the internet outside of our control.
Could you please confirm that the Assn’s position in terms action to be taken on matters posted on the Internet outside of the Assn’s control.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
Conclusion. I can’t say for sure, as I’ve not had responses from either the Secretary or the President, but it seems that a member of the 1AR Assn can say whatever he/she likes on a private FB page, no matter how inappropriate such behaviour might be; but if the same thing is posted on a private blog, disciplinary action will be taken. Am I becoming paranoid?
PS. The Secretary has advised that the matter will be considered at the next C’tee meeting in two or three weeks time.
Comment: D Simpson has commented to say that: “A private Facebook page is only accessible by those whom have access. A public blog is open to the entire world through the Internet”.
This is not correct. In the same way that the operator of a private FB page can chose to make his posts accessible only to those he/she approves, so too can a private blog operator. A blog and a FB page have exactly the same privacy settings available to those publishing them.
As an add-on to the above, the President has stated that: “We as a committee do not condone any form of intimidation, insults or humiliation being placed on open listing on the internet however 1st Armoured Regiment Association does not manage the internet. The current committee is striving to implement a code of conduct for its managed facebook pages however this is not a personal management directive for members outside this arena.” On the one hand, the policy is do as you wish other than on the 1AR Assn FB pages; on the other. don’t post anything on a private blog which we deem to be inappropriate. Seems to me that you can’t have it both ways.
———————————————————————————————–
12 August 2018
The following email speaks for itself … sent to the AWM renovation team, cc Brendan Nelson.
Letter to the AWM in Response to Feedback Sought for Renovation Plans.
“Here is their spirit, in the heart of the land they loved; and here we guard the record which they themselves made”. C E W Bean
Dear Sir/Madam,
I have two matters which I think are relevant to all the Themes that you have proposed.
The First relates to the casualty figures of conflicts.
The information provided to the public by the AWM is limited to the numbers recorded on the Roll of Honour, i.e. those service personnel who died within the prescribed period of a conflict. There is no on-going recognition of those who die as a direct result of their active service after the end of the prescribed period. The AWM, for example, refers to 521 deaths being attributed to the Vietnam War, but hundreds of others have died as a result of their wounds after 29 April 1975. The impact on the Nation of a conflict cannot be defined only in terms of the period during which service personnel were deployed. The Nation continues to bear the cost until all veterans are deceased. Why not acknowledge this total cost, in terms of not just the official casualty figures, but also the continually growing numbers of wounded living (and dying) amongst us?
The United States Vietnam Wall Memorial does this. Anyone who dies as a result of wounds inflicted by enemy action, has their name added to the Wall, no matter when their death occurs. Those who die as a result of causes attributable to the War, but not enemy related (e.g. illness, vehicle accident etc) are recorded on a Commemorative Roll inside the Wall. Those who are responsible for managing the Memorial, say that checking relevant details is time consuming, however, they are committed to acknowledging the service and sacrifice of each and every casualty. Should the AWM not also be committed this end?
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is now regarded as just as much a consequence of enemy action, as a physical wound. The mental illness often arises well after a conflict has ended. Suicide is a frequent consequence. The death of a service person by such means is as much a direct consequence of conflict as it is for those who are killed in action. But neither they, nor their families, are recognised by the AWM. The AWM website and information records refer only to the official figures. This is the information accessed by the Government when preparing commemorative addresses. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs is responsible to assist those who suffer from the consequences of a conflict in which they served, BUT the AWM is responsible for the safekeeping their spirit. How can the AWM achieve its purpose if it has no idea of the number of casualties beyond the ‘official figures’?
I put it to those who have a role in shaping the AWM’s future, that there are many spirits of those who served Australia in war, that do not lie in the AWM. The AWM cannot, in truth, state that it ‘guards the record that they themselves made’ when it does not know the names of the casualties of Australia’s conflicts … it knows only some. To be a place for ALL veterans and their families, the AWM needs to recognise ALL casualties and embrace them … not just those recorded in official statistics for the prescribed periods.
When schoolchildren refer to the AWM website for their school projects, they should not write that the cost to Australia in terms of, for example, the Vietnam War was 521 killed … they should be able to gain an appreciation of the on-going cost and be conscious of how this affects the society in which they live. The AWM could contribute to this by incorporating figures from DVA in its ‘Fact Sheets’. Of course DVA might not wish to co-operate. May I suggest that it is incumbent on the Guardian of the spirits of Australian service personnel … to accurately represent and commemorate the service and sacrifice made by them ALL on behalf of the Nation.
The Second relates to the service of indigenous Australians in defending their country.
Australian service personnel died on Australian soil while defending their country against the Japanese in 1942. Indigenous Australians died when resisting British troops and others wanting to colonise their land. What is the difference?
The sacrifice of those killed in Darwin and Sydney is commemorated in the AWM; the sacrifice of indigenous Australians is not. But both were trying to protect their families and deny the right of the invader to take their land.
The Charter of the AWM refers to commemorating ‘formed units’. So WWII service personnel killed while defending their country can be recognised, but others cannot. It has to be acknowledged that the place of the AWM is commemorate Australian service personnel on active duty, so the spirits of civilians who died in Darwin and Sydney cannot be guarded by the AWM; but what of indigenous warriors? They were not part of ‘formed units’ as the term is applied today, however, they were in every other sense … soldiers protecting their families, land and possessions against an invader.
As a former serviceman, I cannot begin to imagine the bravery of indigenous warriors opposing the ‘might’ of 18/19th Century military forces. But they did! They stood firm and resisted attacks. To my thinking, these ‘soldiers’ are just as much (if not more so) entitled to have their spirits guarded by the AWM, as is the case with service personnel from the Colonial Wars, Federation, and onwards.
I dream of the day in which I could stand on the steps of the AWM on Anzac Day, alongside an indigenous Australian … both of us, paying respects to our forebears. (The AWM Charter can be amended to allow for this by a simple stroke of the pen by the responsible Minister … if there is a will to do so!)
For those who are tasked with setting the course of the AWM’s future, please give consideration to embracing not only indigenous Australians who have served in ‘formed units’ since Federation, but also those who previously defended our country with all the bravery and sacrifice that we acknowledge in their successors. The example set by the actions of these ‘warriors’ in defending their lands, is something that all Australians can be proud of (the AWM has a role in making this known). It’s to be hoped that such selfless defensive efforts will never be required again.
Many thanks for your consideration, Bruce Cameron
————————————————————————————————-
11 August 2018
There are so many topics to talk about … best to just stick with each in its own time. however.
Minutes 1 AR Assn C’tee Meeting
There are many positive matters to have come out of the first 1AR Assn (2018-19) C’tee Meeting. Congratulations are in order for the most part. Discussion below.
The meeting was held via the Internet. This must be a first and the C’tee has to be complimented on its organisation.
The Assn is wary of reporting illness of members because of privacy and ensuring the accuracy of info. The Assn has both a FB page and website by which to pass info to and between members. This gives it a unique position with respect to the welfare of our comrades. An example … a member is in a car accident, is badly injured in hospital and is allowed to see visitors for a short time each day. Surely, such information can be confirmed and passed on the members (possibly vide the State rep).
All C’tee members were reminded of their responsibility to become familiar with the Act applicable to Associations Incorporated in Victoria. Tremendous! This has been advocated in the past and would have prevented a number of problems if it had been the case before now.
Policies developed by the C’tee for governance of the Assn are not to be made available to members for comment prior to approval, eg. the Code of Conduct for Internet communications was approved by the C’tee alone. Another option would have been for the C’tee to discuss such policies with members before setting them in concrete.
Obtaining approval for the use of Regimental flag on coffins has long been advocated. The C’tee is moving forward on this, however, does not seem to be seeking the approval of 1 Armd Regt in the first instance. The procedure used by the RTR Assn has been advised to previous C’tees, however, does not appear to be considered relevant, eg. hiring the especially made up coffin drape to NOK.
Concern about Categories of Membership able to be approved under the Constitution has been advocated previously. To their credit, the C’tee is acting upon this.
The RAAC Corporation is to be asked to take the lead with submissions for unit awards, eg. Hammersley Citation. The response to this will be interesting as the RAAC Corporation have previously made it very clear that it is unit associations’ responsibility to take the lead in such matters (hence some of the existing problems). The Corporation has previously made it clear that it wants nothing to do with such things … their job being to report to higher levels of Government. If the RAAC Corporation has changed its position, it would be good for this to be made known (given their previous position was made widely knwon.)
Commemorative activities, eg. 50th Anniversary of Binh Ba, are to be anticipated in advance to enable planning. This also something which has been advocated and the C’tee are to be congratulated. Re Binh Ba, liaison with the 1 Armd Regt is to be initiated, but should not liaison with other Assns also be undertaken, eg. RAR, 3 Cav, 161 Recce, 9 Sqn, RAAF.
Assets based on unpaid membership fees to be written off. Another positive action, previously advocated.
It has also previously been advocated that C’tee members should be informed of the existence or otherwise of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance. This has been done and the lack of such insurance to be rectified.
Coral-Balmoral Veterans Reunion Acknowledgement. I had referred to my much earlier proposal that the two members who were instrumental in forming the Assn should have their costs paid to attend the 20th Anniversary dinner* and extended the thought to veterans of Coral-Balmoral (given that the Reunion is billed as the 50th Anniversary of C-B). The C’tee have rejected this on the basis of cost (airfares, accommodation etc). This misses the point. My purpose was to suggest that those veterans who attend should be formally acknowledged with respect to their service and sacrifice. I’m sure that the C’tee can propose a method of doing this (if they think it a worthy idea).
*Re this proposal, although approved as a motion at the prior AGM, I learnt recently that it was never enacted.
Conclusion. Many of the shortcomings which had plagued the Assn in previous years appear to have been, or are in the process of being, addressed. There is more to be done, however, and communication with members is an important part of this. Circulating minutes of C’tee meetings is a positive step.
——————————————————————————————————
10 August 2018
The Good News and the Bad News!
The good news first. The C’tee of the 1AR Assn have copied the Minutes of their first C’tee meeting to members. How good is that? I’ll have to amend the ‘To be Achieved List’ set out on the Blog a week or so ago. The C’tee have also published ‘policies’ for the running of the Assn. These are not the same as By-Laws (in that there is no regulation that they have to be approved by members) … but it seems that members’ approval is to be obtained. If any provide ‘feedback’ via the Members’ Only FB page, … be careful, there could be a ‘sting’ in the tail (see below). Postscript. It seems that Assn policies are not to be circulated to members for feedback/approval … the Minutes of the recent C’tee meeting shows policies (eg. Internet communications) being approved by the C’tee in isolation.
BANNED!!
Email to the Secretary, 1AR Assn (yesterday):
“Thanks for your advice that ‘The feeling of Committee members was that [I was] using the retirement of an illustrious member of the Corps [by saying, ‘Hopefully the RAAC Corporation will mark this occasion appropriately’] to score political points, and this was not considered acceptable’.
As a result of the C’tee’s view, I have been blocked for the 1AR Assn FB pages. (I have no idea what the reference to “political points” refers to.)
May I say in response, I find it difficult to understand how an RAAC RSM-A’s retirement is first advised to everyone vide the Army Newspaper. I would have hoped that prior to the event, the RAAC Corporation would have informed member associations and arranged, either directly or through the RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel, to participate in his farewell. What about the RSMs of the RAAC units in which he had served, being surprise guests at the ‘official’ farewell ceremony. What about an ASLAV to transport him from the front of Russell Offices ‘into retirement’?
This is the equivalent of the Chief of Army we’re talking about. How many resources go into the staging of CAs’ farewells?
BUT, none of this was to be … though I understand that the former RSM-A he will be included with others who have retired after 20 years+ at the next Corps Conference Dinner at the SoA.
Isn’t it within us to do something special for those who have served the Corps in an exemplary manner?
For consideration, and action if appropriate, by anyone who can make a difference.
—————————————————————————————————
9 August 2018
The Hammersley CGWP Unit Citation.
I’ve got all the insults out of the way (or most of them ‘any road’) … now is the time to concentrate on the important matters.
I informed the RAAC Corporation that, should they “wish to work co-operatively, I am happy to do so and await contact”. Silence. One might have thought that after sixteen months of hearing nothing in response to their submission to Defence, that now was the time to try a different approach. That’s not to be the case, apparently.
I have advised the Corporation that “I have developed a plan to pursue the matter and will proceed accordingly … in an open and transparent manner (not to claim credit, but to involve as many stakeholders as possible). I have no desire to claim credit …”.
Interestingly … I copied all my submissions etc to the HoC RAAC (and HoC RAE). I’m now advised by the RAAC Corporation that they have all the material I’ve presented so far. One imagines that the RAAC HoC passes the information from my submissions (there have been four so far) to the RAAC Corporation … whose single submission is sixteen months old. The thing about this is that the RAAC Corporation have decided not to use the ‘new’ material I’d uncovered. Why might this be?
Thirteen months ago, I received advice from the RAAC Corporation requesting that I not make known the new material about this matter that I’d uncovered at the AWM. Their submission three months previously, did not make reference to this … therefore, I should ‘keep quiet’, so as not to cause them to have to revise their submission.
This advice was confronting in the extreme. I had expected the RAAC Corporation to welcome research into the matter, not to ‘bury’ it. It was my expectation that each and every submission raised in relation to the gallantry of RAAC personnel will be judged according to all available evidence. An award granted on the basis of evidence which is not presented in its entirety, is not an award at all. Some people might be able to live with such knowledge … I am not one.
So … the first part of my plan to pursue the matter has been completed and the submission sent forward. In a change to my usual procedure, I will no longer copy this material to either the Blog, or the RAAC HoC. While awaiting the response, I’ll focus on the next step.
Notice how many times I’ve used the ‘I’ word above? As mentioned in a recent blog post, I do not resile from this in any way. If the RAAC Corporation will not work co-operatively and denies me the right to say ‘we’, then so be it.
———————————————————————————————
8 August 2018
Email to the RAAC Corporation
Came across this from June 2017… thought it was interesting re background aspects:
“Re Hammersley … I originally prepared my submission in June 2015. I did so on the basis of it being forwarded from the 1 AR Assn to the RAAC Corporation for further action. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on the 1AR Assn Facebook that: ‘The award for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always …. The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing”. There being no further progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister in February 2017.
As you know, a similar situation existed re my draft submissions concerning the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour and the error with the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1AR Standard. Fed up with a lack of action, I forwarded both proposals to the the Minister on an individual basis (having checked with the `1AR Assn Patron that I wouldn’t be upsetting any considerations in-progress). The Minister approved both requests and 1AR is now emblazoning the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour for the first time. I’ve suggested that the Regiment invite Coral Balmoral veterans to the next Cambrai Parade, if that’s to be the first time the ‘new’ Standard is paraded.
All my endeavours have been posted and made known in an open and transparent manner on my daily blog. I fail to understand, therefore, why the RAAC Corporation didn’t contact me before forwarding a new(?) submission about “the bloody thing” to Defence on 30 March 2017 … knowing that I’d already made a submission to the Minister on 28 February 2017.
Anyway … the Minister responded to my submission on 7 May 2017. He was advised by Defence not to approve the extension of eligibility. Given that Defence had had the RAAC Corporation’s new(?) submission for over a month, it has to be assumed that his decision was made taking into account the new(?) arguments put forward.
So where to now? My original strategy (formulated after speaking to the 1RAR guys who successfully gained approval for the extension of eligibility for the unit citation awarded to 173rd Airborne) was to ascertain the reason for the initial decision to reject approval and then focus all effort on addressing that in an appeal. (I made this known when I first forwarded my submission two years ago.) Following the Minister’s response (which I’d anticipated, having spoken to the 8RAR Assn) I have spent days going through all the relevant files at the AWM. You are aware of this as you mentioned that I’ve found the original 1ATF unit citation proposal forwarded to HQ AFV, for forwarding to the FWMAO, for forwarding the RVN JGS (as per the procedure required at the time). This, together with other research material, proves conclusively that the advice given to the Minister was completely false. I am preparing a follow-up submission with supporting documentation in relation to B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 FD Sqn. I provided an update in this regard to the President of the 1AR Assn last week. His response was that the outcome sounded very hopeful.
I am thinking of presenting my ‘appeal’ submission at a meeting with the Minister. Would the RAAC Corporation like to be represented as a part of the delegation?
Finally, last time we ‘spoke’ … I asked if I could see the ‘supporting’ submission that the RAAC Corporation had provided to Defence after I had lodged my submission to the Minister re the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour (see any similarities with the above?). I was concerned because I didn’t know how it would impact on the Minister’s decision (the Chairman of the Corporation stated that he had not seen my submission despite the fact that it had been provided to him in 2015). How could a ‘supporting’ submission be provided if you haven’t seen the original, I asked. The RAAC Corporation declined to allow me to see their submission, so you weren’t able to answer my question. As a result I submitted an FOI request to Defence. The response was that I couldn’t see the RAAC Corporation’s submission in support of mine because:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with “exempt matter deleted”, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Unsurprisingly, I have sought a review of the FOI decision. I suggested that there will be many more FOI requests from member associations of the RAAC Corporation, once it is known to them that the contents of this document could reasonably be expected to cause them to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation.
Getting back to Hammersely, I guess that the Corporation has its own reasons for again not allowing me to see their submission to Defence. I only hope that the result of the subsequent FOI request is not the same as that re Coral-Balmoral. Please let me know if you wish to be a part of the delegation to see the Minister re the appeal to his decision.
Postscript. The appeal against Defence’s decision to oppose the above FOI request has been challenged. The Information Commissioner recently gave Defence two weeks to respond … more time was needed and this was approved … Defence stated that they would have a response in two days … that time elapsed … Defence now say that a response will be provided by 13 August 2018. (Best not to hold our breath … but this is Defence’s last chance. They were given an opportunity on the basis of ‘fairness’ … no response next week, proceedings will go ahead despite them.)
———————————————————————————————–
7 August 2018
A Crisis of Conscience
When I retired from the Army, I took up a position with the Office of Defence Production (later Australian Defence Industries, ADI).
While in the Army, I was very much aware of having to say “bullets, bullets etc”, because of the shortage of blank ammo (caused, we were told, by a shortage of Defence funding). Imagine how I felt when I learnt that a number of costs, which had nothing to do with production of Army’s ammunition orders and which should have been shared across the factory ‘cost centres’, were being added to the cost of orders to be paid by Defence. I made my feelings known about this unethical ‘accounting’ and later heard back that I was considered to have a ‘crisis of conscience’.
Fast forward to the present. As recounted, I submitted my first submission to the Minister re the Hammersley recognition in February 2017. The RAAC Corporation (despite their previously vehement opposition to any involvement in the matter) decided that they should join in … they made a submission to Defence a month later.
I received a response from the Minister in May 2017 and set about researching the basis for the claims made by Defence to justify their opposition to extending eligibility. I came across a document which shows categorically that the arguments put forward by Defence were false. I referred to this on the Blog
Not long after I was contacted by the RAAC Corporation. They were aware of the material that I had uncovered and asked me not make it known, as that would be detrimental to the submission that they had put forward. (I should also say that the Corporation refused to allow me to see their submission, forcing to lodge an FOI request.)
So, what do I do? My new ‘crisis of conscience’ turned on whether or not I should withhold the ‘facts’ as to what happened. Should I support the RAAC Corporation in pursuing a submission based on information which was incomplete (if not incorrect) or should I prepare a new submission based on the factual AWM evidence that I was aware of?
If this wasn’t enough of a quandary by itself, I was presented with the argument that if I was to proceed, this would destroy any opportunity for any other unit, apart from 8RAR, to ever receive acknowledgement for their role in Operation Hammersley. This message was backed by the inference that the most senior members of the RAAC leadership group endorsed it. Could this be intimidation, I wondered?
Question. No-one was interested in the documents that I had found. How could it be that a submission is to be backed totally, irrespective of evidence found which might suggest that it should be revised?
The other factor was that the RAAC Corporation submission had been with Defence for four months. Three months later, Defence advised the Minister not to approve my submission. Surely, if the ‘secret’ RAAC Corporation submission was to make a difference … that opportunity had come and gone, or so it was that I rationalised the matter.
I decided to present the evidence from the AWM to the Minister to prove that the arguments presented by Defence were false. That was in September 2017. Tomorrow’s blog will address the new ‘strategy’ which is already underway.
———————————————————————————————————-
6 August 2018
The Final Insult.
Without breaking the contact of secrecy imposed on me, I have responded to the insults from ‘official’ sources which describe me as a self-centred person who does everything in order to claim glory and receive public fanfare.
The following additional insult was not subject to ‘Confidentiality’:
“Your claims on Social Media are deliberately calculated to cause irreparable damage, to the RAAC Corporation in general but also in particular the 1st Armoured Regiment and the 1st Armoured Regiment Association”.
The ‘social media’ referred to was, in fact, my blog. I stated that it was “time to start the process [of achieving approval to extend eligibility to the RVN CGWP Unit Citation] over again. Sadly, neither the RAAC Corporation nor the 1 AR Assn has opted to pursue this issue.”
I was referring to the fact that sixteen months after the Corporation wrote to Defence, no (apparent) progress has been made. Should something have been discussed at the RAAC Corporation AGMs, that is a ‘secret’ denied to members of the 1AR Assn. (Mr Fenton, the 1AR Assn Rep, continues to prevent 1AR Assn members seeing the Minutes, or even doing them the courtesy of providing a report). I used the word “pursue” in the context of ‘continue with’.
I had had a response to my second submission to the Minister seven months previously (copied to HoC) and it seemed to me that the time had come to respond to the false arguments continuing to be put forward by Defence. The RAAC Corporation submission was long overdue for a response …if one was ever going to be made. (The Corporation admit to not having any idea as to why they have not received a response after sixteen months.)
Have I attempted to do irreparable damage to the RAAC Corporation, 1 Armd Regt, and the 1 AR Assn? No.
Have I attempted to hold the RAAC Corporation to account? Yes.
Have I attempted to have those RAAC and RAE veterans of Hammersley recognised for their service and sacrifice? Yes.
Have I urged priority for this to be done before those veterans’ ranks dwindle further? Yes.
————————————————————————————————–
5 August 2018
The Claiming of Glory Criticism.
I am not only supposedly an ‘I” person (see yesterday’s blog), but also someone motivated solely by being able to claim glory and receive public fanfare. Please bear in mind that I am not using direct quotes in making such references, given my ‘Contract of Silence’ (see 3 August).
I have no desire to claim credit, let alone ‘glory’ … my first submission with respect to the extension of eligibility of the Hammersley Citation. was sent to 1AR Assn with a draft covering letter from them to the RAAC Corporation. I thought that this was the appropriate course to follow; only after years of inaction and when the Corporation said that they didn’t want anything to do with “the bloody thing”, did I pursue my own advocacy in order to progress the matter.
The same has been the case time and time again. I tried through ‘official’ channels to have the incorrect Vietnam Theatre Honour changed on the Standard … absolutely no support. I (yes ‘I’, no longer will I be PC and say ‘we’) wrote to the Minister and it was changed. The Coral-Balmoral battlehonour is another case in point. I wrote to the Minister to argue the case, because of a complete lack of support elsewhere. Defence asked the view of the RAAC Corporation … they supported it and it was approved. Is this a valiant ‘achievement’ of the RAAC Corporation? Should I lie down and accept that I had no part in the process as the Corporation have demanded … despite them being opposed to the initiative when it was put forward?
Yet another example is that of the name of the 4/19 PWLH ‘Unit’ included as part of the 173rd Airborne Citation. The RAAC Corporation supported the Defence position … this was wrong (ie. it was not the correct title). The 4/19 PWLH Assn and I worked together to have the correct title approved. The RAAC Corporation claimed credit. Another matter. Defence decided not to award the Army Combat Badge to the NOK of those KIA (so as to save money). Who was going to highlight the mean-spiritedness and injustice of this? It took someone outside of the ‘chain of command’ to shame Defence into changing its position.
The 1 AR Assn C’tee have stated that they “do not, and will not support, the efforts of those who work independently, without consultation and who are not prepared to work within the required administrative process.”. So this means that the 1AR Assn would not support any of the above efforts made by someone acting independently, because of the lack of ‘official’ backing. The ‘elephant in the room’ here is not whether someone is acting independently, but why and for what purpose?
I should, at this point, remind readers that my Blog was only started after a shameful abuse of due process by the 1 AR Assn and the RAAC Corporation. At the heart of all this … recent events have indicated that the location of the Centurion log books which disappeared from the Tank Museum is now known. Should this be true, it completely justifies the action taken to uncover their whereabouts (rather than the ‘no-one can find them and best we forget they were ever there’ position advocated by some).
Why does the above mean so much to me? I spent twelve years researching and writing the story of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam. I conducted countless interviews (verbally and by mail/email) with those directly involved. The failings of the official ‘system’ and duty of care uncovered during this time, were mind boggling. I recorded all those that I became aware of and personally briefed the then RAAC HoC and the ADF’s IED Task Force accordingly (so that the same lessons don’t have to be learnt again). I must say that both were very appreciative of the effort made to bring these matters to their attention.
Sadly, it seems that this is the exception, rather than the rule. Most of those who occupy positions of authority take a very different view of anyone who acts out of a sense of moral justice, to secure the best interests of the RAAC and its personnel … especially when they have been approached to work collaboratively and have rejected the idea.
———————————————————————————————–
4 August 2018
‘I, Me and My’ People; as Compared to ‘We, Us and Our People.
‘Management Principles 101’ suggests that we should be careful of those people who always refer themselves in the first person, ‘I’, ‘me’, or ‘my’. Some very senior members of the RAAC community support this idea. Far better is the person who refers to ‘we’, ‘us’ or ‘our’.
So … how to avoid this? Obviously, if someone is in a ‘relationship’, they can refer to ‘we did this’ or ‘our aim is to’. Also, if a member of an Association or Corporation and speaking on their behalf, the same thing applies.
The email I received which referred to me as being one of those in the undesirable ‘I’ category (as compared to the sender who saw himself in a more flattering ‘We’ category) showed that assessing people on such a basis is fraught with difficulty. In his email, which highlighted his own achievements, the author used the terms ‘I, me or my’ twenty times, while ‘we, us’ our’ did not appear at all.
Interestingly, only the day before I received this email, I responded to a post on an RAAC forum, The author said:
“When I became aware that the UCG tribunal [re Coral-Balmoral] were to hold a two day sitting in Brisbane I decided to attend, I’m pleased that I did because I and all the other attendees got to hear 1st hand a female Navy rep for defence state that, “Defence were categorically against the retrospective aspect of the award”… Upon that utterance there were very audible hushed murmurings of disgust from just about all in the room …”.
I responded to say:
“You might be interested … Defence stated exactly the same thing here in Canberra. We investigated as to whether or not they were entitled to stipulate that no restrospective award (of the UCG) could be made. Legal opinion was that the Letters Patent signed by the Queen do not disallow retrospective awards; therefore if Defence wish to make this a criteria, they have to amend the Letters Patent. It was subsequently accepted by Defence, that they have no legal authority to disallow retrospective awards. Despite this, they tried to asset that it was their prerogative to do so (This was seen by all concerned to be an abuse of their duty to appropriately recognise the service and sacrifice of those who have served, and are serving, in the ADF.)”
It occurred to me that Defence might not be legally justified in taking their ‘no retrospective award’ approach. I copied the Letters Patent for UCG; sought the opinion of a lawyer (who confirmed my suspicions); and wrote to the DHAAT (copy to Defence). This action may or may not have had any impact on the outcome. But it is relevant to all future cases, because Defence have acknowledged that they are acting contrary to the Letters Patent (and, wrongly, believe that they entitled to do so).
What’s the point of all the above? I thought that if I was to say “I investigated as to whether or not ….”, that I might fall victim to the RAAC leadership group who regard “I and me” people as glory hunters. I did not want this to detract from the issue …. so I said “We investigated” … meaning me and a fictional ‘buddy’. I hoped that this would mean that I was not seen to be trying to claim any credit for anything. (I would have gladly consulted with the RAAC Corporation in terms of this action, however, there was no representative present.)
Now, however, as a result of recent matters, I find that I’ve had enough of trying to please all the people all the time.
From now on, I’m going to use ‘I, me, or my’ and be proud to do so. Management Principles 101 can take a back seat!
————————————————————————————————–
3 August 2018
‘Contracts’ of Silence
Unfortunately, it’s happened once before. Before insulting you, someone tells you that ’this is not for copying, in whole or part, to anyone else’. It’s been said that “people with heightened concerns about their privacy may use contracts of silence more aggressively”. Seems to me that there is a fundamental flaw in the concept of assuming that you can say whatever you like about another person, while at the same time telling them that it’s “confidential and must go no further”.
If I’m told that something is ‘confidential’ and is not to be shared, then my personal integrity tells me that this is what should happen. But does this caveat extend to personal insults delivered under the same banner? Why would a person be concerned that his or her insults to another might become known to others? One reason I can see is that of intimidation, ie. a person wishes to intimidate another, without anyone else knowing. Another reason might be that the person making the insults is concerned about a backlash from others who hold different views and so wishes to deliver his/her insults on the ‘qt’.
There will be occasions when one wishes to communicate privately with another person. For my part, however, I would never insult someone and expect him/her to regard this as ‘confidential’.
Seems to me that if one person is going to insult another, that this should be something able to be placed on the public record. To expect a person not to divulge insults levied against them, by imposing a rule of confidentiality, is not (to me at least) an ethical thing to do.
————————————————————————————————
2 August 2018
1 AR Assn: Funerals, Awards and Need for Assistance
Email to Secretary, 31 July
“It would be nice if the protocol for deaths, as per past AGM Minutes, was able to be incorporated in the By-Laws when they are drafted. (This comment followed a query regarding expenditure for wreaths in the last financial report.)
Response to me, 31 July:
“Arrangements for funerals for members and non-members is currently under consideration and a policy should be published in the next four to five weeks. We are currently seeking advice from the experts (ceremonial) over the use of palls (1 Armd Regt flag), the Australian flag and the place for all other paraphernalia that may be included on coffins.”
Email to Secretary, 31 July:
“It would be great to see protocols for deaths/awards/need of assistance to be formulated and published in By-Laws. I drafted suggested procedures to be followed when a death or an award becomes known to a member of the Assn (wherever he/she was located) … the C’tee at the time decided that there was no need for any such thing (as was their right).”
Response to me, 1 August:
Mr Cameron, Ultimately there will be many topics and subjects included in the by-Laws. In the meantime, the new Committee will publish a series of policies and/or guidelines – that will be distributed to all members electronically and physically. There are many experts that need to be consulted and we will consult widely. There are many valuable opinions and we will seek these out.
Previous committees did things their way – this committee will do what it will, and it does not need to be reminded of its responsibilities on a daily basis.
Bottom Line: The C’tee is moving ahead quickly on a number of identified areas. This is tremendous, however, communication with members still lags behind. When the Communication Strategy is finalised, it is hoped that the Members’ Forum might be resurrected (thereby also accommodating those who don’t use social media) and members kept up to date and regularly informed of matters being considered and inquiries being made on their behalf … thereby giving them the opportunity to provide input. Please may the communications strategy be a consultative, rather than directive, one. (Hopefully the action mentioned above about the C’tee publishing policies etc, will follow a period of consultation with members.)
Interestingly the Secretary has stated that “The Executive of the Association does not, and will not support, the efforts of those who work independently, without consultation and who are not prepared to work within the required administrative process”. Hopefully the consultation referred to is two-way, ie while members are expected to consult with the C’tee (though not too frequently); the C’tee will also consult with members. I, for one, would not mind how frequently the C’tee wished to consult with me (should they decide do so at all).
—————————————————————————————————
Operation HAMMERSLEY Recognition
Latest News: Mr Rosemond has withdrawn his ‘Open Letter’ from the 1AR Assn FB Page and the 3 Cav Forum, so I ‘ve withdrawn my Open Letter in Response. (I’ll advise, if and when, the RAAC Corporation responds to my offer to work collaboratively.)
I’ll finish on this topic with the following post. Someone asked the following:
“Don’t know where you blokes are going with this but it seems to me that you are all trying to head in the same direction while trying to pull each other down. Not a good idea. Why can’t you work together to accomplish what is an admirable cause for the RAAC and since you are writing on this site for the 3rd cavalry Regiment in particular? We were once brothers in arms and now it seems we are brothers in adversity? For why? All people involved seem to have valid points and valid input. Why not combine all info and input for the submission or is there someone who needs the cu-does to enhance their reputations??I know one that doesn’t need this as he has done enough for those in 3 Cav. United we stand, divided we fall, keep your mates back. Perhaps that’s what we should all be doing instead of all this backbiting crap.”
My response:
My point exactly As you’ll see above, three years ago I drafted a submission. My idea was that the RAAC Corporation might support it and liaise with the RAR Assn and the sappers. The Corporation, however, said they didn’t want to have anything to do with the “bloody thing”. Two years later I took the initiative myself (as I had to do with the battlehonours). After two years of doing nothing but wash their hands of it, the Corporation made a submission to Defence (a month after I’d lodged mine).
I asked to see it, but they refused … forcing me to submit an FOI application. My initial submission was not approved by the Minister and I embarked on further research. I came up with evidence that showed that the Minister had been misled. I asked the RAAC Corp if they’d care to view this material and accompany me to a meeting with the Minister. They declined on both counts. I submitted my own follow-up submission accordingly. The evidence was not properly considered and I wrote to the PM (an answer is awaited).
I’ve fallen over backwards to work with the RAAC Corporation without reciprocation … my submissions are copied to the HoC of both the RAAC and RAE. The sapper Assn is right behind my efforts on their behalf and proof-read everything I do. I’ve persevered against knock-backs from supposed friends for three years … hopefully the story of this saga that I’m putting together now (to enable me to respond to Mr Rosemond’s ‘Open “Letter’ which I won’t read until I’ve got the facts lined up) will enable lessons to be learnt for the future.
PS. You’ll see in my letter to the Minister (quoted in 17 Sep 17 post below) that I asked the Minister to consult with the RAAC and RAE HoC (who were copied the submission) before making a decision. The RAAC HoC obviously had the RAAC Corporation’s submission … once again, I was trying to be as open and transparent as humanly possible, ie. absolutely everything open and available for anyone to add input and/or correct (as it happened … one former 1 Armd Regt member was doing his own research and found that the streamer of the 8RAR Colour was named “Minh Dam’ … this warranted a supplementary submission to the Minister.) What more could I have possibly done in terms of working with the RAAC Corp (apart from doing nothing at all)?
————————————————————————————————–
31 July 2018
OPEN LETTER [IN RESPONSE] REGARDING OPERATION HAMMERSLEY 1970
To: Mr Peter Rosemond, CSC. OAM
And for Information,
1st Armoured Regiment Association Management Committee
Gentlemen of Armour,
Crikey … just writing that salutation makes me feel important!
I hereby write to Mr Rosemond, a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board. He published an ‘Open Letter’ on RAAC social media (stating at the same time that he does use social media under any circumstance).
He expressed offence at my proposal to pursue approval for the extension of eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Op Hammersley, given that the 1 AR Assn and RAAC Corporation supposedly “have carriage of this matter”. I had stated my intention on my Blog (not “various social media sites” as claimed), as it seemed to me that both 1 AR Assn and the RAAC Corporation had given up on the matter. To compound my offence, I was falsely accused of “personal grandstanding”. How did all this come about?
Three years ago, (June 2015), I prepared a submission for eligibility for 8RAR’s Unit Citation to be extended to supporting arms (as a result of the 1RAR Assn having successfully argued a similar matter). I sent it to the 1AR Assn, hoping that they would join with the RAAC Corporation. The latter, however, said that they wanted nothing to do with “the bloody thing”. Not to be outdone, a member of the 1AR Assn C’tee referred to my draft submission as a ‘pile of drivel’.
In February 2017, eighteen months after having drafted it and with nothing being done, I sent my submission to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. In May 2017 he replied to say that he had been advised that the Unit Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s whole tour in Vietnam, not just for Operation Hammersley. I set about some detailed research, discovering that the advice provided to the Minister by Defence was incorrect.
Surprisingly … I was contacted by Mr Rosemond in June 2017. He stated that the RAAC Corporation had provided a submission to Defence in March 2017, a month after my submission to the Minister. Because of this, I should not tell anyone about the false advice given to the Minister. The RAAC Corporation was not interested in seeing the results of my research, nor in joining together to meet with the Minister.
Why had the RAAC Corporation suddenly changed its position? Previously, when I had sent a submission to Minister seeking approval to emblazon the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour on the Standard, Defence had contacted the RAAC Corporation to see if they supported the proposal. Is this what had happened again?
Should I allow a submission for recognition of the service and sacrifice of RAAC personnel to be considered on false grounds? Should I allow recognition to be granted on this basis? Of course not. Why would the RAAC Corporation wish to have this happen?
I decided that the right thing to do was to inform the Minister. I did so (September 2017), but his staff intercepted the letter and declined to review the new information. I wrote to the Prime Minister (November 2017) to protest at this abuse of democratic process. Not having had a response, I mentioned on my blog (July 2018) that it was time to prepare a new submission. Three days later … we have Mr Rosemond’s ‘Open Letter’.
I am now asked to refrain from any further submissions, as this could jeopardise the RAAC Corporation’s case … which has only been ‘pending’ for sixteen months. I am also accused of all sorts of other things … deliberately calculated to cause irreparable damage to the RAAC. This is the last thing I want.
It is my hope that submissions raised in relation to the gallantry of RAAC personnel will be judged according to all available evidence. An award granted on the basis of false evidence is not an award at all. Some people might be able to live with such knowledge … I am not one. (The RAAC HoC has been copied into all my correspondence about this matter and this courtesy will continue.)
I will proceed with my revised submission to the new Minister for Veteran’s Affairs, asking him to seek a further review. If this is not approved by Defence, then a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal is the next step. In taking this, it will be known that all known evidence concerning the bravery and sacrifice of RAAC (and RAE) personnel is being presented to the DHAAT. Instead of this, should the RAAC Corporation wish to work co-operatively, I am happy to do so and await contact.
Bruce Cameron, 29 July 2018
30 July 2018
In all the ‘toing and froing’of late, I’ve realised that I haven’t posted Mr Rosemond’s ‘Open Letter’.
No point in posting my response, I thought, if nobody knows what I’m responding to. So … here ’tis (my response tomorrow).
OPEN LETTER REGARDING OPERATION HAMMERSLEY 1970
To
Mr Bruce Cameron, MC
And for Information,
1ST Armoured Regiment Association Management Committee
Gentlemen of Armour
I am informed of recent posts on various Social Media Sites, and in particular the ‘Armoured
Advocates BLOG’, relating to Operation Hammersley of Feb/Mar 1970 and the Cross of Gallantry
with Palm (CGWP), Unit Citation presented to 8 RAR.
The personal grandstanding and public claims are knowingly incorrect. You are fully aware of the
submission made by the RAAC Corporation in 2017 seeking an extension of the entitlement to the
CGWP, but continue to publicly deny knowledge as evidenced by your posts.
I personally informed you of the submission when I wrote to you in 2017. Requesting in that
correspondence; that you refrain from any actions in relation to this mater and also pointed out that
the actions you had taken and further proposed could jeopardise matters currently being considered
by the Defence Honours and Awards Staff and within Army. It is also inappropriate to create or
promote expectation on public forums.
The 1st Armoured Regiment Association and the RAAC Corporation have carriage of this matter
(Hammersley and the CGWP) and represent the Veterans of A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment; B
Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment and 1 Field Squadron, RAE. The Corporation submission is currently
being considered by the appropriate authorities and will result in a determination. If unsuccessful, a
further submission on Appeal will be compiled and submitted by those entrusted to do so.
Your correspondence to various Ministers is inappropriate. Evidence Based submissions are
required and should, in the first instance be made to Defence Honours and Awards. Upon receipt
DHA conduct research and confirmation of facts before making recommendation to Army. Army
conducts its own committee review if necessary and makes recommendation to CA. If the
application is unsuccessful an appeal can be made to the Honours and Awards Tribunal, who in turn
make recommendation to the Minister. You have posed questions directly to various Ministers
thereby corrupting the process to the detriment of fair consideration.
You should also note that unless there is a public enquiry, these matters are within the realm of
Defence “HONOURS IN CONFIDENCE”, therefore, will remain confidential and not be disclosed by
Defence. Your application to access copy of the submission (you imply no knowledge of) under
Freedom of Information was denied.
You are not the representative of the Veterans, you were not there as a participant and therefore
should keep clear of all the good work undertaken by others who are and were.
Please refrain from any further submissions to all Ministers relevant to this subject as you may
jeopardise our case and fatally wound or corrupt the fair consideration we seek from those same
Ministers and their staffs, also the Army.
I believe your claims on Social Media are deliberately calculated to cause irreparable damage, to the
RAAC Corporation in general but also in particular the 1st Armoured Regiment and the 1st Armoured
Regiment Association, in respect of the Hammersley Submission in this example.
PeterWRosemond
P.W. Rosemond
23 July 18
29 July 2018
The Saga of Seeking Approval to Have Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR, Extended to Supporting Arms Part 6
25-29 September 2017
I won’t continue to copy the submission in parts as I did on the Blog last tear Happy to email the whole submission to anyone interested.
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days ….:
25 November 2017
Following on from 20 September et al.
It appears that the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs has decided not to inform the Minister that he was wrongly advised about 8RAR being awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for the whole of its time in Vietnam.
If this isn’t enough, the Minister’s Office has come up with a new reason for not extending eligibility for the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN.
Should his involvement not result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner … then a media campaign will be initiated. A story board along the lines below is being prepared. The public revelations will be quite ‘explosive’ and interest in the story has already been shown.
Operation Hammersley: A Conspiracy to Deny Vietnam Veterans Just Recognition of Their Valor
“…there are a lot of very senior officers both within and retired from the Army who may not necessarily agree or support the submission regardless of the strength of the evidence.” Email received 5 June 2017
21 July 2018
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The following letter, sent in November last year … has not been responded to
Time to start the process over again. Sadly neither the RAAC Corporation nor the 1 AR Assn has opted to pursue this issue.
Time to have another go. More to follow soon.
—————————————————————————————————–
Dear Prime Minister,
FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
I write to seek your consideration concerning a matter which has resulted in I, and many Vietnam veterans whom I represent, having been subjected to a clear lack of democratic process by the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs.
It is my expectation, as a citizen, that a query to one of your Ministers regarding a matter within his/her portfolio responsibility, will result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner.
As well as consulting widely with relevant agencies, it is expected that a response be clearly explained, so as to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved. I’m sure that you would agree that these standards should apply equally to Ministers and those who act as delegates on their behalf.
I wrote to Minister Tehan on 28 February 2017. The seven page submission, on behalf of veterans involved, asked that he consider eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
Minister Tehan responded on 7 May 2017 to say that this could not be done because the Citation was awarded for the Battalion’s whole time in Vietnam, not just Operation Hammersley. Unfortunately the information he had been given was incorrect (the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation was awarded to the Battalion for the whole year).
Another submission (eight pages) was forwarded to Minister Tehan on 10 September 2017 (attached), providing detailed evidence that the GCWP Unit Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley and those units attached or under control of 8RAR for this Operation, should be awarded the Citation also. Additional evidence was received soon after and a supplementary submission was made on 22 September.
Minister Tehan’s Chief of Staff responded on 16 November 2017 (letter attached).
He makes no reference to the evidence presented in the submission that the Citation was awarded specifically for Operation Hammersley. Instead, with stunning insult, he says “As you know, the citation was conferred on the 8th Battalion for its service throughout its deployment to Vietnam”. It is clear that the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs took no steps to ensure the merits of the submission were investigated; nor were the relevant standards of procedural fairness observed in an open and accountable manner.
The reasons for the response were not explained at all, making it plain the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved were not considered. Furthermore, the submission requested that those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) be consulted. No mention has been made of this and it has to be assumed that the Heads of these Corps were given no opportunity to offer advice.
If it is not enough that the submission was not considered, the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs introduced a new reason for not making the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN. This is exactly what the Government did last year with respect to RAN and RAAF units. (See attached.)
Will you please take steps to ensure that the submission for eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley … is considered in accord with the standards of democratic government set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Yours sincerely ….
THE PRESENT
On 23 July 2018, I received the following email from Mt Rosemond”
“G’day Mr Cameron
I am writing to you in response to the following post copied from your personal blog [ie. the 21 July post copied above].
The post is false and misrepresenting your knowledge of a formal submission.
You have deliberately and directly accused the RAAC Corporation and 1st Armoured Regiment Association in a manner causing significant discredit knowing your statements to be false.
I have attached a letter setting out my further concerns and requests.”
I will now summarise all the events, read the ‘Open Letter’, and prepare an Open Letter in response.
—————————————————————————————————-
28 July 2018
Close to the end now … and very recent ‘events’.
The Saga of Seeking Approval to Have Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR, Extended to Supporting Arms Part 5
9 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Quotes from the Blog two years ago will continue, but for today … a thought which arose during the preparation of my (long and detailed) submission to the Minister resulting from the fact that he has been misinformed and misled about the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR :
“A Battle Honour is the public recognition and commemoration of an outstanding achievement on the battlefield by a unit or formation of the Australian Army”. (DOD website) A battle honour was recommended for 1 Armd Regt, 3 Cav Regt and the RAR for Operation Hammersley.
Only five battle honours were approved for the whole of Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. While the assault on the Minh Dam Secret Zone (Long Hai Mountains) was an outstanding achievement of combined arms co-operation, bravery and self-sacrifice, the casualties resulting from anti-personnel mine explosions towards the end, had political ramifications when Australia was withdrawing troops. The battle honour was not approved.
The infantry involved (8RAR) were recognised by the awarding of a RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Such recognition was not extended, however, to AFV crews from 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Regt, nor the field engineers (sappers) of 1 Fd Sqn who accompanied both armour and infantry into the battle.
During the fierce assault on the enemy’s entrenched defensive position which led to the battle honour recommendation, casualties to AFV crews providing fire support and armoured mobility to 8RAR were 2 KIA and 11 WIA. These resulted from: two tanks detonating anti-tank mines (one of which was destroyed); two tanks being struck by anti-armour rockets (RPGs); one APC destroyed by an anti-tank mine; one APC destroyed by a satchel charge (thrown by the enemy); and four APCs struck by RPGs. Also unrecognised were the small teams of sappers whose task was to clear anti-personnel mines: one sapper was KIA and another WIA.
——————
10 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Another thought bubble as I prepare my submission (see yesterday).
The following is a quote from a 1ATF ‘Proposal for a VN Unit Citation’ for 8RAR (probably drafted by 8RAR):
“… and outstanding results. One hundred and eighty six enemy have been eliminated; the Battalion has suffered nineteen fatal casualties, eleven as a result of mine explosions and not as a result of direct enemy action. This comparison is indicative of the high standard of military professionalism displayed by the Battalion”.
Mine explosions are not the result of direct enemy action? Simply unbelievable!!
Laying a mine, whether it be anti-personnel or anti-tank, is obviously as much a direct enemy action as an enemy sniper hitting his target. It can be argued, in fact, that mine warfare utilises more enemy resources than anything else. The sourcing of the explosive, the training of the technicians, the building of the mine, the anticipation of the target’s likely movement; the laying of the mine and its concealment; and finally the steps taken to lure the target onto the mine.
Is the author really saying that the comparison which forms the basis of “outstanding results” is 186 enemy KIA to ‘only’ eight own troops KIA and that the eleven of the Battalion’s soldiers who were KIA as a result of mines, should somehow be thought of differently?
The US II FFV HQ estimated from reliable sources that “over 100 enemy were killed” as a result of Operation Hammersley (OH, p387). The proposal for a VN Unit Citation for 8RAR fails to mention the casualties of supporting arms. There is no doubt that Operation Hammersley would not have successfully breached the enemy’s Long Hai defences if it was not for the combined efforts of the “8RAR Group”.
It seems strange, therefore, to claim ‘outstanding results’ without acknowledging the contribution of supporting arms and acknowledging their casualties (three KIA and twelve WIA in Hammersley alone).
1 July 2017
FOI Request .
“On 28 February 2017, I wrote to The Hon Dan Tehan MP asking that he extend the eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to the 8th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
On 30 March 2017, The Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) Corporation Ltd forwarded a submission to the Department of Defence, supposedly advocating the same thing. I was not permitted to see this submission.
On 7 May 2017, Minister Tehan advised me that he was unable to extend eligibility for the award. I have since discovered official documentary evidence which shows that the advice given to Minister Tehan was wrong. Before informing him of this, I would like to know what Defence was advised by the RAAC Corporation, in case that might have contributed to the misinformation given to the Minister.
I therefore I seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the submission made to Defence by the RAAC Corporation in relation to extending eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR.”
————————————————————————————-
18 July 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
Time to get back to the above.
On 5 June I was advised that “On 30 March 17 a completed work [on the same matter] was submitted by the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC have carriage of the submission and it is strongly supported”. I told the Corporation about the Minister’s response and said that I would be putting up a new submission, as the advice that had been given to him by Defence was wrong. The Corporation declined my request to see what they had advised Defence. (Background for the above is at the blog posts for 5 and 16 June 2017.) The Corporation also declined my offer of a copy of my second submission, as well as the opportunity to meet with the Minister as part of a delegation.
I submitted an FOI request to see the Corporation’s submission on 1 July:
The FOI team have responded to my request to ask for additional time as the“documents are held in an area staffed by reserve members, some of which are on leave, or only parade one night a week”.
Hopefully the FOI response will not be the same as that concerning the request to see the submission made by the Corporation in respect of the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour (now subject to an independent review by the Information Commissioner), ie the submission cannot be released because:
It contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
Release of the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
5 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation Work started on 1 September on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested in a supporting submission.
Given that I’m working flat out on the letter and submission, I thought that it wouldn’t do any harm to go back to the very start and copy the blog posts which tell the story; ie. my intentions to draft a submission for 1AR Assn to forward to the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC Corporation’s position that they couldn’t make representations on behalf of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and Chairman’s statement that he “didn’t want anything to do with the bloody thing” … and, finally, my decision to ‘go it alone’.
It’s been a long couple of years, but I’m not giving up; those who served during Op Hammersley deserve no less. I believe that the story was misrepresented at the recent A Sqn reunion; those who did so, no doubt have their reasons … these may become a clear as the ‘story’ progresses from 7 June 2015 ….
9 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation.
What a load off my mind! The submission is completed and will be in the mail on Monday.
17 September 2017
Hammersley Submission (Covering Letter II)
As mentioned earlier on the Blog, the submission was finished and sent off in the post last Monday. The second half of the covering letter is copied below.
Dear Minister,
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
……
“Statements from others in support of the fact that the CGWP Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley are included in the original submission. Foremost among these is that from the then Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Force, which states “…in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palm earned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”. His Excellency Major General the Honourable Michael Jeffery, AC, CVO, AO, MC (Ret’d) should know. He served with 8RAR in Vietnam and was awarded the Military Cross for his actions as a company commander during Operation Hammersley.
Given that the previous advice to you, and from you to me, was incorrect … will you please ask that the extension of eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR be reconsidered as per the attached submission.
Supporting units involved in Operation Hammersley suffered three Killed In Action (KIA) and thirteen Wounded In Action (WIA). Many others suffered in different ways and continue to do so today. The families of all those involved know the cost that the unjust recognition of the bravery and sacrifice of only one part of the combined arms team has caused. (Other examples of this happening in respect to Operation Hammersley are described in the submission.) The solace of those ‘forgotten’ and their families is in your hands.
I have been informed that those who advised you did not consult those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE). It is requested that decisions related to this new submission are made following input from the Heads of these Corps.
Yours sincerely,”
For information:
Brigadier Chris Mills, RAAC Head of Corps
Brigadier David Wainwright, DSC, RAE Head of Corps
Mr Jack Chipman
Mr George Hulse, President, 1 Field Squadron Group RAE Qld Inc
23 September 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The covering letter to the minister has been published on the Blog, as has the first installment of the Submission itself (a process interrupted by the RSL National Conference).
It’s not usual for a Ministerial submission to be followed up by a supplementary submission. But I felt that the information provided by Bruce Scott was too important not make it known to those considering the matter. Herewith a copy of the follow-up letter posted off yesterday (to the same list of recipients as the original submission).
Dear Minister,
It good to meet you at the RSL National Conference yesterday. I hope you had a successful visit to Canada. I’m sure that the Invictus Games would have been able to reach their full potential with the support they have deservedly received. It was a pity that you were not able to stay longer at the Conference, as the presentation and responses to questions by Simon Lewis was particularly well received by all attendees.
On 9 September 2017 I forwarded the attached letter to you. While I know that there would not have been an opportunity for your Department to fully consider the matter, today I received a letter from one of the groups of the many many veterans hoping to see the injustice overturned.
This letter made me aware of additional evidence in support of the submission (which I made on their behalf) and I thought it sufficiently important to warrant me passing it on for consideration with the evidence forwarded earlier.
You will recall that your advice had been that eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation could not be extended to those units that supported 8RAR in Operation Hammersley because it was thought that the Citation had been awarded to the Battalion for its entire period of service from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970.
It was, of course, the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation that was deservedly awarded to 8RAR for it’s entire tour of duty. Other evidence was provided to support the fact that the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its action in Operation Hammersley in the enemy’s Minh Dam Secret Zone (the Long Hai hills).
The CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR included a ‘streamer’ to be attached to the pike of the Battalion’s Regimental Colour. The attached two pages from the history of 8RAR (http://www.rar.org.au/documents/8-9RARHistoryComplete.pdf) state that the Streamer is named the ‘Minh Dam’ Streamer.
This reference from the Battalion itself, would seem to positively underscore the fact that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its action on Operation Hammersley.
It follows that eligibility should be extended to those RAAC and RAE units who provided operational support at the time.
Yours sincerely.
24 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (II)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
25 November 2017
Hammersley Recognition.
Following on from 20 September et al.
It appears that the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs has decided not to inform the Minister that he was wrongly advised about 8RAR being awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for the whole of its time in Vietnam.
If this isn’t enough, the Minister’s Office has come up with a new reason for not extending eligibility for the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN.
Should his involvement not result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner … then a media campaign will be initiated. A story board along the lines below is being prepared. The public revelations will be quite ‘explosive’ and interest in the story has already been shown.
Operation Hammersley: A Conspiracy to Deny Vietnam Veterans Just Recognition of Their Valor
“…there are a lot of very senior officers both within and retired from the Army who may not necessarily agree or support the submission regardless of the strength of the evidence.” Email received 5 June 2017
————————————————————————————————–
27 July 2018
Ok … so we’re getting to matters which I think might have been raised in the Open Letter above (see 5 June). I haven’t read the Open Letter yet … I thought that I’d review the background first.
Before the ‘saga’ continues below, a response to a person who thought I should co-operate with the RAAC Corporation more:
“My point exactly. As you’ll see above, three years ago I drafted a submission. My idea was that the RAAC Corporation might support it and liaise with the RAR Assn and the sappers. The Corporation, however, said they didn’t want to have anything to do with the “bloody thing”. Two years later I took the initiative myself (as I had to do with the battlehonours). After two years of doing nothing but wash their hands of it, the Corp made a submission to Defence, a month after I’d lodged mine.
I asked to see it, but they refused … forcing me to to submit an FOI application. My initial submission was not approved by the Minister and I embarked on further research. I came up with evidence that showed the Minister had been misled. I asked the RAAC Corp if they’d care to view this material and accompany me to a meeting with the Minister. They declined on both counts. I submitted my own follow-up submission accordingly. The evidence was not properly considered and I wrote to the PM (an answer is awaited).
I’ve fallen over backwards to work with the RAAC Corporation without reciprocation … my submissions are copied to the HoC of both the RAAC and RAE. The sapper Assn is right behind my efforts on their behalf and proof-read everything I do. I’ve persevered against knock-backs from supposed friends for three years … hopefully the story of this saga that I’m putting together now (to enable me to respond to Mr Rosemond’s ‘Open “Letter’ which I won’t read until I’ve got the facts lined up) will enable lessons to be learnt for the future.
PS. You’ll see in my letter to the Minister (quoted in 17 Sep 17 post below) that I ask the Minister to consult with the RAAC and RAE HoC (who were copied the submission) before making a decision. The RAAC HoC obviously had the RAAC Corporation’s submission … once again, I was trying to be as open and transparent as humanly possible, ie. absolutely everything open and available for anyone to add input or correct (as it happened … one former 1 Armd Regt member was doing his own research and found that the streamer of the 8RAR Colour was named “Minh Dam’ … this warranted a supplementary submission to the Minister.) What more could I have possibly done (apart from nothing at all)?”
The Saga of Seeking Approval to Have Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR, Extended to Supporting Arms Part 4
23 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
Dear AWM,
I’m doing some research re Operation Hammersley at present and thought I should bring the following to your attention..
‘Fighting to the Finish’, p383, states “Lieutenant General Tri added his congratulations in a personal letter to Weir“. The reference given relates to a letter copied in “The Grey Eight in Vietnam“.
I’ve attached copy of this letter from AWM 103 R212/1/1/3. You’ll see that it was actually a letter to Brig Weir from Lt Gen Ewell, not Tri, that is quoted. This letter was sent on 25 March 1970, and enclosed a letter to Ewell from Lt Gen Tri dated 6 March 1970.
It seems that receipt of Tri’s letter (also on the above file) was the only reason for Ewell to write to Brig Weir [coming as it did some time after Operation Hammersley].
The letter from Weir is significant [to me] for two reasons. Firstly, it clearly identifies the units which comprised the “8 RAR Group” and, secondly, it shows that the last sentence was written by Weir, not Ewell. (It has been wrongly included as part of Ewell’s letter in a number of publications, including ‘The Grey Eight’.)
As an aside, Tri’s commendation (and Ewell’s) is for actions on 21 Feb 70. As we know, this was essentially a battlefield clearance day, following the delayed B52 strike. It would seem that Tri is responding to reports from the two ARVN (RF) companies involved on that day and wanted to emphasize the importance [in his view] of joint ops.”
24 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
I almost missed it. I saw it and flicked over it and put the file aside. Of course, I went back to it and looked again. Problem was that it was very hard to read. Photocopy of a photocopy perhaps. Finally the penny started to drop.
Firstly, this was a HQ 1ATF file. What made me flick over it at first, was that it the 1ATF file related to the AATTV RVN Unit Citation. Buried within it, was a page headed ‘Proposal for VN Unit Citation’. The title gives it away, This was the 1ATF draft citation for the 8RAR RVN Unit Citation. Who is most likely to have drafted this for 8RAR? Obviously 8RAR … possibly the 2IC, the then Maj Clunies-Ross.
As we know, those advised the Minister have told him that the Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR was for the whole of its tour up to 31 Oct 70. The proposed wording states: “During nine months of almost continuous contact with the enemy …”.
Given (i) that the battalion arrived in SVN in Nov 69 and it’s first operation was Atherton in Dec 69, the proposal must have been drafted in Aug 70. Given (ii) the liaison necessary between 1ATF, HQ AFV (and Australia), FWMAO, and ARVN JGS in relation to such awards, it is probable that idea had been raised in Jun-Jul 70, if not earlier (ie, following Lt Gen Tri’s commendation for Op Hammersley in on 25 Mar 70).
So … the Minister has been misled in being advised that the award was presented in recognition of 8RAR’s contribution to operations up to 31 Oct 70. I feel a second letter to the Minister coming on.
(Interestingly, protocol required that the Queen give approval for the award to be accepted. AHQ Canberra was advised of this on 5 Sep 71, not 70. The award was gazetted on 9 Sep 71.)
29 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
A few points:
The Minister has been advised by Defence that the Citation covered the Battalion’s operations from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970. This is not supported by the Citation which refers to operations from “28 November 1969 to the present” (as well as the undeniable fact that fact that the Citation was presented prior to 31 October 1970).
The fact that the Minister was incorrectly advised is supported by a 1ATF proposal for the award which appears to have been finalised in August 1970, as necessitated by the length of the approval process for an award to be presented two months later. Discussions associated with the Citation between HQ AFV, FWMAO, and RVN JGS, would have been initiated well prior to this.
The Citation states that the Battalion participated in “almost every military” operation from 28 November 1969. In fact, it took part in eleven of the twenty seven 1ATF operations during its tour of duty.
The RVN CGWP is awarded in recognition of deeds of valour or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy. The only example of this specifically referred to in the Citation is Operation Hammersley. The 1ATF citation proposal referred to the Hammersley operations as being “of particular significance“. This was replaced in the RVN Citation with the words “their most remarkable military operations“.
The letter of commendation “to elements of 1ATF” for Op Hammersley from the Comd III Corps (Lt Gen Tri) to the US Comd II FFV (Lt Gen Ewell) was dated 6 March 1970. Ewell forwarded the letter to Comd 1ATF, adding his congratulations to the “8RAR Group“, on 22 March 1970. Three days later, Comd 1 ATF forwarded the letter to CO 8RAR, OC A Sqn 1AR, OC B Sqn 3 Cav and OC 1 Fd Sqn (the component forces of the “8RAR Group” which conducted Op Hammersley).
It was announced in April 1970 that 8RAR would not be replaced when they left in October. It is possible that the idea of an award was sparked at this time in relation to Operation Hammersley.
If the idea of a unit citation came from the RVN rather than HQ AFV/1 ATF as happened with individual awards, discussion between RVN JGS, FWMAO, HQ 1ATF would have been conducted prior to a citation proposed being drafted by 1ATF (eg. is the award suitable? … is it able to be accepted?).
HQ AFV had no experience with foreign unit awards. While Comd AFV could approve the acceptance of individual awards, this was not the case for a unit citation. This required the Queen’s approval (which was granted retrospectively). Army HQ Canberra advised HQ AFV on 5 September 1971 that HM the Queen had approved acceptance of the award (it was gazetted on 9 Sep 71)
5 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
It’s simply unbelievable.
I originally prepared my submission in June 2015. I did so on the basis of it being forwarded from the 1 AR Assn to the RAAC Corporation for further action. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on the 1AR Assn Facebook page that: ‘Theaward for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always …. The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing”. There being no further progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister in February 2017.
A similar situation existed re my draft submissions concerning the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour and the error with the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1AR Standard. Fed up with a lack of action, I forwarded both proposals to the Minister on an individual basis (having checked with the `1AR Assn Patron that I wouldn’t be upsetting any considerations in-progress). The Minister approved both requests and 1AR is now emblazoning the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour for the first time. (I’ve suggested that the Regiment invite Coral Balmoral veterans to the next Cambrai Parade, if that’s to be the first time the ‘new’ Standard is paraded.)
All my endeavours have been posted and made known in an open and transparent manner on the blog. Surprisingly (at least as far as I was concerned) I’ve just learnt that the RAAC Corporation forwarded its own Hammersley submission to Defence on 30 March 2017 —- knowing that I’d already made a submission to the Minister on 28 February 2017.
The Minister responded to my submission on 7 May 2017. He was advised by Defence NOT to approve the extension of eligibility. Given that Defence had had the RAAC Corporation’s submission for over a month, it has to be assumed that his decision was made having taken into account all the arguments put forward.
So where to now?
My original strategy (formulated after speaking to the 1RAR guys who successfully gained approval for the extension of eligibility for the unit citation awarded to 173rd Airborne) was to ascertain the reason for the initial decision to reject approval and then focus all effort on addressing that in an appeal. (I made this known when I first put forward my submission two years ago.) Following the Minister’s response (which I’d anticipated, having spoken to the 8RAR Assn) I have spent days going through all the relevant files at the AWM. The results of this prove conclusively that the advice given to the Minister was completely false. I am preparing a follow-up submission with supporting documentation in relation to B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 FD Sqn. I provided an update in this regard to the President of the 1AR Assn last week. His response was that the outcome sounded very hopeful.
I am thinking of presenting the submission appealing the Minister’s decision at a meeting with him. I have asked the RAAC Corporation if they would like to be represented as a part of the delegation.
[They declined. I did, however receive an email from Mr Rosemond. He said that he understood that I had uncovered new information throwing doubt on the validity of 8RAR’s award (correct, as explained in Blog posts); he went on the say that if I was to argue a case on this basis, it could ‘upset’ the RAAC Corporation’s submission. But the timing of the RAAC Corporation’s submission was such that Defence Honours and Awards would have been aware of the arguments it advocated, when advising the Minister NOT to give approval. The decision for me was whether or not to proceed with my submission rebutting the advice to the Minister. If I decided not to proceed, I would be supporting the RAAC Corporation’s submission (already considered by Defence) predicated on the basis of information known to be incorrect. Surely the Corporation would accept my offer to review my new research and amend their submission accordingly? Mr Rosemond also mentioned that there were very senior officers, both serving and retired, who were opposed to any change to the award of the Unit Citation. I think this made me even more determined to proceed on the basis of factual evidences which could be substantiated.]
—————————————————————————————————–
26 July 2018
The Saga of Seeking Approval to Have Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR, Extended to Supporting Arms Part 3 I can understand many readers just ‘switching off’ re the amount of detail I’m posting. But it is the story of unraveling our shared history … it’s the detail that’s critical to overturning a decision which fails to acknowledge the service and sacrifice of RAAC personnel. This is a saga of uncovering this detail, despite a lack of support.13 May 2017 Minister Tehan has written to say that “The Citation was awarded for the 8th Battalion’s contribution in operations against the enemy throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, rather than Operation Hammersley alone. As such, consideration of extending eligibility for the Citation to units that supported the Battalion during this operation would be inconsistent with the original award.”The above is factually incorrect. The CGWP Unit Citation was presented on 24 October 1970. It could hardly be awarded in respect of operations up to 31 October 1970. The award, in fact, was one of a number which the South Vietnamese Government had decided to make. Preparations to do so would have commenced well before 24 October. Just weeks before, the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, US Air Force, also received the same award. There was no mention of 2 Squadron, RAAF, in the Citation; however, being part of the 35th, eligibility for the CGWP was automatically extended to the Australian bomber squadron.If the above Ministerial decision was to stand, the following references will need to be amended:8RAR History:“Lieutenant-General Do Cao Tri, Commander of III Corps and Military Region III (of which Phuoc Tuy Province was part) presented 8RAR with the Meritorious Unit Commendation of the Vietnamese Armed Forces [i.e. the CGWP]for its actions in the Long Hai Hills.”AWM: “The [8RAR] battalion was awarded …the Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamese government for its involvement in Hammersley.”Governor General: In a speech at the 2008 Annual Dinner of the Royal Australian Regiment Association (QLD Divison). His Excellency, Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC, GG and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, stated that “3 RAR and D Company, 6 RAR proudly wear the United States Presidential Unit Citation, 1 RAR the United States Meritorious Unit Citation: and in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palm earned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”.US Commanding General 11 Field Force Vietnam:“Dear Brigadier Weir [Commander, 1st Australian Task Force], I am enclosing a letter from Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General, 111 Corps and 111 CTZ, commending the 8th Battalion Groupfor its combat achievements on 21st February 1970 in the Minh Dam Secret Zone. It gives me great pleasure to add my commendation to that of General Tri. The dedication and true professionalism demonstrated by your forces have significantly enhanced our Common efforts against a very stubborn enemy. Only by grinding away at the enemy, capturing his supplies and denying him his sanctuaries as you are doing, will we be able to force the enemy out of Phuoc Tuy Province and eventually out of the Republic of Vietnam. I wish you continued success in the future and request that you pass on’ to your soldiers our appreciation for their outstanding performance. It will be seen that our continuing combined operations in the Long Hais are significant and important.”CGWP Unit Citation (Extract) Their [8RAR’s] most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.An appeal will be lodged with the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal.History. I originally prepared the submission in June 2015 and provided it to the 1AR Assn. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on Facebook that: ‘Theaward for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always…. The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing”. There being no progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister in February 2017. His response was received yesterday. This is positive. The reason for the decision has been formally stated. This provides the basis for appeal.The attitude of the RAAC Corporation is disappointing. A valuable liaison role could be played, given that the submission seeks to recognise the service of not only 1 AR personnel, but also those from 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn (sappers) involved. One might hope that the RAR Association would also be willing to assist, given that they are now able to emblazon all five Vietnam battlehonours thanks to RAAC efforts. I guess I’ll just have to fit it in.Interestingly, I had to point out the following to the AWM (appropriate corrections were made, but it illustrates that sometimes a narrow lens is used in looking at such matters) :“Reference is made [in the Vietnam gallery] to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well … 3 KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’)…it would seem appropriate to mention them.15 May 2017Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RARHow to proceed with the appeal (this might be the wrong word)?Remember the response from the Minister, “The Citation was awarded for the 8th Battalion’s contribution in operations against the enemy throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, rather than Operation Hammersley alone. As such, consideration of extending eligibility for the Citation to units that supported the Battalion during this operation would be inconsistent with the original award.”Unfortunately, to say that the Citation was awarded for operations against the enemy throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, is plain rubbish.To do so, the award would have been made after, not prior to, 31 October (it was announced by the Chairman RVNAF Joint General Staff on 24 October 1970). The Minister was obviously poorly advised.It’s not just a matter of a few days, however.The award process involved a recommendation going from HQ 1AFV to HQ AFV to MACV to Free World Military Command HQ (for translation) to RVNAF JGS and back again. This would’ve taken some months.I’ll be checking the HQ AFV, HQ 1ATF files at the AWM for the original recommendation.Meanwhile, the Wikipedia entry is interesting:“In early 1970 8 RAR took part in Operation Hammersley, a reconnaissance operation in the Long Hải area. This operation began on 10 February and on 18 February it captured a large bunker complex after the Vietnamese Communist defenders withdrew following air raids. The operation continued until 9 March, with the battalion carrying out patrols and conducting ambushes in order to engage Communist troops. These operations were successful, and 8 RAR was awarded the South Vietnamese Government’s Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation for its role in the operation.”———————————————————————————–19 May 2017Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)The search for the ‘defining’ document goes on. I’ve already mentioned the trap of searching under ‘8RAR’, rather than ‘8 RAR’. Another trap, I believe, is to limit the search to a date range, eg. ‘1970’. You’d think that that would mean that those files listed as ‘1969 –1971’, would be included? Wouldn’t you?So, what to do? I’ve decided to scan all the ‘unit’ files. For ‘HQ 1 ATF’ this means running through almost 6,000 titles. It’s a bit tiresome, but worthwhile. I’d not have thought to search under keywords such as, for example, ‘Briefings’, ‘Conferences’, and ‘Letters. (Those demi-official letters from commanders contain some wonderful ‘pearls’.)Meanwhile, the files retrieved after my searches under keywords such as ARVN Awards, Citations, Letters of Commendation, have provided some wonderful reading. I hope the Tank Museum has copies of the letters of commendation for RAAC personnel, as well as the award certificates (incl those for the SVN Armor Badge). Interestingly, when you read the originals, you sometimes find differences with the documents as published. The letter of commendation from the US Commanding General II FFV to Comd 1ATF re Op Hammersley is a case in point (when compared with the version published in the 8RAR history, ‘The Grey Eight’, edited by A. Clunies-Ross).The files confirm that those who drafted Minister Tehan’s response to my submission (see earlier blog posts) have misinformed him. For those who haven’t heard of it, FWMAO stands for Free World Military Assistance Office.Let’s look at a case whereby an Australian soldier is recommended by his CO for a Vietnamese award. The CO advises HQ 1 ATF, who passes the recommendation to HQ AFV in Saigon; who in turn pass it to FWMAO. It is translated into Vietnamese and the FWMAO liaises with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). When the JCS concur (or don’t disagree), the FWMAO advises HQ AFV that the RVN proposes to award the soldier a ……. HQ AFV then advises the soldier via HQ 1 ATF that “the RVN proposes to award you the ….. “. The soldier is also advised at this time that COMAFV has given approval for him to accept the award and has asked that it be approved. Subsequently, HQ AFV inform the soldier that the RVN JGS have approved the award. On average, the time from proposal to approval was three months (a range from two to six months).PS. Nearly caught myself out re searching techniques… HQ 1 ATF is the correct title and searches under that will return all files so titled. But some files were mistitled as HQ 1ATF (no space) and so a search has to be conducted on this basis as well (otherwise these files are missed).20 May 2017Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont) How to target the search? I’ve scanned the titles of some 6000 HQ 1 ATF files and 7000 HQ AFV files. I’m yet to see all the actual files of interest, however, I don’t have proof as yet that the Unit Citation for 8RAR was awarded for Op Hammersley. I can prove that it wasn’t awarded for “its tour of duty from 28 Nov 69 to 31 October 70″as stated by the Minister, but that’s something different. Whereto from here?If the Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s “contribution in operations against the enemy throughout it’s deployment”, what is there that sets this battalion apart from the others at the time (apart from Op Hammersley)? Leaving aside Hammersley, was 8RAR responsible for more enemy casualties or capture more weapons and equipment, than any other Battalion?What do we know of the CGWP medal and unit citation?“The medal was created on August 15, 1950 and was awarded to military personnel, civilians, and Armed Forces units and organizations in recognition of deeds of valor or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy.” “Known as the Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation with Palm …the Unit Citation … was created on January 20, 1968. The former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) Armed Forces awarded the Gallantry Cross to specific military units that distinguished themselves to the same level as would be required for the individual award” (Wikipedia)Given the above, ie. being an award for deeds of valour or heroic conduct, the reference to civil action in the 8RAR Citation is not really relevant.I think I’ve got enough to go on with.21 May 2017Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)Lt Gen Tri (Comd III Corps) wrote to Lt Gen Elwell (Comd II FFV) on 6 Mar 70 to congratulate 1ATF for its operation against the Long Hais on 21 Feb 70. He’d heard about this through “reported information”. Link below. What happened on the 21st to warrant this commendation?On 18 Feb 70, immense bravery was shown by combat arms in attacking the enemy’s defended position. The attack was to be resumed at first light next day, but a withdrawal was ordered. A ‘political’ decision was made to seek a B52 mission instead. Approval procedure for the bombing meant that villages in the vicinity had to be informed. Rather than taking place on 19 Feb, it was delayed until the next day. The enemy withdrew and the operations on 21 Feb largely amounted to battlefield clearance, BUT two companies of ARVN (RF) were involved. Extract from COF:“Interestingly, the plan devised for the follow-up to the B52 strike involved the ARVN. As well as C Company 8RAR, together with 2 and 4 Troops (Brennan and Cumper), the force to return to the enemy position and conduct bomb damage assessment included two RF companies. Allowing the Vietnamese to enter the Minh Dam Secret Zone and to be associated with the capture of the significant facilities which were expected to be found was important.”So the Comd III Corps was particularly pleased to see ARVN troops associated with a successful operation, especially one which forced the enemy from one of its Secret Zones. This wasn’t a letter of congratulation for Op Hammersley as a whole.What’s this mean in terms of the CGWP Unit Citation?22 May 2017Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)Yesterday’s blog post copied the letter of commendation from Gen Tri. It was sent to Lt Gen Ewell, Comd II FFV. Gen Ewell forwarded this to the Comd 1ATF under his own covering letter. He refers to the ‘8RAR Group’ in place of Gen Tri’s reference to ‘elements of 1ATF’. Again, the battlefield clearance on 21 February is the subject of the commendation.The Task Force Comd, Brig Weir, attaches Gen Tri’s letter to his own letter quoting Gen Ewell. This can be seen vide the link below. Who does Brig Weir send his letter to? The component members of the “8 RAR Group” who took part in Op Hammersley, of course. Who are these?The Distribution List is: CO 8RAR; OC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt; OC B Sqn 3 Cav Regt; and OC 1 Fd Sqn. The latter three being exactly those for whom the extension of eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation is being sought.Related matters:
Brig Weir’s letter contains two paragraphs. A number of publications have included his second para as part of Gen Ewell’s latter. This is significant in terms of the political debate about continuing ops in the Long Hai area and the extent to which 1ATF was being urged to disregard casualties.
The Official History refers to Gen Ewell sending a personal letter of commendation to CO 8RAR.
What a disappointment, the National Archives are closed for access to records until 1 July. Will check then, but I think the file is probably just the GG’s involvement in the Queen’s approval for 8RAR to accept the citation (which was granted on 5 Sep 71. Gazetted 9 Sep 71.
——————————————————————————————————–
25 July 2018
The Saga of Seeking Approval to Have Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR, Extended to Supporting Arms Part 2
“For something that was “underway” in July 2015, things are taking a very long time.”
15 March 2016. Continuing …:
“Email to President 1 AR Assn (14 Mar 16). Subject: Re: Hammersley Citation
“It’s been almost a year now since I started to develop an application for the 8RAR CGWP Unit Citation to be extended to supporting arms involved in the Operation.
I had assumed that the 1AR Assn had passed the submission (copy attached) to the RAAC Corporation so that the involvement of 3 Cav and the sappers could be formally co-ordinated (I did my best to liaise with both and represent the importance of the support provided by them). As we now know, this was a false assumption. The RAAC Corporation Chairman has pointed out the Corporation’s only role is to lobby if the submission made by 1AR Assn is unsuccessful. He indicated, however, that he had allowed you to seek the services of Maj Gen Krause (a member of the Corporation’s Advisory Board) to proof read the submission.
A lot more than proof reading is required. If the 1AR Assn wishes, I will take back the submission, liaise with 3 Cav and the sappers and prepare an amended submission supported by both the RAAC and RAE (ie. both the HsOC). I will then submit that to Defence Honours and Awards for consideration. “
16 March 2016: Hammersley Citation. Now that we know that the submission, referred to by the Chairman RAAC Corporation, as “that bloody thing”, is not to be advocated by the Corporation, goalposts can be moved. As with the submission to emblazon Coral-Balmoral on the Standard, there is a complete absence of any info re the management of the issue. The RAAC Corporation’s comments suggest that it is a matter which is preventing their time being spent on other things; hopefully the1AR Assn C’tee feels differently; though from his Facebook posts, one C’tee member would obviously rather have no part in these “mad ravings”:
I’ve now been copied a C’tee member’s post on the 1AR Assn Facebook page. The C’tee member described my draft submissions for the award of the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation to A Sqn 1AR and approval to emblazon the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour on the 1AR Standard … as: “mad ravings”; “a pile of drivel”, “bloody sad”, and “weird”; finishing by suggesting the need to put “white coat boys from the funny farm on stand bye [sic]! . Do the President and C’tee of the 1AR Assn support this?
25 March 2016: Progress re the Hammersley submission is still unknown
27 March 2016: As per recent posts … nothing is known about the status of the submission. My email to the 1AR Assn ACT Rep asking about this, has gone unanswered.
30 May 2016. Chairman RAAC Corporation says that it’s with Maj Gen Krause (member of the Corporation Advisory Board).
25 February 2017. The following letter is self-explanatory (it follows from there being no progress re the issue for twelve months)…
The Hon Dan Tehan MP Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Dear Minister,
Supporting Arms Contribution to the Success of Operation Hammersley.
A submission advocating extension of eligibility to supporting arms for the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry With Palm Unit Citation (CGWP) awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, is attached. 8rar-sumission-final
There are two main issues involved:
Was the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for its actions during Op Hammersley or for service throughout its tour of duty in Vietnam?
The CGWP unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its action during Operations Hammersley. The Submission includes a quote from the then GG and Commander-in-Chief of the ADF (an 8RAR company commander during Hammersley) stating that this was the case. It also includes a quote from the battalion’s history in Vietnam to the same effect (written by Dr Bob Hall from ADFA, an 8RAR platoon commander during Hammersley) to the same effect.
Further evidence is provided by the Australian War Memorial Unit History for 8RAR: “The battalion was awarded … Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamese government for its involvement in Hammersley.”
Furthermore, the Submission makes the point that the purpose of the CGWP Unit Citation was to recognise ‘deeds of valor and heroic conduct’. The only such deeds referred to in the 8RAR Citation were those related to Operation Hammersley
Given that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, should those involved from other supporting arms also have been acknowledged?
The submission includes overwhelming evidence that the outcome of Operation Hammersley would not have been the success it was, if it were not for the deeds of valour and heroic conduct performed by the tank and APC crews and engineers, both RAE and RAEME (recovery vehicle crews), involved. The 8RAR Historian, Dr Bob hall, is also quoted to this effect.
Furthermore there is evidence that the Republic of Vietnam were aware that the success of Operation Hammersley was due not only to 8 RAR, but also its supporting arms. The Citation itself makes this clear: “But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there”.
It has to be concluded that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, the success of which was due to the combined arms nature of the operation. Eligibility for the award should be extended to the members of the supporting units that comprised the ‘forces of the 8th battalion’ at the time.
——————————————————
I’d hoped to present the finale for this saga tomorrow, as it’s even more unbelievable! Unfortunately there will have to be a couple more posts to do justice to all that has happened (and is happening!). Stay the course to learn how we honour those who have served.
————————————————————————————————–
24 July 2018
The Saga of Seeking Approval to Have Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR, Extended to Supporting Arms.
In June 2015 (yes, more than three years ago) I commenced a draft submission (my initiative for doing so was sparked by my interviews with Jack Chipman for the story of Australian tank operations in Vietnam). I also asked if it was possible “for the 1st Armd Regt Assn to contact the 1RAR Assn, and the RAAC Corporation to contact the RAR Association, to ascertain the process they followed to have Defence Honours and Awards extend the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to the 173 Airborne Brigade to the 1RAR battalion Group under their command … with a view to 1st Armd Regt Assn making a submission to the RAAC Corporation for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersely, particularly A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and the combat engineers? [I had already liaised with the 1RAR Assn, but I thought it best for official ‘Assn to Assn’ contact to be established.]
The Blog post for 7 July 2015 made the following points:
The RAAC Corporation’s Position and the Consequences. As it is understood, President 1 AR Assn supports the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s view that the Corporation cannot take the lead re the CGWP Submission, because the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation (the Submission seeks to have those who provided support, ie 1AR, 3 Cav and RAE, acknowledged). The 1AR Assn, therefore, has to advocate the award alone. If unsuccessful, the RAAC Corporation might then offer support. (The RAAC Chairman later advised in his 2015 Annual report that “the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn is not a Member Assn of the Corporation and is not prepared to assist its own members”.)
What’s this mean in terms of the Submission? The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAT), where the real power lies in terms of approving the Submission, can only consider it after Defence Honours and Awards (DHA) have ‘knocked it back’. So, 1 AR Assn submits to DHA, it is knocked back (as expected) and is resubmitted to DHAT. If it is knocked back, the new submission, supported by the RAAC Corporation, is submitted to DHA and then, finally, DHAT. The whole process has been made twice as complicated as it need be, with consequential lessening of its chances of approval (compared with a Submission which is supported by the RAAC Corporation right from the start).
The Lack of Moral Justification for This Position. Part of the RAAC Corporation’s Constitution refers to fostering the interests of the RAAC. The members of 3 Cav Regt who served in Vietnam did so as part of the RAAC. Some are members of the 3 and 4 Cav Regt Association (a member of the RAAC Corporation), some are members of the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association (not a member of the RAAC Corporation), while others are not members of either Association. How petty can we be as former members of the RAAC, to deny to those who fought with 3 Cav Regt during Operation Hammersley,the best opportunity to achieve the recognition that is due to them? Apart from anything else, recognition for them, is recognition for the RAAC. Isn’t this what the RAAC Corporation stands for??I’m reminded that a number of people sign off emails with the words “Yours in Armour”, how hollow this sounds in light of the above.
At the 2015 1AR Assn AGM on 10 July 2015, the following Motion (07/15) was considered: “That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee strive to have eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, extended to A Sqn 1st Armd Regt and other supporting arms. Background notes are herewith. Proposer: Bruce Cameron Seconder: Jack Chipman”. (An Executive Summary of the submission was provided in support of the Motion.) The Minutes noted that ”Actions are currently in underway for this to occur”.
Fast forward to the blog for 6 March 2016
I wonder what’s happened to the following proposal? Last I heard, the 1AR Assn had passed it on to the RAAC Corporation, where it is being rewritten.
The black hole that seems to swallow proposals certainly dampens one’s enthusiasm to raise such matters. It will be a wonderful thing if some of those who fought in A Sqn 1AR and B Sqn 3 Cav at Hammersley are still alive to see the Citation awarded to their former units.
14 March 2016:
“One of the questions I asked on my blog was what the state of play was regarding the Hammersley submission that I’d drafted.
I’ve been advised that, in response to this, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation has stated on the 1AR Assn Facebook page that the ‘award for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always…. The President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing.We are there to lobby at the higher levels of Government if the application falls over’.
The Corporation Chairman further stated that I’ve been constantly informed by the President 1AR Assn that the RAAC Corporation is not involved in any way in submitting the application. This is news to me.
I’d thought that the process of presentation of matters to the Government was through the 1AR Assn to the RAAC Corporation. I thought that this is why the Corporation was established. The draft application sought to have those from 1AR, 3 Cav and RAE acknowledged for their efforts. It was thought that the RAAC Corporation would represent the RAAC interests and liaise with the RAE Association with respect to the involvement of sappers. It now appears that there might even have to be three separate applications. Or is there just a lack of interest?
Finally … how can it be that a submission seeking to acknowledge the bravery of RAAC soldiers can be referred to as “that bloody thing” by the organisation that was supposedly formed to represent their interests.”
Tomorrow’s blog post will follow the saga through 2016 and 2017 to today. It gets more and more incredulous!
(Should messengers be punished for speaking truth to power?)
————————————————————————————————
23 July 2018
Asking Questions … Should it be Done More Often?
I had a definite plan when I wrote yesterday’s post. It became ‘lost’, however, in the incredible ‘to and fro’ which marked the Internet ‘social’ pages. (Is ‘social’ a misnomer? It seems that some of the posts are anything but social.)
Mr C M Fenton OAM (as he has told me to call him) gave me no choice, other than to point out the following.
The Saga of the ‘Missing’ Logbooks.
A request was made vide the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum for information regarding the Cent owned by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. This prompted some questioning as to where the log books for the fleet had gone. I knew that Mr Cecil had some log books, I did know how many (nor how he came to have them). I was conscious, however, that he had told me not to tell anyone. (I believed this to be because he did not want to have to deal with lots of inquiries.)
Investigations revealed that log books for tanks held in military areas such as Puckapunyal stayed went with the tanks, log books for tanks used as range targets were held by the AWM and log books for tanks sold privately went with the tanks. One of the tanks on the parade ground at the SoA had been transferred to the AWM. As expected, its log book was in the Tank Museum and it went with the tank. When asked about the other log books, the Museum said that they had no record of them. It seemed that they had just disappeared.
The person who purchased the Cents privately was asked what had happened to his log books. According to Mr Cecil, they concocted a story between them to say that the logbooks had been sold to a private collector as a collective lot on a confidential basis. This was done to “have a bit of fun” at my expense.
It was at this time that the Members’ Forum was shut down. Lies were told to explain why this happened and members were falsely accused of having acted improperly. At one stage it was said that a third party had threatened legal action, but members weren’t able to be told who had made the threat or what it was about. (It was presumed that it had something to do with the log books)
I started up my blog as a means of providing open and transparent discussion about RAAC matters, in lieu of any other means.
Should it be required, I can copy the account from the time of the lies (there is no other word, ie. misrepresentations knowingly and deliberately made) that members were told. (Mr Cecil is banned from the 3 Cav Forum for misrepresentations associated with this matter.)
————————————————————————————————–
22 July 2018
The Binh Ba 50th Commemoration.
Crikey! I had no idea how many people read my blog. Now they’re quoting my blog on other sites. I take this as a compliment. I’m late posting today as I’ve had to fight off attacks from all quarters. As is often the case, defence in depth has proven to be the answer, ie. lure them into a dead-end and bite off their noses! It’s my nose, however, which has proven to be the antagonist for some. (I can manage about 20 mins at a time at the keyboard before I have to give it away … this has been a long long day!)
The following posts are from an RAAC forum
“Bruce Cameron: “Given that the funding request has been submitted by the 5RAR Assn, is it known if they copied AA Avn; 9 Sqn RAAF and 1 Fd Sqn Assns? ”
Noel McLaughlin: “For the last time, read my keystrokes. The funding bid was lodged by me and NOT the 5 RAR Assn. … I think a trip to Specsavers might be in order for you. You don’t need to stick you nose into this matter. You are not an involved person. There will be no further comms on this means regarding this matter, UFN.”
Bruce Cameron: I was following the post from Colin Toll on the 1AR Assn FB page (copied below)
“Colin Toll: I am pleased to report that today, a request for funding was submitted for the 50th [Commemoration of Binh Ba]
Bruce Cameron: Thanks Colin … was this on a personal basis, or on behalf of the 1AR Assn or on behalf of the RAAC Corporation?
Colin Toll: The submission was made by the RAR Assn behalf of all participating units.” Obviously Colin meant to say ‘made by the RAAC Corporation on behalf of all participating units’. Sorry if I’ve upset you and/or the RAAC Corporation … I’ve contacted others (sappers, Avn, RAAF) involved and asked if they were aware of the planning. I can get them to contact the RAAC Corporation, rather than the RAR Assn if you wish. Sorry … 9 Sqn RAAF Assn just rang. they’ll touch base with the RAR Assn. (I wonder if the Binh Ba Commemoration will be the first time that 5 Avn Regt’s Guidon will be paraded with an RAAC Guidon?)”
A follow-up post on the same site:
‘Blackie’: Bruce please keep your nose out of where it is not wanted nor warranted. Did all the other commemorations go off the way that the members wanted and expected? Yes. Your assistance is obviously not required or needed. Please let those who have the situation in hand continue to do the job unimpeded and unhindered by having to answer unwanted and unwarranted questioning by someone who was not involved and who appears to be throwing spokes in the wheel of what seems to be the right way to go about it. Leave people alone to do their best and after they have done so you may be able to come up with some accolades?
Bruce Cameron: Hi ‘Blackie’, You raise other commemorations. Let’s look at Coral-Balmoral. Why is it that eligible veterans received their insignia by post? How did C Sqn 1 Armd Regt receive their insignia? Presumably from the Q Store. No insignia were supposed to be awarded to 1 Armd Regt veterans until a formal presentation had been made to the two OCs C Sqn (the one from the time of the action and the current one).
I suggested beforehand that if the current C Sqn members were to receive their insignia on a parade, then veterans should be invited to have theirs presented at the same time. I suggested that those who could not get to Adelaide be given the opportunity to attend a parade night at an ARES unit (10 LH for example) for a presentation there by a suitable RAAC representative. How could all this organised?
My proposal was that when the application proforma was completed, recipients indicate whether or not they would like to have their insignia presented. These names and addresses would be passed to the HOC Cell for co-ordination.
OK … so none of this happened. It’s the right of those who carry responsibility for honouring RAAC service and sacrifice to decide such things as they see fit. I will argue to the hilt, however, my right (and everyone else’s) to ask questions and make suggestions. To be denied this right is to be denied democracy. RAAC representatives were not provided the opportunity to lay a wreath at during the service at the AWM. Asking why may be regarded as an unwanted and unwarranted question …nevertheless, it is one that anyone is entitled to ask.
Sometimes mistakes are made by oversight. DVA’s proposed to hand out lapel pins (left over because Viet Nam cancelled the 50th Long Tan Commemoration) with the Australian flag crossed with that of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The organisers of the C-B Commemoration supported the idea of a “commemorative pin”.
Many veterans, however, believe that before Australia recognises the current communist regime, steps should be taken to improve the human rights of our former allies (ie. members of the ARVN) and their families. At the moment they are treated inhumanly. As a result of raising the issue, the lapel pins were withdrawn and DVA apologised to the Vietnamese Community of Australia for their insensitivity.
Of course, everything is a matter of priority, which, in turn, depends on relative importance. Years of inaction followed my raising the issue of the Coral-Balmarol battlehonour not being emblazoned on the 1 Armd Regt Standard, coupled with the dates on the Vietnam theatre honour being wrong. Finally, I wrote to the Minister … both were corrected in time for the 50th Commemoration. Because a representative body holds a particular view … does not mean that every person has to share it and abide by it. I am, for example, lodging a further submission for eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved. Because no-one is pursuing the issue, does not mean that everyone else has to follow suit. Some might even say that persistence is the only thing which will win through.
Please go to the top of this thread. I asked what was being done. Concern was expressed by someone who should know. Presumably my question was unwanted, but can you really say that it was unwarranted?
Conclusion.
The start of all the above lies in my question to Colin Toll (at the start of the thread)… “as member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board, will the Corporation be liaising with DVA, the AWM, 1AR Assn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, and 5RAR to co-ordinate a 50th Anniversary Commemoration next year? (Planning really needs to start now should this be contemplated.)”
Colin’s reply: “…there has been some informal conversations about the issue. I understand that DVA had funds for such commemorations in the 100 years of ANZAC, that is, 2014 to 2018. So we may have some issues there to overcome. But, we do need to get running on this issue.”
I mentioned that I “will be suggesting to the 1AR Assn that they engage with others about this (if they have not already)”.
So … it all goes back to a question. Should we be encouraged to ask them (ie. questions) or not? Should we all be lemmings kept in brine? The answer tomorrow.
————————————————————————————————-
21 July 2018
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The following letter, sent in November last year … has not been responded to
Time to start the process over again. Sadly neither the RAAC Corporation nor the 1 AR Assn has opted to pursue this issue.
Time to have another go. More to follow soon.
—————————————————————————————————–
Dear Prime Minister,
FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
I write to seek your consideration concerning a matter which has resulted in I, and many Vietnam veterans whom I represent, having been subjected to a clear lack of democratic process by the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs.
It is my expectation, as a citizen, that a query to one of your Ministers regarding a matter within his/her portfolio responsibility, will result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner.
As well as consulting widely with relevant agencies, it is expected that a response be clearly explained, so as to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved. I’m sure that you would agree that these standards should apply equally to Ministers and those who act as delegates on their behalf.
I wrote to Minister Tehan on 28 February 2017. The seven page submission, on behalf of veterans involved, asked that he consider eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
Minister Tehan responded on 7 May 2017 to say that this could not be done because the Citation was awarded for the Battalion’s whole time in Vietnam, not just Operation Hammersley. Unfortunately the information he had been given was incorrect (the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation was awarded to the Battalion for the whole year).
Another submission (eight pages) was forwarded to Minister Tehan on 10 September 2017 (attached), providing detailed evidence that the GCWP Unit Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley and those units attached or under control of 8RAR for this Operation, should be awarded the Citation also. Additional evidence was received soon after and a supplementary submission was made on 22 September.
Minister Tehan’s Chief of Staff responded on 16 November 2017 (letter attached).
He makes no reference to the evidence presented in the submission that the Citation was awarded specifically for Operation Hammersley. Instead, with stunning insult, he says “As you know, the citation was conferred on the 8th Battalion for its service throughout its deployment to Vietnam”. It is clear that the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs took no steps to ensure the merits of the submission were investigated; nor were the relevant standards of procedural fairness observed in an open and accountable manner.
The reasons for the response were not explained at all, making it plain the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved were not considered. Furthermore, the submission requested that those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) be consulted. No mention has been made of this and it has to be assumed that the Heads of these Corps were given no opportunity to offer advice.
If it is not enough that the submission was not considered, the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs introduced a new reason for not making the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN. This is exactly what the Government did last year with respect to RAN and RAAF units. (See attached.)
Will you please take steps to ensure that the submission for eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley … is considered in accord with the standards of democratic government set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Yours sincerely ….
————————————————————————————————-
20 July 2018
Freedom of Information (FOI)
Blog posts for 26 May 2017 and 30 June 2017 are copied below (from Doing the Right Thing ‘I’). Re the latter post, the Australian Information Commissioner has recently sought documents from Defence. The period for Defence to reply by, expires on 23 July 2018. Hopefully the Information Commissioner will be able to make a decision soon after.
26 May 2017.
Background is provided by the 5 April 2017 blog post. In essence, I asked to see a copy of the submission made by the RAAC Corporation in support of mine seeking approval for the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1AR Standard. Surprisingly, the Corporation stated that they had not seen my submission, yet they had prepared another submission in support of it (which I was not permitted to see).
The FOI Decision
My FOI request to see the RAAC Corporation’s submission has been refused because the Accredited Decision Maker is satisfied that:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with “exempt matter deleted”, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
How can disclosure of a supporting submission to a Minister (a public document), harm an organization to the extent that RAAC member associations would refuse to continue to support the RAAC Corporation? What could the submission possibly contain, to have this effect?
I have requested a review of the decision. (As they say … sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.) [This was a review by Defence of the decision they made. The result was that they upheld their decision. The final appeal option was that below.]
30 June 2017
Request for Review by the Information Commissioner
Following on from the past two days … parts of the next review request are copied below.
“Summary of why you think the decision is wrong
There are essentially two reasons given for not releasing the document
It contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
Release of the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
These reasons raise the question as to what sort of opinions are these that are being referred to? It seems that if the views of individuals of the Executive of the RAAC Corporation as expressed in the document, were to be made public, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Corporation would be harmed. Presumably these are opinions which are damaging to Defence in some way.
There is a conflict of interest involved here. The Department of Defence has decided that views presented to the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs have to be kept hidden from public disclosure for the sake of the RAAC Corporation’s relationship with it. Presumably this also accounts for Reason 2 above, ie. if the RAAC Corporation’s members were to become aware of the Executive’s opinions as expressed to a Government Minister, they would think less highly of the Corporation which represents them. Surely the Department of Defence cannot rule on a matter in which self-interest is involved.
If the opinions of the Executive of an incorporated body, as put to a Minister of the Commonwealth, cannot be released to someone possibly affected by them, then the FOI Act has failed in terms of its purpose of providing the Australian community access to information held by the Government.
Resolution
What action or result would you like from the Information Commissioner?
I would like the Information Commissioner to release the submission made by the RAAC Corporation to Minister Tehan, supposedly in support of my earlier submission to Minister Tehan regarding the emblazoning of Vietnam Battlehonours”
————————————————————————————————-
19 July 2018
The Ideal World
The following post from 25 March 2019 has been updated.
——————————————————————–
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have to draw attention to.
This would mean:
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which effectively provided rapid and hard hitting firepower.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and have access to an adequate repair pool.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provided good access to training areas and suitable housing and schooling for families.
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a suitable crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour.
No-one on RAAC related social media would use personal insults and derogatory language in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to the ‘official’ position.
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege.
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets and plumes at public expense.
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
The Frontier Wars, during which first Australians defended their families, their land and their possessions, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the first Australians who lost their lives during the Frontier Wars, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’.
Attention would be given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
Peter Best would receive just and compassionate treatment from Immigration authorities.
Those former 1AR members who desired to do so, could use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
Having obtained permission for the above from 1AR, the 1AR Assn would pay to have a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan/hire this to NOK for use at funerals.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings would be made available to members.
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise as they consider best.
The objectives of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘camaraderie’).
The 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/distinguished former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/distinguished former members of 1AR die.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed when 1AR Assn members are in need of assistance; including how to make this known to the 1AR Assn.
Pending …
Minutes of the 1AR AGMs would be published without any defamatory material.
The 1AR Assn would have a valid Constitution approved by members.
Crossed off the List:
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral are entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry.
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
The C-B Battlehonour has been emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard have been corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modelled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal supported by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
———————————————————————————————
18 July 2018
Disabled Members : How Do We Treat them?
The following email to the Secretary is self-explanatory:
Dear Secretary,
I am one of the Assn’s disabled members (I wonder if you know how many others there are?).
I suffered a stroke which meant that my thought processes don’t function as normal and I have trouble remembering things. I had to stop work as a result.
I am able to interact with a keyboard on a limited basis. I’ve used this ability to write a history of 1st Armd Regt in Vietnam (over 12 years). I also observe things that occur (or don’t occur) in terms of the governance of the 1 AR Assn and comment accordingly on my blog (which I was compelled to start as a result of the 1 AR Assn Members’ Forum being closed)..
Recently I mentioned on my blog that I had served with one of the candidates for election in Vietnam in 1971. The candidate quickly pointed out that this was incorrect, we’d served together in Puckapunyal in 1970. Although I had amended my Blog, you demanded that I apologise to all Australian Vietnam veterans. I did so, advising that my memory was one of the things affected by my stroke.
Subsequently, Mr Soutar and Mr Duncombe demanded via the 1 AR Assn Members’ Only FB page, that I attend the AGM to argue the issues that I had raised in my Blog. I explained that I couldn’t attend because of the consequences of my stroke.
Immediately following the AGM, the 1 AR Past & Present FB page posted images which ridiculed me for not attending … a printed place mat with my name was photographed in various places accompanied by the question: ‘Where is he?’ (See below.)
Mr C M Fenton OAM is noted as suggesting that I’d forgotten it was on … “ha ha” he added (knowing as he did, that my memory has been adversely affected). Mr Soutar stated that one of his friends had also had a stroke (that “almost killed him”) and yet he still attended. The inference was clear and I was further belittled.
What is my disability situation? If I was capable of attending a meeting and coherently arguing a point of view …I’d still be working. I can, of course, provide a doctor’s report to substantiate this. It’s my belief that those who are disabled in one respect, should not be denied the opportunity to function in other respects. What does the Law say?
Firstly those people who are disabled are defined as those having a “physical, intellectual, psychiatric, sensory, neurological and/or learning disability”. I come within this bracket. Secondly, harassment occurs “when someone makes you feel intimidated, insulted, humiliated” because of your disability.
I feel that I’ve been intimidated, insulted and humiliated in relation to my disability. I believe that the 1AR Assn should not have allowed this to happen. I appreciate that the 1AR Past and Present FB page is outside the control of the C’tee, however, the C’tee would obviously have been aware of photos being taken at the AGM. The 1AR Assn Member’s Only FB page has also been used to facilitate the harassment.
Can the C’tee please apologise for the intimidation, insults and humiliation I have been subjected to; together with an assurance that this sort of behaviour by members of the Assn will not be tolerated in the future. If this is not possible, can you please explain why.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
.
——————————————————————————————–
17 July 2018
The 1AR Assn Going Forward II
A well respected former member of the RAAC has recently joined the 1AR Assn and has posted (inter alia) on the Members’ Only FB page: “We are all members for the same reason”.
If he had been a member longer, he might be aware that this statement raises more questions than it answers. I won’t respond on the FB page as it will only lead (from past experience) to unrelated accusations, bitching etc.
Is there a common reason that we all joined the 1AR Assn? If so, what is it?
There was a strong debate some time ago sparked by those who joined the Assn to have a “shitload of fun” and couldn’t care less about governance and the law under which the Assn must operate. Those who felt that no matter the purpose of the Assn, it had to operate within the regulations, were howled down and accused of causing members to leave.
One of the purposes that the ‘constitutionalists’ felt was important for the Assn to achieve was that of helping former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt who were in need of assistance. The shitload of fun tribe, referred to a decision made at a meeting of the RAAC Corporation where all member associations agreed that providing such assistance was not within their resources and individual members should be referred to the RSL.
Debate among members revealed that State Reps used to maintain a list of contact info re those qualified, among the general population, to assist in different ways that might be needed by their members. Such details were obtained by networking and passing on from one rep to another.
It seems that the new C’tee have opted not to maintain a strict policy of referral to the RSL, but to provide assistance as might be possible to members in need of it. (See new Constitution … Purposes.).
Maybe the C’tee will prepare a By-Law on the procedure to be followed in this respect. (Motions for the preparation of similar ‘protocols’ for action on learning of a member’s death or award were approved at a previous AGM. Nothing further was heard, however.)
“We are all members for the same reason” … what is it?
It would be a great thing if this was to be true … for me, having a “shitload of fun” was something which ended on 26 June 1971, so it wasn’t my reason for joining the Assn.
Postscript. I was mistaken in believing that Mr Soutar Jnr had been banned from the 1AR Assn FB page … apparently he has blocked myself and a number of others from seeing his posts. This means that he is able to post whatever he likes without fear of being taken to task by those he’s criticising. A bit like the other FB pages he runs as ‘closed’ sites in which only a small group of like minded people are able to see each others’ posts. As mentioned yesterday … it takes a certain kind of person who has to go behind people’s backs in order to vilify them. I hope he enjoys reading this publication which is open to all. Readership has skyrocketed in recent times, it seems that more and more people (from all levels of society) are interested in the benefits that ‘sunlight’ can bring (see yesterday).
——————————————————————————————————-
16 July 2018
1AR Assn Going Forward
Well done!! The new C’tee has moved quickly. Simultaneously with yesterday’s blog post, details re the new C’tee were posted on the 1AR Assn webpage and FB page. Not only that, all posts from Mr Soutar Jnr have been deleted from the Assn’s FB page. Hopefully, this will be the end of provocative taunts.
I expect that some ‘requirements’ might be placed on me re my Blog, in order to retain my m’ship. While this is understandable, many of the issues raised on my blog would never have appeared if the C’tee have been responsive to members’ concerns. It is not, and has never been, my intention to bring the Assn into disrepute. The opposite is, and has always been, the case
What will my position be re any such ‘negotiations with the C’tee’?
I will reserve my right to bring matters of concern to the attention of the C’tee; and subsequently publish posts about these on my Blog if the C’tee does not respond (or if I am not satisfied with the response, ie. it is not fair and comprehensive). I realise that the latter is subjective and I will not act unilaterally, only after consultation with other members.
In stating the above, I am not trying to place myself above the C’tee (nor in opposition to it). I hope for a situation in which members can ask questions (in the appropriate manner) and receive answers. It is the absence of answers which has been the problem in the past (in my opinion)
Following some bad press a couple of months ago (from Mr Soutar Jnr et al), I posted the following on my Blog:
A ‘thorn in the side’ is described as ‘someone or something that continuallycausesproblems for you’.
As a result of writing the story of Australian tank operations in Vietnam and becoming aware of the sacrifices made by RAAC crewmen and those who supported them, I’ve taken it upon myself to be a ‘thorn in the side’ of those who:
are not truthful and honest;
mislead those they are appointed to represent;
fail to meet their elected or official responsibilities;
put themselves before those they lead;
act in a mean-spirited manner (towards veterans in particular); and
are not open and transparent about dealings that affect those they represent.
I believe that sunlight is the best disinfectant for actions resulting from the above and will attempt to bring it to bear whenever possible.
While I do not believe in making personal insults … I do believe in congratulating those who ‘do the right thing’ at any level at any time, while giving credit to those who attempt to do so but are denied.
If any of the above mean that I’m not welcome as a member of the 1AR Assn, then so be it.
————————————————————————————————–
15 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM
Well the AGM is well and truly over at the time of writing. No post as yet on the FB page as the election results and who it is that will guide the Assn for the next 12 months.
Mr Anthony Soutar Jnr has stated, presumably as a result of information from his private ‘sources’, that it’s “a great result”. What does this mean, I wonder?
One has to assume that if the election results had been different, that it wouldn’t have been a great result in his opinion. Maybe a ‘good result’ or an ‘OK result’. If Mr Soutar Jnr is pleased, the inference is that all other members should be pleased. What if other members voted for other candidates?
Whether or not the results went the way of those who voted, one would hope that all members will now be united behind the elected C’tee. What we don’t want is somebody posting on FB to say that it is a ‘poor result’, but this is what Mr Soutar Jnr is inciting. Why can’t he simply say … congratulations to the new C’tee and leave out the boasting for once?
But there’s more … he continues on to say with “luck and good leadership it [the Assn] shall be returning to its former greatness”. So it seems that the past C’tee was holding it back from achieving ‘greatness’. The team he supported (which was presumably elected in the “great result”), are the ones to fix this apparently.
Why not post this on the 1 AR Assn Members’ Page FB Page? Because it would just result in venomous posts which have nothing to do with the issues raised. It seems that Mr Soutar Jnr is now ‘retiring’ from his position as champion of the 1 AR Assn FB page …indeed, he might well have been recruited with the specific purpose of escalating the vitriol just prior to the AGM.
The question now is … what will the new C’tee do with respect to communicating with the members of its Assn?
It’s a pity that there is obviously no ‘protocol’ with respect to advising members who were not able to attend the AGM who the new C’tee comprises. (One might have thought that a pro-forma FB post needing only the blanks to be filled in, could have been set up.)
Leaving that aside, will the new C’tee seek input from members? Coming up within its term of office is the 50th Commemoration of the Binh Ba. Who knows what preparatory plans they may (or may not) have been left by the out-going C’tee? Despite this, the central question remains … will the C’tee ask its Binh Ba veteran members what they might wish as a 50th Commemoration?
Postscript. It comes as no surprise that Mr Soutar Jnr, Mr C M Fenton OAM and someone called ‘John Lister’ badmouth me for not attending the AGM on the 1 AR Past and Present FB page … knowing that I can’t see their childish comments (I was banned from the FB by Mr Soutar Jnr’s Admin friends for responding to one of his other ‘comments’). Mr Soutar Jnr also boasted that I “would have a hissy fit” if I was to see the posts on his BBBBB FB page (he won’t, of course, say what the acronym stood for). There is a certain type of person who has to go behind peoples’ backs to talk about them ….
———————————————————————————————
14 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM Part VI
Following on from yesterday, another blog post on this topic from last year is copied below.
The 2018 AGM is currently underway. Let’s hope that the outcome is a positive one for the 1 AR Assn. {What a pity the final agenda and financial report weren’t available to members beforehand.]
2017 1AR Assn AGM Minutes: Two Quotes [28 July 2017]
Crook –…why has there been no action on Mr Cameron and his continual abuse of his position on his website in denigrating people in this room and of the Corporation and why hasn’t there been any disciplinary action taken? 2
Crook – In regards to the perceptions and behaviours of the Association. With the split that is appearing there are concerns of the levels of bullying and harassment that are occurring. Mr President what is the role of Mr Baikie within the Association and his official capacity to steer proxy votes?
Mr T Crook is a former Assn president who resigned his position in 2016 after admitting to lying to members.
The allegations he makes above are:
I am continually abusing my position on my website. Given that it’s my individual blog, how can is it be possible for me to abuse my own position? Armouredadvocates is not a publication sent to people, those who might be interested in things I try to bring to light … have to go to the blog themselves to read it. It is my belief that ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant for bad ideas’. I appreciate that some disagree … preferring to cloak things in a veil of secrecy. Everyone has a right to their own opinions.
I use my blog to denigrate people and the RAAC Corporation Ltd. (Denigrate: to unfairly criticize) I have continually stated that if at any time I am shown that I have posted something on the blog which is incorrect, I will immediately withdraw it and apologise.
In relation to the Corporation, I currently have a FOI under consideration. Brief details: I submitted a request to the Minister to have eligibility for the Hammersley citation extended; a month later the Corporation submitted a similar request to Defence; five weeks later the Minister informed me the Defence had advised that eligibility could not be extended … problem is that the advice from Defence was wrong; I asked the Corporation if I could see their submission … they refused; hence FOI request (ie. was Defence influenced by the info provided by the Corporation?) This info is sought prior to informing the Minister that he has been wrongly advised. Is explaining this, denigrating or providing sunlight?
There is a split occurring in the Assn. I agree. There are those who wish to just have a good time and bugger the regulations and BS (they speak the loudest); and there are those who believe that lawful governance has to come first (they try to influence by reason). One way of managing this is to appoint a governance c’tee to work alongside and advise the management c’tee.
Bullying and harassment are occurring. I agree. People such as Mr Crook are using their standing (eg. past president, Corporation Director) to intimidate those who argue for governance reform (it was during Mr Crook’s time as President that the Assn’s Constitution was found to be unlawful, the Assn spending $960 of members’ funds to confirm what members had discovered.)
Mr Baikie must have an official capacity within the Assn to be allowed to “steer proxy votes“. This is garbage. The basis of democracy is that any member is empowered to encourage any other member to vote in a particular way (providing this is done in a lawful manner, ie. without inducement). Mr Baikie openly encouraged members to vote for particular candidates. Such action could not be more lawful (or democratic), [This is exactly what Mr Soutar Jnr has been doing recently on the 1AR Assn FB page … he is entitled to do so … as was Mr Baikie.]
———————————————————————————————-
13 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM Part V
Following on from yesterday, another blog post on this topic from last year is copied below.
How Should a Financial Statement be Presented? [1 August 2017]
Regulations related to an association’s financial statement are very specific for obvious reasons. Those who made donations need to see that their money has been properly recorded and all members must be able to understand exactly how their funds were spent during the past year. Where financial assets are held, members must be informed where these funds are invested and how these investments have performed.
Desirably, the financial statement should be sent to members with the agenda for the AGM. This allows members to review the financial position and prepare any questions.
Of course, accountability is paramount for ensuring honest financial management. To this end, rules for associations incorporated in Victoria require that the financial statement be prepared by the Treasurer at the end of the FY and presented to the Management C’tee.
The C’tee would verify that all transactions were probably recorded, ie credit card expenditure had been in accord with the Assn’s rules and all usage had been for approved Assn purposes. Once all questions have been resolved, two members of the C’tee then sign a declaration stating that the financial statement gives a true and fair view of the Association’s financial position.
The financial statement is then ready for presentation to the members for consideration at the AGM. The C’tee’s declaration is required to be included in the Minutes of the AGM.
What Happened with the 2017 Financial Statement?
The Minutes didn’t include the C’tee declaration certifying the accuracy of the financial statement. Then again, no such declaration could’ve been made on the basis of the detail available. The financial statement detailed neither the source of income nor how funds were expended … just income and expenditure totals. So members have no idea if all income has been properly receipted, nor whether expenditure was appropriate, nor whether investments have been soundly made. They were asked to accept all this on trust.
Of course the C’tee are all volunteers, working on behalf of the members. Their enormous efforts are greatly appreciated and it follows that the C’tee have the trust of members. But … the association is incorporated in Victoria and MUST follow the rules prescribed by law. There are penalties for not so doing.
How Can the Situation be Recovered?
By rights, details of an Assn’s financial position are lodged electronically with Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) within a month of its AGM. In effect, this is a certification that the financial affairs of the Assn are truly and fairly represented. If CAV have any doubt they can request to see the Minutes of the AGM and the C’tee’s declaration to this effect.
However, CAV appreciate that not all Assns are able to meet this requirement. They allow, therefore, an Assn to have its members approve its financial statement by special resolution, provided that this is done and advised to CAV within six months of the end of the FY.
————————————————————————————————-
12 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM Part IV
Following on from yesterday, another blog post on this topic from last year is copied below.
1AR Assn 2017 AGM: The Tale of an Election [31 July 2018]
At least one member has called on the President to hold a new election for office bearers. Why?
Fact File
Given that the current Constitution allows for nominations from the floor, a member urged (i) those he knew who would be standing for election to send out brief bio details/quals etc to others, and (ii) members who were not able to attend the meeting, to appoint a proxy so that their votes were not wasted.
A former WO1 of high standing was advised by someone who had some sort of quasi-legal knowledge, that what the above member had done was illegal and a corruption of the election process. The former WO1 informed members accordingly.
When the above allegation was made known to Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) they advised that the quasi-legal opinion was totally false. What had happened was completely lawful and an acknowledged part of the democratic process. [In preparation for the 2018 AGM, bio details have been sent out by the C’tee and one person in particular, Mr Soutar, is urging all members to submit proxies … a positive outcome for openness and transparency in governance.]
When the AGM commenced, those attending were informed that there were 33 financial members present, and 21 proxy ‘votes’ had been received. A total of 54 potential votes
After the AGM, a member asked one of those who had counted the votes, what the result was for the election of the President. He was informed 55 for and 15 against. A total of 70 votes cast. This discrepancy became known among members.
When the Minutes were circulated, members were informed that four more members had actually been present and another twelve proxy votes had been ‘found’, ie 37 members and 33 proxies; a total of 72 potential votes.
The Minutes listed the names of those who had submitted proxy votes. Seven members immediately stated that they had submitted proxies, but their names weren’t listed.
On registering at the AGM, the proxy appointed by one member was informed that that member was unfinancial (he wasn’t); therefore his vote could not be lodged by the proxy. Unbelievably, the member’s name was listed in the Minutes as one of proxy votes which was counted (how his vote was ‘cast’ and by whom, is unknown).
The Minutes advised that the votes of those who had nominated the President as their proxy, were invalid. When this was queried with CAV, the response was that: while the proxy holder can decide to abstain from voting himself, there is an obligation on his part to meet the expectations of those who have trusted their proxy to him.
Conjecture.
For the first time, a democratic initiative meant that there was a possibility that a number of candidates who were favour of improvements to governance, might be elected … raising the possibility of the Assn being thrown into ‘unknown waters’. The former WO1 and others of his ilk banded together (working on the assumption that only they knew what was best for the Assn). Their first action was to smear the encouragement given to members to appoint proxies, as unlawful. Their attempted smear was shown to be completely false (however, no apology was made).
The next action for the ‘clique’, was to do a ‘deal’ which would see their own candidates elected. They did not know how many proxies in support of the ‘other’ candidates would be received, so they had to take precautions. They decided to have a number of proxy votes ‘held back’, so that there would be no chance that the candidates supported by the pro-governance ‘faction’, could be elected.
This would have worked a treat (with a declaration being made at the meeting that 21 proxies had been received), except that someone discovered the actual number of votes cast … which included 33 proxies. No problems, the Minutes simply recorded different voting figures (ie. another 12 proxies were ‘found’).
This might have been the end to the matter and a victory for the ‘clique’ … except it was pointed out on social media that CAV required details of proxy votes to be included in the Minutes. So the names of 33 who appointed proxies were included (but not who their proxies were). Unfortunately for the ‘deal’ brokers, seven members who had appointed proxies realized that their names weren’t included and came forward.
The Minutes also stated that those members who appointed the President as their proxy, were “invalid”. This would appear to be part of the ‘deal’ to ensure that proxies from the pro-governance ‘faction’ (who had thought they had the support of the President) could not result in their preferred candidates being elected.
The Question at the Start…
Why is it that at least one member has called on the President to hold a new election for office bearers? It’s may or may not be hard to answer … depending on whether or not you support management of your Assn in accordance with governance regulations.
Note: All previous blog posts can be accessed. The above is included in “Doing the Right Thing”. Earlier posts can be found below that.
———————————————————————————————
11 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM Part III
Following on from yesterday, the next blog post on this topic from last year is copied below.
The 2017 1AR Assn AGM (Proxies etc) [26 July 2017]
We know about the problem with the 1AR Assn Constitution not specifying a cut off for nominations, thereby not allowing members to specify who they want their proxy to vote for. This is obviously impossible in terms of knowing all candidates prior to the meeting … especially as nominations can be made from the floor at the meeting itself. Interestingly, directing proxies how to vote is the process that Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) recommend (see below).
Hopefully the Constitution will be amended to stipulate such a process for the 2018 AGM. The failure, and suggestions to rectify it, was mentioned in the blog posts of 9 & 10 July. [Copied below on 8/9 July 2018]
So, what happened re proxies at the 2017 AGM? Those present at the meeting were informed that there were 33 financial members present and 21 valid proxies. These numbers immediately raised concern when the votes for President were stated to be 55 for and 15 against. Voting numbers were confirmed in the Minutes.
The Minutes, however, raised more questions than they answered. The figure for members attending was changed from 33 to 37, however, only 36 of those listed were eligible to vote.
It’s now been revealed (because he was mentioned in the Minutes) that one member failed to sign in at door, but still voted. How many others might have done the same (with no check as to whether or not they were financial and eligible to vote)? So the number of those known to be present and eligible to vote goes back up to 37.
Now we have the number of proxies; this was changed from 21 to 35, with three others being declared to be invalid (one being unfinancial and two listed as having nominated their proxy to be the President). What is wrong with the latter? … they might well ask.
So in total, the number of eligible votes numbers 72, two more than the votes recorded for President. If we assume that the Patron elected not to vote, this means that someone did also. The main thing, of course, is that we now have more voters than votes (rather than the opposite, as before)
However … given that the Minutes list the names of those voting by proxy, it comes as a surprise that, as soon as the Minutes were circulated, seven members raised concerns that they had submitted proxy forms, but their names are not listed. Two of these sent their forms to the Secretary (with the expectation that they would be passed to the nominated proxy). Another two sent their forms direct to the member they nominated to be their proxy.
There is more. When the member immediately above was presenting his proxy forms for checking, he was told that one of them was unfinancial and therefore the proxy was invalid. The member, therefore, had his own vote, plus his proxy votes (less one). Surprisingly, the member whose proxy was declared invalid is not listed as such in the Minutes; even more surprisingly, he is listed as one of the valid proxy voters (even though his ‘vote’ had been deleted from the number that his nominated proxy could cast). Who knows how he was supposed to have voted?
So … taking all the above into account, it seems that at least seven proxy votes have been held back. If members nominated a proxy and that person decided not to vote on their behalf … is that allowable?
CAV advise that a person who provides another with his proxy, is doing so with the expectation that his vote will be used to influence the outcome, ie. select the best person for the appointment; he is trusting the proxy holder to represent his interests in this respect.
The best use of a proxy is when the person receiving the proxy is informed how the absentee person wants him to vote on their behalf (it is recognised that this requires a cut-off for nominations prior to the AGM, as well bio details/quals etc of candidates being sent out to members in time for them to select the candidates of their choosing and submit their proxies).
While the proxy holder can decide to abstain from voting himself, there is an obligation on his part to meet the expectation (above) of the person who has trusted his proxy to him.
There is more to this story [tomorrow]. One has to hope that recording what has happened will assist in ensuring lessons will be learnt for the future.
———————————————————————————————-
11 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM Part II
Following on from yesterday re this topic, the next blog from this time last year is copied below.
How Should the Next AGM be Conducted? [10 July 2017]
Yesterday’s post was about the recent 1AR Assn AGM. As said then, the new C’tee is to be congratulated. It was mentioned that such a small numbers of members present (9% in person and 6% by proxy) there is considerable scope for behind the scenes ‘lobbying’ to have a significant impact on the outcome.
The election certainly seems to have been well conducted, and the C’tee did well to ensure that this was so. The meeting was informed that 33 financial members were present and there were 21 proxies. When a member asked what the voting figures were for the two candidates for President, he was informed 15 and 55. It would seem that there are lessons to be learnt. The following points might be relevant for the next AGM.
Prior to the Meeting.
A cut-off date should be set for nominations. When received, they should be accompanied by biographical notes for the candidates, coupled with a simple statement as to why they seek election and what their priorities would be as a member of the C’tee if elected.
All members should be sent details re the candidates, together with a proxy form at least four weeks prior to the AGM. Problem … how does a member know who is attending, ie. someone who will vote in accord with their wishes? This, I submit, is why only 6% on members were represented by proxy. A situation which is not healthy for an Assn whose members are spread nationwide.
My suggestion is to allow postal votes … these to be sent the Secretary and opened at the AGM by the scrutineers. If the signature of a member on a proxy can be accepted, why not a signature on a postal vote. (As with proxies, financial status would have to be checked.) [I subsequently asked CAV about this and it is not acceptable for matters requiring a special resolution, such as financial reports etc]
The Meeting
On arrival, members should be required to provide id when their name is being marked against the register of financial members (otherwise any number of so called ‘members’ could be recruited to ensure someone is elected )
Prior to the meeting commencing, members should be advised whether or not a quorum is present (10% required, 15% were at the last AGM). [Of course members should also be advised the number of financial members eligible to vote.]
Those present who are not entitled to vote should be seated separately to others, to ensure that they are not given a ballot paper.
Election of the C’tee.
Before the ballot is taken, each candidate may make a short speech in support of his or her election. If they are not present, they should supply a statement to be read at the meeting. No-one should be allowed to speak on behalf of a candidate, other than by reading this statement.
No other speeches should be allowed to be made, lest unfair influence corrupts the voting process. (A number of such speeches were made at the last AGM. These included defamatory content and were clearly intended to influence voters in accord with views of a powerful ‘clique’ within the Assn.)
When the votes are tallied, members present must be informed what the numbers of votes counted totalled for each candidate (rather than simply being told who had ‘won’).
Financial Statement
A completed financial statement must be presented to members at the AGM. This must include an Income Statement; Balance Sheet; and information necessary to give a true and fair view. (The Financial Statement provided at the last AGM provided detail re the amount of expenditure made, but no info at all about what it was spent on.) [It also failed to represent all the financial transactions for of the previous 12 months; nor was it verified to be correct by two C’tee members.]
This statement must be lodged with CAV within one month after the AGM, together with the required signed declarations.
Minutes of the Meeting
The minutes of the AGM must include the names of all members attending (both those eligible to vote and those who were not), as well as those who had provided proxies. (Note: CAV require actual proxy forms to be included with the Minutes.) The financial statement presented at the AGM must also be included. [CAV have recently relented on the requirement for the actual proxies to be included with the Minutes.]
10 July 2018
2018 1AR Assn AGM
The AGM is to be held next Saturday (14 July). For the remaining days beforehand, I think it’s worthwhile looking back at the blog posts from this time last year. The first of these is copied below.
9 July 2017
1AR Assn AGM
“Well it’s over … and a new C’tee has been elected. They are to be congratulated (as are those who were not elected, for being prepared to offer themselves for the good of the Assn and its members.)
Interestingly, of the 348 financial members, 33 were present (including eight candidates). This is a little surprising, given that the Spt Sqn/ B Sqn 3/4 Cav Renaming Parade followed, with the birthday dinner that night. Travel to Puckapunyal imposes constraints, however. Of greater surprise, therefore, was the fact that only 21 proxies had been received. In total, members interested enough to either travel to the meeting or send a proxy, amounted to 15%.
Unfortunately the new Constitution, revised through the considerable efforts of a small group of members, had not yet been adopted. This meant that there was no requirement for members to be informed about those who had nominated; indeed, it was possible for someone to nominate on the day of the meeting. No wonder only 6% of those not present bothered to send proxies. (I have no idea at all about the background and qualifications of the new President.)
When the voting numbers are so small, there is considerable scope for behind the scenes ‘lobbying’ which can bring about a prearranged outcome. Is it right for someone who is not entitled to vote, to address the meeting and influence the votes of those who can? Maybe it is, maybe it’s not. (Allowing everyone, without restriction, to address members before they vote, will obviously affect the outcome. The question is … is this appropriate?) The new Constitution is crucial in these matters, as well as many others.
Hopefully the new C’tee will continue the process started by the immediate past President to ensure that C’tee decision making processes are open and transparent, as well as ethical and honest. It seems a long time since the Members’ Forum was closed and members were not only lied to about why this happened, but also falsely accused of inappropriate conduct. (See ‘A Story in Three Parts’ above.)
———————————————————————————————
8 July 2018
7 Brigade Abrams?
The Blog post from 2 September 2017 is copied at the end.
What a difference a single word can make. One of the media reports about the recent Ex Diamond Strike referred to 7 Bde testing its newly procured Abrams tanks. The Australian Army has finally purchased the additional Abrams needed to overcome the capability gap! Fantastic … or too good to be true?
Sadly, other media reports did not support this story. They used the phrase “7 Brigade’s newly acquired” tanks. One report nailed it: “the tanks recently relocated to 7 Brigade”.
On 4 October 2017, the Blog made the point that: “Current Abrams fleet numbers (59) were based on a single armoured regiment with two tank squadrons. The ORBAT has changed, however. We now have three ACRs, with a tank squadron each. Even with each squadron restricted to three tank troops, the present fleet is too small to provide for SOA, RTC, and repair pool need (exasperated because of the new geographical spread involved. It’s unclear, however, as to whether LAND 907 (Initial Abrams purchase, plus upgrade) or LAND 8160 (engineering and breaching capability) are to be supplemented to meet the need. Indeed, it’s unclear as the whether financial provision has been made at all.
On 11 February 2018, the blog post included: “Thirty additional tanks have been identified by Army as being needed to equip three ‘common’ brigades and their meet their repair pool needs. Three ACRs, geographically dispersed, each with a tank squadron, is very different to the ‘model’ that existed when the tanks were purchased, ie. two squadrons co-located as part of a single regiment.
It seems that Army’s bid to acquire the tanks needed to equip three ACRs has been put on the backburner. The case has been argued on the Blog before … becoming a proficient tank squadron is a full-time job. You can’t move tanks between brigades depending on their Plan Beersheba state of readiness and expect to achieve ‘instant’ readiness levels. Maybe this isn’t what is to happen, maybe it is. Who knows? The importance of communication was referred to yesterday. The RAAC Corporation can’t contribute to a public debate, or even provide public information. The Corporation doesn’t make public statements and, if it did, it would be confined to supporting whatever the defence position is. So, in the land of the blind ….
———————————————————————————————————-
2/14 QMI ACR Tank Squadron [2 September 2017]
The following was included in the Blog a couple of days ago:
“Tanks? Some time ago, following the then CA’s assurance that raising the 2/14 QMI ACR’s tank squadron would happen, it was reported in the Army newspaper that it was scheduled for next year. Whether or not the tanks required have yet been approved for purchase (let alone purchased) has not been publicly announced, nor whether or not a decision has been made to locate them in Brisbane or Shoalwater Bay.”
Further information was provided in the following Fin Review article on 7 Mar 2017. Col Tony Duus, a very capable armoured corps officer, explains where the situation is at in terms of public information. Unfortunately, research re LAND 8160 reveals little more re the additional 31 tanks. The 2017/18 budget papers do not seem to mention the project either.
So a third tank sqn is desirable, but will it be approved? Or put another way … how long is the capability gap to continue? What will be the effect when 7 Bde becomes the ‘ready’ bde under the Plan Beersheba force generation cycle?
The Australian Army’s main battle tank (MBT) is the M1 Abrams, an American 62-tonne behemoth that carries four people and a 120mm main gun. It has not seen combat since 59 of them were bought in 2007, and Australia has not used an MBT since it deployed its Centurions in the Vietnam War.
The MBT is the core of an Army’s ability to engage in sustained close combat: when you can actually see the enemy, an MBT is an indispensable and devastating weapon, says Colonel Anthony Duus, the Australian Army’s Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems.
Duus says we may have one of the best tanks in the world, but we have too few, we have the ‘analogue’ models and we do not have the domestic sustainment capacity for the M1 Abrams in the way that the RAAF and RAN sustains its fleets.
The Army’s Plan Beersheba from 2011 – ratified in the 2013 Defence White Paper – stipulates three armoured cavalry regiments, which each contains a tank squadron.
Duus says the current Land 8160 phase 1 project will resolve the challenges, although the exact details are still being finalised.
“We see the optimum fleet size for the M1 Abrams fleet as 90,” says Duus. “That’s a return to the fleet size we had with the Leopard but it’s still short of the 110 we had with the Centurion. Ninety is a realistic fleet size to cover three tank squadrons.”
————————————————————————————————-
7 July 2018
Congratulations to 1 Armd Regt, RAAC, on its 69th BIRTHDAY!
[1st Armd Regt RAAC came into being on 7 July 1949 with one squadron of Churchills.]
—————————————————–
Details re a Telephone Scam for Information of Others Who May be Similarly Affected.
Info passed to Scamwatch: “We have been repeatedly telephoned by ‘Microsoft Technical Support Unit’, claiming to need to rectify a fault with our computer and stating that they can verify their bona fides by giving the serial number of our computer.
When I asked for their address I was told 64 Chelsea Cres, Brisbane 4101; when I queried this at the next call I was told 64 Chelsea Cres, Minyama QLD 4575; at the next call when I said that this was a private house, I was told the address was: 3/23 Anthony St, WEST END QLD.
The caller IDs on the phone were 017038032825; 015 8626 48471; 0170380037290. I understand that these are internet ‘numbers’. When I asked for a telephone number that I could ring I was given 07 3040 9898. When I rang this, the person answering stated that this was ”SolutionInfoSoft’ and this was the international HQ of a company which operated all over the world. They have 80 employees working from 3/23 Anthony Street.
When I looked the Company up on Google I found that it was listed at the West End address, but the number was (SA/WA?) 61 8 7200 0010.
When I rang this number, it was not connected. I rang the Brisbane number again and asked why SolutionInfoSoft’s number was not connected. The person I’d spoken to before said that he was only the receptionist and he would have to discuss with the manager. I said I’d wait, but he hung up.
I was rung again and I explained to the caller that I was wondering why the telephone number on their webpage wasn’t connected … he hung up”.
Subsequently:
I called ACCC Brisbane’s office and asked if the information that I had provided to Scamwatch, should also be provided to the police.
The ACCC person explained that they do not have any investigative powers, they receive Scamwatch reports solely for educational purposes and to provide guidance to consumers.
I assumed that they would work closely with Police and asked for a contact number. They said that, no … they don’t work with police and I should call the police switchboard.
The Qld Police person I spoke with explained that, as I had not allowed any access to my computer, no offence had been committed; therefore, there was nothing they could do.
The person further explained that I should not have made the report to Scamwatch, but to ACORN (Australian Cybersecurity Online Reporting Network)
I looked up ACORN and found it was interesting that they, like the ACCC, have no investigative powers. Nevertheless, I persevered and completed the lengthy on-line report.
Interestingly, the Qld police officer informed me that SolutionInfoSoft were certainly not working from the 23 Anthony St WEST END address, but would be located overseas. Not surprisingly perhaps, there was no interest in following up re the Qld telephone number that the scammers were using.
When I followed up with Qld Police as to why there was to be no follow-up re the Qld telephone number that the scammers were using, I received this reply:
The number displayed on your telephone, e.g. a ‘ Queensland number ‘, 07 xxxx xxxx, is no indication that the actual call or caller is physically originating from, or is in, Queensland. The persons / organisation who generated the call establish a number through Telstra / a Service Provider to show as an Australian-based number.
I had no idea that this was possible. I’m still puzzled I must admit. I rang the number and spoke to the so-called company, presumably my call could’ve been routed anywhere. (I wonder what my bill will say?)
The Police said that ACORN collate all such data (the implication being that this was the only way to bring those responsible to account, ie. there was no point in following up individual ‘leads’).
I wonder if BBBBB stood for ‘Brotherhood for Boasting, Bullshitting, Bitching and Bravado’. (Interesting that no-one is prepared to say … why could that be?)
———————————————————————————————–
6 July 2018
Tomorrow’s Vietnamese Protest : What It’s About
VIETNAMESE COMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA : Immediate Media Release
Re: Vietnamese overseas around the world condemns Vietnam’s bill to lease three strategic provinces
The Vietnamese Community in Australia, in collaboration with other Vietnamese communities in the US, Canada, Germany, France will hold a peaceful protest in support of the Vietnamese people inside Vietnam who are risking their life to oppose the proposed legislation to lease three provinces, Van Don (North), Bac Van Phong (Central), Phu Quoc island (South), to imperialist China. These three locations are strategic locations for international shipping access through Asia.
In Australia, the protest will take place on Saturday 7/7/2018, 11am at the Vietnamese Embassy in Canberra followed by the rally at the Chinese Embassy at 1:30 pm.
In and of itself, 99 year lease is a common practice, except in the case of imperialist China where it is used as a tool to legitimise its domination. We have seen this in Sri Lanka, in the Horn of Africa’s Djibouti, in Fiji and now in Vietnam. In more recent times, the world knew about the sale of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, the Oil Rig 981 in 2014, the establishment of many Special Economic Zones throughout Vietnam. None of these so-called projects has employed locals. Even Vietnamese officials are not allowed to enter into these zones. Chinese workers are brought in to fulfil the labour needs. Worse still, the military built up with full air and marine capabilities is a direct threat to the rest of the whole region, and in turn will affect Australia’s security and economy. Over the past few weeks, the draft legislation to lease the three provinces to China for 99 years which had already been approved by the Vietnamese Communist Party, has been marked to be passed in the Vietnamese Parliament. This has sparked the largest scale of protest throughout the country which has surpassed the Oil Rig rallies in 2014 and the biggest environmental disaster in 2016 dubbed the Formosa Disaster. “Vietnam is probably the only country that has suffered the longest of domination by China in its history. We understand China’s DNA the most. We are facing annihilation.” Paul Nguyen, President VCA-NSW. The Vietnamese overseas are exercising our democratic rights, in full protection from our uniform men and women, in support of the people of Vietnam, and to tell the world to wake up to China’s domination. “Australia should not be fooled by Vietnam’s position on the East Sea (AKA South China Sea). Vietnamese and Chinese governments are in it together. We are concerned about the level of ‘trust’ Australia places in the Vietnamese Communist Party. Unless vigilance remains high, and proportionate actions are undertaken, Australia’s way of life, national security and regional stability is at risk much more than we are prepared to accept”. Bon Nguyen, President VCA For more information contact Bon Nguyen (+61 411616453) or president@vietnamese.org.au.
Another suggestion (see below): ‘BBBBB” : Bold & Beautiful Bra-Boys’ Buffoonery
———————————————————————————————————–
5 July 2018
Mr Soutar’s 5 B’s FB Page
Mr Soutar on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB Page:
2 July 2018: Guy’s [sic] the name of the 5 B’s [sic] has been changed and it is now known as the 1AR Engine Deck
3 July 2018: I have been approach [sic] by a couple of people asking why I changed the name of the group. Firstly it is not because BC thought for some stupid reason that the group was called the 5 Bravo’s after the Centurion parked at at AWM. As usual this was a stupid assumption. I was approach by Paratus Derek with an idea which I then took to the members of the page which all were in favor [sic] of changing the name. I believe that as the admin of this page it is my duty to listen to good ideas and use them. Of course someone will tell a completely different story less the facts.
Now just what is the “stupid assumption” I made?
Quotes from the 1AR Assn FB
Soutar, 8 June “….on the 5 Bravo page I have had a stack of enquiries about the Assn. It is great seeing a number of new guy’s [sic] & girls wanting to join.”
Cameron, 9 June Re the “5 Bravo page” … there has only been one AFV in the RAAC allocated that c/s. It’s now in the grounds of the AWM. On behalf of those whose sacrifices in 5B deserve to be honoured, I respectfully ask that you change the name of your “page”.
Paratus Derek 9 June. Bruce Cameron “It is actually BBBBB, it is an acronym and has absolutely no reference to any call sign.”
Cameron 9 June Paratus Derek “I take your point, but does it not concern you that “on the 5 Bravo page {Soutar] has had a stack of enquiries about the [1AR] Assn” . Members to the Assn of which you are VP are being recruited via a ‘secret’ site … who knows what prospective members are being told. Those applying to join could be doing so for any number of reasons, apart from supporting the Purposes of the Assn”.
So my “my respectful request” is, in Mr Soutar’s view, : ‘a stupid assumption made for some stupid reason’.
There’s been lots of suggestions are to what the acronym ‘5Bs’ might stand for. One I like:
Of course, we’ll never be told what it really stood for … I guess it’s the difference between serving your country and serving yourself.
———————————————————————————————
4 July 2018
Keeping up to Date.
The Blog post for 6 April 2018 is copied below. Mr Fenton has subsequently resigned for his position as the 1AR Assn Rep on the RAAC Council (without providing any report on the last RAAC Corporation AGM).
Despite this development, the RAAC Corporation Website has not been amended. There is still no outline of the ACRs (as distinct to the old single role regiments). The only thing that might remain are the photos of Bushmasters, as it seems that they ARE now AFVs operated by the RAAC.
If anyone is able to communicate with the RAAC Corporation, please ask them to update the Corporation’s website … it’s not a good look for the RAAC’s representative body to be misinforming the public as it is presently.
——————————————————————————–
RAAC Corporation [6 April 2018]
I was asked the following question a couple of days ago on the 1AR Facebook page:
“What is the RAAC “Corporation?”.
I responded to say that: “The RAAC Corporation is an umbrella organisation that the 1AR Assn and other RAAC unit assns belong to. Part of our membership fees go towards the cost of being a member and a specific c’tee position is designated as the 1AR Assn representative. Unfortunately members have not received a single report as to what the Corporation does. It holds AGMs and our rep travels and attends at our expense, yet we don’t see any Minutes”. [Mr Fenton subsequently advised that his attendance at the last AGM was paid for by a grant from DVA.]
Of course it is Mr C M Fenton OAM who is the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation. (His appointment came about in response to the conflict of interest that existed with the President 1AR Assn being both a Director of the RAAC Corporation and the 1AR Assn Council Member.)
Mr Fenton (who I understand is a regular reader of the Blog) … can you please explain what was decided at the last RAAC Corporation AGM and what the Corporation has done since then?
You might also like to inform the RAAC Corporation that its webpage is woefully out of date (definitely not the right ‘look’ for the representative RAAC body). The following info is presently included on the website:
The RAAC is the senior arms Corps within the Army and was granted the Royal prefix in 1948. Units of the RAAC include tank regiments, reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel-carrier regiments.EquipmentThe RAAC is primarily equipped with three types of vehicles: A1 Abrams – the Abrams is Australia’s main battle tank (MBT) and equips 1st Armoured Regiment.ASLAV – the ASLAV is a variant of the LAV II vehicle designed specifically for the Australian Army and is used in the armoured reconnaissance role with 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment.BUSHMASTER – the Bushmaster PMV is an Australian-built wheeled armoured vehicle which provides a high degree of protection from IEDs.
It seems that the RAAC Corporation has missed the creation of the Armoured Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) and is unaware that the SoA and Corps RSM has stated categorically that the RAAC does NOT operate the Bushmaster PMV. Photos such as that below are obviously inappropriate on the RAAC Corporation website (according to the Corps RSM and SoA).
———————————————————————————————
3 July 2018
How the 1AR Assn C’tee Must Love Mr Soutar.
On 14 June 2018, I posted the following on the 1AR Assn Members’ Only FB page:
“I won’t be posting anything further on this means until after the AGM (unless I can help someone with specific information).
For what it’s worth … I think I can see how it is that problems arise with the nature and tone of some posts. I believe that all such incidences can be sheeted home to someone expressing a personal opinion about someone else. It stands to reason that if you authoritatively state that someone is a “blowhard” or is “pathetic”, then there will be someone else who either disagrees with you or questions your authority for doing so.
If we can confine our input to matters of process, rather than individuals involved, then I’m sure that everyone’s contribution will add value to the Assn’s endeavours. The Secretary, for example, is investigating the problems with the proxy voting process described below. If anyone has input … either post here or email him direct.”
I thought that it was only reasonable that the month prior to the AGM be free of ‘electioneering’, BUT, Mr Soutar keeps blazing away. Yesterday he dropped these little ‘pearls’:
“The questions you ask me should be more directed at one person who has done much damage to the Assn over the last few years”; and
“One other question I hope you have also contacted the Admins on the 1AR past & present and asked them why one person in particular is banned”.
It would seem that I have damaged the Assn. Exactly what have I done? It’s true that I helped bring attention to (among other things): lies that members were told; a fraudulent declaration made in respect of a non-conforming Constitution; legal liability to compensate a member falsely expelled; wrongful use of the Assn’s accounts to transfer money; and non-conforming accounting and governance procedures.
Highlighting these matters has helped bring about new financial accounting and governance procedures; as well as a much improved draft Own Rules Constitution. I beg to suggest that the Assn is in better shape today, in terms of being able to achieve its Purposes, than it has been for years. It’s an interesting thought …. no one will ever thank either myself or the many others who have contributed to this; nevertheless, we have our self-respect. (I don’t mind this on my part, but I feel that it would be more than appropriate for the new C’tee to express appreciation to all the others who have contributed in this way.)
May I suggest, that if members leave the Assn because of actions taken to address the matters above, then they do not deserve to be members … they should form their own association and not incorporate it, then there won’t be anyone to keep them accountable to defined financial and governance standards
Turning to Mr Soutar’s second point, the answer to this was addressed in the Blog post on 12 May 2018, copied below:
“Loaded Questions
Speaking about communicating … some time ago, Mr Soutar asked the following question of me on social media: “Is it true that the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation got you a gold card?”.
I happened to believe then (as I do now) that personal information is exactly that. Whether or not I am ill is nobody’s business but my own; the same applies to whether or not I have a gold, white or any other sort of ‘card’.
The purpose of the question didn’t escape me … if the Chairman had got me a gold card, I should not, in return, raise difficult questions about the RAAC Corporation.
So how do I reply, in order to avoid the ‘entrapment’?
I’ve always thought that the best response to a loaded question (see below), is to reply with another.
So I asked: “Have you stopped beating your wife?”.
Rather than being seen to be the traditional example of a loaded question, it was thought that I was actually accusing Mr Soutar of the crime. All hell broke loose. I pointed out that I was simply using this example from Google (see below) to highlight that he was asking me a loaded question.
Not acceptable … apparently Mr Soutar’s friends thought that I’d gone too far in making such an ‘allegation’ and I was banned from the 1 Armd Regt Past & Present FB page. (You have to laugh!)”
[In retrospect, I probably should have said: ‘It’s none of your business!’. Then again, I don’t think I’ve suffered by not being a member of the 1 Armd Regt Past and Present FB page.]
A loaded question:attempts to limit direct replies to be those that serve the questioner’s agenda.[2]The traditional example is the question “Have you stopped beating your wife?” Whether the respondent answers yes or no, he will admit to having a wife and having beaten her at some time in the past. Thus, these facts are presupposed by the question, and in this case an entrapment, because it narrows the respondent to a single answer,
——————————————————————————–
Finally: It seems that Mr Soutar has to rely on others to inform him as to what is posted on Armouredadvocates (a site open to all). I guess he can’t bring himself to read it, or is scared to admit that he does; or that he doesn’t wish to acknowledge that it is an ‘open’ blog that anyone can read if they wish to do so (as compared to his recently renamed FaceBook page which he controls; ie. only allows those he ‘approves of’ to view what’s posted).
Why is it that he always says “appears”?
Anthony Soutar “Ok it appears I have featured on Mr Cameron {sic] Toilet door again…”.
Anthony Soutar “It appears I have upset someone again…“.
His FB page is now called ‘The 1AR Engine Deck’ (suggested to him by the 1AR Assn VP). The previous name “5 Bs” was an acronym … I wonder what the five Bs stood for and why it was seen to be of benefit to the 1 AR Assn for Mr Soutar to change the name? Maybe: Bullshit and Brawn Beats Blue-stockings and Beauty?
Why can’t everything be open and transparent to all? It was to foster this that the blog was set up …. it seems that there is a long way to go.
———————————————————————————————–
2 July 2018
Training of RAAC PMV Crews [“Who are not Crewmen”]
The Blog post for 5 April 2018 is copied below. This was in response to authoritative statements that the RAAC does not operate PMV and has no responsibility for training crew commanders.
The following extract is from a very recent RAAC unit Assn newsletter:
“In the second half of last year, a directive was released that has fundamentally changed the way the Regiment operates and caused a limited restructuring of the unit to meet those demands. The Regiment’s primary task is the provision of Cavalry Scouts to the Armoured Cavalry Regiments. Our sister Regiment in this construct is 1st Armoured Regiment. Our Secondary Task is support to the 2nd Division Reinforcing Battlegroup (BG JACKA) with the provision of a Cavalry effect through the employment of PMV. …. To continue development of our people, a new PMV course specifically targeting RAAC values, skills and tactical AFV employment was drafted by the unit and recently took place.”
Since when has the SoA abrogated responsibility for the training of RAAC members operating an AFV tasked to provide a “Cavalry effect”? The way things used to be done was that specific competencies were stipulated by the SoA for those crewing an AFV in a particular role; unit instructors were qualified to certify training to these standards. Now we have units themselves specifying the competency levels to which RAAC members are to be trained. Surely it’s not just me, but blind Freddy can see the shortcomings with this penny pinching ‘initiative’.
We have already had a PMV roll during a night move … an accident directly attributed to poor training. A vehicle accident which occurred at Shoalwater Bay a couple of months ago has been hushed up by Defence (see earlier blog posts). Although two crew members were injured, no details are provided on request. Was this another PMV? When will the safety of RAAC personnel be put before crass Defence cost saving directives?
PS. Mr Soutar has amended one of his posts on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page to say” Also you crew commanders of Bushmasters are not called mere truck drivers” I’ve suggested that he decide on the appropriate words with the SoA (see below).
—————————————————————————————-
5 April 2018 The On-Going RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’: Part III (RAAC ‘Truckies’)
Last month, I asked: “Will the SoA act to safeguard RAAC ARES personnel operating PMVs (and their passengers) … by ensuring that they meet designated competency standards [during their training]?”.
I received the following response:
“Your belief is that RAAC Reserve soldiers are crewman. This is in fact not the case, the trade of our reserve soldiers is a Light Cavalry Scout. There are no vehicle qualifications as a part of the Light Cavalry Scout training continuum. All of their RAAC Employment Spec training is dismounted. This provides a capability that the ACR can use.
The provision of the protected lift capability is a secondary task dictated by COMD 2 DIV. The PMV is not an AFV and has nil requirement for a “commander”, it is just a truck, that requires a licence code. The training for that code is owned by RACT, as it is only a truck.”
The above policy position seems to be supported by the Corps RSM who stated in the recent Ironsides that: ‘the RAAC does not operate the Bushmaster PMV-M”.
It’s hard to rationalise the above denials of any responsibility for ensuring the safety of RAAC personnel, with the article in today’s Army Newspaper. http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/
Page 22 includes a feature about a 1/15 RNSWL PMV crew commander during Exercise Telopea Run (5 Bde). “A highlight of the exercise was seeing a full cavalry squadron [C Sqn, 1/15 RNSWL] on the go.” This is not bad for a dismounted unit which does not operate the PMV and whose members have no vehicle qualifications (other than truck licences). “We provided support by fire [for the attack on Docra Airstrip].”
Of course, if the enemy had counter-attacked, 1/15 RNSWL could have just relied on the fact there is a ‘nil requirement’ for RAAC PMV crew commanders .,.. so neither they, nor the PMVs, were really there.
How long before penny pinching cost savings which refuse to acknowledge a responsibility to adequately train RAAC personnel commanding PMVs, results in more accidents and possibly deaths.
————————————————————————————————-
1 July 2018
Mr Soutar’s ‘Toilet Door’
Mr Soutar has stated on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page, that “if you are going to quote me please do not cherry pick what I say”. To appease his concern, I’ve copied a post from his FB page, in full, below.
“Ok this post is for all my old Army mates and members of the 1st Armd Regt Assn. Guy’s [sic] a pretty important event will soon be soon with the Assn’s AGM in Canberra on the 14th Jul 2018. It will be a turning point for this Assn with its very survival depending upon the out come [sic]. Every member will have a chance to influence the outcome by either attending and voting in person or sending in a proxy vote. Last year I heard a lot of blow hardship [sic] promise the world and watched them sit on their hands. These people amaze me, they whinge long and hard about the Assn but will not get off the arses and do something. Keith Meloncelli has decided to run for the presidents [sic] job and I think if he gets in the it is a positive for our Assn. For too long the new members of the Regt have been given bugger all respect and it seems that the Assn has been in the hands of one particular group hell bent on destroying it. The Assn is a fantastic group and in the hands of the younger guys and we all learn old and new learn to respect each other more. It is also my plan to keep the Assn Attack Dog firmly in the kennel!”.
It is clear that Mr Soutar believes that the current C’tee has:
(i) given “bugger all respect’ to new members of the Regt;
(ii) mismanaged the Assn’s affairs to such an extent that the Assn’s very survival is now in jeopardy; and
(iii) promised the world and then sat on their hands (in other words, “whinged long and hard, yet not got off their arses to do something”); placing the Assn in the “hands of the younger guys” is now the only hope.
Another post, this time on the 1AR Assn Members’ Only FB page:
“There has been the usual BS by the usual suspect that I having been having a go at the current Committee. As you all know this person never allows the truth get in the way of a good story.”
Given that I’m likely to be the ‘usual suspect’, why on earth would I suggest that Mr Soutar was “having a go at the current Committee”?
It’s hard to avoid this impression, given that, in his view, they are all blowhards who don’t respect new members of the Regt and have mismanaged the Assn to the extent that it’s very survival is in jeopardy. Apart from these ‘trifling’ concerns, Mr Soutar seems to be right behind them
Yet another post from him on the 1AR Assn FB
“ I believe someone rang the Sec complaining about this post. Firstly read the post at no time did Richard mention numbers. It was a general comment that this year there have been a lot of returns as apposed [sic] to other years. I have no idea who these proxies are for. To this person, before before [sic] you go running to teacher whinging and crying read the post and fact check. It seems our little spy has been busy, it is a good thing you cannot see what is being said on the 5 Bravo’s you would have a complete hissy fit! Lol!!!
“5 Bravo’s [sic]” is Mr Soutar’s closed FB page. The clear implication from the above, is that he uses this site to run down (behind their back), those whom he isn’t prepared to challenge publicly. Why am I not surprised?
Just for the record, if someone rang the Sec 1AR Assn as stated above, it was not me. I guess there must be at least two ‘little spies’. What sort of lizard boasts that he has criticised someone in a place and manner that that person cannot see??
Mr Soutar refers to my Blog as the “toilet door”. I guess the significance of this depends on the side from which one’s looking at the door. I have a feeling that he’s on the inside ripping up newspaper!
Mr Soutar’s Response (it only took two hours before he posted the following on the 1AR Assn FB page):
It appears I have upset someone again. Yes I do run another page called the 5 B’s and yes it is controlled tightly on its membership. Most of the people on it are also members here. The reason it is tightly controlled is that is what the people on it have asked for. It is a secret group but if you have any idea about FB you would understand why. No amount of crying, whinging or foot stamping is going to make me open it up to those I have excluded. You are excluded for very good reasons and that will not change and there is nothing anyone can do to change that. On the 5 B’s there is no slagging anyone off and that is strictly enforced. So complaining will not change a thing, it will remain what it is so suck it up!!!
So “there is no slagging anyone off and this is strictly enforced”! So why is it that he stated: “it is a good thing you cannot see what is being said on the 5 Bravo’s you would have a complete hissy fit! Lol!!!”?? . Why, therefore, would I have a “hissy fit” if I was to read the posts? Maybe Mr Soutar thinks that I would not be able to keep up with the rationale debate (ie. arguments for and against proposals for the betterment of members) associated with the future of the 1AR Assn. He seems to think that I want to join his FB page … he must have tickets on himself, that’s the last thing I would want to do. I just fail to understand why anyone would boast about bagging someone else when that person is not able to see what they’ve said. Sounds a bit gutless to me.
—————————————————————————————————————-
30 June 2018
‘Due Recognition’: What’s Happening?
A new C’tee will be taking the reins in a couple of weeks. They will obviously have priorities. I wonder where By-Laws will fall?
With respect to By-Laws generally, the following comment was made re the draft Constitution: “Rule 89: Reference is made to: “Discipline Principles set out in the Association’s by-laws”. As far as I’m aware, neither By-Laws nor Discipline Principles exist. If they were to be drafted, they would have to be approved by members. Amendment [of the draft Constitution] is required. “
The C’tee’s response was: “Rule 10 of the revised Constitution provides for the Management committee to make, amend or repeal by-laws, not inconsistent with these rules, for the internal management of the Association. ACTION TAKEN: NIL”
I find that I’m left wondering. “Discipline Principles set out in the Association’s by-laws”, but By-Laws don’t exist, therefoe, there are no Discipline Principles … no amendment??
This leads into the matter as to where things will stand with the new C’tee re By-Laws.
At the 2015 AGM, two motions were proposed by me. The relevant Minutes are copied below:
“Honours and Awards. Action to be taken by 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee when a member or someone who has had a strong association with 1st Armd Regt becomes the recipient of an award such as, but not limited to, that announced in the Australia Day or Queen’s Birthday Honours List. Motion 04/15: That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee consider the most appropriate manner and style of congratulations to be conveyed to the recipient on behalf of the Assn, post the agreed ‘protocol’ on the Assn’s website, and thereafter act accordingly.
This is currently done via letters of congratulations from the Association. Procedure will be written into Association By-Laws Carried
Death. Action to be taken by 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee when a member or someone who has had a strong association with 1st Armd Regt dies.
Motion 05/15: That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee consider the most appropriate manner and style of sympathy to be conveyed to the deceased’s NOK on behalf of the Assn, post the agreed ‘protocol’ on the Assn’s website, and thereafter act accordingly.
This is currently done by letters of congratulations. Procedure will be written into Association By-Laws.” [A pity about the typo.]
Of course, as we know, there are no Association By-Laws. One could ask what recognition was made by the C’tee on behalf of Assn members for the honour awarded to the Head of Corps in the last QB List, or what will be done for the coming funeral of a former RSM. There is no communication and members have no input. [I even drafted a detailed draft ‘protocol’ on suggested actions to be followed if a member became aware of a relevant death or award … it seems, however, that this has been ‘lost’.]
A related matter. A member enquired some years ago, whether or not he would be permitted to have the 1 Armd Regt flag used to cover his coffin. The RTR Assn use a special Drape (ie. an oversize regimental flag) that they hire out to NOK for use at funerals. I advised the C’tee that, in my opinion, permission was vested in 1 Armd Regt, but that I’d be surprised if they would not allow the 1AR Assn to do the same, ie. have a drape made up. I’ve made a number of enquiries since, without response. Would it not be something for a former RSM’s coffin to be covered in this way, should he have so wished?
———————————————————————————————–
29 June 2018
The Apology Saga II
The blog post on 21 June provides the background. In retrospect, I don’t think I should have apologised as I did. The mistake was corrected before anyone contacted me and I would have been better to have provided an explanation (as happens with other publications, newspapers etc). I have emailed Mr James accordingly, as below:
“Hi Russ,
You said in your email to me that you had “been contacted by many Vietnams Veterans over the weekend, and asked to indicate to you how angry they were…. . Your blog with the title, ‘Doing the Right Thing’ has done the wrong thing and Vietnam Veterans in particular want an apology. Changing the words to exclude ‘Vietnam’ in insufficient and you should publish an apology on your daily blog, as well as public apologies to the face book pages of 1 Armd Regt Assoc (members only), 1 Armd Regt Social and 1 Armd Regt (past and Present).”
I asked that you let me know who these ‘many Vietnam veterans’ were who contacted you, so that I could apologise direct. But you haven’t done so.
I provided my email address on my blog so that anyone who was offended could let me know and I could apologise personally. None have done so.
Please tell me …. how many Vietnam veterans contacted you to ask that you “indicate to [me] how angry they were” that I had made a mistake on my blog (that was corrected before you emailed me)?
Also … can you please tell me why were you chosen as the person to represent these veterans and indicate their anger to me? Why could they not do so themselves (too scared perhaps?). You are obviously the fearless ‘go to man’ in such matters.
Given that you yourself are standing for election …
I put it to you that someone saw the mistake on my Blog when I said that I’d served with another candidate in Vietnam (an honest mistake on my part which was quickly corrected when the candidate informed me of my error) … you were contacted to confirm the mistake from the records you maintain and you decided to maximise your own election chances by demanding the most public of apologies on behalf of ALL the ‘supposed’ outraged Vietnam veterans who were frothing at the mouth in anger.
You knew that I had already corrected the mistake, before you emailed me. A ‘heinous’ offence had been committed, nevertheless, and you (and dare I say it, Mr Soutar) weren’t going to let such an opportunity go by during the election period. It was not good enough that the mistake had been corrected. Instead of the other candidate and I serving together in Vietnam, we’d served together for a year prior to that.
Why is changing my wording to exclude Vietnam, ie. correct the mistake, “insufficient”? Presumably the strident demands of veterans were such that you had no choice, other than to represent their hostility to the very best of your ability. Is this why you demanded your fellow candidate (who had been misrepresented by me and had done absolutely nothing wrong) apologise for my mistake to ALL Australian servicemen and servicewomen who have ever been deployed on operations?
Once again, will you tell me who was offended by my blog post, so that I can apologise personally (in addition to my public apology)?
Many thanks, Bruce”
Should anyone wish to follow up with Mr James re the above … rf.james@bigpond.com
————————————————————————————————
28 June 2018
When Does a Donation Create a “Constructive Obligation”?
The Author’s Note in the history of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam (published in 2012) states:
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author ave been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours. “
The Association Committee was represented at the book launch and provided bank account details for the Publisher to pay royalties direct to the Association for use as the C’tee thought appropriate over time. There was no constraint, nor ‘obligation’, imposed by me on how any funds that might accrue should be spent, other than the expectation that they would be used “to assist the Association’s endeavours”. I trusted the C’tee of the Association not to use the funds for any other purpose (e.g. personal advantage).
Some years later, lawyers hired by the C’tee advised accountants hired by the C’tee that when I made the donation to the Assn, “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds” was created; this obligation only being removed when the donated funds were returned to me.
As made clear at the time of the donation, the funds were donated to assist with the purposes of the 1AR Assn, in any way the C’tee thought fit, i.e. there was no constraint, nor obligation, with respect to the use of the funds
Other members have subsequently made donations. Have these members also created “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds” and will the Assn have to refund the donations to them to discharge this obligation? If this situation arises, there would seem to be little point in anyone donating funds to the Assn.
If, on the other hand, these donations don’t create “a constructive obligation”, (i) why don’t they? and (ii) why did my donation so do?
It would seem important to inform members that either they can’t make donations; or if they can, what the criteria is that they must meet to avoid a ‘constructive obligation’ being formed. Would a donation made solely for the purpose of maintaining Centurion 169005, for example, create a ‘constructive obligation’?
This was in my mind when I commented on the draft Constitution, suggesting that where “donations” were mentioned, clarification re what constitutes a ‘constructive obligation’ should be made.
The C’tee’s response was that : “Decisions concerning the acceptability or otherwise of individual donations must be left with the Executive and Management Committees as each case arises”. I guess that clarifies everything.
————————————————————————————————
27 June 2018
Viet Nam Today. Following on from the post on 25 June, the Vietnamese Community in Australia will be protesting on 7 July in front of Vietnamese and Chinese Embassies and Consulates with regard the Viet Nam’s intention to grant 99 year leases to China for three ‘Special Economic Zones’ on the coast of Viet Nam (north, centre and south). Unsurprisingly, the SEZs are thought to have military purposes.
————————————————————
BS by Me or Hypocrisy by Mr Soutar?
Definition: “Hypocrisy: A situation in which someone says the opposite of what they say at another time”.
(1) Recently: “It gives me great pleasure to see that Keith Meloncelli, John ‘Tubby’ Brooker, Russ James and Mark Reid will be standing for President, Vice President, Secretary and Committee Member respectively. [Since deleted from Members’ FB]
Now: “I have no team Soutar”.
(2) Recently: “In these guys’ hands [ie. those above whom Mr Soutar supports for election] the Assn will come out from under the cloud it has been under in the last few years, I can assure all of you who are sick and tired of the past bullshit [that the current C’tee is responsible for] these guy’s [sic] will be a new broom who will not stand from any bullshit from anyone including me.” [Since removed from Members’ FB page]
Now: “…whoever is elected to the new Committee will do a great job”.
(3) Recently “Last year I heard a lot of blowhards promise the world and watched them sit on their hands. These people amaze me, they whinge long and hard about the Assn but will not get off the [sic] arses and do something”.[Personal FB page]
Now: “… it has been a great time under the current Committee … and I thank them for their hard work and complete honesty with the members.
(4) Recently: “… the Assn’s “very survival depend[s] upon the outcome” of the coming AGM. [Personal FB page]
Now: “I am grateful to the current Committee for the job they have do of keeping this fantastic Assn afloat through very difficult and trying times”.
Conclusion:
Now: “There has been the usual BS by the usual suspect [me, I think] that I having been having [sic] a go at the current Committee”.
BS by me or hypocrisy by Mr Soutar??
———————————————————————————————-
26 June 2018
The PTSD ‘Crisis’
To: The Hon Darren Chester MP, Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
“Dear Minister,
A PTSD Initiative Like No Other
It has been recommended to me that I contact you about a project which could make an enormous difference to those who suffer from PTSD today and might do so in the future, while simultaneously highlighting the qualities of Australians which make our Nation so great.
This is not an appeal for funds. Simply an attempt to place the outline of an incredible true story before those who have the appreciation and skills to advance such a project. Family members stand ready to provide all rights and assist with their research and the resulting documentation that has been uncovered. (Many of the original documents have already been passed to the State Library of Western Australia)
It is a largely unknown story … about an Australian serviceman who deserves to be recognised; as well as a true pioneer whose adventurous spirit was that which was so essential to the making of our nation. Arthur Richardson’s descendants recently researched his life and were astounded at what they uncovered. A synopsis is attached (it takes 10 minutes to read, please please do so). [See ‘ArtieX’ at bottom]
A book could be written, but the visual canvas is so dramatic that it is likely that only film could capture it fully. A re-enactment of the first round Australia bicycle ride is quite a feasible proposition. There would be sponsors, as there were in 1899. But what of the broader story … who would want to invest in the re-creation of this?
All soldiers who have been to war are confronted by the same demons. This story shows that no matter how strong, resourceful, or well-connected you are … the consequences can be the same. This is a narrative that a government/private enterprise partnership could bring to life for the wider understanding and well-being of communities everywhere (both in Australia and overseas).
I believe that this could be an enormous awareness raising platform for the disastrous effects of PTSD left untreated … charity screenings, donation envelopes etc, as well as being a potential box office hit in its own right (whilst telling a truly memorable Australian story). I can imagine a film, the ending of which, would be very confronting for the audience (making them much more aware of the PTSD crisis in our midst, than any other initiative has been able to do so far).
If you consider it worthy, could you please ask your staff to advise how this project might be best progressed.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
PS. I have also written to your colleague, The Hon Paul Papalia CSC MLA (WA Minister for Defence Matters and Tourism) about this.
“ … former members of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces and their families who remain in Viet Nam have been, and continue to be, subject to the most inhumane persecution imaginable …apart from lack of health care and employment opportunities, their cemeteries have been bulldozed, their graves vandalised, they are barred from worship and they are unable to bury their loved ones with dignity. If Australia’s veterans are to show solidarity with the current Government in Viet Nam, positive steps must be seen to be taken with respect to human rights reform (particularly as it applies to their fellow comrades-in-arms and their families).
The result of the above concern was that the proposed commemorative lapel pin, to be given out to all attending the 50th Commemoration of Coral-Balmoral, was withdrawn. {It turned out that these lapel pins were ‘left over’ from the Long Tan 50th Anniversary Commemorations, which Viet Nam cancelled.] It was the same story in 2011 … the President of the RSL (acting together with the Australian Government) proposed that the RSL enter into an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam. RSL members protested that this should not happen until Vietnam stopped the appalling abuse of former ARVN soldiers and their families. It was proposed that the RSL make this a pre-condition of any MOU … the RSL declined to do so, however, and the MOU proposal was withdrawn.
Human rights improvements, as preconditions to favourable international treatment of Vietnam, are being demanded by others …. Our Government must do much much more in this space!!
“Some demonstrators were also opposing a proposed cybersecurity law that gives authorities wide discretion to censor free expression and collect information on online dissidents. On Tuesday, the National Assembly passed the law, which will go into effect January 1, 2019.
The mass protests were a rare sight in a country that severely restricts the right to freedom of assembly. Authorities require approval for public gatherings and refuse permission for meetings or marches they deem politically unacceptable. Surveillance, harassment, and detention are employed to prevent activists from participating in public events. At least 135 political prisoners are currently serving sentences for exercising their basic freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and religion.
The Vietnamese government should ensure that security forces respect basic human rights standards on the use of force, including in dispersing illegal demonstrations. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provide that officials “shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force.” When using force is unavoidable, officials must exercise restraint and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense.
The protests and sweeping police response are taking place as the European Union considers ratifying its free trade agreement with Vietnam.
“The crackdown on these protests is one more stain on Vietnam’s human rights record,” Adams said. “The EU should signal that any improved economic ties are contingent on the government reversing its repressive treatment of activists and critics, including releasing the scores of detained protesters. Vietnam needs to know that the world is watching this situation unfold.”
This article was published by the Human Rights Watch on the 15th of June 2018.
————————————————————————————————-
24 June 2018
Is This a Just Rule?
1AR Assn Draft Constitution states, Rule 30 (1), that: “The membership of a personceases on resignation, expulsion or death.”
This would seem right and proper, ie. “expulsion” would be a consequence of disciplinary procedures which are stipulated in the Constitution …. action taken in this respect being made known and justified to members.
BUT … there is another reason that that membership of a person can cease, which is contained elsewhere in Constitution. Rule 19 states that
(2)” A renewal of membership shall be treated by the Management Committee in the same manner as an application for membership including due diligence”; and
(4:) “A decision to reject a renewal of membership shall be final and binding on all parties”.
So … a person applies to join the Assn; they meet the requirements; are accepted by the C’tee; and pay their m’ship fees. The C’tee has stated that when their m’ship comes up for renewal they MAY be “invited … to pay membership fees for the next period of time”.
We now have a situation whereby a member who has not been subject to any disciplinary action, may or may not be invited to rejoin, and, if they are, may or may not have their application approved. As with refusing an initial application for m’ship, the C’tee does not have to give any reason for their decision.
It would seem that there are, in effect, two disciplinary C’tees; an ‘official’ one appointed to investigate an offence and an ‘unofficial’ one, ie the Management C’tee, acting in this capacity, to consider whether or not to approve a person’s membership renewal. In the case of the ‘official’ disciplinary action, actions have to be justified; in the case of the ‘unofficial’ c’tee … they do not.
Is this fair and just?
The ‘secret’ powers (in the sense of the power to take action which does not require reason or justification to be given to either those directly affected or members generally) granted to the C’tee by the Constitution, do not stop as per the above.
Rule 16 states that a prospective member has to pass “a fit and proper person test, as established by the Association from time to time, to verify their eligibility”. The C’tee have advised, in response to a query, that the test does not have to be agreed by members generally; ie. the C’tee themselves can decide on the test (and change it whenever they wish) and use it to bar a prospective member, with neither explanation nor justification.
Surely, the 1AR Assn does not need such draconian ‘secret’ measures and can operate on an open and transparent basis whereby reasons are given to members for decisions which are made on their behalf.
——————————————————————————————————
23 June 2018
‘Dignified'(?) Snow Domes
See Blog post 15 November 2017 for background. Letter to the AWM Director on 13 November 2017 copied below. See Dr Nelson’s response … blog post 5 December 2017.
Update: Dr Nelson agreed that the item did not honour the objectives of the AWM and he asked his staff to discontinue the line. I subsequently visited the AWM shop and saw that it had been removed, BUT earlier this week I noticed it was on the shelf again.
I contacted Dr Nelson, and, to his credit, he responded immediately to apologise and advise that it had been removed.
———————————————————————————.
Dear Dr Nelson,
Many congratulations on the fine work that the AWM has undertaken during your period as Director. Your leadership has been very evident in the fitting and dignified fashion in which the sacrifices of Australians who have died in war, have been commemorated.
In May 2013, you were interviewed by the Canberra Times in relation to promotional products to be sold at the AWM shop. You stated emphatically that “there will be no kitsch such as snow domes on sale”.
‘Magical look snow globes’ are currently stocked and promoted by the AWM shop. These feature ‘the Memorial building and a selection of icons which represent our permanent displays’. The icons are depicted with cartoon like eyes, similar to the imagery that Disney productions are known for.
One of the icons featured is a Centurion tank that was crewed by Australian soldiers during the Vietnam War. During the time I commanded it, our driver was wounded by shrapnel from an enemy anti-tank rocket. He was permanently disabled as a consequence. Trooper Peter Cadge was Mentioned in Despatches, when, despite his very serious head wounds, he endeavoured to go to the aid of the remainder of the crew who he believed were trapped in a burning tank.
It is hard to accept that the representation of the tank he was driving, as shown above, is a ‘fitting and dignified’ means of commemorating his service, his sacrifice, and the on-going suffering he continues to experience today. Of course, the consequential hardships involved are shared by his family.
Would you please consider removing the ‘magical look snow globe’ from the stock on sale at the AWM shop.
Many thanks for your consideration,
Yours sincerely …
———————————————————————————————–
22 June 2018
“He claims that I have a team in the up and coming election.”. “What utter complete bullshit and drivel!”
This is what Mr Soutar stated on the 1AR Assn Members’ Only FB page on 18 June.
There are obviously two questions: (i) did I make such a claim and (ii) if I did, why?
Let’s look at the ‘facts’.
The following message (inter alia) was posted on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page by Mr Soutar on 7 June:
“It gives me great pleasure to see that Keith Meloncelli, John ‘Tubby’ Brooker, Russ James and Mark Reid will be standing for President, Vice President, Secretary and Committee Member respectively.
In these guys’ hands, the Assn will come out from under the cloud it has been under in the last few years, I can assure all of you who are sick and tired of the past bullshit these guy’s will be a new broom who will not stand from any bullshit from anyone including me. What is needed now is proxies to help these guys to carry the day … “.
I responded (see Blog for 10 June) with a post to say:
“Dear Anthony, ‘Team Soutar’ is obviously hand-picked. They “will not stand from (sic) any bullshit from anyone” and they will make the 1AR Assn a place where “where old and new members can be treated with the full respect they are due” . Why is it that others standing for election are unable, in your opinion, from doing the same?”[There has been no reply to the question at the end.]
Is it ‘b/s’ and drivel to claim that Mr Soutar has selected a team? Why did he nominate the members he did and not all of those standing for election?
One would think that someone such as Mr Soutar would stand by the things he states, but what does the 7 June post on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page from Mr Soutar NOW say?
“Guy great news, with the announcement with guy’s like Mel, Tubby, Russ & Mark standing for committee positions. Thank you to the current committee for the fantastic job you have all done. I look forward to seeing a revitalised Assn progress in the future for all of its members!” [Compare the two, 7 June, above, and now.]
Is this a backflip or just a change of heart?
Before he changed his FB post, Mr Soutar was right behind the idea of “Team Soutar”.
Who’s pulling his strings?
———————————————————————————————–
21 June 2018
Sorry to have kept everyone waiting ,,, but everything has its priority in terms of importance etc. The ‘story’ is as set out below:
The Apology Saga
It’s taken me a couple of days to devote the requisite time to this. Many may well not be aware of it at all … so let’s start at the beginning:
This is part of the post on the Blog under for 15 June:
“I have sent my proxy form to Geoff Stelmach (Geoff will fill in his address details, depending which form is used). Geoff is standing for President and has put in considerable effort behind the scenes to assist the governance of the Assn. I served with him in 1970 and can vouch for his commitment to ‘doing the right “.
When I first posted it, I sent a copy to Geoff to let him know. He immediately responded to say that my original reference to “I served with him in Vietnam” was incorrect (he’d training with us for a year, but had broken his wrist just before deployment and wasn’t allowed to go). I last saw him at the funeral of my best mate, Warren Hind (Geoff had been in Warren’s Troop at Puckapunyal). In my mind, the memories came together and I thought that he’d been with us in Vietnam (the fact that I thought I knew him so well speaks greatly for the impression he made on me during the previous year in Puckapunyal).
Anyway … on 17 June I saw a post by Mr Soutar on the 1AR Assn FB Members Only Page … this stated that I had posted Geoff’s bio details on my Blog (which I knew wasn’t right, the bio info as per the Secretary is very different the two sentences posted above), I checked my Blog posts and saw that I hadn’t amended my incorrect statement re being with Geoff in Vietnam; I changed ‘Vietnam’ to ‘1970’.
So, for two days … there had been an incorrect statement on the Blog. What happens next? The following email is received from Mr R James on 18 June 2018:
“Good Afternoon Bruce,
I have been contacted by many Vietnams Veterans over the weekend, and asked to indicate to you how angry they were with your post stating that you had served in Vietnam with Geoff Stelmach, when in fact that person did not serve in Vietnam at any time. You are wrong! You demand the truth from others, now others expect no less from yourself.
Your blog with the title, ‘Doing the Right Thing’ has done the wrong thing and Vietnam Veterans in particular want an apology. Changing the words to exclude ‘Vietnam’ in insufficient and you should publish an apology on your daily blog, as well as public apologies to the face book pages of 1 Armd Regt Assoc (members only), 1 Armd Regt Social and 1 Armd Regt (past and Present). If, as you claim on your blog that, Geoff Stelmack [sic] is committed to doing the right thing, then you should also convince him to apologise on the previously mentioned face book pages. Mr Stelmach has been asked a number of questions and Vietnam Veterans expect these to be answered.
The only response that is required to this email is a public apology.
Crikey!
I felt that I had offended members of the Assn and misrepresented Geoff to his detriment when running for President. I must apologise.
I did so on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page. I pointed out how this was entirely my mistake, as evidenced by the fact that Geoff’s bio info as sent out to members by the Secretary makes no mention of Vietnam. I added that
“I hope that this explanation might be accepted, being made as it is by someone who has suffered a brain haemorrhage (stroke) and whose memory is such that he sometimes can’t even recall his own name (embarrassing having to get out your wallet) … this, of course, is why I can’t stand for election as I would dearly love to do; and why I respect so much all those who put themselves forward in this capacity.”
What I didn’t say was that Mr James had also emailed Geoff to demand that he publicly apologise ,as well, on behalf of the many incredibly angry Vietnam veteran members who had contacted him … not only on all the same FB pages, but also to every Australian serviceman and servicewomen who been deployed on operation service!! Incredible. It was not Geoff’s mistake, but Mr James is demanding that Geoff apologise on behalf of me!
I responded to Mr James to say that I would like to apologise personally to every Vietnam veteran member of the Assn whom I’d offended. I asked him to send contact info as appropriate. I’ve had no reply from him.
One of Mr James’ supporters, Mr Soutar, quickly followed up on the FB page, stating that I was a “pest” and that I had made a “grovelling excuse”. … encouraging members to “remember this” [ie. his opinion of me] when lodging their proxies at the AGM.
One of the things that matters to me is that, if I’ve offended anyone, they let me know so that I can apologise personally. My email address is cameronshome@bigpond.com.
(I would also apologise to every Australian serviceman and service woman who has been deployed on operations, but I’m not sure that DVA would provide addresses … maybe I should take out space in a national newspaper … don’t laugh, it might just happen; I might be old, but I’ll continue to keep trying to do the ‘right thing’, no matter what it takes.)
———————————————————————————————-
20 June 2018
Where Do We Stand?
I ask this question in relation to the recent allegations associated with operations in Afghanistan. I do so from a personal experience.
While researching a book I was writing about Vietnam, I read widely. One of the publications I read contained a very confronting account. Written by an infantryman, it was about a successful night ambush. A wounded enemy soldier could be heard moaning; company HQ was radioed and the response was; ‘Don’t bring back any prisoners!’. Following these orders, the ambush party stood up and emptied their magazines into the body of the wounded soldier.
What do I do? This is an account of, if not murder, then unlawful killing (offences for which there is no statute of limitations). The telephone book had a number for a Defence Whistle-blower hotline. I rang, but they don’t deal with murder, this was a matter for police. So I wrote to the Minister.
An investigation was conducted, but it was a whitewash. I wrote again and another investigation was conducted. There was no corroborating evidence from Army records. I had, by this time, contacted the author … he swore that what he had written was correct “right down to the last steel jacketed bullet”.
Of course, by now I had started to receive pressure from the infantry unit involved … I was supposedly bent on denigrating their reputation. The names of very senior officers were mentioned. To their credit, once I provided copies of the letters I’d written to the Minister, my motivation was accepted and supported.
How to achieve something positive from all this? I wrote to the Minister and asked for assurance that ADF training related to the Geneva Convention and Rules of Engagement was adequate. The response was that it was.
So where do you stand? Is ADF training adequate?
In my case, it was. During a tank night ambush in Vietnam two enemy were seen approaching (that is, two pairs of legs were seen through the very ‘ordinary’ starlight scopes provided at the time). Rules of Engagement said that we could not engage unless the enemy were positively identified (taken to mean, carrying weapons) … so what do we do? Count Down … Three, Two, One: Switch On! The order related to the tank searchlights which had been set up prior to the ambush.
I don’t know who got the biggest shock, us, or the largest buck deer anyone could imagine! (The four legs turned out to be attached to one animal, albeit a big one).
Tomorrow: ‘The Apology Saga’ (I’ve had to spend a fair bit of time on the above today.)
——————————————————————————————————-
19 June 2018
Re yesterday’s post … the Secretary has advised that he is working to have the financial statement finalised prior to the AGM, so that members might have a chance to understand it before the Meeting. How good is that!
Creating a Culture of Openness and Transparency or Being Vexatious?
A comment was made in relation to the drafting of the new 1AR Assn Constitution that “Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal”.
One possible follow-on from this was to ensure that the Constitution clearly stated that the C’tee must not use the offices of the Assn for anything other than the Assn’s Purposes as set out in the Constitution
The C’tee’s response was “It is now understood that the findings of the Army Fraud Unit are that there is no wrongdoing and therefore no case to answer. Continued reference to ‘illegal acts’ is considered vexatious”
I have not seen the “the Army Fraud Unit findings” and I take offence at the allegation of being vexatious.
I contend that knowingly or unknowingly, the C’tee has facilitated actions which are clearly outside the Purposes of the Assn and, even as a perceived Conflict of Interest, is clearly in breach of Defence regulations.
Background:
The Assn’s 2016/17 Financial statement referred to a “Donation made to the association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd $5,000.00. The company concerned was Rheinmetall Simulation Australia, an integral part of Rheinmetall Defence. It turned out that there had been at least three other similar payments received by the Assn and passed on to 1 Armd Regt.
Assessment:
Why couldn’t the company simply make donations direct to the Unit? Relevant Defence regulations are set out below. It is clear that donations (gifts) of money can’t be accepted. Money can be accepted as Sponsorship, however, there are specific rules governing how this is managed … in particular, the benefits to be accrued by the company in return for this sponsorship have to specified and high levels of approval are required.
Of course, no such sponsorship can be agreed to, if it involves a perceived Conflict of Interest. To avoid this, gifts or sponsorship cannot be accepted if the company involved is tendering for a defence procurement contract. In this case Rheinmetall Defence was one of two contenders for LAND 400, a multi-billion dollar AFV acquisition project (which they were awarded).
I recommend that the C’tee consider all aspects of this matter when informing members. In doing so, may I suggest that trying to bring about a culture of openness and transparency is a lot different to being vexatious. An apology would be welcomed.
Defence Ethical Relationship Policy Document
“Defence must deal with offers of gifts and hospitality in a transparent manner taking care to avoid any actual or perceived bias or conflict of interest”.
“If a supplier wishes to provide an individual or a team in Defence with a low value gift, it should be given openly and should not be offered at a time that could raise general concerns about conflict of interest (such as during a tender or a contract negotiation period).”
Defence Instruction Concerning Gifts and Sponsorships
Acceptance of Gifts or benefits will not be appropriate from a person or company if they are: involved in a tender process with the agency, either for the procurement of goods and services or sale of assets. It should not be assumed that Gifts of minor value are acceptable. Even token gifts that carry a company’s logo can create, in some circumstances, a perceived Conflict of Interest.
Officials must not accept cash as a Gift.
Sponsorship is an arrangement where a sponsor provides a contribution in money or in kind to support an activity in return for certain specified benefits. Officials must ensure that the acceptance of any Sponsorship does not give rise to a Conflict of Interest or compromise the Reputation of Defence.
Officials must not accept Sponsorship unless approved by the following: – Sponsorship valued at $10 000 or more must be approved by Senior Executive Service (SES) Band 3, O–9 (3-Star) or above. – Sponsorship valued at less than $10 000 must be approved by SES Band 2, O–8 (2-Star) or above
All Sponsorship revenue must be recorded in Defence’s Financial Management Information System (ROMAN).
What Would I Like to See Characterise the 1AR Assn?
Question. If candidates for the 1AR Assn C’tee were to be asked to state their ‘platforms’, what would I vote for?
Answer. This is what I would say:
(i) A commitment to Openness and Transparency in all things, eg. Minutes of C’tee Meetings made available to members; and financial statements circulated for consideration prior to AGMs;
(ii) A Program of Work, with priorities, for the coming year… established with the agreement of members;
(iii) Emphasis on Consultation with Members, eg. if an initiative is to be introduced, or changes made to the Constitution, members are asked for their views and input at the earliest possible stage;
(iv) A system of Communications Between C’tee and Members established so that members at any time might ask questions or make suggestions and be assured of receiving responses from the C’tee’;
(v) A system of Communication Between Members established so the members might freely discuss ideas for the betterment of the 1AR Assn and its endeavours;
(vi) A clear Policy Regarding Donations be established so that there is no confusion as to was is, or is not, an acceptable donation to the Assn;
(vii) A Commitment to Help Former or Serving Members who require assistance to manage their personal circumstances (rather than simply referring them to the RSL as agreed by RAAC Corporation members).
(viii) A Continuation of the Good Projects initiated by past C’tees; such as awards to 1 Armd Regt soldiers/students of merit and gift packs to those on operations.
————————————————————————————————————-
17 June 2018
1 AR Assn AGM 2018 and the 1AR Assn Members Only FB Page
On the 10 June post (Doing the Right Thing I) I raised the following concerns, related to Mr Soutar’s posts on the 1AR Assn FB page:
Sample Soutar post: “In these guys’ hands [ie. those Mr Soutar supports for election] the Assn will come out from under the cloud it has been under in the last few years, I can assure all of you who are sick and tired of the past bullshit [that the previous C’tee is responsible for] these guy’s will be a new broom who will not stand from any bullshit from anyone including me.”
I asked why others standing for election could not, in his opinion, could not do the same thing. No response.
I went on to say in the Blog that “It’s interesting that he is so critical of the current C’tee: ie, they dish out bullshit and don’t treat members with respect; because of them, the Assn has remained under a cloud and a new broom C’tee is needed to rightfully take back “our” Assn from the hands of those currently in charge. But it doesn’t stop there.
“Anthony Soutar’s personal FB page states that the Assn’s “very survival depend[s] upon the outcome” of the coming AGM.
Crikey! The current C’tee must have a lot to answer for. They seem to have given attention to the financial accounts and a new Constitution, surely this counts for something? It seems not.
Mr Soutar continues: “Last year I heard a lot of blowhards promise the world and watched them sit on their hands. These people amaze me, they whinge long and hard about the Assn but will not get off the [sic] arses and do something”.
—————
Surprise! Surprise! Mr Soutar has changed his mind. He now states on the 1AR Assn FB Page that “I believe this and any future committee has worked and will work bloody hard at making this a great Assn once again and because of that they will always have my support!”.
So the “blowhards’ and their bullshit … which previously needed a new broom to sweep them away in order to take back the Assn for the good of the members and to make it great again… are now his best mates; those who have worked “bloody hard” and who have his full support.
Can you believe anything that such people say? Are the current C’tee “blowhards” or ‘good guys’? Are they responsible for past bullshit or have they worked bloody hard on behalf of the members?
Even more importantly, does the “very survival [of the Assn] depend upon the outcome” of the coming AGM?. I asked the VP this (ie. what could make someone say such a thing), but have had no response (as is the same re my question as to whether or not Minutes were recorded for the 2017/18 C’tee Meetings?).
Why (i) is there such a secretive culture within organisations and (ii) does someone change his loudspeaker delivered personal opinion from black to white? (Could some incentive be involved?)
A number of us who have served on tanks on operations were pleased to read that the “Ha-Gō contained three crew: a driver who sat in the front proper right side of the hull; a gunner/mechanic who operated the 7.7-mm machine-gun in the lower portion of the hull in the proper left side; and the commander who stood behind the driver in the turret”.
We have been trying to get those responsible to amend this for some time. They state, however, that an actual crew list shows ‘four’.
Our research shows that a senior NCO was sometimes allocated to each tank to act as a guide (and this was the case with the Marine units).
We have recommended that a note be added to the Fact Sheet to indicate “Tactical guides were sometimes allocated” (or words to that effect).
—————————————————————————-
This has been a long ‘campaign’, but as they say … persistence is everything. The Ha Go is an important AWM exhibit and those studying its effect on the battlefield should not be misled about one of its principle characteristics, ie. its crew and their functions. Well done to Rod Ward for his continuing interest and expertise.
I posted the following on the 1AR Assn Members’ Only FB page earlier:
“I won’t be posting anything further on this means until after the AGM (unless I can help someone with specific information). For what it’s worth … I think I can see how it is that problems arise with the nature and tone of some posts. I believe that all such incidences can be sheeted home to someone expressing a personal opinion about someone else. It stands to reason that if you authoritatively state that someone is a “blowhard” or is “pathetic”, then there will be someone else who either disagrees with you or questions your authority for doing so.
If we can confine our input to matters of process, rather than individuals involved, then I’m sure that everyone’s involvement will add value to the Assn’s endeavours.”
The post is still there, though others which have relevance in terms of openness and transparency, have been removed.
I asked, for example, if Minutes of the 1AR Assn C’tee meetings for 2017/18 have been recorded and if so, if they could be made available to members who asked to see them.
The request was made to the VP on four occasions (initially to the designated email address and then on the FB page) and has been ignored each time. The Constitution requires that Minutes of C’tee Meetings be kept. The reasons for this in terms of accountability are obvious. Given the lack of response from the VP, the Secretary has been asked if this was done for 2017/18.
2018 AGM Proxy
I have sent my proxy form to Geoff Stelmach at g.stelmach@optusnet.com.au (Geoff will fill in his address details, depending which form is used). Geoff is standing for President and has put in considerable effort behind the scenes to assist the governance of the Assn. I served with him in 1970 and can vouch for his commitment to ‘doing the right thing’.
——————————————————————————————–
14 June 2018
‘Thorn in the Side’
I’ve had some bad press lately … people who criticise me for not providing messages of congratulation to those who are nominally responsible for achieving things. In a blog post a couple of days ago, I questioned who I was supposed to say ‘well done’ to on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page for the conduct of the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
A ‘thorn in the side’ is described as ‘someone or something that continuallycausesproblems for you’.
As a result of writing the story of Australian tank operations in Vietnam and becoming aware of the sacrifices made by RAAC crewmen and those who supported them, I’ve taken it upon myself to be a ‘thorn in the side’ of those who:
are not truthful and honest;
mislead those they are appointed to represent;
fail to meet their elected or official responsibilities;
put themselves before those they lead;
act in a mean-spirited manner (towards veterans in particular); and
are not open and transparent about dealings that affect those they represent.
I believe that sunlight is the best disinfectant for actions resulting from the above and will attempt to bring it to bear whenever possible.
While I do not believe in making personal insults, …
I do believe in congratulating those who ‘do the right thing’ at any level at any time, while giving credit to those who attempt to do so but are denied.
————————————————————————————————–
13 June 2018
Insults.
Why is it that some people delight in insulting others, almost making the occupation an ‘art’ form? Previously on the Blog I have posted my research into this and I won’t repeat the human characteristics which result in some people acting in this way.
Some of us (maybe even most of us) don’t like being insulted. Recently I was called “Brucie” on a public forum. I didn’t like this … but to respond in kind is a bit ‘schoolboyish’ and one would hope that we’ve grown out of that sort of behaviour. So what to do?
The person who insulted me has a nickname from his army service … ‘Poon’.
Now I don’t know why he was given that name. I didn’t even know what it meant … maybe it was something like ‘prune’. Then I referred to Google.
The first definition given was “simple or foolish person”.
That was an intellectual sort of nickname I thought. Then I looked at the Urban Dictionary!
I won’t say any more, however, now I think I understand.
————————————————————————————————–
12 June 2018
Original letter to the Minister is at the Blog post for 21 March 2018. I recently received a reply and have responded as below. (There were some interesting comments when I raised the issue on Trevor Hyde’s Tango and Tango Alpha Facebook page a couple of days ago.)
Dear Minister,
The Defence Budget, Soldiers’ Morale and Black Berets
I wrote to the Minister for Defence on 21 March 2018 about the recent policy requiring RAAC members to purchase their own berets (letter attached). Your Chief of Staff kindly responded on your behalf (letter attached).
I ask that you consider the following matters raised by Mr Curtin’s response:
“Every Australian soldier and officer is provided at Commonwealth expense, with two slouch hats complete with Corps specific embellishments…”. This seems incorrect. The Army Dress Manual ‘requires’ (i.e. this is not an optional matter) RAAC personnel to wear emu plumes with their slouch hats. The plumes, which are Corps specific embellishments, are not provided at Commonwealth expense.
“The beret is considered an important item of dress … to allow for the purchase of such items … each member of the Army … is provided a uniform allowance”. This, again, seems incorrect. Members of the Army Reserve are not provided with a uniform allowance. The uniform allowance, for those who receive it, is provided to “assist members maintain uniforms in good order and condition”, it is not provided (nor allowed to be used) to purchase optional items of uniform.
I, and many former and serving members of the RAAC, would be most grateful if you could ask Defence to explain:
Why RAAC members are required to pay privately for uniform items that are not optional, i.e. emu plumes which the Dress Manual requires that all RAAC members wear with slouch hats (the ‘official’ headdress);
Why you were advised that uniform allowance is the means provided for RAAC members to buy their berets, when the allowance is specifically excluded from being used for this purpose; and
Why you were advised that ALL members of the Army receive uniform allowance, when Army Reservists do not do so.
Finally, this a matter not about regulations … it’s a matter of ‘doing what is right’ in terms of provisions made by the Government to provide for those who serve the nation at the Government’s behest.
It is one thing to say that the beret is an optional item of dress and soldiers should pay for it. But who is it ‘optional’ for? It is not ‘optional’ for soldiers, for example, when they are ordered to buy one and wear it. The term ‘optional’ would seem to be applicable only when used in the context of savings for the Defence budget.
Please Minister, consider this matter and act accordingly to ‘do the right thing’ by Australian soldiers. The effect on the Budget is infinitesimal, the effect on morale is enormous. Should you require, I will be happy to initiate a petition to Government to demonstrate the extent of support for the principle which underpins this matter.
If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.”
A Story in Four Parts. (This provides an introduction and background to the Blog, which follows below on a daily basis.)
Once upon a time there was a 1AR Assn Members’ Forum. This was a page on the Assn’s website and members used it to keep in touch and discuss matters relevant to the Assn. Suddenly the Forum was closed. It was explained that it was costing members too much to keep operating. When it was discovered that this was not the case (ie. there was no cost to the Assn), the Forum was reopened.
The topic which was being discussed on the Forum when it was closed was a request for information about the history of the Centurion held by the Cairns Arty and Tank Museum. This led to a discovery that all the log books for the Centurions at Puckapunyal had mysteriously disappeared from the Tank Museum.
After the Forum was reopened, discussion on the topic continued. Suddenly the Forum was closed again. A number of reasons were given for the closure, all of which turned out to be untrue. One of them was that a post or posts on the Forum had brought the Assn into discredit. No-one was prepared to say what the post was or who had posted it. Misconduct by members was publicly announced as the reason for the closure.
One member lodged a grievance as provided for under the Constitution. He felt that members should be informed as to what their misconduct was and be given the opportunity to defend themselves. He also started a blog to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters.
While the grievance process was underway, members were informed that the Assn’s Constitution had to be changed. This was duly done, disciplinary provisions being extensively strengthened. The member who had submitted the grievance was now found to be guilty of misconduct under the new Constitution. He was expelled from the Assn and his grievance went unheard.
Part 2
Service in the military, no matter what capacity, inculcates a commitment to doing ‘the right thing’. This became obvious when a group of members banded together to lodge a grievance to protest at the lack of natural justice provided to the member who had been expelled. While preparing this they noticed that actions taken against the member were not in accord with the Assn’s Constitution.
Delving into this more deeply, they discovered that the process required to change the Constitution had not been followed. Furthermore, the reasons given to members for having to change it were not correct. The group sought advice from Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), the authority for associations incorporated in that State). The outcome was that the Constitution was declared to be invalid, as were actions taken on the basis of its provisions.
The group of members who had brought about this outcome, asked for an apology from those who had misled members as to the reasons for changing the Constitution. This was not forthcoming. Not long after, the President and other committee members resigned. The new President and Committee spent $960 of members’ funds to get an independent legal opinion re the Constitution.
The findings confirmed the view of CAV that the Constitution was invalid. Furthermore, any member adversely affected by it was entitled to take action against the Association. The member who had been expelled was reinstated. He agreed not to seek an apology so as to avoid causing any divisiveness in the association.
The new C’tee examined the original Constitution and found valid reasons for changing it, eg. the CAV’s default ‘Model Rules’ are ok for a State based association, but have limitations as far as a national organization is concerned. A proposed draft was sent to members. The group which had taken action against the now invalid constitution saw that the required process was still not being adopted (by oversight).
Bringing this to the attention of the C’tee stirred up something of a hornets’ nest among some members of the Assn. Social media went into a frenzy, accusing ‘constitutionalists’ of forcing younger members to leave the association because they had become fed up with “rules and BS” which mean nothing to them.
This is a recognized situation within many ex-service organizations. At least one PhD thesis is being compiled on the subject of maintaining the interest of younger members. The C’tee have been put in touch with the author. As one member of the ‘constitutionalists’ has stated, however, the Constitution is the members’ contract with their association. It must be got right, both for the members’ and Association’s sake. There is no other option. Those donating their time and energy to help the C’tee ensure the Constitution is a valid one, should be thanked, not persecuted, by the wider membership.
Part 3
The C’tee decided to withdraw what would’ve been an illegal constitution if the draft had been approved by members. A new draft constitution is now being prepared by the members group (who have invested immense time and energy in the matter), incorporating the changes desired by the C’tee, but based on the CAV Model Rules. (It seems that the earlier draft may have been based on the NSW Department of Fair Trading Rules, which are different to those required of an association incorporated in Victoria).
The Assn AGM was held on 8 July 2017. It augured well for the Assn that there are a number of members who are prepared to stand for the vacant C’tee positions. There was hope that a valid and well thought through Constitution would soon be able to be presented to members for approval.
Part 4
A powerful ‘clique’ gathered at the AGM, intent on installing ‘their men’ in a number of C’tee positions. They addressed the AGM, venting their spleens … the person who had been expelled and reinstated, was described as a bully and a coward, “a bad apple who needs to be cut out”. The clique’s candidate for President referred to the need to clear out “disruptive” elements in his pre-election speech. Once a new Constitution was finalised, the findings of the original disciplinary hearing would simply be enforced again. The ‘clique’ didn’t attend the 1AR Birthday Dinner on the evening of the AGM … they gathered instead at a local hotel. The retiring Vice President expressed his disgust at this on social media
It has subsequently been discovered that considerable irregularities occurred in the conduct of the AGM: in particular, there were enormous discrepancies with proxy voting; the numbers of votes stated in the AGM Minutes were 30% more than figures given at the meeting to those attending; membership records were inaccurate and wrongly disallowed at least one member from voting; a person addressed the meeting, described as a “financial Affiliate Member”, but there is no provision for affiliate members in the Constitution; another ‘member’ addressed the meeting, but there is no mention of him in the list of those attending; and the financial statement was not certified by the C’tee as being true and correct, it did not cover the whole FY and did not disclose the reasons that funds had been expended.
All irregularities with respect to the Constitution have been brought to the attention of the C’tee, however, no response has been received. Six weeks after his election, the Treasurer resigned, stating that “when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow”. (There had been three previous Treasurers in the past 12 months.)
It is to be hoped that governance provisions as required by law can be enacted so that the Assn will be able move ahead with its good work looking after former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt.
The blog continues below, the story remains unfinished
—————————————————————————————————–
11 June 2018
The Black Beret and a Silver Badge.
Just in case the following post was missed on the 1 AR Assn Members’ Only FB page a couple of months ago, it’s copied below.
“What’s he see when he turns off the light?
How much more pain will be due in his life?
Isn’t it enough that he fought for what’s right?
What does he see when he closes his eyes?”
This refrain (which will stay with you once you hear it) is from a song by Natalie Atkins on a cd just released in time for the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration. Natalie is the daughter of John ‘Shorty’ Atkins, tank crew commander in Vietnam. She wrote the song for her father.
The song backs the The Black Beret and a Silver Badge, which is an adaptation of the Ballard of the Green Beret, originally devised at Nui Dat by Bill Burton and John Atkins. With help from the AWM and permission from Barry Sadler’s NOK, it has been recorded with the aim of raising funds for two ‘seeing eye’ or ‘assistance’ dogs for veterans of recent conflicts who need them.
Who knows maybe ten dogs will be able to be provided (heavens knows we all wish they weren’t needed).
Well done to Bill for his efforts in bringing this project to fruition. The best contact to order is bill.burton19@bigpond.com
———————————————————————————————————-
10 June 2018
The 1AR Assn 2018 AGM
The following message was posted on the 1AR Assn Members Only FB page by Anthony Soutar on 7 June:
“It gives me great pleasure to see that Keith Meloncelli, John ‘Tubby’ Brooker, Russ James and Mark Reid will be standing for President, Vice President, Secretary and Committee Member respectively.
In these guys’ hands, the Assn will come out from under the cloud it has been under in the last few years, I can assure all of you who are sick and tired of the past bullshit these guy’s will be a new broom who will not stand from any bullshit from anyone including me.
What is needed now is proxies to help these guys to carry the day. Several people are going to the AGM in Canberra including Dave Paterson & Dave Key.
For proxies to be valid you must be a fully paid up member of the Assn. A proxy form can be down loaded scanned & emailed to Secretary@paratus.org.au or mail to The Secretary, 1ST Armd Regt Assn Inc. PO Box 60, Bandiana MILPO3694
The ball is now in our court and we the members have a chance to rightfully take back our Assn. It is up to us to make sure this happens and the Assn can be a place where old and new members can be treated with the full respect they are due.
It means many things to many different people. For me I have never lost sight of its true mean, brotherhood, friends for life and a sense of pride that I still have today.
I responded with a post to say:
“Dear Anthony, ‘Team Soutar’ is obviously hand-picked. They “will not stand from (sic) any bullshit from anyone” and they will make the 1AR Assn a place where “where old and new members can be treated with the full respect they are due” . Why is it that others standing for election are unable, in your opinion, from doing the same?”
It’s interesting that he is so critical of the current C’tee: ie, they dish out bullshit and don’t treat members with respect; because of them, the Assn has remained under a cloud and a new broom C’tee is needed to rightfully take back “our” Assn from the hands of those currently in charge. But it doesn’t stop there.
Anthony Soutar’s personal FB page states that the Assn’s “very survival depend[s] upon the outcome” of the coming AGM. Crikey! The current C’tee must have a lot to answer for. They seem to have given attention to the financial accounts and a new Constitution, surely this counts for something? It seems not. Mr Soutar continues: “Last year I heard a lot of blowhards promise the world and watched them sit on their hands. These people amaze me, they whinge long and hard about the Assn but will not get off the arses and do something”.
Interestingly, Mr Soutar has removed his original post on the 1AR Assn (Members Only) FB page (above) and replaced it with:
“Guy great news, with the announcement with guy’s like Mel, Tubby, Russ & Mark standing for committee positions I have had a rush of younger guy’s asking me how do they join the Assn. I have also had a few ex members contact me saying they are going to rejoin. Thank you to the current committee for the fantastic job you have all done. I look forward to seeing a revitalised Assn progress in the future for all of its members!” (No mention of his personal favourites, nor criticism of the current C’tee.)
My response (above) to Soutar’s original post has been deleted. I guess there is no surprise in that.
———————————————————————————————-
9 June 2018
Binh Ba 50th Anniversary Commemoration II
Following on from yesterday, the Chairman RAAC Corporation advises (on the 3 Cav Forum) that:
“Colin [Toll} will be the main B Sqn 1AR POC and will liaise with his BB veterans”
Hopefully Colin would’ve been aware of this, but sadly this was not the case: “Oh! That is news to me…. Where did you hear that?”
“Comms, should we get funding approval, will be strictly via email or phone between myself [Chairman. RAAC Corporation] and the heavy lifters (Dallas and Colin), other specific cc addressees and the Commemorative Committee.”
Surprisingly Ray De Vere is not named as one of the 3 Cav “heavy lifters”.
“ the President of the Repat Commission Maj Gen Mark Kelly requires a formal submission seeking funding approval, to be lodged. That has been done.”
The RAAC Corporation has been asked if the formal funding request for BB Commemorations submitted by the Corporation, was made in conjunction with 5RAR? If not, what consultation has occurred with them?
,
From DVA: It is vital to have regard to the fact funding has not yet been approved. The reality is, we’ll just have to wait out until word comes down from Higher, regarding funding. I personally do not anticipate that occurring much before 11/11/18 being the 100th anniversary of the end of WW1 and I guess that might signal the termination of funding for the Anzac Centenary.
The RAAC Corporation has been asked, if funding post the 1918-2018 Anniversary is not approved by DVA, whether any fall-back position been considered by the RAAC Corporation/5RAR?”.
Let’s be open and transparent about the arrangements we make on behalf of others … better still, should we not ask them for their input in terms of what we do on their behalf?
—————————————————————————————————
8 June 2018
Binh Ba 50th Anniversary Commemoration
What will happen on 6 June 2019? Anything?
Will 1 Armd Regt commemorate the 50th Anniversary of one of its Battlehonours?
Will the 1AR Assn hold its AGM in conjunction with a dinner in commemoration?
Will the RAAC Corporation liaise with DVA, the AWM, 1AR Assn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, and 5RAR to co-ordinate a commemoration?
Planning should have commenced already. It could start with the 1AR Assn seeking feedback from its members as to what they think should happen.
————————————————–
I asked Colin Toll, as member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board …“will the Corporation be liaising with DVA, the AWM, 1AR Assn, 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn, and 5RAR to co-ordinate a 50th Anniversary Commemoration next year? (Planning really needs to start now should this be contemplated.)”
Colin’s reply was:
“First, I am no longer a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board. I have, however, been asked to adopt a hull down position on radio silence just in case I can be of help in some way. And, I am more than happy to do that. In relation to BB 50 years on next year my personal thoughts are that a commemoration similar to CB this year should happen. There has been some informal conversations about the issue. I understand that DVA had funds for such commemorations in the 100 years of ANZAC, that is, 2014 to 2018. So we may have some issues there to overcome. But, we do need to get running on this issue.”
I’ve passed the above onto the Secretary 1AR Assn and asked that he inform the C’tee accordingly.
—————————————————-
Extract from COF re Binh Ba: “The employment of tanks when the use of both their firepower and artillery support were restricted, highlighted another aspect: their vulnerability. The fact that three tanks had been penetrated and eight crewmen wounded was well appreciated by the squadron as a whole. The penetration of Munsell’s tank a few weeks before, following on from that of Sergeant Swarbrick’s tank earlier in the year, made the vulnerability of Centurions to RPGs, frighteningly clear. Coupled with the two drivers recently killed in mine incidents, it took a brave and determined crew to take on the enemy day after day.”
Stop Press: There have been recent developments; more about these tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————-
7 June 2018
RAR Corporation, RAAC Corporation: Why is There Such a Divergence?
One of the Royal Australian Regiment Corporation’s purposes is to support the RAR Foundation, whose role is described below:
“In 2017, the Board of the RAR Foundation decided that it must move in a new direction with an emphasis on supporting the development of the Regiment and its serving members. We are of the view that we can strengthen the Royal Australian Regiment through support to the professional development and welfare of the Regiment and its serving members.
Based on feedback from those currently serving in the Regiment, we will in the future support units of the Regiment for activities that are related to the history of the Regiment, provide leadership development and resilience opportunities that are not readily available in Army, facilitate professional development and coaching and mentoring, facilitate activities that allow for ‘cross-pollination’ between units of the Regiment and continue to provide financial support to serving members of the Regiment and their immediate families to alleviate hardship when they cannot obtain support from other sources.”
By contrast, in January 2018, Mr C M Fenton OAM (the 1AR Assn Rep on the RAAC Corporation Executive Council), stated that the “Committees of the member Associations decided back in 2014 that their members did not have the training, the resources or the volunteers to carry out advocacy/welfare tasks. If one of their members do require assistance then they would be guided to the organisations that do have the volunteers, training and the resources to assist them”.
So … . no advocacy/welfare assistance for former or serving RAAC personnel.
Why is the RAR Corporation so different? They have even gone beyond advocacy assistance to providing financial welfare support to those in need.
————————————————————————————————————
6 June 2018
Well Done?
“Bruce, not once have we seen any sort of “well done” or such from you for the work that has been put in. You just dig and dig and dig up crap.”
The above was a post on the 1AR Assn Members’ Only Facebook page by Richard Arthur. It followed a sequence in which I’d explained, according to info that I had, that the RAAC Corporation had intended that a wreath be laid at the AWM on behalf of the RAAC, but the AWM had made a mistake in not scheduling it. The VP of the 1AR Assn, who was there,said that it was not an AWM mistake.
Getting back to the allegation above …to whom I am I supposed to have said “well done” on the 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook page?
To the 1AR Assn? The Assn had no part in the proceedings at all. I expressed disappointment to the C’tee that the Assn had not made a submission to the Tribunal re the UCG for Coral-Balmoral. To his credit, the President responded to say that they had dropped the ball in this regard and would endeavour to be more supportive of 1 Armd Regt and Assn members in the future. The 1AR Assn, of course, refused to lodge a submission requesting approval for the C-B Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the Standard. (I had to do that myself.)
To the RAAC Corporation? The only ones in touch with the Corporation are the C’tee of the 1AR Assn. No-one else has contact details. Should I have asked the 1AR Assn C’tee to say ‘well done’ to the RAAC Corporation? The Chairman of the Corporation and an RAAC Leadership Group were involved in a planning conference with DVA. There were some things that should have been done better: (i) There should never have been an acceptance of a “commemorative lapel pin” showing the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam flag crossed with that of Australia (this was stopped by the actions of others) (ii) An RAAC wreath should have been laid at the AWM (see above), desirably by the present OC C Sqn 1 Armd Regt and the most senior C-B veteran together; (iii) an opportunity should have been provided for veterans of C-B to be presented with their insignia, rather than receiving them by mail; (iv) the requirement for a rep of OC C Sqn to be formally invested before anyone else received their insignia should have been maintained; (v) a representative of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt should have carried the Standard when the C Sqn Streamer was affixed to it; and (vi) the first time the newly emblazoned 3 Cav Guidon was to have been paraded was supposed to be the 50th C-B Commemoration … but it was paraded beforehand.
To DVA? Given the battle I had with them to have the lapel pin withdrawn, it would be disingenuous to do so.
To 1 Armd Regt? There is to be no opportunity to present veterans of C-B to be formally presented with their insignia at 1 Armd Regt; nor has information has been made available re the formal investiture of the current OC C Sqn and the presentation of insignia to sqn members (at this stage it would appear that all members of C sqn will be issued with insignia from the Q Store).
To Those Responsible for the UCG Submission? This was done immediately the award was announced. Richard Arthur probably doesn’t even know who they are.
To Veterans of C-B? I wrote a book, a whole chapter of which, does exactly that. I also congratulated those veterans with whom I was in contact.
If the expectation raised above are “crap” that should never have been raised (or “dug up”), I’m glad that I served in different Army to Richard Arthur.
—————————————————————————————————————
5 June 2018
I was to respond to Richard Arthur, however, I thought it more important to review the draft Constitution of 1AR Assn. I’ve copied the more important comments I’ve made, below.
1AR Assn Constitution (Draft):
Para 3. Objectives. The following are listed:
(3) promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependants (sic) and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve;
(4) provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity.
At a recent RAAC Corporation AGM, it was decided that Member Assns of the Corporation (ie. the1AR Assn) don’t have the resources to assist their members as per above; the Assns should instead, refer those in need of advice and help to the RSL (see post on the 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook page by Mr C M Fenton OAM). It would seem that these objectives (ie. 3 and 4) should be deleted, unless members are to be informed otherwise, as far as assistance being provided to them is concerned.
Para 16 Fit and Proper Person Test. It is stated that a prospective member has to pass “a fit and proper person test, as established by the Association from time to time, to verify their eligibility”. A person who fails to meet the fit and proper test is ineligible for consideration of membership, re-admission to the Association or renewal of membership. It is clear that the test is to be established by the Association (ie. not the C’tee), what is not clear is how this is to be done. Presumably a resolution has to be passed at a General Meeting. This must be specified in the Constitution, otherwise a C’tee could become a ‘law unto itself’.
Para 25 Affiliates. It is stated here that one of the qualifications for Affiliate Membership is that applicants are people who are in a position to assist the Association in carrying out one or more of its Purposes. But there is only one Purpose of the Assn, ie to form an Assn. I believe that the ‘Objectives’ is meant, rather than the ‘Purposes’.
Para 46 Special Resolution. The Note states “In addition to certain matters specified in the Act, a special resolution is required— (a) to remove a committee member from office; (b) to alter these Rules, including changing the name or any of the purposes of the Association.” What are the ‘certain matters’ in the Act? Unless these are specified (or at least summarised) every time a resolution is proposed, the Act will have to be checked to see if special resolution procedure must be used.
Para 68 Term of office. It is proposed that management c’tee members be elected for two years. While two years is a good for management ‘stability’, is it best practice for ALL the management c’tee to be replaced at the same time? I suggest that it would be best for management stability if half the C’tee was up for election (or re-election) every year.
Para 80. Minutes of C’tee Meetings. There is no mention of these Minutes being made available to members, ie. either placed on the webpage or sent individually. This is essential if the governance of the Assn is to be open and transparent.
Para 80. Minutes of C’tee Meetings. It is stated that Minutes of Ctee Meetings are to be kept, but there is nothing to say for how long. This obviously needs to be stated.
Para 82. Donations. There must be a definition of ‘Donation’. I made a donation to the Assn “to assist the Assn’s endeavours” (see COF Author’s Note). Funds donated for this purpose were not considered to be acceptable donations. What is an acceptable donation?
Para 83. Management of Funds. Funds were recently paid to the Assn and then passed on the 1 Armd Regt. This was done as a means of concealing the donor’s identity. Such a practice is illegal. The following amendment is required: ‘The Assn’s financial accounts must not be used to conceal the payment of monies for purposes other than those of the Assn itself.’
Para 88 Reference is made to: “Discipline Principles set out in the Association’s by-laws”. As far as I’m aware, neither By-Laws nor Discipline Principles exist. If they were to be drafted, they would have to be approved by members. Amendment is required.
Para 97 Application of Grievance Procedure. It is stated that a grievance may not be raised by a member about a matter that is subject to disciplinary action, until that action is completed. The corollary needs to be inserted for fairness, ie. Disciplinary action must not be brought against a member who has lodged a grievance until the relevant grievance procedure has been completed.
————————————————————————————————————
1 June 2018
This will be last post until Tuesday, 5 June 2018 (R&C)
Purposes: 1 AR Assn and RAAC Corporation
This was the heading of the blog post on 29 May 2018. As it happened, I only referred to the Purposes of the 1AR Assn,
What of the RAAC Corporation?
The Purposes for which the Corporation exists include:
fostering and protecting the interests of ordinary members and their families in any matter likely to affect them during or after their service in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps;
providing advice, guidance and welfare assistance to ordinary members;
representing the interests of the serving and ex-serving ordinary members of The Corps; and
considering and providing advice where appropriate, on benefit services
Can the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation proclaim at the next AGM, like the President of the 2/14 QMI LH Assn that “The Corporation is, in my opinion, developing well, is financially secure and is focussed firmly on achieving its Constitutional purposes.”
The answer would have to be NO as far as the above purposes are concerned.
A resolution was passed at an RAAC Corporation AGM that members of Corporation associations who were in need of advice and assistance in relation to their affairs, would be directed to the RSL. There was general agreement that Associations do not have the resources to provide such assistance and they were not interested in ways to achieve this.
So … will these purposes (ie. those listed above) be deleted from those that the RAAC Corporation has been established to achieve? (Second question … will Minutes of Corporation AGMs be made available to Member Associations to pass onto their members? Third question: If not, why not?)
STOP PRESS! I have been taken to task by Richard Arthur (I don’t know him and vice versa) on the 1AR Assn Members Only page. He criticizes me for not having said “well done” on the Facebook page to those involved in the Unit Citation for Gallantry. I will respond on 5 June 2018.
—————————————————————————————————-
31 May 2018
1AR AGM Ceremony of Remembrance
The VP 1AR Assn has advised that “The association is pleased to inform you all that, through some excellent work by the corporation and liaison with the AWM, there will be a poppy ceremony post the AGM at the AWM commencing at 1200. There will be a series of wreaths laid within the tomb of the unknown soldier followed by an opportunity for poppies to be laid on the tomb by others. This is a great opportunity to reflect and bond, whilst engaging with the community and continuing to tell your stories. More details will be provided in the lead up to the event”.
Posts on 7 & 10 May and 26 & 27 May refer….
One has to wonder why the Corporation is involved, given that the 1AR Assn President lives in Canberra (though being co-located is not a prerequisite to liaising with the AWM).
Possibly it’s because, apparently, the AWM made a mistake at the C-B 50th Commemoration in not making provision for an RAAC wreath to be laid, and the AWM have acted quickly to compensate. I had suggested the Hon Col and HOC could lay wreaths, possibly also the new President of the 1AR Assn (having so informed the AWM)
The VP has stated that my suggestion “has been acknowledged”. I don’t know what this means, as I haven’t had any acknowledgement. The only contact was when I suggested that one of those killed in Vietnam could be honoured in the Last Post ceremony. The Assn let me know that they’d subsequently been in touch with the AWM, only to be informed that a family service had been booked for the date of the AGM.
The VP has stated that the Last Post Ceremony is still scheduled as an AGM activity, as well as the noon ‘Poppy Ceremony’. Whether or not wreaths will be laid at both is unknown.
Members are to be given more details at a later time. What a pity it is that members are informed (from above), rather than being given the opportunity to have input into such things.
Still … a positive outcome.
————————————————————————————————
30 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry : Coral- Balmoral
Email to Defence Honours and Awards, cc RSM-A
“The Defence Honours and Awards Directorate has made the following determination re the UCG: “The actual citation is a warrant presented to the unit. Insignia are worn by individuals to denote their membership of a unit that has been awarded a citation. Personnel cannot be issued with the insignia until the authorised unit representative, normally the CO, has been formally invested with the citation”. http://www.defence.gov.au/Medals/Hon-Decs/Gall-Dist/Unit-Citation-Gallantry.asp
I think this a very commendable policy, however, the present wording leads to some confusion. The point is that there will always be two COs … the one who commanded the unit at the time of the action for which the UCG was awarded, and the one who is that CO’s current successor.
I would have thought that most symbolic formal investiture would be that of the commander at the time, but was this the intent of Defence Honours and Awards direction?
Could you please advise. I’m aware that UCG insignia are currently being issued to those veterans of Coral-Balmoral. In terms of C Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment, however, there has been no formal investiture of either ‘CO’.”
———————————————————————————————-
29 May 2018
Purposes: 1 AR Assn and RAAC Corporation
The following quote from the President of the 2/14 QMI Assn at their last AGM, is great to see:
“The Association is, in my opinion, developing well, is financially secure and is focussed firmly on achieving its Constitutional Objects.”
Is a similar report able to be given at the 2018 1AR Assn AGM?
The Purposes of the 1AR Assn are:
(1) To combine into an Association:
(a) former members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(b) currently-serving members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(c) widows, dependants and next of kin of former and present members of the units however prescribed.
(2) To foster and perpetuate ties of comradeship created by those eligible for membership;
(3) To unite members of the Association for their mutual benefit;
(4) To promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependants and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve;
(5) To provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity;
(6) To preserve the history of 1st Armoured Regiment through the fostering and sponsorship of awards for excellence in soldiering;
(7) To diffuse or disseminate knowledge and information or otherwise further these Objects;
(8) To maintain, promote and encourage the establishment of groups of members to act as a branch or branches of the Association; and
(9) To do all such other acts and things and enter such affiliation as are incidental or conducive to the furtherance of the above objectives.
(Currently, anyone who simply supports these purposes can be a member of the 1AR Assn, irrespective of whether or not they served with the Regiment.)
Of course, the same thing can’t be said at the 1AR Assn July AGM, in relation to focussing on achieving the Purposes as per the Constitution. The Assn agreed sometime ago, without any consultation with members, to support an RAAC Corporation resolution that members in need of advice and assistance in relation to their affairs, would be directed to the RSL. Apparently, the Assn does not have the resources to provide such assistance and is not interested in ways to achieve this. Hopefully there will be some discussion in relation to the new Constitution, before Purpose (5) is deleted in favour of focusing on ‘camaraderie’ (as seems to be the current priority).
In terms of Purpose (5), one might hope that State Reps would develop a list of contacts re those who are qualified to offer advice and assistance and provide contact details to members accordingly (and follow-up as an on-going point of contact) … rather than simply referring the member to the RSL. The list could be handed on from one State rep to the next.
————————————————————————————————————————-
28 May 2018
C-B Unit Citation for Gallantry (II)
My response to the criticism raised yesterday is copied below:
“It’s not my intention to snipe at the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation. The Corporation comprises Directors, an Executive Council and an Advisory Board. It is not one man. There is no means of communicating with it, however (no email address, no telephone number, no website form … nothing). The only way to communicate is through a member association. [As 3 Cav (Vietnam) is not a member, you don’t have this access.]
To make a suggestion re the C-B UCG … I could email the 1AR Assn, however, given that both the President and VP have full time jobs, it will take some time for the suggestion to be considered and then voted on at a C’tee meeting and then make its way to the Corporation.
So the Chairman RAAC Corporation comes up on the Forum. Why not grab the chance and put forward a question? It seems that the Corporation has accepted that recipients of the UCG will receive their insignia through the mail. It’s my belief that awards to soldiers, especially for gallantry, should be made by way of a formal presentation.
Would it not be something worthwhile for all of you guys in WA to receive your insignia from the OC 10LH, or the Senior officer in WA, or the Governor? What would it take to organise this? Simply notate on the application form ‘To be Presented … mail to RAAC HOC Cell, Puckapunyal’. There could be a cut off date for presentations. Those who are unable to get there or who only find out after the cut off … receive their insignia in the mail. Why not bring together all those involved in C-B … incl those who were not able to get to Canberra? Would it not be something for today’s soldiers to share as well?
If 1 Armd Regt were to have a parade to present insignia to those serving in C Sqn today (the alternative is for insignia to be issued through the Q Store, how demeaning would that be) … original C-B veterans could be presented at the same time (would this not be something … bringing together the present and the past).
What about B Sqn 3/4 Cav. They are custodians of the 3 Cav Guidon … should there not be some form of an acknowledgment re members serving today (as with those serving in C Sqn 1 Armd Regt)? This is something which would really benefit from discussion (but that doesn’t seem possible). Would it be appropriate for the B Sqn 3/4 Cav Guidon Party to wear the insignia, for example?”
Stop Press: The first UCG insignia have been received by those present at the battles … BY POST!!!
27 May 2018
C-B Unit Citation for Gallantry
Well I was partly wrong. In reference to my post yesterday, the RAAC Corporation has not advised why no RAAC wreath was laid (as I expected), but someone who was there has offered an explanation. As they understand it, there was a mistake by the AWM and they believe an RAAC wreath “has since been laid, albeit after the actual event”.
Interestingly, my having raised this point was regarded as a “quip …another snipe at Noel McLaughlin [the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation]”. This surprises me … I had after all, stated that “I can’t comment as I don’t know the reason”. Apparently my follow-on question to the Chairman as to whether or not formal presentations of the UCG insignia would be possible, was seen as “vitriolic”.
May I say that I don’t engage in personal jibes or slander. I simply raise matters that I believe should be addressed in an open and transparent manner. I’ve said it before … there is a communication problem. There is no means of contacting the RAAC Corporation. Any matter to be communicated has to be through a unit association; unless, of course, the Corporation places a post on social media. One can then ask a question, however, there is usually little hope of a response.
The 1AR Assn is to hold its AGM in Canberra in July. Attendance at the Last Post Ceremony is scheduled. I advised the Secretary that the C’tee might like to consider laying a wreath as part of the Ceremony (seeking permission from the AWM accordingly).
‘Is this a criticism or a snipe? Of course not. If the 1AR Assn Members Forum was still operating, I’d have posted my suggestion there. Discussion would have followed and a wreath may or may not be laid in the end. The important thing is that the idea would have been discussed openly and opportunities for stakeholders to add value would have been available. This is generally how the best outcomes are achieved.
————————————————————————————————
26 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry : Coral-Balmoral
The RAAC Corporation had informed those veterans eligible, to apply for their insignia via the Defence on-line application form
While there may or may not be a parade to present insignia to members of the serving squadrons (if B Sqn 3/4 Cav members are eligible, given that they are custodians of the 3 Cav Guidon) it would appear that there’s no alternative to original members receiving their insignia in the post. The Chairman of the Corporation has been asked to confirm if this is the case, however, he has not responded as yet.
Video of Last Post Ceremony at the AWM on 13 May 2018 is at
I can’t comment as I don’t know the reason … it just seems at odds with wreaths being laid to acknowledge inf, gunners, sappers, and sigs involved in C-B (not all these Corps lost men, but they still honoured the sacrifices that were made by everyone) … that there was no RAAC wreath laid.
How good it was to see the current CO 1RAR lay a wreath together with the CO 1RAR at the time of C-B. Where was the current OC C Sqn? Was it not possible for he and Bernie Sullivan to lay a wreath together? Maybe the RAAC HOC and a representative of A Sqn 3 Cav could have done the same.
Seems to me that there is a lack of leadership evident in some matters. A lack of understanding of things that go beyond mere symbolism.
The lapel pins showing the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam’s flag crossed with that of Australia should not have been regarded a ‘commemorative’ pin and plans made to hand them out with tickets. A representative of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt should have been carrying the Standard when it was affixed with the Unit Citation awarded to C Sqn.
Surely a formal presentation could be offered as an alternative to mandatory mailing out of insignia?? Not everyone would be able to attend a parade in Adelaide, however, RAAC Unit COs/OCs around the country could make presentations. All that would be required is for recipients to indicate on their applications that they want their insignia forwarded to the HOC Cell (who could then forward to units).
Why was the RAAC not represented when wreaths were laid at the AWM in honour of the sacrifices made at Coral-Balmoral? (There may be a good explanation, but the likelihood is that it’s on a ‘need to know’ basis; OPSEC would well be given as the reason for not telling anyone … again.)
————————————————————————————————-
25 May 2018
Soldiers Injured in Vehicle ‘Incident’ During Training at Shoalwater Bay
Frustration at the news blackout has been mentioned previously.
Email below to Defencemedia (info a number of other media)
“Hi Guys,
With respect to the incident on 16 May 2018 (presently available information below), can you please advise:
What was the vehicle(s) involved?
What was it doing at the time?
Were those injured in the vehicle?
What were the duties of those injured?
What unit was the vehicle from?
What unit were those injured from?
What was the nature of the injuries suffered?
Was the vehicle damaged? If so, to what extent?
I am interested as an ex-ADF member who has trained at Shoalwater Bay.
Many thanks,
THURSDAY [17 May 2018]:
THE Defence Department have confirmed a soldier was injured in a vehicle incident at Shoalwater Bay.
No further information on the soldier’s injury was provided.
“Defence can confirm a soldier was evacuated from the Shoalwater Bay Training Area following a vehicle incident on 16 May,” the spokesperson said.
“Shortly following the evacuation the soldier’s condition was confirmed as satisfactory.
“The incident is being investigated.”
WEDNESDAY [16 May 2018] 12.44PM:
TWO people are being assessed by paramedics after a “vehicle incident” at the Shoalwater Bay Military Training Area.
A Queensland Ambulance Service spokesperson said the crews were called to the area about 11.30am, but referred all other enquiries to the Department of Defence.
The spokesperson said two people were being assessed at the scene and the RACQ Capricorn Helicopter Rescue Service would be tasked.
In advising the AWM of this, the following info/request was included:
“Just again, our concern relates to the AWM’s exhibit description which states that ”This particular Type 95 tank had a crew of four (usually reported as three): commander, gunner, driver, and hull gunner”.
We know that the AWM has a crew manifest which refers to a fourth man, a Petty Officer. This is not in dispute. It’s a matter of what the Petty Officer’s role was.
References have previously been provided which state that a fourth person (an experienced NCO) was allocated to the tank to act as a guide to assist the tank in its initial deployment.
To members of any armoured force, an AFV ‘crewman’ is someone inside the vehicle. The AWM could easily differentiate between the two … drawing attention to the important role of the fourth person in doing so (this highlights limitations in the tank design).
The impression that the AWM gives at the moment, ie. there were two people in turret, a commander and a separate gunner, is undoubtedly wrong. The reference below is confirmed by Bovington.
“The main armament of this tank is a 37mm Type 94 tank gun. In the Ha-Go there is only the crew commander in the turret and the 37 mm gun is fired and loaded by the Crew Commander (CC). The gun is raised in elevation and depression by the movement of the CC’s right shoulder via a padded rest, the rest is mounted on the left of the gun. Traverse is achieved by moving his shoulder, left and right. The gun has 10 deg right and 10 deg left movement. The turret can also traverse with a gear/cog hand-wheel arrangement but the final traverse and laying of the gun are done by the movement of the CC’s body. The CC has to open the breech via a handle on the right side of the gun using his right hand, he also will use his right hand to load the gun, the firing trigger is located on the left along with a telescopic sight.
The following quote provided by Bovington (from the UK current Ha Go restorer who has previously advised the AWM re the armament of its Ha Go) is relevant:
“I can see why the AWM in Canberra assumes that the tank should have a crew of four. This was the ‘guesstimate’ made by the Directorate of AFV Production in Melbourne when they evaluated the Ha-go that Australian forces captured at Milne Bay. This incorrect figure was included in the otherwise excellent report that the DAFVP produced in 1943, and which the AWM obviously referred to when compiling their fact sheet.”
All the above info, with details of sources, has previously been provided. Given that the Type 95 is an important exhibit, can the AWM please reconsider the wording used to describe it.”
————————————————————————————————
23 May 2018
Lessons Learnt (or Not).
A week ago (16 May) mention was made of Army’s failure in its duty of care by not providing flame retardant tank suits (i.e. garments incorporating means to assist in the lifting of a wounded crewman from inside the turret) which were suitable for wearing in tropical conditions. Such clothing for crewmen would’ve help facilitate the lifting out of Phil Barwick from the operator’s hatch.
A reader has advised that:
“Re your comment on 16 May concerning Defence’s failure to provide suitable light-weight tank suits. Sometime late 1969 when on ops I received a package from Nui Dat containing a tanks suit designed by Defence Materials with instructions to report back in 7 days on its worth. It did not take 7 days. Without going into details, it was rubbish! Obviously no tank crewman involved in its design. Never heard of again.”
So a need was recognised. Or was it? Nov 69 was more than two years after C Sqn was warned for Vietnam. Work had started at AHQ on a contingency plan for possible deployment to South Vietnam in 1961. This was in addition to Plan Ambrose, involving a SEATO response force, including a squadron of tanks. The planning was obviously flawed.
Was the prototype lightweight tank suit developed in 1969 a read response to an urgent operational need? Was Army doing everything it could to meet its duty of care … or was it simply going through the motions?
Armouredadvocates wrote to the Minister with respect to the suitability of crewman clothing to be worn if Abrams were deployed to Afghanistan (a troop was on seven days notice to move). Did the contingency plan take this into account? There was a lot of correspondence with DMO … the Abrams has specific requirements for crew protective wear … it was accepted that this has to be compatible with climatic conditions associated with any contingency plan.
———————————————————————————————
22 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry
I’ve been challenged by the RSM SoA/VP 1AR Assn to make positive comment re the UCG. I responded as follows:
Presumably there will a parade at some stage, during which, serving members of C Sqn will be presented with the UCG insignia (original members could be invited to attend to be presented with their insignia as well. One hopes that it will not be a matter of Australia Post and Q store issue (but who knows?). Of course no presentation/mail out of the insignia can take place before the OC C Sqn has been presented with his.)
The tradition of WO2s holding the position of SSM, carrying the Guidon/Standard goes back way before your 34 years. The RAAC, is I believe, the only Corps in which this happens. The AAAvn Guidon is carried by a subaltern, as are the Colours of all RA Inf battalions.
What I would like to see is a statement to the effect that ‘all effort was made to arrange for C Sqn to be in charge of the Standard when the Squadron’s streamer was affixed to it, but this was not possible because ….’. Depending on the reasons given, I would be more than happy to say ‘Well done for trying!’.
But what’s the situation re B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt? Do members of the Squadron charged with responsibility for the 3 Cav Guidon, wear the insignia of the UCG?
If so, one would hope that a parade as above will be held and eligible members of A Sqn 3 Cav might be invited. Of course, if that was the case, no-one can be presented with/mailed to with the insignia until OC B Sqn 3/4 Cav is presented with his.
——————————————————————————————————-
21 May 2018
Doing the Right Thing
A fortnight ago, Armouredadvocates initiated steps to stop lapel pins being distributed to the attendees at the Coral-Balmoral 50th Anniversary Commemoration.
These lapel pins were in the form of an Australian flag crossed with that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. (They were produced by the Dept of Foreign Affairs for the planned Long Tan Commenoration in Vietnam. When that was cancelled by Vietnam, they were left with stock on their hands and attempted to dispose of them in Canberra.)
The reason for taking such action was that the SRVN, apart from more general widespread human rights abuses, persecute, in particular, former members of the RVNAF and their families (i.e. our former allies).
It was felt that before Australian veterans should demonstrate support for this regime, an undertaking should be given that such persecution would cease.
As it’s understood, no lapel pins were distributed.
For those interested, the link below is to a book which speaks to these things. (Copy and paste will be necessary.)
Everything has gone quiet following injuries in a vehicle “incident” at Shoalwater Bay. The extent of information available is contained in the news report below. No further details have been released by Defence.
One always hopes that an AFV was not involved. The fact that one of the news reports was accompanied by a photo of ASLAVs is possibly not related to the incident at all.
Armouredadvocates has been warning that another Bushmaster accident is inevitable if Army does not introduce and oversee competency based training standards for the commanders of PMVs in their various roles, including protected mobility and fire support for infantry as provided by RAAC ARES units.
THE Defence Department have confirmed a soldier was injured in a vehicle incident at Shoalwater Bay. No further information on the soldier’s injury was provided.
“Defence can confirm a soldier was evacuated from the Shoalwater Bay Training Area following a vehicle incident on 16 May,” the spokesperson said.
“Shortly following the evacuation the soldier’s condition was confirmed as satisfactory. The incident is being investigated.”
WEDNESDAY 12.44PM: TWO people are being assessed by paramedics after a “vehicle incident” at the Shoalwater Bay Military Training Area.
A Queensland Ambulance Service spokesperson said the crews were called to the area about 11.30am, but referred all other enquiries to the Department of Defence.
The spokesperson said two people were being assessed at the scene and the RACQ Capricorn Helicopter Rescue Service would be tasked.
—————————————————————————————————
19 May 2018
2/14 QMI : What’s Happening?
Armouredadvocates has questioned for some time, the delay in procurement of the additional 90 Abrams needed to make viable the Plan Beersheba ACR concept. The following extract from an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) article makes the situation clear:
Australia’s fleet of M1A1 Abrams has kept pace with the American upgrades, most recently with a series of upgrades meant to extend the platform’s life to 2035. The Plan Beersheba reforms divided the Abrams fleet between the three combat brigades as part of an ‘armoured cavalry regiment’. That has maximised their combined arms potential, as the tanks can better practise and deploy with other army elements. But the small number of tanks in each regiment means that they are too few to carry out effective armoured warfare against enemy tanks or an independent breakthrough role against enemy lines. To remedy that, the goal is to increase the fleet from 59 tanks to 90, as well as provide a number of support vehicles based on the Abrams chassis. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/tanks-out-with-the-old-in-with-the-new/
There are government priorities and there are defence priorities … this is a fact of life (part of a democratic process). But why is there no debate about the above? It seems that Defence is a closed shop and anyone who speaks out, gets their marching orders. This is ok as far as it goes, nobody wants to be viewed as a counter-revolutionary, unable to abide by the party line. BUT … the absence of open and transparent discussion can sometimes have adverse consequences.
Does anyone know what the current policy is with the Abrams tank fleet and Plan Beersheba?
Armouredadvocates has speculated before … ’twill be interesting to see what comes (or doesn’t come) to pass.
————————————————————————————————
18 May 2018
From Sad Things, Some Good Sometimes Comes
A couple of months ago, a former US soldier asked for help in finding relatives of the late Phil Thomson OAM (former VVAA President whose efforts led to the establishment of the Agent Orange Royal Commission). Steve and Phil had become friends in Vietnam in 1966 during which time Steve received Phil’s ID tags and slouch hat (one can only imagine the basis of the ‘exchange’).
Steve came to appreciate the respect and meaning these items would bring to someone in Phil’s family and he decided that it was time to pass them on. He has just advised that the items were delivered to Phil’s sister a couple of days ago.
Reminds me of the Native American (Robert King, Fort Belknap Reservation, Montana) who served with John ‘Chesty’ Bond, on the Training Team in Vietnam.
Chesty (advisor, 7 ARVN Cav) was KIA during fighting at the US Special Forces camp at Lang-Vei on 25 April 1969. Robert was with him at the time (radio op for an Arty FO)
When he got back to the States, Robert obtained an Australian flag from our Embassy in Washington and carried it in memory of Chesty at Pow Wow Color Guard Grand Entries and at ceremonies at the Vietnam Memorial Wall.
———————————————————————————————–
17 May 2018
Lessons Learnt : Woe is me!
There’s nothing like the circumstances described yesterday to make you want to make people aware that the difficulty in getting Phil out of the turret should never have been made as great as it was (indeed specific measures should be taken to facilitate the evacuation of a wounded crewman from inside a tank … as is done now).
I finally decided that I had to attend the Chief of Army’s Annual History Conference, the topic of which was: ‘How do Armies Learn While on Operations?’. I’d been thinking about it for some time. I’d sent a submission based on the lessons learnt paper that I provided to the then HOC; which had resulted from the research for Canister! On! FIRE!. I couldn’t let the opportunity pass to emphasize what had gone wrong in Vietnam and what should be done to correct it.
I got on the Internet, prepared to pay to attend (though not to the dinner … that would be a bit too far). There was nothing about the 2018 CA Army History Conference!
Had it been cancelled, I wondered? More searching … it turns out that the Conference about ‘learning on operations’ was held in October 2017.
Now to get a copy of the Conference Papers and see what outcomes might have resulted. (How I hope that the value of operational analysis will have been underscored and recommendations made to capitalise on it!)
To be shared….
—————————————————————————————————————–
16 May 2018
Operation HERMIT PARK: 14 June – 27 July 1971 (II)
This post follows on from that on 13 May (below).
The video link (you might have to copy and paste) relates to Callsign 3B and the wounds suffered by Andy and Phil.
It also demonstrates similarities between Aust and NZ political systems … as referenced yesterday.
Postscript. We used to wear tank suits at Puckapunyal. They had straps sown in to help facilitate a wounded crewman being lifted out of the turret by someone above. The tank suits were too hot to wear in Vietnam … did Defence urgently order lightweight fire-retardant tank suits for issue to AFV crewmen? No. What happened … let them wear ‘greens’ like everyone else! Think about this when watching the video. There are so many things which should never have been allowed to happen. To be continued tomorrow.
————————————————————————————————————-
15 May 2018
UCG Coral-Balmoral (V)
The full report of the Defence Honours & Awards Tribunal consideration of the UCG for Coral-Balmoral is at:
A number of references to the position of Defence in opposing the award are copied below (surely someone will tell the Emperor that he’s not wearing any clothes …).
The Tribunal considered the Defence guidance to be largely unhelpful and in previous Inquiries, has commented on the lack of policy guidance and the potential damage this may have upon consistency and the integrity of the assessment process. The Tribunal noted that despite Defence being directed to introduce more guidance ‘for implementation in 2017’, this has not been completed.
The Tribunal noted the Acting Chief of Defence Force’s view that Defence did not support retrospective recognition but considered that this view had been examined and refuted in previous Inquiries. The Tribunal decided that there was little utility in repeating the arguments of those previous Inquiries.
Although Defence provided a formal response to the Tribunal’s request for reasons why Defence hold the view that retrospective honours diminish the integrity of the honours and awards system, no evidence was presented to the Tribunal that suggests any negative impact has been created by previous retrospective awards
A previous blog stated that neither the HOC, nor the RAAC Corporation had the time to make a submission. The full report includes a list a submissions and one of these was from the Chairman, RAAC Corporation. I now recall learning of this and being told that it was prepared on a ‘need to know’ basis. I was disappointed, as I’d hoped that the RAAC family might work together on such a matter.
———————————————————————————————————————
14 May 2018
UCG Coral-Balmoral (IV)
“The extraordinary gallantry displayed by members of the 1st Australia Task Force (Forward) and associated units deployed to Area of Operations SURFERS during the Battles of Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral is being recognised by the Unit Citation for Gallantry today in Canberra.”
Congratulations to all those involved at Coral-Balmoral and those who initiated (George Hulse and Jack Parr) and progressed the submission.
The announcement wasn’t made by the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs, nor the Governor-General, but by Defence (via a press release).
This isn’t as remarkable as it appears, given that Defence steadfastly opposed the award being made. The Letters Patent stipulate that the Minister for Defence is the approving authority, not the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs. (There was an immediate appeal pending if the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs had accepted Defence’s position and not approved the award.)
The Tribunal Chair asked the Defence delegate during one of the hearings in Canberra: “How can ‘Defence support the previous retrospective UCG awards, when Defence was opposed to them being made?’ The response was that the decision was the Minister’s and Defence always supports its Minister. These previous awards (Long Tan, HMAS Yarra) did not set precedents as Defence opposed them at the time and continues to oppose similar awards being made.
Unsurprisingly, the press release states that the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal “made five recommendations, which were supported by Defence ….”
PS. Because the RAAC Corporation has tied itself to the HOC (and the HOC is obviously tied to Defence) the Corporation has given up any opportunity to promote any position which is not in accord with that of Defence. A previous HOC has told the Corporation that it has the opportunity to advocate on behalf of matters which he is not. This has gone by the wayside. Sad really.
————————————————————————————————————–
13 May 2018
Operation HERMIT PARK: 14 June – 27 July 1971.
Not sure how many saw this n edition of the VV Federation Journal Last Year: “War vet focus of display” By Marie Hobson Gunnedah
GUNNEDAH Water Tower Museum has a new display featuring Vietnam veteran, the late Phillip Gregory Barwick.
The Barwick family donated Phillip’s uniform and a citation, as well as an artwork of Trooper Barwick riding in the open top of an army tank. It was painted by one of his army mates.
A new mannequin has been purchased by the Gunnedah and District Historical Society to display the uniform, which is the start of a new section featuring Vietnam veterans.
The Late Phillip Gregory Barwick was a conscript who became one of the many long-term casualties of the Vietnam War.
The son of Harry and Ruby Barwick of Carellan, Kelvin, Phillip was called up for National Service in 1969 and was sent to Vietnam on the last day of September 1970. He was attached to A Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment from October 10, 1970 to December 16, 1970 and was then transferred to C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, from December 17, 1970, until his medical discharge on July 12, 1971.
Trooper Barwick returned to Australia with shocking injuries, including the loss of both eyes, from a rocket propelled grenade onto the machine gun he was operating on his army tank. His devastated parents saw him through 18 months of pain and rehabilitation at Concord Hospital, (Ryde), before he recovered enough to be trained to use a switchboard.
Once a talented sportsman, Phillip Barwick returned to his former place of employment at Peel Valley County Council, Tamworth, with his guide dog, Donna. He also learned Braille and was soon in demand as a speaker for the Guide Dogs association. In 1983, Phillip received a life-saving kidney from his sister, Helen, but the long term effects of his war injuries took a toll on his body, and he died from kidney failure in 1988, leaving a wife, Kath, and a son, Rohan.
The Barwick family erected a memorial on the hill above their home at Carellan where the once carefree child roamed as a boy. When the new Kelvin community hall opened in May 2005, third generation Kelvin resident, John Barwick, presented a plaque in memory of his brother, Private Gregory Barwick, a casualty of the “not-talked-about-war”.
The Gunnedah and District Historical Society is keen to expand its Vietnam War display and is seeking photographs of all local veterans. Anyone who can assist is asked to email a resolution image in large file to Marie Hobson at mhobson5@bigpond.com, or deliver to the Water Tower Museum during opening hours on Saturday from 10am-2pm or Monday mornings.
—————————————————————————————————————–
12 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry (III)
The Minister has put out a press release regarding the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration, but without any mention of the UCG being approved.
My money is on the GG announcing this during the Ceremony tomorrow.
Loaded Questions
Speaking about communicating … sometime ago, Mr A Soutar asked the following question of me on social media: Is it true that the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation got you a gold card?
I happened to believe then (as I do now) that personal information is exactly that. Whether of not I am ill is nobody’s business but my own; the same applies to whether or not I have a gold, white or any other sort of card.
The purpose of the question didn’t escape me … if the Chairman had got me a gold card, I should not, in return, raise difficult questions about the RAAC Corporation.
So how do I reply, in order to avoid the ‘entrapment’?
I’ve always thought that the best response to a loaded question (see below), is to reply with another.
So I asked: “Have you stopped beating your wife?”.
Rather than being seen to be the traditional example of a loaded question, it was thought that I was actually accusing Mr Soutar of the crime. All hell broke loose. I pointed out that I was simply using this example from Google to highlight that he was asking me a loaded question.
Not acceptable … I’d gone too far making such an ‘allegation’ now I’m banned. (You have to laugh!)
A loaded question:attempts to limit direct replies to be those that serve the questioner’s agenda.[2]The traditional example is the question “Have you stopped beating your wife?” Whether the respondent answers yes or no, he will admit to having a wife and having beaten her at some time in the past. Thus, these facts are presupposed by the question, and in this case an entrapment, because it narrows the respondent to a single answer,
—————————————————————————————————-
11 May 2018
1AR Assn & RAAC Corporation
You wouldn’t know unless you stumbled on it … Mr C M Fenton OAM is no longer the 1AR Assn rep on the Corporation’s Executive Council. It’s now “Greg Nicholas (Interim)” (according to the Corporation website)
The reason that Mr Fenton was appointed was to avoid any conflict of interest with the then 1AR Assn President also being a Director of the Corporation. Mr Fenton continued in the role, even after the President changed. One has to wonder if his departure has anything to do with other changes pending re the Executive Council.
The new President 1AR Assn can take his place on the Council when elected in July
Interesting that Mr Fenton resigned. He was previously the ACT rep for the Assn. Following one AGM he advised that he had “NTR”. The Minutes stated that he would provide a written report following the meeting. When asked when he would be doing so, he responded “I had NTR then and I have NTR now”. He resigned soon after.
Recently, he was asked to give a report to members of his attendance at the last RAAC Corporation AGM (as given to members of other Associations). He declined to do so and has now resigned. Seems he doesn’t like giving reports.
Interestingly, the Corporation website still states that the RAAC operates the Bushmaster and is comprised, in part, of single role ARA regiments, instead of ACRs. Photos of Bushmasters are also given prominence … nor has change been made to information given re the 1AR Standard and 3 Cav Guidon (re new battlehonours and amended theatre honour).
———————————————————————————————–
10 May 2018
1AR Assn 2018 AGM: 14 July, Canberra (III)
Following on from the 7 May post below …
Well done to the Assn for contacting the AWM with respect the the Last Post Ceremony on 13 July. Unfortunately, that date, however, “has already been scheduled for a family request and [the AWM] cannot reschedule’. The response continue: Again, we would be very happy for you to attend and participate on 13 July regardless of the story being told. Please let me know if you’d still like to come along and we can then discuss further details for the day.
Hopefully the C’tee will continue to liaise with the AWM re attendance, numbers etc. While it’s mainly a courtesy, the AWM can help with arrangements and can ‘formalise’ the occasion accordingly. If the Assn was to invite any VIPs such as HOC, Patron, Rep Hon Col to attend, then it would be good to let the AWM know. The opportunity will also be available, of course, for the Assn to lay a wreath.
Of course the 1st Armd Regt plaque is in the grounds of the AWM, as is Centurion 169056.
(Pity about the ‘old ‘ Theatre Honour being shown.)
—————————————————————————————————
9 May 2018
‘Black Beret and Silver Badge’
What’s he see when he turns off the light? How much more pain will be due in his life? Isn’t it enough that he fought for what’s right? What does he see when he closes his eyes?
This refrain (which will stay with you once you hear it) is from a song by Natalie Atkins on a cd just released in time for the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration. Natalie is the daughter of John ‘Shorty’ Atkins, tank crew commander in Vietnam. She wrote the song for her father.
The song backs the Black Beret which is an adaptation of the Ballard of the Green Beret , originally devised at Nui Dat by Bill Burton and John Atkins. With help from the AWM and permission from Barry Sadler’s NOK, it has been recorded with the aim of raising funds for two ‘seeing eye’ or ‘assistance’ dogs for veterans of recent conflicts who might need them.
Who knows … maybe ten dogs will be able to be provided. (We all wish they wouldn’t be needed!)
Well done to Bill for his efforts in bringing this project to fruition. The best contact to order is bill.burton19@bigpond.com
Comment from Barry Diwell (tank driver ’68-’69):
“I have just received and played my copy of the CD. The content and production is excellent. It brought back some great memories of Pucka and SVN. Well done Natalie, “Shorty” and Bill et al, and I hope this endeavour far exceeds your expectations.”
——————————————————————————————————————————-
8 May 2018
Is an Injustice Being Done?
This is the ultimate question. The law can be applied to the letter, but the result might not be a just one. A legal system that has place for neither compassion nor the exercise of discretion resulting from extraordinary circumstances … is un-Australian.
Consider the following:
‘Peter’ was brought to Australia from NZ by his parents, when he was six months old. All his family are in Australia. He was not aware until subject to deportation action, that he was not an Australian citizen. He was able to vote and enlist in the Australian Army. (These being the right of Australian residents and British subjects.)
When he served in Vietnam, he was under the impression that he was serving his country. When he disregarded his own safety, on behalf of others, he was doing so in the name of his country (Australia). He went above and beyond the call of duty and was singled out for his bravery by an American officer who witnessed it. As a result, he was Mentioned in Dispatches. How is this repaid?
He had a breakdown and broke the law. He was given legal advice to plead guilty on the basis that the offence would only incur a community service sentence (which would mean he could continue to care for his family). The advice was wrong and the sentence was worse, partly because there was no opportunity to test the police evidence.
Now he is to be deported. Why? It’s assessed that he’s a threat to the Community? Why? He’s a non-Australian citizen with a criminal record. He suffers PTSD as a result of his Vietnam service (which led to his offence) and his treating doctor states categorically that he is not a threat to the Community. The incident was completely out of character. Numerous members of the coastal community in which he lived and worked, have testified to this effect. According to Minister Dutton, none of the above is relevant, however.
He has no family in NZ and his family in Australia, who stand behind him completely, can’t accompany him because of their lifelong ties and employment circumstances.
How is his selfless service with 1 Armd Regt repaid? No compassion, no discretion. Is this the Australian way?
I guess it must be … the 1AR Assn C’tee even declined (as is their undeniable right) to provide a statement of his Army service.
————————————————————————————————————————-
7 May 2018
1AR Assn 2018 AGM: 14 July, Canberra (II)
Re yesterday’s post … it’s been suggested that asking for either Jim Kerr or Mick Hannaford to be commemorated at the AWM’s Last Post Ceremony on 14 July would upset AWM planning and others’ family arrangements which are already locked in. My response was:
“I was involved in organising a reunion in Canberra (also based on the Mercure) in Nov 2017. We contacted the AWM and they arranged for the Last Post Ceremony to be for one of our number (SAS) who was killed in Vietnam. The NT Govt flew his NOK to Canberra and the General, Special Operations, read Brian’s ‘story’. The SAS Assn were also represented. All we had to do was ask if it was possible … and it all just happened. There’s no stipulation that it’s WWI only at this time. If an ‘event’ is to be held in Canberra, the AWM are very happy to fit in … if it’s possible.
I can’t tell you how moving the Ceremony was for Brian’s widow and children (and us), being at the Last Post … the family together with Brian’s mates.
Certainly, the AWM planning is well advanced for the Ceremonies, mainly because of the need to organise preparation of the ‘Story’ and have it approved (as well as the photo).
Relatives are not usually involved (esp for WWI soldiers, as the records don’t provide contact details). We found the AWM most receptive to our request … it means so much more to have those who knew the person and what he experienced, present for the Ceremony.
There’s no reason that anyone else’s family arrangements would be changed as a consequence. As mentioned, one of those scheduled without any family connections … would simply have the date reallocated.
The Patron of the Assn or Rep Hon Col of the RAAC, or HOC could read the ‘Story’. All the C’tee have to do is ask … it may or may not be possible.”
—————————————————————————————————————————-
6 April 2018
1AR Assn 2018 AGM : 14 July, Canberra
The sequence of activities for the AGM has been advised to members. There is no draft Agenda, but the only two Resolutions proposed are approval of the Financial Statement and election of office bearers. Disappointingly, the draft ‘Own Rules’ Constitution doesn’t rate a mention.
Attendance at the AWM’s Last Post ceremony is being organised and I’ve advised the C’tee that if the Assn speaks to the AWM, they can organise for the person whose name is read out at the Ceremony to be someone KIA or DOW in Vietnam while serving with 1 Armd Regt, ie someone on the RoH … either Jim Kerr or Mick Hannaford.
The Assn could speak with the family concerned, clear it with them, and invite representatives to attend. This could be something that could make a number of members, who might not otherwise have attended the AGM, want to do so.
It will be interesting to see if a report is to be given on the extent to which the 1AR Assn has achieved it’s Purposes during the past 12months.
The purposes of the 1AR Assn are to::
(1) To combine into an Association:
(a) former members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(b) currently-serving members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(c) widows, dependents and next of kin of former and present members of the units however prescribed.
(2) To foster and perpetuate ties of comradeship created by those eligible for membership;
(3) To unite members of the Association for their mutual benefit;
(4) To promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve;
(5) To provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity;
(6) To preserve the history of 1st Armoured Regiment through the fostering and sponsorship of awards for excellence in soldiering;
(7) To diffuse or disseminate knowledge and information or otherwise further these Objects;
(8) To maintain, promote and encourage the establishment of groups of members to act as a branch or branches of the Association; and
(9) To do all such other acts and things and enter such affiliation as are incidental or conducive to the furtherance of the above objectives.
———————————————————————————————————————
5 May 2018
Unit Citation for Gallantry (II)
I was asked: Will my Crew Commander at the time (who was subsequently KIA) get the award posthumously?
My response:
I raised this at the Tribunal hearing in Canberra, referring to the initial mean-spirited policy associated with designating the Army Combat Badge a dress embellishment (therefore making the NOK of those KIA ineligible to receive it and saving some money). I think I made my point, however …
I subsequently had reason to check the Letters Patent for the Unit Citation for Gallantry (a legal argument was submitted challenging Defence’s claim that the award could not be made retrospectively). I’m pretty sure from memory (later verified) that the Letters Patent state there that those killed at the time (as well as those subsequently deceased) are eligible via NOK.
Extracts from the Letters Patent:
When a Unit is awarded a Citation, each person who was a member of the Unit at the time of the action for which a Citation is awarded, or during the period to which the Citation relates, is entitled to wear the Federation Star.
Insignia of a citation may be awarded posthumously.
The insignia miniature is a two-thirds size replica of the insignia of the Citation surrounding a miniature ribbon bar 18 millimetres wide.
The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal (DHAAT) has recommended that the UCG be awarded to 1ATF (Fwd) for the Battles of Coral-Balmoral. (The Minister still has to approve.)
“To capture the legacy of the gallantry displayed by participants in the battles, the Tribunal recommends that the following Australian units substantively deployed to AO SURFERS between 12 May 1968 and 6 June 1968 be awarded the Unit Citation for Gallantry for extraordinary gallantry in action at the Battles of Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral: • 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment • 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment • A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment • C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment • 12th Field Regiment, Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery • 1st Field Squadron, Royal Australian Engineers”.
What Does it Mean?
Those who were present during the actions for which the award was made, get to receive the award insignia (with the Federation Star … see above). They wear it above their medals (like the blue insignia for the US Presidential Citation … I think).
For C Sqn I Armd Regt, I would hope that a parade would be held to which veterans from the actions would be invited. The insignia would be presented both to those serving in C Sqn today (they can only wear while so posted) and the veterans present.
Given that there is no A Sqn 3 Cav, my suggestion would be for the HOC to organise a combined presentation parade (such as on a Cambrai Day) at 1 Armd Regt. The Guidons for 3 & 4 Cav could be paraded and the insignia presented to 3 Cav veterans at the same time as for the tankies.
I expect that some of those attending the C-B Commemoration will buy their own insignia to wear (presuming the Minister approves the award … he might save the announcement for the day).
It’ll be nice to see the HOC’s Order of the Day congratulating all involved (once the Minister has given his blessing). Can’t remember the last OOD.
Info re The Citation ….
The Unit Citation for Gallantry is awarded to a unit for extraordinary gallantry in action.
Design
The insignia of a Unit Citation for Gallantry is a gilt rectangular frame surrounding a deep green ribbon. The frame has a design of flames emanating from the outer edges of the frame to the centre.
Wearing
The actual citation is a warrant presented to the unit. Insignia are worn by individuals to denote their membership of a unit that has been awarded a citation. Personnel cannot be issued with the insignia until the authorised unit representative, normally the CO, has been formally invested with the citation.
Personnel who were members of the unit when an award was made wear a Federation Star in the centre of the ribbon and continue to wear the insignia after leaving the unit. Army and Air Force dress policy allows personnel who are subsequently posted to the unit to wear the insignia without the Federation Star, but only while actually posted to the unit.
What a pity there is no longer an A Sqn 3 Cav Regt; however, members will be entitled wear the insignia if the unit is ever raised again.
————————————————————————————————————–
3 May 2018
One member of the Vietnamese Community who is very upset about the lapel pins DVA has provided for those attending the the 50th C-B Commemoration is Dr Tien Nguyen OAM.
His speech to the 47th Coral-Bakmoral reunion is attached. It is worth reading.
Lapel Pins to be Handed Out to all Those Attending the C-B Commemoration (VI)
One member of the Vietnamese Community in Australia commented about the letter to DVA copied in yesterday’s blog:
“This letter is good, but the writer has left out a very important aspect: it is so insensitive for DFAT/DVA to hand out lapel pins with the Aussie flag intimately locked arms with the Viet Communist flag which represents the enemy who killed those Aussie heroes!!! Therefore, it’s a tremendous insult to the 521 diggers who have lost their lives in the VN War, and also a huge blow to the feelings of their relatives !
My response follows:
Firstly, I’m not sure that the lapel pins are so much an insult to we Australians, as compared to the insult to the Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA). The majority of Australians will agree that there needs to be a coming together of old enemies, eg Australia and Japan. This should not happen, however, whilst those soldiers we fought alongside (and their families) are being persecuted as they are.
If there were no human rights abuses in Vietnam today, I would support closer relations between our countries. BUT that’s far from being the case! Vietnam veterans have the opportunity to make a difference. We can highlight the appalling abuses that our former allies are being subjected to and bring pressure to bear on our Government to bring about change. It is intolerable, however, for our Government to be trying to manipulate us to support the current Government in Viet Nam, while these abuses continue.
Secondly, I wince whenever someone mentions ‘521’. (I’ve actually counted the names on the AWM Roll of Honour to point out an error in the number of killed.) The fact is that this number only represents those who died during the course of the War itself. Since then, the same number at least, have died from the wounds they suffered. We need to highlight the fact that casualty numbers don’t stop when the War ends.
————————————————————————————————————————-
1 May 2018
Lapel Pins to be Handed Out to all Those Attending the C-B Commemoration (V)
Email to DVA:
Dear …
(This can be taken as my response to your email of 24 April which, unfortunately, I didn’t get.)
Thank you for your advice as to what happened with the lapel pins featuring the Australian flag crossed with that of today’s Socialist Republic of Viet Nam , ie. theCoral-Balmoral Organising C’tee were informed they [the lapel pins] were left over from the Long Tan 50th Commemoration and they were being given to the C’tee members to either hand out to attendees, or to discard.
I think there are some lessons here that deserve to be highlighted. I understand that the lapel pins were in envelopes passed out at the end of the last C’tee meeting. The majority of members, therefore, didn’t see the pins until they returned home. On at least one occasion, the pins were immediately thrown in the bin. For another member, however, because the pins had supposedly been worn by those attending the Long Tan Commemoration … they were regarded as ’Commemorative Pins’ and Coral-Balmoral veterans were advised that the pins would be handed out with their tickets. Those involved in providing this advice were obviously unaware of either the reason for, or the extent of, the devastation that it would cause to Australia’s Vietnamese Community, if the pins were worn as part of the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration.
To explain: former members of South Vietnam’s Armed Forces and their families who remain in Vietnam have been, and continue to be, subject to the most inhumane persecution imaginable …apart from lack of health care and employment opportunities, their cemeteries have been bulldozed, their graves vandalised, they are barred from worship and they are unable to bury their loved ones with dignity. If Australia’s veterans are to show solidarity with the current Government in Vietnam, positive steps must be seen to be taken with respect to human rights reform (particularly as it applies to their fellow comrades-in-arms and their families).
One has to wonder why so many lapel pins were “leftover” from the Long Tan Commemoration. Is it because they were funded by DFAT to be given out at the planned ceremony at Long Tan as a gesture of reconciliation, and DFAT were left holding them when the Vietnam Government disallowed the Commemoration? All Long Tan veterans who have been asked about receiving the lapel pins at the 50th Anniversary ceremonies in Australia, have denied any knowledge of them.
How to proceed? I believe that it would be most appropriate for DVA to write to the National President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) and apologise for any (unintentional) disrespect felt by his members. (Only two days ago the VCA held their annual service at the Vietnam Memorial in Canberra to thank Australia for the support provided to them, and, this year, to remember the more than 5000 Vietnamese massacred in Hue 50 years ago.)
I would not be surprised if letters have already been written to Members of Parliament and Government Ministers. Early action on DVA’s part could help to defuse the impact of these.
——————————————————————————————————————
30 April 2018
Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour
This post follows from that on 23 April (below).
The text under is from a RAAC Corporation post on a Facebook page on 8 April 2017:
“In March 2017, the Corporation lodged a submission behalf of 1AR through the Corps to have the BH Coral-Balmoral emblazoned on the 1Armd Regt Standard.
A legislative anomaly was found and used to great effect.
The submission was approved on 28/3/17 and action was to be commenced by AHQ to correct the error and make it consistent the relevant D-I(A).
Both Colours with their new emblazoning will have their first public airing on Sunday 13 May 2018 as part of the Colour Parties assembling in Canberra to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the battles of Coral-Balmoral. “
[The final point above is as it should’ve been, but the 3 Cav Guidon was paraded earlier …despite a request to the HOC for him to “initiate action to ensure that the first parading of the newly emblazoned 3 Cav Guidon is an event which will make proud, all those who contributed to the battlehonours it now carries”. It is obvious that the RAAC Corporation and the HOC are not communicating effectively]
The RAAC Corporation subsequently asked for similar information to be posted on the 1AR Assn website under the heading: “Emblazoning New Battlehonour for Coral-Balmoral”. Instead of in “March 2017”, however, it was stated that Corporation’s submission was lodged in “February 2017”. This change was queried and the Corporation advised that this was an oversight, the submission actually being lodged on 10 March 2017.
It will be seen from the 23 April blog post that, after two years of inaction from representative bodies, I posted my submission to the Minister on 7 February. The submission is attached. It clearly identifies the ‘legislative anomaly’ referred to above [rather than it being only found after the RAAC Corporation’s action].
There should be absolutely no doubt what happened. On receipt of the Armouredadvocates submission, the Minister asked Defence, Defence asked the HOC, the HOC asked 1 Armd Regt and finally (a month later) 1 Armd Regt asked the RAAC Corporation if the submission was supported. It’s great that the Corporation did so, but two years had been wasted because of the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation’s failure to support the proposal. This is not as it should be.
It sticks in my craw that the RAAC Corporation is now claiming that the emblazoning of the battlehonours only took place because of their initiative. They had to be dragged ‘screaming and kicking’ (as the saying goes). The RAAC Corporation and the 1AR Assn each have the prerogative to act as they see fit. Having done so, however, they must must have the integrity not to try and cover up their past ‘mistakes’. We all make them!
————————————————————————————————————————————-
29 April 2018
Lapel Pins to be Handed Out to all Those Attending the C-B Commemoration (IV)
It seems that some progress is being made … not quite a ‘withdrawal’ of the lapel pins (seeing as DVA has already issued them to Corps/unit reps), but the next best thing. Hopefully RAAC attendees will be spared the indignity of being asked to wear one.
Email to DVA: “Dear All,
The annual Service conducted by the Vietnamese Community in Australia was held in Canberra today (at the Vietnam Memorial).
As well as expressing appreciation to Australian service personnel who fought with, and on their behalf, in Vietnam … the gathering gave prayers to the more than 5000 victims of the Mau Than TET massacre in Hue 50 years ago.
It was announced by one of the members of the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration organising c’tee, who spoke at the Service, that DVA had advised all members that they should NOT distribute the so called ‘commemorative’ lapel pin, if it was thought inappropriate to do so.
This is welcome, albeit ‘second-hand’, news.
If DVA could do me the courtesy of replying to my emails with respect to their new policy concerning these lapel pins, I’ll inform journalists accordingly. (I’d assumed, in light of not having had a response, that DVA had decided to maintain their original position .. and so provided initial advice to journalists.)”
——————————————————————————————————————–
28 April 2018
Is There Something Sinister Afoot?
The Chief of Army has come in for a bit a flack recently for his policy outlawing inappropriate symbols such as that above.
This was an image posted on the 1 Armd Regt Facebook page in February 2017 … the message being that this is a mantra which should be respected and adhered to by everyone (ie. serving and retired) I’ve copied below my response (from the blog post at that time).
I’ve also forwarded it to the CA, as I thought that he might be interested to know that others share his concern about such things.
The full quote is “Respect is earned; Honesty is appreciated; Trust is gained; Loyalty is returned.” (Unknown)
With the values of honesty and trust removed, the saying has been adopted by a number of gangs whose hierarchy demands total respect and loyalty at all times. In these circumstances, respect is not earned by positive characteristics of honesty, integrity, leadership and ethical behaviour, it is achieved through force and brutality, resulting in fear and mindless compliance.
The following quotes are taken from Google:
Loyalty and respect are two of the biggest social currencies within gangsterism, both of which are required to live in the criminal underworld. In order to earn respect and show loyalty, new recruits who wish to join gangs often have to submit to rituals that prove their mettle to the entire crew.”
“They know that NO ONE CAN PROVOKE ONE CLUB MEMBER WITHOUT HAVING TO ANSWER TO THE ENTIRE CLUB, and that such an answer is a point of honor that must come to the last person. The type of respect that this generates is one that is born out of fear.”
Outlaw bikers follow a pack mentality that demands that every member support each member to the utmost. Treating these men respectfully at all times is of paramount importance to decrease the likelihood of aggression …
“The loyalty of brotherhood is the greatest strength of any club or friendship, and the club loyalty’s ALWAYS come first.”
“Of all the things in this persons life, their loyalty and commitment to the well being of their club comes first, above family, friends, job, personnel possessions, and personal safety.”
…. often escalate their criminal activity in order to gain attention and respect.
It is common for members of both biker groups and white supremacists (especially members of racist prison gangs) to speak of “love, loyalty, honor and respect” for their fellow members.
The most common—and visually most obvious—cross-cultural connection between white supremacists and biker gangs is their shared use of symbols derived from Nazi Germany and the German military of the Nazi era.
———————————
A few references to respect and loyalty as these terms apply to the military (and other hierarchical organisations which embrace a completely different set of values to those referred to above) follow:
To me, you treat everyonewith the same degree of respect, regardless of rank, title, status, or tenure. You don’t have to “earn my respect” – but you can lose it.
Those in authority must be loyal to their subordinates: representing their interests faithfully, dealing with complaints thoroughly and developing their abilities through progressive training. Subordinates must be loyal to their leaders, their team, and their duty. Being loyal to ones’ leaders or subordinates does not mean that wrong-doing should be condoned or covered up: this is misplaced loyalty and questions a soldier’s integrity. Loyalty, though expected, must be earned through commitment, self- sacrifice, courage, professionalism, decency and integrity. These qualities are required both on and off duty as they are enduring characteristics that cannot be turned on and off at will.
Respect for others is a hallmark of the British Army: it comes from the duty to put others first and means that there is no place for prejudice or favouritism. Like loyalty, respect for others goes both up and down the chain of command and sideways among peers. The Army’s recruiting motto ‘Be the Best’ can only have meaning if all members of it have equality of treatment and opportunity.
Respect for others also extends to the treatment of all human beings, especially the victims of conflict, the dead, the wounded, prisoners and civilians, particularly those we have deployed to help. All soldiers must act within the law and the nature of modern, complex, land based operations makes it essential that they maintain the highest standards of decency and fairness at all times, even under the most difficult of conditions.
Treat people as they should be treated. In the Soldier’s Code, we pledge to “treat others with dignity and respect while expecting others to do the same.” Respect is what allows us to appreciate the best in other people. Respect is trusting that all people have done their jobs and fulfilled their duty. And self-respect is a vital ingredient with the Army value of respect, which results from knowing you have put forth your best effort. The Army is one team and each of us has something to contribute. (US Army)
Those who ‘endorse’ the death mask image and mantra above, allowing its use in their promotional material and under their corporate banner, should consider the message they are sending to others in terms of the values they stand for.
——————————————————————————————————————–
27 April 2018
Lapel Pins to be Handed Out to all Those Attending the C-B Commemoration (III)
A follow-up letter to DVA re that posted yesterday:
“Good Morning All,
A quick update re the email below. Mr Corke is referred to as having said that the same lapel pins were given out at the Long Tan 50th Anniversary. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith SG MC advises that: “Your Committee can tell DVA we are still waiting for our issue of these badges that were supposedly given out for the 50th in 2016″. Another Long Tan veteran, who attended the National Ceremony, advised that he was not aware of them being distributed then (and wouldn’t have worn one if they had been).
On another note … the President of the Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia advises that he has “received a supply of those pins and [has] no intention to distribute”.
If this story were to be picked up by the media, the disgraceful way in which former soldiers of the RVN and their families are treated in Vietnam today would be highlighted in no uncertain terms. Before wearing the lapel pin DVA has handed out, Australian Vietnam veterans want to see tangible commitment to human rights reform in the SRVN. The abhorrent practices of bulldozing the graves of former ARVN soldiers, closing their cemeteries and denying them dignified burial rights cannot be supported by Australian veterans.
If DVA is not to withdraw the lapel pins, please advise why Australian veterans should wear them,
Many thanks ….
26 April 2018
Lapel Pins to be Handed Out to all Those Attending the C-B Commemoration (II)
Letter to DVA: Now that ANZAC Day is over, I wonder if you might consider the following:
One of the members on the DVA planning Committee for the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration has given the reason for his acceptance of the lapel pins provided by DVA for the attendees as:
“The matter of the lapel pins occurred after the conclusion of the final Coral-Balmoral Commemorative Committee meeting at 1100hrs on 10/4.
After meeting’s end, each of us unit reps were given envelopes with our names on them containing the ticket allocations for veterans/spouses/carers attending the reception.
We were also given another a white envelope with our named on them, containing lapel pins inside.
When I saw that what they were, I approached Ken Corke Nat Mgr Domestic Commemorations and Grants, Amanda Gilmartin his A/Director and John Fely FAS Domestic Commemorations and Grants. I explained that the flag represented Communist Vietman an enemy against which Australians had fought and died.
I also put to them that if one changed the top half of the red background to blue we’d have the VC flag and stated that I wasn’t too sure how these would be received by the guys. I was informed by Ken Corke that these pins had in fact been given out for the Long Tan 50th Anniversary. (If that be the case I’ve never read or heard, of any backlash from the LT ceremony about these pins).”
One of the LT veterans at the Commemoration has stated that as far as he was aware, no such lapel pins were given out (and he wouldn’t have worn one if they had been). A response from Harry Smith is awaited in terms of his recollections.
The President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia (Bon Nguyen) has said that should the DVA lapel pins be worn during the C-B Commemoration, this will devastating to Vietnamese Australians.
Should a choice be given? Wear the RVN/Aust lapel pin or the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam/Aust lapel pin during commemoration ceremony? (images above)
On the one hand we curry favour with a trading partner, but offend a large section of our multi-cultural population alongside whom we fought in 1968. On the other hand, we respect our former Allies in their bid for human rights reform in a country in which we made sacrifices, but offend a trading partner with an appalling human rights record. Of course both could be worn, but this would be offensive to both sides.
The best solution is obviously not politicise the C-B commemoration and detract from the values of self-sacrifice that it seeks to honour, ie. for lapel pins not to be handed out at all.
————————————————————————————————————————–
25 April 2018
Thinking, in particular, of all those for whom ANZAC Day is ‘every’ day …
A story was told to me recently. Apparently the CDF (an RAAF officer) was speaking to a service audience and someone asked if he had actually had to confront an enemy himself. The question was a loaded one, in that the person asking knew that the CDF hadn’t done so … the inference being: how could his directives to the ADF with respect to ‘war-fighting’ have any credibility? I remember thinking when told this, that the CDF might have missed an opportunity, ie. to say that: ‘It is my hope that one of my successors will soon be able to respond to such a question, by stating that neither he nor any member of the ADF has any combat experience’.
——————————————————————————————————————————
24 April 2018
Lapel Pins to be Handed Out to all Those Attending the C-B Commemoration.
I’ve had to leave the battlehonour saga, to address another issue (also involving the RAAC Corporation).
The above lapel pins are to be handed out by the three RAAC senior representatives, with tickets, to all those attending the C-B Commemoration on 13 May.
I’ve copied one view about this below. I believe momentum will gather for a stand to be taken and thought that you should be aware.
It’s not enough for a conscience decision to be made by individuals. Veterans are being manipulated by those who have no idea what it’s like to put your life on the line for your country and its allies. Our sacrifices are being used to curry diplomatic favour. I believe that, in handing out the lapel pins, DVA is acting in accordance with the wishes of DFAT.
It was DFAT that was behind the RSL’s proposed MOU in 2011. The RSL’s National President at the time, together with the then Foreign Minister, proposed a MOU with the RSL’s “counter-part” in Vietnam. Rather than being an organisation which helped ALL veterans, however, it was a branch of the Vietnamese communist party that administered the policy of human rights abuses against former members of the RVAF (ie. ARVN and their families). Once this became known, there was a backlash from RSL members. It was suggested that any MOU should be linked to a cessation of the cruel practices suffered today by those we fought alongside. This was too much for DFAT/the RSL and the MOU was cancelled. See
DFAT has an interest in building diplomatic ties with Vietnam, it has no interest in helping our former allies and their families who are persecuted beyond belief in their own country. On 28 April, the Vietnamese Community in Australia will hold its annual service in Canberra to honour those who were killed and to show appreciation to the allied forces who fought with them. This year they will also be remembering the thousands of civilians slaughtered 50 years ago during Tet Mau Than (the Hue massacre). Imagine their feelings two weeks later if veterans of Coral-Balmoral were to show their support for the communist party of Vietnam which continues to persecute those we fought alongside.
Diplomatic ties are essential to improving human rights, but let’s not put the cart before the horse. The only honourable and compassionate thing to do is for DVA to withdraw the lapel pins.
Organisers are saying that the lapel pins are acceptable because they are the same as were handed out and worn at the Long Tan Commemoration. This has been disputed by at least one of those at the LT ceremony who states that no such badges were handed out and wouldn’t have been worn if they were. If we are to keep our self-respect, we must stand up to DFAT and strike down this degrading attempt at diplomatic bum licking.
—————————————————————————————————————————–
23 April 2018
Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour
What follows is my post from 4 April 2017 (which can be seen about 350 posts below). The reason for reposting will be made clear (should anyone be in doubt) tomorrow.
——————————————————————————-
4 April 2017: In June 2015 I prepared a submission seeking approval for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the 1AR Standard. I had hoped that the RAAC Corporation might have taken the lead in presenting this to Government on behalf of 1AR, 3 Cav and the RAR (the submission points out that the precedent set by the 1AR approval would enable three more battle honour to be emblazoned of the guidon and colours of the units involved.)
After years of inaction I sent my submission to the Minister on 7 February 2017:
The Hon Dan Tehan MP Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Dear Minister,
Forty eight years ago in May/June 1968, Australian soldiers fought what the Australian War Memorial refer to as “their largest, most sustained and arguably most hazardous battles of the Vietnam War” in defence of Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral.
The men of Australia’s 1st Armoured Regiment contributed greatly to the outcome of the actions. The Regiment was awarded a Battle Honour in acknowledgement of their gallantry.
Although current Defence Instructions allow the Battle Honour to be emblazoned on the Regiment’s Standard, apparently the Department of Defence will not approve it. The full background is set out in the attached submission. coral-balmoral-2
As the author of ‘Canister! On! FIRE!: The Story of Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’, I am in regular contact with many of the participants. All of them feel strongly that bureaucratic wrangling should not prevent them seeing the battle honour emblazoned before the 50th Anniversary of the battles. Of course, many of those who fought are either deceased or very ill.
Can you please consider this matter so that those remaining who participated in these battles might see their service and sacrifice appropriately acknowledged before they die.
As is to be expected, the Minister forwarded the submission to Defence who sought advice from 1AR, who sought advice from the RAAC Corporation. According to emails copied on Facebook, Noel McLaughlin, on behalf of the Corporation advised (inter alia):
“I am delighted and hugely honoured to confirm the RAAC Corporation’s complete and unequivocal support for this proposal to go ahead. Since this matter was first mooted some time back, the Corporation has always remained steadfast in its view that it will support any initiative to have the Regiment and its members who fought at Coral-Balmoral, so honoured.
In so stating, I must also have regard to the involvement of A Sqn 3rd Cavalry Regiment in the Coral-Balmoral actions and hope this will also translate into a similar award for the Guidon of that unit.
Since it was first mooted some ago, the RAAC Corporation has remained steadfast in its support of this initiative for the Regiment and 3 Cav as it has done for a similar form of recognition for the RAAC veterans of Operation Hammersley.
I agree that it is quite possible Battle Honours to the other non-RAAC units involved in Coral-Balmoral will flow in due course, and it is very, very heartening to see the Regiment taking the lead on this issue.
If there is anything at all the Corporation can do to assist you in this matter, please do not hesitate to ask.
The Advisory Board of the Corporation is the jewel in our corporate crown and they are an excellent source of additional firepower, should you feel the need to seek their input.”
1AR responded to say: “Firstly, thank you for the quick response and I [Regt 2IC] really appreciate the Cooperation’s support on this. I will brief my Bde Comd – BRIG Ben James that there is no impediment to emblazing Coral-Balmoral on the Standard and I will link the precedence set to supporting the recognition on 3rd Cavalry Regiment’s Guidon.
Ideally, I will push to have the battle honour emblazoned on the Standard by the Coral-Balmoral Anniversary period this May with the Standard’s first planned parade being in support of National Beersheba Centenary Celebrations on 31 Oct 17.”
It’s fantastic that the Minister has initiated consideration and the RAAC Corporation has supported my proposal … BUT, it is almost two years since I prepared the submission and made it available (it wasn’t an idea that I “mooted” in passing). Why didn’t the Corporation take the lead and co-ordinate action between associations and Corps? At least the Minister has acted “so that those remaining who participated in these battles might see their service and sacrifice appropriately acknowledged before they die”.
Footnote: With Reference to Mr McLaughlin’s advice to 1AR that: “In so stating, I must also have regard to the involvement of A Sqn 3rd Cavalry Regiment in the Coral-Balmoral actions and hope this will also translate into a similar award for the Guidon of that unit” ….
I’ve informed him: You’ll be aware that the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour is already emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon. When I stated in the my submission that approval of the DI 38-3 would enable three more battlehonours to be emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon, I was referring to Hat Dich, Binh Ba and Bien Hoa.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
22 April 2018
RAAC ARES Units : Now Just Infantry Reinforcements?
In an address about the ARES last year, the CA stated that:
“As well as changes in recruiting, training and participation models, change is underway
with respect to equipment. Modern land platforms, such as the armoured vehicles being
acquired for the Army in Project Land 400, are highly capable. They are also highly
complex and costly. Due to the complexity of these vehicles they will not be crewed by
Reserve personnel. This is a factor of the number of training days per year necessary to
establish and maintain crew proficiency. The high cost of this capability also makes it
unlikely that our nation can afford more than a number sufficient to equip our full time
brigades.
Of course, the Reserve will utilise Land 400 Armoured vehicles, as Cavalry Scouts for the
Armoured Cavalry Regiments and as reinforcements for the infantry battalions of the 1st,
3rd and 7th Brigades.”
So … the reasons that RAAC ARES units are theoretically restricted to a dismounted role are
LAND 400 vehicles are too complex;
There are insufficient training days available for the ARES; and
LAND 400 vehicles are too expensive to acquire an ARES training pool.
Of course, the CRV complexity is not a problem if sufficient ARES training days are allocated, but this requires funding; as does the acquisition of ARES platforms.
But the ARES don’t have to operate complex and expensive LAND 400 CRVs, they could develop mobile warfare skills using the much cheaper Hawkei … but it’s an even cheaper solution to keep them dismounted.
Armouredadvocates has highlighted the RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’ for years. More tomorrow.
——————————————————————————————————————————-
21 April 2018
Newly Emblazoned Vietnam Theatre Honour
I’ve had a few queries since I pointed out that the 1 Armd Regt Standard not only has a newly emblazoned Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour, but also a new Theatre Honour. My letter to the then Minister requesting this was posted on 22 February 2017 (following soon after my request for C-B to be emblazoned). He approved both submissions on 31 March 2017. My second letter is copied below and explains ….
The Hon Dan Tehan MP Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Dear Minister,
You’ll appreciate that for those who were deployed on active duty on behalf of their nation, not a day goes past when they don’t think about those they served with. It goes without saying that the nation expects that their service will be recorded accurately, especially in the places that most reverently acknowledge their sacrifices
I was taken aback, therefore, when I learnt that the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard was incorrect. ‘Vietnam 1968-72’, should read ‘Vietnam 1968 -71’.
What is a standard and what is its significance?
Armies have carried rallying symbols into battle for centuries, eg. the eagle standards of the Romans. Today, heavy cavalry units (ie. tank regiments) are awarded standards, in recognition of their place at the point of battle. The design of a standard is approved by the Sovereign and presented to a unit by the Sovereign or her representative. It carries the battle honours of its unit and is consecrated as a reminder of the past and an inspiration for the future, when the courage which was that of the unit’s predecessors, is to be called upon again. The 1st Armoured Regiment is the only unit within the Australian Army to have a standard. Guidons and colours are carried by other units.
I am very much aware of the error in the date, as my tank troop was the last to serve in Vietnam and we were withdrawn from operations on 30 August 1971. The tank squadron left Vietnam the following month.
This might not seem an important matter. Imagine, however, if the Standard for the British Household Cavalry was to be found to bear the Battle Honour ‘Waterloo 1816’ (instead of ‘Waterloo 1815’). There would be national outcry in the UK and the Standard would be immediately re-emblazoned correctly. Why should the service of the Household Cavalry be any different to that of the 1st Armoured Regiment? When lives are placed on the line, the bravery and courage of those involved is just the same.
How did the error come about?
On 18 April 1979, the Vietnam Battle Honours Committee met to consider if a theatre honour should be awarded for Vietnam. It was agreed that the Theatre Honour ‘South Vietnam 1965–1972’ was appropriate. (Later approved as ‘Vietnam 1965–72’.) Eligible units included 1st Armoured Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the Royal Australian Regiment.
It was not intended that the theatre honour was to be awarded, irrespective of the period that a unit served in Vietnam. The Regimental Colour of 7 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, for example, is emblazoned with ‘Vietnam 1967-68’ and Vietnam ‘1970-71’. The Guidon for the 3rd Cavalry Regiment is emblazoned with ‘Vietnam 1965-72’. The intention for the honour awarded to 1st Armoured Regiment (‘Vietnam 1968-72’) was obviously meant to acknowledge the period that the Regiment served in Vietnam. The arrival year is correct, however, the departure year was 1971, not 1972.
Can you please initiate action to recognise the service of 850 members of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam, by having the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment re-emblazoned ‘Vietnam 1968-1971’.
Yours Sincerely
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
20 April 2018
Membership of 1AR Assn
I’ve copied below the Blog post from 14 October 2017. It seems that the C’tee has recently determined that the Constitution is to be followed, ie. they do not have the power to honour the decisions of previous C’tees regarding membership such as life or affiliate members (see below).
Members who had previously been designated Life Members (and not subject to fees) are now obliged to pay membership dues in order to continue to enjoy the benefits offered by the Assn.
———————————————————————
1AR Assn Constitution
I recently queried the reference to “financial affiliate member” in the Minutes of the 2017 AGM.
The current Constitution (the only one the Assn has had) states that membership falls into two classes: members and associate members. The latter is defined as: “(a) any members under the age of 15 years; and (b) any other category of member as determined by special resolution at a general meeting”.
>
To be valid members of the 1 AR Assn, therefore, Life Membership and Affiliate Membership, have to be categories of membership determined by “special resolution at a general meeting”.
>
The President has stated, in relation to this, that the current C’tee intends “to honour decisions of previous Committees regarding membership such as life or affiliate member” (letter 4 Oct 17). Of course, as quoted above, it’s not within the C’tee’s power to introduce new categories of membership. This can only be done by a vote of a majority of members vide special resolution at a general meeting.
>
The other thing is that according to the Constitution, Associate Members (ie. Life and Affiliate Members) do not have voting rights. The right of Life Members to vote is one of the provisions contained in the draft Own Rules Constitution prepared by a group of members (understood to be currently under consideration by the C’tee).
>
Unless there are Minutes of a past General Meeting recording a Special Resolution proposing Life and Affiliate membership, which was approved by members … neither category of membership exists. If such a Resolution was approved, the categories of members created do not have voting rights unless this provision was included in the Resolution.
>
If the above Resolution cannot be found, it would seem that if they voted at the last AGM, Life and Affiliate members did so unlawfully.
Given the numerous failures to abide by the Constitution which occurred at the last AGM, the above information is brought to the attention of the C’tee to ensure that no unlawful votes are lodged at the next general meeting. It would seem that the only way that a Life Member can vote (without a Special Resolution having been passed) and providing he/she meets the requirements for ordinary membership, is to pay the membership fee and become a financial member.
This matter needs to be clarified absolutely so that no unlawful voting jeopardises the validity of the coming General Meeting to consider the audited Financial Statement*.
[*Note … no General Meeting to consider and approve the audited 2016/17 Financial Statement has been held. Presumably the reason for this will be advised at the coming AGM.]
—————————————————————————————————————-
19 April 2018
The Link Between Monash and Coral-Balmoral Commemoration
A recent sequence of posts on the 3 Cav Forum established what the situation was with the emblazoning of battlehonours on the 3 Cav Guidon and 1 Armd Regt Standard (and provided details re the first parade with ‘all’ battlehonours).
What now about the award of the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG) for those involved in Coral-Balamoral?
The 50th Anniversary commemoration is on 13 May 2018 and an announcement is to be made before then. The matter of merit is unlikely to be successfully challenged … so how is it possible that the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal could not recommend that the award be made?
One of their Terms of Reference is “In making its findings and formulating its recommendations the Tribunal is to maintain the integrity of the Australian honours system and identify any consequential impact [that] any finding or recommendation may have on that system”.
The view held by the Department of Defence Honours and Awards Directorate (which represents Defence as a whole and is separate to the Tribunal) is that the integrity of the Honours and Awards system would be damaged if a retrospective approval was given for an award for an action, when that award did not exist at the time that the action took place.
I spoke to the Director, Defence Honours and Awards) about this, last year. She acknowledged that Defence’s position was at odds with the Letters Patent for the UCG, but Defence regards the Letters Patent only as an ‘enabling document’ which allows them to have a different policy.
The current Defence policy is that they will not support any retrospective awards unless there was some maladministration that can be shown to have occurred at the time.
The reason advanced for this is that the criteria governing the Australian honours and awards system is different to that which applied to the Imperial system (ie. the acts of gallantry are the same, but the administrative process for recognising them is different).
The 1942 RAN and Long Tan awards are not precedents as far as Defence is concerned, as they opposed the awards at the time (but were overruled by the Minister).
If the UCG for Coral -Balmoral is to be awarded, the same thing will have to happen. The reason given in media articles for the Government’s decision not to retrospectively promote General Sir John Monash, is that such an act could open the floodgates for other retrospective awards (Defence’s position).
The final outcome re the UCG for Coral-Balmoral will always be a political one, rather than one which turns solely on the acknowledgement of the extraordinary gallantry of those involved. But there has to be hope that public support for the award is such the Government will agree.
Let’s not forget … well done to George Hulse and Jack Parr and their team for the enormous work they devoted to this (especially the public petition which might well win the day.)
————————————————————————————————————————
18 April 2018
2017/18 1AR Assn AGM
With the AGM not long away, it is timely to reflect on the matters which the Constitution dictates that have to happen. What follows is my understanding:
Quorum. The meeting cannot proceed unless 10% of the members entitled to vote are present or represented by proxy (this requires that the number of members entitled to vote is made known at the start of the meeting).
New Constitution. If the draft Constitution prepared by the members’ group in conjunction with the previous c’tee is to be considered for approval, this must be done vide a Special Resolution.
Special Resolution Notice. Twenty one days notice must be given to members along with details of the resolution, ie. a copy of the draft Constitution.
Special Resolution Approval. Three quarters of the members voting (either in person or by proxy) must approve the resolution.
Minutes of the AGM. The Minutes must include: names of members attending; copies of the proxy forms submitted, the financial report, and the signed certificate certifying the financial report to be true and correct.
It’s not stated in the Constitution, but openness and transparency would demand that the returning officer’s figures for election results and any special resolution would be included in the Minutes. (This is obviously the rationale behind the names of those attending and proxies submitted, being included in the Minutes.)
17 April 2018
The 1AR Assn & the Future
The 2017/18 AGM is to held soon. There has been an increase in posts on social media concerning matters which might be on the Agenda. One example relates to a person who stated that they were an Associate member. The Constitution, however, only provides for associate members who are under 15 years of age (the person concerned was older than this).
Another example relates to C’tee positions to be filled. There was an assumption that an Operations Manager was to be automatically appointed. The Constitution, however, only provides for a president, VP, secretary and treasurer. Ordinary members can, however, be appointed.
The Constitution sets out the procedure … a case is put at the AGM for additional c’tee positions eg. operations manager and possibly assistant secretary and treasurer positions (to both help with the work load and cover absences). If a vote of the members approves additional C’tee members being appointed, nominations are taken from the floor accordingly.
Probably the most obvious example, is that members assumed that you had to have served in 1 Armd Regt to be eligible to be a member of the 1AR Assn. But that’s not so. The Constitution provides for ANYONE who supports the Purposes of the Assn to become a member (irrespective of whether or not they have served in 1 Armd Regt).
Of course, none of the above would be concerns, if the revised Constitution drafted by a members’ working group under the leadership of the last C’tee, is approved. This is a Constitution which is fully compatible with the requirements of the regulator and caters for the specific needs of the 1AR Assn.
One would think that there would be overwhelming support for this initiative. This might be the case, but those who are vocal on social media express the following views:
“Individuals DON’T CARE about what I certainly perceive as minor details. I don’t care about crossing T’s and dotting I’s. Personally I enjoy getting together every now and then, having a few ales and a laugh.”
“I’ve had enough of this shit! its like a fkn mothers club meeting! grow up people ffs!!”
Anyone who wishes to discuss a governance matter is berated for “drivelling shit”.
It is an inescapable fact that the 1AR Assn is an association incorporated in Victoria and, as such, there is no option other than to accept the governance regulations that apply. I suspect that the members of the NSW RSL might have had a similar attitude to that expressed above, as far taking a close interest in anything to do with the governance of that organisation was concerned.
The first step towards securing the future of the 1 AR Assn, is to adopt a the new Constitution which has been drafted by members for the benefit of members..
——————————————————————————————————-
16 April 2018
What’s Important?
Recently, the 1AR Assn Facebooks pages have been full of comments about what the Assn stands for.
Mr Fenton: “Unit Association’s do not have the logistics, money, resources, training or willing members [to look after serving and ex serving members]. Unit Association’s should be able to refer there (sic) members to the RSL”.[Apparently this is what the unit associations agreed at the last RAAC AGM … according to Mr Fenton, the 1AR Assn rep. But members aren’t provided with Minutes, so we’ll never know.]
Mr Soutar: “I get a few [members] asking me about gold cards but usually point them to the local RSL!”.
I responded to Mr Soutar to say: I suggest you refer to the register of qualifications of 1AR Assn members in your area as a first step; if there are none that you can refer the person seeking help to … you contact other ESOs such as DFWA and, VVAA,, as well as the RSL. Some people will be more qualified to help than others. The important thing is to follow the process through, so that the person who approached you for help doesn’t find himself/herself left in the gutter.
Purposes of the Association. The present Constitution specifies to the Assn exists to fulfil the Purposes set out at the end of this post. But do we really want to “look after” serving and ex-service members? Or do we just want to organise get-togethers and send anyone needing help to the RSL? Are the Purposes a statement of what we believe in and want to see happen … or are they just for ‘show’?, ie. to kid ourselves that we have good intentions and the will to carry them out.
Register of Qualifications. If we did want to fulfil the Purposes we set for ourselves, you’d think that State Reps would hold a register of members listing their skills. Possibly a disabled member needs help in providing wheelchair access for his house. Possibly one of the other members is/was a carpenter. If the Assn thought that looking after serving and ex-service members was important, there is one hell of a lot that could be done.
But there has to be a will. Food for thought perhaps (perhaps not).
The purposes of our existing “model rules” Constitution are:
(1) To combine into an Association:
(a) former members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(b) currently-serving members of 1st Armoured Regiment; and
(c) widows, dependents and next of kin of former and present members of the units however prescribed.
(2) To foster and perpetuate ties of comradeship created by those eligible for membership;
(3) To unite members of the Association for their mutual benefit; (4) To promote and advance or otherwise assist the welfare and well-being of members, their dependents and next of kin and any other persons as the Management Committee, branch or branches shall approve; (5) To provide all possible assistance to members in a practical and advisory capacity;
(6) To preserve the history of 1st Armoured Regiment through the fostering and sponsorship of awards for excellence in soldiering;
(7) To diffuse or disseminate knowledge and information or otherwise further these Objects;
To maintain, promote and encourage the establishment of groups of members to act as a branch or branches of the Association; and
(9) To do all such other acts and things and enter such affiliation as are incidental or conducive to the furtherance of the above objectives. .
—————————————————————————————————————————-
15 April 2018
The Minister’s response to my submission can be read in the attachment below. My second letter was written to seek his approval for a correction to the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard. Both this submission and the one copied below for the emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour, were approved.
The question, of course, is what does it matter how approval was obtained?
For me … it’s the frustration that comes from having tried and tried, in vain, to have representative organisations take the submission forward. As mentioned yesterday, I eventually had to give up and submit the request myself. The speed with which credit was quickly claimed by representative bodies, suggests that they are doing everything they should be doing. This is far from the case.
The purpose in highlighting the failure in the present system of representation (and this is certainly not the only example) is to try and create an awareness which will result in a better system.
Pigs might fly, but I’m an optimist … believing that the right thing will be done eventually.
Time now to leave the subject aside and focus on other issues deserving of armouredadvocates’ attention.
———————————————————————————————————
14 April 2018
Battlehonours
Following the back and forth re the emblazoning of the 3 Cav Regt battlehonours, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation decided that he should make known some background:
“In March 2017, the Corporation lodged a submission behalf of 1AR through the Corps to have the BH Coral-Balmoral emblazoned on the 1Armd Regt Standard. A legislative anomaly was found and used to great effect. The submission was approved on 28/3/17 …”.
When I queried this, the Chairman stated: “No self-promotion, not claiming credit just informing people of the facts”.
The reason for my query was that, on 7 Feb 17, I sent the submission below to the Minister.
At the time, I had given up trying to encourage representative bodies to argue the case (there’s a story here for another day) and decided that I had no option but take on the challenge myself. I posted my submission publicly, so as to keep all stakeholders informed.
More to follow (one might think that there are already grounds to query the RAAC Corporation’s statement above).
Submission Seeking Approval to Emblazon the Battle Honour‘Coral-Balmoral’ on the1st Armoured Regiment Standard.
Background.
Following the First World War, a British/Imperial Battle Honours Committee (BHC) decided that emblazoned battle honours should be limited to ten per regiment (because of constraints on the available space on colours etc). The same constraint was imposed following the Second World War.
Because of differences in scale, the limit set for Korean War battle honours was one theatre honour and one battle honour. This decision was initially accepted by the Australian Army. Twenty years later, however, it was considered that the Battle of Maryang San was so important that the BHC edict would no longer be complied with — both Maryang San and Kapyong Battle Honours would be emblazoned.
The limit of one theatre honour and two battle honours was maintained by the Vietnam BHC.
1st Armoured Regiment was awarded three battle honours for Vietnam, but only Hat Dich and Binh Ba are emblazoned on its Standard. Despite Coral-Balmoral’s overwhelming importance in terms of the Australian Army’s military heritage, the battle honour is not able to be emblazoned.
Is it not time to question a policy founded in the days of Empire which denies an Australian unit the right to proudly proclaim all its battle honours?
Aim
This submission argues that the use of the First and Second World Wars as benchmarks on which to base the number of battle honours able to be emblazoned on the colours etc of today’s Army, is outdated and completely inappropriate in terms of acknowledging the service to the Nation selflessly given by Australian soldiers in modern conflicts.
Justification.
Authorisation Already Exits. It could be argued that there is no need for this submission. Current Army policy as set out in DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions, states that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned.
It has been suggested, however, that this is a ‘known error’. If so, it raises the question: why has no amendment been made? Presumably this is a matter that is already recognised as requiring further consideration in light of the very different circumstances in which today’s Army operates.
This is not the only reference at variance with a limit of two battle honours. Christopher Jobson spent thirty years in the Army. Prior to retirement, he was RSM Ceremony and Protocol and an acknowledged expert in the subject. In his 2009 book, ‘Looking Forward, Looking Back : Customs and Traditions of the Australian Army’, he states that there is no limit on the number of battle honours that can be emblazoned on colours etc today.
Precedent for Re-evaluating Convention. A precedent has been set in which the Australian Army acted contrary to Imperial directions and authorised a battle honour to be emblazoned because of the extent of bravery displayed by Australian soldiers in the action concerned. Those soldiers, it was decided, had earned the right for their sacrifice and gallantry to be formally acknowledged. There is no doubt that gallant efforts of those who fought at FSBs Coral and Balmoral deserve no less.
Nature of Modern Warfare. As the Second World War was different to the First World War, so are modern conflicts different again. Why should the extent to which today’s soldiers can be honoured be based on circumstances from over 70 years ago?
Why should those former members of 1st Armoured Regiment who fought and earned three battle honours for Vietnam, only be able to see two of them emblazoned on their Regiment’s Standard? Why should members of that Regiment today, not be able to fully appreciate the significance of all the battle honours their forebears were awarded?
Wider Implications. What would be the implications of endorsing the existing provisions of DI (A) Admin 38-3? Three more battle honours would be able to be emblazoned on the Colours of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Guidon of 3rd Cavalry Regiment; one more battle honour would be able to be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment.
Timing. The emblazing should carried out as soon as possible. It will further boost unit morale, provide enhanced public profile of the gallantry of soldiers who fought during those iconic battles, and boost the public profile of Army’s heritage. Furthermore, for the ever decreasing numbers of veterans who participated in the battles and are still alive, it will be seen as public acknowledgement of their job well done before they all succumb to the ravages of time.
Conclusion.
Today’s Army fights different wars to those of 1914-18 and 1939-45. The basis on which the gallantry of today’s soldiers is honoured should be determined on current circumstances, not those of more than 70 years ago.
The existing provisions of DI(A)-Admin 38-3, Administration of Australian Battle Honours, Theatre Honours, Honour Titles and Honour Distinctions, which state that up to ten battle honours can be emblazoned on colours etc, should be strongly endorsed, rather than any thought being given to reverting to benchmarks set last century. The Battle Honour, “Coral-Balmoral”, should be emblazoned on the Standard of 1st Armoured Regiment as soon as possible.
————————————————————————————————————————–
13 April 2018
3 Cav Guidon (IV)
Following on from yesterday’s post, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation advised that he was told (‘ordered’?) not to tell “anyone until the emblazoning which was under the purview of the RSM SOA had been completed”.
He went on to say that as this “has now been done, I’ve honoured the Corps’ request and I now consider the embargo has been lifted”; furthermore (his emphasis): “Both Colours with their new emblazoning will have their first public airing on Sunday 13 May 2018 as part of the Colour Parties assembling I
Of course, we know that this is not to be. The newly emblazoned 3 Cav Guidon is to be paraded at Broadford on ANZAC Day. It was the apparent lack of any special recognition for this first parading (or “public airing” in the Chairman’s words) which led to the initial post on the matter.
It seems that the secrecy imposed on the emblazoning and parading of the 1AR Standard and 3 Cav Guidon has had an unanticipated consequence, ie. arrangements were made without any attention being paid to the (unknown) agreement between the HOC and the RAAC Corporation.
The SoA mentioned during the course of this that, in relation to the 3 Cav Guidon, the SoA is B Sqn 3/4 Cav’s higher HQ and that arrangements to parade the Guidons were their prerogative,
It’s so easy for secrecy to be imposed on things. Can anyone justify why it was needed on this occasion?Surely it’s in everyone’s interest to know that the battlehonours are being emblazoned on the Guidon and Standard. Instead of not telling anyone, why not tell everybody?
Why can’t there be free and open communication about matters such as this? It’s my belief that there is an obligation to keep stakeholders informed. Seems to me that pulling teeth is easier than getting information sometimes.
———————————————————————————————————————–
12 April 2018
3 Cav Guidon (III)
My request for info about whether or not the 3 Cav Guidon had been emblazoned with the recently approved battlehonours (which the SoA declined to comment on) was answered emphatically with the photo below:
I responded to say:“The next hope is that all those who served with 4/19 PWLH/1APC Sqn/3 Cav from 1965 to 1972 will be invited to attend the occasion at which the 3 Cav Guidon is paraded with all battlehonours for the first time (or it will at least be made known to them when that event is to occur)”.
I was informed that B Sqn 3/4 Cav is providing the ARA component at the Anzac Day service at Broadford this year. I commented in a post that “I wouldn’t think that the Guidons would be paraded, however”.
A response came through quickly. Someone had seen a notice on another 3 Cav site (dated 27 March) which stated
The Guidons of 3rd & 4TH Cavalry Regiment’s will be paraded in Broadford Victoria, on ANZAC Day 2018. The Broadford RSL extends an invitation to members that served in either or both units to march with the RSL on ANZAC Day. The guidons will be marched on just after 09.00 by members of B SQN 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment (SOA).
I responded to say:
“Doesn’t anyone understand how significant an event this is? (Q. Where’s the RAAC Corporation? A. Probably the same place as the HOC)
At least the info is in part of the public arena … words fail me (and I won’t try to extemporize). I can’t speak for those involved in Bien Hoa, but I know a little about the sacrifices which contributed to the Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours (and I’m humbled by them).
I wonder how the parading of the 1AR Standard will be handled? Maybe, they’ll save the first parade until the Coral-Balmoral commemoration (then again, maybe they won’t).”
My next post was a copy of an email to the HOC:
“Dear Sir,
As HOC RAAC, are you aware that on ANZAC day the 3 Cav Regt Guidon will be paraded for the first time, carrying all of the battlehonours that were awarded for Vietnam?
Apart from the significance of this for those who contributed to the outcome of the battles involved, the Guidon is unique in the Australian Army in carrying all battlehonours that were awarded.
I have interviewed (for a book I wrote) many of the RAAC crewmen involved in these events and I am humbled by their bravery and sacrifice.
Can you please initiate action to ensure that the first parading of the newly emblazoned 3 Cav Guidon is an event which will make proud, all those who contributed to the battlehonours it now carries.”
To follow: What Happens Next.
——————————————————————————————————————————
11 April 2018
3 Cav Regt Guidon
Everything started with my post on the 3 Cav website:
Does anyone know what the delay is in emblazoning the Binh Ba, Hat Dich and Bien Hoa Battle Honours? (The SoA doesn’t seem to want to say.) Is a special parade be held when it’s done (with all Vietnam members invited)?
Someone posted to the effect that a lot of people were so slighted by lack of recognition that nobody gives a damn about such things.
I responded to say:
“I’m not sure if you’re aware … there used to a restriction on the emblazoning of battlehonours to two two per theatre honour. That has been overturned and all five battlehonours can now be emblazoned by those units who were awarded them for Vietnam.
Only two regiments were awarded all five … the RAR and 3 Cav. RAR Colours carried by battalions are emblazoned with the battlehonours that the battalions were awarded.
It’s only the 3 Cav Guidon, therefore, which can be emblazoned with all five battlehonours. It is unique in the Australian Army and reflects the enormous service and sacrifice of all those who served as members of the 3 Cav squadrons.
I can’t understand why the RAAC Corporation, the SoA, or the HOC will not provide any information about correcting a policy oversight which should never have existed … the end result being that those who served in the actions which resulted in the award of the battlehonours, are only now able to see them carried on parade (if they live long enough).
The Coral-Balmoral battlehonour which was not able to be emblazoned on the 1AR Standard (because of the ‘only two’ policy) was last seen in the drawer of the CO’s desk.
There is an opportunity for those who served in the major battles of the Vietnam War to see the honours that their sacrifices justly deserved …paraded at last. The longer the procrastination, the fewer who will live to see the day. I apologise not for trying to highlight the failings that have led to this point.”
I responded to another post on the website to say:
“The next hope is that all those who served with 4/19 PWLH/1APC Sqn/3 Cav from 1965 to 1972 will be invited to attend the occasion at which the 3 Cav Guidon is paraded with all battlehonours for the first time (or it will at least be made known to them when that event is to occur).”
More to follow ….
——————————————————————————————————————————
10 April 2018
RAAC Corporation. (Finishing off, back to the 3 Cav Guidon tomorrow.)
In the 6 April post I asked Mr C M Fenton OAM who is the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation if he could please explain what was decided at the last RAAC Corporation AGM and what the Corporation has done since then?
He has responded to say:
“It is up to The Association to pass that information down to their membership which I believe was done through the Association’s News Letter.”
Unfortunately Mr Fenton seems not to have read the Assn’s great newsletters. His belief is mistaken, no report has been provided.
I had thought that Mr Fenton’s travel costs to attend the AGM were paid for by the Assn, but he tells me that his ”traveling expenses were paid by DVA through a grant to The Corporation”. It is, nevertheless, a tax payer funded trip and one would think that a report to members was the least they could expect. I explained that it was my contention that his attendance was on behalf of the members of the Assn.
Mr Fenton rejected this as “the ‘Association’ is the member to the Corporation, not the Association’s members”. Furthermore: “I am the link between The Corporation and The Association, not to its members”. I find it had to understand that anyone could disassociate an association from the members that comprise it. However … stranger things have happened.
I summarised the ‘toing and froing’ on the Facebook site:
Here’s a summary: You were paid by DVA to attend the last AGM of the RAAC Corporation (Oct 17). You prepared a report and gave it to the 1AR Assn C’tee. The C’tee decided not to release your report to members of the Assn. I’ve copied an extract from another Assn’s report to its members re the same AGM. I imagine that our Assn feels the same re those separating from 1AR (?).
It’s hard to acknowledge the excellent work being done by the Corporation if we can’t be told about it. You’ve said that you can’t do anything about this. So I guess that that’s that then.
Extract from the report to members of another association about the RAAC Corporation AGM (by their rep that attended):
“I represented the Association at the Annual General Meeting of the RAAC Corporation held at Seymour/Puckapunyal 13-14th October [2017].
The Chair raised DVA concerns over contacting members separating from the service and their welfare. DVA are seeking a better system than those currently supporting ex-service personnel. There are (evidently) over 5500 Ex-Service Organisations (ESOs). The Corps RSM intends to ask the transition cell to hand out contact details of local Associations which personnel may choose to contact.
Our Association will have our details as recorded as part of this scheme. Quite clearly departing personnel are at liberty to take whatever future pathway in life they chose. Our Association will be there when and if needed as a place that offers camaraderie and a link to the Corps.”
—————————————————————————————————————–
9 April 2018
3 Cav Guidon
There has been a lot of ‘toing and froing’ about the parading of the newly emblazoned 1AR Standard and 3 Cav Guidon. I will set out the background tomorrow. For now … what follows is my response to someone on the 3 Cav forum who queried how it was that certain actions resulted in battlehonours and others didn’t.
Happy to pass on what I know. A six person c’tee reviewed combat engagements that took place during Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War … with a view to recommending those for which a battlehonour should be awarded. Their consideration was conducted on an operation by operation basis. The decision, therefore, was whether or nor Operation XXX met the criteria. Which were? … you ask.
What they considered first was what constitutes the magnitude of a battle and whether or not this should be the basis of the criteria. They decided that the following were essential elements: size of forces; intensity (including duration, results, area covered, enemy intentions; and significance (ie. the outcome should have had a significant effect on subsequent operations). In relation to size of forces … the benchmark was initially thought to be two units (ie. inf bns), then it was decided that a unit supported by a tank or cav elm would meet the criteria). It was agreed that in some operations, some of the criteria may carry more weight than others. (A unit was considered to be present if it included its HQ and more than 50% of its strength.)
I have seen the spreadsheet which records the operations considered and reasons for and against the award of a battlehonour. I can’t recall it in detail, however, I know that there were many actions considered (this document is available for anyone to view in the AWM).
There is one further aspect that might interest you. The C’tee were initially advised that it was unlikely that the criteria for the award of a battlehonour would exceed ten. It was further advised that this might be reduced to three, given the magnitude of a small number of actions. These included the “Tet Offensive”.
As we know, five battlehonours were awarded for Vietnam. My feeling is that operations associated with the “Tet Offensive” might have been considered for a number of battlehonours (ie,. not just Operation Coburg, but also Operation ‘Tet-Baria/Long Dien). I’ve mentioned this in the past.
Hope the above is of value.
—————————————————————————————————
8 April 2018
Governance and the Need for a Constitution
The post below was placed on the 1AR Assn (Members Only) Facebook page a couple of days ago.
“Mr Fenton, You are the spokesperson you say, for “most of the members”, ie. nearly all the members using this Facebook page. You claim, therefore, to be representing and speaking for at least 65 members.
None of these members, you say, gives a “rat’s rear end” about governance of their Association and its lawful financial reporting … regarding anything related to these matters as “drivell”(sic)..
I think that this is exactly the situation that arose within the NSW RSL not long ago. While this saddens me (and a lot of others I know), you (and the overwhelming majority of members you apparently represent) seem only too happy to denigrate any member who express concern about governance issues.
Speaking of which, given that you are the Assn representative on the RAAC Corporation can you please provide a report from the last AGM you attended on our behalf.”
The post lasted about five minutes before being taken down.
The following post was made soon after, in response to a person who stated that they had been an associate member for three years (they are not under fifteen):
‘The point that I was trying to make is that the Assn’s Constitution needs to be approved as a matter of urgency. Associate members, for example, are currently provided for as follows
“(1) Associate members of the Association include—
(a) any members under the age of 15 years; and
(b) any other category of member as determined by special resolution at a general meeting.”
There has not been a special resolution re categories of members, therefore, the only associate members currently, are those under 15. The draft Constitution which you refer to of three years ago, was found to be invalid. Numerous changes have been made in the new document, however, the C’tee is yet to forward it to members for their appraisal so that it can subsequently be voted on at a general meeting.’
The 1AR Assn needs its own Constitution. One has existed for well over 12 months. It took many, many, hours of work by a number of very committed members.
Is it not time that it be circulated to all members to see if they can improve on it, before it is voted on at a general meeting?
————————————————————————————————————————
7 April 2018
Sleight of Hand?
It used to be that a tank squadron comprised four troops, each of four tanks.
With cost savings being paramount, there is an argument for having three troops, each of four tanks. Of course, should the need to train commanders to exercise control over sub-units be seen to be important… you could go back to four troops, each of three tanks. There are arguments for and against both groupings. If you’re not watching carefully, however, you could end up with three troops, each of three tanks (a reduction of five tanks per squadron).
LAND 400
The Defence Technology Review has reported that the number of turreted Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRVs) has been reduced from 180 to 133, to save cost. What does this mean in terms of operational capability?
A Recon Troop used to comprise five vehicles, two recon, two fire support and one APC. The ASLAV recon troop might have been different, but let’s consider the cav troop as five vehicles, four turreted.
There are two cav sqns in each of the three ACRs and each should have four recon troops. Hence, twenty four recon troops … if each has four turreted CRVs, there is a need for 96 vehicles. We are left with 37 turreted CRVs to meet the needs of the SoA, RAEME Training Centre and repair pools.
Gunnery and Tactics Wings at the SoA would surely require eighteen turreted CRVs between them. One would think that RTC could make do with six. This leaves 13 vehicles for repair pools and operational reserve, Obviously this is insufficient!!
What’s the answer? Reduce the number of cav troops in a cav sqn from four to three.
The same solution might have been decided upon to make up the numbers for the ‘additional’ tank squadron and repair pool needed for the 2/14 QMI (ACR) tank squadron …rather than acquiring the additional 90 tanks needed for the existing organisation. Just maybe, this is a temporary measure. (Problem is that ‘temporary’ often quickly becomes ‘permanent’.)
——————————————————————————————————————————
6 April 2018
RAAC Corporation
I was asked the following question a couple of days ago on the 1AR Facebook page:
“What is the RAAC “Corporation?”.
I responded to say that: “The RAAC Corporation is an umbrella organisation that the 1AR Assn and other RAAC unit assns belong to. Part of our membership fees go towards the cost of being a member and a specific c’tee position is designated as the 1AR Assn representative. Unfortunately members have not received a single report as to what the Corporation does. It holds AGMs and our rep travels and attends at our expense, yet we don’t see any Minutes”.
Of course it is Mr C M Fenton OAM who is the 1AR Assn rep for the RAAC Corporation. (His appointment came about in response to the conflict of interest that existed with the President 1AR Assn being both a Director of the RAAC Corporation and the 1AR Assn Council Member.)
Mr Fenton (who I understand is a regular reader of the Blog) … can you please explain what was decided at the last RAAC Corporation AGM and what the Corporation has done since then?
You might also like to inform the RAAC Corporation that its webpage is woefully out of date (definitely not the right ‘look’ for the representative RAAC body). The following info is presently included on the website:
The RAAC is the senior arms Corps within the Army and was granted the Royalprefix in 1948. Units of the RAAC include tank regiments, reconnaissance regiments and armoured personnel-carrier regiments.EquipmentThe RAAC is primarily equipped with three types of vehicles: A1 Abrams – the Abrams is Australia’s main battle tank (MBT) and equips 1st Armoured Regiment.ASLAV – the ASLAV is a variant of the LAV II vehicle designed specifically for the Australian Army and is used in the armoured reconnaissance role with 2nd Cavalry Regiment and 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment.BUSHMASTER – the Bushmaster PMV is an Australian-built wheeled armoured vehicle which provides a high degree of protection from IEDs.
It seems that the RAAC Corporation has missed the creation of the Armoured Cavalry Regiments (ACRs) and is unaware that the SoA and Corps RSM has stated categorically that the RAAC does NOT operate the Bushmaster PMV. Photos such as that below are obviously inappropriate on the RAAC Corporation website (according to the RSM and SoA).
5 April 2018
The On-Going RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’: Part III (RAAC ‘Truckies’)
Last month, I asked: “Will the SoA act to safeguard RAAC ARES personnel operating PMVs (and their passengers) … by ensuring that they meet designated competency standards [during their training]?”.
I received the following response:
“Your belief is that RAAC Reserve soldiers are crewman. This is in fact not the case, the trade of our reserve soldiers is a Light Cavalry Scout. There are no vehicle qualifications as a part of the Light Cavalry Scout training continuum. All of their RAAC Employment Spec training is dismounted. This provides a capability that the ACR can use.
The provision of the protected lift capability is a secondary task dictated by COMD 2 DIV. The PMV is not an AFV and has nil requirement for a “commander”, it is just a truck, that requires a licence code. The training for that code is owned by RACT, as it is only a truck.”
The above policy position seems to be supported by the Corps RSM who stated in the recent Ironsides that: ‘the RAAC does not operate the Bushmaster PMV-M”.
It’s hard to rationalise the above denials of any responsibility for ensuring the safety of RAAC personnel, with the article in today’s Army Newspaper. http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/
Page 22 includes a feature about a 1/15 RNSWL PMV crew commander during Exercise Telopea Run (5 Bde). “A highlight of the exercise was seeing a full cavalry squadron [C Sqn, 1/15 RNSWL] on the go.” This is not bad for a dismounted unit which does not operate the PMV and whose members have no vehicle qualifications (other than truck licences). “We provided support by fire [for the attack on Docra Airstrip].”
Of course, if the enemy had counter-attacked, 1/15 RNSWL could have just relied on the fact there is a ‘nil requirement’ for RAAC PMV crew commanders .,.. so neither they, nor the PMVs, were really there.
How long before penny pinching cost savings which refuse to acknowledge a responsibility to adequately train RAAC personnel commanding PMVs, results in more accidents and possibly deaths.
—————————————————————————————————————————————–
4 April 2018
A Warning About ‘Team Players’
I posted the following on the Blog a few days ago: “Recently some members of an association’s leadership group were exposed as having lied to members and to have signed false declarations. What happened? Those members who exposed the wrongdoing, were themselves branded as the wrongdoers. ‘Group think’ and intimidation outplayed integrity standards.”
The following is an edited extract from an article by Ian McAuley (see below). It is relevant to the above situation and I commend it …
“One doesn’t need a degree in sociology to understand why loyalty is such an asset to a group: just one or a handful of defectors can inflict mortal damage to a group.
But behaviour motivated by misplaced loyalty can be no less damaging to a group. We now know that senior clergy who protected child abusers have inflicted far more reputational damage on their institutions than would have been the case had they exposed the wrongdoers.
More generally, group solidarity can be at the expense of the interests of wider society. Motorcycle gangs and the mafia are held together by strong sanctions against defectors. Tightly-knit groups can conspire to secure privileges for their members and to thwart desirable reforms …
Obviously defection from a group and refusal to follow illegal or unjust orders takes courage. It also requires a well-developed sense of morality – based on religious or humanitarian beliefs, adherence to professional standards, or strong norms in the wider society.
A moral compass, however, is of limited use if there is no clear direction in which virtue lies. Those who study group processes and game theory know that the more entrenched bad behaviour becomes, the harder it is for people to find a way to break the pattern, and the personal costs of a moral stance become higher.
Breaking the pattern is even harder when bad behaviour is supported by small-group norms as in a sporting team, in a workgroup in a financial services firm, or in a tight-knit group such as a religious community or a police force.
We need a culture more supportive of those who break from their groups and disobey their bosses in the public interest. Strong whistelblower protection helps, but there has to be more, because the life of the defector can be lonely. Corporations need to understand that the whistleblower may be doing the organization a favour. Just as we honour those who make sacrifices in war and in policing, we could celebrate those who have broken from their groups in the public interest. ”
Mungo MacCallum* made the following observation yesterday:
“As what is left of Australian cricket segues from its dismal autumn into a miserable winter, there is at least a tinge of irony in the disaster.
Last week, Malcolm Turnbull, still drooling with spittle and bile after another session of parliamentary question time, gave the world a homily about the evils of sledging before returning to denigrate, abuse and generally defame his political opponents, principally Bill Shorten.
Rank hypocrisy, yes; but it made a weird kind of sense. After all, such fine judges as John Howard and Ginger Meggs regard the positions of prime minister and captain of the Australian cricket team almost on a par, so why should not the two occupants behave equally badly?”
I had referred to sledging a few days earlier in the following post on the 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook page:
‘What’s the following post mean? Bob suggested that there had not been much activity on the site and Mr C M Fenton OAM states that: “Yes Bob must of us are still out here, however most of us use the other sites as there is less shit dribbled on the other sites”. Should all those like Lou Walker who have made posts below feel that they have been responsible for dribbling shit? Is this not something for the Admin to say ‘this person is criticizing all those who post on this site and his sledging should be deleted’. It seems that it’s not only the cricketers who have to suffer as a result of one of their number not doing the right thing. Of course, he who alleges “shit [being] dribbled” could always apologise.’
I guess that if we are to put any store in the example set by the Australian Prime Minister, we have to accept that slandering all and sundry (even members of your own Association) is acceptable behaviour. Interestingly, Mr C M Fenton OAM (who has said that this is how he is to be referred to) has been recognised for outstanding work in the ceremonial field. I wonder how he would feel if he was to also be cited for “dribbling shit”? The scenario goes like this: WO Ceremonial: “Markers, Take Post! Response: “You’re dribbling shit again, Sir!”.
What does he do? Does he just accept the slander or does he take exception to it? This is, of course, a rhetorical question. What hypocrisy he is guilty of then, when his own slander is not simply accepted by those it’s directed at! You’d have thought that WWIII had started!.
Someone called Phillip Cornish told me in no uncertain terms to “Piss Off!” for daring to be so bold as to take a stand against one person high-jacking social media to slander others. One of the few posts remaining (ie. not removed by the site Admin because of their derogatory nature) is that from me quoted above …it was a simple question designed to bring attention to the fact that civil behaviour should be the rule for dialogue between adults, whether or not you’re in the Army!
Playing the Man, Not the Ball; Tampering with the Truth: Call it What You Will.
I’ve just learnt that I’ve been excluded from posts on the 1 AR Assn Facebook page made by David Paterson (former Operations Managers and Treasurer). I have blocked nobody in my Facebook account, so I assume that I have been blocked by Paterson himself (rather than the Assn) but who knows?.
The posts which brought this to my attention occurred on 12 Dec 17. Paterson made numerous derogatory statements about a number of people; he even claimed that because I did not respond (to a post that I couldn’t see) that this proved that he was correct in what he said about me.
One of his statements demands my response. He states that the funds that the 1AR Assn received from the Publishers of the history of Australian tank operations in Vietnam were “committed to a specific purpose and [were] not just cash for the Association to spend as it wanted”.
This is totally untrue. The contract signed with the Publishers (for payments to be made directly to the 1AR Assn bank account) places absolutely no restriction on the way in which the Assn C’tee might use the funds received. The only expectation was that the funds would be used by the C’tee for the good of members (as set out in the Epilogue of the book) and were not in any way for the personal benefit of the C’tee. Is this not the general expectation that accompanies all donations?
It is now apparent that this is the source of the information provided to the accounting firm called in to redo the 1AR Assn’s last financial statement. As stated in the Blog on 19 February 2018 (in a letter to the accounting firm):
“The then RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel (former Chief of Army) who launched the book at the 1st Armoured Regiment’s then base in Darwin complimented me on my generosity. The Association Committee was represented at the occasion and provided bank account details for the Publisher to pay royalties direct to the Association for use as the C’tee thought appropriate over time. There was no constraint, nor ‘obligation’, imposed by me on how any funds that might accrue should be spent, other than the expectation that they would be used “to assist the Associations endeavours”. I trusted the C’tee of the Association not to use the funds for any other purpose (e.g. personal advantage). A cd of the complete launch of the book is available should you desire to see it.
The reason that I donated all monies raised by the book to the 1 Armoured Regiment Association was because so many members helped me in the writing of it over the more than fifteen years involved, that I felt that I could not profit at their expense … besides it is to them that the book is dedicated and they are the ones who should feel ownership of it>’
Mr Paterson has made a very specific claim, ie. money was paid to the 1AR Assn by the Big Sky Publishing for a specific purpose. Let him now say what this purpose was.
Remember that approx $1500 of the money was used to purchase building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club and a TV set for the D Sqn ‘boozer’ in Adelaide. Were these funds used in accord with the ‘specific purpose’ that supposedly governs their use?
Easter commitments mean that this will be the last post until Mon, 2 Mar 18.
—————————————————————————————————
28 March 2018
ESOs Going Forward II
Many thanks for responses re yesterday’s blog. I’ve copied below an edited response to one of you. There have been many good points made … which I’ll keep in mind and archive for future reference.
Dear XXXX,
You touched on a point that I was thinking of adding to my response re DFWA, ie. it’s a waste of the resources of ESOs to duplicate each other’s efforts; far better for an ESO to differentiate itself from other ESOs and work to that focus.
The 1AR Rep for the RAAC Corporation has stated that all Corporation Member Assns agreed that helping those in need was better handled by other organisations. Rather than putting up a brick wall, however, I believe that the 1AR Assn should encourage those in need to get in touch so that they can be referred to others with appropriate skills.
Members of 1AR Assn are both serving and retired; but the Assn really only focuses on promoting the camaraderie of the latter (apart from prizes for trainees etc).
I’ve recommended a number of times that the C’tee should consider enlarging its representation, eg. an asst treasurer; asst sec etc. I’ve also suggested reps for each generational group, eg Centurion, Leopard, Abrams. These reps would be able to inform the C’tee re cross generational views. Another suggestion was to form an advisory group re Constitution/regulatory matters (a number of members would be prepared to assist here). Yet another idea was that members should be surveyed to determine what they believe the Assn’s priorities should be. The C’tee has been unresponsive, however.
Kel Ryan is an ideal President for DFWA. Hopefully we’ll see others who acknowledge the importance of seeking the views of their members, taking up leadership positions in their ESOs.
Of course, if the views of a majority of members are to be adopted, this might mean that an ESO has to adopt a very different path to that that its founders envisaged. In this case, I believe that the consequences of leaving behind all the ideals of the past should be clearly articulated (dinosaurs are not necessarily all bad).
Many thanks again …
———————————————————————————————————————–
27 March 2018
ESOs Going Forward.
The following is a response to Kel Ryan, DFWA President. The 1AR Assn called for similar input from members some years ago. I gather that I was the only one who responded. It seems to me that if members of ESOs can’t make the time to respond to requests for input into future governance policy, they don’t deserve the efforts and hard work of C’tee members on their behalf.
Dear Kel,
Saw your request in the Newsletter and offer the following for consideration ….
Firstly, I believe that we have to be careful about using the term ‘veteran’. There is a gulf between those who have been on active service and those, for whatever reason, have not. I suggest that it would be better to refer to service personnel (i.e. male, female, regular, reserve, serving, retired, and DFWA members). [Please note this usage in the matters discussed below.]
The issues facing ‘the present generation’ of service personnel and their families today are pretty much the same as those we faced. Sure, technology has changed and, for example, social media is with us, but that it is the case for society as a whole.
Issues are broad based. Not just human resource matters (e.g. allowances, sexual orientation, posting turbulence, and schooling), they also relate to such matters as health and safety, suitability of equipment and uniforms, appropriate recognition for active service, organisational structure and roles, war-fighting capability, retirement benefits, health care for service related injuries/wounds etc.
Service personnel need a voice to represent them in relation to matters which, although they might be Defence policy, are not in their best interests. Many associations have baulked at opposing the ‘official’ position and have become a ‘mouthpiece’ for the status quo.
Service personnel need a means of communicating their issues to DFWA. If this does exist, decisions are effectively made in a vacuum. How this might be achieved should be a priority for the DFWA, i.e. how do you find out what the issues are with which service personnel need assistance (even though they might not know it)? I can imagine a workshop having to conducted on this topic.
Not all ‘issues’ that service personnel have are bad. They should be encouraged to communicate the things that they find to be of benefit (as well as the opposite). DFWA should also advocate on behalf of good policies, so that they can be built on and benefits to service personnel can be extended.
The DFWA of the past should inform the present and not be consigned to the dustbin. What issues flew under the radar? Why did this happen? The experience that DFWA has gained must ensure that lessons do not have to be relearnt.
The organisational structure of DFWA must reflect its objectives, i.e. how can the interests of service personnel be represented most effectively by DFWA? This requires a blank page approach. The most important criteria would seem to be: how can communications with service personnel be best maintained, while at the same time maintaining effective administrative control of DFWA in terms of membership issues and input? Standing working groups or other structural changes might be appropriate to deal with certain categories of ‘issues’.
Finally, all organisations have stakeholders, as well as members. The Minister is probably the most important of DFWA’s stakeholders. What can DFWA offer him, that he cannot receive from other ESOs? Is this what he needs and wants? Whether or not these the answers to these two questions match each other, must constitute an important part of DFWA’s agenda.
Footnote: Doing the Right Thing’ is axiomatic to military service. The Australian cricket team has failed to do the right thing recently. DFWA should position itself to be seen to always stand for ‘Doing the Right Thing’ … proud to be an independent and apolitical organisation which stands up for all service personnel at all times and in all matters.
————————————————————————————————————
26 March 2018
Doing the Right Thing.
How things would be different if this was the mantra that all leadership groups followed.
The Australian cricket team’s reputation would, for example, be very different today if this was the case.
It’s been discussed on the blog before … why is it that it is only when certain groups fail to do the right thing, that outrage results. The failure of the Commonwealth Bank to protect the interests of its customers provoked outrage, but rorts by politicians often fly under the radar.
Do expectations have something to do with this? We have high expectations for our cricket teams and our banks, but politicians are held to a lesser standard of integrity?
Do we also have low expectations of those who form the committees of our associations? The RSL shortcomings certainly resulted in outrage, but possibly the RSL is held to be an icon, with a similar public profile to that of our cricket team.
Recently some members of an association’s leadership group were exposed as having lied to members and to have signed false declarations. What happened? Those members who exposed the wrongdoing, were themselves branded as the wrongdoers. ‘Group think’ and intimidation outplayed integrity standards.
I said at the time of my invalid expulsion from the 1AR Assn, ‘doing the right thing’ is axiomatic with Army service.
Is it not appropriate to express outrage whenever there is a failure to ‘do the right thing’ … irrespective of whether or not the organisation or individual concerned has the high public expectations of, say, the Australian cricket team?
Re yesterday’s blog … thank you to those who suggested some ‘omissions’ … these have been included.
—————————————————————————————————————————
25 March 2018
The Ideal World
In such a world there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have draw attention to.
This would mean:
Members of the RAAC who participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral would be entitled to the Unit Citation for Gallantry.
Members of the RAAC who participated in Operation Hammersley would be entitled to the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation.
Armoured crewmen would be entitled to wear a ‘silver’ Army Combat Badge (or other such badge) to acknowledge the unique dangers they face in combat.
Serving members of the RAAC would carry into combat a personal weapon which effectively provided rapid and hard hitting firepower.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would be equipped with a full squadron of tanks and have access to an adequate repair pool.
2/14 QMI (ACR) would operate from a base which provided good access to training areas and suitable housing and schooling for families.
All RAAC ARES units would be equipped with a crew operated vehicle (such as Hawkei) and have roles which are in keeping with the conduct of mobile warfare.
All RAAC personnel who serve as PMV-M (Bushmasters) crew commanders would be trained and certified to a level of competency approved by the School of Armour.
No-one on RAAC related social media would use personal insults and derogatory language in an attempt to stifle free and open discussion.
The RAAC corporation would stand up and advocate for issues which adversely affect the RAAC, even if this is contrary to the ‘official’ position.
The minutes of RAAC Corporation AGMs would be made available to the members of the associations who make up the Corporation and pay for the privilege.
Serving RAAC personnel would be issued with black berets at public expense.
Those personnel who do not retire as SNCO or above, would be able to request a miniature ACB to be provided to them at public expense … should they have an occasion in which they need to wear it.
The Frontier Wars, during which first Australians defended their families, their land and their possessions, would be commemorated by the AWM.
ANZAC Day services would commemorate the first Australians who lost their lives during the Frontier Wars, on the same basis as all other Australians who have died defending their nation.
Wars in which Australia participated would no longer be defined by the casualty figures at their end, but references to them (including school text books) would acknowledge that casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths occurring every day.
Those who were wounded in action would no longer be referred to as being ‘injured’.
Attention would be given (as a matter of course) to ensuring that the health of RAAC crewmen is not affected by the transmissions of radios and other electronic equipment in their AFVs.
Peter Best would receive just and compassionate treatment from Immigration authorities.
Those former 1AR members who desired to do so, could use a Regimental flag as a drape for their coffin.
Having obtained permission for the above from 1AR, the 1AR Assn would pay to have a coffin drape made (ie. a large Regimental flag) and loan this to NOK for use at funerals.
Minutes of 1AR Assn C’tee meetings would be made available to members.
The 1AR Assn would operate in complete openness, transparency and honesty, particularly as far as governance decisions are concerned.
The 1AR Assn would have a valid Constitution approved by members.
Donations would be able to be made to the 1AR Assn for the C’tee to utilise as they consider best.
The objectives of the 1AR Assn would include efforts to care for those less fortunate (in addition to simply promoting ‘comraderie’).
The 1AR Assn would have valid By-Laws approved by members which would include the procedures to be followed by AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/distinguished former members of 1AR receive awards for their endeavours.
The above By-Laws would also include the procedures to be followed by 1AR Assn members/C’tee when members of the Assn and serving/distinguished former members of 1AR die.
Pending …
Minutes of the 1AR AGMs would be published without any defamatory material.
The C-B Battlehonour would be emblazoned on the 1 AR Standard
The dates shown on the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard would be corrected.
The Binh Ba, Hat Dich and Bien Hoa Battlehonours would be emblazoned on the 3 Cav Regt Guidon.
Crossed off the List:
Army Combat Badges are now provided to the NOK of those who have been killed in action.
Approval has been given for the C-B Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1AR Standard.
Bien Hoa, Hat Dich and Binh Ba battlehonours have been emblazoned on the 3 Cav Guidon
Approval has been given for the dates of the Vietnam Theatre Honour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard to be corrected.
The insensitive (made in China) ‘snow dome’ modeled on the Centurion tank in the grounds of the AWM (in which crew were WIA), has been removed from sale at the AWM
1 Troop A Squadron 4/19 PWLH has been acknowledged as the first RAAC unit to be deployed in action (and is the recipient of the RVN Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation), rather than being designated ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, the Defence proposal supported by the RAAC Corporation.
Personnel subjected to mine incidents and the like, in which blast effects may have caused occult wounds (ie. invisible at the time), will now have the incident recorded and be subject to follow-up medicals.
A Centurion tank is now back on display at the AWM.
The RSL has abandoned its proposal to sign an MOU with the Communist Party of Vietnam, while the human rights of former SVN Armed Forces members (our Allies) continue to be violated.
The Army has abandoned its policy banning the wearing of berets.
————————————————————————————————–
24 March 2018
RAAC Crewman Personal Weapon
The following sequence is from the 1st Armoured Regiment Past and Present Facebook page. It was started by someone posting a photo of an FI SMG.
Post: Aeroguard is more effective.
Post: My mate Barry would always say that throwing the F1 at the VC would do more damage than firing it at them.
Post: “A simple, light, robust weapon capable of producing large volumes of effective fire at ranges up to 100m”Good God, where did that come from? Oh yeah, my days as an RTI at Kapooka 73 -75. It’s a worry isn’t it?
Post: That was when I knew I was in for some bullshit, a tomthumb cracker had more powder!
Post: Awful to use. Even preferred the OWEN gun!!!
Post: The Owen might be from the 1930`s it is still the best machine carbine the Aust Army has had.
Post: I loved the F1. If you got good store-bought ammo into it, it was a belter. The main reason it appeared under powered was some of the ammo was Korean War era and late sixties vintage. I had the opportunity to test an F1 at the Federal Police range in Melbourne. Brand new full metal jacket Winchester ammo and I was hitting inside the nine ring and with Jacketed Hollow Points I shot a 315/320 at 25 metres. Zero stoppages with good ammo. Ugly but effective…
Post: Store bought ammo wasn’t the ammo of choice for the ADF in the 70’s.
Post: I know. 1976 to 1987. The F1 had a bad reputation due mainly to the ammo. Which was sadly underpowered and degrading with age.
Post: I got a lot better in the AFP when I bought my own pistols and reloaded my own ammo. At one stage I had a .22 Browning Sportsman, 2x .357 magnum S&W L frame (6 inch barrel) revolvers one iron sights one red dot Tasco. One H&K P7m13 (my favourite 9mm) & One S&W 4006 .40Cal.. I’d shoot about 800 – 1000 rounds a week preparing for competitions like the Steel Challenge and Service Match … I was the only officer in the AFP to shoot two perfect qualifications in the same day, one with the standard K Frame .38 special (4 inch barrel) and then the J Frame 5 shot 1 inch barrel S&W. Practice makes perfect. The AFP allowed 200 rounds (reloaded wadcutters) per year for official practices and 30 rounds factory ammo for qualifying. Not useless… dangerous.
Post: A piece of junk! Rubbish! Tried to be an Owen …. failed miserably!
Post: Shoot someone with the 9 m parrabelum ammo and they got really cranky and ran away. Anything smaller than a 50 cal is a peashooter!
Post: Tend to agree, although I did carry a Thompson .45 during my time in Vietnam and no one ran away after being tapped with that.
Post: I agree. Pretty useless and made to a price I think.
Post: How many people have used one to defend yourself with NVA 10 feet away..Better than anything else to use in that position.
Post: Ha Ha!
Post: Better than a bayonet?
Bruce Cameron Page 189, COF, Vol 1. Better than ‘your’ 9mm pistol, As the 50th anniversary of 26 May 1968 approaches, today’s tank crews still don’t have an effective personal weapon (and nothing’s being done about it!)
Post: Did not have one [a bayonet]…only a pick handle …Disgraceful is it not.
Bruce Cameron Experience has shown that AFV crewmen need a high rate of fire, hard hitting, personal weapon. I have just finished a book about tank operations in Burma during WWII. This was overwhelmingly the case then, as it was in Vietnam. The problem is that Army commanders, as they were during Vietnam, are not prepared to ‘rock the boat’ about such matters (which are always decided by supposed budgetary priorities). Unfortunately, the RAAC Corporation will not raise issues that are contrary to the HOC position (which will always be in line with the ‘Army’ view). How do you eat an elephant? One bite at a time!
Post: In 1980 (I think) LTCOL Ian Bryant, then CO 2 Cav, called a meeting of the squadron commanders, 2IC and QM (me) to discuss the range of crew personal weapons to be adopted with the introduction of the F88 Austeyr. It was decided that we would have the F88C (carbine) version across the board. I have no idea where it went from there.
Bruce Cameron An extract from my blog:”The current handgun issued to AFV crewman is the same Browning 9mm pistol issued to crews in Vietnam. It was of limited use then and is no better today. The fact that it first entered service in 1935 says a lot. Both the British and US Armies have recently updated their issued handguns. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) commented recently that “the current ADF handgun belongs to an era when bolt-action rifles were king of the battlefield. We wouldn’t send our troops into harm’s way with a .303 Lee Enfield rifle today, so why do we send them out with vintage handguns—or none at all? (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-adf-handgun-is…/
ASPI goes on to say that the Australian Army has “a blind spot when it comes to handguns … contrast this with the British Army’s commitment to rushing its newly-acquired Glock pistols [referred to as the ‘Kalashnikov’ of hand guns] to its frontline units deployed in Afghanistan, where pistols have been credited with saving the lives of several soldiers”.
Why isn’t this something on the agenda of the RAAC Corporation?
Tomorrow: The ideal world in which there would be nothing for Armouredadvocates to have draw attention to.
———————————————————————————————–
Secrets (?).
23 March 2018
The following sequence is from 1st Armoured Regiment (Australia) Past & Present Facebook page:
Anthony SoutarOk Guy’s I have been asked to remove my last post by Paratus Derek. [Vice president, 1AR Assn]. I have taken it down but watch this space as this shit will get interesting., Dutchy.
Post: Would have like to know what was so offensive, so much for free speech?
Paratus Derek There was nothing offensive at all. Anthony Soutar, as always, was respectful. The subject he spoke of (written by someone else on another site) has potential to be quite damaging and could possibly be very malicious. Thanks Dutchy I appreciate your work.
Anthony Soutar Mate it is not about free speech, but I was asked by someone I respect to remove it and I decided as a favour to him and the Assn I said I would. This is not done yet but we win this. Watch this space!
Site Admin: We have said it many a time that this page is for Ex members and families to share photos, stories and memories of their time in the Regiment. It is not a playground for politics or fishing expeditions. There are other pages for that. There is zero tolerance, if a post is considered to be antagonistic unsavoury or offensive it will be binned. Flea.
Anthony Soutar And fair enough and I am sorry that sometimes I let my emotions get the better of me, but if you bullshit or attack people I respect then the gloves are off. There are sometimes are times people have to hear the hard truths about what bullshit is being spread by people who should know better.
What’s going on? Why are there so many secrets? This blog was stared to provide a means for open and transparent discussion of RAAC matters, as a result of a vacuum in this area. As far as I know, the above Facebook page has nothing to do with the 1 AR Assn, yet the Assn steps in t0 close down discussion. The subject is apparently one damaging to the Assn and also is of “malicious” intent, ie. intended to harm the Assn. Whatever the “shit” (above) is … it seems that there’s some sort of action [to harm the Assn] and counter action [to defend the Assn]. According to Mr Soutar, bullshit and personal attacks are involved and the Assn will “win” the contest (whatever it may be).
Two thoughts: ‘Secrecy won’t clean up dirt’ and ‘Sunlight is the best disinfectant for bullshit’.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
22 March 2018
Recognition for AFV Crews
The following sequence of posts appeared recently on the Tango and TA Website recently. It was sparked by a photo of someone wearing a ‘silver’ ACB.
Post: Love the chromed ACB. I have one.
Response: When did they award chrome ACB’s ???
Post: The chromed ACB was introduced as the alternate ICB. It was put to Army HQ as the Armoured Combat Badge to highlight armoured service just as the infantry have the ICB. However the hard work and submissions were hijacked and introduced to cover all corps serving in a combat role. IE the Army Combat Badge’.
Response: ‘I know of the history and hard work done by a small group, but my question was when was a chrome ACB awarded as far as I know chrome is not worn on serving RAAC members, only the bronze ACB.
Post: ‘As far as I know they didn’t, do it yourself, I did looks good
Response: ‘I’ll stick to the current colour until the system does a chrome one’.
Bruce Cameron Last year the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs stated, in response to a submission for RAAC personnel to wear a ‘silver’ ACB, that this could not be approved because “risks are common across many corps and trades and singling out individual corps for service within a combined arms team would result in inequity in the face of common danger”. Somewhat surprisingly, the Minister went on to say that there was a sole exception …the Infantry Combat Badge. This was justified on the basis of “the unique requirements of service within the infantry and the history associated with the badge”. Efforts to have the unique dangers faced by AFV crews and gallant service rendered by them, acknowledged … will continue (even if not supported by supposed representative organisations).
Response: ‘Agree. That RAAC in recent times have emu plumes in an infantry slouch hat presumes a ‘unique requirement of service’ within the RAAC along with longstanding silver uniform accoutrements could be an argument using the Infantry Combat Badge analog.
Bruce Cameron “The nature of the dangers faced by AFV crews is unique. … The gallant service of past crews demands that appropriate recognition of those involved in armoured combat today be pursued vigorously at all levels, until achieved.” Page 358, COF, Vol 2. A revised submission will be lodged with the Minister in due course. That being submitted today asks that black berets be provided to members of the RAAC at public expense (as per all other uniform items) rather than soldiers having to buy them themselves.
Post: ‘ I remember when i was in the Regt we ‘had’ to have our brass chromed, we ‘had’ to buy our own stable belts & we ‘had’ to buy our own 2nd black beret for parades and ceremonial events. We were given an annual allowance of $160 which we had to produce receipts for tax purposes. It was back in the days if you completed 6 years service and signed on again they gave you a $1000 re-engagement bonus. I think that’s all gone now.
Bruce Cameron When I prepared the options paper as a basis for the RAAC Assn (NSW Branch) discussions with the Minister re an Armour Combat Badge, I came up with the idea of an Army Combat Badge. I emphasised, however, that this would only be feasible if the ICB was withdrawn. I warned that to have both an ICB and an ACB (for all the others), would create a ‘them and us’ situation contrary to the concept of combined arms teams. What happened is history. I have absolutely no hesitation in wearing a ‘silver’ ACB. The more attention I can draw to this injustice, the better.
Post: I remember when B 3/4 before coming home from I think it was Iraq, they rang me from there and ordered 200 Armoured Combat Badges, so when they got home our members, [3 Cav Assoc] awarded each serving member one. I have heard, no name, of a RSM that wore one on a non corps posting at a formal dinner and no one noticed. I wonder if HOC would buck the system and get the soldiers at the SoA what have the bronze ACB get them to wear the silver ACB. That would be something to see, but it wont happen, one can dream.
Post: You can purchase chrome ACB’s from RAACA NSW
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
21 March 2018
Minister for Defence, Parliament House.
Dear Minister,
The Defence Budget, Soldiers’ Morale and Black Berets.
Two of the above would no doubt occupy a lot of your attention. You are to be congratulated on the recent decisions affecting Army’s future equipment. Replacement reconnaissance vehicles such as those to be procured through LAND 400 will have a very positive impact on the morale of soldiers, especially those in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC).
As you would appreciate, morale is of such importance within the ADF (as in all defence forces), that it is classed as an element of combat power (along with firepower, mobility, strength etc). It is not only ‘big ticket’ items such as LAND 400, however, which influence it … uniforms and accoutrements are an example.
History of Black Beret. There are a number of different coloured berets worn by soldiers: dark blue is general issue; while beige is restricted to members of the SAS; green to commandos; and sky blue to the Aviation Corps. In addition to these, all ranks in the RAAC wear a black beret.
Black shows oil stains the least, so it was that this colour was approved by King George V as the headdress for the Royal Tank Corps (RTC). The RTC gifted black berets to the Australian Armoured Corps soon after it was formed in 1929.
Meanspiritedness of Government Officials. Some years ago an Army Combat Badge (ACB) was approved for awarding to those members of the ADF who had served in action against the enemy. The NOK of members who were killed in action, however, were not entitled to receive the award on behalf of their lost ones, as it had been designated as a dress embellishment and it could not be worn by the deceased.
The intention of this policy was to save money. When its meanspiritness was made public, the policy was reversed. Many NOK have since been presented with the ACB awarded to their deceased family members and have received it gratefully.
Incredibly, a similar policy to that which was overturned re the ACB, presently exists in relation to black berets … serving RAAC personnel are required to purchase their own berets.
Effect on Morale. Not surprisingly, some uniform items, more so than others, differentiate parts of the Army from one an another. I also served in the British Parachute Regiment and our red beret was (and is) known internationally. It galvanised members of the Regiment to ensure that they lived up to the heritage set by those who had gone before.
The black beret has the same meaning for members of the RAAC. The adverse effect on morale when soldiers are told they must pay for their headdress, can only too easily be understood. Imagine: “This part of your uniform embodies the heritage of your unit more than anything else. You have to pay for it, however. Why? Because the Government does not believe in Army traditions and wants to save money at your expense”.
Surely Minister, is this not something you can fix?
——————————————————————————————————————————
20 March 2018
‘Casualties’ … Letter to the Editor.
Dear Sir,
I would like to commend Gavin O’Brien (Letters, March 20) for highlighting the fact that on ANZAC Day we remember not only those who lost their lives fighting, but also those who died later from their wounds.
The casualty figures shown in school books are ‘only’ those suffered during the period of each war. These are the names inscribed on the Honour Roll at the AWM. An awareness of the need to make known the full cost of wars we enter into, is slowly emerging.
As we approach 11 November 2018, there will be many references to the 60,000 Australians lost. Dr Brendan Nelson, Director of the AWM, has revealed that almost as many Australians died of their wounds in the decade after they returned from WWI, as were killed during that conflict.
If there is one thing we should learn from the coming Centenary, it is the fact that the casualties did not end with the Armistice. The cost to the Nation of any war must never be defined by the casualty figures at its end.
Anyone who asks how many have died, after the end of the Vietnam War, from wounds they received, is told that such ‘information is not available’. While, at its end, 521 Australian service personnel had lost their lives and more than 3000 were reported as wounded, it is time to acknowledge that the casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths resulting every day.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
19 March 2018
The Ethics of ‘Masking’ Payments through the 1AR Assn.
It was announced during my recent travels that Rheinmetall has been awarded the LAND 400 contract to provide the replacement for the ASLAV recon vehicle in the three ACRs. This underscores the ethical issues highlighted in the previous blog posts copied below.
28 December 2017
Priorities; Urgency; and Importance
The telephone can be the enemy of effective time management. Time and all other resources are, of course, allocated to ensure that important matters are appropriately dealt with. When someone calls on the telephone, they expect their call to be (i) answered and furthermore, (ii) their concern addressed immediately. By default … this becomes an urgent matter. If dealt with straightaway, however, it might well absorb resources required to deal with an important matter. Of course, if something is both urgent and important, it must be allocated appropriate priority.
I referred yesterday to Assn Governance (urgent) and RAAC Issues (important). It is possible, of course, for either category to include matters which are both urgent and important.
The following has the potential to be included in this category.
The financial ledger sent to Assn members recently, included the information below:
“Misc – Donation made to association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd Regt Regimental Funds ….. $5,000.00”
One has to wonder if this is the first ‘donation’ which been channeled through the Assn to avoid (presumably) any suggestion of conflict of interest (ie. as might arise if the company was a defence contractor or potential contractor). The possibility arises that other payments have been made via the Assn and that other RAAC Units are also beneficiaries. Furthermore, if ‘secret’ payments are being made to units, it has to be assumed that other payments might have been made to individuals.
There is a major project in the pipeline which affects all ARA RAAC units. Companies are vying for selection. The overall cost is in the order of $5b.
It is both urgent and important that an assurance be given that any equipment to be operated by the RAAC is chosen on its merits and the decision is not, in any way, influenced by payments“masked by coming through” the Assn.
—————————————————————————————————————-
30 December 2017
Donations?
Continuing on from 28 December …. the Assn’s 14/15 Financial Statement (included in the Minutes of the 2015 AGM) includes the following reference under the heading, Expenditure:
“Donations (to 1AR from Rheinmetall Sim) $10,000”
I believe that $5000 may also have been donated on this basis in FY13/14.
So it appears that Rheinmetall may have donated at least $20,000 to 1AR (regimental funds presumably) through the 1AR Assn
Why would any commercial company do this, ie. what benefit would it expect to gain?
One has to assume that the funds are being paid to the Assn because to pay direct to 1AR would raise conflict of interest concerns (ie. the payment would have to appear on the company’s ledger which would be open to audit). As the Assn C’tee stated in the 15/16 accounts, the payment “is masked by coming through us” (see 28/12 blog).
There is nothing to stop unit regimental funds receiving donations, however, I cannot begin to imagine the deviousness that might justify such ‘secret’ donations, and their acceptance, on commercial grounds. One presumes that the money is buying ‘influence’ of some sort, such as when China funds a new hospital on an island in the Pacific. As we know, however, the money for the hospital not only buys bricks and concrete, but also contributes to the personal wealth for those who allocate contracts.
This blog was set up to provide openness and transparency where none existed previously. It would seem that there is a way to go until everybody does ‘the right thing’.
——————————————————————————————————————-
2 March 2018
Three ‘Letters’ Prior to Departure
A new grandson has arrived and we’re off to the UK today, back on 19 March. No more blog posts before then. I wonder if responses to the following queries will have been received by then ….
IRONSIDES
Dear Sir,
Congratulations on a great Ironsides.
I thought I should point out an apparent contradiction: on page 6, the Corps RSM states that the PMV-M is not employed by the RAAC; directly opposite, however, the Commander Forces Command states that protected mobility for infantry will remain the responsibility of the RAAC in the 2nd Division.
I presume that the latter statement is the correct one. Please let me know if this is not the case.
It’s been some time since we were in touch. We’ll recall that Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) directed that the 1 Armoured Regiment Assn (1ARA) C’tee send a revised 16/17 financial statement to members for approval by 31 Dec 17 (as the statement presented at the AGM did not cover the whole FY). The C’tee weren’t able to meet this deadline and you granted an extension of time.
The revised financial statement was subsequently forwarded to members, however, it contained a number of errors. Members brought these to the attention of the C’tee and a further revise was conducted. Revise Mk II was sent to members. Without there being any consultation with them (the members), you advised the 1ARA C’tee that they no longer needed to seek members’ approval for the financial statement to be ‘passed’ (as it should have been at the AGM) retrospectively.
Members noticed that the latest financial statement, ie. Revise Mk II, also contains errors. When these were raised, one was quickly addressed by the accountants who prepared it … they withdrew one page and substituted it with a replacement which no longer contained the error.
Given your direction that members do not have to approve the financial statement of their Association, can you please advise if members have to accept the document (irrespective of its errors); or if there’s a mechanism (possibly through CAV) by which they can express their concerns?
Incorrect Company Annual Account
Dear Sir,
The replacement page provided by your Company (see below) contains major errors, and, as a result, members of my Association have been misinformed.
BRJ Accountants and Business Advisors state that an agreement between the 1st Armoured Regiment Association and myself created a constructive obligation with respect to donated funds. This is completely wrong. The facts are these:
I am the author of an account of the history of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam. In many ways I wrote this on behalf of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association. The following extract is from the book itself:
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours.”
The agreement entered into with the C’tee of the 1st Armoured Regiment Assn at the time the book was launched, was that the publishers would pay royalties directly into the account of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association as arranged by the C’tee (ie. I received no payment). If there was any ‘obligation’, it was that the funds be used to assist the Association’s endeavours (as stated above). Isn’t this what all donations are provided for … whether openly stated or not?
After some years of this arrangement operating and money being spent by the C’tee to assist the Association’s endeavours, I stood up for the rights of members and was expelled from the Association. The unspent funds were gifted to me (not returned) by the Association. I did not ask for this to be done and had no say in the matter whatsoever. My expulsion was subsequently found to have been unlawful and I was deemed to be eligible for compensation should my reputation have been tarnished (something which I have chosen not to follow up as yet). My Life membership was reinstated.
You will see that there was never any agreement between the 1st Armoured Regiment Association and myself which could have created a constructive obligation of any sort. (If it did, all other donations made by all other people over many years, would have to returned to discharge the obligations.)
Another mistake in page 7 is that you state that the supposed obligation was cleared when funds were returned to me in the 2017 FY. Two points:
I never held the funds, so they can’t be returned to me (if they were to be returned they’d have to be paid to the publishers); and
the funds which were gifted to me by the C’tee at the time, were only those which had not been spent. I have not asked for the other funds to be gifted to me. However for your statement to be correct, they would have to be so.
Can you please correct these matters and issue another replacement page. I realise that your understanding was based on what you told by the C’tee at the time you were preparing your report. I hope you will now see that that information was neither correct nor complete.
1 March 2018
The On-Going RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’: Part III (RAAC ‘Truckies’)
An exchange of emails followed my question from 27 February, ie. Will the SOARMD act to safeguard RAAC ARES personnel operating PMVs (and their passengers) … by ensuring that they meet designated competency standards [during their training]? The latest exchange is copied below.
To Me:
After reading through your responses to emails between us, I identified that your belief is that the RAAC Reserve Soldiers are crewman. This is in fact not the case, the trade of our reserve soldiers is a Light Cavalry Scout. There are no vehicle qualifications as a part of the Light Cavalry Scout training continuum. All of their RAAC Employment Spec training is dismounted. This provides a capability that the ACR can use.
The provision of the protected lift capability is a secondary task dictated by COMD 2 DIV. The PMV is not an AFV and has nil requirement for a “commander”, it is just a truck, that requires a licence code. The training for that code is owned by RACT, as it is only a truck.
WAGGA lad and Army Lance Corporal …… is keeping an eye on things in Afghanistan from the top of a Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle.
L/Cpl …. is a Bushmaster crew commander responsible for guarding and transporting Aussie soldiers who work at the Afghan National Army’s 205 Hero Corps near Kandahar Airfield.
“I work the MAG-58 (machinegun) on the top of the vehicle and tell the driver where we’re going,” he said. [Isn’t this what every crew commander does?]
“It’s good being up the top of the vehicle because I have good situational awareness and understand what’s happening around us.”
It seems to me that the Bushmaster is not being used as a truck under convoy conditions; rather it is being used as an AFV to provide protected mobility and fire support for infantry. If the Corporal’s Bushmaster entered an enemy ambush, are you telling me that he would NOT direct the driver in accord with the anti-ambush SOP and employ the vehicle’s weapons accordingly?
Once again, I ask who takes responsibility for competency level to which he [and other B Sqn 3/4 Cav crew commanders] were trained, or not trained, as the case may be?
[While I appreciate that it’s a different Army today, I haven’t before seen a truck tasked with providing fire support for infantry … should RAAC soldiers now be called ‘truckies’?]
———————————————————————————————————————————
28 February 2018
The On-Going RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’ Part II
An exchange of emails followed my question from yesterday, ie. Will the SOARMD act to safeguard RAAC ARES personnel operating PMVs (and their passengers) … by ensuring that they meet designated competency standards [during their training]?
The emails are copied below:
To me: “The PMV is not organic to 1st Armoured Regiment. Whilst it is widely used by RAA, RAE and RAINF the RAAC regular elements do not utilise it. So … the question is not relevant.”
From me: “RAAC crewmen comprise both ARA and ARES personnel. …. should we not be doing all we can to ensure the safety of all RAAC crewmen? Can we really say … these vehicles aren’t used by 1 Armd Regt, therefore, the matter doesn’t involve me? Thank you for inviting me to Puckapunyal “to be refreshed on how the RAAC operates and which platforms it operates from”. My present concern relates to the platforms that the RAAC ARES operates. It seems to me that the SOARMD has little interest in this part of the RAAC. If I’m wrong in this and I can be refreshed on RAAC ARES platforms and roles … I would be delighted to accept.”
To me: “The training of 2nd Division Soldiers and officers is managed by the COMD of the 2nd Division. He manages that training through a variety of training units within the 2nd Division. The School of Armour does not train reserve RAAC Soldiers in their initial employment, this is conducted by MUR for all of the RAAC Reserve units. This is directed training driven by the tasks that COMD 2 Div directs. The School of Armour trains the at the SUBJ 2 SGT and WO2 level. These are planning courses and utilise TEWTS and other activities. The School train Phase 3 of the Reserve ROBC, once again a planning based activity, with some mounted employment of a dismounted force.
The RAAC Reserve Soldiers are platform enabled and not platform dependant. The RAAC has nil ownership of the training of PMV, that is owned by RACT at this point.
If you would like to witness what reserves do in training then write to them and ask to visit as you will not witness it here at the SOARMD.
In relation to your comment about little interest about the RAAC Reserve from the School of Armour, I am sure the CO would welcome you here to provide your thoughts and ideas, we discuss the RAAC reserve very regularly and have regular contact with the closest of units, 4/19 PWLH Regt.
Once again, come on down and be educated on the RAAC of now. You will not see a single PMV in the compound though, we have nil requirement as we only train ARA RAAC Soldiers and Officers in their point of entry training.
I hope this assists in your perception of the Reserve RAAC training model.”
From me: “Thanks for this information. I’m surprised that the SOARMD has been allowed to divest itself of responsibility for oversighting the competency levels to which RAAC ARES soldiers are trained.
How can MUR determine the skill level required for RAAC ARES soldiers to operate Bushmasters as per the requirements of RAAC ARES units. The 1/15 RNSWL Bushmaster that overturned during a night march … to what degree was night movement taught at MUR and to what degree did MUR teach RAAC tactics.
As far as I am aware, IET training prepared soldiers to take up an AFV crewman position in the unit to which they were posted, ie. they would be able to operate the vehicle in accord with the RAAC/Unit tactical requirements. Crew commanders would be trained similarly.
No more it seems … the RAAC ARES are in the hands of the MUR.
Who has prepared the competency skill requirements around which MUR base their training? Does the SOARMD have any oversight?
Does anyone care about what RAAC crewmen are being taught (or not taught)?
The RAAC ARES might be platform enabled, but they still operate vehicles … who knows what competency standards they are trained to? (RAAC ARA crewmen operated Bushmasters in Afghanistan … who certified their competency to do so?)
I believe that the RAAC has dropped the ball. The pressure of cost cutting must not be allowed to affect the safety of crewmen. I will follow up with MUR and make this issue one which receives public attention, should it deserve to do so.”
To me: “Ok, just to confirm for you, all training for the RAAC Reserve is conducted by RAAC soldiers, a mix of current serving ARA and Reserve. The RAAC owns the trades and training is conducted IAW the LMP’s Learning Management Plans] which are based on same the skills required of an ARA RAAC IET. Significant time is spent ensuring the reserve RAAC remains relevant to the RAAC.
From Me: “The RAAC owns the trades and training is conducted IAW the LMP’s which are based on same the skills required of an ARA RAAC IET”.
This is my point … as the Bushmaster is not operated by the ARA RAAC, it would seem that the LMPs for the RAAC ARES have no foundation.
“I am sure the CO would welcome you here to provide your thoughts and ideas, we discuss the RAAC reserve very regularly and have regular contact with the closest of units, 4/19 PWLH Regt.”
Please convey to the CO that I would be pleased to visit and address staff or the YOs course (you name it). The topic would be something like ‘Are We Making the Same Mistakes Over and Over Again?’.
I felt so strongly about what my research into IED development in Vietnam revealed, that I was compelled to ask to address the IED Task Force. I believe that this provided some valuable insights.
If I was to be invited, I would need a few weeks to get prepared. I’m away from 2-18 March overseas. This is a big thing for someone who has had a brain haemorrhage to commit to, however, the need to highlight failings inherent in the training system, makes it something I would willingly undertake.
——————————————————————————————————–
27 February 2018
The On-Going RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’.
“Dear Sir,
I previously expressed concern about the lack of training for RAAC crew commanders operating the Bushmaster PMV. You explained that this was not a SOARMD responsibility as no Bushmasters were operated by the RAAC. This was questionable, given the place of the vehicles in the RAAC ARES and their role as operated by RAAC crews in Afghanistan.
The report of the last RAAC Corporation AGM in the 2/14 QMI newsletter stated that the briefing provided to the meeting made it clear that the RAAC ARES were to have a dismounted role. [Interestingly, the Corps RSM states in the 2017 ‘Ironsides’, just published, that the RAAC does not operate the Bushmaster PMV-M.]
However ….
The same ‘Ironsides’ recently made available to members vide the 1AR Assn website includes a statement from Commander Forces Command that the “provision of protected mobility for the infantry will remain the responsibility of the RAAC in the 2nd Division”. Sitreps from RAAC ARES units makes it clear that Bushmasters are operated by these units.
The previous reason for not providing crew commander training for RAAC personnel operating Bushmasters was the PMVs were officially an RACT responsibility and the vehicles travelled in ‘packets’ without anyone designated as a crew commander, ie the vehicles did not operate as individual callsigns.
Given that that is no longer the situation, are RAAC personnel commanding Bushmaster PMVs to be trained to RAAC competency standards so as to ensure the safety of RAAC crews, infantry passengers, and anyone possibly in the proximity of an accident. As we know, a PMV being operated by an RAAC ARES unit overturned during a night move because of a lack of training.
I understand that there was concern that if the RAAC was to provide training for Bushmaster ‘crew commanders’ that this would tarnish the RAAC’s role in terms of mobile warfare, ie. the RAAC would be seen to be something other than a combat arm conducting mobile warfare.
Well that time has come … RAAC ARES units now provide protected mobility to infantry (as did 3 Cav in Vietnam). Will the SOARMD act to safeguard RAAC ARES personnel operating PMVs (and their passengers) … by ensuring that they meet designated competency standards; or will it take accidents and injuries (rather than deaths, if we’re lucky) to make this happen?
Your response would be appreciated … many thanks.”
————————————————————————————————————-
26 February 2018
Legal Matters VIII.
Following the post below, BRJ Accountants issued a replacement page to their report (which the C’tee sent to all members). This omitted the defamatory statement, however, the matter of donations is still unanswered.
Can Donations be Accepted?
Dear Secretary
Many thanks for arranging for the misleading and defamatory statement about me being removed from the BRJ Accountants’ report. (Don’t worry about an apology, I can rise above that.)
More importantly, however, in the revised financial statement you’ve just sent out from BRJ Accountants , it states that when I made a donation to the Assn, “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds” was created; this obligation only being removed when the donated funds were returned to me.
BRJ Accountants are aware that funds were donated to assist with the purposes of the 1AR Assn, in any way the C’tee thought fit, ie. there was no constraint, nor obligation, with respect to the use of the funds. This had been publicly stated and documented; the C’tee arranging for donations to be paid directly into the Assn account from the Publishers of the History of 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam.
I see in Peter’s newsletter that the following members have made donations to the Assn recently: Bob Snape; Roger Powell and Brian Dunn.
Have these members also created “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds” and will the Assn have to refund the donations to them to discharge this obligation? If this situation arises, there would seem to be little point in anyone donating funds to the Assn.
If, on the other hand, these donations don’t create “a constructive obligation”, (i) why don’t they?, and (ii) why did my donation so do?
You’ll see that I’ve copied this to BRJ Accountants. The lady I spoke to there was very helpful and I’m sure will be able to explain the situation. The important thing will be to inform members that either they can’t make donations; or if they can, what the criteria is that they must meet to avoid a ‘constructive obligation’ being formed.
Best wishes, Bruce (25 February 2018)
———————————————————————————
Subsequent email exchange:
Hi Bruce,
Thanks for your email, I’ll pass it on to Greg and Derek’s secondary emails for you.
Hi Dick,
Not quite sure what this means: “I’ll pass it on to Greg and Derek’s secondary emails for you”.
Surely as Acting Treasurer this is your call; can’t you ask BRJ Accountants and then inform the Executive C’tee accordingly?
Hi Bruce,
I don’t feel at all qualified to interpret what your’re asking about Bruce and of course I can ask BRJ for you.
Hi Dick,
As you’re the current Treasurer, I can sympathise with your position.
The fact is, however, that members’ funds are paying for the advice of BRJ Accountants … if neither you, as Treasurer, nor the members themselves can ‘interpret’ what BRJ Accountants have stated, then our money has not been well spent (it could even be said that it’s been wasted)
I’ve copied this this to BRJ Accountants once again … if neither the President nor VP can understand the advice that they’ve paid for (on behalf of members) then there is an enormous failure in accountability as far as members’ funds are concerned.
Please, please … in light of the President’s and VP’s failure to try and understand the advice that they’ve purchased on behalf of members … ask BRJ Accountants if Bob Snape; Roger Powell and Brian Dunn’s donations create “a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds”. If they do not, why does my donation do so?
———————————————————————————————————————-
22 February 2018
(Note: There will be no further blog post until Monday 26 February … grandparental duties.)
Legal Matters VII: Action Required to Correct Misleading and False Public Information Provided by the Executive C’tee
Dear Executive C’tee,
I’ve just spoken to BRJ Accountants. They told me that you stated that I had been expelled from the Association for disciplinary reasons and they assumed that that meant that I was no longer a member. They had no idea that the expulsion had been invalid and that my Life Membership had been reinstated. As it was your information which misled them, they need your revised advice in order to correct their report and withdraw the slur on my character.
The same applies in relation to my donation to the Assn bringing with it an obligation in terms of how the money was spent. They had no idea that the basis of the donation, as set out in the history of 1st Armd Regt in Vietnam, was to assist the Assn’s endeavours as the C’tee saw fit, ie. it was completely up to the C’tee as to how the funds were spent (as seen by the payments made to help with the Mick Rainey MM Club and to purchase a TV set for D Sqn). Again, BRJ Accountants need you to inform them of this, so that they can correct that part of their report.
Dear Secretary, following consultation with the other Exec C’tee members, will you please confirm that you have informed BRJ Accountants of the mistakes in their report so that they can amend it. Can you also confirm that you will advise members of these amendments.
I’ve copied below an earlier email, so that I can be assured that it, too, is entered into the Correspondence Received Register.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
“Dear [President and Vice President],
You are aware that I’ve asked for an apology from Gebbedy Milson Lee for inferring that I was in some way associated with irregular financial tranasctions; as well as asking if I was banned from making all donations to the Association for all time.
You’ll also be aware that I’ve asked BRJ Accountants to correct the public statements defaming me in their financial report and for this amended report to be sent to you for on-forwarding to all members.
I’m conscious that the more I work I create for these two firms, the greater the impact on members’ funds (unless, of course the legal advice is being provided pro-bono, there being no C’tee approval of any such expenditure as required by the Constitution).
So should you wish to be proactive in respect to the above, I can inform the firms that the matters have been resolved.
I await the outcome of your consideration ….”
[Email sent 17 February 2018]
—————————————————————————————————————-
21 February 2018
Legal Matters VI
“Dear [President and Vice President],
You are aware that I’ve asked for an apology from Gebbedy Milson Lee for inferring that I was in some way associated with irregular financial tranasctions; as well as asking if I was banned from making all donations to the Association for all time.
You’ll also be aware that I’ve asked BRJ Accountants to correct the public statements defaming me in their financial report and for this amended report to be sent to you for on-forwarding to all members.
I’m conscious that the more I work I create for these two firms, the greater the impact on members’ funds (unless, of course the legal advice is being provided pro-bono, there being no C’tee approval of any such expenditure as required by the Constitution).
So should you wish to be proactive in respect to the above, I can inform the firms that the matters have been resolved.
I await the outcome of your consideration ….”
[Email sent 17 February 2018]
——————————————————————————————–
20 February 2018
Legal Matters V
“Dear Sir,
I informed your Secretary that I no longer expected you to return my telephone calls. I understand the work pressure that you’re experiencing and do not want to exacerbate this.
I appreciate that I must wait accordingly and now expect your response either by email or letter to the matters which I previously raised with you, viz:
As I have not in any way been involved in any irregular financial transactions, I ask for an apology from Gabbedy Milson Lee for inferring that this was the case
You said that I must not make any future donations to the 1 AR Assn. Can you please inform me what would happen should I be so impertinent to do so, ie. to contribute to betterment of veterans in needy circumstances? Is your direction such that it only applies to monies that I received from writing the history of the 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam, ie. if I make a donation and state that it is money from my late aunt’s estate, is that satisfactory or will all donations from me be rejected by the 1AR Assn for some reason?
Finally, all Association members have received a copy of the financial accounts for FY 16/17 undertaken (at members’ expense because of management shortcomings) by BRJ Accountants & Business Advisors Pty Ltd. I have written to the Principal to ask that he correct mistakes concerning myself and the monies I donated to the Association. A copy of that letter follows (so as to do my bit to ensure that everyone is on the same page.).
Yours faithfully ”
—————————————————————————————————-
19 February 2018
Legal Matters IV
Dear Sir,
I wish to draw your attention to the financial advice your company offered to the 1st Armoured Regiment Association.
Your report makes the point that you are “not required to verify the reliability, accuracy or completeness of the Information provided” to you.
I wish to advise that some of the information provided to you was both inaccurate and incomplete. Rather than asking for an apology, I request that you amend your report accordingly.
The relevant section is: “The Provision for Members benefits was created when donation was received by B & J Cameron in the FY 2016. The reason behind the creation of the provision is that:- 1, The past event, the agreement with Mr Cameron, created a constructive obligation in respect of the donated funds: 2. There was probable outflow of resources in order to settle the obligation; and 3. The amount of the obligation was certain. Criteria satisfies the requirements for the creation of a provision under sl4 of AASB 137 as at the 30th June 2016. The provision was cleared when funds were returned to Mr Cameron in the 2017 year. The funds were returned as a result of disciplinary infractions by Mr Cameron and he was expelled from the Association.”
Issue 1: “The Provision for Members benefits was created when donation was received by B & J Cameron in the FY 2016.”
For more than 15 years leading up to 2012 I wrote a book on the history of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam. The Author’s Note in the book states: “
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours. “
The then RAAC Representative Honorary Colonel (former Chief of Army) who launched the book at the 1st Armoured Regiment’s then base in Darwin complimented me on my generosity. The Association Committee was represented at the occasion and provided bank account details for the Publisher to pay royalties direct to the Association for use as the C’tee thought appropriate over time. There was no constraint, nor ‘obligation’, imposed by me on how any funds that might accrue should be spent, other than the expectation that they would be used “to assist the Associations endeavours”. I trusted the C’tee of the Association not to use the funds for any other purpose (e.g. personal advantage). A cd of the complete launch of the book is available should you desire to see it.
The royalty payments would have commenced and been paid six monthly thereafter, i.e. in 2013, not FY 2016. Furthermore the only payment from ‘B&J Cameron’ (my cheque account) was related to monies received from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation for me allowing them to use my research into the Battle of Binh Ba. I felt that, as this research was primarily based on the contributions from members of 1st Armoured Regiment, that the payment should be passed on to the Association.
The reason that I donated all monies raised by the book to the 1 Armoured Regiment Association was because so many members helped me in the writing of it over the more than fifteen years involved, that I felt that I could not profit at their expense … besides it is to them that the book is dedicated and they are the ones who should feel ownership of it. To have any revenue raised, passed on to the Association to help members in need, was the best way I could think of doing this.
Issue 2: You state that “The funds were returned as a result of disciplinary infractions by Mr Cameron and he was expelled from the Association”. This statement is totally misleading. I was expelled from the Association, however, subsequent legal advice (paid for by members’ funds) found that the basis for the action taken against me was contrary to the regulations for an incorporated association. I was found to be eligible for damages, but decided to simply accept the reinstatement of my Life membership. As the above statement has appeared in the report sent to all members, my reputation has again been tarnished.
I request that BRJ Accountants amend their report and direct the C’tee of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association to send the amended copy to all members.
Yours sincerely,
—————————————————————————————————-
18 February 2018
The Battle of Long Khanh : C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment Aspects. PART III
(In memory of Warren Hind, Jim de Turt and Lance Clarke
9.15am. The infantry platoon were reached by the remainder of their company and ammunition was redistributed. The two tank troops were ordered to hold their positions while an ammunition supply was organised. When their requirements were added up, the tanks needed: 79 canister rounds, six APCBC rounds, 13,500 rounds of .30cal and 1200 rounds of .50cal. (Each tank carried about 35 canister rounds, it was apparent that only those hardest to get to within the floor bins were left.)
When the sweep through the position recommenced later in the day, infantry were in support. The enormity of the position now became apparent: 800m x 800m; 46 bunkers; numerous fighting pits; lecture areas; obstacle course; training facilities and extensive living areas.
Conclusion
The Duty Officer’s Log for 14 June 1971 records that C Squadron returned to Nui Dat at 11.30pm, noting that the following arrangements were made: ‘0001hrs: Dinner served in all Messes; ORs’ Canteen opened until 0100hrs; 0300hrs: Lights out.’ There was a sense of satisfaction among the crews, especially as wounds were very light.
The Squadron Commander observed: ‘Overlord was the turning point of relations between the tank squadron and the rest of the Task Force. The tanks had proven yet again that they could fight effectively in heavy jungle in close support of infantry.
Operation Overlord resulted in the destruction of important base and training facilities for 3/33 NVA Regiment and D445. The enemy’s ability to destabilise the withdrawal by mounting attacks against towns, villages and military posts in Phuoc Tuy, as well as against 1ATF itself, had been diminished.
——————————————————————————————
17 February 2018
The Battle of Long Khanh : C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment Aspects. PART II
(In memory of Warren Hind, Jim de Turt and Lance Clarke).
6 June 1971.
Enemy voices were heard by an infantry platoon on 6 June. The enemy had the advantage of high ground. Night was approaching and there was insufficient time to mount an attack. The infantry were ordered to pull back to provide a safe margin for artillery; the plan being for artillery and mortars to be brought down on the enemy position at 6am the next morning. Previous experience had shown that the position would have been evacuated by the time the infantry moved in soon after. In the short time before last light, the closest tank troop tried to find a way to get to the infantry if they were needed the next day. The jungle was just too thick, however, or so it seemed.
7 June 1971.
6.30am The enemy did not abandon their position. This was immediately apparent when the indirect fire lifted at 6.30am and the infantry platoon moved forward. Enemy weapons which inflicted casualties included a heavy machine gun. Tank support was desperately needed.
The closest tank troop had already started moving. There was no option … but to bash their way through the jungle. The infantry CO was quickly airborne in a helicopter to guide the tanks as much as was possible from above. At 7.10am the lead tank ‘bellied’ on a tree stump. The driver expertly worked the tank free, but just 50m further on an RPG exploded against the tank’s front right suspension station.
The tank troop were still 800m from the infantry they were racing to support. The battalion radio log summed up the situation pretty well: “The enemy are between [the tanks] and [the infantry]”.
7.30am. The tank troop (three tanks and an ARV) executed their immediate action drill, ie. they formed a square and saturated their arcs of responsibility with fire. As the jungle foliage was decimated, bunkers were uncovered. There was only one option. The tanks formed up in line abreast and attacked (with the ARV to their rear). It quickly became clear how large the enemy position was … the thick jungle gave way to reveal a cleared base area with thatched huts, seating, and extensive cooking facilities, all connected by heavily trodden paths. One crew commander recalls feeling compelled to use coax mg to engage a large thatched hut … almost out of sheer surprise that it was there.
Hearing what was happening, the Squadron Commander ordered his second tank troop to move (via squadron headquarters) to assist the troop in contact with the enemy.
The tanks assaulting the enemy were shocked not only at how big the enemy position was, but also at how strong their bunkers were. Not being able to collapse them with the weight of the tanks caused a problem with ammunition availability. The use of solid shot (APCBC rounds) had to be limited because the infantry platoon pinned down by the enemy were reporting twenty pounder rounds flying close overhead. Crew commanders, therefore, dropped grenades into the bunker entrances, hoping to ensure that no enemy were able to jump up behind them as they advanced through the position (there being no infantry to provide close-in protection of this sort).
Relief came from above at this point. The leader of a US helicopter gunship team radioed the tank troop and informed them of the extent of the ordnance his Corbras were carrying. In response to “Where would you like it”, the answer was “50 yards directly in front”.
7.55am. Squadron headquarters was under fire from the enemy when the second troop arrived. The sudden appearance of the tanks helped disperse the enemy and the troop continued on at best speed to assist their mates fighting through the enemy position about 1200m away.
The enemy’s bravery in defending their position was extraordinary. Mutual support was essential as the enemy continually tried to outflank the tanks and attack them from the side or the back. Fortunately, in at least one case, the RPG’s minimum range prevented the warhead from detonating against the rear of a tank turret [an RPG 7 ‘turbine’ was found on the tank’s back decks later]. One driver was shocked that he might have run over an infantryman when an arm went past him caught up in the track of his tank. Being told that there were no infantry in support might have pleased him on one count, though not necessarily on another.
8.15am. As a result of his concern about the rate of ammunition usage, the Squadron Commander ordered the troop attack to hold, until the second troop caught up. As soon as this happened, the two tank troops lined up abreast and continued the assault through the position. Helicopter gunships provided renewed support. Enemy opposition continued to be determined.
16 February 2018
The story behind the following post was provided on 12 February.
The Battle of Long Khanh : C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment Aspects. PART I
(In memory of Warren Hind, Jim de Turt and Lance Clarke).
Synopsis: An action involving Australian tanks supporting infantry in Vietnam, in exactly the same way as occurred in New Guinea during WWII, is described below.
Why is this account important today? The Government, as have other in the past, fails to appreciate the importance of tanks which are an expensive item of military hardware. Why is it that one the ADF’s ‘common’ brigades is without a tank squadron to support it? Throughout history, tanks have saved lives and won battles. Well trained effective crews don’t come in a cereal packet, however. Training must be continual, not a bit of ‘here and there’ as we might be able to afford it. The skills that are learnt become part of the life blood of an armoured unit. Randomly turn them off and the capability simply withers away
Why were the tanks able to influence the outcome of the following battle? Primarily because their crews were able to make good use of the tanks’ inherent characteristics of firepower and mobility. Used with aggression, tanks can have a devastating effect on the morale of the enemy confronting them. Imagine what it would have been like for the defenders … the tanks just kept coming and they just kept firing! No other weapon system could have achieved the same effect. There is no question as to why Shock Action is regarded as one of the characteristics of armour.
BUT: Why didn’t tank crews know the arming distance of their HE rounds? If it was too short for the rounds to used effectively in jungle, why wasn’t a different fuze fitted? Why weren’t crews trained to operate with drivers closed down in jungle? When grenades started to be supplied from the US, why weren’t crews told that they were fitted with a circlip which had to be removed? Why weren’t the crews wearing flame retardant light weight tank suits?
The answer is that the military ‘system’ at the time was broken. It remains broken today and is worsening with the refusal of those within it (both serving and retired) to make the critical analyses needed and to stand by the results. The latter being the real scourge. (More about this later … again.)
Background.
In 1971, Australian forces in Vietnam comprised two infantry battalions with supporting arms and services. A phased withdrawal of these units was to occur during the year. Inexplicably, the Government decided not to agree to the TF Commander’s request that tank support be maintained until the end. Indeed, the tank squadron was to be the first combat element to go. Brigadier McDonald was directed to remove one tank troop from operational duties each month, the first as of 1 May.
According to Major Peter Bourke, Officer Commanding C Squadron, the Task Force Commander was determined to destroy as much of the enemy’s supporting infrastructure as he could, while he still had the firepower of the tanks available to him. So it was that Operation Overlord was born. This was one of the few brigade operations conducted by the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF). It was also be one of the largest.
5 June 1971.
The earliest that the Operation could be commenced was 5 June. One tank troop had already been stood down; another was to have been withdrawn of 1 June, however, this was postponed. Two tank troops were required for defence of two Fire Support Bases (FSBs), leaving Squadron Headquarters with two tank troops to provide close fire support for the Operation. (Normally the task of a tank troop, Detachment 1 Forward Delivery Troop released their small number of tanks under command of the Squadron Quarter Master, to provide a counter-penetration force, should the 1ATF base be attacked.)
As the C Squadron Group set off at 3.15am, everyone was aware that every 20 year old Centurion would prove crucial to the outcome. As always, RAEME would be relied on for the mechanical know-how to keep them going, both for the 40km approach march into Long Khanh Province and the intense jungle bashing likely to follow. It could all come to nothing, of course, if the logistic back up failed in any way.
By 7.30am both tank troops were in positions which would enable them to react quickly to support the infantry if needed. The troops were restricted to three tanks each, with two tanks held at squadron headquarters as a reserve. Reports of well used tracks and freshly cut timber indicated that the enemy were in the area in strength. All crews had to be alert at all times, there were no infantry to assist with their security.
—————————————————————————————————-
15 February 2018
Legal Matters III
So far I’ve discovered that the President and/or Vice President have made a decision to return to me the money I donated which was spent to refurbish the Mick Rainey MM Club and to buy a TV set for D Sqn. I did not ask for this to be done. The Acting Treasurer was simply told to prepare the cheque. He did not ask why this had to be done (it was not a C’tee decision as such and he knows nothing about the reasons involved.)
In addition to the email below, I’ve asked the law firm the following:
You said that I must not make any future donations to the 1 AR Assn. Can you please inform me what would happen should I be so impertinent to do so, ie. to contribute to betterment of veterans in needy circumstances? Is your direction such that it only applies to monies that I received from writing the history of the 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam, ie. if I make a donation and state that it is money from my late aunt’s estate, is that satisfactory?
Dear Mr Gabbedy,
It is very frustrating not being able to speak to you or anyone else in your office, since I received your letter dated 8 February.
I write now to ask for an apology.
You infer that in some way I have instigated unethical, possibly illegal, financial transactions involving royalties from my book. You state that I have to cease this immediately.
Firstly, I did pay any royalties from my book to the Association. They were all paid as a result of a contractual arrangement with the Publishers, ie. by the Publishers direct into an account, details of which were provided to them by the Association. The fact that such monies were to be paid to the Association to assist in their efforts to help those in need, was made clear both within the book itself and during the launch of the book (at which C’tee was represented).
So a direction to me to cease payments, should in fact be a direction to the Publishers. This, however, is not required as such an instruction was given more than two years ago and no funds have been paid to the Association by the Publishers since that time.
The “current management” say they don’t know why funds were returned to me. This really means that they haven’t bothered to find out. Following a disagreement, my membership of the Association was cancelled. The C’tee decided to refund to me that portion of the monies that the Association had not spent. I did not ask for this to happen and I had no say in the decision whatsoever. All relevant events are well known within the Association and the proceedings are fully documented. (As it happened, the actions in expelling me were subsequently found to be completely invalid and my membership was reinstated.)
So … I have not in any way been involved in any irregular financial transactions and I ask for an apology from Gabbedy Milson Lee for inferring that this was the case.
Yours faithfully,
—————————————————————————————————-
14 February 2018
Legal Matters II
Dear Secretary,
Letter from solicitors hired by the C’tee is attached.
You’ll have seen my response. When I rang Mr Gabbedy to find out what’s behind all this, I was told that he’s in court all week.
Can you tell me why members’ funds would be spent to have lawyers write to me to tell me to stop making donations to the Assn, when these stopped over two years ago.
Can you also explain what is meant by “the balance will be refunded to [me] shortly”.
As an aside … It’s not worth making a point of it, but not all the monies donated were royalties. I also received a payment from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation for allowing them to use my research into the Battle of Binh Ba, which I also donated.
As far as I’m aware … all donations have been refunded, apart from those used in relation to building materials for the Mick Rainey MM Club and a TV for D Sqn. Is it these amounts which are being referred to as “the balance”?
If anyone wants to know why I made donations to the Association as I did …. It was because so many members helped me in the writing of the book over the approx fifteen years involved, that I felt that I could not profit at their expense, besides it is to them that the book is dedicated and they are the ones who should feel ownership of it. To have any revenue raised, returned to the Association to help members in need, was the best way I could think of to do this.
Many thanks, Bruce
“Every knot was once straight rope”. This was the saying on the letter I received yesterday. The logo surmounted a fighting cock equipped with spurs.
The metaphor is obvious, ie. If you’ve got a problem come to us and we won’t simply cut off the knot, but trace its origins until it can be untied (ie. we’ll get to the root cause). The symbolism of the fighting cock is also clear, if somewhat surprising. Given that cock fighting was banned for its cruelty, is there not some other image that a firm of lawyers could use as their logo (and still convey the message that everyone involved will fight with all their strength on their clients’ behalf).
—————————————————————————————————-
13 February 2018
Legal Matters
I received a letter today from Gabbedy Milson Lee. The letter doesn’t say who these people are (if that’s who the names refer to). Google informs me that at “Gabbedy Milson Lee we pride ourselves on providing sound professional legal advice in a broad range of specialisations, including: Personal Injury Law Commercial Law Family Law Criminal Law Wills & Probate Conveyancing”.
So now I read the letter. My response is copied below:
Dear Nigel,
I received your letter today. You advise that you are acting on behalf of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association, and, in that capacity, you order that I immediately ensure that no royalties from the sales of the history of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam, are paid to the Association.
I can inform you that no royalties have been paid to the Association since at least January 2016.
You state that these royalties have been paid to the Association and then paid out of Association revenues to me (as if, in some way, I was ‘laundering’ the money). You further state that the current C’tee have no idea as to “why this arrangement came to pass”.
I have been surprised by a few things in my life, but this is by far the most bizarre.
The following extract is from the Author’s Note in the History of 1st Armoured Regiment in Vietnam:
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours. “ Does the C’tee really not know of this?
I was subsequently granted Life membership of the Association (see attached). This was withdrawn, however, when I stood up for the injustice evident when members were disciplined for acting improperly, but not told what they had done. The then C’tee decided that they would refund my donation, less that which had already been spent for the benefit of members. The story does end there, however. Through the wonderful efforts of a number of members who had identified yet another injustice in what was happening, the C’tee’s action in expelling me was found to be in breach of the regulatory requirements for an association incorporated in Victoria. My Life Membership was reinstated.
You’ve stated that “the Association has repaid to [me] the bulk of the royalties received and that the balance will be refunded to [me] shortly”. The funds which were not repaid were those used for the purchase of materials needed for refurbishment of the Mick Rainey MM Club and for a TV set for D Squadron”. Do I understand that the Association is going to refund these amounts as well?
Yours sincerely, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————————————————–
12 February 2018
The Battle of Long Khanh
Would I provide an outline of the contribution of tanks to the Battle of Long Khanh? This is needed to support a submission for the award of a battle honour. After recent events, I advised the former infantry battalion commander to make an official request to the Secretary, 1 Armd Regt Assn and ask that he pass the request to the Chairman, RAAC Corporation re the cav aspects. The Secretary responded to say:
Reading about the action on the AWM site I note that it was indeed ‘Regarded as the greatest single feat for the Australian Army since the Korean War’. Bruce has a wide range of skills one of them being able to present a convincing written argument and if you believe that he can assist you in your application for acceptance of this battle honour the First Armoured Regiment Association would of course be supportive of any opportunity in allowing you achieve the success you seek.
I’m also very happy to pass on your request to the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation in Noel McLaughlin to ascertain if similar support can be provided [re Cav aspects].
So I’m working with the support of the 1AR Assn. Better just bite the bullet and get on with it …
————————————————————————————————————————————–
11 February 2018
Where are the Tanks?
According to the Chief of Army, Plan Beersheba has been finalised and three common brigades, 1, 3 and 7 have been established (interview published in latest Army News).
BUT … the brigades aren’t common. The 7th Brigade’s ACR doesn’t have a squadron of tanks … it has a token troop.
Thirty additional tanks have been identified by Army as being needed to equip three ‘common’ brigades and their meet their repair pool needs.
Three ACRs, geographically dispersed, each with a tank squadron, is very different to the ‘model’ that existed when the tanks were purchased, ie. two squadrons co-located as part of a single regiment.
It seems that Army’s bid to acquire the tanks needed to equip three ACRs has been put on the backburner. The case has been argued on the Blog before … becoming a proficient tank squadron is a full-time job. You can’t move tanks between brigades depending on their Plan Beersheba state of readiness and expect to achieve ‘instant’ readiness levels.
Maybe this isn’t what is to happen, maybe it is. Who knows? The importance of communication was referred to yesterday. The RAAC Corporation can’t contribute to a public debate, or even provide public information. The Corporation doesn’t make public statements and, if it did, it would be confined to supporting whatever the defence position is.
So, in the land of the blind ….
—————————————————————————————————-
10 February 2018
Consultation : Before; During; and After?
I went for a job after the Army and during the interview I was asked what I knew about industrial democracy.
I said that the Army was the best example I could refer to … the views of everyone were taken into account when the plan was being made and thereafter everyone was kept informed as to exactly how it was to be executed. Feedback was called for after it was all over, so as to improve the planning and execution next time.
I got the job … but there are times now when I think I must’ve been in a different Army when I see the way some ex-army guys conduct themselves.
Of course, none of the above is possible, if there is no effective means of communication.
It’s a bit of a paradox. Without any communication, no consultation can occur. Without consultation, the failure to communicate won’t be apparent.
This topic is a perennial one on the blog. How can the C’tee of an Association, develop a plan for the future if they don’t ask the members what their priorities are? There have been calls for the Members’ Forum to be re-established, but the ‘new guard’ have argued that social media is all that’s needed. The result is that there is no effective ‘dialogue’ between members and their elected representatives. The same applies in more general matters affecting the RAAC.
The RAAC Corporation has a website, but it’s not used for dialogue. Minutes of meetings aren’t even published. Who knows what goes on? An absence of communication suits some people … they no longer feel themselves to be accountable. When this situation arises, things can go awry (and have to be corrected through regulatory control).
————————————————————————————————————————————
9 February 2018
Coral-Balmoral Commemoration
Anzac Day is widely promoted as an opportunity for Australians to show their respect and appreciation for those who have fought on their behalf. Everyone is invited attend and acknowledge those who created the history of our Nation. The march past is an established part of ceremonies across the country.
Why is it that arrangements for the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Battles of Coral and Balmoral are being confined to those who participated. Why is it that there is no widespread promotion of the significance of the Battles and an open invitation extended to all who can, to attend?
A couple of the points that had to be corrected when the AWM Vietnam Gallery opened were:
The description of Balmoral states that the inf were supported by arty, tanks and air. I believe that the support from Bruce Richards’ APCs was also important in the defence of Balmoral.
The narrative states that “Balmoral was occupied by soldiers of 3RAR and a tank squadron”…this should be ‘soldiers of 3RAR and a tank troop’.
The latter indicates a failure to understand the role of tanks which is inexplicable. There was no tank squadron at Balmoral … there was no tank squadron in Vietnam. Half a tank squadron had been sent to Vietnam on the basis that the remainder would be sent if those there first proved themselves. Half of the half squadron was at Balmoral, ie. a single tank troop.
Seems to me to be a pity to have veterans of the Battles take part in a march-past with no-one present to applaud them and what they achieved. According to the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation, the RAAC leadership Group (see 10 January) has it all in hand.
At a time when it appears that the third Abrams tank squadron for 2/14 QMI ACR is not to be provided (confined to a troop only), some accurate historical information regarding the value of tanks is sorely needed. Those tank crews who participated in the half C Sqn present at Coral-Balmoral, achieved a remarkable feat. Will we see any media accounts? … any interviews? … any comparative analysis as to the value of armour to the Army today?
———————————————————————————————————————————–
8 February 2018
Honours and Awards
The following quote is from the Minutes of the 2015 1AR Assn AGM:
“Honours and Awards. Action to be taken by 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee when a member or someone who has had a strong association with 1st Armd Regt becomes the recipient of an award such as, but not limited to, that announced in the Australia Day or Queen’s Birthday Honours List.
Motion 04/15: That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee consider the most appropriate manner and style of congratulations to be conveyed to the recipient on behalf of the Assn, post the agreed ‘protocol’ on the Assn’s website, and thereafter act accordingly.
Response: This is currently done via letters of congratulations from the Association. Procedure will be written into Association By-Laws.”
Unfortunately no policy seems to have been developed. Following the recent Australia Day Awards List I wrote to the VP to ask what the C’tee’s position is. (While not familiar with all those serving today, I was aware that RAAC recipients included a former CO SOA and Corps Director, if not many others) I haven’t had a response as yet.
I’m reminded that the C’tee are totally overworked. Why not, as has been suggested previously, ask for volunteers to help (possibly assistant secretary etc)?
——————————————————————————————————————————–
7 February 2018
Why Do We Do It? (Part 2)
The easiest thing is just to do nothing … to ignore the military connections you had, in many cases, for decades. Is this really easy, however?
The military demands everything from those who serve in it. Being a soldier, even for a short time, changes you. In particular, you understand what ‘doing the right thing’ amounts to.
For some, commitment to this is stronger than for others. When they see that the right thing is not being done and they know that they can make a difference … they stand up and do what they can. Thank heavens for those who see a ‘wrong’ and don’t look the other way.
I’ve copied below part of a response to an article written by someone who failed to understand this philosophy:
Published Comment: “Old soldiers will scarcely ever tell us about their experiences. They were haunted for years with the horror of it all. But today we don’t seem able to stop talking about Anzac and Gallipoli”.
My Response (in part): “May I beg to suggest that if you ask ‘old soldiers’ (as I have) they will be prepared to explain why they did what they did. If you asked fire fighters why they battled the bushfires, or police why they stood their ground, or lifesavers why they entered the surf, or ambulance officers why they put in the efforts they did; or nurses why they cared as did … I believe it is to do with doing the right thing, and, in particular, helping others. The groups I’ve mentioned are just a few of those which make Australia great. Let’s not run down one element, but recognise the community as a whole.”
——————————————————————————————————————————
6 February 2018
It seems that the post for 5 February got ‘lost’. I have repeated it below (the answer will be posted tomorrow.). Apologies for the confusion.
Why Do We Do It?
The question has been asked in another Blog post. Rather than tracking it down through the archives, I thought it might be useful to pen something today (and later go back and look at any differences).
Who’s “We?”
‘We’ are the former members of the RAAC and 1AR, in particular, who don’t ‘just leave it all behind’. As has been discussed here before… the RAAC Corporation were asked to set up a chapter of the RAAC Corporation in Canberra. The then State Rep for the 1AR Assn undertook to do this … he contacted all former Black Hats in the ACT and told them what he had organised. The response was such that the concept of a RAAC Corporation Chapter being formed in the ACT was stillborn.
Why would this have been so? One answer is that an entirely different result might have occurred if the ACT’s former Black Hats had been asked what they might want by way of an RAAC Chapter, rather than being told what they were going to get.
So the majority of former Black Hats said … ‘why bother?’. What they are saying, in effect, is ‘’why should we make the effort, let’s just forget our past association with the RAAC, 1AR etc’.
Why would they take this view?
To ask the question in another way … why is it that there are those who are totally committed to ensuring that the 1AR Assn is able to survive its past management woes and go on to successfully fulfill its objectives with respect to former and current serving members of 1AR?
————————————————————————————————————————————-
4 February 2018
Categories of Membership
This was the heading of the Blog on 2 February. Given that the new Constitution of the 1AR Assn is in draft at present, it is instructive to consider the membership categories which have been incorporated in the Constitution of the 2/14 QMI Assn:. These are set out below:
“2. Extract from the Constitution ‐ “5. Classes of members ‐ The membership of the Association consists of: (a) A Patron; (b) Ordinary members; (c) Service associates; (d) Associates; and (e) Life members.
(a) Patron. The Honorary Colonel of the Regiment will be invited to be the Patron of the Association. If the Honorary Colonel does not accept the position, another person may be approached for a fixed term not exceeding the term of the Honorary Colonel’s appointment.
(b) Ordinary Member. Any person who serves or has served in the Regiment in its present form or its previous forms is eligible to be an Ordinary member. For example, previous members of 4th Cavalry Regiment at the time of transition to the 2/14 LHR (QMI) would be eligible. An Ordinary member has full voting rights and may hold any position in the Association.
(c) Service Associate. A Service or Ex‐Service person from another existing or past RAAC regiment which does not have an association based in Brisbane; or, a Service or Ex‐ Service person who is a ‘friend’ of the Regiment. A ‘friend’ of the Regiment may, for example, be a person from another Corps who has, or has had, ties with the Regiment. A Service Associate also has full voting rights and may hold a position on a subcommittee or the management committee, other than the President, Secretary or Treasurer.
(d) Associate.
(1) Partners, adult descendants and ‘civilian friends’ of the Regiment. A ‘civilian friend’ of the Regiment is a civilian person who provides, or has provided, a benefit to the Regiment or the Association. An Associate has no voting rights but may hold a position on a subcommittee or the management committee, other than the President, Secretary or Treasurer.
(2) Widow or widower of any soldier who served in the Regiment or was an Ordinary member or Service Associate member of the Association.
(e) Life Member. A life member shall be an Association member who in the opinion of the Ordinary / Service Associate members has rendered exceptional service to the Association. A Life member will be nominated by the Management Committee at an Annual General Meeting of the Association and must be elected by a majority of three fourths of Ordinary / Service Associate members present. A Life member shall be exempt from payment of subscriptions and shall be entitled to all the other rights, duties and privileges of an Ordinary member.”
—————————————————————————————————-
3 February 2018
Assistance for Those Who Have Served and Those Who Currently Serve.
Mr C M Fenton OAM recently informed members of the 1AR Assn that all RAAC Corporation Member Associations decided at an AGM that welfare assistance was not part of their role, as there were plenty of other ESOs that provided such services.
I must have been quite naïve when I donated the royalties from the ‘History of Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam’ to the 1AR Assn. The Author’s Note included the following ….
“The 1st Armoured Regiment Association was formed in 1996, a time when those who had served together both in Vietnam and subsequently, were going different ways. As well as providing a means of keeping in touch, assisting those in need, and maintaining Regimental history, the aim was to provide a means whereby those who had served before could encourage and assist their successors. At a time when Australian tank crews are on stand-by for service in Afghanistan, the goals of the Association are even more important today. Proceeds from sales of the book which would normally accrue to the author have been donated to assist the Association’s endeavours.”
——————————————————————————————————————————————
2 February 2018
Categories of Membership.
I’ve raised this issue a number of times before. There is specific procedure stipulated in the 1AR Assn Constitution to introduce different categories of membership, eg. Life Members and Affiliate Members.
This process has not been adopted, therefore, only financial ordinary members are empowered to vote.
I received a letter from my State Rep yesterday. A membership form was enclosed. I’ve copied my reply below:
“Can’t understand the confusion re my email. I’ve only ever had one email address and it’s correct on the Sec’s list.
Re membership fees … as a Life Member, I understood that I didn’t have to pay.
I also understand that Life Member and Affiliate Member categories haven’t been correctly adopted as per the Constitution.
If all such memberships are to be abolished, I’d be happy to pay along with the other former Life Members. (Of course, the Affiliate Memberships would no longer exist as they are not eligible to be Ordinary Members).
Please let me know.”
——————————————————————————————————————————–
1 February 2018
Continual Improvement
On 24 January a letter to the Editor, Queensland ANZAC Centenary Newsletter was published in the Blog (see below). The following response has been received:
Hi Bruce
Thank you for your email and apologies that it has taken a while to get back to you.
I appreciate you bringing this information to my attention. The team in this office have backgrounds in grants, events and marketing. While we’re all interested in the topic, few us are totally across all aspects of our military history – so it’s really valuable to be made aware of issues like this.
I’ve shared these details with the team, and we’ll endeavour to be more accurate and sensitive in the future when referring to casualties and the total cost of conflicts.
Thanks again for your email. This sort of feedback helps us immensely.
Kind regards
Communications and Marketing Officer
Queensland Anzac Centenary Coordination Unit
Department of the Premier and Cabinet
————————————————————————————————–
I replied as follows:
Thanks for getting back to me.
Unfortunately there are some who regard such feedback as criticism (which was not my intention) … I’m pleased that you see it as part of a process of continual improvement.
You won’t be surprised that the detail involved in matters like this is something which is hardly ever correct on the first attempt. The Prime Minister’s Department and other Federal Agencies are now aware that that is not only incorrect, but also insensitive, to refer to “521 Australian servicemen who lost their lives as a result of their service in Vietnam during the period of the War”. The point here is that they were not all men.
Best wishes, Bruce
———————————————————————————————————————-
31 January 2018
1AR Assn and the Future
It seems as if everything’s up in the air at the moment. The FY 16/17 financial statement was to be presented to members for approval by 31 December 2017, but it had to be revised. A new Constitution was presented to members for approval, but neither the content, nor proposed approval process was in accord with regulatory requirements.
It’s acknowledged that a lot of work goes into these documents and members have offered to help. But … who knows what the state of play is? The communication channel seems to have been shut down, with no hope of any update.
Blogs during over the last couple of days have mentioned the paper I prepared in 2014 following a request to members by the C’tee. I’ve copied one of the sections below:
“How to Maintain (and Expand) Membership.
The text book answer is to survey members to find out what they expect in return for their membership fee and then set about delivering it. There is something even more fundamental here, however. Without it, no amount of effort will bring results. You’d think that those with experience in an armoured unit would be better at it than anyone else … communication! Without it, no matter how ‘good’ an armoured unit is, it goes nowhere.
Unless there is a means by which members can express their views openly (and their elected representatives can respond equally openly) there will never be a united membership body. Such a means of communication doesn’t exist at present.”
———————————————————————————–
30 January 2018
The 1 AR Assn and Priorities for the Future
In 2104, the then President said:
“We sent out a discussion paper to the state reps to look at the future of the Association and how we should recruit and operate and develop a succession plan. From this we have received some feedback, but intend to get the committee together early next year to discuss how we are to move forward and restructure to meet the demands of the future. We will keep you updated on any progress and if you can provide time to assistor provide suggestions in any way, let us know.
It seems that the initiative must’ve fizzled out, as there has been no “restructure to meet the demands of the future”. The C’tee operates now with less members than it ever has.
An extract of the discussion paper is copied below:
“The challenge for the association now is that we need to recruit more members from the second group [those who didn’t serve in Vietnam]. Why? Those that served in Vietnam are all now in their middle 60’s late 70’s, they are the ones most likely to drop out as they get older. Poor health will be the most common cause.
We seem to see many ex serving members of the Regiment on face book, all are happy to relate tales of their service, so how do we get these people to join the association? What can we offer to get these people on board, because if we don’t our numbers will deteriorate over time.”
Yesterday I referred to some of the feedback I provided (after asking three times to see the discussion paper). The following observation picked up on the paper’s reference to Facebook (above):
The Facebook Phenomenon.
“There is, of course, another dimension to membership of an association; that of maintaining social friendships. These links are important, but are being increasingly catered for by social networks such as Facebook. A strong and lasting unit association is unlikely to be solidly founded on this basis alone. It is a deeper dimension which will really unite members. Rather than being self-serving, important aspects here include helping those in need, recognising achievement by former members, as well as those serving today, and preserving history and traditions.”
————————————————————————————
29 January 2018
1AR Assn Reunion and the Future
There is no doubt that those involved in organising the 2018 Reunion are doing a fantastic job! I helped organise a reunion here in Canberra a couple of years ago. This involved about 120 people over three days… and the work was enormous. By the sounds of it the Reunion C’tee have ‘gelled’ together and are meeting all the challenges thrown at them.
When I was looking at the attendance list so far, I noted that 70% (25 out of 36) of the members attending are Vietnam veterans. What does this mean I wondered?
A few years ago the 1AR Assn C’tee asked for suggestions regarding the future of the Assn. I think that I might have been the only member to respond. An extract from my paper is copied below:
“Associations of people are bound by common experiences. This applies particularly, but not only, to groups of veterans marching on Anzac Day.
What bonds members of the 1AR Association?
I think everyone will agree that being a member of an AFV crew is a unique experience. This by itself, however, is not enough to form the basis of an association. If it was, there would be no need for papers such as this. Members of RAAC ARES associations are linked not only by their individual service, but also by the enormous history of their units.
Members of the 1AR Association have a proud heritage. While it is just the Vietnam Battle Honours that are emblazoned on the Standard, members of Australian armoured regiments fought gallantly during the Second World War. Perhaps there are opportunities to promote this heritage to younger members.
In another paper on this theme, I suggested that the common experiences that might bond members of the 1AR Assn could well be defined in terms of ‘Centurion’, ‘Leopard’, and ‘Abrams’. I suggested that if the C’tee was to include a representative from these groups … their particular interests could be made known in way which might not otherwise be possible.
If the Centurion group continues to make up 70% of Reunion attendees, the Assn’s future might not be assured.
(I didn’t get any response to my proposals … but I’ve learnt that any expectation is unrealistic.)
—————————————————————————————
28 January 2018
‘Due Process’
The extracts below from the Minutes of the 2015 1AR Assn AGM clearly state that procedures will be incorporated into the Assn By-Laws. (It’s to be noted that there is an unfortunate ‘typo’ towards the end.)
The Assn By-Laws, however, never ‘came to be’ (essentially because of a lack of ‘due process’).
So what happens now? Members have passed two motions at an AGM … do these just go down the gurgler, never to be heard of again?
One point of view is that it is up to members to ensure that such motions are carried out by the C’tee. Another pov is that the C’tee should contact members and inform them of their options, eg. the motions being presented at the next AGM etc.
If neither option is facilitated by the C’tee, the outcome is that members wishes have been denied.
The 2018 AGM will be three years later … will the blackhole keep expanding?
————————————————————————————————————-
Honours and Awards. Action to be taken by 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee when a member or someone who has had a strong association with 1st Armd Regt becomes the recipient of an award such as, but not limited to, that announced in the Australia Day or Queen’s Birthday Honours List. Motion 04/15: That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee consider the most appropriate manner and style of congratulations to be conveyed to the recipient on behalf of the Assn, post the agreed ‘protocol’ on the Assn’s website, and thereafter act accordingly.
Proposer: Bruce Cameron Seconder: Jack Chipman
This is currently done via letters of congratulations from the Association. Procedure will be written into Association By-Laws Carried
Death. Action to be taken by 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee when a member or someone who has had a strong association with 1st Armd Regt dies.
Motion 05/15: That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee consider the most appropriate manner and style of sympathy to be conveyed to the deceased’s NOK on behalf of the Assn, post the agreed ‘protocol’ on the Assn’s website, and thereafter act accordingly.
Proposer: Bruce Cameron Seconder: Jack Chipman
This is currently done by letters of congratulations. Procedure will be written into Association By-Laws
—————————————————————————————————-
27 January 2018
A couple of days ago I mentioned that there were three responses awaited from queries last year; one was from the Information Commissioner in relation to an RAAC Corporation matter; another from the PM in relation to Op Hammersley (see posts below for info about both of these). The third is a response from the AWM in relation to advice provided by a UK expert countering their insistence that the Ha Go tank was normally crewed by four men. The AWM staff member concerned has been away on leave, so it is reasonable to wait and not ‘follow up’ quite so quickly.
Background is provided by the 7 December 2017 post, copied below.
The Latest on the Ha Go Tank (Part 2)
Following on from yesterday … I referred the AWM’s advice to the person that the UK Tank Museum had nominated as an ‘expert’ on the Ha Go tank. His response is copied below. (Interestingly the AWM sought his help in restoring their own Ha Go … see his note at end.)
Thanks for your message, and for your thoughts on the crew capacity of a Ha-go tank.
Re the possibility that the crew size was, from time to time, increased from three to four – I see no reason why this might not have been done in exceptional circumstances (for example when a guide was needed, or for rescue purposes), but the presence of a fourth man on board a Ha-go would be an abnormal event. It would be physically difficult as the internal space is very confined, and the presence of an extra man would impair the fighting efficiency of the vehicle. Remember that the Ha-go tank commander can only just stand in his turret owing to lack of space (no seat is provided for him) and the bow gunner has to curl himself up on a small rubber mat next to the driver (again, no seat is provided). In an emergency the gunner could perhaps share his space but it would be fiendishly uncomfortable and he would not be able to do his job properly.
The normal method of carrying extra people on a Ha-go was to make them cling to the outside of the vehicle. For this purpose a board was frequently fitted across the rear of the tank and ‘hold-on’ handles fixed to the upper corners of the engine compartment. Such passengers could send signals to the driver by means of a button mounted next to the rear number plate, and which sounded a horn in the driver’s compartment.
As to whether or not the Japanese ever produced a Ha-go with a larger turret to take a more powerful gun – This would have required a bigger turret ring, which in turn would have meant redesigning the whole tank. They may have experimented with this, but they never produced a production Ha-go in this configuration. Certainly, the Mitsubishi factory blueprints make no mention of such a variant, and I have never seen evidence of such a thing.
Lastly; I was interested to read in your notes that a friend of yours [came across 37mm cannons in the a museum in Rabaul] many years after the war. The AWM could have done with this in 2013/14 when they were restoring their Ha-go and which was missing its main armament – In the absence of an original gun, I built one for them by copying the cannon on my tank.”
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
26 January 2018
Australia Day … how much do we care for our ‘mates’?
Welfare Assistance
The Purposes for which the RAAC Corporation exists include the following:
“To fosterand protect the interests … of ordinary membersand theirfamiliesinany matter likelytoaffectthem during orafter their service in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps;
To provideadvice, guidanceandwelfare assistanceto ordinarymembers; and
To represent theinterestsofthe servingand ex-serving ordinarymembers of The Corps.”
Earlier this year, we had Mr Fenton OAM saying that he “would like pass on [his] thanks to the RAAC Corporation and Noel McLaughlin, its Chairman for successfully assisting [him] with an issue [he] had with DVA”.
When he was asked if he could inform others who are also experiencing issues with DVA how they can contact the RAAC Corporation for similar assistance (the RAAC Corporation webpage doesn’t have any contact details) … he refused.
Subsequent 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook posts revealed that the sticking point was that the RAAC Corporation doesn’t want to provide advocacy services, only welfare advice (and the Chairman want’d to make this clear).
Presumably this means that the RAAC Corporation will do everything to meet the welfare assistance undertakings given above, other than making representations on a member’s behalf.
The RAAC HOC recently made it clear that one of his priorities is to organise the ‘RAAC Collective’ to assist former members of the RAAC who are in need … as much as is possible.
According to Mr Fenton OAM, the member associations of the RAAC Corporation made it clear at a recent AGM that they did not want to have to provide welfare assistance for their members, as there were numerous other ex-service agencies that had the skills to do so.
It is plainly time for all associations that profess to have the welfare of their members at heart … to set out clearly and unequivocally how they will do this when a member in need approaches them for help.
—————————————————————————————————-
25 January 2018
On 23 January I referred to one of three matters for which responses were outstanding. The following letter to the PM was sent in mid November 2017. Given Christmas etc, I think it’s reasonable to wait a little longer for the response. The previous relevant blog post text was on 25 November (below). For some reason I decided not to print the text. It is now copied below.s not been printed before
Dear Prime Minister,
FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT
I write to seek your consideration concerning a matter which has resulted in I, and many Vietnam veterans whom I represent, having been subjected to a clear lack of democratic process by the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs.
It is my expectation, as a citizen, that a query to one of your Ministers regarding a matter within his/her portfolio responsibility, will result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner.
As well as consulting widely with relevant agencies, it is expected that a response be clearly explained, so as to ensure appropriate consideration is given to the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved. I’m sure that you would agree that these standards should apply equally to Ministers and those who act as delegates on their behalf.
I wrote to Minister Tehan on 28 February 2017. The seven page submission, on behalf of veterans involved, asked that he consider eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
Minister Tehan responded on 7 May 2017 to say that this could not be done because the Citation was awarded for the Battalion’s whole time in Vietnam, not just Operation Hammersley. Unfortunately the information he had been given was incorrect (the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation was awarded to the Battalion for the whole year).
Another submission (eight pages) was forwarded to Minister Tehan on 10 September 2017 (attached), providing detailed evidence that the GCWP Unit Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley and those units attached or under control of 8RAR for this Operation, should be awarded the Citation also. Additional evidence was received soon after and a supplementary submission was made on 22 September.
Minister Tehan’s Chief of Staff responded on 16 November 2017 (letter attached).
He makes no reference to the evidence presented in the submission that the Citation was awarded specifically for Operation Hammersley. Instead, with stunning insult, he says “As you know, the citation was conferred on the 8th Battalion for its service throughout its deployment to Vietnam”. It is clear that the Office of the Minister for Veteran’s Affairs took no steps to ensure the merits of the submission were investigated; nor were the relevant standards of procedural fairness observed in an open and accountable manner.
The reasons for the response were not explained at all, making it plain the rights and interests of the applicant and others involved were not considered. Furthermore, the submission requested that those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) be consulted. No mention has been made of this and it has to be assumed that the Heads of these Corps were given no opportunity to offer advice.
If it is not enough that the submission was not considered, the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs introduced a new reason for not making the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN. This is exactly what the Government did last year with respect to RAN and RAAF units. (See attached.)
Will you please take steps to ensure that the submission for eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), being extended to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley … is considered in accord with the standards of democratic government set out in paragraphs 2 and 3.
Yours sincerely ….
—————————————————————————————————-24 January 2018
COUNT THEM ALL: ANZAC Centenary Newsletter
Dear Sir/Madam,
I’d like to draw attention to the following quote from the latest edition of the Queensland ANZAC Centenary e-newsletter:
“During [the Vietnam War], 15,381 national servicemen served, tragically resulting in 200 killed and 1279 wounded.”
You may be surprised to learn that the casualty figures quoted massively understate the real cost of the war. The figures refer only to the casualties which were evident up until the end of the prescribed period of the War (29 April 1975).
Anyone who later died of his wounds or whose wounds only became known after that date, is not included. Hundreds of national servicemen are in this category and the number is growing every day.
If there is one thing the Centenary of ANZAC should teach us as a nation, it is the fact that the casualties of war never end with the Armistice. The consequence of wounds among both veterans and their families continue to grow.
The cost to the nation of any war must never be defined by the casualty figures at its end.
One way of correctly presenting the information above, is as follows:
‘During [the Vietnam War], 15,381 national servicemen served. In 1975, when it ended, 200 had been killed and 1279 wounded. The casualties among veterans and their families continue to mount,, with more wounds becoming apparent and more deaths resulting every day.
Yours sincerely,
—————————————————————————————————-
23 January 2018
There are three responses outstanding from requests made last year. One relates to the FOI decision not to release the RAAC Corporation’s submission (supposedly in support of mine) regarding the emblazoning of battlehonours on the 1AR Standard. Background is given in the Blog posts for 28 and 29 June 2018 (below). I have been in touch with the Information Commissioner’s staff. They are working within the statutory timelines and hope to finish their review soon. Part of the request is shown below.
Blog 30 June 2017 : Request for Review by the Information Commissioner
Following on from the past two days … parts of the next review request are copied below.
“Summary of why you think the decision is wrong
There are essentially two reasons given for not releasing the document
1. It contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
2. Release of the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
These reasons raise the question as to what sort of opinions are these that are being referred to? It seems that if the views of individuals of the Executive of the RAAC Corporation as expressed in the document, were to be made public, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Corporation would be harmed. Presumably these are opinions which are damaging to Defence in some way.
There is a conflict of interest involved here. The Department of Defence has decided that views presented to the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs have to be kept hidden from public disclosure for the sake of the RAAC Corporation’s relationship with it. Presumably this also accounts for Reason 2 above, ie. if the RAAC Corporation’s members were to become aware of the Executive’s opinions as expressed to a Government Minister, they would think less highly of the Corporation which represents them. Surely the Department of Defence cannot rule on a matter in which self-interest is involved.
If the opinions of the Executive of an incorporated body, as put to a Minister of the Commonwealth, cannot be released to someone possibly affected by them, then the FOI Act has failed in terms of its purpose of providing the Australian community access to information held by the Government.
Resolution
What action or result would you like from the Information Commissioner?
I would like the Information Commissioner to release the submission made by the RAAC Corporation to Minister Tehan, supposedly in support of my earlier submission to Minister Tehan regarding the emblazoning of Vietnam Battlehonours”
—————————————————————————————————-
22 January 2108
RAAC Matters
The Abrams Tank Fleet.
As previously reported, the member unit reps attending the last RAAC AGM received a report on Corps matters: the committee was presented with a plan for the future of the RAAC: This included deployment to Operation TAJI, the return of the M113AS4 vehicles to the RA Inf, an upgrade of the M1 Abrams fleet to A2/3 standard and the replacement of the ASLAV fleet under Land 400. This decision is due to be made in March 2018. The future of 2 Div RAAC units was presented, where ARES units will be allocated a dismounted role. [2/14 QMI Assn newsletter]
Is there an elephant in the room? Why, one has to ask, is there no mention of the increase in Abrams fleet size to 90 (from 59). The larger figure is the number that Army has determined is needed to meet the requirements of three tank sqns, one in each ACR (as per Plan Beersheba). The is just one troop at 2/14 QMI. There seems to be no mention of the additional tank procurement in current Defence projects (LAND 907 Phase 2 and LAND 8160). Is it possible that the additional tanks have been sidelined? Unfortunately, the RAAC Corporation has no voice in raising concern about this … sadly yet again, it’s ears to the ground, letters to the editor etc etc. [Sadly aslo, unlike other assns, the members of the 1AR Assn have had no report on the RAAC AGM … makes you wonder why we’re members.]
ACR Tank Squadron : B Sqn or C Sqn?
It’s been asked before on the Blog … will there be a standard designation for the tank sqns in the ACRs, ie. will all the tank sqns be designated C Sqn for example?
This would avoid having to say ‘B Sqn, 1 Armd Regt (Tank) or A Sqn, 2 Cav Regt (Recon). It could also avoid possible confusion in terms of operational groupings.
It seems that there is to be no standard designation. Media reports suggest that, while the tank sqns in 2 Cav and 2/14 QMI are both designated C Sqn … the tank sqn in 1 Armd is B Sqn.
Task Group Taji 5.
One of Brigadier Scott Winter’s responsibilities as Comd 3 Bde, will be to manage the ‘adjustment’ of those from Taji 5 returning to the Bde after six months in Iraq. There could not be a better person to do so.
—————————————————————————————————-
21 January 2018
‘Tongue in Cheek’ Advocacy
Part of a post by me on the 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook page is copied below.
“If you, as a member of the 1AR Assn, are in need of assistance with a DVA matter (this may or may not involve advocacy), how can the 1AR Assn help you, ie. how can you gain access to the support and advice offered by the Assn?
Who knows? State Reps don’t have any such training or information on hand [some used to have access to a register of members with advocacy quals]… so they forward your request to the Secretary. What does he do? There is no Welfare Officer on the C’tee, so he asks the VP/President. They are both in full time employment, do they have time to manage these matters? The answer is obviously … no.
May I suggest that if the 1AR Assn is serious in offering support and advice to members who are in need, that the C’tee be expanded to included a Welfare Officer.”
The Assn VP responded to say: “Is that a nomination for yourself Bruce?”
I replied: “Hi Derek, I think that would be premature. Presumably the C’tee will discuss the HOC initiative and how best to assist. The C’tee would then put its draft welfare policy to members and seek input. If it was decided to proceed, and it was intended that a welfare officer be added to the C’tee, then an appropriate resolution must be approved at an AGM (as per the Constitution). It would be expected that the resolution to add a welfare officer, would include a duty statement. Once the composition of the C’tee is determined, it is expected that nominations would be called for. It is, of course, possible that members would vote not to expend resources on member welfare, leaving this instead to other ESOs. (Consultation with members, as always, would be paramount.)’
The reference to the process for changing the numbers of people on the C’tee, as per the Constitution, was deliberately made as this is a time when the provisions of an own Rules Constitution are being considered. At the moment there is no provision for a Welfare Officer, however, if one was thought to be needed … it would be a simple matter to include this in the draft for approval by members.
I thought the VP might have responded along the lines that the composition of the C’tee will be considered in due course (there’s an obvious need to expand the C’tee to even out workloads).
Imagine my surprise at the actual response from the VP: “It was a tongue in cheek comment Bruce”
[‘Tongue-in-Cheek’ : not meant to be taken at face value].
Of course Mr C M Fenton OAM just had to weigh in: “Either put up or shut up Bruce”. I assume that this was a tongue in cheek comment too.
What does it all mean? Probably that there will be no discussion as to the need for a Welfare Officer on the C’tee and no amendment to the draft Constitution to provide for one. Quite sad really.
—————————————————————————————————-
20 January 2018
Personal Weapons for AFV Crews
“The Sahib got out of his tank with his Tommy gun.”
The quote above is from “The Story of British Armour in Burma”. The tommy gun, of course, was the 45mm Thompson sub-machine gun. It was valued for its high rate of fire (around 650 rpm) and hitting power. There are numerous other references to tank crews using tommy guns as their personal weapons (both from the turret and when forced to dismount).
The Browning 9mm self loading pistol was issued to tank crew in Vietnam. It is still carried by Australian AFV crews today. It is absolutely useless in this role. Any analysis of the personal weapon needed by AFV crews will identify one which was a high rate of fire and good hitting power. RAAC soldiers don’t deserve to be fobbed off with an obsolete second rate weapon.
The blog of 19 July was entitled Personal Weapons and is copied below:
On my blog post on 11 July, I listed the following as matters as some of those I regarded as being of particular importance:
Ensuring the sacrifices and achievements of AFV crews in Vietnam are recorded fully and accurately in the annals of history
Full recognition and acknowledgement of the unique service of AFV crews in battle.
Overcoming the capability gap currently affecting the RAAC.
Open and transparent governance of the 1AR Assn in accordance with statutory regulations.
Cessation of the targeted human rights abuses meted out by the CPV to former members and families of RVN armed forces (our ‘allies’)
Full recognition and acknowledgement by all Australians of the service and sacrifice of Indigenous Australians during the Frontier Wars.
I forgot one:
Equipping RAAC AFV crewmen with a personal weapon which is both suitable (for the confined conditions in which AFV crews operate) and effective. (It could be argued that this is part of the capability gap affecting the RAAC, listed above)
The current handgun issued to AFV crewman is the same Browning 9mm pistol issued to crews in Vietnam. It was of limited use then and is no better today. The fact that it first entered service in 1935 says a lot. Both the British and US Armies have recently updated their issued handguns.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) commented recently that “the current ADF handgun belongs to an era when bolt-action rifles were king of the battlefield. We wouldn’t send our troops into harm’s way with a .303 Lee Enfield rifle today, so why do we send them out with vintage handguns—or none at all? (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-adf-handgun-is-an-ethics-issue/)
ASPI goes on to say that the Australian Army has “a blind spot when it comes to handguns … contrast this with the British Army’s commitment to rushing its newly-acquired Glock pistols [referred to as the ‘Kalashnikov’ of hand guns] to its frontline units deployed in Afghanistan, where pistols have been credited with saving the lives of several soldiers.
I recall leaving my tank after it was stopped by enemy fire. When I got to the ground, I couldn’t see through the foliage immediately in front. I’d have liked to have been sure there were no enemy close by on the other side, but I didn’t bother firing. I returned my pistol to its holster when I realised that it was useless in providing any sort of suppressive fire in such a situation. I needed something with a high rate of fire and good hitting power.
Some commentators have asked why Australian police forces are equipped with better personal weapons than the ADF (ie. AFV crews).
A comment from a reader:
“Have just read your blog today on personal weapons for AFV crews. Could not agree more. I recall on our day at the small arms range to practise with the Browning. The S/Sgt instructor’s message to us was, something like, “the most effective use of this particular weapon is to throw it hard as you can at the target”. I also recall inspecting my target and noting that the round had not even penetrated the plywood. Fortunately, in Vietnam I was able to substitute my 9mm for something more effective; can’t recall who inherited it.”
—————————————————————————————————————–
19 January 2018
Passing on Lessons From Our Experience
I initiated a post on the 3 Cav Forum recently. It, and the thread, which followed, are copied below.
Me: The following extract is from an account of operations in Somalia by a member of B Sqn 3/4 Cav …
“On Operation Solace we were sans-belly armour as the resource was not stored at the squadron’s barracks. When it was requested through the logistics chain, it could not be located in time for our rapid departure to Africa. There were more than a million mines in the ground in Somalia and we were all inadvertently playing Russian roulette.”
Surely this could not be right? Is it naive to think that belly armour would have been designated as an operational priority item with contingency plan arrangements for its transport and fitting. Hopefully, today, things like this are identified in exercises to test reaction plans and their execution.
Chairman, RAAC Corporation: That’s correct. I spoke with Greg Hooper about this last year. They were given bugger all time to prepare.
The belly armour couldn’t be located and it wasn’t until the Sqn RTA’d that they were eventually found in stacked in the weeds at the back of a supply depot. The sheer lack of any attempt to locate and send these belly plates to follow the Sqn to Somalia with a specialist RAEME team to arrange for fitting in country is a disgrace. I’d hate to have seen what the reaction back here would have been, had a track or two hit a mine or two.
Contributor: Nothing changes does it in the Army. Just deploy as fast as possible before higher up change their mind, like what happen to 2 Cav in the early seventies when it was placed on standby for Israel. Why weren’t the cars already equipped with belly armour in the first place?
Me: The belly armour was removed from training vehicles in order to reduce running costs.
Short notice contingency plans (ie. involving a reaction force) should either provide access to a stock of ready to go vehicles or be able to suitably equip the force within the designated
Chairman: To not learn from the lessons of previous RAAC history on Ops and in this particular instance added mine protection, and deploy to Somalia basically naked, is unforgiveable.
Me: I’ve attached a list of lessons associated with operation of the Centurion in Vietnam (as a result of research associated with my book).
I presented these to the then HOC (Maj Gen Chalmers). He expressed great interest and initiated work to ensure that the mistakes were not being repeated in the RAAC at that time. Possibly ‘Lessons’ could be a standing agenda item at each RAAC Corporation AGM (?).
Comment: Here we have an incident of RAAC soldiers being placed at risk, because of “unforgiveable” procedures that the RAAC should have prevented. Surely it is not enough for the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation to simply make this point. Why not do something positive to ensure that lesson is one that would not be repeated today. Why not suggest to the RAR Association, for example, that they investigate what would happen if an APC Sqn was reacted today. Are the belly armour plates still covered by weeds at the back of a supply depot?
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
18 January 2018.
Governance.
There’s a new dawn breaking (at last).
With any sort of luck, the next 1AR Assn AGM will consider a resolution to approve a new Constitution, one drafted and voted on in accord with regulations for incorporated associations and with input from members.
Not only that, but the financial statement presented will follow the format of a revised 16/17 financial statement which will have been previously presented to members and found to have been both comprehensive and in accord, finally, with regulations for incorporated associations.
Furthermore, the AGM might pass a motion to adopt a policy of welfare assistance to members in need. Previously, this has been ruled out by agreement within the RAAC Corporation forum. ie. member associations felt that there were sufficient ESOs providing such care and support. (Interestingly, this position was one adopted following consultation within the RAAC Corporation, but not with members. Furthermore, once the policy was agreed, members remained in the dark.)
Finally, there used to a policy whereby the minutes of C’tee meetings were made available to members. For some reason this has fallen into abeyance. Hopefully, it will be renewed in accord with the other positive governance moves referred to above.
————————————————————————————————————————————–
17 January 2018
RAAC Role, Equipment, Locations, and Personnel (According to Defence Media)
Following on from the post of 15 January the response from Defence was:
“Bruce, ref below, ack, thanks for the heads up, we will correct and replace any out of date material over the next few weeks (it takes a little while to log the job and get it changed). I have asked that all the relevant material on RAAC trades be double-checked with the RAAC School on behalf of HOC.”
In subsequent exchanges, I felt I needed to also point out that:
“It’s not only RAAC trades of course, but RAAC roles, units, locations and equipment … HOC should be able to address them all.)” and
Just as follow on … it’s a travesty that our youth are being recruited into the RAAC ARES on the false basis that they would be members of units that have a mobile warfare role using “either the Light Cavalry Patrol vehicle (LCPV) and the Interim Infantry Mobility vehicle (IIMV) or the Bushmaster (PMV)”.
As has been made clear in a number of media articles, the RAAC ARES now has a dismounted role only. The following is a quote from the 2/14 QMI Assn December 2017 newsletter article summarizing the RAAC Corporation AGM proceedings:
“In addition to discussing matters relating to veterans and ex-serving personnel, the committee was presented with a plan for the future of the RAAC. This included deployment to Operation TAJI, the return of the M113AS4 vehicles to the RA Inf, an upgrade of the M1 Abrams fleet to A2/3 standard and the replacement of the ASLAV fleet under Land 400. This decision is due to be made in March 2018. The future of 2 Div RAAC units was presented, where ARES units will be allocated a dismounted role.”
These matters were acknowledged. (I refrained from pointing out the case that could be made for compensation by someone who enlisted as a consequence of false and misleading advertising. I think all those involved in public media of any sort will be aware of their responsibilities in this regard.)
Of course … wouldn’t it be great if it turned out that the RAAC ARES were NOT to be allocated a dismounted role only, but were actually to be equipped with Hawkei light patrol/reconnaissance vehicles. Maybe this is a hidden agenda, which is not able to spoken about. Stranger things have happened. We might have to wait for a leak from the RAAC Corporation’s next AGM.
——————————————————————————————————————————–
16 January 2018
Advocacy.
It was revealed recently that all RAAC Corporation member associations decided at an AGM that welfare and advocacy was not part of their role, as there were plenty of other ESOs that provided such services.
Interestingly, the RAAC Corporation itself provides advocacy services. Surprisingly, a member of the 1AR Assn who went on line to thank the Chairman for his assistance with a DVA matter, refused to provide the contact info for the Corporation to others … so that they could seek similar assistance.
The 1AR Assn VP has now stated that the Assn does “provide a level of support to advise and guide, something we are working to improve”. The reference to improvement presumably relates to the President’s recent meeting with the RAAC HOC in which the ability of the ‘RAAC Collective’ to assist former RAAC service personnel was raised by the HOC.
If you, as a member of the 1AR Assn, are in need of assistance with a DVA matter (this may or may not involve advocacy), how can the Assn help you, ie. how can you gain access to the support and advice offered by the Assn? Who knows? State Reps don’t have any such training or information on hand … so they forward your request to the Secretary. What does he do? There is no Welfare Officer on the C’tee, so he asks the VP/President. They are both in full time employment, do they have time to manage these matters? The answer is obviously … no.
May I suggest that if the 1AR Assn is serious in offering support and advice to members who are in need, that the C’tee be expanded to included a Welfare Officer.
The following extracts are from the Defence and Defence Jobs websites. Is there any wonder that there is some confusion in the public arena as regards defence matters?
I wonder what response I’ll get when I draw this to the attention of Defence media?
RAAC Role
RAAC units are able to participate in a range of operations including armoured mobility to infantry …NO, this is an infantry task
Units of the RAAC are equipped with … M113AS4 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) and Bushmaster (PMV) family of vehicles … NO, these vehicles have been reassigned to infantry.
Locations:
1st Armoured Regiment is based at Robertson Barracks, Darwin … NO, 1st Armd Regt isocated in Adelaide.
2nd Cavalry Regiment is based in Darwin, Northern Territory … NO, 2 Cav is based in Townsville.
Units.
The Armoured Vehicle Crew Regiments are Army Reserve units that can operate either in a mounted or dismounted role … NO, no such regiments exist.
The Armoured Vehicle Crew Regiment (ACR) provides Army the core element of its high-end war fighting capability through the provision of armoured protection, mobility and firepower on the battlefield … NO, ACR is the acronym for Armoured Cavalry Regiment. The ACRs do not provide armoured mobility, this is an infantry role.
RAAC Reserve units operate either in a mounted or dismounted role … NO, RAAC ARES units operate in a dismounted role only.
Light Cavalry Regiments are Army Reserve units that can operate either in a mounted or dismounted role … NO, RAAC ARES units operate only in the dismounted role.
Light cavalry tactics comprise security, stability and enabling activities including the operations of protection, counter-insurgency, evacuation and strategic response options and RFSU operations … NO, these roles are not compatible with a dismounted capability.
Personnel
An Armoured Vehicle Crew member is an RAAC soldier who operates as a member of a mounted troop and a dismounted patrol … NO, there is no such designation.
Equipment.
Units of the RAAC are equipped with the Abrams M1A1 main battle tank (MBT) family of vehicles or the Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV) and Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle (PMV) …NO, the PMV has been transferred to infantry.
The Light Cavalry Regiments are equipped with either the Light Cavalry Patrol vehicle (LCPV) and the Interim Infantry Mobility vehicle (IIMV) or the Bushmaster (PMV) … NO, RAAC ARES units operate in the dismounted role only..
Currently the ACRs are equipped with the M1A1 Abrams tank (M1A1), the Australian Light Armoured vehicle (ASLAV) CRV and M113AS4 APC … NO, ACRs are not equipped with M113AS4 APCs, these have been transferred to the infantry.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
14 January 2018
Following on from yesterday ….1. This is the first draft; 2. The credibility of papers is usually judged on the basis of the experience/qualifications of their authors. I have no medical experience (other than being a recipient) nor quals; I do have a bit of experience of being an AFV crewman on active service and I have interviewed many others who have also. Any input appreciated…
The Stress Experienced by AFV Crews on Active Service
Purpose.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to some of the factors which may have affected the mental health of Armoured Corps Vietnam veterans, in order to better anticipate the needs of future veterans separating from the Service.
Human Factors in General.
When considering the performance of an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its capability, such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
These factors are taken into account of when choosing between two contenders for a particular combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident they feel, eg. whether or not they are likely to suffer anxiety in any form when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that identifying these is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. To complicate matters, man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
Morale.
There are two main determinants of the degree to which AFV crewmen feel ‘comfortable’ in terms of their survivability. Foremost is their confidence in the overall superiority of the system in which they are a part (ie. their commanders at all levels, their battle grouping, and their equipment) … vis a vis the enemy. Following from this, is their confidence regarding the provisions which have been made for their protection.
What happens, however, when a loss or reversal in combat is suffered (eg. an AFV is penetrated, causing crew casualties). It is understandable that confidence in the superiority of the overall system is reduced, while provisions for individual survivability are also called into question.
Matters Affecting Confidence in Individual Survivability
All military training is conducted on the basis that it equips service personnel with skills superior to those of the enemy. This means that AFV crewmen are confident in meeting their responsibilities when under fire. They know that their fellow crew members are similarly trained and they will support each other.
When the enemy demonstrates that they possess an equivalent ability, AFV crew have to accept that their vehicle could be penetrated by an anti-armour weapon or severely damaged by an anti-tank mine. Apart from the obvious anxiety of being wounded or killed at any time, the following matters are some of those which become particularly important:
Being able to exit the AFV quickly if it is ‘knocked out’ or experiences a fire (particularly important for someone like a tank gunner who does not have direct access to the outside);
Knowing that the vehicle fire-fighting system will always operate immediately and effectively;
Being assured of the fire/flash retardant capability of crew combat clothing;
Being kept informed of what is happening beyond the AFV itself and not being forced to imagine the possibilities;
Being able to maintain contact with other crew members and not put in a situation of feeling isolated and alone (as can happen when the inter-communication system fails) and
Knowing that medical support will ensure that all wounded will immediately receive life-saving treatment and evacuation.
Loss of confidence in any of these areas will significantly increase the anxiety and fear that comes with the stress of battle. Should information overload occur in this digital age, the situation will be exasperated.
Post -Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
One definition of PTSD is a particular set of reactions that can develop in people who have been through a traumatic event which threatened their life or safety, or that of others around them. It is generally recognised that it is not only the experience of a single traumatic event which can generate these reactions, other stressful situations (especially if repeated over and over) can have the same effect.
Conclusion.
AFVs, by definition, operate at the forefront of operations against the enemy. Even if a crewman does not directly experience a traumatic event, being enclosed in a vehicle which could be penetrated by an enemy rocket or detonate an anti-tank mine at any time, gives rise to stressful feelings associated with being wounded or killed, being trapped inside an AFV and burnt to death; and/or being abandoned in a disabled vehicle on the battlefield. These thoughts are often made worse by a lack of communication with other crew members, feelings of isolation, and a constant uncertainty about what is happening around him.
There are unique factors which impact on the stress experienced by the crews of AFVs on active service. These must be taken into account when any assessment is made of their mental health.
———————————————————————————————————————————
13 January 2018
Survivability Confidence for AFV Crews
When assessing an AFV, there are obvious characteristics which affect its performance such as suspension, armour protection, number of rounds carried, visibility provided for crew to control vehicle movement and acquire targets, ease of maintenance, etc etc.
Sometimes these are the only factors taken into account of when choosing between two contenders for a particular mounted combat role (such as with the LAND 400 combat reconnaissance vehicle at present).
But what are the factors which determine … not how well the crew can fulfil their responsibilities, but rather how safe and confident the crew feel, ie. whether or not they have particular anxiety when occupying their crew station?
The British Defence Standard for Designers of Military Land Vehicles acknowledges that his is far from an easy task as “human factors issues are not always quantifiable, unlike engineering parameters”. Furthermore, “humans do not all react in the same way” and their performance varies “with stress, tiredness and extreme environmental conditions”. Not only this, but man is adaptable and often compensates for “deficiencies in system design to the eventual detriment of his own efficiency, safety, health or well-being”.
The are a number of factors which determine the confidence level that an AFV crewman will feel in terms of his survivability. Some of these are:
(To be continued)
———————————————————————————————————————————–
12 January 2018
Advocacy
The discourse proceeds …
Bruce Cameron Speaking about truth … last time you were caught out presenting false information, you responded to say that “it was only a personal opinion, therefore it didn’t have to be correct”.I don’t know who the “said member” is that you refer to … the information you state is totally false (again) as far anyone I’m aware of is concerned. Was this the sort of issue the RAAC Corporation had to help you with? (Don’t worry, your ‘secret’ is safe with me.) For the fourth time of asking … will you tell others how they can contact the Corporation for similar assistance to that you received? Surely you won’t begrudge others the same help you got?
Chris Fenton Your words Bruce “As it happens, it’s now known that a simple letter from the Assn emphasising the member’s distinguished service in Vietnam could have made a big difference to his circumstances”. Bruce, could tell us all what offences the said member has been charged and convicted with which is the reason the Government is deporting him back to NZ.
Bruce Cameron I responded to the top post in an effort to get the contact details for the RAAC Corporation so that others may be helped in the same way that ‘Chris Fenton’ had been. This was an important matter as the 1AR Assn had adopted the position that no welfare assistance would be provided by the Assn. (We have learnt very recently that this is about to change.) I am now asked to provide details of a request for assistance that was rejected. If I was privy to this information, it would be breach of privacy to discuss it on a public forum. Mr Fenton seems to know the details, but doesn’t want to make his views known for fear of being charged with libel and having the same charge brought against the Assn. What purpose would it serve? The only thing that has the potential to allow us to seek the same assistance as he received, is for him to provide the RAAC Corporation contact details that he used to gain his assistance. It seems that he will not share this knowledge, however. Why then, did he publicly thank the RAAC Corporation for having helped him with a issue he was having with DVA … when the same help is to be denied to everyone else in a similar position?
Injured or Wounded?
The post on 20 December copied a letter to the Editor of DVA News. The response received is below:
Dear Mr Cameron,
Many thanks for alerting us to the error and for passing on your article on the topic. We are aware of the distinction in meaning between ‘injured’ and ‘wounded’, and when we proofread each edition we always look out for their misuse. In this instance, we simply missed it.
Please accept our apology. We have now corrected all four online versions of Vetaffairs to feature the word wounded rather than injured, and have also reminded everyone involved in the production of Vetaffairs how important this issue is. We’ll make sure it doesn’t happen again.
Kind regards,
Charlotte Harper
Editor - Vetaffairs
Public Affairs Section, Communications and Engagement Branch
Transformation and Engagement Division
————————————————————————————————————————————
11 January 2018
What Great Leadership by the RAAC HOC!
The blog post on 7 January was entitled ‘Advocacy’ and featured a post by Mt C M Fenton OAM and a response from me. The discourse continued as below:
Bruce CameronI now understand why there’s been no response to the query above. The RAAC Corporation will only consider providing assistance if requested to do so by a member association (ie. that assn has tried without success to advocate on their member’s behalf). The 1AR Assn has no Welfare Officer because advocacy is not sufficiently important to the overall membership. A member of the RAAC Corporation provided the above assistance as a personal favour. The last thing that the Corption wants is for their contact details to be made known, so that others in a similar position can ask for help.
Chris FentonAre you volunteering to step up and be the welfare/advocate person Bruce? At the Corporation’s AGM in 2014 and 2015 the Member Associations all said that their Associations did not want get in involved in advocacy/welfare matters as that is an RSL/VVA/VVF area. If a member needs an advocate/Welfare Person then they can Google one of the organisations above. Like I said Bruce “dont let the truth get in the way of a good story”.
Bruce CameronI’m always prepared to help others in any way I can, as I have in the past (see my Life Membership certification), am doing at the moment, and will continue to do in the future. Before anyone can stand for the position of Welfare/Advocacy Officer on the 1AR Assn C’tee, however, the position has to be created. What you’ve clearly explained, makes that possibility very unlikely. So not one of the RAAC Corporation’s member associations believe in helping their members who fall on difficult times … instead their C’tees cold-hearteredly tell them to ‘bugger off’ and contact the RSL etc. This leaves the RAAC Corporation as the only RAAC organisation prepared to offer advocacy/welfare support (as they provided to you). I ask again, how can those who find themselves in need of assistance with an issue they have with DVA (as you did), contact the RAAC Corporation to ask for assistance (as you did)?
Chris FentonA every poor choice of words Bruce. The Committees of the member Associations decided back in 2014 that their members did not have the training, the resources or the volunteers to carry out advocacy/welfare tasks. If one of their members do require assistance then they would be giuded to the organisations that do have the volunteers, training and the resources to assist them. Bruce, to say that the C’tees cold heartedly tell them to ‘bugger off’ is offensive and uncalled for.
Bruce CameronIt may be a poor choice of words … but it was the response from the 1AR Assn to a request to help a member fallen on difficult times recently. As it happens, it’s now known that a simple letter from the Assn emphasising the member’s distinguished service in Vietnam could have made a big difference to his circumstances. I guess you’re not aware that the President met with the HOC today. Guess what the topic of discussion was: how we, as an RAAC collective, can better serve ex-serving members! So just maybe … the focus will move from an association which only facilitates comraderie, to one which also gives some priority to the advocacy needed to help with the welfare of members in need. (I know that you won’t be bothered to assist in this latter respect.)
Bruce CameronI forgot to ask … how is it (for the third time of asking) that a member in need of help with a DVA issue (as you were) can contact the RAAC Corporation for assistance (as you did) … ie. can you provide the contact details for doing this, or must they remain a secret?
I understand that the President 1AR Assn will endeavour to bring the the ethos of the 1AR Assn into line with that of the ‘RAAC Collective’, as enunciated by the HOC … what great leadership is being shown here!!! Just have to hope that those who only believe in an association which sponsors opportunities for get-togethers and swapping stories … will value other opportunities.
———————————————————————————————————————————————
10 January 2018
The RAAC Leadership Group.
“…these people [those involved in the organisation of the Coral-Balmoral Commemoration] include the RAAC leadership group, Floody, Gerry Mc Cormack, Pedro Rosemond et al,…except you [ie. me] of course …”. Chairman, RAAC Corporation, 3 Cav Forum, 8 January 2018.
I have never aspired to be part of the RAAC leadership group. In fact, I didn’t even know that one existed. I was well aware, however, of a clique of former WOs who conspire to achieve outcomes they consider are best for one and all.
But now a ‘leadership group’ appears. Quite a large one by the reference to “et al”, ie. too many to list. I wonder who ‘they’ are?
Presumably this is a leadership group within the RAAC Corporation (otherwise why have a Corporation). I was asked once if I wanted to be part of an advisory body regarding RAAC matters. I explained that, above all, I needed to retain my independence to raise matters which did not reflect Army/RAAC policy. This, of course, is not possible as far as the RAAC Corporation is concerned.
Ian McAuley’s quote from the post about Leadership on 8 January is relevant:
“Leadership is the hard task of getting communities [or organisations/associations] to make progress on difficult problems requiring adaptive change.
To make progress on difficult problems requiring adaptive change. Before this can happen, the problems need to be recognised (and listed). Take, for example, the crisis faced by the RAAC ARES … ie. being reduced to a solely dismounted role. There have been numerous blog posts on this topic, the most recent on 3 January 2018.
What a pity the RAAC Corporation (aka the RAAC leadership Group) simply endorses (rather than having the ‘balls’ to question) Army/HOC policy. They can’t even manage an ‘excuse me Sir … I don’t mean to be presumptuous Sir, but if I may be so bold as to point out’ the adverse consequences that consigning decades of RAAC mounted experience to the dustbin, will have on the RAAC’s ability to conduct mobile warfare and the capability gap in terms of Army’s readiness. Why not sponsor a debate on the issue, allowing all the relevant points of view to be presented? Of course … I fantasize.
———————————————————————————————————————————————–
9 January 2018
Acknowledging the Sacrifices of ALL
A memorial to those who died as a result of their service in Vietnam was recently opened.
The intent of the inscription “In memory of the 521 Australians who died defending the Republic of Vietnam” is a very noble one. I do not wish to diminish the dignity of its sentiment, however, I believe the following observations are important.
Firstly, if you simply refer to ‘Australians’ in this context, you also have to include the Australian civilians who died serving their nation in Vietnam (eg. Cathy Wayne, entertainer; John Cantwell, journalist). Their names are listed on the Commemorative Roll in the AWM
Secondly, the figure 521 is the number of Australian service personnel (not servicemen, as they were not all men*) who died during the prescribed period of the War (3 August 1962 – 29 April 1975). It does not include the hundreds of other Australian service personnel who have died since then, as a direct result of the wounds they suffered while serving in Vietnam.
To be accurate, one form of wording for the inscription is the following:
In memory of the 521 Australian service personnel who died defending the Republic of Vietnam during the War itself, as well as all those who have since died of their wounds.
My concern is that unless attention is drawn to the accuracy of inscriptions such as this, our school children will continue to be taught that the cost to Australia of the Vietnam War was 521 dead (when the actual figure is much much higher).
*I had to remind the Office of a former PM that the grief of Barbara Black’s parents would not be alleviated by his reference to the “521 Australian servicemen killed” during a Vietnam Day address.
—————————————————————————————————————————
8 January 2018
Leadership
“Leadership is the hard task of getting communities [or organisaions/associations] to make progress on difficult problems requiring adaptive change. It is not to be confused with authority. Beware of the call for a “strong leader”.
Ian McAuley. Reframing public ideas Part 1: Leadership
Well known University of Canberra academic, Ian McAuley, writes that “We tend to look for leadership in the wrong places, usually among those who occupy positions of authority – prime ministers, bishops, corporate CEOs, heads of institution. He argues that doing this tends to “conflate the exercise of authority – a necessary function in any organization – with leadership.
That’s why, he argues, that a number of writers do not refer to ‘leaders’. “It’s an over-used term, and it leads to the easy assumption that leadership is something to be left to those in positions of authority. The idea that a strong “leader” can solve our problems relieves us from personal responsibility in tackling hard issues…”.
Continuing, his observations are very relevant to organisations and associations as we know them: “While those in positions of authority have certain powers … they also have certain constraints. One of those constraints is the need – at least a perceived need – to maintain the organization’s equilibrium, to protect it from disruption so that it can go on functioning”.
He concludes that “In general, we should not expect leadership to come from those in positions of authority. The work of leadership takes place down the line and is largely unsung”.
I could name a number of members of the 1AR Assn who have shown extraordinary leadership in addressing the issues being faced by the 1AR Assn. It’s a pity that those in authority will not do so.
——————————————————————————————————————————————–
7 January 2017
Advocacy
The blog recently addressed the decision by the 1AR Assn C’tee not to do anything to help a member who is appealing against a decision to cancel his visa. (A simple letter to provide details of his distinguished service with 1AR in Vietnam would have helped.)
The vocal members of the 1AR Assn say they joined for camaraderie; to catch up with mates; and to tell stories. Advocacy doesn’t rate at all. It has to be assumed that it is for this reason that there is no welfare officer on the C’tee and for the decision adopted above.
It is a surprise therefore, when one of the vocal group of members should post the following on the 1AR Members Only Facebook page:
I would like pass on my thanks to the RAAC Corporation and Noel McLaughlin, its Chairman for successfully assisting me with an issue I have had with DVA.
He, presumably, had an issue with DVA which required advocacy. Not being able to receive any assistance from his own association, he sought assistance from the RAAC Corporation.
Interestingly, the RAACC have always stated that they will not only ever offer assistance after the member’s own assn has attempted to resolve the matter, has had no success and has sought assistance from the RAACC on behalf of their member. Given that the 1AR Assn has no welfare officer (the President and VP have very busy full-time jobs and the Secretary is also acting as the Treasurer), one would think that RAACC assistance would not be possible.
The following question was posted on Facebook in relation to the Fenton post:
Great news. Could you inform others who are also experiencing issues with DVA how they can contact the RAAC Corporation for similar assistance (the RAAC Corporation webpage doesn’t have any contact details). Many thanks!
There has been no answer … nor is one expected!
The last thing that the RAACC would want is for contact details to be made widely known so that anyone with an issue requiring advocacy could contact them.
How then was Fenton able to gain advocacy assistance? I guess being the 1AR Assn C’tee representative on the RAACC would have helped. Didn’t I mention that before?
I’m sure that it isn’t a matter of ‘I’m alright … don’t worry about anyone else!’.
———————————————————————————————————————————–
6 January 2018
Governance (Cont)
Dear Secretary,
I have some concerns re your email/letter of 5 January 2018. They are listed below.
The letter states that “I write to you regarding the Association’s constitution …”. One assumes that the unsigned letter is from the President, but the signature blocks for the President, VP and Secretary are at the end. Who is the letter from?
The letter states that “…the former Committee headed by Kevin Bell sought assistance from a small group to review and draft an ‘Own’ Rules constitution”. Who made up this small group?
The letter states that “Enough time and energy of various people has been expended in the Association’s desire to adopt a new constitution which is an essential ingredient for our operation”. Surely the process of drafting the Constitution ends when the draft is right, not because ‘enough time has been spent on it’?
The letter states that: “a new draft constitution presented to the membership on 8 Jul 2017”. This is wrong. A review of the Minutes will confirm that no draft constitution was presented to members at the AGM. (The AGM was of significance in that a financial statement was presented which did not cover the complete 16/17 FY, was not certified by the C’tee as required, and failed to meet the requirements for Incorporated Associations in a number of other ways.)
The letter states that “… due to an administrative shortcoming it [the new draft Constitution] was not adopted”. As the draft constitution was not presented to members (above), there could be no “administrative shortcoming”. Maybe the letter writer is referring to an earlier attempt to adopt an own rules constitution … it was presented to members, but a when a fraudulent declaration was made to the regulator; lawyers hired by the C’tee confirmed that it was invalid.
The letter states that “Attached is the draft Constitution previously presented to membership on 8 Jul 2017”. This is wrong (see #3). The draft constitution is, in fact, that which was found invalid because of the fraudulent declaration that accompanied it. The content of that draft would also have made it invalid if it had been considered by the regulator.
The letter refers to “a member who was awarded Life Membership under the Old (2012) Constitution”. I believe that reference to the existing Constitution must be wrong as there is no provision for life members in the Model Rules. The wording should probably be ‘a member who was previously appointed to be a life member by the Assn’.
The letter includes a proforma for members to indicate their acceptance or otherwise of the draft constitution attached. Even if the constitution had been the right one, a postal vote is not permitted under the rules for incorporated associations. The Special Resolution has be passed to approve it. Special resolutions can only be considered at general meetings. (Dispensation was given for postal voting to be used for consideration of the revised financial statement. This is allowable because the rules specify special resolutions have been used for matters involving changes to the constitution and other important matters. The regulator allowed the financial statement to be regarded as not coming within the ‘important matter’ category. This is no such discretion for changes to the constitution, however.
It would seem that the intent of the email/letter is to present to members the draft prepared under the auspices of the previous President (assuming that it was that prepared by the small group of which I had the privilege to be a member). Please attach the correct draft and make arrangements for a general meeting at which members who are unable to attend can vote by proxy.
Best wishes, Bruce
————————————————————————————————————————
5 January 2018
Ask Not What the Assn Can do For You …
On 1 Jan 18, the Blog reported on the situation faced by a member of the 1AR Assn … he was scheduled to have his visa cancelled (he fought with 1AR in Vietnam not knowing that his parents had not become Australian citizens) unless an application to revoke the Minister’s decision was successful. (Visa cancellation is automatic following a criminal offence.)
The 1AR Assn was asked to advocate on his behalf. The president’s response was
“While he may have provided service to Australia during the Vietnam period, he has been found guilty of a serious criminal matter. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection has determined that he is not considered a fit and proper person to continue as a resident of Australia. The Committee [therefore] will not make representations on [his] behalf.”
Many submissions have been made by other associations, friends and individual members of the 1AR Assn. To ensure that everything possible was being done … the help of an ‘expert’ in these matters was sought. Part of the advice offered was that:
It is essential that all information relevant to the circumstances be made available to the Immigration Department. The medical report regarding the offence as being a consequence of the PTSD, itself a consequence of gallant service on behalf of the nation, is particularly important. As are the character references from members of the community and the nature of the military service provided.
A letter from the Assn to the Minister to say that the member concerned had served in 1AR during Vietnam and had been decorated for his bravery (a copy of the citation could be attached) would have been taken minutes to compile. An easy addition would have been to mention that he was asked to extend his tour of duty and willing did so; finally, he was honourably discharged on ….
This information, coming from an Association of which he was a foundation member, would have been highly regarded by those considering whether or not to revoke the visa cancellation. But it was too much to ask.
—————————————————————————————————————————–
4 January 2018
The Future of the RAAC
Yesterday’s blog started out with the following two paragraphs:
The Annual General Meeting of the RAAC Corporation was held at Seymour/Puckapunyal on 13-14th October 2017. 1AR Assn members have not yet been given a report. The 2/14 QMI Assn December newsletter, however, provided details for its members. An extract follows:
“In addition to discussing matters relating to veterans and ex-serving personnel, the committee was presented with a plan for the future of the RAAC. This included deployment to Operation TAJI, the return of the M113AS4 vehicles to the RA Inf, an upgrade of the M1 Abrams fleet to A2/3 standard and the replacement of the ASLAV fleet under Land 400. This decision is due to be made in March 2018. The future of 2 Div RAAC units was presented, where ARES units will be allocated a dismounted role.”
The blog focused on the total lack of debate and seeming acceptance by the RAAC Corporation of the complete loss of the RAAC ARES mounted warfare capability.
Another issue that has been raised time and time again by Armouredadvocates, is the absence of tanks to complete the 2/14 QMI ACR.
At the moment a token tank troop is based in Brisbane. Thirty additional tanks have been identified as the number needed to provide for three tank squadrons, one located in each brigade ACR. When are they to be purchased? Have other Govt priorities intervened in terms of funding? Unless a strong voice is heard, the RAAC, both regular and reserve, will continue to slip behind in terms of essential war fighting capability and skills (as will the Army as a whole).
The idea of moving a squadron’s worth of tanks between brigades according the Plan Beersheba force readiness cycle, is not a viable one.
Tank craft is not an on again/off again learning experience. It has to be a constant part of training. Interestingly, there is no concern raised by the 2/14 QMI Assn in their newsletter. Those attending the AGM must have asked what was happening. Were they sworn to secrecy? Is it possible that the timing and the resulting capability gap for Army, has meant that there’s to be no openness nor transparency in this matter?
Another opportunity for the RAAC Corporation to show leadership. Another opportunity lost. (Why does the RAAC Corporation maintain a website …. nothing has been posted on it in years.)
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
3 January 2018
The RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’ (Cont)
The Annual General Meeting of the RAAC Corporation was held at Seymour/Puckapunyal on 13-14th October 2017. 1AR Assn members have not yet been given a report. The 2/14 QMI Assn December newsletter, however, provided details for its members. An extract follows:
“In addition to discussing matters relating to veterans and ex-serving personnel, the committee was presented with a plan for the future of the RAAC. This included deployment to Operation TAJI, the return of the M113AS4 vehicles to the RA Inf, an upgrade of the M1 Abrams fleet to A2/3 standard and the replacement of the ASLAV fleet under Land 400. This decision is due to be made in March 2018. The future of 2 Div RAAC units was presented, where ARES units will be allocated a dismounted role.”
The blog post on 29 December is relevant, as are numerous posts prior to that. An extract is:
“ … providing a mounted reconnaissance capability is an essential RAAC role … one critical to the Army’s combat power. The RAAC ARES cannot do this, however, as it has no vehicles. Sadly, the reservoir of once highly tuned mounted reconnaissance skills vested in the RAAC ARES, no longer exists”.
Those attending the RAAC Corporation AGM seemingly accepted the fact that all the RAAC ARES will be called on to deliver in the future is ‘a reconnaissance capability deployable in a dismounted role’, ie. assault troopers.
One might have expected a vigorous debate as to the degree to which the RAAC ARES is being sold short (with direct consequences as far as the defence of the nation are concerned). Sadly the RAAC Corporation is a ‘lapdog’ for the official RAAC HOC/Army policy. This was a prerequisite to its formation.
————————————————————————————-
2 January 2018
Ethics, Governance et al
Following on from yesterday … the 1AR Assn C’tee deemed that they would not approach the Patron of the Assn to advocate on a member’s behalf (ie. not argue for leniency, but simply seek compassionate consideration of his circumstances).
The Blog has previously examined the role of a patron of an association. Without referring back to that, it’s instructive to consider a previous occasion in which the C’tee did seek the intervention of the Patron.
A former Operations Manager used to use his professional signature block on his emails to members (presumably it was good advertising). I ‘clicked’ on the business link, and, finding this interesting, subsequently called up his CV which was available on the Internet (at that time, but no longer).
I mentioned on the Blog that I found it hard to understand that a person could be a ‘self-employed company director’ at the same time that he was a tank troop leader (having included his troop leaders’ course in his qualifications). He could, of course, have been an ARES officer … but the opposite appeared to be the case, the way the CV was written
I received a copy of an email sent from the C’tee member to the Patron. It was alleged that I was involved in ‘stalking’ the Operations Manger and the Patron was asked to intervene.
Shortly after I received an email from a US government department charged with ensuring that the Internet was not used in a way which breached individual rights. I was advised that a complaint had been received (from the C’tee member) regarding my Blog content. They had examined it and considered the content was fair comment, as allowed for under freedom of speech. I heard nothing from the Patron.
The C’tee has declined to seek the help of the Patron for a member in a life-threatening situation … but (earlier) they did so in a trivial matter affecting one of their own.
—————————————————————————————————-
1 January 2018
A Case Study in Justice and the 1AR Assn Way.
As we enjoy the Christmas season and reflect on its meaning, one of us (now aged is in Villawood and has been for over two years. He lives in fear of the mindless justice that is often metered out in such institutions. He once believed that the rule of law was backed by a justice system characterised by compassion and fairness. He’s almost given up hope that this will ever be the case.
He arrived in Australia when he was six months old. As he came from NZ, he was classed as a British subject. Come the Vietnam War, he volunteered (he was eligible to enlist, being an Australian resident/British subject). As far as he was concerned, however, he was an Australian citizen … he could vote and he could fight for his country. He wasn’t aware that although his parents had lived in Australia for 20 years, they had never taken out citizenship..
He served with distinction with 1 Armd Regt in Vietnam and was decorated for his gallantry and self-sacrifice on behalf of his ‘country’:
“…. displayed admirable qualities of leadership, courage, perseverance and physical endurance …. His brave, dedicated example, without regard for his own safety, was an inspiration to his comrades. ……’s actions earned the respect of the Vietnamese, Americans and fellow Australians who were present. These actions are in keeping with the highest traditions of the Military Service and reflect credit upon himself, his Regiment and the Australian Army”.
Towards the last year of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam, there were shortages in the numbers of those with particular skills … he was asked to extend his tour of duty from the normal twelve months, to what became more than sixteen.
After his Army service he settled on the NSW south coast, establishing a property-related business. This was successful and he married and brought up two children. He was well regarded in the community and he and his family made many friends. Then came PTSD.
He had thought that he was not one of those affected … until things suddenly spiraled out of control. In one of his darkest moments, he committed an offence using the computer. He was advised by a lawyer to plead guilty as he was sure to get a custodial sentence. That was poor advice. He was sentenced to a prison term. His plea meant that the police evidence was not tested in court (many elements of which could have been explained and led directly to the sentence handed down). To avoid embarrassment to his family, he opted not to appeal. He served his time.
His sentence ended and he was expecting to be reunited with his supportive and loving family. This was not to be. He now learnt that he was not an Australian citizen; furthermore, as he had served a prison term … therefore, he was not of good character. This meant deportation and transfer to Villawood!
Eventually, deportation orders were drawn up and signed by the Minister. With assistance provided through the Vietnam Veterans’ Assn (VVAA), this legal document rejected by the Court. New deportation orders had to be prepared. As he was supposedly a threat to the community he had to remain in custody in Villawood. Was he being detained illegally?
A medical specialist examined him and declared that what had happened was completely out of character and he was not a threat to the community. His professional opinion has been rejected by Immigration authorities. He needs on-going treatment for his PTSD, however, he has to be escorted, in handcuffs, by two Immigration officials. The door to the consulting room has to remain open and the Immigration officials have to maintain eye contact with him. The medical specialist states that he cannot provide appropriate treatment in these circumstances.
Members of the community in which he lived have provided character references to the effect that he is not a threat to the community. The President of the Royal Australian Regiment Assn contacted DVA seeking to have his distinguished service to Australia taken into consideration by Immigration officials. Fellow members of the 1AR Assn have endeavoured to do what they … the PM has been contacted, as has the NZ Govt. An appeal to the President of the 1AR Assn to seek advocacy on behalf of a foundation member was one of the first things done.
The response was delayed … now received, extracts are copied below:
“While not familiar with Mr Best’s criminal matter, it is understood [that] … as a consequence of his criminal actions he is to be deported.
While he may have provided service to Australia during the Vietnam period, he has been found guilty of a serious criminal matter. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection has determined that he is not considered a fit and proper person to continue as a resident of Australia.
The Committee will not make representations on Mr Best’s behalf.
No approach will be made to the Patron [who holds a senior appointment with DVA]”
Judgments as to whether or not this cold-hearted can be made by readers. Why, however, would the President say that he “may have provided service to Australia during the Vietnam period”? This throws doubt on his distinguished military service in 1 Armd Regt … when there is absolutely no doubt about this at all.
Surely the President of the 1AR Assn could have said something along the lines of: “Despite his distinguished military service on behalf of the Regiment and Australia” … even if it is too much to hope for consideration ‘characterised by compassion and fairness’.
————————————————————————————————————————————
31 December 2017
Funerals.
I was about to say that it’s an usual time of the year to be thinking of funerals … but, of course, funerals don’t know the time of year.
I was contacted yesterday by someone seeking help in relation to the headstone for someone who had served with 1 Armd Regt AIF (AAC) in New Guinea and Borneo, 1 Armd Car Sqn in BCOF and 1 Armd Regt (RAAC) at Puckapunyal. His widow wanted an image of either a Matilda or Churchill tank incorporated into the design of his headstone.
I was able to supply some drawings which could be used to create the required impression (cast or otherwise). This remined me of two things: (i) to always be careful when referring to things like ‘the first shot fired by 1 Armd Regt in anger’ etc, to specify AAC or RAAC; and (ii) what happened to the enquiry to the 1AR Assn C’tee re funeral drapes?
A member wanted to know if it was ok for him to have his casket draped with the 1Armd Regt flag. I pointed out that the protocol for this is vested with the Regt, further explaining that the RTR Assn have a drape (ie. a large flag) which they loan to members’ families to use should they so wish.
The Assn C’tee undertook to liaise with the Regt to determine the guidelines which apply and to consider manufacturing a RTR style drape if appropriate.
This was months ago and nothing’s been heard to date … maybe next year.
Bonne annee et bonne sante a vous!!
———————————————————————————————————————————–
30 December 2017
Donations?
Continuing on from 29 December …. the Assn’s 14/15 Financial Statement (included in the Minutes of the 2015 AGM) includes the following reference under the heading, Expenditure:
“Donations (to 1AR from Rheinmetall Sim) $10,000”
I believe that $5000 may also have been donated on the basis in FY13/14.
So it appears that Rheinmetall may have donated at least $20,000 to 1AR (regimental funds presumably) through the 1AR Assn
Why would any commercial company do this, ie. what benefit would it expect to gain?
One has to assume that the funds are being paid to the Assn because to pay direct to 1AR would raise conflict of interest concerns (ie. the payment would have to appear on the company’s ledger which would be open to audit). As the Assn C’tee stated in the 15/16 accounts, the payment “is masked by coming through us” (see 29/12 blog).
There is nothing to stop unit regimental funds receiving donations. I offered the $8300 refunded to me from the Assn … to the 1AR Regt funds (I suggested that the money could be used to help pay for a small contingent from 1AR to attend the Cambrai Centenary in France), but the donation was declined. (I think that I was ‘on the nose’, courtesy of the Assn C’tee at the time … and the controlling clique that became evident as the controlling faction in the subsequent AGM.)
I cannot begin to imagine the deviousness that might justify such ‘secret’ donations, and their acceptance, on commercial grounds. One presumes that the money is buying ‘influence’ of some sort, such as when China funds a new hospital on an island in the Pacific. As we know, however, the money for the hospital not only buys bricks and concrete, but also contributes to the personal wealth for those who allocate contracts.
This blog was set up to provide openness and transparency where none existed previously. It would seem that there is a way to go until everybody does ‘the right thing’.
“The Light Horse today provide protected mobility for troops and deliver a reconnaissance capability deployable in a mounted or dismounted role.”
The above quote is from an informed RAAC ARES source. It is representative of the current situation in these units … once highly skilled in the art of mobile warfare.
The RAAC used to operate Bushmaster PMV; then the capability was transferred to the RACT; and now it belongs with the RA Inf. Some Bushmasters are issued to RAAC ARES units by their ARES Brigade HQ, so as to provide a mobility capability that they would not otherwise have. The problem with this is that Bushmasters, when operated by RAAC units, are crewed by a commander and a driver. The RAAC (SOA) has declined to train crew commanders, as this would create the impression that the RAAC recognise the Bushmaster as an being AFV (you have to be careful with what you hope for, as one SOA source informed me).
Of course, providing a mounted reconnaissance capability is an essential RAAC role … one critical to the Army’s combat power. The RAAC ARES cannot do this, however, as it has no vehicles. Sadly, the reservoir of once highly tuned mounted reconnaissance skills vested in the RAAC ARES, no longer exists.
What can be delivered is “a reconnaissance capability deployable in a dismounted role”. Surely there is much greater need as far as the RAAC ARES is concerned, than to train what used to be called ‘assault troopers’? (The answer to this is a separate post.)
In 2018 … will the RAAC ARES role be defined? If it is to be one involving mobile warfare (what else does the RAAC do?), what platform will be made available to it (the Hawkei perhaps)?
————————————————————————————————————————————————–
28 December 2017
Priorities; Urgency; and Importance
The telephone can be the enemy of effective time management. Time and all other resources are, of course, allocated to ensure that important matters are appropriately dealt with. When someone calls on the telephone, they expect their call to be (i) answered and furthermore, (ii) their concern addressed immediately. By default … this becomes an urgent matter. If dealt with straightaway, however, it might well absorb resources required to deal with an important matter. Of course, if something is both urgent and important, it must be allocated appropriate priority.
I referred yesterday to Assn Governance (urgent) and RAAC Issues (important). It is possible, of course, for either category to include matters which are both urgent and important.
The following has the potential to be included in this category.
The financial ledger sent to Assn members recently, included the information below:
“Misc – Donation made to association from a company, it is masked by coming through us and then directed to 1 Armd Regt Regimental Funds ….. $5,000.00”
One has to wonder if this is the first ‘donation’ which been channelled through the Assn to avoid (presumably) any suggestion of conflict of interest (ie. as might arise if the company was a defence contractor or potential contractor). The possibility arises that other payments have been made via the Assn and that other RAAC Units are also beneficiaries. Furthermore, if ‘secret’ payments are being made to units, it has to be assumed that other payments might have been made to individuals.
There is a major project in the pipeline which affects all ARA RAAC units. Companies are vying for selection. The overall cost is in the order of $5b.
It is both urgent and important that an assurance be given that any equipment to be operated by the RAAC is chosen on its merits and the decision is not, in any way, influenced by payments“masked by coming through” the Assn.
An Open and Transparent Ideas Space for Advancing RAAC Issues.
It’s a pity to be distracted from wider RAAC issues (the elephants in the room, so to speak) and we have to hope that housekeeping matters are put to rights next year.
Assn Governance (Cont)
I was reading the latest edition of Plumes, the 4/19 PWLH Assn’s newsletter and came across the following breakdown of their membership:
“We currently have 226 members of the Association.
83 are financial, 3 honorary life members, 67 are paid Life members and 73 are not financial.”
This reminded me of the recent summary of 1AR Assn’s assets which included $2800 under ‘Accounts Receivable’ which are explained as “Membership fees due as at Feb 2017 and a handful of lapsed memberships beyond the 2016/2017 membership period”.
One has to wonder at the wisdom of continuing to regard ‘bad debts’ (ie. unpaid fees by 112 members who have not advised that they have resigned) as assets when they are ten months overdue.
Speaking about Income … the C’tee were asked what was meant by Unclassified Income as shown on the account ledger. The answer given was that: “This is the income which does not fit within a designated category such as Membership fees, event income etc”. I guess this is accountant speak for ‘this is our business … don’t you worry about that!’.
What income can the Assn receive if it is not within a designated category, such as M’ships, Donations, Q store sales, Event fees etc? Should a new category designated ‘Leftovers’ be added, I wonder?
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
21 December 2017
This is the final post until 27 December.
Governance (Cont)
Hopefully
CAV will agree to the 1AR Assn C’tee’s request for an extension of time beyond 31 Dec to rectify shortcomings in the financial statement prepared by accountants for FY 16/17; and
the C’tee will acknowledge the accountability matters that have been raised by concerned members and take appropriate action.
Toilet Humour
Following the blog post on 19 December, the following sequence is copied from the 1AR Assn Facebook page. (I’m tempted to comment re the last post that “You said it” … but I think the humour will be lost.)
Bruce Cameron Given that writing on the back of the toilet door is done neither for wealth nor critical acclaim, it is regarded as one of the highest forms of literature. Thank you.
Chris Fenton Highest forms of literature? We obviously dont go to the same toilets, Bruce
I refer to the article entitled “I thought he’d died there …” in Vetaffairs, Vol 3 No 4 Summer 2017.
The subject is two soldiers who fought at El Alamein in 1942 and are described as having been “injured”.
One “sustained a shrapnel wound to his leg”, the other was “shot through the eye”.
Both soldiers were, of course, wounded in action.
I know that I don’t have to point out the difference to DVA, given the importance of the cause of ailments suffered during military service … as far as the nature of the Department’s responsibilities are concerned.
Should it be of interest, however, I have copied an extract below from an article I wrote some time ago.
Best wishes, Bruce Cameron
It is relevant to look back a little in time. Australia suffered about the same number of fatalities during the Boer War, as the number of soldiers lost during the Vietnam War. In South Africa, however, the number of battle and non-battle fatalities were about the same, i.e. 50%. Medical services improved greatly during the period up until the Vietnam War, with non-battle fatalities being reduced to about 15%. The driving force in this regard was the transparency associated with casualty reporting. No longer was it acceptable for a commander to simply state “x number of deaths resulted”. Military hierarchy had become accountable for those who died of illness or were killed by accident, in the same way they were accountable for battle casualties. Reporting someone as having been ‘killed in action’, is NOT high diction intended to romanticise war…but a means of stating definitively, what happened.
Contrary to the belief of some, describing someone who sustained wounds fighting the enemy, as having been ‘injured’ (as would be the case if he tripped on a tent peg) is demeaning in the eyes of many casualties. For this reason, during both the First and Second World Wars, Australian soldiers took pride in wearing wound stripes on their uniforms.
Apart from the issue of respect for the casualties themselves, is it trivial or pointless to ensure that the correct terminology is used in public reporting? Success on the battlefield is generally regarded as being self-evident in terms of the number casualties sustained by the enemy, as compared to the number of one’s own losses. Other types of casualties, however, are equally important in terms of sustaining combat power. The number of troops who become casualties of disease, accidents, or friendly fire can rightly provide an important performance measure. During Vietnam, losses due to friendly fire became a major political issue. Cases exist of casualty reports being changed from ‘killed accidentally’ to ‘killed in action’, for this reason.
The number of battle casualties sustained overall also became a political ‘hot potato’ at various times. In response to pressure being placed on 1ATF commanders to minimise casualties, it was proposed in 1970 that the classification ‘wounded in action’ should only apply to those soldiers who were evacuated to hospital, i.e. if a wounded soldier remained on duty, he would not be listed as wounded. The proposal was not approved and the following policy was affirmed: “All battle casualties, including those remaining on duty, need to be fully recorded, having regard to the possible after effects of even a minor casualty”.
Trivial, pointless … these are NOT terms to be used when considering the need for accuracy in public accounts concerning military casualties. Indeed, the opposite is the case and this needs to be acknowledged by all those who have responsibilities in this area.
————————————————————————————————————————————————-
19 December 2017
Governance (Cont)
Mr C M Fenton OAM. I see we not only have barrack room lawyer’s but we also have barrack room accountants. BRJ Accountants and Business Advisors Pty Ltd compiled the financial statements, if there was a problem they would have advised the Committee. Ron, Trevor and Geoff how about we leave it to the qualified Accountants and stop making false and damaging accusations against the Committee.
Attention has recently been focused vide the 1AR Assn Members’ Only Facebook page, on the Assn’s Financial Statement for FY 16/17.
Background: An incomplete statement was presented at the AGM. Consumer Affairs Victoria spoke with the C’tee and agreed they could have until 31 December to have a new statement approved by members and presented to CAV. The C’tee appointed a firm of accountants to do the work (at a cost of $1800). The accountants’ statement was sent to members. Faults were found and the C’tee has now sought an extension of time from CAV (ie. beyond the 31 December deadline).
The discussion on Facebook highlighted the errors … in an open and transparent manner.
The post above is typical of the views of a small group of members: (i) the accountants did the financial statement, therefore it must be right; (ii) if anyone points out an error, they must be wrong; (iii) any dissenting view is damaging to the C’tee, therefore should not be made; and (iv) the responsibility of members is to let the C’tee do their job and approve whatever they recommend.
Thank heavens for members with the integrity to proceed in the face of views such as these … knowing that if they don’t point out the shortcomings and insist on an accurate financial statement, the C’tee could be found guilty of making a false declaration and compounding mistakes in accounting for members’ funds (which may have existed for some time). It’s easy to see how the problems arose with the NSW and SA RSLs.
Only if members take a close interest in the accountability of their association and offer help to their C’tee, will the future of their association be assured. (The member quoted above is on the record as being adamant about a particular matter … when evidence to the contrary was presented, he said that ‘his was only a personal view and didn’t have to be correct’.)
—————————————————————————————————————————————-
18 December 2017
Governance (Cont)
Email from C’tee:
“***IMPORTANT NOTICE: ‘The attachments to this message are provided ‘in-confidence’ for member consideration in the context of transparency [about the financial statement]. They are not to be circulated, distributed or placed (posted) in any form – whole or part – on any media site or distributed beyond recipients to this message.’***”
This is not a constraint imposed by the Constitution, therefore it must be imposed by the C’tee? WHY?
Members have been advised that: “this Committee (and we suggest previous committees) has no reason to hide information. Such suggestions are foolhardy, ill-informed and unfounded”.
Members are entitled to inspect the books and tell others of their findings. The C’tee cannot muzzle members and prevent them discussing publicly financial affairs of the Assn to which they belong.
The C’tee have been asked to confirm that, privacy issues related to other members aside, members are able to speak publicly about the Assn’s financial transactions eg. the confidence level associated with a valuation of 005 at $65,000.
As an aside …just recently the Alice Springs RSL Club had to close its doors. The one thing which may have prevented it reaching the crisis point it did, was for attention to be focused on its financial affairs. See below
History of difficulties
The Alice Springs sub-branch has a experienced financial difficulties in the past.
The club was closed for more than eight months in 2012 after owing hundreds of thousands of dollars to creditors due to poor management and fraud issues.
It was bailed out by the South Australian branch, which continued to run the Alice Springs sub-branch.
A new Alice Springs committee was formed 12 months ago with the hope of turning the club around financially, including paying off a “substantial” debt owed to the Australian Tax Office.
But on April 13, RSL SA entered into voluntary administration and could no longer provide financial security to the Alice Springs RSL Club, triggering the decision to close the doors at the Alice Springs club.
Taking a break … I deserve it after NBN, a new computer and Windows 10 (from XP) upgrade. Next blog Monday or Tuesday.
Governance (Cont)
Ron Baikie and others have done a fantastic job checking the financial statement and bringing errors to the attention of the C’tee and members … for the purpose of helping the C’tee and Assn in general. But how have the C’tee reacted?
Silence. Not a word.
There seems to be a common thread with some service associations … keep the members in the dark and release info in controlled doses. This seems all the more strange, given that the military relies on sharing information at all levels in order to conduct an operation successfully.
Anyway … members have been asked to approve a financial statement which has been shown to be false. Why is there no horror expressed on the part of members? I think it is because of an attitude which resulted in the RSL falling foul of the regulator. Most people are time poor. They stop reading after the third line of a report … thereafter either dismissing it or asking for a pen and approving it.
Thank heavens for those like Ron who are prepared to invest the time that most members don’t have (of allocate to other ‘priorities’).
Will the C’tee release a statement give their thanks for this magnificent effort on behalf of the Assn? We’ll have to wait and see.
—————————————————————————————————————————
14 December 2017
Coral-Balmoral Unit Citation for Gallantry (Following on from previous blogs…)
I posted yesterday’s blog on the 3 Cav site. The Chairman RAAC Corporation must have felt threatened. Among other things he felt the need to say: “I think walking around with one’s head trapped in a very, very dark place where no light enters, is a real tragedy. It tends to give one tunnel vision”. I suppose he must know (but refrained from saying so).
The response I made is set out below.
“Well there we have it.
Simple question: Why did the 1AR Assn, RAAC Corporation and RAAC HOC not make a submission to the Defence Honours and Awards Trubunal regarding the UCG for Coral-Balmoral within the deadline imposed (when effort was made in respect to extending eligibility for the RVN CGWP awarded for Operation Hammersley)?
The answer ….
To their credit … the C’tee of the 1AR Assn acknowledge the shortcoming in the Assn’s preparedness regarding the DHAAT Inquiry re Coral-Balmoral. Their intent is “to ensure that this is not repeated”.
As far as the RAAC Corporation is concerned … it seems to be my fault, ie. I didn’t do enough. The RAAC HOC is MIA. Of course, it may not be possible for them to advocate a position at variance with the policy of the Department of Defence.
Does it really matter? Of course it does. Those who participated in the defence of FSBs Coral and Balmoral need all the support possible to have their extraordinary gallantry recognised.
If the Minister rules against the UCG, it will be because of Defence’s total opposition to retrospective awards. Yesterday the Chairman of the Tribunal told Defence that he found it hard to reconcile the fact that Defence had a policy which was not to approve of awards being made retrospectively … BUT when such an award was approved by Govt, Defence accepted that it was right and proper. The discussion led to the Tribunal noting there was a need for a whole new look at what was involved in such an inconsistency.
This is in keeping with what a large number of believe is needed, ie. “a whole new Australian paradigm of recognition and retrospectivity”. The “frustration with which the veteran community views some contemporary thought” is coming to a head.
Anyway … where does all this get us? Hopefully some attention has been focused on the issue and if an Appeal has to be lodged with respect to Coral-Balmoral, there might be better understanding as to what the nature of the issue is.
(BTW. Does anyone know where things stand with the RAAC Corporation’s work regarding the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley?)”
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
13 December 2017
Coral-Balmoral Unit Citation for Gallantry (Following on from previous blogs…)
The final hearing was held in Canberra today. A presentation was made by reps of inf, arty, and tanks. (The inf praised the APCs for the gallantry of crews in bringing forward ammo, and evacuating casualties.)
Defence maintained their position that no awards should be made retrospectively (unless there was some maladministration evident in the chain of command at the time).
Defence opposed the award of the UCG for Long Tan and the decision in that case came down to being one based on the extent of political pressure felt by the Minister.
In terms of Coral Balmoral, individual awards were made at the time, the Battlehonour ‘Coral-Balmoral’ was awarded, as was the Honour Title ‘Coral’ to 102 Battery … isn’t this sufficient acknowledgement (suggests Defence)?
It’s a travesty that no supporting submissions were made by the either the RAAC Corporation or RAAC Head of Corps. (But we can’t expect them to be seen to be advocating something in opposition to the Defence policy … can we.)
The final outcome is most likely to be a political one, rather than one which acknowledges, in its own right, the extraordinary gallantry of those involved.
Coral-Balmoral Unit Citation for Gallantry (Following on from previous blogs…)
I spoke to the Director, Defence Honours and Awards) a little while ago. She acknowledged that Defence’s position was at odds with the Letters Patent for the UCG. Defence regards the Letters Patent as an enabling document which allows them to have a different policy.
The current Defence policy is that they will not support any retrospective awards unless there was some maladministration that can be shown to have occurred at the time.
The reason given for this is that the criteria governing the Australian honours and awards system is different to that which applied to the Imperial system (ie. the acts of gallantry are the same, but the administrative process for recognising them is different).
The 1942 RAN and Long Tan awards are not precedents as far as Defence is concerned. Defence opposed the awards at the time, but were overruled by the DHAAT/Minister.
If the UCG for Coral -Balmoral is to be awarded, the same thing will have to happen.
Email to VP, 1 AR Assn …
Hi Derek,
Any info available as why the 1AR Assn, RAAC and HOC declined to make a submission in support of the Unit Citation for Gallantry?
Following the first hearing here in Canberra, I made three submissions on matters of fact … which the DHAAT Tribunal have accepted.
I was talking to the Director, Defence Honours and Awards today. There were about 180 submissions, but nothing from either of our peak associations or HOC.
Is this apathy with respect to one of our three battlehonours?
There is a counter argument to Defence’s position which I will submit at the final DGAAT Hearing tomorrow (more to come…)
The C’tee has opted not to accept any advice about governance provisions from a members group interested in ensuring that the Assn follows regulatory requirement in an open and transparent manner.
So be it.
Interestingly, the financial statement prepared by the accountant (for an undisclosed sum) includes the as yet to be paid membership fees of those who have been members, but have not resigned … as ‘accounts receivable’ ($2800). Is it really appropriate to calculate the assets of the Assn on this basis, ie. assuming someone who has not paid his/her membership fee, is going to do so at some stage in the FY?
Hopefully a revised financial statement will be prepared (as a result of members’ comments) and sent out for approval. Members are asked to vote by post. There has been no mention of it, but it is presumed that the postal votes received will be available for scrutiny by members (in the same way the Constitution requires proxy votes to be included in the minutes of an AGM).
How is the postal vote to be managed? It is assumed that the same conditions will apply as per an AGM, ie. a quorum will amount to 10% or more of members eligible to vote. Of course, this precludes life members (unless they are financial) and affiliate members … as there is no provision for these classes of members in the Constitution. A simple majority of votes will be sufficient to approve the financial statement … or will it? Given the importance of the motion, should a 75% majority vote be required?
10 December 2017
Governance (Cont)
Members have been asked to vote on a financial statement prepared by a team of accountants (for an as yet undisclosed cost).
The problems that are arising appear to stem from the fact that the accountants don’t have any insight as to the operations of the Assn. Thankfully, concerned members have looked at the figures presented and identified anomalies.
The bottom line is that all financial transactions need to be open and transparent.
This means explaining the $876 spent on ‘Training and Conferences’. It appears that this was made up of $270 for petrol and $606 for the Mawson Lakes Hotel … all for the same activity in October 2016. If this was a conference that the then president attended, should a report not have been given to members?
The practice of a commercial entity providing a donation(s?) to 1 Armd Regt appears to have caused confusion. The payment(s) are made to the Assn and on-forwarded by the Assn to the Regiment so as to avoid there being any appearance of the company having a conflict of interest.
(The computer gremlin has won … a new computer is coming, with an upgrade from Windows XP.)
Governance
Hopefully the financial report sent out by the accountants (and forwarded to members of the 1AR Assn for approval) will be amended.
At the moment there is no way of knowing what the Assn’s assets amounted to at the end of FY 2015/16. It follows that the total assets at the end of FY 2016/17 can’t be relied on, as nobody knows if the starting point was correct.
The regulator’s website provides a sample financial statement for incorporated associations. This makes it clear that a comparison of sub-totals should be made with the previous FY. This allows variations to be readily seen, eg. changes in membership, sales, assets etc. Such trends chart the progress of an Assn (for good or otherwise).
Interestingly, of the 149 entries under Membership Income, 21 are designated “Misc- fees”. I hope ‘Misc’ knows who he is.
————————————————————————————————————————————-
8 December 2017
Unit Citation for Gallantry : Coral-Balmoral
The VP, 1AR Assn has advised vide facebook that:
“All, any correspondence to any committee member is to be through the appropriate email addresses as indicated on the web page. Any correspondence to personal addresses (unless informed otherwise) will not be responded to and not classed as correspondence in. Thank you for your continued support.”
I have responded to say:
Hi Derek, The following email was sent to the address for the VP on 8 November. I’ve not had a response as yet. Can you advise please.
“Dear Vice President,
The TOR of the DHAAT enquiry into the Battles of Coral and Balmoral include the following:
“In particular, the Tribunal is to examine relevant evidence and consider whether it is appropriate that any Australian military units who participated in those battles be awarded an Australian unit decoration, or a further or other form of recognition for service in those battles between 12 May and 6 June 1968”.
Submissions closed on 16 May 2017.
As you know, 1st Armd Regt was one of the units involved.
Why then, didn’t HOC, RAAC Corporation, or 1 AR Assn make a submission to the Tribunal highlighting the bravery and sacrifices of the tank crews and the significance of their actions?”
The following was received in response:
“Good evening Bruce, I acknowledge your question and will make enquiries as I do not wish to provide an ill informed answer.”
My final advice was:
“Many thanks Derek. Was this not possible four weeks ago? I’ll be attending the (likely final) Tribunal hearing on 13 December. It would be good to be able to explain the reasons then.”
———————————————————————————————————
7 December 2017
The Latest on the Ha Go Tank (Part 2)
Following on from yesterday … I referred the AWM’s advice to the person that the UK Tank Museum had nominated as an ‘expert’ on the Ha Go tank. His response is copied below. (Interestingly the AWM sought his help in restoring their own Ha Go … see his note at end.)
Thanks for your message, and for your thoughts on the crew capacity of a Ha-go tank.
Re the possibility that the crew size was, from time to time, increased from three to four – I see no reason why this might not have been done in exceptional circumstances (for example when a guide was needed, or for rescue purposes), but the presence of a fourth man on board a Ha-go would be an abnormal event. It would be physically difficult as the internal space is very confined, and the presence of an extra man would impair the fighting efficiency of the vehicle. Remember that the Ha-go tank commander can only just stand in his turret owing to lack of space (no seat is provided for him) and the bow gunner has to curl himself up on a small rubber mat next to the driver (again, no seat is provided). In an emergency the gunner could perhaps share his space but it would be fiendishly uncomfortable and he would not be able to do his job properly.
The normal method of carrying extra people on a Ha-go was to make them cling to the outside of the vehicle. For this purpose a board was frequently fitted across the rear of the tank and ‘hold-on’ handles fixed to the upper corners of the engine compartment. Such passengers could send signals to the driver by means of a button mounted next to the rear number plate, and which sounded a horn in the driver’s compartment.
As to whether or not the Japanese ever produced a Ha-go with a larger turret to take a more powerful gun – This would have required a bigger turret ring, which in turn would have meant redesigning the whole tank. They may have experimented with this, but they never produced a production Ha-go in this configuration. Certainly, the Mitsubishi factory blueprints make no mention of such a variant, and I have never seen evidence of such a thing.
Lastly; I was interested to read in your notes that a friend of yours [came across 37mm cannons in the a museum in Rabaul] many years after the war. The AWM could have done with this in 2013/14 when they were restoring their Ha-go and which was missing its main armament – In the absence of an original gun, I built one for them by copying the cannon on my tank.”
———————————————————————————————-
6 December 2017
The Latest on the Ha Go Tank (Part 1)
Following on from 28 November, the AWM have advised:
“When we were putting together the caption for our Type 95 Ha-Go we found several references directly stating four crew for our particular vehicles for the Milne Bay operation. I appreciate that they are likely to have included the fourth crewman for this specific operation and to reflect this clear evidence we have listed the crew for our Type 95 Ha-Go captured at Milne Bay as being four. We are not claiming that every Type 95 Ha-Go tank operated by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during the war were manned by four crewmen. The Type 95 Ha-Go tank that we have on display was manned by four crewman at Milne Bay, though as much as I am astounded that they could fit four men inside!
The attached document (RCDIG1021177) contains an interrogation report from an AIF intelligence officer. Please see page two in which the captured Japanese Marine states four crew were with each Type 95 Ha-Go at Milne Bay. As a primary piece of evidence this is very strong. The statement was taken very soon after the battle and the statement by the IO that the claimant was trustworthy adds weight to this account.
The additional image I have attached is a posed image of four Japanese Army soldiers in front of a Type 95 Ha-Go presumably in Manchuria/China or Japan due to their cold weather uniforms.
Thanks for passing on that story about the original 37mm guns that Mr Rod Ward spotted in Rabaul. I have seen images in our collection of dozens of Japanese AFVs abandoned in Rabaul and Timor after the cessation of the war. I often wish our forebears had managed to bring a few of them back to Australia for not just our collection here at the AWM but others such as the RAAC Museum.”
5 December 2017
‘Dignified’ Snow Dome to be Removed from Sale.
Dr Nelson ‘s response to my letter (see Blog 15 November):
Note: Blog Pause. There’ll be no further blog posts until Tuesday 5 December. (There are too many final farewells these days.)
2/14 QMI ACR
The latest Army Newspaper states that five Abrams (presumably a single tank troop plus reserve/s) took part in a recent exercise at Shoalwater Bay Training Area and that “more tanks will join 7 Brigade next year“. Where are these tanks to come from?
Are they being procured under LAND 8160 or does their availability result from a realignment of current assets between brigades to fit in with the Plan Beersheba force development cycle? (Still no information as to whether or not the 2/14 ACR tank squadron is to be based at SWBTA. The uncertainty must be driving families up the wall.)
Extracts from recent blogs are copied below.
2 October 2017 Current Abrams fleet numbers (59) were based on a single armoured regiment with two tank squadrons. The ORBAT has changed, however. We now have three ACRs, with a tank squadron each. Even with each squadron restricted to three tank troops, the present fleet is too small to provide for SOA, RTC, and repair pool need (exasperated because of the new geographical spread involved). The following article states that Army wants to increase the Abrams fleet size to 90 (a 50% increase): http://www.afr.com/news/special-reports/defence-and-national-security/armys-plans-for-more-and-better-tanks-20170303-guqamb
It’s unclear, however, as to whether LAND 907 (Initial Abrams purchase, plus upgrade) or LAND 8160 (engineering and breaching capability) are to be supplemented to meet the need. Indeed, it’s unclear as the whether financial provision has been made at all.
3 October 2017 It looks like a three tank troop has been positioned at Enoggera so that 7 Bde can get some inf tank training. (Then again, as mentioned yesterday, this might only be a temporary measure.)
If a full tank squadron was to be established at 2/14, the limited numbers of tanks held at present would mean three tank sqns of three tank troops, each of three ranks, across the three ACRs. (This means something like 33 tanks in the sqns, 9 at SOA, 4 at RTC and 4 repair pools of 3 tanks). The repair pool capability is the weak point. SHQ tanks would most likely be used to augment as needed. When, and if, the fleet gets to 90, complete tank sqns would be able to be fielded.
As discussed recently, the current strategic circumstances demand that the above force structure be achieved as a matter of priority.
——————————————————————————————
29 November 2017
Governance
Checklists. New committee members are required by legislation to quickly become familiar with the details of each and every rule related to the governance of an incorporated association. This often proves difficult, especially when committee members have full time jobs, and circumstances mean that no handover/takeover is possible. Breaches of the Model Rules and the Act can easily result in hefty penalties (including fines).
One way of helping with this challenge is for C’tee members to have available to them a number of Checklists which deal with the primary functions that the C’tee is responsible for. A proposal by a group of members to prepare these was supported by Consumer Affairs Victoria (they could provide copies to help other Associations), but not by the 1 AR Assn C’tee. One checklist would have dealt with the preparation of financial statements (below)
Audit Results. Members of the 1AR Assn will shortly receive (i) advice of the audit into the association’s accounts and (ii) a new financial statement for 2016/17 to approve.
Dear Members,
I’d like to let you know the results of the reconstruction of the 2015/16 and 2016/17 association accounts.
I’d like to be able to say that all financial transactions were related to authorized Association matters and were made in accord with financial governance requirements, ie. each and every one was documented and all relevant receipts were retained and were able to be examined.
Unfortunately ….
I acknowledge that all members of the C’tee have a legal responsibility for, and duty to manage, the finances of the Association. This financial statement has been examined by the C’tee and we certify that is a true and accurate account of the Association’s financial position as of 30 June 2017.
Will there be an ‘unfortunately‘ in the President’s email when it comes in the next couple of weeks??
Surprise! Surprise! Before I had time to post the above, the email below was received (headed ‘Warning order’)
Dear Members, In various communications, you will have received notice that the Association Committee intended to seek an independent agency complete a ‘reconstruction’ of the Association’s accounts for the 2016/17 financial year. The Committee’s decision was based on probity and for it to conduct its own due diligence. At the same time the Committee sought advice on an appropriate finance software package that will not only manage our accounts but also offer the facility to manage our membership roll. The latter functionality is to tie membership fees to the ‘roll book’ and avoid confusion about voting rights (who is or isn’t ‘financial’) at the time of the AGM. The Committee appointed BRJ Accountants & Business Advisors Pty Ltd to undertake the work. The reconstruction of the FY16/17 accounts and financial statement is complete with all Committee members signing the statement. The transfer to the financial package is all but complete with just the tedious task of uploading the membership details to be completed. Shortly you will receive a copy of the FY16/17 financial statement.
Gregory Nicholas Derek Simpson Richard (Dick) Stanios President Vice President Secretary/Treasurer 29 Nov 2017
There is no “unfortunately” … but neither is there any audit report.
——————————————————————————————
28 November 2017
The On-Going Ha Go Tank Story
The following email was sent to the Curator, Tank Museum, Bovington,UK:
“Dear Sir,
I write to enquire about the fighting arrangements for the Type 95 Ha Go light tank.
The Australian War Memorial has recently completed restoration of a Ha Go captured at Milne Bay during WWII.
The Tank Museum’s online information states that the Ha Go in your collection had a crew of three. This accords with the research conducted by myself and a friend with whom I served in Centurions in Vietnam, ie.
“The main armament of this tank is a 37mm Type 94 tank gun. In the Ha-Go there is only the crew commander in the turret and the 37 mm gun is fired and loaded by the Crew Commander (CC). The gun is raised in elevation and depression by the movement of the CC’s right shoulder via a padded rest❶, the rest is mounted on the left of the gun. Traverse is achieved by moving his shoulder, left and right. The gun has 10 deg right and 10 deg left movement. The turret can also traverse with a gear/cog hand-wheel arrangement but the final traverse and laying of the gun are done by the movement of the CC’s body. The CC has to open the breech via a handle on the right side of the gun using his right hand, he also will use his right hand to load the gun, the firing trigger is located on the left along with a telescopic sight.”
The above has been brought to the attention of the AWM, however, they are not convinced by our evidence and stand by the four man crew.
Could you advise if the Tank Museum has any information about the possibly of a Ha Go turret accommodating two crew members.”
—————————————
The Curator forwarded the enquiry to a person currently restoring a Ha Go tank. He advised (and the Curator supports him) that:
To answer your question: The Ha-go tank definitely only has a crew of three (confirmed by reference to the war-time Japanese Imperial Army handbook on the vehicle).
I can see why the AWM in Canberra assumes that the tank should have a crew of four. This was the ‘guesstimate’ made by the Directorate of AFV Production in Melbourne when they evaluated the Ha-go that Australian forces captured at Milne Bay. This incorrect figure was included in the otherwise excellent report that the DAFVP produced in 1943, and which the AWM obviously referred to when compiling their fact sheet.
The Curator added the observation that: “I know the Japanese are small but have you seen just how small the space is in such a tank?”.
This info has been forwarded the AWM. Will the ‘Fact Sheet’ be amended?
The following extracts are from the article above. The authors are emeritus professor and honorary professor respectively, at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre.
“Australia’s strategic outlook is deteriorating and, for the first time since World War II, we face an increased prospect of threat from a major power.
Contingencies that are credible in the shorter term could now be characterised by higher levels of intensity and technological sophistication than those of earlier decades. This means that readiness and sustainability need to be increased: we need higher training levels, a demonstrable and sustainable surge capacity, increased stocks of munitions, more maintenance spares, a robust fuel supply system, and modernised operational bases, especially in the north of Australia.
For the longer term, the key issue is whether there’s a sound basis for the timely expansion of the ADF.
The prospect of shortened warning times now needs to be a major factor in today’s defence planning. Much more thought needs to be given to planning for the expansion of the ADF and its capacity to engage in high-intensity conflict in our own defence—in a way that we haven’t previously had to consider. Planning for the defence of Australia needs to take the new realities into account, including by re-examining the ADF’s preparedness levels and the lead times for key elements of the expansion base. “
What is the RAAC’s expansion capability? Almost zero, given the current state that the ARES has been allowed to deteriorate to. How is it possible that this has been allowed to occur without strong protest by those who are supposedly the guardians of the RAAC’s interests? Two words … self interest and apathy. Unless matters co-incide with self interest, there is no incentive to ‘rock the boat’. In fact, self interest is predicated on not ‘rocking the boat’. Sad really.
Blog post for 3 March 2017:
“The Role of the Army Reserve
If we accept that the role of the Army reserve is to ‘deliver specified capability and support and sustain Australian Defence Force (ADF) preparedness and operations’, what does this mean for the RAAC ARES units?
With the M113AS4/IFV being operated by the inf in the armoured mobility role and the Bushmaster by the RACT in the protected lift role, what’s left for the RAAC ARES?
Surely the role is to supplement the ARA cavalry capability. If dismounted cavalry scout option is to be followed, the whole rationale for maintaining armoured units disappears. Cavalry scouts have a valid place in the force structure, but if the RAAC ARES is confined to this role then the whole skills base is lost with respect to armoured operations.
Armouredadvocates has argued previously that equipping the RAAC ARES with Hawkei PMV-L would provide a means of developing cavalry skills. While this role would of necessity be a limited one, it could have a real supplementary capacity with respect to the ACRs.
Two years ago the then CO 1/15 RNSWL stated that it is “important to ensure that there isa clearly articulated role for the ARES RAACwhich will inform the employment categorisation and that appropriate resources are made available …”.
Let us hope that this will be achieved before the armoured skill base in the Reserve is eroded completely.”
—————————————————————————————
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG)
The submission made by the A/CDF to the DHAAT is copied below. A link to the challenge to the legal basis of dening the UCG on the basis of retrospectivity was provided on 21 November.
It appears that the Office of the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs has decided not to inform the Minister that he was wrongly advised about 8RAR being awarded the RVN CGWP Unit Citation for the whole of its time in Vietnam.
If this isn’t enough, the Minister’s Office has come up with a new reason for not extending eligibility for the award … the Australian Government cannot award the RVN Citation to units not named by the RVN.
Should his involvement not result in all reasonable steps being taken to ensure the merits of the matter are properly investigated and the relevant standards of procedural fairness are observed in an open and accountable manner … then a media campaign will be initiated. A story board along the lines below is being prepared. The public revelations will be quite ‘explosive’ and interest in the story has already been shown.
Operation Hammersley: A Conspiracy to Deny Vietnam Veterans Just Recognition of Their Valor
“…there are a lot of very senior officers both within and retired from the Army who may not necessarily agree or support the submission regardless of the strength of the evidence.” Email received 1 June 2017
———————————————————————————————————
24 November 2017
Canberra Times this morning:
Can’t scan well enough to read. Text below:
Nicholas Stuart (“A new kind of arms race looms”, November 22, p20) drew attention to the recently published views of Professors Dibb and Brabin-Smith from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Their article, however, gives a very different perspective on Australia’s strategic outlook, to that presented by Mr Stuart.
Rather than adding value to the Defence debate, his harping about so-called “rigid military thinking” does the opposite. Why allege views on the part of senior officers, then describe them as “rubbish”? Why berate defence planners for not, in his opinion, being able to “engage intellectually”?
Stuart demeans Army’s mobile warfare capability by saying that our tanks will “never be anywhere near a shot fired in anger” and new armoured vehicles will not be of any use. The professionalism of tank crews who served in Vietnam and were on very short notice to deploy to Timor and Afghanistan is a testament to the need to maintain skill levels at a time of shortened warning times.
Dibb and Brabin-Smith present a well argued case for the Australian Defence Force to be able to “engage in high-intensity conflict in our own defence”. Such contingencies they contend, are “credible in the shorter term”. A basis for the timely expansion of the ADF, as well as improved readiness and sustainability levels, are vital; as is the funding needed to achieve them.
The editors left out the last line of my draft:
“It is the rigour of debate such as this which contributes to Australia’s defence preparedness, not silly headline seeking banter”.
———————————————————————————————
23 November 2017
Matters of Governance Continue.
CAV will continue to monitor the situation regarding the compliance with the resolution passed at the 8 July 2017 annual general meeting of the association (ie. an accurate financial report to be presented to members by 31 Dec 2017).
The association also agreed to provide CAV with a copy of the revised financial accounts that will be presented to members by 31 December 2017.
CAV understands that the manner in which the required financial details will be provided to members of the association has not been settled.
Much depends on Point 3, ie. whether or nor a Special Resolution is required.
If it is, a quorum (10% of financial members) is required to approve the new financial statement; if it is not, the statement can be approved by a majority of members at the meeting.
A Special Resolution is required when decisions of particular importance are to be made by an Association.
Given the circumstances of the original financial statement not being in compliance with the Act and a new financial statement having to be presented … is this not a matter of particular importance? Auditors have been called in to reconstruct financial accounts, irregular transactions could be involved … is it possible for there to be a more important motion to be considered by members?
Surely the circumstances demand a Special Resolution.
——————————————————————————————
22 November 2017
The Continuing Governance Saga (Following on from 13 November)
Dear [Department of Justice] ….
I understand that you’ve been away, so haven’t been able to respond as yet to my previous email (12 November) and the questions I posed (copied at end).
I thought it best to highlight the aspect of timing involved in the matter.
If, as CAV (Aaron among others) advised, the revised financial statement is to be presented to members vide a Special Resolution {presumably so designated because of the importance of the matter] and lodged with CAV by 31 December 2017, then the agenda for the SGM and Special Resolution (including revised financial statement) have to be with members by 10 December … only three weeks away.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron (19 November 2017)
Questions asked on 12 November:
Can you please advise what the C’tee of 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc are now obligated to do with respect to the Assn’s 2017 financial statement as per the provisions of Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012?
If, because CAV has accepted the Annual report and there is no obligation under the Act, what obligation exists for the C’tee to meet CAV’s informal request to forward a revised financial statement?
If the only obligation on the C’tee is to meet the undertaking given to members that it would prepare a financial statement which met the requirements of the Act by 31 December 2017, what recourse is open to members if the C’tee either fails to do this or presents a financial statement which still does not meet the requirement of the Act?
Response …. “Your queries will be responded to as quickly as possible”.
———————————————————————————-
21 November 2017
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
Dear Tribunal Members,
At the recent hearing in Canberra, there was a suggestion that opposition from the Department of Defence to the UCG for unit service at the Battles of Coral and Balmoral being retrospectively awarded, may result in the UCG not being made.
The attached submission provides evidence that the regulations specified in the Prerogative Instrument (Letters Patent) do not allow the award of the UCG to be denied on this basis.
[Pity that no-one’s prepared to say (maybe they don’t care) whether or not the Coral Balmoral battlehonour was emblazoned on the 1AR Standard for the 100th Cambrai Day parade.]
———————————————————————————————————
20 November 2017
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
The final … sent off today to DHA, info DHAAT (I’m not expecting a reply)
Dear Ms Kropinksi-Meyers,
As the Director of Defence Honours and Awards, Admiral Griggs (acting Chief of the Defence Force) appointed you his representative in relation to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal’s (DHAAT’s) Inquiry into recognition for unit service at the Battles of Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral.
In his letter to the DHAAT of 1 September 2017 (attached) he states that Defence does not support the retrospective awarding of unit citations such as the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UCG), for units which served prior to 1991 (the year this award was introduced) because it “would be inappropriate to apply contemporary criteria to military activities which occurred almost half a century ago”.
As a matter of public interest, can I ask why?
If the contemporary criteria used to determine what is and what is not extraordinary gallantry today, cannot be used to make the same determination in respect to acts which occurred 50 years ago … changes to the criteria must have occurred over the intervening period. How then, is today’s definition of what constitutes extraordinary gallantry, different to that used 50 years ago?
In a unit context today, one would assume that collective action which involved an extremely high level of risk to lives in achieving an objective or in saving the lives of others, would be central to the concept of gallantry. Holding firm in the face of attacks by overwhelming numbers of enemy that had breached defences (or were about to breach defences),steadfastness in dire and/or desperate situations, outstanding and sustained bravery/performance which turned the tide of battle and influenced the result, would also seem to qualify in this regard.
Would the same criteria not have been used to assess gallantry 50 years ago (and for centuries before that)?
In October 2007, the then Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia His Excellency Major General Michael Jeffery presented the UCG to 4RAR (Commando) for gallantry in action during operations in Afghanistan in 2005/06. He referred to some of the characteristics of those receiving the award as being “initiative to a marked degree, physical and moral courage; personal and group discipline, and composure under pressure”.
If it is contemporary criteria that are described in the paragraphs above, can you please explain why it is inappropriate to apply them to military activities which occurred 50 years ago?
Many thanks,
————————————————————————————————–
19 November 2017
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
Any further thoughts before this is sent off … appreciated. (I think this is one of the worse cases I’ve seen of Defence abrogating its responsibilities to those who serve in/have served in, the ADF.)
Dear Ms Margot Kropinksi-Myers,
As the Director of Defence Honours and Awards, Admiral Griggs (acting Chief of the Defence Force) appointed you his representative in relation to the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal’s (DHAAT) Inquiry into recognition for unit service at the Battles of Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral.
In his letter to the DHAAT of 1 September 2017 (attached) he states that Defence does not support the retrospective awarding of unit citations such as the Unit Citation for Gallantry (UGC), for units which served prior to 1991 (the year this award was introduced) because it “would be inappropriate to apply contemporary criteria to military activities which occurred almost half a century ago”.
As a matter of public interest, can I ask why?
If the contemporary criteria used to determine what is and what is not extraordinary gallantry today, can’t be used to make the same determination in respect to acts which occurred 50 years ago … changes to the criteria must obviously have occurred over the intervening period. How then, is today’s definition of what constitutes extraordinary gallantry, different to that used 50 years ago?
In a unit context today, one would assume that collective action which involved an extremely high level of risk to lives in achieving an objective or in saving the lives of others, would be central. Holding firm in the face of attacks by overwhelming numbers of enemy that had breached defences (or were about to breach defences), would seem to qualify in this regard.
Was this not also the criteria used to assess extraordinary gallantry 50 years ago (and for centuries before that).? Can you please advise how contemporary criteria differs?
Many thanks,
———————————————————————————————————
18 November 2017
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
Following on from yesterday …
The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) received almost 180 submissions in favour of awarding units involved in the battles of Coral-Balmoral the Unit Citation for Gallantry. One might expect that one of these would have been from the ADF.
Admiral Griggs, Acting Chief of the Defence Force on 1 September 2017, advised the DHAAT that he believes that “it would be inappropriate to apply contemporary criteria to military activities which occurred almost half a century ago”.
Interestingly, two awards of the UCG have been made retrospectively: D Company, 6RAR (2010) and HMAS Yarra II (2014). The latter being for acts of extraordinary gallantry in action in 1942.
Is there a disconnection of some sort here? One might expect the CDF to support recognition of ADF members who display extraordinary gallantry, no matter when they did so. One might also expect the HOC RAAC to support recognition of RAAC members who display extraordinary gallantry, no matter when they did so.
While it is open to Defence not to support the award of a Unit Citation for Gallantry for the units involved in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral, it is not lawful for differing criteria to that contained in a prerogative instrument (the Letters Patent approved by HM The Queen for the UGC) to be used as the reason to deny an award (unless the prerogative instrument has been amended).
How is it that it comes to this (rather than honouring the sacrifices made)?
———————————————————————————————————
17 November 2017
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
Following on from 10 and 11 November …
Dear DHAAT,
Thank you for letting me see the Defence submission to the Tribunal.
I wish to offer the following comments:
1. C Squadron, 1 Armoured Regiment: “HQ Troop responsible for coordmation of defence at Coral; 1 Troop under operational control of 3 RAR; 2 Troop under operational control of 1 RAR”. There are two points here; firstly 1 Troop
was under opcon 1RAR and 2 Troop was under opcon 3RAR (not vice versa);
secondly (and most importantly) HQ Troop [Squadron Headquarters] was not
responsible for the defence at Coral. FSB Coral was a battalion defensive
position occupied by 1RAR, under command of the CO. General Sir Phillip
Bennett, AC, KBE, DSO (retd) will be able to confirm.
2. “The operation was conceived as a sweep through these provinces covering the northern approaches to Saigon in order to disrupt further attacks on the city and Bien Hoa/Long Binh military bases, and at the same time support local forces operating in the area.” The idea of the Operation being
thought of as a mobile sweep through a number of provinces, is misleading.
I’ve copied an extract from my history of Australian tank operations in
Vietnam at the end. This draws on HQ 1ATF’s Operational Order and describes
Operation Toan Thang in the context of the War at the time.
3. Admiral Griggs has stated that “Defence does not support the retrospective awarding of unit citations such as the Meritorious Unit Citation or the Unit Citation for Gallantry for units which served prior to 1991 (the year these awards were introduced).” While it is open to Defence
not to support the award of a Unit Citation for Gallantry for the units
involved in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral, it is not lawful for differing
criteria to that contained in a prerogative instrument (the Letters Patent
approved by HM The Queen) to be used as the reason to deny an award (unless
the prerogative instrument has been amended).
Legal opinion in regard to the above will be forwarded early next week.
‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘ p169:
“On the one hand, it might seem that the North Vietnamese had time on their
side; on the other, there was a limit to the losses that could be sustained.
Their strategy, therefore, depended on maintaining both military and
political pressure. This was the objective in May 1968, when Hanoi ordered
another uprising. Military action would again be directed at Saigon, the goal
being to influence the Peace Talks about to open in Paris.
Anticipating such an offensive, II Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) launched the
first phase of Operation Toan Thang (Complete Victory) at the end of April.
1ATF were called upon to deploy north into Bien Hoa Province to help protect
two key US facilities, the giant logistics base at Long Binh 6 and the
nearby Bien Hoa airforce base 7 (about 25km north-east of Saigon).
As the NVA/VC activity around Saigon unfolded, the Australians were ordered
to take up new positions some 40km north of the capital to ‘interdict enemy
withdrawal routes from the south and SW’. 8 II FFV expected that the enemy
would be moving away from the heavy fighting near Saigon in some disarray
and were likely to be ‘in small groups, may be disorganised or even lost,
and their morale will be low’. 9 1ATF units were surprised, therefore, when
they found themselves directly astride an established route used by 7 NVA
Division between War Zone D and Saigon. Another shock was that not all enemy
were withdrawing, and those that were, were not in disarray.”
Footnotes: 6 With 60,000 personnel and covering some 64 sq km, Long Binh
was the biggest US miltary base in Vietnam. HQ II FFV was located there. 7
Bien Hoa rivalled Tan Son Nhut [Saigon] as the busiest airport in the world at the time. 8 HQ 1ATF, OpO 19/68, 10 May 1968. AWM 95, 1/4/98. 9 Ibid
—————————————————————————-
16 November 2017
The AWM Ha Go Tank
Following on from 6 November … Rodger Tocock recently provided the following info…
This was passed to the AWM, along with the comment that “One might expect that a 1944 US Army manual giving details re Japanese Army equipment, would be correct. (Considerable effort went into ensuring that the Australian Army manuals concerning the ‘Enemy’ were accurate during the Vietnam War.)” The above manual is actually available in the AWM Collection: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/LIB139105
The AWM was asked if this reference, plus the research by Rod Ward (operation of the 37mm and role of tank ‘guides’, provided previously and copied again below) was cause for any rethink re four man crew?
“The main armament of this tank is a 37mm Type 94 tank gun. In the Ha-Go there is only the crew commander in the turret and the 37 mm gun is fired and loaded by the Crew Commander (CC). The gun is raised in elevation and depression by the movement of the CC’s right shoulder via a padded rest❶, the rest is mounted on the left of the gun. Traverse is achieved by moving his shoulder, left and right. The gun has 10 deg right and 10 deg left movement. The turret can also traverse with a gear/cog hand-wheel arrangement but the final traverse and laying of the gun are done by the movement of the CC’s body. The CC has to open the breech via a handle❷ on the right side of the gun using his right hand, he also will use his right hand to load the gun, the firing trigger is located on the left along with a telescopic sight”.
The response from AWM:
We were “provided hard evidence directly from Japan that our particular Type 95 Ha-Go tank (and its off-sider) were each manned by four Imperial Navy crew … they recorded four crew, per vehicle landed at Milne Bay. Despite how poor the crew were accommodated inside the confines of the Type 95 tank! Japanese (and Soviets in particular) did not factor crew comfort highly (two examples being the T-34 versus Sherman or Type 59/Type 54-5 tank versus Centurion).
Maybe the Imperial Navy tank crewmen were good contortionist’ who benefited from their naturally smaller physiques!”
The response to the AWM response:
“The Japanese crew manifest is not in dispute. It’s a matter of what the Petty Officer’s role was. They obviously weren’t crew commanders (they were shot, the POs survived).
Rod has provided the references which state that a fourth person (an experienced NCO) was allocated to the tank to act as a guide to assist the tank in its initial deployment. To ‘us’, a crewman is someone inside the vehicle. I think the AWM can differentiate between the two … drawing attention to the important role of the fourth person in doing so (this highlights limitations in the tank design).
The impression that the AWM gives at the moment, ie. there were two people in turret, is a nonsense (this is an important exhibit). Just ask those who were involved in the restoration of the AWM’s tank to show you where the two turret crew sat.
Please give some thought to this.
(Note. If there were two in the turret, if one is shot, the tank can still operate … there is no evidence of this happening; when the commander was shot, the tank was effectively ‘knocked out’.)
————————————————————————————-
15 November 2017
‘Dignified’ Snow Domes
Following on from 12 November …
Dr Brendan Nelson, AO (Director, Australian War Memorial)
Dear Dr Nelson,
Many congratulations on the fine work that the AWM has undertaken during your period as Director. Your leadership has been very evident in the fitting and dignified fashion in which the sacrifices of Australians who have died in war, have been commemorated.
In May 2013, you were interviewed by the Canberra Times in relation to promotional products to be sold at the AWM shop. You stated emphatically that “there will be no kitsch such as snow domes on sale”.
‘Magical look snow globes’ are currently stocked and promoted by the AWM shop. These feature ‘the Memorial building and a selection of icons which represent our permanent displays’. The icons are depicted with cartoon like eyes, similar to the imagery that Disney productions are known for.
One of the icons featured is a Centurion tank that was crewed by Australian soldiers during the Vietnam War. During the time I commanded it, our driver was wounded by shrapnel from an enemy anti-tank rocket. He was permanently disabled as a consequence. Trooper Peter Cadge was Mentioned in Despatches, when, despite his very serious head wounds, he endeavoured to go to the aid of the remainder of the crew who he believed were trapped in a burning tank.
It is hard to accept that the representation of the tank he was driving, as shown above, is a ‘fitting and dignified’ means of commemorating his service, his sacrifice, and the on-going suffering he continues to experience today. Of course, the consequential hardships involved are shared by his family.
Would you please consider removing the ‘magical look snow globe’ from the stock on sale at the AWM shop.
Many thanks for your consideration,
Yours sincerely …
———————————————————————————————————
14 November 2017
Vale: Graeme Smith
From Bill Noble:
It is with regret that I advise of the passing of 3794142 2Lt Graeme Smith. Graeme served with B Sqn 3 Cav Regt in 69/70. Graeme had been ill with liver failure for some months. I will notify funeral details later on when I receive them
Extracts from ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’:
At 10.45am on 21 May 1970, a combined armour/infantry force set out from the Horseshoe in search what was believed to be a camp being used by elements of D445. A Hoi Chanh helped guide them to the location, around 5km to the northeast. The infantry came from 7RAR: 1 Platoon A Company (Lieutenant Chris Johnson) and the Reconnaissance Platoon (Staff Sergeant Col Rowley). 2 Troop B Squadron 3 Cav provided the APC component: the Troop Officer, Second Lieutenant Graeme Smith, together with Sergeant John Pepper’s 23 Section. 3 Troop’s tanks completed the composition. In addition to Second Lieutenant Graeme Jones, crew commanders were Sergeant Barry Chambers (3Alpha); and Corporal Les Snelling (3Bravo). Sergeant Dennis McLean commanded the ARV (8Bravo). Riding on its rear deck were the mini-team: Sappers Stephen (Willie) Wilson and Robert (Butch) Marsden.
A moment frozen in Smith’s memory occurred at this point: as he was firing, his vehicle hit a paddy bund, which caused the .50cal suddenly to elevate. He immediately stopped firing, but was appalled when he realised that the rounds were heading straight for Grey’s [Lt Col, later Maj Gen, Ron Grey] helicopter. Greatly relieved, he “saw the last tracer go between the skid and the bubble of the Sioux”.
The APCs had now become targets as well. Smith continues: “We had wounded all around us and were boarding them, when an RPG impacted the front of the vehicle. This went through the trim vane, access panel and penetrated the engine. All hydraulic and drive power was gone; it also popped all the interior inspection panels, filling the ‘car’ with fumes and smoke; the next RPG hit nearby bamboo, the [resulting] airburst took off the antennas, no comms”. Smith used hand gestures to indicate to the closest APC, Corporal Jeff Swann (23Alpha) that he was OK, then similarly conveyed to Jones the need for the tanks to provide covering fire, while the wounded were being loaded.
“We were towed into the Dat, fitted overnight with a new power train, had the hole in the trim vane patched up, rearmed, and were back on deck at the Horseshoe next morning.”
———————————————————————————————-
13 November 2017
The Continuing Governance Saga
Dear [Dept of Justice]
Thank you very much for taking the time to respond to concerns raised by members of 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc (the ‘Assn’).
You say that [at the AGM] “members accepted the treasurer’s statement with a more accurate report to be presented to members by 31 December 2017“. You don’t specify, however, what members required a “more accurate report” to comprise.
It is clear from the Minutes that members called for a report which meets the “requirements of a financial statement as per the Act”, ie a report that gives a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the Assn during and at the end of its last financial year; and has attached to it a certificate in the prescribed form signed by two members of the C’tee certifying that that is the case.
Given that the report presented did not cover the whole financial year, did not detail the nature of any expenditure (approx $47,000), and was not certified by members of the C’tee, this would seem a reasonable request.
In essence, the report presented did not meet the requirements of the Act and members stated that they wanted to be presented with one which did.
Following the meeting, members contacted CAV and asked what needed to happen to ensure that relevant governance requirements were met. We were advised (by Aaron among others) that, as the report did not meet the requirements of the Act, CAV would not be able to accept its lodgement via MyCav.
What had to happen, we were told, was that the C’tee had to apply (using the form on the CAV website) for an extension of time to lodge the Assn’s annual report. When the financial statement was finalised, it had to be presented to members via a special resolution at a Special General Meeting (SGM), and, when approved, the Assn’s annual report had to be submitted to CAV by 31 December 2017.
This information was provided to the C’tee with a reminder that 21 days notice was required to be given to members for the SGM. At this stage, we thought that everything was proceeding as it should (which is all that members wanted, ie. governance of the Assn in accordance with the Act).
Suddenly, however, everything changed. At the instigation of CAV, the C’tee lodged the Annual Report via MyCav, making a false declaration to say that the financial details were correct and covered the whole year. There was no longer any requirement for a special resolution. Members who wanted nothing more than to see governance in compliance with the Act, were left ‘speechless’.
Paradoxically, CAV has accepted an Annual Report which does not meet the requirements of the Act (when the members required one which did). This being the case, there does not now seem to be any obligation (under the Act) for the Assn to complete a Financial Statement in accordance with the Act and present it to members.
Can you please advise what the C’tee of 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc are now obligated to do with respect to the Assn’s 2017 financial statement as per the provisions of Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012?
If, because CAV has accepted the Annual report and there is no obligation under the Act, what obligation exists for the C’tee to meet CAV’s informal request to forward a revised financial statement?
If the only obligation on the C’tee is to meet the undertaking given to members that it would prepare a financial statement which met the requirements of the Act by 31 December 2017, what recourse is open to members if the C’tee either fails to do this or presents a financial statement which still does not meet the requirement of the Act?
Many thanks for your consideration …
———————————————————————————————
12 November 2017
‘Dignified’ Snow Domes.
Following on from 27 October …
In May 2013, the Director of the AWM, Dr Nelson, was interviewed by the Canberra Times in relation to promotional products to be sold at the AWM shop. Extracts from the article are copied below.
‘Anzac promo gear to hit the shelves at AWM’[http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/anzac-promo-gear-to-hit-the-shelves-at-awm-20130523-2k2of.html]
The Australian War Memorial is gearing up to sell a special range of promotional merchandise during the centenary of ANZAC.
However, there will be no kitsch such as snow domes on sale, according to memorial director Brendan Nelson.
“I don’t think you are going to see fluffy slippers or beach towels produced by the Australian War Memorial.”
“At this stage, we haven’t got clear ideas about what kind of things we will produce but I can assure you and your readersthey will be dignified and appropriate to the nature of the commemorations.”
The merchandising strategy was suggested by the Anzac Centenary Advisory Board in its report on suitable commemorations.
The government accepted the proposal for the sale of a “small, appropriate range of official merchandise that upholds the dignity” of the centenary.
————————————————————————————————
Although Dr Nelson was speaking in relation to merchandise connected with the centenary of ANZAC, one would expect that standards in terms of what is dignified and what is kitsch would be maintained across all promotional material. It appears, however, that this has not happened.
“This magical look snow globe from the Australian War Memorial features the Memorial building and a selection of icons which represent our permanent displays”
The item is described as “Water ball: Centurian tank”. (Nice eyes … pity about the spelling).
I think I feel a letter to Dr Nelson coming on.
——————————————————————————————————–
11 November 2017
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
Following on from yesterday … I’ve been told that the previous C’tee was “too tied up with constitutional rubbish” to lodge a submission. My response is described below.
I believe that:
(i) … one of the most important duties of any Executive C’tee is not to allow themselves to be sidetracked with ‘rubbish’. They must allocate priorities as to how their time is spent;
(ii) … if a C’tee finds that it has too many priority tasks to be able to undertake, it should ask for help. This can be done by appointing assistants to members of the C’tee, eg. asst sec; or by simply asking for volunteers.
(iii) … in April 2017 when submissions were called in support of the award of a UGC for units at Coral-Balmoral; the C’tee could have:
asked the RAAC Corp Inc if they were putting forward a submission … if so, offer to contribute re 1AR aspects; if not, undertake a submission on behalf of the Assn;
either way, the C’tee could then have used its communication links with its members (eg, newsletter, Facebook, email, Forum etc) to ask for contributions from members as to whether or not 1AR tank crews displayed extraordinary gallantry at Coral-Balmoral.
Two telephone calls or emails, that’s all. Will we be able to manage such a challenge differently in the future (or will we just ignore it again).
There is still time for those who wish to step up to the plate with respect to Coral-Balmoral. I’ve suggested some things which need to be done below.
Paratus (which means …?)
The Next Step…
What has to be done by those who want this award to be made (and those who profess to represent them) is that a case has to put forward to convince the Minister and the Trinunal why the units that participated in the Battles of Coral-Balmoral should be granted a retrospective Unit Gallantry Citation as a priority above all others, eg units that participated in the Battle of Kapyong.
Having done that, a further case must be made to convince both that granting such a retrospective award will not damage the integrity of the present Honours and Awards system (eg. will not set a precedent which will be impossible to set a limit on as far as other applications are concerned … the question already being bandied around is: ‘How far back do we go?’).
I think that both cases can be successfully argued (and I will attempt to do so for my small part). What the RAAC Corporation Inc (perhaps its ‘Advisory Board’) could do is liaise with people like Jack Parr (RA Inf) and George Hulse (RAE), the other Associations, and Coral-Balmoral veterans. Collectively, together with media attention, they could mount overwhelming arguments to counter challenges raised in terms of the above.
These arguments should be delivered to the Defence Honours and Awards Directorate and Tribunal in the first instance. If Defence maintain their position of not supporting retrospective awards, the arguments should be referred to the Minister.
Then it will be a matter of waiting for the Tribunal to make its recommendations and for the Minister to consider them and announce his decision accordingly.
——————————————————————————————
10 November 2017 (Gremlins struck yesterday, post redone)
Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC): Canberra Hearing
I attended the Canberra hearing yesterday as an observer. I was permitted to comment on some of the things which were stated in presentations which I believed needed clarification.
Regimental associations will be able to provide significant help to Defence in identifying those who were actually involved in the Coral-Balmoral battles (indeed much of this work has already been done);
Battlehonours are awarded to corps which close with and engage the enemy (armour, infantry and aviation). 1 Armd Regt was prevented from emblazoning Coral-Balmoral because of a limit imposed by the Ceremonial Manual. Minister Tehan overturned this earlier this year. (The two battlehonours initially emblazoned were Hat Dich and Binh Ba. No battlehonour awarded for Operation Hammersley.)
It is generally recognized that awards should have been made to a number of tank crewmen involved in Coral-Balmoral actions. When asked why this did not happen, the tank squadron OC stated that everyone was just thought to have been doing their job; there was no benchmark to distinguish extraordinary gallantry. (Peter Phillips, who was present for the first session, explained to me that he was a member of the End of War Honours Tribunal … but the only cases they could consider were those for which recommendations had been submitted at the time.)
There was a suggestion that Brigadier Hughes had no part in bringing the tanks forward to Coral. In fact, while Col Dunstan gave the order, Brig Hughes had already given the Tank Sqn OC a warning order to be prepared to move (which explains why they were able to depart so quickly).
All the presentations which were made, focused on fighting associated with the defense of FSBs Coral and Balmoral. It must be noted that there were a number of actions outside the FSBs and these also involved extraordinary gallantry.
Personal Point to Finish. It is to be hoped that if a Unit Gallantry Award is to be made, that the insignia will be made available to the NOK of those who were KIA or who DOW as a result of the battles (unlike the Army Combat Badge criteria which denied the badge to NOK because it was classed by Defence as a ‘dress embellishment’ to save money).
Postscript. The Tribunal accepted a copy of my book for use as a reference.
Issues Confronting the Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) re the Coral-Balmoral Unit Gallantry Citation (UGC)
It is not just a matter of merit (ie. the award being deserved). The Tribunal could find that this is the case, but might still not be able to recommend the UGS. On the other hand, the Tribunal could recommend that the award be made, but the Minister might not accept the recommendation.
The matter of merit is unlikely to be successfully challenged (though some of the submissions to the Tribunal have attempted to do so). So how is it possible that the Tribunal could not recommend that the award not be made? One of the Terms of Reference is “In making its findings and formulating its recommendations the Tribunal is to maintain the integrity of the Australian honours system and identify any consequential impact [that] any finding or recommendation may have on that system”.
The view held by the Department of Defence Honours and Awards Directorate (which represents Defence as a whole and is separate to the Tribunal) is that the integrity of the Honours and Awards system would be damaged if a retrospective approval was given for an award for an action, when that award did not exist at the time that the action took place. In particular, how can an award for one action (eg. Coral-Balmoral, Vietnam) be justified and another (eg. Kokoda, WWII) be denied?
Leaving the above aside, for the moment … there is another issue confronting the DHAAT. By definition, the UGC is awarded to a unit. If a UGC is awarded for Coral-Balmoral, which ‘unit’ is it to be awarded to? If all those personnel involved in Coral-Balmoral are to be considered to have displayed extraordinary gallantry (the basis for the award) are they to be considered to have belonged to 1ATF … and 1ATF as a whole awarded the UGC? The Tribunal accepts that all of 1ATF was not involved, only part. This part might be referred to as 1ATF(-) or 1ATF (Forward). If the UGC was awarded on this basis, those units (or sub-units) comprising, say, 1ATF(-) would be eligible for the UGC.
For C Sqn 1 Armd Regt this is straight forward, ie. the majority of the Sqn was present; those personnel involved would be eligible to receive the citation insignia and those members of C Sqn 1 Armd Regt serving today would be eligible to wear the ‘legacy’ insignia. What about someone from 8 Pet Pl who was present, how is he/his unit acknowledged? This might be able to addressed by grouping such personnel/units together under the title TFMA (although this was not a ‘unit’ as such).
Going back to the elephant in the room …. retrospectivity. Unit definition is not an issue if the UGC is not recommended on the basis that such an award would damage the integrity of the Honours and Awards system, ie. if the Tribunal accepts the argument put forward by Defence. This can be countered and a valid case can be put forward to say that an exception can be justified in the case of Coral-Balmoral. I won’t advocate that here at the moment, suffice to say … letters to the Minister might well be need.
This is especially so, as the RAAC Corporation cannot advocate in opposition to the RAAC HOC and the RAAC HOC cannot advocate in opposition to Defence. We’re on our own you could say …
9 November 2017
A Lone Voice in Support of Armour (it was ever thus, or so it seems)
Dear Editor,
Nicholas Stuart is to be congratulated for drawing attention to Defence matters. Unfortunately, the credibility of his latest article (“Terrible defence policy”, November 8, p16) suffers through a lack of evidence. The assertion that both an amphibious capability and an armoured force cannot be maintained, is one example. If these capabilities are perceived as unsuited to emerging threats, this is wrong. Neither is geared solely to conventional conflict, quite the opposite.
An element of defence policy overlooked is that of warning times for threats to emerge and lead times for defence capabilities to be developed. Core skills have to be maintained as a basis for contingency planning. Defence industry and equipment policies cannot be viewed as political footballs, they underpin operational planning and the ADF’s degree of readiness.
In a previous article (“Defence’s age-old habit of buying duds”, 1 November) Mr Stuart asserted that Army’s planned Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle (CRV) “won’t be able to do the job”. He claimed that it would snag low-slung electricity wires and only one bridge in Timor-Leste could accept its weight.
In fact, the CRV is lower than Centurion tanks operated successfully in Vietnam (even with radio antennae protruding two metres above the turret). While half the bridges in Timor-Leste are less than 10m wide, well within Army’s bridging capability, an advantage of a CRV is that it is not confined to roads. The tag of ‘dud’ Mr Stuart applies to Defence policy and equipment procurement is inappropriate on the basis of evidence presented.
—————————————————————————————-
8 November 2017
Bullying and Personal Attacks in Public Forums
The extract below is from the President’s Report in the November 1AR Assn newsletter:
“I would also like to reflect on my comments in the August newsletter regarding member behaviour. You’ll recall that a non-negotiable for me is individual member commitment to assist ‘righting of the ship’ with positive respectful conduct with no vested interests apart from the long term survivability of the Association.
Unfortunately, there remains a small group who continue to resort to bullying and personal attacks in public forums which is unacceptable behaviour in any Australian workplace or household. Poor behavioural traits do little other than damage the reputation of the individual who initiates the poor behaviour. Let me close by reiterating my comments that such behaviour has no place in this Association!”
What are these “public forums” in which “bullying and personal attacks” are made?
Could one be the 1AR Assn Members Only Facebook page? Presumably not, apart from being a closed forum, the C’tee has appointed a moderator to ensure that an appropriate standard of debate is maintained (and the 1AR Assn is not liable for defamation action). This forum is under the control of the C’tee.
Could one be the 1AR Assn Social Page Facebook page? Again, presumably not, as the behaviour of users is subject to the control of the C’tee.
Could one be the 1AR Past and Present Facebook page or the Tango and Tango Alpha Facebook page? While the ‘Admins’ of the former are unknown, Trevor Hyde, the moderator of the latter, bans both on his site.
So is it the 1AR Past and Present site that is being referred to by the President … or is it individual Facebook pages? I don’t use social media sites such as Facebook, so I can’t comment. The content on the Past and Present site does not appear to breach social conventions. What constitutes personal attacks is reasonably straightforward; for example, the published Minutes of the 1AR Assn 2017 AGM contained defamatory material and have had to be amended by the C’tee.
‘Bullying’ is a concept open to interpretation, however. One definition is: Bullyingis an ongoing misuse of power that causes physical and/or psychological harm.Is holding someone accountable, bullying? A member of the 1AR Assn C’tee was reported in the Minutes of an AGM as not having prepared a report for the meeting. It was stated that he would do so later in writing. After some months had passed, I asked the person if he had submitted his report. He said that he “had NTR then and had NTR now“. When I made this known, he accused me of bullying him.
Maybe the President is referring to this Forum. If so, I am certain that there are no personal attacks among these pages, but, if the above is bullying, then I am guilty. As I have stated time and time again, if anyone can find something which is wrong or unjustified, I will immediately remove it and apologise. I will not refrain, however, from raising issues of accountability. These include failure to meet the requirements of the Constitution and the Act under which the Assn is regulated. Should a false declaration be made, it will not go unchallenged (as is currently happening).
7 November 2017
Coral-Balmoral Commemoration
Hi Greg [President, 1AR Assn Inc]
Congratulations on another great newsletter.
I notice that you say that: “the DVA Committee only provides for a single RAAC representative and that the 1AR and 3 Cav (Vietnam) Associations jointly agreed for the RAAC Corporation to represent their respective interests at the DVA Committee”.
It seems that what you’re saying is that DVA (presumably David Chalmers) made a decision to allow infantry units to be represented on an individual basis (ie. 1RAR and 3RAR), but not the RAAC units. Furthermore, should individual representation have been requested, this would have been refused. The latter is surprising, given that the TPI Assn was not represented initially and DVA allowed a representative to join the Committee when asked.
At the last Coral-Balmoral commemoration organised by DVA (which included a function in the Great Hall, Parliament House) the APC Troop Leader at Coral (Bruce Richards) was asked why he was there. It seems that the role of the APCs was so understated in the lead up, that it was almost unknown. The same used to be evident at the AWM where the list of weaponry that contributed to the defensive fire at Coral, omitted reference to the firepower of the APCs. (This was amended after my representation.)
The Chairman of the RAAC Corporation Inc has stated that “I was contacted by DVA on 16 August and informed that as the Corporation was the overarching RAAC ESO entity, I was now a member of the Coral-Balmoral Commemorative C’ttee”. The Chairman also stated that he asked a member of the RAAC Corporation Advisory Committee to assist you in meeting the 1 Armd Regt Assn Inc’s obligations to the DVA Committee, “because of your work commitments“. (Presumably you decided that no member of the Assn was capable of this task.)
The horse has bolted, nevertheless (possibly for consideration ‘next time’) I would like to suggest that the best RAAC representation on the DVA Coral-Balmoral Commemorative Committee would have been that provided by 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Regt veterans of the Battles. This would be equivalent to the representation granted to the RA Inf.
Best wishes Bruce Cameron
———————————————————————————————————
6 November 2017
The Ha Go Tank Story Continues.
Following on from 31 October 2017 ….
AWM Response
Good afternoon Mr Cameron,
Firstly thank you for your compliments regarding the Type 95 Ha-Go tank that we now have on display in Anzac Hall.
In the very involved process that my good colleagues and I here at the Memorial did in researching this vehicle we liaised closely with a range of Australian and international experts, historians and ‘enthusiasts’ all with an interest in this subject.
Most modern secondary sources and internet sources propose that the Ha-Go was crewed by three. However, much of this information lacks any detail as to its source and can be regarded as supposition only, based on Western notions of crew space and comfort. The following three sources indicate that the crew was indeed four:
The single biggest piece of information that were given came from Japan via the Australian Defence Force attaché to our embassy in Tokyo. Being an expert linguist with a passion for Japanese wartime operations against Australia he provided us a transcription of the nominal roll of the actual tank crewmen who operated the two Type 95 Ha-Go tanks at Milne Bay.
Kure No.5 Special Landing Force Tank crews
Tank Crew
Fate
No.1 Detachment
Petty Officer 1st Class Ishigami
Survived
Naminaka
Killed 31 Aug 1942
Tanabe
Killed 28 Aug 1942
Emura
Killed 31 Aug 1942
No.2 Detachment
Petty Officer 1st Class Itō
Survived
Hashimoto
Killed 31 Aug 1942
Shiokawa
Killed 25 Oct 1944
Yamaguchi
Survived
Source : Okada, T., Nyūginia no Bohyō (New Guinea Tombstone), Sōei Shuppan, Tokyo, 1998, pp. 23-24.
Two other significant pieces of information were also found (I have placed in bold that both reports cite crew of 4) :
Research and Development Division, Directorate of AFV Production Melbourne. Report on Examination of Japanese Light Tank. February 1943. Those undertaking the assessment were unsure of the crew numbers, as the tank has only one seat, but thought : “Crew: Presumablyfour persons., ie Commander Gunner and Loader Machine gunner in turret, Driver and Machine Gunner at front”.( p 3. ) “The turret is so cramped that it would be virtually impossible to load and fire the turret machine gun and the main armament at the same time”.( P34)
Allied Land Forces Headquarters SWPA Technical Intelligence Summary No 4 July 1943 p14 came to the same conclusion : “Crew: Presumably four persons, that is Commander Gunner and Loader Machine gunner in turret, Driver and Machine Gunner at front”
While the two contemporary sources essentially repeated themselves in respect of crew information, the two reports covered much different analytical ground and together formed part of what can only be described as the most comprehensive and authoritative analysis ever undertaken of the tank’s structure, performance and ergonomics.
Until assisting (in a minor role I must add) with this Type 95 Ha-Go project I too was under the impression that these Ha-Go tanks were crewed by three not four.
Having been shown the evidence above by one of my colleagues here (who is currently deployed to the Middle East to collect items and so forth for the AWM) I changed my mind. It is obviously a very cramped environment of course and as you know with your service in Centurions in South Vietnam, the tropical heat and humidity inside would be extremely uncomfortable.
I trust that this information is helpful to you with your enquiry on the issue of crew numbers of our captured Imperial Japanese Navy Type 95 Ha-Go tank from Milne Bay.
My Reply to the AWM
Thanks for the information above.
There are two issues: (i) is there room in the turret for a commander and gunner?; and (ii) what role did the fourth person (the petty Officer?) listed in the crews below actually have?
Re the turret, Mr Rod Ward (former Centurion crewman in Vietnam) has researched this and advises:
“The main armament of this tank is a 37mm Type 94 tank gun. In the Ha-Go there is only the crew commander in the turret and the 37 mm gun is fired and loaded by the Crew Commander (CC). The gun is raised in elevation and depression by the movement of the CC’s right shoulder via a padded rest❶, the rest is mounted on the left of the gun. Traverse is achieved by moving his shoulder, left and right. The gun has 10 deg right and 10 deg left movement. The turret can also traverse with a gear/cog hand-wheel arrangement but the final traverse and laying of the gun are done by the movement of the CC’s body. The CC has to open the breech via a handle❷ on the right side of the gun using his right hand, he also will use his right hand to load the gun, the firing trigger is located on the left along with a telescopic sight.”
He can forward you links to all the references should you wish. The above statement is made on multiple assessments of the fighting arrangements in the tank, post WWII. The fact the information you quote is from 1943, is, I believe, relevant. The two man turret was the ‘norm’ at the time. The fact that there was only one seat was surprising to those examining the turret … hence the two man configuration was given the caveat “presumably”.
Re the role of the fourth crew member. Mr Ward was located a source which refers to the tanks having a specially trained NCO to guide as a guide to assist them move to the forming up place prior to an attack being launched. Is it not likely that this was the role of the Petty Officer within the Naval Special Landing Force. This person would also be responsible to guiding them off the barge and onto the beach. See http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/2917/rec/2 Page 100 for the guide duties and p25 for Ha Go crew.
The Ha Go crew functions are also listed in the book below.
Postscript. It’s interesting to see the Japanese soldier standing on the tank in the top photo. Perhaps this was the ‘fourth’ crewman, ie, allocated NCO/guide.
————————————————————————————-
5 October 2017
2/14 QMI LHR : ACR Tank Sqn?
Following on from yesterday … Bruce Scott drew attention to the following article on the Net:
An Australian Army M1A1 Abrams Tank from the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry), 7th Combat Brigade fires its main gun during a live fire practice at Shoalwater Bay Training Area as part of Exercise Diamond Run 2017.
Content includes the following extracts:
Tanks from 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) participated in live-fire exercise at Shoalwater Bay Training Area this week.
This was the first time 7th Brigade has employed its newly acquired M1A1 Abrams tanks on exercise.
Brisbane’s 7th Brigade is employing its newly acquired M1A1 Abrams Tanks on exercise for the first time marking the realisation of the Australian Army’s Plan Beersheba.
Exercise Diamond Run involves five M1A1 Abram main battle tanks conducting both live-fire and dry-run combined-arms training at Shoalwater Bay Training Area.
Commander 7th Brigade Brigadier Anthony Rawlins said that while the brigade had operated with tanks in the past, tanks had never been part of the brigade’s normal inventory.
“Tanks provide the firepower, protection and communications enabling the combat brigade to be heavy hitting on the battlefield, so it’s very exciting,” Brigadier Rawlins said.
“It also reaffirms the capability of Army to maintain the heavy combat power of a ‘Beersheba brigade’ in a suburban base in Enoggera, which is very important, and the Brisbane community is really excited about it.
“This marks the logical conclusion of a transformational project that allows us to position Army in the contemporary battle space as both relevant and decisive.”
The incorporation of tanks into 7th Brigade is an important milestone for the Australian Army as it marks the conclusion of Plan Beersheba, a significant restructure of Australia’s three combat brigades.
More than 1600 soldiers are taking part in the exercise which runs from 14 October to 8 November.
It looks like a three tank troop has been positioned at Enoggera so that 7 Bde can get some inf tank training. (Then again, as mentioned yesterday, this might only be a temporary measure.)
If a full tank squadron was to be established at 2/14, the limited numbers of tanks held at present would mean three tank sqns of three tank troops, each of three ranks, across the three ACRs. (This means something like 33 tanks in the sqns, 9 at SOA, 4 at RTC and 4 repair pools of 3 tanks). When, and if, the fleet gets to 90, complete tank sqns would be able to be fielded.
Callsigns
One of the callsigns seen on the 2/14 tanks was 31. Is C Sqn standardised throughout the three ACRs as the tank squadron? It would make sense if it was.
———————————————————————————————
4 October 2017
2/14 QMI LHR : ACR Tank Sqn?
“Brisbane’s 7th Brigade has only recently been issued with tanks – marking one of the final components of the Australian Army’s Plan Beersheba and the realisation of the final Armoured Calvary Regiment”. Contact Magazine, 25 October 2017
According to the 4/19 PWLH Assn newsletter, the photo below (of an Abrams arriving at Enoggera as part of the ACR tank squadron, was on the 2/14 QMI Assn website.
So is the 2/14 tank sqn being formed or is this ‘fake news’? One indicator is that the photos are no longer on the 2/14 QMI website. If it was true, two issues would have had to have been resolved: (i) the number of Abrams would have been increased and (ii) a decision would have been made to locate them in Brisbane not in proximity to a Shoalwater Bay Training Area (SWTA).
Are the Abrams at Enogerra really part of the 2/14 QMI tank sqn or are they tanks prelocated in order to take part in last weekend’s parade?
2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Beersheba with a mounted Freedom of Entry March into Brisbane City on Saturday, 28 October, starting at 10am.
The parade will involve more than 150 soldiers, 20 horses and the largest procession of armoured military vehicles ever seen in Brisbane, with more than 60 vehicles including three of the Regiment’s new M1A1 Abrams tanks. Is this true, or will the three Abrams be returning to 2 Cav Regt or elsewhere.
The Missing Ninety
Current Abrams fleet numbers (59) were based on a single armoured regiment with two tank squadrons. The ORBAT has changed, however. We now have three ACRs, with a tank squadron each. Even with each squadron restricted to three tank troops, the present fleet is too small to provide for SOA, RTC, and repair pool need (exasperated because of the new geographical spread involved). The following article states that Army wants another 90 Abrams: http://www.afr.com/news/special-reports/defence-and-national-security/armys-plans-for-more-and-better-tanks-20170303-guqamb
It’s unclear, however, as to whether LAND 907 (Initial Abrams purchase, plus upgrade) or LAND 8160 (engineering and breaching capability) are to be supplemented to meet the need. Indeed, it’s unclear as the whether financial provision has been made at all.
The Road to Rocky
An extract from a recent Bulletin article (29 August 2017) explains the state of play
KEEPING Matt Canavan as a senator has become even more important to Central Queensland.
The Rockhampton-based politician, whose parliamentary future remains in limbo pending an October High Court decision on his dual citizenship issue, is backing the relocation of an armoured regiment from Brisbane to Rockhampton.
That is a big step up from Senator Canavan’s position following last year’s election when he only supported the transfer of an armoured vehicle maintenance section here (up to 40 staff).
To move a regiment would mean about 500 personnel and their families moving to Rockhampton in a major boost to the local economy.
“I fully support the relocation of a tank regiment here,” Senator Canavan said in an interview in Rockhampton last week.
“That would be hundreds of personnel: not just maintenance staff, but all the operators should all be based up here.
“If I was made defence minister tomorrow, that would be the first thing to do. I’m not going to make promises I can’t keep but that’s what I’d be fighting for.”
He said Capricornia MP Michelle Landry also supported the push.
He didn’t name the regiment but the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment (Queensland Mounted Infantry) is located in Brisbane and is a regiment of the Australian Army and forms part of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps.
Senator Canavan said the first step would still be moving the maintenance staff to Rockhampton.
He said to move transport vehicles “back and forwards from Brisbane every time” there was a Shoalwater Bay exercise was “ridiculous”.
He said the transfer of the full unit to CQ was now a priority.
“I’ll be pushing this case,” he said. “That’s my position.”
But he said Central Queenslanders could not expect the process to be a quick one.
“It’s not going to happen in the next year or even two. You have to be realistic about what you can achieve in politics,” he said.
“We can’t move people out of their homes in a matter of months, but long term we should be looking to get the whole regiment up here. Why not?
Even More on Good Governance Following on from yesterday …
Dear Mr Stevens,
Thanks for making time to discuss the issues members of 1 Armd Regt Assn Inc are concerned about and for referring these to the Department’s legal counsel.
I hope you’ll understand that with a prominent not-for-profit organization like the RSL being able to circumvent regulations concerning the misuse of members funds, we’re keen to ensure the regulatory oversight of our association is such that it would be impossible for the same thing to occur, either now or in the future.
We can understand why the Act requires that two members of the committee certify that that the financial statement gives a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the association during and at the end of its last financial year. Most ordinary members would not be familiar with financial accounting and would rely on the Committee’s assurances in this regard. The fact that the financial information did not cover the full period of the financial year and was not certified by the Committee were obvious concern to members when they read the minutes of the AGM.
As you know, many of us are also concerned about the false declaration given when the assn’s Annual Statement was lodged via MyCav, ie. “The financial statements for the financial year ending [30 June 2017] were submitted to members of the association at that annual general meeting”. This, of course, did not happen as the financial statements presented to members only covered part of the FY.
We acknowledge that your instructions were well intended when you directed the Secretary to submit the assn’s Annual statement via the MyCav website (resulting in the false declaration as above).
Given that you would have inadvertently breached the Act as below, you may wish to consider the possibility that someone else might have to oversee the legal aspects associated with this matter.
208 False and misleading statements (1) A person must not, in a document referred to in subsection (6), make or authorise the making of a statement that the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular.
———————————————————————————————————
2 November 2017
Even More on Good Governance
The following request was submitted to Consumer Affairs (Victoria (CAV) yesterday. Response is awaited.
Dear Mr Stevens,
This is a follow up request to those I submitted to CAV on 30 October (C2017/10/013551 and C2107/10/01350)
The CAV website states that the 1st Armoured Regiment Assn Inc lodged its Annual statement on 23 October 2017. I understand that CAV encouraged the Secretary to do this after examining the minutes of the Assn AGM.
When preparing my earlier requests, I wasn’t aware of what information had to be presented via the MyCav lodgement process. I am now aware of this and would welcome the opportunity to speak to you about the implications of what has happened.
The Annual Statement declaration requires that the Secretary to declare that the financial details are (i) for 12 months and (ii) as presented to members at the AGM. (CAV warns those making an Annual Statement that such a declaration is Legal and Binding.)
Now we come to the problem. Both (i) and (ii) can’t be correct, only one or the other.
The financial statement presented to members at the Assn AGM was for 11 months only. The month of June was not included and the Bank statement was as at 31 May 17. Either the information provided was for 11 months, or it was amended to 12 months, but not presented to members.
This means that a false declaration has been made. (No information was presented to members at the AGM re Gross Assets, so unless that box was left blank on the Annual Statement, the extent of the false declaration is compounded.)
Can you advise how this matter should be resolved please.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
——————————————————————————————–
1 November 2017
Letter to the Canberra Times
“Nicholas Stuart is to be congratulated for drawing attention to important defence matters (‘Defence has painful old habit of buying duds”, Letters, 1 November). To be credible, however, the facts on which he bases his conclusions have to be valid.
His assessment that the likely contender for Army’s new Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle “won’t be able to do the job”, is based on four ‘facts’: the Dutch had the vehicle, but decided not to use it in Afghanistan; its height means that it will snag low-slung electricity wires of countries in our region; only one bridge in Timor-Leste can accept its weight; and it cannot be loaded direct onto the Navy’s amphibious assault ship (LHD) because of the ship’s ramp angle.
Closer inspection reveals a different story. The Netherlands Task Force withdrew from Afghanistan in 2010, three years before it received its new armoured vehicles. To fill the gap, the Dutch placed an urgent order for Australian Bushmasters. The height of the vehicle is less than that of Centurion tanks operated by Australia in Vietnam. These had radio antennae which protruded another two metres above the turret, but operations were not impeded by low hanging wires. While half the bridges in Timor-Leste are less than 10m wide, well within Army’s ability to cross, the advantage of an off-road vehicle is that it is not confined to roads. The ramp angle of the LHD can be compensated for without difficulty.
The tag of ‘dud’ seems inappropriate on the basis of evidence presented.”
—————————————————————————
31 October 2017
The Ha Go Tank Story
Following on from blog posts 9 September 2015 and 8 October 2017, this email has been sent to the AWM:
The vehicle now on display is a real credit to the professional skill of all those who were involved.
The AWM Fact Sheet for the tank (on the website) states that it had a crew of “4 – Driver, Machine gun operator, gunner and commander”.
This is contrary to many other references which state that the commander operated the armament (ie. the tank had a crew of three, with only one person in the turret).
Would it be possible to forward this email to the conservation team to ask them if they can confirm that it is a two man turret on this particular tank.
An explanation for the AWM’s four man crew belief has recently been uncovered by Rod Ward (C Sqn ’71). He has located a US Army reference from 1945 entitled
“Japanesetank and antitankwarfare, SpecialSeries, no. 34”
This states (p100) that specially trained NCOs would guide each tank to preliminary attack positions. Given that the Ha Go tanks at Milne Bay were operated by the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force, it is conceivable that each tank had an additional person assigned to it to fulfill various functions associated with landing and movement ashore. Actual crew duties are described at p25.
The AWM summary of the Milne Bay action is copied below.
During August 1942 the Japanese attempted to capture the Milne Bay area in New Guinea, which was to be used as a staging point for their planned advance and capture of Port Moresby. Between 25-29 August 1942, two Type 95 tanks, singly or in pairs, were used to attack the Australian positions around Milne Bay. During the night of 25-26 August a small group of Australians from 61 Battalion (AMF) were attacked by one Type 95 tank with infantry support. The Australians managed to kill the commander when he stuck his head out of the cupola whilst negotiating a log bridge.
On the night of 27 August, two Type 95 tanks attacked Australian positions which were defended by elements of 2/10 Infantry Battalion. The tanks were seemingly impervious to Australian small arms fire, and using their headlights to see and support each other, cruised among the positions, machine gunning and attempting to run over individuals. This action caused the Australians to retreat to Homo Creek and later to Gama. Later that night the Japanese attacked other Australian positions defended by 2/10 Battalion. As the Japanese advanced, Corporal JFP O’Brien engaged this tank with his .55 calibre Boys anti- tank rifle.
Corporal O’Brien was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his actions. Another encounter was met by elements of 25 Battalion (AMF) who faced the tanks when the retreating 2/10 Battalion passed through them. The tanks pressed the advance, forcing 25 Battalion to withdraw as well. Finally, on 29 August, patrolling Australians found both Japanese tanks bogged and abandoned. They were sent to Australia for scientific assessment.
—————————————————————————————————-
30 October 2017
Even More on Good Governance
The following request was submitted to Consumer Affiars (Victoria (CAV) yesterday. Response is awaited.
Dear Mr Stevens, [Senior Regulatory Officer]
This is a follow up request to that I submitted to CAV earlier today [below] C2017/10/013551)
I understand that you’ve advised the Secretary of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association that the financial document submitted to members at the AGM on 8 July 2017 is acceptable to CAV in terms of the Assn meeting its annual reporting requirements. This is the case, even though the requirements of the Act were not met in terms of what constitutes a financial statement, ie. it did not cover the whole financial year, did not state the purpose for which funds had been expended and was not certified as being a true and correct statement in any manner at all.
There now seems to be two possibilities, either
(1) If the above is correct … all the Assn has to do is present an updated financial statement to its members by 31 December 2017 (as called for in the AGM Minutes); or
(2) If the piece of paper presented to members at the AGM (which can’t be deemed a financial statement) is not accepted by CAV, then the Assn C’tee must finalise the Financial Statement, certify it, and present it to members as a special resolution for approval at a Special General Meeting. This has to be timed to ensure that the financial statement is able to be lodged with the Registrar before 31 December 2017.
Can you please advise which option CAV has regulated should occur.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
————————————————————————–
29 October 2017
More on Governance Issues
Dear CAV,
1st Armoured Regtiment Association Inc (A004180K)
Your website states that the above Assn is operating under an Own Rules Constitution which was passed by special resolution on 23 May 2015. It also states that the last Annual Statement was lodged on 23 October 2017.
The statements above are surprising, given the amount of correspondence and discussions with CAV on both matters.
The 1 Armd Regt Assn Inc is currently operating on a Model Rules Constitution. The Own Rules Constitution which was submitted to CAV in 2015 was found to have been invalid for a number of reasons, one of which was an unlawful declaration by the C’tee members concerned. The subsequent C’tee sought legal advice (at a cost of nearly $1000 of members’ funds) which confirmed the invalidity … adding that anyone affected by the error was entitled to claim compensation. A new Own Rules Constitution has been drafted, however, financial matters are the priority at the moment.
A financial statement was presented to members at the AGM on 8 July 2017. It did not cover the whole financial year, did not indicate what funds had been spent on (around $40,000) and was not certified by two C’tee members as being true and correct. The present C’tee has employed auditors to reconstitute the past two years accounts as there seem to be a number of irregular transactions. Obviously CAV could not accept an Annual Statement on this basis.
Many discussions with CAV have occurred (the most recent with Mr Stevens last Friday). The course of action that’s been adopted is that the Assn C’tee will finalise the Financial Statement, certify it, and present it to members as a special resolution for approval at a Special General Meeting. This is to be timed to ensure that the financial statement is able to be lodged with the Registrar before 31 December 2017.
It would be appreciated if your website could be updated to avoid adding further confusion to what is already a very confused situation.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
—————————————————————————————–
28 October 2017
In Search of Good Governance (Part II)
“Dear Secretary,
I recently sent CAV the request copied below. [See Blog post for 22 October] I was rung back today and informed that the idea of checklists was thought to be a good one and CAV would be very interested to see what we came up with (possibly including them on their website).
The question now is … will the 1 AR Assn Management C’tee endorse the preparation of such checklists? The list of topics is endless, but the main ones would be:
Actions on Being Appointed to the C’tee; Maintaining the Financial Accounts; Preparation of the Annual Financial Statement; Maintaining the Register of Members; Preparation for the AGM; Conduct of the AGM; Writing the AGM Minutes; and Changing the Constitution.
A full Checklist for the organisation and conduct on the coming Special General Meeting could be prepared as an example. In relation to this, I mentioned my concern about getting a Quorum for the SGM (10% of financial members). This would suggest that proxies would be important. I asked if, as an adjunct to this, a system of postal voting could be used. The answer was that the Constitution could be changed to allow postal votes for some matters, but not in cases involving Special Resolutions (such as voting on the Financial Statement). I mentioned that the President had made it known that he might use the Australian Electoral Commission to ensure that all proxy votes were accounted for. CAV advised that this was not allowable, the procedure set out in the Model Rules would have to be followed.
Interestingly, CAV were under the impression that the Assn had met its obligation to submit a financial statement to the Registrar within a month of the AGM. When It was realised that the document concerned did not: “give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the association during and at the end of its last financial year; and have attached a certificate in the prescribed form signed by two members of the committee certifying that that is the case”, it was agreed that this had not yet been done.
The immediate need was agreed to be that which has been well known for some time: finalise the Financial Statement; certify it as true and correct; send to members with 21 days notice of a SGM; conduct the SGM; and submit the approved financial report to the Registrar before 31 December. I asked what would happen if the 31 December deadline was not met, but CAV declined to speculate on this.
Best wishes ….
A Checklist Example re the SGM: : The 1AR Assn C’tee would be given a checklist which sets out, in sequential order, all the things that the Constitution (Model Rules) stipulate have to be done in organising and conducting the SGM. An example of one item on the Checklist would be:
“Arrival at Meeting: All attendees are to be checked off against the Register of Members to ensure that they are eligible to vote: ie. they are not Associate Members (including Life Members) [S14 (1) (2)] and have been financial for at least 10 business days [S13 (92) (a) (b)] . Note: If attendees who are not entitled to vote are allowed into the SGM, they should be seated in a clearly identified area, so there is no confusion during voting.”
The checklists could be printed on card and made available to all C’tee members. Should they wish, the C’tee would hold the computer file on which the Checklists have been prepared and undertake revisions in the future (or this can be done by those who prepared the originals).
Postscript. I have been advised that the above request will be considered by the 1AR Assn C’tee in due course.”
———————————————————————————————————
27 October 2017
Thought for the Day
Dear Editor,
Keith Mitchell (Letters, October 16) recently queried the use of a line from the national anthem on signs at the front of the Australian War Memorial (rather than what he believed were the more appropriate words of C E W Bean “here is their spirit in the heart of the land they loved”). I, too, have reason to query the AWM’s marketing.
Yesterday I was pondering the nature of submissions to be made in support of a Citation for Gallantry for units involved in the Battles of Coral and Balmoral (Vietnam). My concern was how best to inform those responsible for approval, what it was like to be a crewman in a tank during battle. There is a perception that those inside were protected from enemy fire and faced few hardships … when the opposite was the case.
The tank’s armour could be penetrated by anti-tank rockets and the vehicle destroyed by mines. Furthermore, the tanks drew fire and crewmen were very vulnerable to shrapnel. One of these Centurion tanks is located in the grounds of the AWM (temporarily absent for refurbishment). During operations in 1971, shrapnel from a rocket permanently disabled its driver.
Today I noticed one of the products sold at the AWM shop. A plastic ‘snow dome’ made in China, it contained a replica of the AWM and a Centurion tank. When shaken, glitter rose to the top and sparkled as it came down. In what way, I wondered, does this trinket honour either their spirit or sacrifice.
————————————————————————————–
26 October 2017 (Following on from 20 October)
Good Governance (Part 2) : What’s it Mean in Practical Terms?
It means that 1AR Assn members’ funds wouldn’t be wasted in these ways:
Hundreds of dollars spent to audit poorly maintained financial accounts; and
Almost one thousand dollars spent on legal fees to verify that an Own Rules Constitution had been adopted unlawfully;
It means that these breaches of the Constitution, among other, would not occur:
Failure to ensure that categories of membership are correct;
Invalid votes allowed to be cast at an AGM;
Valid votes prevented from being cast at AGM;
Failure of Association’s registered number to appear on all notices;
Failure to maintain an up to date register of members;
Failure to make a true and correct declaration when the draft Own Rules Constitution was submitted to Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV);
Failure to make a declaration that the Financial Statement was true and correct when submitted to members at the AGM;
Failure of the AGM minutes to include a certificate from two c’tee members stating that the Financial Statement was true and correct
Failure to lodge the Financial Statement with the registrar within a month of the AGM;
Failure to apply for an exemption with respect to the submission of the Financial Statement, as required;
Failure of all former C’tee members to pass all relevant documents to the new C’tee within 28 days of the AGM;
Failure to inform CAV of the appointment of a new Secretary within 14 days of the AGM;
Failure to inform CAV of the new registered address of the Assn within 14 days of the AGM.
It means that the following would not occur:
Defamatory material included in published AGM minutes; and
A statement that a person knows is false or misleading in a material particular would not be made to CAV.
——————————————————————————————————–
25 October 2017
RE: Submission for the Award of a Unit Gallantry Citation to Those Units Involved in the Battles of FSBs Coral and Balmoral
I was asked for advice by someone who will made a submission to the DHAAT. I’ve changed my mind a little bit re what I posted on 23 October. I’ve been so caught up with the Hammersley Citation submission that it influenced my thinking. The Coral Balmoral submission is not about asserting that armour had a vital role to play and should be recognised for it (which is the case with Hammersley).
This is what I said:
“The C-B submission prepared by the 1RAR Assn seeks recognition for all those involved. This is as it should be.
How then should personal submissions to the DHAAT be tailored to best effect as far as the Tribunal deliberations are concerned?
Of relevance is the ‘Narrative’ section which includes “a one to three line citation describing the actions applicable to the award and the activities undertaken and justification for the award, which must be a clear description of the action to be recognised”.
Also the ‘Synopsis’ section which is “no more than six lines outlining the actions to be recognised which justify the main reason(s) for the nomination“.
So, in essence, you are justifying the award on the basis of the gallantry displayed by your unit (in the context of a broader canvas of gallantry). I would not worry too much about the specifics of the Battles themselves … I would focus entirely on the gallantry you observed and that which was evident in the events which transpired. This is your opportunity to give your account of matters that nobody else could know about, ie. they might know about actions from reports or other peoples’ accounts, but you are the only one to know of your individual experience. It is the events as you remember them.
You could be wrong in terms of specifics such as timings, left or right etc etc, but your memory of how you felt and what you saw happen is that which belongs to you alone. If you believe that your experience can help substantiate that extraordinary gallantry occurred, then you should explain this to the Tribunal … otherwise they have no way of knowing what you experienced and the overall fabric of the events will forever be incomplete.
It is very disappointing that the RAAC Corporation is involved in helping plan the commemoration, but not in substantiating the gallantry involved. In an ideal world, you would be aware of what the Tribunal has been told in terms of the role of armour in the overall context and would be able to tailor your presentation accordingly.
As it is, if I were you, I would assume that the Tribunal have all the info re the sequence of events etc, but what they don’t know is what you saw and felt. I would concentrate on this, ending with a succinct conclusion“outlining the actions to be recognised which justify the main reason(s) for the nomination“.
Well done for standing up at this time.”
Congratulations
Colonel Scott Winter, AM, former CO 1 Armd Regt, was promoted to Brigadier yesterday by the CA. Scott takes command of 3 Bde at the end of the year. Well done and richly deserved.
24 October 2017
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the sixth of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
Defence and Strategy #4
—————————————————————————————————–
23 October 2017
RE: Submission for the Award of a Unit Gallantry Citation to Those Units Involved in the Battles of FSBs Coral and Balmoral
Background.
The 1RAR Association initiated a submission with the support of the RAR Association. The Associations representing the other Corps involved were asked to advise the names of those involved (to ensure that, if the submission was approved, the Citation could be immediately awarded to those eligible). The RAE Assn initiated a public petition to garner support and raise awareness.
The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAAT) called for submissions. The request was widely circulated by the RAR Association, but not by the RAAC Corporation. The DHAAT called for presentations to be made in person to the Tribunal. Former members of the RAAC heard about this by chance and passed the information onto others.
RAAC personnel involved in the battles are expected to make personal presentations to the DHAAT without any knowledge of any submissions made and without any co-ordination.
What Would Have Been Better.
A RAAC representative liaises with the 1RAR Association and RAAC Head of Corps.
The representative liaises further with 1AR Assn and 3 Cav Assn to establish a consensus re the main issues involved; ie. (i) the contribution to the Battles made by RAAC units and (ii) what would have happened if those RAAC units were not present. The RAAC HOC and those involved in the battles are informed accordingly.
The RAAC representative forwards submissions from the 1 AR Assn and 3 Cav Assn to the DHAAT and collates copies of personal submissions made by individuals. The material assembled is used as the basis for awareness raising articles in the 1AR/3 Cav Assn newsletters, Defence Force Journal etc etc.
The representative maintains contact with DHAAT and informs the 1AR Assn and 3 Cav Assn and those involved in the Battles, of the opportunity to make personal presentations. The RAAC HOC is also informed and invited to make a presentation
Finally, the representative ensures that presentations to be made to the DHAAT cover all aspects of the RAAC involvement.
——————————————————————————————————–
22 October 2017
In Search of Good Governance
The following request has been submitted to CAV. Depending on their response, the suggestion will be again put to the C’tee. (The idea was previously submitted to Patron and C’tee, but was ignored.)
Dear CAV,
“Model Rules (55) ” … a committee member holds office until the positions of the Committee are declared vacant at the next annual general meeting”.
For those associations that have not adopted Own Rules, the twelve month tenure provision means that new committee members have to quickly become familiar with the details of each and every Model Rule.
This often proves difficult, especially when committee members have full time jobs, and circumstances mean that no handover/takeover is possible. Breaches of the Model Rules and the Act can easily result.
I am a member of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association Inc (A0044180K). Its AGM was held on 8 July 2017. Ignorance of the Model Rules on the part of the former and present Management Committees has meant that the Association is currently in breach of the Act in a number of areas. Examples are: S92 Obligation to prepare financial statements;S94 Submission of financial statement to annual general meeting; S102 Lodgement of financial statements with Registrar; and S103 Exemption from requirement to lodge financial statements.[For Blog readers see 13 September 2017 for more details.]
One way of avoiding this happening in the future, would be for checklists to be prepared with respect to specific activities, eg. Being elected to the Committee; Preparing and lodging the financial statement; Organising the AGM; Changing the Constitution; etc etc.
Each checklist would be set out in a simplified manner to make it easy for the relevant committee member (and President) to be sure that all the requirements of the Model Rules (or Own Rules) had been met and nothing had been overlooked.
Could CAV please advise, to the best of your knowledge, if such checklists have been prepared in the past, and, if not, if CAV would be interested in viewing those prepared for the 1st Armoured Regiment Association. (Should they prove worthwhile, those responsible for the preparation would be happy for CAV to adopt the format for use by other Associations.)
Many thanks
21 October 2017
Vale: ‘Bluey’ Ummels
“UMMELS, Hubertus Elsie Maria Johannes Late of Howe Street, Gordonvale. Hubertus passed away peacefully, at the Cairns Hospital, on Saturday 7th January 2017, aged 69 years.”
Born in the Netherlands, Bluey [later known as Bert] served in Vietnam with B Sqn and A Sqn 1 Armd Regt (2 April 69 to 1 Apr 70). Later service in the Army including being SQMS at 2 Cav Regt.
‘Bluey’ is survived by a sister, two children, two grandchildren and extended families.
The following is an extract from “Canister ‘on’ Fire”:
“3Alpha reversed slowly, gun over the rear of the tank, Clark and Ummels peering intently into the gloom in an effort to detect any disturbance in the surface of the track to their front, 100m, 200m … nearly there! Clark recalls thinking that ‘we had almost made it across the low ground’, when, suddenly ‘the rear of the tank lifted off the ground in a massive explosion and a thick cloud of dust enveloped us. A wall of flames erupted in front of me.’ Within seconds, the whole of the rear of the tank was on fire. Looking down into the turret, all Ummels could see were ‘flames licking at [his] boots’.
Barlow’s perspective from the gunner’s seat was even more dramatic: ‘sheets of flame [were] coming from the engine compartment into the turret (around my boots and all the ammo below them).’ Those in the vehicles behind feared the worst: ‘There was an almighty explosion, a huge cloud of dust pierced by a sheet of flame … the tank disappeared.’ For Roberts in 3Bravo, ‘it was a long count as I waited for the crewmen to leave the vehicle’.
Clark’s immediate concern was for his driver: ‘it took a second to recall that I had been travelling in reverse.’ Having quickly ‘taken stock’, he informed his troop leader that they were bailing out and coming back on foot. Clark had the presence of mind to unpin the commander’s .30cal machine gun and bring it with him, denying the enemy a very attractive ‘prize’. As Barlow scrambled up from inside, he heard shots. Just moments later, when he saw the operator fall off the turret, he thought the worst – ambush!
The realisation that Ummels had not been shot, he had just slipped, came as a relief. As the gunner, Barlow was much less conscious of what was happening outside, compared with the other crew members. Incredibly, there were no apparent wounds from the mine and the crew were all able to make it to the safety of the other vehicles. Some of the credit for their successful bail-out, must go to Smith for remembering the driver’s responsibility to set off the fixed fire extinguisher system. He would have thought himself lucky to have been able to exit at what had become the rear of the vehicle, rather than the front as normal.
Just how lucky he really was, however, was not apparent until next morning. The mine had been a big one, made up of slabs of explosive, coupled together with a number of artillery ‘blinds’. It was also offset to go off under the hull, rather than detonating under one of the tracks. The force of the explosion buckled and split the hull, as well as severely damaging the right rear suspension station; leaking petrol ignited, causing a fire which immediately engulfed the engine and transmission compartments. There is no doubt that if the tank had not been reversing, the crew (particularly the driver) would have been seriously wounded. As was expected, the Centurion had to be returned to Australia for rebuild.”
The photo below was taken by Cpl Bob Roberts, cc 3Bravo.
Careful inspection will reveal 3Alpha’s crew running back along the track.
————————————————————————————————
20 October 2017
Governance (Part 1)
The ‘Good Governance Guide’, produced by the Municipal Association of Victoria, seeks to promote good governance.
WHAT ARE THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE?
Aaccountable
Accountability is a fundamental requirement of good governance. The Management C’tee has an obligation to report, explain and be answerable for the consequences of decisions it makes on behalf of the members it represents.
Transparent
Members should be able to follow and understand the decision-making process. This means that they will be able to clearly see how and why a decision was made – what information, advice and consultation were considered, and which legislative requirements (when relevant) were followed.
Follows the rule of law
This means that decisions are consistent with relevant legislation or common law and are within the powers of the Management C’tee.
Responsive
The Management C’tee should always try to serve the needs of all members, while balancing competing interests in a timely, appropriate and responsive manner.
Equitable and Inclusive
An association’s wellbeing results from all of its members feeling their interests have been considered by the Management C’tee in the decision-making process. This means that all groups, particularly the least powerful, should have opportunities to participate in the process.
Effective and Efficient
The Management C’tee should implement decisions and follow processes that make the best use of the available people, resources and time to ensure the best possible results for its members.
Participatory
Any member affected by or interested in a decision should have the opportunity to participate in the process for making that decision. This can happen in several ways – members may be provided with information, asked for their opinion, given the opportunity to make recommendations or, in some cases, be part of the actual decision-making process.
Governance (Part 2): What the above means in practical terms for the governance of an Association.
——————————————————————————————————–
19 October 2017
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the sixth of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
Vietnam Casualties & AWM #2
——————————————————————————–
18 October 2017
Defamation
Dear Secretary,
I recently wrote to the 1 AR Assn C’tee with respect to the following reference in the Minutes of the 2017 AGM Minutes:
“T. Crook – On that why has there been no action on Mr Cameron and his continual abuse of his position on his website in denigrating people in this room and of the Corporation and why hasn’t there been any disciplinary action taken?”
I pointed out that published material is ‘defamatory when it conveys a meaning (or imputation) about a person that lowers that person’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of the community’.
The President has amended the Minutes accordingly. In so doing, he commented that the Assn is not empowered to determine matters of defamation (only the courts can do this). This is certainly the case, however, the Assn is responsible for the content of the material it publishes.
I should mention that it is not necessary for a person to have been specifically named. It only has to be shown that a reasonable person would identify the person to whom the words refer. There are sections of the Minutes of the 2017 AGM which could also be classed as defamatory on this basis.
For information re future Minutes, I’ve copied extracts below from the CAV’s ‘Guide for Secretaries of Victorian Incorporated Associations’:
Sometimes a secretary will have to deal with potentially defamatory matters in the minutes of AGMs. A chairperson should challenge any defamatory statements at the time they are made in an AGM and have them withdrawn. The statements will then not be recorded in the minutes.
If an organisation has published defamatory statements in the minutes of an AGM, the defence of “qualified privilege” may be available, however the organisation should seek specific legal advice.
Generally a “defamatory statement” about a person is one that:
exposes the person to hatred, contempt or ridicule;
tends to lower them in the opinion of other people;
harms their reputation (for example in their profession); and/or
causes them to be shunned or avoided by others.
Be very careful not to defame anyone.
Do not write: “Ms L Little reported that the builder engaged to renovate the club house has a history of stealing from organisations and said he was a disgrace to his profession.”
Do write: “Concern was expressed about the suitability of the builder for the task of renovating the club house.”
Tip: For difficult meetings, the secretary could consider asking the chairperson for specific help to draft the minutes (in any case, it is good practice for the secretary to always check the minutes they have drafted with the chairperson before distributing them to others),
Remember! The law of defamation is complex. If a secretary is concerned about any potential defamatory matters when drafting minutes, they should seek legal advice before finalising and distributing the minutes to anyone.
———————————————————————————————————
17 October 2017
Letters
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the fifth of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
Defence & Strategy #3
—————————————————————————————
16 October 2017
Coral-Balmoral Commemoration
The background to the planning c’tee established by DVA was detailed on 9 October.
A couple of questions have since been raised:
Why do 1RAR and 3 RAR Assns both have representatives on the C’tee (rather than being represented by the RAR Assn) when 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Regt have to be represented by the RAAC Corporation?
Why does co-ordination of 1Armd Regt aspects have to be undertaken by a member of the RAAC Corp Advisory Board just because the President of the 1AR Assn is busy on other things (ie. why aren’t members of the 1AR Assn C’tee and wider Assn able to undertake the work involved)?
Leaving this aspect aside, there seems to be some uncertainty as to what has to be done by the 1AR Assn or its proxy. In simple terms, actions that have to be taken are:
Obtain the existing list of C Sqn members at C-B;
Obtain current addresses for them;
Contact them, inform them of the Commemoration and ask if they’d be attending (if they’re able to at the time);
Contact all members of the Assn, inform them of the Commemoration and ask if (i) they’d be attending (if they’re able) and (ii) if they are veterans of CB;
Compile indicative numbers and advise to RAAC Corp Chairman by 31 Oct 17;
Contact everyone again and seek definite intentions; and
Compile final numbers and advise to RAAC Corp Chairman by 31 Jan 18.
This is not really a challenging exercise. As an example, the TPI Assn achieved Actions 1 to 4 a couple of weeks ago, by sending out a form to all its members.
The form provided details of the Commemoration and asked two questions: (i) are you interested in attending; and (ii) are you a C-B vet?
The response date was set to enable to the TPI Assn President to attend the next C’tee meeting (early Nov) and report on estimated attendance as far as her ESO is concerned (eg. “…estimated attendance at this time is 23, with four of those being C-B veterans”).
I will be surprised (unfortunately) if members of the 1AR Assn are contacted and asked the same questions prior to 31 Oct 17
———————————————————————————————
15 October 2017
The post below could have been entitled ‘The Role of the Media in the US/Korea Conflict’, however I decided to encompass a broader context in order to encourage readers to think about what might lie behind the ‘news’ reports we receive.
How Would the US Launch a Pre-emptive Strike on North Korea? : A Hypothetical Analysis.
What Has Happened Already?
Korean/US ‘Agents’ would have been inserted into North Korea some time ago to blend with the population and feed back information. Potential offensive action could also be on their agenda. It is unlikely that US Special Forces would be deployed in advance in a covert role, as any capture would sound the alarm. There could be a plan for their deployment in conjunction with the first strike, however.
Cyber warfare would have to be a major element in the strategy. Given the reliance that all nations place on electronic command and control systems, one would think that satellites would have a role in disrupting military communications and electronic guidance systems. It would be surprising if North Korea’s computer systems had not already been infected with ‘sleeper’ viruses … waiting for the command to activate them. Of course, any military power would be aware of this and have a back up system … which would also have been targeted by the US. Cyber sabotage will have been practised for some time, so that the effectiveness of different techniques is well known. North Korea’s ability to protect its electronic systems could decide the outcome.
Grounds for double bluff scenarios will have been established. For example, if the explosion of earlier North Korean missile launches was due to US cyber sabotage, the success of recent launches might have been a result the US creating a false sense of security in the North Korean regime.
Accurate Intelligence will be key. Are the North Korean missile silos actually ‘hidden’ or only thought to be? The correct identification of Targets to be hit in the first strike is obviously vital. These would include: nuclear research facilities, missile silos, command and control headquarters, air defence control systems and weapon systems, airports and air traffic control facilities, transport and power infrastructure, and ammunition and fuel stockpiles.
Psyops strategy suggests that it would be advantageous to have the media report that attacking North Korea’s missile systems would be very difficult for the US, while also emphasizing the ability of North Korea to inflict casualties on South Korea which the US would not be able to prevent. Furthermore psyops ‘messages’ would predict that even if Kim Jong-un was killed, the leadership would not be disrupted (thereby inferring that he would not be a target). The US will use the media to achieve its own ends (this article could be part of such a strategy).
Logistics would be one of the most critical elements, particularly the availability of ammunition stocks, fuel supplies and medical facilities. This support will have been built up slowly over time and will already be in place with back-up contingency plans.
Evacuation of civilians from US and allied nations would have commenced. The US can’t afford to show their hand by initiating evacuation plans immediately prior to a strike.
What is Happening Now?
Cyber warfare and intelligence gathering is on-going. US Navy vessels (including submarines and aircraft carriers) are rehearsing deployment into the region. US Air Force aircraft are similarly rehearsing flight paths and timings. Logistics stocks continue to be amassed (not necessarily in their final positions).
The South Korean military continues to undertake a number of ‘routine’ exercises near the border in preparation for attack by North Korea. (For this reason, the Chinese proposal that North Korea stop nuclear testing if US/South Korea stop military exercises close the border, will never be agreed to by the US.)
Civilians from US and allied nations continue to leave North Korea.
What Will Happen Immediately Prior to a Strike?
The critical element is the deception plan. A ‘situation’ has to be created to get North Korea to ‘look the other way’. This could be where an ally such as China or Japan has a role to play. Then again, it could be a ‘political’ crisis in the US in which the attention of the country (and the world) is focused on some matter involving the President’s private life.
South Korean military forces deploy near the border on the pretext of a routine exercise. (The activity will repeat that which has happened many times before and will not, therefore, suggest anything unusual.)
US submarines and surface ships deploy close to their attack positions.
What Will Happen in the First Strike?
The cyber warfare plan would be initiated and North Korean command and control systems would be disabled. Missiles fired from US submarines and aircraft would hit pre-determined targets.
US Special Forces might be deployed to undertake specific tasks. This would occur simultaneously with the first strike, at the same time that additional anti-missile defence systems would be moved into pre-determined positions along the South Korea border.
The North Korean leader will be a primary target and timing of the first strike could well be dependent on a public engagement that he will be attending. (Of course, the ‘figure’ seen at such events might not be the actual North Korean leader.)
What Will Happen in the Follow Up Strikes?
US aircraft would constitute the follow-up strike force, with missiles being launched from stand-off positions immediately the first strike has been completed. These aircraft would be flown from aircraft carriers and/or bases in the region.
It would be expected that one of North Korea’s first responses would be to target Guam. The US Navy would help provide an anti-missile shield and ships would be on station accordingly. An equal priority target for North Korea would be Seoul. The effectiveness of the deployed missile defence system, plus air strikes against North Korean artillery positions, will be critical.
What Will Happen in the Aftermath?
Planning has not reached this point.
———————————————————————————————————
14 October 2017
[I anticipated the travel, but not the computer problems on return. Back to normal now, fingers crossed.]
Constitution (General)
A Constitution is a set of rules by which an organization (or country) is run
Q. Why is it so important (eg. the basis of the current High Court consideration re Members of Parliament who have dual citizenship)?
A. It constitutes the basis of the Rule of Law which is fundamental to the way our society functions.
1AR Assn Constitution
I recently queried the reference to “financial affiliate member” in the Minutes of the 2017 AGM.
The current Constitution (the only one the Assn has had) states that membership falls into two classes: members and associate members. The latter is defined as: “(a) any members under the age of 15 years; and (b) any other category of member as determined by special resolution at a general meeting”.
>
To be valid members of the 1 AR Assn, therefore, Life Membership and Affiliate Membership, have to be categories of membership determined by “special resolution at a general meeting”.
>
The President has stated, in relation to this, that the current C’tee intends “to honour decisions of previous Committees regarding membership such as life or affiliate member” (letter 4 Oct 17). Of course, as quoted above, it’s not within the C’tee’s power to introduce new categories of membership. This can only be done by a vote of a majority of members vide special resolution at a general meeting.
>
The other thing is that according to the Constitution, Associate Members (ie. Life and Affiliate Members) do not have voting rights. The right of Life Members to vote is one of the provisions contained in the draft Own Rules Constitution prepared by a group of members (understood to be currently under consideration by the C’tee).
>
Unless there are Minutes of a past General Meeting recording a Special Resolution proposing Life and Affiliate membership, which was approved by members … neither category of membership exists. If such a Resolution was approved, the categories of members created do not have voting rights unless this provision was included in the Resolution.
>
If the above Resolution cannot be found, it would seem that if they voted at the last AGM, Life and Affiliate members did so unlawfully.
Given the numerous failures to abide by the Constitution which occurred at the last AGM, the above information is brought to the attention of the C’tee to ensure that no unlawful votes are lodged at the next general meeting. It would seem that the only way that a Life Member can vote (without a Special Resolution having been passed) and providing he/she meets the requirements for ordinary membership, is to pay the membership fee and become a financial member.
This matter needs to be clarified absolutely so that no unlawful voting jeopardises the validity of the coming General Meeting to consider the audited Financial Statement.
—————————————————————————
9 October 2017 [Note: No Blog posts on 10 or 11 Oct due to travel.]
Coral Balmoral Commemoration
It’s a funny world. On 4 Sep 17, I posted the following on the 1 AR Assn Facebook page (and the 3 Cav Regt Assn Forum):
50th Anniversary Commemoration of Battles of Coral and Balmoral
Will be interesting to see if there is any RAAC orientated commemoration (apart from 1AR Assn Reunion).”
On 7 Oct 17, I received info which led to me posting the following on the same sites:
Coral Balmoral Commemoration.
“Dear 1AR Assn C’tee,
The link given in the post a couple below refers to the intention of DVA to organise a commemorative ceremony for the 50th Anniversary of the Battles of Coral and Balmoral on 13 May 2108.
I understand that a workshop is being organised to plan the event. A small number of representatives from the ESOs involved in the workshop will be invited to a luncheon on the day. (Priority being given to veterans of the battles.)
The ESOs involved are: 1RAR, 3RAR, Navy, RAAF, VVAA, and TPI Assn.
You may like to get in touch with DVA to organise a place at the table, so as to ensure the reason for awarding 1 Armd Regt the Coral Balmoral Battlehonour is not overlooked. I’ve offered the same suggestion to the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn.”
A few hours later, the Chairman, RAAC Corporation Ltd posted a message on the 3 Cav site to say that he had been contacted by DVA on 16 August and asked to represent 1AR and 3 Cav Assns at the workshop. When asked, the Presidents of both Assns agreed to this. The Chairman was away for the first meeting, however attended the next on 4 Oct 17.
The following remarks copied by him on the 3 Cav site are of interest:
“The Chair stated “DVA do not have a any definitive lists” of who participated in these battles and are relying on the ESOs to do due diligence on members who wish to attend.”
“The Chair …. has asked the ESOs to report back at the next meeting (7/11) on progress with numbers for Canberra. If I could have some indication by 31/10, that would be great.
“Colin [Toll]: I’d be very grateful if you as a former CO, and the Corporation’s proxy to the CBCC, could assist Greg [Nicholas] (given his work commitments) in helping to collate a list of C Sqn veterans who took part in these battles. My thinking here is that Tubby Brooker maybe a good starting point. I’ll leave it to you and Greg to discuss at your discretion.
“As a member of the Corporation’s Advisory Board as well, Colin Toll is very well placed to assist and he has already established comms with Greg Nicholas. [From Colin]:”My first point of contact with those who were at Coral/Balmoral will be Gerry McCormack and Mick Butler. Being an old fart I knew all the C Sqn officers and many of the NCO’s well. First, we should have a chat.”
So the DVA Workshop would like the 1AR Assn/ 3 Cav Assn to provide a list a those of former unit members who participated in the Battles of Coral and/or Balmoral. The RAAC Corp Chairman has not mentioned current addresses, just requested a list of names. The Workshop needs an indication of the numbers of those attending at its next meeting (presumably early November).
So you’d expect that the 1AR Regt Assn would send out a notice to all members, giving details of the Commemoration, and asking for an indication of those who would hope to attend. (You don’t have to be a Coral Balmoral veteran to attend, however, they will be given priority for seating etc.) It makes enormous sense, therefore, for the TPI Association to send out a form to its members as they have, asking for an indication of attendance and whether or not a Coral Balmoral veteran.
One has to wonder how the 1AR Assn will gather details about attendance by 31 October. In comparison with the TPI Assn, why does everything have to be so secretive? If my 4 Sep 17 post on the 1AR Assn Facebook page had been responded to be the C’tee (the President, at least, was aware of the arrangements by then) an estimate of numbers might well have been known by now.
Of course, the efforts of Bill Burton and Rusty Dyson in collating a very detailed list of names of all 1 AR personnel involved with Coral Balmoral could have been submitted to DVA as well.
It has been shown many times before that effective communication between leaders and those they lead, can determine the difference between a successful and an unsuccessful organisation.
Postscript. Bill and Rusty have provided their lists to me and I’ve passed to the 1 AR Assn C’tee with the suggestion that they might consider the following actions:
1. Names of those involved in Coral Balmoral be agreed and advised to Chairman RAAC Corporation for passing to DVA;
2. A form be prepared giving details of the Commemoration and asking recipients if they are (i) planning to attend, and (ii) veterans of Coral Balmoral. The form should include a reply-by date of 29 Oct.
3. The form be sent to 1AR Assn members;
4. John Dyson be contacted and asked if he would be kind enough to email the form to those veterans of Coral Balmoral that he is in contact with; and
5. Indicative figures be given to the Chairman RAAC Corp Ltd of (i) total 1AR members planning to attend and (ii) number of CB vets included in the total.
Information used to support the exhibit is copied below.
AWM Fact Sheet – Type 95 Ha-go light tank Description and Characteristics: Japanese light tank. Hull of riveted and welded construction. 7.4 tons Historical or technical Significance: The Ha-go was the Japanese tank most commonly encountered by allied forces during the Second World War. This example was one of two Type 95s that attacked Australian infantry positions at Milne Bay in August 1942. The tank was abandoned by the Japanese and taken back to Australia for detailed scientific examination. The tank was obsolescent by 1942, and completely outclassed allied tanks later in the War. Where and when these tanks used: Used by the Japanese in China and through the course of the Pacific War. This example captured at Milne Bay 1942 Who used the type: Japan, in Manchuria and the Pacific. Post war was used by France, Soviet Union, Thailand, China Engine: 6 cylinder A6120VD air-cooled 14.4 Litre diesel, 110hp, air cooled. Engine was of advanced design, giving good power to weight ratio. No manufactured: 2300 Crew 4 – Driver, Machine gun operator, gunner and commander Speed 25mph Armour 6 – 12 mm Armament 37mm gun and two 7.7mm machine guns. Date manufactured: Developed in 1933, manufactured until 1942 by Mitsubishi AWM example: REL32684.
Of interest is the fact that the crew is stated as being four.
This was queried with the AWM (blog post 9 September 2015 refers)
“As far as I can find, the AWM is the sole source to refer to a crew of four.
(There was another contemporary Japanese tank which had a crew of four, the Type 97 Chi-Ha medium tank, but this weighed 15 tonnes.)”
The AWM had other information, however, which they considered accurate in terms of a crew of four.
Given the significance of the battle of Milne bay and this exhibit, Rod Ward (C Sqn ’71) has undertaken considerable research and offered it to the AWM for consideration. In part, he explains:
“The main armament of this tank is a 37mm Type 94 tank gun. In the Ha-Go there is only the crew commander in the turret and the 37 mm gun is fired and loaded by the Crew Commander (CC). The gun is raised in elevation and depression by the movement of the CC’s right shoulder via a padded rest ❶, the rest is mounted on the left of the gun. Traverse is achieved by moving his shoulder, left and right. The gun has 10 deg right and 10 deg left movement. The turret can also traverse with a gear/cog hand-wheel arrangement but the final traverse and laying of the gun are done by the movement of the CC’s body. The CC has to open the breech via a handle ❷ on the right side of the gun using his right hand, he also will use his right hand to load the gun, the firing trigger is located on the left along with a telescopic sight.”
More information about the Battle of Milne Bay is at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rlrDzh1VE-g
———————————————————————————————————
7 October 2017
Letters
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the fourth of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
Defence & Strategy #2
——————————————————————————————————–
6 October 2017
Letters
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the third of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
Defence & Strategy #1
———————————————————————————————————
5 October 2017
1 AR Assn Governance (The sentence above, in bold, is relevant.)
The letter below was sent to members yesterday (click on it to read.). Well done to the C’tee. This is a good initiative to help in ensuring openness and transparency in management of the association. Well done also re the initiatives which have been/are being implemented re financial and Constitutional accountability. (The state of the financial records has at last been acknowledged.)
There are a few points that I have queried. The Update refers to:
… the Executive C’tee. I can see no mention of this in the Constitution.
….m’ship fees and donations as the only two sources of income. Does this mean that sales through the Q Store are made on a ‘not for profit’ basis? I’m a little surprised if this is the case, as it would seem a perfectly reasonable means by which assist funding the Association’s expenses.
…. “31 December deadline” for submitting the Association’s financial statement to CAV. Of course the real deadline is earlier than this. The financial statement has to be passed by members at a SGM and members are required to be given at least three weeks notice. Will members be informed if the Registrar approves an extension of time and, if so, for how long?
… the “EC” investigating hiring the AEC to conduct a ballot of members to approve a new Constitution. This sounds great, but the existing Constitution makes no provision for postal voting. The Constitution provides for proxy voting only.
——————————————————–
4 October 2017
Letters
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the second of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
Vietnam Casualties and AWM Roll of Honour #2
———————————————————————————————-
3 October 2017
Beersheba Related Activites
Info below with thanks to Plumes, newsletter of 4/19 PWLH Assn:
1 Wednesday 18/10/2017 @ 12:00 at the Shrine of Remembrance, Melbourne in the Auditorium. Dr David Holloway OAM will reflect on the 100 years since the charge of Beersheba by the 4th Light Horse. Cost $5.00 (refer to the Shrine web page for further details).
2. Friday 20/10/2017 @ the Shrine of Remembrance, Melbourne.
The opening of the Light Horse display. Individual invitations will be sent to those nominated. (There is no limit to the number invited).
3. Tuesday 31/10/2017 @ 11:00 at the Shrine of Remembrance
Wreath Laying on the Forecourt. To commemorate the centenary of the battle and the legend of the Australian Light Horse, there will be a special wreath laying service on the Shrine Forecourt at 11am, supported by a procession of horses and riders in Light Horse uniform (available to meet after the Service).
4. Tuesday 31/10/2017, at Muswellbrook NSW.
The unveiling of a bronze statue of a mounted Waler leaping over a trench brandishing a bayonet and depicted in bronze (2.5 tonne,3m high). As you know the 4th LH was on the right flank of this famous charge with the 12th on the left with the 11th in reserve. The Council has requested that representatives from the 4/19 PWLH should be present.
5. Tuesday 31/10/2017 In Canberra.
a. Commemorative service at the LH Memorial, Canberra. Standard /Guidons Present – 1400hrs.
b. Last Post Service at AWM – HOC is doing the reading – Standard /Guidons Present – 1700hrs.
c. Beersheba Happy Hour at the RMC Officers Mess – commencing – 1715-2030hrs.
6. Saturday 11/11/2017 @ 14:00 at the Shrine of Remembrance, Melbourne. The launch of the General Sir Harry Chauvel Memorial Foundation, which will create a lifesize plus bronze sculpture of Sir Harry mounted on a horse. It is proposed to have the sculpture unveiled around 1st October 2018 to coincide with the centenary commemoration of Chauvel’s entry into Damascus in 1918. The plan is to have the sculpture located outside Victoria Barracks in St Kilda Rd Melbourne.
7. Saturday 11/11/2017 @ 18:30~19:00 at the MCG, Melbourne, Vic.
a. 4/19 PWLH will host the “Beersheba Ball” at the MCG. Cost to be advised (expected to be $100.00 plus – Association members limited to 1 x table of 10).
b. Payment will be $100.00 for members and must be paid up front. Secretary to maintain list.
8. Saturday 11/11/2017 @ 18:00~18:30 at the “Rising Sun Hotel”, South Melbourne, Vic. 4/19 PWLH Association Inc. will be holding a Dinner at the Rising Sun Hotel, 2 Raglan Street, South Melbourne to Celebrate the events of Beersheba and the laying up of the 4th Light Horse Guidon. Dinner will consist of 2 courses and will cost approx. $40.00. Drinks will be available from 16:30 hours onwards. This in no way will conflict with the Beersheba Ball but will be an adjutant to that event and will be more affordable to our members.
Ich Dien, Peter Sampson
Peter Sampson
Secretary / Public Officer
4th/19thPrince of Wales’s Light Horse
Regiment Association Inc.
Bougainville Lines, Simpson Barracks
Macleod Vic 3085 Australia
Email: 419associationsecretary@gmail.com
——————————————————————————————————
2 October 2017
Letters
Posting a copy of the letter to the Editor of the Canberra Times on 30 September, made me realise that it’s quite instructive looking back on other inaccuracies in the media which have had to be brought to the attention of the public. That below is the first of these posts. (Click on it to enlarge.)
——————————————————————————————————–
1 October 2017
The Governance of Not for Profit Organisations.
It has been revealed recently that the former National President of the RSL directed that failings of RSL members to act in accordance with the RSL Constitution should be ‘covered up’. See ….
It goes without saying that if breaches (of any sort) are revealed, the matter must be handled in an open and transparent manner. If the person concerned has given valuable service to the association, then this must be taken into account (but not used as an ‘excuse’ to cover up the matter).
Some years ago the then National RSL President (the person behind the ‘cover up’ above) proposed that the RSL would enter into an MOU with its equivalent organization in Vietnam. Sadly that organization is an arm of the governing Communist Party and directly involved in imposing particularly harsh human rights abuses on former members of the Armed Forces of the RVN (our former ‘allies’). It was suggested that any such proposed should be linked with improvements in human rights for those who had been members of the RVNAF and their families. This was rejected. See:
The following letter indicates the extent of subterfuge which can be associated with the ‘cover up’ mentality. There was no response and I subsequently took the matter up with the Patron, ACT Branch, RSL … the Governor General. (The saying ‘history repeats itself‘ seems particularly apt now for a number of reasons.)
—————————————————————————
Commander D J Robson, AM, RAN (Retd)
National Secretary, Returned and Services League of Australia
October 2011
Dear Derek,
You’ll be aware that on 21 October 2011 the RSL National President (Admiral Doolan) cancelled a meeting scheduled for the following day with myself and others from the Concerned Veterans Action Group (CVAG). This was done on the basis that you felt that a threat had been made; the matter being reported to the police. As there was an ‘on-going investigation’, the President said that he could not speak to anyone about his decision (to cancel the meeting).
When I was informed by the President, I immediately rang the ACT Federal Police because I was confident that I could explain a misunderstanding and therefore save the Police time that they might otherwise have spent on the investigation. Surprisingly, the Police stated that there had been NO report of any sort from the RSL and there was NO on-going investigation.
The Police asked me to give them the Incident Report Number and the name of the person who reported the incident and the time that this was made. I said that I’d call back. With neither RSL President nor Secretary being available when I phoned, I left requests with the National RSL HQ Staff and on the RSL President’s mobile, explaining the situation. No response was received.
As I had not provided further details re the ‘alleged’ report, the Police subsequently contacted me and conducted an interview on the basis that I had made a nuisance call and had wasted police time. I now wish to clear my name in this matter.
Can you please advise me the Incident Report Number and the name of the person who reported the matter to the Police and the time that this was made. I understand that I have other avenues to progress this matter, should you again feel unable to provide this information. As you know, there is another dimension to the above circumstances.
When arrangements for the meeting were being made, you advised that “those attending must make arrangements for their own personal coverage as they will not be covered for public liability insurance purposes by the RSL”. As this seemed very surprising, given that the National President stated that attendees would “be RSL guests in the League’s National Headquarters”, I sought information from the Insurance industry.
Before receiving a response, one of the former members of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam who was to attend, advised you that even though he might not be able to obtain the requisite insurance cover [which appears might be unobtainable for a one hour meeting] he was so keen to attend that he would do so, even if the roof fell in and he was to die.
The advice I subsequently received from the Insurance industry was that RSL cannot claim immunity from responsibility for acts of their negligence which might cause harm to guests invited onto their property. It seems that the immunity you might have been seeking was that associated with an action on part of one guest which might have an effect on another.
Given that I have not received a response to my requests to RSL National HQ for confirmation of this, can you please advise the nature of the personal coverage insurance required, so that we will be prepared if the opportunity for a future meeting arises.
Many thanks,
—————————————————————————————-
30 September 2017
Letter to the Editor.
The following is self-explanatory. Click on the image to enlarge. (A pity that the RAAC Corporation won’t correct some of the misinformation carried by the media.)
—————————————————————————————–
29 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (VII)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
………
Precedents for the Retrospective Award of the RVN CGWP Unit Citation
In addition to precedents listed in the original submission (Attachment A), on 21 December 2016 the Minister gave approval for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation to be awarded to personnel in the following units: RAN Clearance Diving Team; RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam; RAN personnel in 9 Squadron; RAAF 9 Squadron; and RAAF Transport Flight Vietnam/35 Squadron.
The Minister’s press release stated that “The Citation was originally awarded by the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to all units subordinate to Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) during the period 8 February 1962 and 28 March 1973, and to United States Army Vietnam and its subordinate units for the period 20 July 1965 and 28 March 1973.
Policy at the time regarding foreign awards to Australian military units required the foreign government to make a formal offer to the Australia Government. As no such offer was made, some units were overlooked for the Citation.”
Conclusion
The advice given to the Minister with respect to extending eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was incorrect. 8RAR was awarded a Meritorious Unit Commendation for the entire period of its tour of duty and a RVN CGWP Unit Citation for its leadership and valour during Operation Hammersley; an Operation which would not have been successful without the support of the RAAC and RAE personnel involved.
Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation should be extended to members of A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and 1 Fd Sqn involved.
——————————————————————————————–
28 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (VI)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
………
Other Failures to Recognize Supporting Arms Involved in Operation Hammersley
AWM. The Vietnam Gallery opened at the AWM in 2008. One of the display panels was set up to illustrate the role played by armour. It used Operation Hammersley as an example; however, only the casualty figures suffered by 8RAR were mentioned. After it was pointed out that casualties to the armour and engineer support involved in the Operation amounted to a further 3 KIA and 13 WIA, the information panel was changed.
Citation Proposal. The following is a quote from a ‘Proposal for a VN Unit Citation’ forwarded to 1ATF: “… and outstanding results. One hundred and eighty six enemy have been eliminated; the Battalion has suffered nineteen fatal casualties, eleven as a result of mine explosions and not as a result of direct enemy action. This comparison is indicative of the high standard of military professionalism displayed by the Battalion”. The US Army estimated from reliable sources that “over 100 enemy were killed” as a result of Operation Hammersley (Official History, p387). The ‘high standard of military professionalism’ which resulted in these casualties can be, to a considerable extent, attributed to the direct firepower brought to bear by supporting armour.
Official History. The Official History states that “Lieutenant General Tri added his congratulations in a personal letter to [the Task Force Commander]”. The reference given is the unit history of 8RAR’s tour in Vietnam. As has been seen at Attachments D & E, General Tri’s letter was not a personal one to the Task Force Commander. Leaving this aside, however, the important fact is that the senior commanders all recognized that it was the ‘8RAR group’ that was to be congratulated.
————————————————————————————————–
27 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (V)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
………
Significance of Operation Hammersley
A Battle Honour is the public recognition and commemoration of an outstanding achievement on the battlefield by a unit or formation of the Australian Army”. (DOD website) A battle honour was recommended for 1 Armd Regt, 3 Cav Regt and the RAR for Operation Hammersley. (Official History, p338)
Only five battle honours were approved for the whole of Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. While the assault on the Minh Dam Secret Zone (Long Hai Mountains) was an outstanding achievement of combined arms co-operation, bravery and self-sacrifice, the casualties resulting from anti-personnel mine explosions at the end, had political ramifications at a time when Australia was withdrawing troops. The battle honour was not approved. (Of course, the infantry involved, 8RAR, had already been recognised with the award of a RVN CGWP Unit Citation.)
RVN Joint General Staff (JGS) View of Operation Hammersley.
The differences between the wording of the citation proposed by 8RAR and the actual citation presented by the RVN are of interest. Some changes might have been incorporated by HQ 1 ATF and HQ AFV, but the same term used by General Tri in his letter “the forces of the 8th Battalion” appears. In addition to this, Operation Hammersley has been elevated in importance in the text… “their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills”. Interestingly, 8RAR’s proposal referred only to “8 Battalion’s operations”. It would seem that JGS recognized the bravery and sacrifices shared by all those involved in Operation Hammersley.
———————————————————————————
26 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (IV)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
………
HAVE THE SUPPORTING FORCES INVOLVED IN OPERATION HAMMERSLEY BEEN WRONGLY OVERLOOKED?
What Were the Forces of the 8th Battalion, 1ATF, During Operation Hammersley?
In addition to his own men, the CO 8RAR commanded tanks from A Squadron (1st Armoured Regiment) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) from B Squadron 3rd Cavalry Regiment, as well as field engineers (sappers) from 1 Field Squadron. The armoured vehicles closed with an engaged the enemy, while the sappers accompanied both armour and infantry into battle in order to clear mines. Without their efforts, many more casualties would have been incurred and it is likely that operation would not have been successful.
During the fierce assault on the enemy’s entrenched defensive position, casualties to the supporting armoured troopers and engineer sappers amounted to three killed and thirteen wounded. These resulted from: two tanks detonating anti-tank mines (one of which was destroyed); two tanks being struck by anti-armour rockets (RPGs); one APC destroyed by an anti-tank mine; one APC destroyed by a thrown satchel charge; and four APCs struck by RPGs. One sapper was Killed in Action (KIA) and another Wounded in Action (WIA).
The senior Vietnamese officer with responsibility for military operations in the area of Vietnam where 1ATF was located (Lieutenant General Tri), wrote to his US Senior Army Commander (Lieutenant General Ewell) congratulating “1st Australian Task Force forces” for their success on Operation Hammersley (Attachment D). General Ewell forwarded the letter to the Commander, 1ATF (Brigadier Weir), adding his own congratulation to the “8th Battalion Group“. Brigadier Weir copied this letter in a Minute and forwarded it the commanders of those units in the 8RAR Group (Attachment E). The Distribution list is: “CO 8RAR; OC A Sqn, 1 Armd Regt; OC B Sqn, 3 Cav Regt and OC 1 Fd Sqn”. The Task Force Commander asked recipients to “pass on to your soldiers our appreciation for their outstanding performance”.
——————————————————————————————-
25 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (III)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
………
Misconception That the CGWP Unit Citation was Awarded for the Entire Period of 8RAR’s Service in Vietnam (and not Just Operation Hammersley).
It has to be mentioned … the Minister was advised by staff that “On 24 October 1970, the contribution made by the 8th Battalion throughout its tour of duty in Vietnam, from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, was recognized by the awarding of the Citation”. Of course, an award for service which ended on 31 October, could not be made on 24 October. The citation does not mention 31 October 1970. The timing issue described below is of far more significance.
The ‘Proposal for VN Unit Citation’ is at Attachment C (best read with a magnifying glass in some places). The final paragraph commences: “During nine months of almost continuous contact with the enemy …”. Given the Battalion’s first operations were in December 1969, this means that the proposal was drafted in August 1970. This would have the latest time that the award process could have been initiated, if it was intended that a presentation be made prior to the Battalion’s departure from Vietnam.
The following quote from the AWM website is relevant: “The battalion was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamese government for its involvement in Hammersley.” https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/U53503
Misconception That Only one RVN Unit Award was Made to 8RAR.
The Official History of the Vietnam War (‘Fighting to the Finish’, p813) states that 8RAR was awarded the “RVNAF Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation”. The Meritorious Unit Commendation (MUC) and CGWP Unit Citation are two separate awards.
The MUC is awarded to a unit for meritorious performance during a complete tour of duty. It can be assumed that this is reflected in the citation by references to civic action projects such as assisting “the local population to reconstruct their houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc”. The CGWP, on the other hand, is awarded to either individuals or units who perform deeds of valour or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy. Only one such action is detailed in the citation, that for Operation Hammersley, conducted by “the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force”
——————————————————————————————
24 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (II)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. Starting on 20 Sepetember, the submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
…..
Aim.
The aim of this submission is twofold: (i) to show conclusively that advice given to Minister Tehan was incorrect; and (ii) to provide a convincing argument that the original submission should be reconsidered.
First Submission and Minister’s Response.
The original submission is at Attachment A and Minister Tehan’s response at Attachment B)
EVIDENCE OF INCORRECT ADVICE TO THE MINISTER
There are three primary misconceptions associated with the advice given to the Minister:
The RVN proposed the award of the CGWP Unit Citation
The CGWP Unit Citation was Awarded for the Entire Period of 8RAR’s Service in Vietnam; and
There was only one RVN unit award made to 8RAR.
Misconception That the CGWP Unit Citation was Proposed by RVN.
Minister Tehan’s advice suggests that the RVN initiated the citation for the Award that was made to 8RAR. This is not the case. The citations for all RVN awards for troops operating as part of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) were proposed by 1ATF. This is best exemplified by the situation in which a soldier has performed well, but not well enough to be eligible for an Imperial award. The sequence of events is well documented in files held by the Australian War Memorial (AWM).
Firstly, the soldier is recommended by his Commanding Officer (CO) for the award of, say, a CGWP. The soldier’s unit drafts a citation and passes it to HQ 1 ATF, who forwards it to HQ Australian Force Vietnam (AFV) in Saigon; who in turn pass it to the Free World Military Assistance Organisation (FWMAO). It is translated into Vietnamese and the FWMAO liaises with the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS).
If the JCS concur, the FWMAO advises HQ AFV that the RVN proposes to award the soldier the CGWP. HQ AFV then advises the soldier via HQ 1 ATF that “The RVN proposes to award you the CGWP”. The soldier is also advised at this time that the Commander AFV has given approval for him to accept the award and has asked that it be approved. Subsequently RVN JGS advise HQ AFV that the award has been approved. HQ AFV request HQ 1ATF to notify the soldier concerned. On average, the time from proposal to approval was three months (a range from two to six months).
In the case of the 8RAR, a copy of the draft citation provided to HQ 1ATF by 8RAR has been located in a file held by the AWM (293; 445/2/3). Its content is referred to below. [More to follow]
——————————————————————–
Badges
Following on from recent posts, the photo below has been provided by Rodger Tocock. The Australian Tank Corps came into being in 1927 and the ATC badge was worn by the 1st Tank Section in 1929 (as was the black beret).
It would be interesting if anyone could date this photo. If it was after 1932, it would mean that the ATC badge continued to be worn after members of the ATC were transferred to AASC. At some stage with the formation of the AAC and RAAC, gilt and then whitemetal Rising Sun badges were worn, before the Corps badge as we now know it, was adopted in 1955.
I can’t make out the ribbons being worn, ie. as to whether they are are WWI or WWII. Likewise, I can’t be sure that the overseas service chevrons are for WWI or are the different WWII variety. If they have chevrons, why not ribbons? My ‘feeling’ is that the photo was taken circa 1943.
—————————————————————————————–
23 September 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
The covering letter to the minister has been published on the Blog, as has the first installment of the Submission itself (a process interrupted by the RSL National Conference).
It’s not usual for a Ministerial submission to be followed up by a supplementary submission. But I felt that the information provided by Bruce Scott was too important not make it known to those considering the matter. Herewith a copy of the follow-up letter posted off yesterday (to the same list of recipients as the original submission).
Dear Minister,
It good to meet you at the RSL National Conference yesterday. I hope you had a successful visit to Canada. I’m sure that the Invictus Games would have been able to reach their full potential with the support they have deservedly received. It was a pity that you were not able to stay longer at the Conference, as the presentation and responses to questions by Simon Lewis was particularly well received by all attendees.
On 9 September 2017 I forwarded the attached letter to you. While I know that there would not have been an opportunity for your Department to fully consider the matter, today I received a letter from one of the groups of the many many veterans hoping to see the injustice overturned.
This letter made me aware of additional evidence in support of the submission (which I made on their behalf) and I thought it sufficiently important to warrant me passing it on for consideration with the evidence forwarded earlier.
You will recall that your advice had been that eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation could not be extended to those units that supported 8RAR in Operation Hammersley because it was thought that the Citation had been awarded to the Battalion for its entire period of service from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970.
It was, of course, the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation that was deservedly awarded to 8RAR for it’s entire tour of duty. Other evidence was provided to support the fact that the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its action in Operation Hammersley in the enemy’s Minh Dam Secret Zone (the Long Hai hills).
The CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR included a ‘streamer’ to be attached to the pike of the Battalion’s Regimental Colour. The attached two pages from the history of 8RAR (http://www.rar.org.au/documents/8-9RARHistoryComplete.pdf) state that the Streamer is named the ‘Minh Dam’ Streamer.
This reference from the Battalion itself, would seem to positively underscore the fact that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8RAR for its action on Operation Hammersley.
It follows that eligibility should be extended to those RAAC and RAE units who provided operational support at the time.
Yours sincerely.
—————————————————————————————————-
22 September 2017
The 2017 RSL National Conference
My notes….
Theme: Future Direction of the RSL
Traditional practices are not aligned with today’s governance requirements and a rewrite of how the RSL goes about doing things is necessary.
Organisational and cultural change is needed to prevent maladministration and an abuse of trust.
The RSL needs to demonstrate it has changed. The ideals of 100 years ago are still valid, but traditional approaches can no longer form part of the solution. ‘No matter when or where they served‘ has to be a mantra going forward. There are important commonalities between the needs of veterans of all conflicts.
Improved services for younger veterans cannot happen without an improved governance framework. Those leaving the service have a wish for on-going camaraderie, but this can only happen over the long term within a supportive well managed environment. The RSL must define its purpose, ie. not to boost numbers, but to ask: how can we best help?
The RSL/DVA partnership is essential. DVA are making positive changes, eg. the 1 Day non-liability mental health initiative. Anyone who has served one day in the ADF and who suffers a mental health condition will now be automatically accepted as a DVA client.
DVA’s revised acceptance of conditions means that a former serviceperson with a lumbar condition is automatically accepted if they have served for 12mths as an officer and 33 weeks for all others. This change means that the client doesn’t have prove that they lifted jerrycans and went over obstacle course etc etc as they did before.
DVA’s program of change means that they are working with the ADF to try and reach a situation whereby someone retiring becomes a DVA client before discharge. (There is a cultural problem to overcome here, ie. the Services are capability/’can-do’ focussed organisations and the future wellbeing of a discharged serviceperson requires a completely different focus.)
DVA is trying to counter the confidentiality provisions which means that they can’t be made aware of those who have served until they contact the Department. DVA want to know the details of all those who separate from the Services … when they separate, so they can be proactive in getting in touch with THEM
Families. A number of people spoke about the need to think about and deal with veterans in a holistic ‘family’ context, rather than just in terms of the veteran him/herself.
RSL Organisational Change. The RSL state based organisation is not working. A nationally based organisation has be adopted. This will be difficult, but it has to happen.
The Repatriation Medical Authority. I had a very interesting conversation with a member of the RMA (see below re function). He came to see me following my question the Secretary DVA about the way that claims associated with (initially) undetected blast trauma and similar wounds were handled by the Department. (The response was very encouraging, indicating a process of continual improvement as you would expect.) If anyone has questions related to RMA matters, I’d be happy to pass on direct.
“The RMA consists of a panel of five practitioners eminent in fields of medical science. Their role is to determine Statements of Principles (SOPs) for any disease, injury or death that could be related to military service, based on sound medical-scientific evidence. The SOPs state the factors which “must” or “must as a minimum” exist to cause a particular kind of disease, injury or death.”
———————————————————————————————————
21 September 2017
Note: There will be no blog on 21 September as I will be attending the RSL National Conference, the focus of which is on the changes that ESOs must make to remain viable today.
20 September 2017
Hammersley Recognition. (I)
The covering letter to the Minister was copied on the Blog recently. The submission itself will now be chronicled over the coming days:
Submission in Rebuttal of Advice Provided to Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Introduction
On 28 February 2017, a submission was made to the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs advocating an extension of eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to the 8th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
The Minister was advised that this could not happen because the RVN had made the award in recognition of the contribution made by 8RAR, and only 8RAR, throughout the Battalion’s tour of duty in Vietnam from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970.
The advice provided to the Minister was based solely on input from Defence Honours and Awards. Those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) were not involved. It is requested that decisions related to this new submission are made following consultation with the Heads of these Corps (see cc list for covering letter).
—————————————–
Badges (from Yesterday)
Thanks to Rodger Tocock for this photo of a whitemetal Rising Sun badge as worn by members of 1 Armd Regt in the early 50s.
Also a little more info re the Kings Crown badge he came across:
“The authenticity of the 1 Armd Regt beret badge with the King’s (Tudor) Crown was confirmed by one of Australia’s leading experts/dealers and was purchased by him on a confidential basis. The badge is what’s known as a Sample badge. A small qty, probably less that 10 would have been struck. The badges would have been manufactured by a locally based company such as Stokes. The die used to strike the badges would most likely have been destroyed as the badge was never approved nor worn.”
———————————————————————————————————
19 September 2017
Badges
A recent post by Mick Dunn (1 AR Assn Ops Manager) got me thinking. Mick’s post was to ask if anyone could identify the badge that a friend of his had found while fossicking. The badge was unusual, as it was surmounted by a King’s Crown. It was, I suggested, an RAAC collar badge as worn prior to 1955 (when the Queen’s Crown badge was issued).
What were the badges worn by the RAAC and its forebears, I wondered?
The Australian Tank Corps (ATC) came into being in 1927. The badge worn was:
In 1932 it was realized that the Defence Act did not allow for a tank corps. Members of the ATC were transferred to the Australian Army Service Corps and presumeably wore the badge of that Corps (which was, it seems, the badge of what was originally the NSW AASC).
In 1941 the Australian Armoured Corps (AAC) was formed; becoming the RAAC in 1948. I believe that the AAC originally wore a gilt rising sun badge, though at some stage this was ‘silvered’.
1 Armd Regt came into being in 1949. According to Digger History again, the 1 Armd Regt badge as we know it was introduced in 1951 with the King’s Crown; BUT only as collar badges. The Queen’s Crown beret badge was introduced in 1955.
Deduction from the above … the RAAC beret badge with King’s Crown was issued, but the 1 Armd Regt beret badge was not. Interestingly, some time ago, Rodger Tocock came across one of the latter. After some investigation it was verified as not being a ‘fake’ and was thought to have been a prototype made just prior to the King dying (and hence quite valuable). Photo of the design below.
Finally, the badge found by Mick’s friend (below at top) seems to be different to others pictured on the Net. Seems to me that this badge might be rather more significant (and valuable) than initially thought. Compare the detail of the crowns. (The direction of the tanks on the collar badges was reversed for left and right collar.) I’ve suggested a couple of sources for advice. Hopefully we’ll have an answer as to exactly what it’s history (and possible value) is before too long.
—————————————————————————————
18 September 2017
Why the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum was Closed.
It’s amazing how quickly history is rewritten.
The Administrator of the 1AR Assn Facebook page recently stated that the Forum was closed because it “got out of hand & became a slanging match”.
This is the first time that this has been given as a reason. On 12 June 2015, I listed the myriad of different reasons that had been given by the President/C’tee
Closure of the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum.
So far we’ve been told that the Forum was shut down because :
(i) the cost to the Assn was too great (it transpired later that there was no cost to the Assn);
(ii) then the reason became ‘a formal complaint had been made’ (the Forum was subsequently re-established on a no cost basis with a ‘disclaimer re any responsibility for the views expressed);
(iii) the Forum was then shut down again because, according to the President, “some content posted was offensive and was not representative to the standard and values that the Association abides to”;
(iv) then it was revealed that the shut down had been a result of a threat of litigation; and then;
(v) at the EGM in Albury (May 15) the President explained that because of “….changes to the legislation in Victoria and that under the current constitution we are not covered for liability insurance. This was a deciding factor to remove the forum” and finally
(vi) Mr C M Fenton OAM stated that the Forum was closed because no-one was using it.
The President would not reveal who made the formal complaint at (ii), nor what it was made about. The same secrecy applied to (iii), ie. members’ requests to find out what had been said which was offensive and by whom, were refused by the President.
I raised a formal grievance because of the lack of natural justice, ie. penalising members without giving them the opportunity to defend themselves. I was expelled before the grievance was heard … despite this being a breach of statutory regs, ie: “If the dispute is between the association and any of its members, the association must not take disciplinary action related to the same matter until the grievance procedure is completed.” (As it happened, the expulsion was found to be invalid, a decision the C’tee spent almost $1000 in legal fees to have confirmed, and I was reinstated.)
Doesn’t seem to be any point in posting the above on Facebook to make it clear that the view expressed by the Admin as to why the Forum was closed, conflicts with that (those) of the President/Ctee at the time (including that it was closed because it wasn’t being used). People will believe what they want to believe, irrespective of the ‘facts’.
———————————————————————————————-
17 September 2017
Hammersley Submission (Covering Letter II)
As mentioned earlier on the Blog, the submission was finished and sent off in the post last Monday. The second half of the covering letter is copied below.
Dear Minister,
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
……
“Statements from others in support of the fact that the CGWP Citation was awarded for Operation Hammersley are included in the original submission. Foremost among these is that from the then Governor General and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Force, which states “…in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palm earned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”.His Excellency Major General the Honourable Michael Jeffery, AC, CVO, AO, MC (Ret’d) should know. He served with 8RAR in Vietnam and was awarded the Military Cross for his actions as a company commander during Operation Hammersley.
Given that the previous advice to you, and from you to me, was incorrect … will you please ask that the extension of eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR be reconsidered as per the attached submission.
Supporting units involved in Operation Hammersley suffered three Killed In Action (KIA) and thirteen Wounded In Action (WIA). Many others suffered in different ways and continue to do so today. The families of all those involved know the cost that the unjust recognition of the bravery and sacrifice of only one part of the combined arms team has caused. (Other examples of this happening in respect to Operation Hammersley are described in the submission.) The solace of those ‘forgotten’ and their families is in your hands.
I have been informed that those who advised you did not consult those responsible for matters related to the service and sacrifice of members of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) and Royal Australian Engineers (RAE). It is requested that decisions related to this new submission are made following input from the Heads of these Corps.
Yours sincerely,”
For information:
Brigadier Chris Mills, RAAC Head of Corps
Brigadier David Wainwright, DSC, RAE Head of Corps
Mr Jack Chipman
Mr George Hulse, President, 1 Field Squadron Group RAE Qld Inc
——————————————————————————————-
16 September 2017
Hammersley Submission (Covering Letter I)
As mentioned earlier on the Blog, the submission was finished and sent off in the post last Monday. The first half of the covering letter is copied below.
Dear Minister,
Extension of Eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
Thank you for you letter of 7 May 2017 (attached) stating that the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of Gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation was awarded to 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR) for its contribution to operations throughout the whole of its tour duty from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970.
Because of this, your advisers contend that eligibility for the Unit Citation could not be extended to supporting units involved in what is highlighted in the Citation as the “most remarkable military operations” conducted by “the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force” in the Long Hai Hills (i.e. Operation Hammersley).
Unfortunately, the advice you received was wrong and you have been (unintentionally, I am sure) misled. The Unit Citation was not awarded to 8RAR for its whole tour of duty, ending on 31 October 1970. Proof is provided in the attached submission, which also includes new evidence confirming that the RVN CGWP Unit Citation was intended to be awarded to the whole of the ‘8RAR Group’ involved in Operation Hammersley. The units making up this Group are confirmed by the then Commander, 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF), in supporting documentation (attached).
It is acknowledged that the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation that 8RAR was awarded at the same time, under the same citation, was intended to reflect the Battalion’s whole tour of duty and recognise its meritorious achievements during that time. The purpose of the CGWP Unit Citation, however, was to recognize units for their performance in combat, on the same basis as individuals, i.e. those who perform deeds of valour or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy. Only one such action was described in the citation, that for Operation Hammersley. …..
———————————————————————————————————
15 September 2017
Association Governance.
It has been suggested that the 1 AR Assn appoint a Governance Group to advise the Management C’tee on governance issues. This proposal has been rejected.
It is understood that the C’tee believe that they have an automatic extension until the end of the year to submit a financial report to CAV. This would be the case if an AGM had not already been held this FY. This being the case, they need to request an extension of time (granted in two month intervals) by submitting an on-line form to CAV. They are supposed to have done this within a month of the AGM. In the circumstances, they have to submit it late. (There is a fee to pay for each two month extension.)
Dear CAV,
On 8 July 2017, the 1st Armoured Regiment Assn Inc held its AGM. A financial statement was presented, however, it only covered 11 mths of the 20115/16 FY, did not disclose how expenditure was made, nor from where funds had been received. Furthermore, it was not accompanied by a certificate certifying its correctness by two c’tee members.
The C’tee did not request an extension of time to submit the financial statement in writing and believe that they have until the end of December to submit a financial statement to CAV. Of course, this provision only applies if the first AGM of the FY had not been held. Given that it has, it would appear that the Assn has breached Sections 92, 94, 102 and 103 of the Act.
It is members’ understanding that (i) a written application for an extension of time should have been made and (ii) if approved, a Special General Meeting must be held before the end of November for members to vote on a new financial statement … minutes of this meeting, together with certificate and financial statement being submitted to CAV prior to 31 Dec 17.
Given that it’s CAV’s responsibility to ensure compliance with the Act, what should happen?
CAV have a special responsibility (and Section) to ensure compliance re financial management requirements of the Act. Assuming that a two month extension has been properly granted, the SGM must be held before the end of November and notice given to members 21 days before that. The deadline is 9 November. The other requirement to be met is that 10% of members have to be present, either in person or vide proxies, to form the quorum needed to vote on the special resolution.
Two months to hire an accountant, do the books, prepare a financial statement and arrange for a quorum.
———————————————————————————————————
14 September 2017
Openness and Transparency in Associations
Picking up the recent theme … the quotes below are some of those from media articles concerning the NSW RSL.
The effect of poor communication between the leadership group and members is obvious.
“Rank-and-file members are angry and frustrated by the lack of transparency from leadership…”
“It’s disgusting, absolutely disgusting. We’re not told anything about what’s going on…”.
“But that was only the beginning. Members are still being left in the dark. “
“He said he was worried for the future of the organisation. It feels very sad.”
“I think as the enquiries and the investigations move forward they are going to uncover more of these ridiculous expenses, more of these unjustifiable expenses, he said.”
“…where the money was going, including questions about some members who were getting interest free loans, which may or may not have been paid back,”
“But… at the very least they’re irregular and they don’t represent best practice”.
“… anyone criticising the RSL’s leadership has been stonewalled, bullied or threatened with loss of position or loss of life membership.”
“… who did the right thing by … trying to introduce greater transparency measures and was punished for it,”
——————————————————————————————————
13 September 2017
Doing the Right Thing
“It’s the action, not the fruit of the action, that’s important. You have to do the right thing. It may not be in your power, may not be in your time, that there’ll be any fruit. But that doesn’t mean you stop doing the right thing. You may never know what results come from your action. But if you do nothing, there will be no result.” ~ Mahatma Gandhi
There’s been something ‘niggling away’ at me for a while. The heading of the current section of the blog is: Doing the Right Thing’
How does one justify spending time on the things related to trying to ensure proper governance of an association to which one belongs ….when there are so many life and death situations confronting millions of people throughout the world?
In answer to this, I like to think that ‘doing the right thing‘ in one place has the effect of ‘doing the right thing‘ everywhere. If everyone was to do whatever they could to ensure that the ‘right thing’ was done in terms of everything that they were experiencing … we would have a better world.
I know that it’s idealistic, but that’s it.
Breaches of the Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012
I’ve copied sections of the Act below. These indicate that the 1AR Assn could have held its first AGM after the end of the 16/17 FY, up until the end of Nov 17. There would be a month allowed to submit the financial statement to CAV after that (ie. 31 December deadline).
BUT … 1AR Assn held its first AGM after the end of the 16/17 FY on 8 July. This means that they had until 8 August to submit the financial statement to CAV.
The 1AR Assn could have requested, in writing, an extension of time in which to submit the financial report. If this was done (and approved) within a month of the AGM, there would be no breach. However, this was not the case.
The 1AR Assn is also in breach of other provisions of the Act in terms of the nature of the financial statement presented at the AGM and the lack of certification.
This is what governance is all about. It has been suggested to the C’tee that they might consider appointing a ‘Governance C’tee’ to advise the Management C’tee. Such suggestions just go into a void without acknowledgement, let alone response.
What do ‘breaches of the Act’ mean? There is a scale of fines levied for each breach, however, CAV have some discretion. Hopefully they will be able to advise the C’tee how best to move forward in keeping with the requirements of the Act
Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012
63 Annual General Meeting: An incorporated association must hold a general meeting of its members … within 5 months after the end of the financial year of the incorporated association.
92 Obligation to prepare financial statements. As soon as practicable after the end of each financial year of the association, the committee of a tier one association must cause financial statements for that year to be prepared [which] must give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the association during and at the end of its last financial year. Breach
94 Submission of financial statement to annual general meeting
At the first annual general meeting of a tier one association following a financial year of the association, the committee must submit to the members the financial statements for that financial year. The financial statements must— give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of the association during and at the end of its last financial year; and have attached a certificate in the prescribed form signed by two members of the committee certifying that that is the case. Breach
The committee must ensure that the minutes of the annual general meeting include a copy of the financial statements submitted and the certificate referred to above. Breach
102 Lodgement of financial statements with Registrar …after each financial year of the association, the secretary of an incorporated association must lodge with the Registrar in accordance with this section a copy of the financial statements of the association prepared for that year. The financial statements must be lodged with the Registrar within one month after the date of the annual general meeting of the association in which the financial statements were submitted to the members of the association. Breach
103 Exemption from requirement to lodge financial statements The secretary of an incorporated association may apply to the Registrar to be exempt from one or more of the requirements under section 102 either generally or in relation to a specified year. The application must be in writing; and state the reasons for the exemption; and be accompanied by the prescribed fee. Breach
———————————————————————————————————
12 September 2017
Consultation
Three of the fundamentals for an open and transparent association proposed three days ago were:
Open and effective communication channels between Management C’tee and members;
Consultation with members on new initiatives and associated expenditure of funds (ie. as distinct to on-going management costs)
Encouragement of members to put forward ideas for the betterment of the Assn;
An example of an initiative which failed probably because of a lack of consultation is the RAAC Black hats Chapter. The following is an extract from the Chairman’s Annual Report for 2015:
“Branch/Chapter for ACT–based Black Hats. Following a series of meetings with
Maj Gen Roger Powell, Maj Gen Mike Krause and the now RSM-A Don Spinks OAM, the Corporation was asked to look at the viability or otherwise of establishing a Sub-branch or Chapter for ACT-based serving RAAC members and former members living in the area. The proposal for a sub-branch is to enable serving RAAC members and former ACT-based members to have a more formalised grouping for social and commemorative events. This is something that has sadly been lacking in the ACT for a long time. The 1AR Association’s newly-elected ACT Representative WO1(Ret’d) Ian “Gooch” Cummings, has taken this matter up.
It now appears Ian has been successful and has received an agreement with the Dock at Kingston to become the ACT Back Hat RV for get-togethers”
The above was remarked upon in the Blog post for 9 October 2015:
“One has to wonder if 1AR Assn State Branches will become the nucleus for similar Chapters in other cities and if B Sqn 1/15 RSWL at HMAS Harman will be invited to join. Speaking to Ian Cummings, he intends to conduct activities under the umbrella of the 1AR Assn (rather than RAAC Corporation).”
Surprisingly, there was no consultation with Black Hats resident in the ACT, as regards the initiative. What questions could’ve been asked in a quick survey? Possibly: Are you in favour? If not, why not? Do you have any ideas for gatherings, activities etc? Would you be prepared to assist in any capacity? Do you have any thoughts as to why Black Hat gatherings of the past have ceased? Are you in contact with any other Black Hats here in the ACT?
And the list could go on. The thing is that this didn’t happen, the inaugural point of contact has resigned and not been replaced and the initiative is dead in the water. Reviving it now will be much harder than if time had been invested in prior consultation … rather than acting on assumptions.
—————————————————————————————-
11 September 2017
Governance of Associations: The Need for Openness and Transparency
” it appears in some cases Councillors were not aware of the extent of the organisation’s failings, or not able to muster the support necessary to ensure that good governance was implemented and followed. That is not to say that Councillors haven’t tried to fix our problems; there are many examples of attempts to reform and improve our practices and governance. There also appear to be, sadly, cases in which individuals have taken advantage of this complex and non-transparent governance environment. We are now investigating several incidents of financial transactions that are at the very least, irregular. I also want to acknowledge here those staff, both former and current, as well as State Councillors who, at different times and in differing ways, attempted to sound the alarm.
Transparency into finances has been a particular problem.
…many areas corporate governance and accountability may have fallen short of the modern standards expected of an organisation
In short, we have quite a mess to fix. And we are discovering new issues every day.”
In the spirit of renewal and greater transparency, I have asked our staff to investigate the establishment of an external, independent, RSL Whistleblower hotline so that any league member can confidentially report issues of concern.
Apart from the obvious matters of transparency involving governance and accountability, I find two aspects of particular interest:
A number of RSL members attempted to “sound the alarm”. They obviously weren’t listened to and the organisation ended up in the clag (one can’t help but assume that these members were probably also roundly criticised); and
To rectify the above, an independent hotline has been established whereby members can raise their concerns. At the time it was shut down, one wondered if the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum was seen as a threat in terms of seeking explanations re governance issues.
——————————————————————————————————
10 September 2017
Openness and Transparency in Associations.
Yesterday I canvassed what sort of things an Association which valued openness and transparency might do. Three of these were:
Minutes of Management C’tee meetings being available to members;
Encouragement of members to put forward ideas for the betterment of the Assn;
Consultation with members on new initiatives and associated expenditure of funds (ie. as distinct to on-going management costs)
Out of interest I decided to see what sort of information was available on the subject on the Internet. Given that it’s not rocket science … it’s unsurprising to find references which support the above:
I referred to this recently. The topic is related to manner in which the Army has learnt while engaged in operations. Part of information I provided was:
“An additional factor was the ingrained acceptance that the person in charge knew what was best and if anything could be done to improve things, it would’ve been. We needed an Army when those that who tell the Emperor that he’s got no clothes, is the normal, rather than the exception. In essence the Army failed in its duty of care.
Doing the research into Openness and Transparency above, I came across someone who improved on my reference no end. “Give the Emperor a Mirror”, they said.
How well put …. but would the Emperor use it?
———————————————————————————————————
9 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation.
What a load off my mind! The submission is completed and will be in the mail on Monday.
What Does an Open and Transparent Association Look Like?
I hope the answer might be one of the things to come out of the RSL National Conference later this month. It’s a question which certainly deserves a lot of thought.
Some of the basics would have to be:
Minutes of Management C’tee meetings being available to members;
Priorities for the Assn’s work being discussed with members, agreed, and made known to all;
A Financial Statement which details all expenditure and income;
The involvement of all members in development and amendment of the Constitution and By Laws;
Open and effective communication channels between Management C’tee and members;
Consultation with members on new initiatives and associated expenditure of funds (ie. as distinct to on-going management costs)
Encouragement of members to put forward ideas for the betterment of the Assn;
Confirmation to members that statutory regulations are being met.
More thought to be given this this.
———————————————————————————————————
8 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation
Work started on 1 September 2017 on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested in a supporting submission.
Given that I’m working flat out on the letter and submission, I thought that it wouldn’t do any harm to go back to the very start and copy the blog posts which tell the story; ie. my intentions to draft a submission for 1AR Assn to forward to the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC Corporation’s position that they couldn’t make representations on behalf of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and Chairman’s statement that he didn’t want anything to do with the bloody thing … and, finally, my decision to ‘go it alone’.
It’s been a long couple of years, but I’m not giving up; those who served during Op Hammersley deserve no less. I believe that the story was misrepresented at the recent A Sqn reunion; those who did so, no doubt have their reasons … these may become a clear as the ‘story’ progresses from 7 June 2015:
Blog Extract #5: 25 March 2016
Hammersley Unit Citation/Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour
Armouredadvocates recently asked if anyone knew where things were at with the Hammersley submission [I’d drafted]…
Facebook post by Chairman, RAAC Corporation, 9 March: ”
“The award for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always…. Tony [the President of the 1AR Assn] has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of our Advisory Board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing.We are there to lobby at the higher levels of Government if the application falls over”.
——————————————————————————————————–
7 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation
Work started on 1 September 2017 on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested in a supporting submission.
Given that I’m working flat out on the letter and submission, I thought that it wouldn’t do any harm to go back to the very start and copy the blog posts which tell the story; ie. my intentions to draft a submission for 1AR Assn to forward to the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC Corporation’s position that they couldn’t make representations on behalf of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and Chairman’s statement that he “didn’t want anything to do with the bloody thing” … and, finally, my decision to ‘go it alone’.
It’s been a long couple of years, but I’m not giving up; those who served during Op Hammersley deserve no less. I believe that the story was misrepresented at the recent A Sqn reunion; those who did so, no doubt have their reasons … these may become a clear as the ‘story’ progresses from 7 June 2015:
Blog Extract #4: 12 October 2015
The RAAC Corporation Chairman’s 2015 Annual Report (Cont)
Op Hammersley Recognition/ 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn.
“As the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn is not a Member Assn of the Corporation and is not prepared to assist its own members, the Corporation exercised its discretion and acted as a facilitator for both groups of 3 Cav veterans through making representations to various ESOs and for veterans including a former D-ARMD, to help their cause. This included facilitating a line of communication between the 1AR Assn and a representative of the 3 Cav Hammersley veterans.” (Extract from RAAC Corporation Annual Report)
Armouredadvocates commented on the above recognition issue on 4 and 5 October 2015. Another matter now arises, however. “The 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn … is not prepared to assist its own members”. Is this a true representation of the situation, or does it actually represent a breakdown in relations between the 3 Cav Assn President and/or Committee and the RAAC Corporation Chairman? If it was a true statement, one would expect the 3 Cav Assn to have very few members and those that remained would be very disgruntled. There are no such feelings aired on the Assn forum (which is very well utilised).
Advocacy by the RAAC Corporation
“… the Corporation’s policy is, any submissions not tendered by the relevant authorised Delegates to the Corporation for consideration and voting, do not have standing and will not be [considered]. Additionally, the Corporation Executive does not and will not, respond to external comment directed at how it should operate and what it should focus on. If individuals have concerns about the Corporation Executive’s operations they should in the first instance take up the issue via their own Corporation Council.”
Previous comment on the Report noted that there is no public means by which individuals can communicate with the RAAC Corporation (as they can with any other ESO). It is hard to understand therefore, how, individuals can tender submissions or make enquiries. The above policy means that, should the Corporation become aware of a suggestion … it will ignore it, irrespective of how ‘good’ it might be, unless it comes to the RAAC Corporation from a member assn. Is this not a case of cutting off your nose to …
6 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation Work started on 1 September 2017 on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested in a supporting submission.
Given that I’m working flat out on the letter and submission, I thought that it wouldn’t do any harm to go back to the very start and copy the blog posts which tell the story; ie. my intentions to draft a submission for 1AR Assn to forward to the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC Corporation’s position that they couldn’t make representations on behalf of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and Chairman’s statement that he “didn’t want anything to do with the bloody thing” … and, finally, my decision to ‘go it alone’.
It’s been a long couple of years, but I’m not giving up; those who served during Op Hammersley deserve no less. I believe that the story was misrepresented at the recent A Sqn reunion; those who did so, no doubt have their reasons … these may become a clear as the ‘story’ progresses from 7 June 2015:
Blog Extract #3: 20 July 2015
Submission re the Extension of Eligibility for GGWP Awarded to 8RAR
The following is from the July 1AR Assn newsletter:
“Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm Citation. For A Squadron’s actions during Op Hammersley.
A submission is being prepared for A SQN1 AR SVN to receive the Vietnamese Cross of gallantry with Palm Citation as part or the 8 RAR group during OP HAMMERSLEY. The award was intended we believe for the group as a whole but only given to 8 RAR. We believe this is wrong that needs to be rectified. At this year’s AGM it was decided the association should be part of a delegation to press for the award to be passed on to A SQN SVN. More as we progress through the submission.”
I’m surprised that the Submission is referred to as “being prepared”. I thought we’d done a pretty job on it (presumably which is why it was sent as is to 3-4 Cav Regt Assn as had been drafted) … but it’s good to know that we’ll hear more as the 1 AR Assn C’tee ‘finalises’ it.
Interestingly, the following wording has been retained: “This submission is presented by the Chairman and Members of the Advisory Committee of the RAAC Corporation, on behalf of the President and Committee of the 1 Armoured Regiment Association”.
The RAAC Corporation had previously stated that it could not advance the submission as the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation. One would’ve thought that the Corporation could have advocated on behalf of the 1st Armd Regt Assn and 3-4 Cav Regt Assns, both members of the Corporation. Maybe this is to be done (then again, maybe the wording has been overlooked.
I don’t need acknowledgement … but I really do believe that Bruce Scott deserves recognition for highlighting both (i) the scope of the Citation which referred to the ‘forces of 8RAR’ and (ii) the references in the 8RAR history and Michael Jeffery’s address to ‘The CGWP Unit Citation being awarded to 8RAR for Op Hammersley’. If this had not happened, the Submission would not have reached the stage that it has.
—————————————————————————————
5 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation Work started on 1 September on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested in a supporting submission.
Given that I’m working flat out on the letter and submission, I thought that it wouldn’t do any harm to go back to the very start and copy the blog posts which tell the story; ie. my intentions to draft a submission for 1AR Assn to forward to the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC Corporation’s position that they couldn’t make representations on behalf of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and Chairman’s statement that he “didn’t want anything to do with the bloody thing” … and, finally, my decision to ‘go it alone’.
It’s been a long couple of years, but I’m not giving up; those who served during Op Hammersley deserve no less. I believe that the story was misrepresented at the recent A Sqn reunion; those who did so, no doubt have their reasons … these may become a clear as the ‘story’ progresses from 7 June 2015:
Blog Extract #2: 7 July 2015
Extension of Eligibility of the CGWP Awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley
The RAAC Corporation’s Position and the Consequences. As it is understood, President 1 AR Assn supports the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s view that the Corporation cannot take the lead re the CGWP Submission, because the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation (the Submission seeks to have those who provided support from 1AR, 3 Cav and RAE, acknowledged). The 1AR Assn, therefore, has to advocate the award alone. If unsuccessful, the RAAC Corporation might then offer support.
What’s this mean in terms of the Submission? The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAT), where the real power lies in terms of approving the Submission, can only consider it after Defence Honours and Awards (DHA) have ‘knocked it back’. So, 1 AR Assn submits to DHA, it is knocked back (as expected) and is resubmitted to DHAT. If it is knocked back, the new submission, supported by the RAAC Corporation, is submitted to DHA and then, finally, DHAT. The whole process has been made twice as complicated as it need be, with consequential lessening of its chances of approval (compared with a Submission which is supported by the RAAC Corporation right from the start).
The Lack of Moral Justification for This Position. Part of the RAAC Corporation’s Constitution refers to fostering the interests of the RAAC. The members of 3 Cav Regt who served in Vietnam did so as part of the RAAC. Some are members of the 3 and 4 Cav Regt Association (a member of the RAAC Corporation), some are members of the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association (not a member of the RAAC Corporation), while others are not members of either Association. How petty can we be as former members of the RAAC, to deny to those who fought with 3 Cav Regt during Operation Hammersley,the best opportunity to achieve the recognition that is due to them? Apart from anything else, recognition for them, is recognition for the RAAC. Isn’t this what the RAAC Corporation stands for??.
Reason for 1 AR Assn’s Acceptance of the Position.Whenever a Director of a Corporation is also the President of one of the Corporation’s own member Associations, there is likely to be a conflict of interest. By simply agreeing to the position of the Corporation Chairman, 1 AR Assn is not only a party to denying due recognition of those who served with 3 Cav Regt, but also denying its own members the best chance of due recognition of their gallant efforts.
What Should be Done. The President of the 1AR Assn should step down from his Directorship of the RAAC Corporation and strongly advocate the justification for the RAAC Corporation to support the Submission (noting in doing so that there is minimal work involved … the Submission is complete, it only needs to be submitted.)
I’m reminded that a number of people sign off emails with the words “Yours in Armour”,how hollow this sounds in light of the above
———————————————————————————————————
4 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation Work started on 1 September on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested in a supporting submission.
Given that I’m working flat out on the letter and submission, I thought that it wouldn’t do any harm to go back to the very start and copy the blog posts which tell the story; ie. my intentions to draft a submission for 1AR Assn to forward to the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC Corporation’s position that they couldn’t make representations on behalf of 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Assn and Chairman’s statement that he “didn’t want anything to do with the bloody thing” … and, finally, my decision to ‘go it alone’. It’s been a long couple of years, but I’m not giving up; those who served during Op Hammersley deserve no less. I believe that the story was misrepresented at the recent A Sqn reunion; those who did so, no doubt have their reasons … these may become a clear as the ‘story’ progresses from 7 June 2015:
Blog 7 June 2015
Recognition of RAAC Involvement in Operation Hammersley 1970.
Email text …
Dear RAAC Corporation:
As you know a commemoration is to take place today to mark the 5oth anniversary of 1 Troop A Sqn 4/19 PWLH’s arrival in Vietnam. A deployment which earned them not only their place in history, but also the recognition of our Vietnamese Allies with the award of their Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation (CGWP).
Apart from those who were part of the US 173 Airborne Brigade, other Australian units that have been honoured in this way include AATTV, 2 Sqn RAAF, and 8RAR. Unfortunately the award to 8RAR, like that to 173 Airborne Brigade, did not involve recognition of supporting units. This issue, with respect to the 1RAR Brigade Group, has now been overturned through the hard work of the RAR Association.
The success of Operation Hammersley, for which 8RAR were honoured with the CGWP Unit Citation, was largely dependant of the tremendous fighting spirit of the AFV crews of A Sqn 1st Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt. As per the submission on behalf of the 1RAR Brigade Group, the units supporting 8RAR also deserve recognition. The tank squadron commander, the then Major Jack Chipman, has long called for this.
It will be seen from the extract below, that the Vietnamese clearly intended the citation be awarded to 8RAR andunits that provided combat support during Operation Hammersley. Extract of Citation:
“Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.”http://www.vvaa.org.au/8rar.htm
While the recognition of infantry is undoubtedly deserved, unfortunately it has tended to overshadow the efforts of supporting arms which are equally deserving. An example of this was seen in the Vietnam Gallery when it initially opened. The comment below is one of a number that I made at the time (all of which have resulted in changes to the information presented):
“Reference is made to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well…3KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’)…it would seem appropriate to mention them.” The chairman of the AWM C’tee was a former member of 8RAR and I was told that he vetted everything to do with the unit.
Having said all the above, is it possible for the RAAC Corporation to contact the RAR Association to ascertain the process they followed to have Defence Honours and Awards extend the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to the 173 Airborne Brigade to the 1RAR battalion Group under their command … with a view to making a submission for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersely, particularly A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and the field engineers? In closing, I’ve added some below some references Operation Hammersley in ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’.
Best wishes, Bruce
(i) “Both the ARVN and the local population had been shown that there was no such thing as a safe haven for the VC. It was important now that the Vietnamese Forces build on the success and prevent the enemy re-establishing themselves. Consideration was given to the award of a Battle Honour to 1st Armoured Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the Royal Australian Regiment for Operation Hammersley. The Committee responsible decided not to recommend this, however.”
(ii) “8RAR were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation. Understandably, there was considerable disappointment among tank and APC crews that their Units’ involvement was not also recognised in this way.”
———————————————————————————————————
3 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation Work started on 1 September on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested. Comment: This is turning into a hard to deny justification, what a pity that only the sappers (not the RAAC Corporation) wish to help with it.
1 Armd Regt Flag on Coffin?
Sometime ago, a member of the 1AR Assn asked on Facebook if he would be allowed to have his coffin draped with the 1AR Flag. I posted the RTR position (they have a ‘special ‘coffin drape’ and suggested:
One would expect that the authority for the use of the 1AR flag in any situation would be 1AR.
There would seem to be two pre-requisites for its use to cover a coffin: (i) the deceased had served in 1AR and (ii) he was not dishonourably discharged.
The 1AR Assn could discuss relevant protocols with 1AR. It is to be assumed that (i) there would be a particular way to position the flag, (ii) the flag would be removed before the coffin is covered with soil, and (iii) the removal, folding, and possible presentation to NOK, would be done in a dignified manner.
There might also be a protocol associated with using the 1AR flag, together with any others the deceased may desire, to cover the coffin.
As far as I’m aware there has been no response published from the 1AR Assn. (I hope the enquirer hasn’t ‘passed’ during the wait.)
The CA Army History Conference 2017
The theme is this year’s Conference is The Skill of Adaptability: the Learning Curve in Contact. The conference will discuss, through historical examples, how armies learn while in contact with the enemy. I’ve advised one of those involved as follow:
“When I was researching ‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘ it became apparent to me how much we had failed to have any ‘real time’ benefit from our learning experience in Vietnam. This was is stark contrast to the Falklands. I was serving in the UK at the time and we received daily operational analysis as to what was working and what wasn’t. (I believe the Rapier air defence system was on a learning curve at the time.)
Anyway, I realised that I had an obligation as a historian to ensure that lessons that I was becoming aware of, weren’t overlooked as far as the Army today was concerned. I set out a list a points (attached) and forwarded to the Head of Corps, RAAC (Major General David Chalmers). I later expanded this into a larger paper (which I can scan). I also have the response as far as the RAAC aspects are concerned. This was heartening … however, almost 40 years had elapsed. The worry is the extent of the capability gap that existed in the interim.
A simple example of our negligence in terms of Operational Analysis in Vietnam was that of the lack of any means by which infantry could indicate a target to tanks in jungle. In WWII a Very pistol was used. This is exactly what was needed in Vietnam.
Some examples are broader, eg: Anti-Mine Clearance Capability. How easy would it have been to remove the head from a tank canister round and fire the ‘blank’ cartridge to uncover a suspicious object? Of course we weren’t smart enough to do this and the enemy learnt that when we saw something out of place on the road or a track, we would halt and sent forward the engineer mini-team. What did the enemy do? Set up a booby trap. The sappers went forward, prodded with their bayonet and BOOM!
There’s another lesson here. The enemy knew the sappers would use their bayonets, so set the booby trap up to be initiated when the metal blade touched the fly wire surrounding the explosive. Lesson(?). Fibreglass prodders. Was it learnt? Yes it was, but this was more often not the case.
For example … the enemy developed mines that were initiated by a pressure switch and detonated an explosive charge which fired down (from a tree etc) above the tank. Lesson? Were tank crews training in Australia still taught to look out for all signs of mines on the ground in front of them, or were they also taught to look up at suspicious objects which could explode above them? Sadly, we know the answer.”
—————————————————————————————————
2 September 2017
Hammersley Unit Citation Work started on 1 September on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested.
2/14 QMI ACR Tank Squadron
The following was included in the Blog a couple of days ago:
“Tanks? Some time ago, following the then CA’s assurance that raising the 2/14 QMI ACR’s tank squadron would happen, it was reported in the Army newspaper that it was scheduled for next year. Whether or not the tanks required have yet been approved for purchase (let alone purchased) has not been publicly announced, nor whether or not a decision has been made to locate them in Brisbane or Shoalwater Bay.”
Further information was provided in the following Fin Review article on 7 Mar 2017. Col Tony Duus, a very capable armoured corps officer, explains where the situation is at in terms of public information. Unfortunately, research re LAND 8160 reveals little more re the additional 31 tanks. The 2017/18 budget papers do not seem to mention the project either.
So a third tank sqn is desirable, but will it be approved? Or put another way … how long is the capability gap to continue? What will be the effect when 7 Bde becomes the ‘ready’ bde under the Plan Beersheba force generation cycle?
The Australian Army’s main battle tank (MBT) is the M1 Abrams, an American 62-tonne behemoth that carries four people and a 120mm main gun. It has not seen combat since 59 of them were bought in 2007, and Australia has not used an MBT since it deployed its Centurions in the Vietnam War.
The MBT is the core of an Army’s ability to engage in sustained close combat: when you can actually see the enemy, an MBT is an indispensable and devastating weapon, says Colonel Anthony Duus, the Australian Army’s Director of Armoured Fighting Vehicles Systems.
Duus says we may have one of the best tanks in the world, but we have too few, we have the ‘analogue’ models and we do not have the domestic sustainment capacity for the M1 Abrams in the way that the RAAF and RAN sustains its fleets.
The Army’s Plan Beersheba from 2011 – ratified in the 2013 Defence White Paper – stipulates three armoured cavalry regiments, which each contains a tank squadron.
Duus says the current Land 8160 phase 1 project will resolve the challenges, although the exact details are still being finalised.
“We see the optimum fleet size for the M1 Abrams fleet as 90,” says Duus. “That’s a return to the fleet size we had with the Leopard but it’s still short of the 110 we had with the Centurion. Ninety is a realistic fleet size to cover three tank squadrons.”
———————————————————————————————————
1 September 2017
News Bulletin 3
Hammersley Unit Citation Work starts today on the letter to the Minister to advise him that the advice he received from Defence, on which he based his decision not to extend eligibility to RAAC and RAE units involved, is completely false. Reconsideration, on the basis of official documentary evidence, will be requested.
RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’
The following extract is from a speech by the CA to the Royal United Services Institute (Vic) last month. As mentioned in the Blog on 28 August “The RAAC ARES will soon be a thing of the past as far as mounted combat is concerned“.
“As well as changes in recruiting, training and participation models, change isunderway with respect to equipment. Modern land platforms, such as the armoured vehicles being acquired for the Army in Project Land 400, are highly capable. They are also highly complex and costly. Due to the complexity of these vehicles they will not be crewed by Reserve personnel. This is a factor of the number of training days per year necessary to establish and maintain crew proficiency. The high cost of this capability also makes it unlikely that our nation can afford more than a number sufficient to equip our full time brigades.
Of course, the Reserve will utilise Land 400 Armoured vehicles, as Cavalry Scouts for the Armoured Cavalry Regiments and as reinforcements for the infantry battalions of the 1st, 3rd and 7th Brigades. “
Centenary Commemoration Beersheba.
On 31 October 2017 the Australian light Horse Association will be conducting a re-enactment of 4 LH Bde’s charge. The ANZAC Museum is also to be opened on the site. The following links refer.
As with the centenary of Cambrai, there doesn’t seem to be any public info as to what involvement the RAAC Corporation might have or whether the RAAC will be officially represented.
Received a call yesterday from someone who recently visited the Armour and Arty Museum (http://ausarmour.com/). They were really impressed with the range of exhibits and their condition. This was a person with almost 40 years service in the RAAC, so he knew what he was talking about when he said that it was well worth a visit.
3 Cav Regt Guidon
When emblazoned, the 3 Cav Regt Guidon will be unique in the Australian Army in bearing all five battlehonours awarded for the Vietnam War. (The Guidon is now in the custody of B Sqn 3/4 Cav regt at the SOA)
Longest Serving Member of the RAAC : Old Goat (?)
The Old Goat Award (a decanter engraved with all previous recipients) is made to the oldest serving graduate of the US Navy Academy (goats have had a special place in early naval history).
Would it be a good thing to recognise the longest serving member of the RAAC … acknowledging those who may have given 40 years or more service to the Corps? If this was thought to be something worth recognising …how should it be done?
This could be an initiative taken up by the RAAC Head of Corps (or RAAC Corporation). To be inclusive, it can’t be the Old Panzer Award or the Old Track Award … how about the Old Fart Award?
—————————————————————————
31 August 2017
News Bulletin 2
3 and 4 Cavalry Regiments Association. B Sqn 3/4 Cav Regt now fulfills the role of Support Sqn at the School of Armour (and has custody of the Guidons of 3 Cav Regt and Four Cav Regt). The RAAC Corporation Ltd lists 3&4 Cav Regts Assn Inc as a member assn with Tony Shanks as its rep on the Executive Council. Does the 3&4 Cav Regts Assn still exist?
Bushmaster PMV. Talking about the RAAC Corporation Ltd website, it states that “the RAAC is primarily equipped with three types of vehicle: A1 Abrams, ASLAV and Bushmaster”. The SOA, however, states that the RAAC no longer operates the Bushmaster (hence SOA only provide training in the operation of the remote weapon station). Who is correct?
Crew Protective Dress: ASLAV and M113AS4. When Centurions were operated on Puckapunyal range, crews had to wear tank suits with sleeves rolled down at all times (because of the danger of fire). This dress code was strictly enforced because of the danger to tank crews. When Centurions were operated in Vietnam, ‘greens’ were worn with sleeves rolled up because of the daily temperatures and humidity. No-one in Army made the effort to purchase lightweight flame retardant protective clothing. Army failed in its duty of care. Do the crews of light AFVs today have flame retardant protective clothing? (Tank crews are issued special tank suits designed for the risk environment associated with the Abrams.)
1AR Standard Following on from the post on 25 August, the CO at the time the battlehonour insignia were received by 1 Armd Regt was the then Lt Col Gerry McCormack. Apparently the insignia arrived in the mail … the Vietnam Theatre Honour and three Battlehonours. Until very recently, only two battlehonours were allowed to be emblazoned. The decision was made that Coral-Balmoral would be left off. (The envelope with the original C-B insignia is possibly still in RHQ.) Ladies who were skilled at sewing were ‘enlisted’ to tack the insignia in place (wearing white gloves), before the Standard was sent the Commonwealth Clothing Factory, Melbourne, for permanent emblazoning.
LAND 400 Quote from ASPI’s ‘Strategist (29 August 2017):
“Major General David Coghlan, head of Defence’s land systems division, has announced that the year-long risk-mitigation activity ‘to help Defence choose the supplier of the new Mounted Combat Reconnaissance Capability’ has come to an end. The testing focused particularly on ‘protection, lethality and mobility’, and involved mine blast testing of both prototypes. The decision on whether Rheinmetall or BAE Systems will be awarded the contract for Land 400 Phase 2 will be announced in the first half of 2018.”
“The turret can be optioned for demanding requirements such as the Australian Army LAND 400 program, or fielded in a basic configuration which still delivers extremely accurate 30 mm firepower.”
———————————————————————————————————
30 August 2017 (Same date as ‘yesterday’, so as to get the calendar back on track.)
Commerce Before Human Rights?
“The EU and Australia, focusing on commercial relations, made limited efforts to … advocate for improved respect for basic rights in Vietnam.”
Extracts from an article on ADF assistance to Vietnam in the 28 August edition of ASPI’s ‘The Strategist’, are copied below. (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/) :
“Senator Payne said that over decades of diplomatic engagement, Australia had sent strong messages of support to Vietnam ‘that we are prepared to be very consistent in our involvement, that we are not capricious in any way, we just get on and do business’.
At the Hanoi Peacekeeping Centre, Senior Colonel Nguyen The Trung said Australia was providing Vietnam with considerable help and that was greatly appreciated. ‘We are very proud of the cooperation with Australia’, he said. “
There was no mention at all in the lengthy article to any link between Australian aid to Vietnam and improvements in continuing human rights abuses (especially as regards former ARVN servicemen and their families … our ‘Allies’ in a thirteen year War).
Interestingly, DFAT hosted an Australia-Vietnam bilateral meeting on human rights on 10 August 2017. Not surprisingly, Human Rights Watch called for Australia to press for significant progress on human rights abuses. The media has been silent on the outcome.
The question must be asked: Is Australia’s ‘stand’ on human rights abuses in Vietnam, a token one … one which is secondary to the development of cordial relations aimed at commercial advantage?
Postscript:
Amnesty International’s summary for 2016/17 is:
“Severe restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, of association and of peaceful assembly continued. The media and the judiciary, as well as political and religious institutions, remained under state control. Prisoners of conscience were tortured and otherwise ill-treated, and subjected to unfair trials. Physical attacks against human rights defenders continued, and prominent activists were subjected to daily surveillance and harassment. Peaceful dissidents and government critics were arrested and convicted on national security charges. Demonstrations were repressed, with participants and organizers arrested and tortured. The death penalty was retained.”
Tanks? Some time ago, following the then CA’s assurance that raising the 2/14 QMI ACR’s tank squadron would happen, it was reported in the Army newspaper that it was scheduled for next year. Whether or not the tanks required have yet been approved for purchase (let alone purchased) has not been publicly announced, nor whether or not a decision has been made to locate them in Brisbane or Shoalwater Bay.
Assn C’tee. Interesting mention in the newsletter … 2/14 QMI has a unit representative on the Assn Management C’tee. What a good idea. It’s to be wondered whether or not the 1AR Assn may see merit in doing the same.
Ray De Vere An item in the April 2017 newsletter:Ray DeVere is undergoing Prostate Cancer treatment at the moment. He sends his best wishes and apologies for the AGM and says that he remains positive as he fights this nasty disease. We wish Ray a speedy recovery. Best wishes Ray.
Former 1AR RSM.
WO1 Brian Heenan, OAM, currently RSM Duntroon, is to be posted next year as RSM, Australian National Headquarters, Middle East Area of Operations. The ANH-MEAO provides the command function for the Joint Task Force 633, which contains all Australian forces deployed under Operation Catalyst. (Major Generals Craig Orme, DSC, AM, CSC and John Cantwell, AO, DSC, were previous commanders.) Congratulations Brian, on being selected for this important position.
President, 1AR Assn
It’s understood that Greg Nicholas will be part of the EOS Ptd Ltd (Queanbeyan) team to attend Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEI) 2017 Exhibition in London during 12-15 September. See https://www.dsei.co.uk/#/
One of the products that EOS’s Defence Systems Division will be promoting is likely to be the R400S Mk2 Stabilised Remote Weapon Station. I believe that the original RWS is fitted to the Bushmaster (training for which is conducted at the School of Armour). Being President of the 1AR Assn must be a nice ‘fit’ for Greg Nicholas, especially if contracts are in the offing with LAND 400.
Best wishes to the EOS sales team, their company has achieved great things for Australia’s important defence industry.
1AR Assn C’tee meeting.
Will the Minutes of last night’s (?) C’tee meeting be made available to members? This was an undertaking given by the past President to aid openness and transparency in the management of the Assn?
First Camp for Children of Veterans Affected by Mental Illness.
Well done to Dan Tehan and DVA staff for their contributions which have resulted in this initiative being launched.
Ron Baikie recently posted a copy of the new RSL NSW President ‘s email to RSL Branches, on the 1AR Assn Facebook page. When I read it, I was impressed that the new President was acknowledging that the coming months would be hard for the organization, but he was preparing his executive to make the changes necessary for the good of the organization and the good work that it can do. A couple of extracts are copied below:
“…we are not a business, we are a volunteer organisation and always will be. We are a grassroots local organisation and always will be. But we have a lot of problems to fix”.
“I’m also pleased to announce that State Council has resolved to appoint Robyn Collins to the role of General Manager, RSL NSW. Robyn is known to many of you for her excellent work in building RSL DefenceCare into a lean, effective, and excellent organisation delivering help for veterans and their families. Robyn understands our issues and is already at work fixing them – I am very thankful that she has accepted responsibility for leading the reform of RSL’s business operations.”
“As you can appreciate, this has legal implications as well as flow on effects for our audits, insurance, and wider operations. We are working with our regulators to identify and address the issues, and I cannot get ahead of that process. What I can say is that the issue is systemic, and effects every sub-branch, auxiliary, youth club and day club. It has to do with the way we receive money raised through fundraising, account for it, and then report on how it is spent. We are working on a fix to this as fast as possible and will brief all of our members on what needs to be done…”.
I followed up Ron’s post with a message which said: “Well said James Brown [the new President NSW RSL] … turning a negative into a positive (as I hope will soon be happening closer to home).” The important point to me was that the new President acknowledged the mistakes of the past and was working with the authorities and regulator to address what went wrong and why, so as to ensure it doesn’t happen again.
A person well known to readers of the blog, Mr C M Fenton, OAM, added his thoughtful opinion … an extract from which is:
G’day James, what you have said above is rubbish, to the soldier either serving or out there in civiy street, you the RSL dropped the ball many years ago.
Unfortunately it seems that Mr Fenton is of the view that the mistakes of the past must continue to tarnish the organisation of today. Mr Fenton is also of the belief that the 1AR Assn is all about camaraderie and a focus on rules and regs is only keeping younger members away. This view has been addressed in previous blog posts.
What is of more importance is the coming RSL National Conference. “Key speakers at the event will include Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin AC (Chief of the Defence Force), Talissa Papamau (Founder of Modern Soldier & Remembrance Foundation), Sharon Bown (Non-executive Director : Australian War Memorial) and Craig Orme (Deputy President of the Repatriation Commission at Department of Veterans Affairs) discussing the need for change, and new initiatives currently in development, in the ESO landscape”. I doubt the Mr Fenton will be present, but I will. I hope to learn and contribute and I’ll report accordingly via the blog.
Postscript: Someone who will also be present is the new President of the Defence Force Welfare Association, Kel Ryan. Congratulations Kel.
———————————————————————————————————
28 August 2017
The RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’
Armouredadvocates has argued for some time that if an RAAC ARES is to be maintained, it’s role must be clearly defined and vehicles suitable to develop and maintain armoured warfare skills, must be provided (such as Hawkei). Extracts from two posts (24 July and 3 March 2017) are copied below. On 1 July, the 1/15 RNSWL held their Regimental Dinner. The following extract is from the speech made at the dinner by the Honorary Colonel, Colonel Lee Long, RFD. (Col Long is also a member of the RAAC Corporation advisory Board.)
The speech confirms much of what has been long argued on those pages. It seems that there is little confidence that the 2 Div reorganization will amount to anything as far as the RAAC ARES is concerned. It’s a tragedy that the situation has been allowed to get to this point, with no hope of anything happening to stop the slide into the abyss. The RAAC Corporation has to accept some of the blame, given the position adopted by its Chairman of not advocating anything which is in accord with Army policy. The RAAC ARES will soon be a thing of the past as far as mounted combat is concerned.
“I will now focus on the core of the issue I would like to address tonight and it is a return to a common theme. We have heard tonight of the actions of this regiment during world war II which added to the honours already emblazoned on the Guidon. When I joined this Regiment we were operating the Main Battle Tank of the day the Centurion and had gained significant competency to sub unit level. Subsequently we trained as APC troops and Cavalry using the same vehicles as the ARA and were approaching their level of competence. However, today we have lost many of the mounted skills we developed.
While we provide an important capability to the Armoured Cav Regiments by providing light cavalry scouts we also provide crews for protected mobility lift but there is no mounted tactical training, the hard earned skills we acquired have all but disappeared.
While I understand the strategic reasons for allocating Bushmasters to the reserve RAAC units I fail to accept that we cannot use them to develop mounted tactical training. Admittedly Bushmasters are not suitable for a Cav role however there is no reason why we cannot use them to train for that purpose. Having said that it is ironic that the Reserve RAAC now have, other than the M1 MBT, the only other armoured (albeit lightly) vehicle that is now deployable for medium and higher levels of conflict as the Chief of Army has determined that the AS Light Armoured Vehicle and the AS4 M113, both in the ACRs, are no longer capable of deployment in those levels of conflict; however we still use them to maintain crew skills.
It would be ideal for the reserve units to have their own AFVs and I do appreciate the sustainability issues. In my view, the Reserve would be better off with a specialled vehicle such as Hawkei however as the delivery time frame of Hawkei would be too long additional Bushmaster or GWagon Surveillance and Recon Vehicles would suit. What we need is a Training Management package for mounted tactical training. The other problem, in my view, is that this lack of capability creates a major Army shortfall for two reasons:-
It precludes the deployment for the Reserve Battlegroup of a Cav or mounted Surveillance and Recon capability;
It also ensures that round out, reinforcement and replacement is not available to the ACRs from the reserve units without a long training period which means that the operational ACR will have to draw from the other ACRs in the other phases of the raise, train, sustain cycle. I believe that recently the CA asked the Comd 2 Div to identify the training gap between ARes and ARA infantry soldiers, if we applied the same measure to the RAAC that gap would be so significant, it might be faster to enlist or draw directly from the general populace rather than from the reserve. If we had the tactical training then conversion to the appropriate platform would be faster.
I have heard an argument from a two star that the reserve equipped with Hawkei could form a fourth Sqn in the ACRs for close recon or for use in peacekeeping deployments. There is also a capability option to use them where it is necessary to maintain a close relationship to a civilian populace, which is what the British Cav units use their Yeomanry sub units for and they only have armoured Land Rovers. There is merit in adopting either or both these options.”
Lancers Despatch, August 2017
Blog: 24 July 2017
Defence policy and consequent defence arrangements are based on the assessment of the Threat. Of prime importance in this respect, is the warning time (re the enemy’s intentions) and lead times to acquire equipment and train personnel to use it. Coupled with this, is our stockpiling policy (ie. the quantity of defence supplies to be available from within Australia).
Flowing on from the above is the degree of readiness at which our standing army and reserve forces are kept. The Army Reserve is vital to Australia’s defence policy. It is here that military skills which take years to develop can be maintained, either for providing a basis for training others in a time of mobilisation or for supplementing the ARA. An example of failure here is the case of Centurion crew commanders when tanks were sent to Vietnam. The shortage within the ARA would’ve been made good if qualified CMF volunteers could have been deployed (but this was politicly unacceptable).
The whole issue comes down to Defence contingency planning. What part does the ARES play in current contingency plans? I believe the ARES have a vital role and those who currently serve in ARES units deserve our wholehearted support. BUT … they need to be informed of what their role is to be in the contingency plans which form the basis of the defence of our Nation.
Blog: 3 March 2017.
If we accept that the role of the Army reserve is to ‘deliver specified capability and support and sustain Australian Defence Force (ADF) preparedness and operations’, what does this mean for the RAAC ARES units?
With the M113AS4/IFV being operated by the inf in the armoured mobility role and the Bushmaster by the RACT in the protected lift role, what’s left for the RAAC ARES?
Surely the role is to supplement the ARA cavalry capability. If dismounted cavalry scout option is to be followed, the whole rationale for maintaining armoured units disappears. Cavalry scouts have a valid place in the force structure, but if the RAAC ARES is confined to this role then the whole skills base is lost with respect to armoured operations.
Armouredadvocateshas argued previously that equipping the RAAC ARES with Hawkei PMV-L would provide a means of developing cavalry skills. While this role would of necessity be a limited one, it could have a real supplementary capacity with respect to the ACRs.
————————————————————————————-
27 August 2017
What Can be Learnt From the NSW and SA RSL Branch Circumstances?
South Australia
Extracts from the ABC News (24 August 2017).
The SA Branch of the RSL “avoided liquidation last month when a majority of creditors voted assets could be sold off to meet debts”.
The Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC) has now struck a compliance agreement with RSL-SA, following an investigation into “majorgovernance and financial management” issues.
“[It] is really an agreement whereby the RSL board have given a series of undertakings of steps they’re going to take to improve the management and governance of the organisation,” ACNC assistant commissioner David Locke said.
“We need to see proper financial controls and policies put in place, there needs to be a proper conflicts of interest, management and assets register, and forward prevention measures taken. We have reached a decision that we are not going to revoke the charitable status of the organisation and we think the [compliance agreement] is the best way forward,” he said.
“We need to see the appointment of independent board members, and training and induction for those members.”
Keywords: Governance and Financial Management; Proper Financial Controls; Training and Induction [for new board members]; Compliance Agreement
New South Wales
Extracts from an email from the new president, James Brown (18 August 2017):
It has to do with the way we receive money …. account for it, and then report on how it is spent. We are working on a fix to this as fast as possible and will brief all of our members on what needs to be done
This will take some time. Please be patient. We need to get this right so that the public can have full confidence in us.
When the Bergin Inquiry conducts public hearings unfavourable aspects of our organisation will be dragged to light again. We will have to endure this, and take strength in the hope that come February next year we can once and for all put these issues behind us and move forward as a stronger and fully accountable organisation.
Finally, I wanted to let you know that I have taken a leave of absence from my regular paid employment so that I can fully focus on the job at hand. To be clear, we will have our work cut out for us making the necessary repairs to this organisation over the next six months
Keywords: Receive Money, Account For it and Report on How it’s Spent; Full Confidence; Fully Accountable Organisation.
Lessons
The key to successful management of an association is good governance and good financial management. The latter relates to the process of receiving money, accounting for it, and reporting, in an open and transparent manner, on how it’s spent.
An association must be fully accountable to both its members and the regulatory authority under which it operates. Anything less will result in the association trying to operate without the full confidence of its members.
The question has to be asked: What does a fully transparent and accountable association look like?
A Governance C’tee has been proposed for the 1 AR Assn. This C’tee would advise the Management C’tee on governance and financial management issues. One way for this to be done is for the Governance C’tee to prepare checklists for significant ‘events’ such as the AGM, financial statement, elections, etc. The C’tee could also devise a training program for new members elected to the Management C’tee.
Unfortunately, not only does the Association’s ‘information blackout’ impede the ability to think through what needs to change, it also hurts the capacity to ensure that the right ideas remain.
A compliance agreement can be a voluntary one between the Management C’tee and members; or a compulsory one between the C’tee and the Regulator.
——————————————————————————————————–
26 August 2017
See ‘A Story in Four Parts‘ above (Part 4)
——————————————————————————–
25 August 2017
The 1st Armoured Regiment Standard
Where on the Standard will the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour be emblazoned? Will the Vietnam Theatre Honour move to the top centre and the C-B Battlehonour replace it?
Second question … when will the Battlehonour be emblazoned?
Third question … will those members of 1 Armd Regt who fought in the battles of Coral and Balmoral be invited to attend the occasion on which the newly emblazoned Standard is first paraded?
With respect to the second and third questions, my submission to the Minister stated the following:
Timing. The emblazing should carried out as soon as possible. It will further boost unit morale, provide enhanced public profile of the gallantry of soldiers who fought during those iconic battles, and boost the public profile of Army’s heritage. Furthermore, for the ever decreasing numbers of veterans who participated in the battles and are still alive, it will be seen as public acknowledgement of their job well done before they all succumb to the ravages of time.
Will parading of the newly emblazoned Standard be part of the Centenary Commemoration of Cambrai Day (see yesterday’s blog)?
There has been some discussion on the 1AR Assn Facebook page (see below) as to whether or not the Standard can be retained now that Armoured Cavalry Regiments have been raised.
I support Mike Trafford’s and Bruce Scott’s posts. The 1 Armd Regt ACR should continue to carry the Standard (as the 2 Cav Regt ACR should continue to carry the 2 Cav Regt Guidon).
One has to wonder why there has been no explanatory post on this subject from the 1 AR Assn C’tee; RAAC Corporation, or Corps RSM. Surely there must be an ‘official’ position on this, so why can’t stakeholders be advised? Such is life.
Postscript.
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner is currently awaiting information from Defence as to why I have been denied the right to see the RAAC Corporation battlehonour submission made in support of mine … on the basis that it contains the Corporation’s opinions and release of the submission could adversely affect the Corporation’s relationship with its members.
——————————————
From 1 AR Assn Facebook page:
Ian Fullarton So what happens now they don’t have a dedicated Tank Regt, we have three ACRs and two have Guidons and one has a Standard, so where is the standard across the three. Where do they sit against the requirements???
Joe Linford [Army tank Museum] We now have ACRs should they not give up the standard?
Mike Trafford ACR is a role, not a title. There’s no need to change titles with roles. European armies have plenty of grenadiers, fusiliers, lancers, dragoons etc long after the roles changed. Even 1 Armd Regt didn’t have to mean MBTs. If they change the title however, the Standard will have to be laid up … chucking out more history and what few battle honours we have; shame.
Bruce Scott Is a change necessary? 2 RTR was presented with its standard in 1960. In 1977 it converted from tank to the armoured reconnaissance role, remaining so until 1984. It retained its standard.
————————————————————————————————–
24 August 2017
The Centenary of Cambrai : What has Gone Wrong?
The RTR and RTR Association have a detailed schedule of events organized for the commemoration. See below. The RNZAC, RNZAC Association and the Mounted Troopers’ Association have informed members of the activities which have been organised. See below (they have even set up a special Facebook page). What has the RAAC and RAAC Assn got planned? Maybe nothing. Three months away and nobody is aware of any Centenary Commemoration. (Well done the Kiwis … no commemorative open days here, not even at the Tank Museum?)
Last year, I suggested that former COs and RSMs of 1 Armd Regt might like to band together to jointly mark the Centenary with a presentation or inauguration of an annual event (lecture?) or scholarship. This went nowhere (oh … a former RSM informed me angrily that he didn’t need anybody else to tell him how to spend his money.)
I also proposed that a deserving soldier from 1 Armd Regt and a deserving member of 1 Armd Regt Assn be selected as the recipients of a travelling bursary to attend the Centenary commemoration in France and provide reports on their experiences when they return. I offered to pay, but this idea too ended up in the scrap heap.
I know, and respect the fact, that 1 Armd Regt is busy training for war and that there is nothing more important. Nevertheless, it seems to me that if we’re not able to organize a commemoration for the Centenary of our Corps Day, then organizational/financial cutbacks have gone too far. Neither the 1 Armd Regt Assn Inc nor the RAAC Corporation Ltd (who you’d think would be a stakeholder) seem to be willing to take the lead.
RTR/RTR Association Program:
Sun 19 Nov: RTR March to the Cenotaph, Remembrance Service and Lunch; along similar annual lines but with centenary embellishments. However, the Main Effort remains the Cambrai weekend.
Fri 24 Nov:
14.00: Louverval CWGC Cemetery Drumhead Service.
18.00: RAC Band concert, Cambrai Cathedral.
19.30: RTR Officers’ Reception, Salle de la Manutention (normal location); reception in lieu of dinner night due to anticipated numbers; to include substantial ‘eats’.
19.30: RTR Association Reception, Marché Couvert (normal location); comments as above.
Sat 25 Nov:
09.00: Battle of Cambrai Presentation, celebrity historian, Cambrai Théâtre; potentially a repeat presentation if numbers dictate.
a.m/p.m: Battlefield Tour; rather than the normal centrally coordinated battlefield tour with coaches, and due to the potential numbers involved, individuals or small groups may wish to conduct their own visits to specific sites of choice supported by centrally produced ‘guide packs’.
p.m: Cambrai Football match v. Cambrai Town FC, Cambrai Stadium.
18.00 TBC: Son et Lumières, organised by Cambrai Town Council, Town Square.
19.30: RTR ‘All Ranks Evening’, events building in Town Gardens; exact format yet to be determined.
Sun 26 Nov:
09.00 TBC: Cambrai Town War Memorial FR/RTR commemoration ceremony.
10.30: Inauguration of ‘D51 Deborah’ Museum; representative RTR group due to limited space.
11.00: RTR ‘Freedom of Cambrai’ Parade, Town Square; possibly with Presentation of new RTR Standard, subject to Palace confirmation in early 2017.
RNZAC Cambrai 100 Memorial Service at Pukeahu War Memorial, Wellington.
Thursday 23 1700-1900 November:
Mounted Parade through Palmerston North Square.
Friday 24 – Sunday 26 November:
Waiouru Camp visit including Marae visit, army museum visit, vehicle display, church service, NZLAV live field firing demo, concluding with a semi-formal dinner.
ther Relevant Material
Reenacments of the Battle of Cambrai historical reconstitutions replica of Deborah D51 Mark IV, official inauguration of the Cambrai Tank 1917 museum. “Son et lumière” show tellling the story of the Battle of Cambrai
The museum is due to be inaugurated on 26 November 2017, to mark the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Cambrai. Overlooking the site of the battle, the centrepiece of the museum is the British tank ‘Deborah’ which was uncovered in 1998.
At the July AGM, membership was reported to be 384. This was 30% less than the membership 12 months previously. The Secretary 1AR Assn recently emailed members to advise that: “This morning I received emailed advice of the resignation from the position of Treasurer by Trevor Hyde, with effect from immediately, due to personal reasons.
The newly elected Treasurer, however, wished to make it clear that “personal reasons” (my health is ok, my private life is ok, my pets are ok and so are all the animals) had nothing to do with his resignation:
“This morning I have announced my resignation from the 1 AR Assoc Inc. as Treasurer, in-waiting My reasons will remain with me but no doubt in time they will filter out through those who may be dancing in the street. What I will say is that when dealing with members’ monies on a daily basis it has to be within the rules, be open, be accountable and be transparent and most of all be honest and be sure there is some form of trail to follow.”
Another member resigned immediately after. I responded by explaining that writing ‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘, had had a unique impact on my attitude:
“During the twelve years I researched the book, I interviewed many former tank crews. I was honoured by the access they gave me to their letters, voice tapes, and recollections about being (i) on active service, and (ii) a member of a tank crew.
I was so humbled by the sharing of their personal thoughts, that I contacted the RAAC Representative Hon Col (Lt General Laurie O’Donnell, AC). He agreed to meet with me and I explained that I was constantly bothered by the same question. He asked what it was and I said: “How will I know if it [i.e. the book] is good enough [to represent their service]?”. As he’d been CGS [Chief of Army] I knew that he would understand. I presumptuously proposed a deal: I would know if it was good enough if he would read the draft and write the Foreword. He agreed (and later flew to Darwin to launch the book at 1 Armd Regt).
It was as a result the above that I donated all royalties from the book to the 1AR Assn. I was confident that the C’tee would use the funds (about $10,000) for the benefit of former members of 1AR, as well as those serving today.
Of course, as things happened … I was expelled from the Assn for, among other things (see ‘A Story in Three Parts’ above), asking questions of the C’tee and standing up for members’ rights (ie. to be told what they had done wrong and given a chance to respond, rather than being condemned ‘out of hand’). I had earlier proposed that part of my COF funds be used to pay for the costs of a deserving member from both 1 Armd Regt and 1AR Assn to attend the Centenary Commemoration of the Battle of Cambrai in France (Nov 17) … returning to inform their unit/assn members about their experience.
When I was expelled, the remaining COF funds were returned to me (about $8000). I offered the balance to the 1st Armd Regt, as a donation to Regimental Funds. I left telephone messages, emailed and wrote , however, it seems to 1AR Assn C’tee had so poisoned my reputation that no reply was received. (I then used the funds for the benefit of my grandson who has cerebral palsy … with thanks to all those who had contributed to the book.)
Where does all the above leave us?
I am (for reasons which I think you’ll now appreciate) committed to ensuring that the needs of former and serving members of 1 Armd Regt are properly met by the Assn that was formed to do so [thank you Lou Walker]. Others have taken up the challenge and are working hard to this end. Changing the culture of an organisation is always difficult, but never impossible.
—————————————————————————————-
22 August 2017
Vietnam Veterans Day : Media Release by Minister for Veterans’ Affairs III
Dear Minister,
“Today we remember nearly 60,000 Australian men and women who served in the Vietnam War between 1962 and 1975, including 521 who lost their lives and more than 3,000 who were wounded,” Mr Tehan said.
In my Vietnam Veterans’ Day Statement I email, I urged that consideration be given to the following for statements with respect to future commemoration (so as to acknowledge the Australian civilians who died in the service of their nation during the War, journalists, nurses, and entertainers listed on the AWM Commemorative Roll; and the hundreds of Australians who have died of their wounds since 20 April 1975 and those who continue to suffer as a result of them.
There is another group of Australians who should also be recognized. Those members of the Vietnamese Community who fought as members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (our allies) and who are now Australian citizens.
The Victorian Parliament has legislated that the term ‘Vietnam Veteran’ must apply to former members of the RVNAF, as well as ADF veterans. To this end, I encourage the following inclusion:
‘We remember nearly 60,000 Australian men and women who served in the Vietnam War between 1962 and 1975. In particular, today, we reflect on the 521 members of the ADF who lost their lives and more than 3,000 who were wounded. We also think of all those who, since 1975, have died, suffered, and continue to suffer, as a direct result of their wounds. In addition, we acknowledge the sacrifice and suffering of members of our Vietnamese Community with whom we fought as Allies.’
Sorry to have sent three emails about Vietnam Veterans Day, however, as each focused on a different aspect, I thought it best to separate them.
Yours sincerely,
——————————————————————————————–
20 August 2017
Vietnam Veterans Day : Media Release by Minister for Veterans’ Affairs II
Email to the Minister is copied below:
Dear Minister,
“We also mark the anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan, where 105 Australians and three New Zealanders of D Company 6RAR were engaged in one of the fiercest battles of the Vietnam War.
“D Company were greatly assisted by an ammunition resupply by RAAF helicopters, support by Australian, New Zealand and United States artillery and the arrival of reinforcements in APCs as night fell.
Your Vietnam Veterans’ Day media release gives a false impression as regards the combatants. By saying that D Company were greatly assisted by “the arrival of reinforcements in APCs as night fell” you understate the role played by the APCs.
They had, in fact, a significant impact on the outcome of the Battle. Rather than ‘just’ conveying reinforcements to D Company, the armoured force crossed raging flood waters and fought through an attacking enemy force equipped with anti-tank weapons. The Army’s website states:
“As darkness fell over the rubber plantation at 7pm, D Company’s relief appeared with the simultaneous arrival of B Company and the APCs, their .50 calibre heavy machine guns blasting through the rubber, breaking up the attacking ranks of VC and sending them scattered into the darkness. The Battle of Long Tan was over.” (https://www.army.gov.au/our-history/history-in-focus/the-battle-of-long-tan)
One of the 18 killed you refer to, was from 3 Troop, 1 APC Squadron.
Should you seek advice with respect to how to best incorporate this aspect into the statement for next year’s Vietnam Veterans’ Day, the Head of Corps, Royal Australian Armoured Corps would be the best point of contact.
Yours sincerely.
———————————————————————————————————
19 August 2017
Vietnam Veterans Day : Media Release by Minister for Veterans’ Affairs
Email to the Minister is copied below:
“Dear Minister,
“Today we remember nearly 60,000 Australian men and women who served in the Vietnam War between 1962 and 1975, including 521 who lost their lives and more than 3,000 who were wounded,”
There is no doubt that you are factually correct as far as the ADF is concerned in making the above statement (which cannot be said for similar statements made by some of your predecessors).
However, those who have prepared your media statements have forgotten to acknowledge:
(i) the Australian civilians who died in the service of their nation during the War (journalists, nurses, and entertainers listed on the AWM Commemorative Roll); and
(ii) the hundreds of Australians who have died of their wounds since 20 April 1975 and those who continue to suffer as a result of them.
Next year, and in other relevant statements, would it be possible to acknowledge the above by saying something along the lines of:
“We remember nearly 60,000 Australian men and women who served in the Vietnam War between 1962 and 1975. In particular, today, we reflect on the 521 members of the ADF who lost their lives and more than 3,000 who were wounded. We also think of all those who, since 1975, have died, suffered, and continue to suffer, as a direct result of their wounds”.
As Minister for Veterans’ Affairs, you will be aware that such public acknowledgement will be of special significance to those affected and their families.”
Yours sincerely,
Tomorrow: Second email re his reference to the Battle of Long Tan
——————————————————————————–
18 August 2017
Why Did the US and its Allies Lose in Vietnam?
This is one of the questions to be addressed at presentation at the AWM today. The publicity material explains…
“The Vietnam War was Australia’s longest continuous war, the nation’s most divisive conflict. Although it ended more than 40 years ago, it confronted political leaders, military strategists, commanders, and soldiers in the field with issues that resonate to this day. Why did the US and its allies lose in Vietnam?”
I felt compelled to respond as follows:
“Surely the AWM is not a party to asking “Why did the US & its allies lose in Vietnam?”. The AWM”s mission is “to assist Australians to remember, interpret and understand the Australian experience of war and its enduring impact on Australian society”. The question to be addressed in accord with the AWM mission must be: ‘Why did the Republic of Vietnam fall to Communist forces after the US & its allies had withdrawn, having secured the nation from external insurgency?“
Having informed the President of the Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) about the presentation, he and other representatives (including a former doctor with the ARVN) have been invited to attend. Interestingly they were reminded that the day was Vietnam Veterans’ Day.
This was undoubtedly done, as others of us could do also, on the subconscious basis that usage of the term Vietnam Veteran applies only to Australian Defence Force Vietnam Veterans … forgetting those members of the VCA who are also veterans of the Vietnam War.
An extract from the blog of 13 July is relevant here:
What do you think when the term Vietnam Veterans is raised in an Australian context? I would confidently predict that ‘Regs’, ‘Nashos’, Nui Dat, 1ATF etc are all things that come to mind.
Of course, not all Vietnam Veterans were born here. There is a strong case to be made that RVN Armed Forces veterans who are now Australians, should be included when the term Vietnam Veterans is used (rather than allowing its usage, both official and non-official, to apply only to non-Vietnamese born Australian veterans).
The Victorian Parliament has formally acknowledged that the term Vietnam Veteran must include our former Vietnamese Allies, now fellow Australians living among us. This has meant a lot to the Vietnamese community and they are hoping that the Federal Parliament will pass a similar motion.
Returning to the main subject, two extracts from the 2009 Vietnam Veterans’ Day Address by the Late Brigadier Ian Bryant, AM (Retd) correctly and succinctly puts the matter in context:
“… we should always remember our history: that Australian combat forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam in early 1972; that the January 1973 Paris Peace Accords were signed by North Vietnam and US – leading to the US withdrawal by March 1973; and that North Vietnam, in the face of the Paris peace terms, invaded the South in such strength that Saigon rapidly fell to enemy armoured assault in March 1975. Except for the crowing of the media, the world was silent.
Despite the fact that our combat reputation and humanitarian actions throughout our participation in Australia’s longest war remained unsullied, the more irresponsible of the media attempt still to sensationalise events taken out of context or simply misquoted without apology. We never lost a battle.”
———————————————————————————————————
17 August 2017
The RAAC Corporation Show Part III
An extract from a Letter to the Editor of the 1AR Assn newsletter was published on 14 March. In it, Mr McLaughlin, Chairman of the RAAC Corporation Ltd, set out how he had obtained approval to have the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour emblazoned on the 1AR Standard. Another extract is copied below:
“On 30 March 2017, I lodged a further submission to the Corps in respect of Operation Hammersley to: Seek to have the award of the CGWP [RVN Unit Citation] approved for all members of B Sqn 3 Cav, A Sqn 1 Armd Regt and 1 Fd Sqn RAE who took part in that battle…”.
I originally prepared my submission in June 2015. I did so on the basis of it being forwarded from the 1 AR Assn to the RAAC Corporation for further action. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on the 1AR Assn Facebook page that: ‘Theaward for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always …. The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing”. There being no further progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister on 28 February 2017.
The Minister responded to my submission on 7 May 2017. He was advised by Defence not to approve the extension of eligibility. Given that Defence had had the RAAC Corporation’s submission for a month, it has to be assumed that his decision was made having taking into account all the arguments put forward.
Unfortunately, the advice the Minister received from Defence was totally wrong. Before I inform him of this and present the evidence, I need to see the RAAC Submission to ensure that it wasn’t the source of the misinformation. Mr McLaughlin has declined my request. So the matter is now the subject of another FOI investigation.
Re the other on-going investigation (Coral Balmoral Submission, see 14 August) …
The appeal with the Information Commissioner relates to the following reasons given for not releasing the RAAC submission:
It contains theopinions of the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
The effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation.
———————————————————————————————–
16 August 2017
History Repeats Itself : 1 Tp, A Sqn,4/19 PWLH and the RAAC Corporation.
Yesterday’s blog referred to the RAAC Corporation’s claim that it was ‘their’ submission to Defence (rather than mine to the Minister a month earlier) which resulted in approval for the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1st Armd Regt Standard. A similar claim was made in relation to correcting the title of the first first RAAC unit to be deployed on active service, The following article appeared in the 4/19 PWLH Assn newsletter ‘Plumes’ September 2015
“The Pony Soldiers, Who Almost Never Were.
The Announcement.
No less than fifty years after the event, there was recognition at last (or so it seemed). On 11 May 2015, the Governor-General approved the awarding of the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation (CGWP) to Australian units under command of the United States 173rd Airborne Brigade. The Army newspaper listed the units whose members were eligible.
A person interested in such things, we shall call him ‘John’, was astonished. The only RAAC unit listed was ‘1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop’. There was no reference to 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH, the first Australian Armoured unit to be deployed on active service since the Second World War. How could such a thing happen? He contacted the Department of Defence to make them aware of the error which would seemingly mean that those posted to Vietnam as members 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4/19 PWLH would be ineligible for the award. “No, this is not the case“, was the response. Irrespective of the title their units, all those whose names were listed on the nominal roll would be eligible.
The ‘Compromise’ Proposal.
‘John’ then learnt that the 4th/19th PWLH Regiment Association had requested the assistance of the RAAC Corporation to make representations to Defence to have the list of units amended to include 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH. What happened next was just as hard to comprehend as the original omission. The RAAC Corporation publically advised that Defence had proposed a compromise title ‘1 APC Troop (A Sqn, 4th/19th PWLH)’, and not only was this supported, but “it could be reasonably interpreted as now becoming Army policy”. Understanding how this happened requires a moment to look back into history and how it comes to be documented.
The ‘Official History’ (OH) is generally regarded as the authority when matters of fact have to be established. The first volume for the Vietnam War lists ‘1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Troop’ in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of the1RAR Battalion Group during the period September 1965 to March 1966. No other Armoured unit is listed. The text of the OH refers to 1 APC Troop being part of 4th/19th PWLH. So it is that other publications, such as that which specifically deals with M113A1s in Australian Service, refers to “the arrival of 1 APC Trp [sic] in South Vietnam“. What’s the explanation for this? It turns out that the letter from Defence that the Official Historian relied on for his listing of the ORBAT (‘Allotment of Units for Special Duty’, 15 October 1979) was wrong. So, a mistake in a primary document leads to a mistake in the Official History, which results in the mistake being perpetuated 50 years after the event. Should be easy to fix.
The Quest to Correct ‘History’
The RAAC Corporation had recommended to the RAAC Head of Corps (HOC) that the compromise proposal be accepted. The 4th/19th PWLH Regiment Association, however, believed that it was important that the first Australian Armoured unit to be deployed on active service since the Second World War, should be correctly acknowledged, in their words “We do not ask to be ‘satisfied’ with another name. We just ask that the correct name be used when referring to the Troop and to the men that served in that unit”. They made their own submission to the HOC.
‘John’ did his bit as well. He contacted the Official Historian who quickly acknowledged the mistake, advising that he would amend the ORBAT in the Official History to list 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH, as having been deployed to Vietnam from June 1965 to March 1966. This information was passed to the Army History Unit. One would think that would be the end to it. But the powerful RAAC Corporation had strongly supported Defence’s compromise proposal. Thank heavens for historians. The Army History Unit’s recommendation to the HOC was that the designation to be adopted should be: 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH June 1965 to 31 March 1966 (redesignated as 1 APC Troop, 1 APC Squadron from late Sep 1965).
It was agreed that 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH was the first Australian armoured unit to be deployed on active service since the Second World War. “While 1 Troop was redesignated and became part of 1 APC Squadron in September 1965, that information didn’t necessarily make it to the troop. As a result, the troop should remain listed as 1 Troop, A Squadron, 4th/19th PWLH for the duration of their tour. The bracketed statement regarding redesignation is, however, factual and should be included”. The HOC accepted this recommendation, together with that of the 4th/19th PWLH Regiment Association, and advised Defence to amend their records accordingly. Implementation was immediate.
The Controversy About the Timing of the Name Change.
One might have thought that it was all over. But, when did 1 Troop A Squadron 4th/19th PWLH, commanded by Lt R K Hill, become 1 APC Troop? The officer appointed to command 1 APC Squadron when it was raised in Australia in July 1965, was Major Bob Hagerty. He wanted there to be no doubt that he had informed Lt Hill of the formal change of title in September 1965. The Army History Unit, however, was bound to take note of Major General Hopkins’ statement in the history of Australian Armour, that Bob Hill told him ten years or so after returning from Vietnam, that he had received no “official advice” of the new name and retained the 4th/19th title in the field until March 1966, when the PM announced the deployment of 1 APC Sqn to Vietnam.
One would not be too surprised if the commander of an independent APC troop on active service might have ‘turned a blind eye’, when told from Australia of the need to rename his troop. Nevertheless, the Army History Unit saw it to be important, to include reference to the ‘formal’ date of name change, as referred to above by the OC 1 APC Squadron, i.e. ‘1 Troop, A Squadron, 4 th/19th PWLH June 1965 to 31 March 1966 (redesignated as 1 APC Troop, 1 APC Squadron from late Sep 1965)
Postscript.
It might have been thought that the outcome was a positive one. The place in history of the first Australian Armoured unit to be deployed on active service since the Second World War, had been secured. Not so for all, however. One person, who obviously believes that once history is ‘official’, it should never be changed, had this to say publicly: “So much for Truth, so much for History let it be on the consciences of those who have perpetrated this falsehood. How can we be Honourable and live a lie? ‘John’ in the fullness of time and beyond this life you will be judged”. Quite sad really.
(Editorial note; ‘John’ who is a respected member of the Armoured Corps Family, has chosen to publish under this pseudonym, he was instrumental in the final result together with the AWM, HOC, RSM Corps, Army History Unit, and Regimental Association, we are grateful to them all).”
————————————————————————————–
15 August 2017
History in the Remaking.
A letter was published under the following heading in the May edition of the 1AR Assn newsletter. Extracts are copied below
Well done that man, & thanks to 1AR Lt Col Bruce Cameron MC (Retd) BATTLE HONOUR CORAL-BALMORAL
Lieutenant Colonel Cameron MC (Retd) recently wrote to Minister Tehan and requested that the 1st Armoured Regiment’s Standard be emblazoned with the Coral-Balmoral battle honour before the 50th Anniversary of the battle in 2018.
Outcome … There is no administrative impediment to emblazing Coral-Balmoral and amending the date to reflect ‘Vietnam 1968-71′ on the 1st Armoured Regiments Standard.
Regards Peter Swinfield Warrant Officer Class One
In the August edition of the newsletter, the Editor advises (inter alia) that:
“It has been brought to my attention, that an inaccuracy was detected in the heading used in the article on page 13 relating to the emblazonment of the Coral-Balmoral Battle Honour on the Regiment’s Standard and the correcting of the Theatre Honour for Vietnam. Apologies to Noel Mc Laughlin and Committee of the RAAC Corporation for failing to acknowledge the work done in gaining the battle honours for Coral/ Balmoral to have emblazoned on the standard.”
The above ‘apology’ was in response to Mr McLaughlin having written to to the Editor stating that “On 10 March 2017, a submission by me as Corporation Chairman was tendered to the Corps RSM for the emblazonment of the Battle Honour Coral-Balmoral on the 1st Armoured Regiment Standard. Approval for this was received on 28 March 2017″.
So … it would seem that all credit is due to Mr McLaughlin and the RAAC Corporation. Interestingly, my submission to the Minister re emblazoning the Coral Balmoral Battlehonour was sent on 7 February 2017 (and that relating the correction of the error re the Theatre Honour, on 22 February 2017). With respect to the latter (and only the latter), Mr McLaughlin graciously acknowledges my involvement:
“The successful submission to the Minister by Bruce Cameron to have the Theatre Honour Vietnam 1968-72 corrected to Vietnam 1968-71, was also formally endorsed by the Corporation. The work of Bruce in having this matter corrected, is gratefully acknowledged.”
I had previously asked the RAAC Corporation if they would wish to take up the Coral Balmoral submission on behalf of the1AR Assn (a copy was provided). The offer was declined. I then checked with the Patron of the 1AR Assn to ensure that a submission from me would not ‘upset’ any consideration currently in progress within Defence. With this clearance, I forwarded my submission to the Minister on 7 February 2017.
What happened next is that Defence asked Army, and Army asked 1st Armd Regt, who, in turn, asked the RAAC Corporation if they supported the emblazoning. Hence the 10 March submission by the Corporation, in support of mine. Mr McLaughlin made a lot about this on social media. I asked him if his submission was similar to mine. The response was that he hadn’t seen mine. I found it hard to understand how a supporting submission could be made without having seen the original and asked if I could read the RAAC submission to make sure that it didn’t conflict with mine. The request was denied and continues to be the subject of a FOI investigation by the Information Commissioner.
The Minister responded to my submissions in one letter to say that he was pleased to advise that both my requests could be met. I guess he should have written to Mr McLaughlin.
Part 11 (to follow):
History Repeats Itself : 1 Tp, A Sqn,4/19 PWLH and the RAAC Corporation.
——————————————————————————————————–
14 August 2017
Can the 1AR Assn Exist Without Meeting Requisite Governance Requirements?
Patron 1AR Assn 2017 AGM: “Are we perfect at governance? No … We can’t lose sight of what we are about, someone said it at the very start, mateship, comradeship and looking after each other”.
BUT you can’t have an organisation which looks after its members, if its governance standards mean that it is unable to operate. Before you know it, auditors have to be called in and criminal charges become a possibility, to wit the NSW RSL
President 1AR Assn Aug 17 Newsletter: “I’ve also been disheartened to learn that the behaviour within the Association was raised at a Corps Conference. I find such behaviour incongruous for an organisation built around camaraderie.”
BUT camaraderie alone won’t make an incorporated organization a viable one. The only thing that will do that is governance which meets requisite standards and regulatory requirements. If an RAAC association misleads its members and fails to meet governance requirements, it would be an abrogation of (moral) responsibility if such behaviour was not commented on at the Corps Conference.
President 1AR Assn Aug 17 Newsletter: “A non-negotiable for me is your commitment as a member to assist ‘righting of the ship’ with positive respectful conduct with no vested interests apart from the long term survivability of the Association. If we continue an unhealthy path the Association will simply wither on the vine like many others. So let me be clear, the friction must stop.”
BUT the long term survivability of the Association depends on good governance standards being introduced.
BUT if the matters at the heart of the friction [i.e. representations by members who seek good governance standards vs those who believe adherence to “regulations and BS” is standing in the way of camaraderie] are not addressed, the Association will simply wither on the vine like many others.
How should the “friction” be addressed?
There is the story about the high jump coach who told the athlete he was training to try harder, ie keeping doing the same thing, but put more effort into it. Another coach might’ve said: ‘Let’s look at what’s going wrong’.
A good starting point would be for the 1AR Assn C’tee to apologise to members for them having been misled in numerous occasions in the past (all of which can be detailed). The President has stated that his priority is to get the Own Rules Constitution sorted out and the financial accounts in good order.
That’s positive and fundamental, but only the tip of the iceberg. Good governance rules every facet of an incorporated association’s conduct. A proposal has been made that a Governance C’tee be established to advise the Management C’tee (possibly by setting up check lists for things like ‘Preparation for the AGM’). The proposal has gone unacknowledged, however.
I guess we could say ‘lift your game’ and that would take care of everything.
————————————————————————————————-
13 August 2017
Penalties that the 1AR Assn Might be Liable For.
Infringements of legislative requirements can result in fines being imposed by the Corporate Affairs Victoria:
Does the Association’s registered number appear on all notices?
Has the registered address of the Assn changed with the appointment of the new C’tee and, if so, was CAV advised within 14 days?
Did the new Secretary give CAV notice of his appointment with 14 days of the AGM?
Did all former C’tee members pass all relevant documents to the new C’tee within 28 days of the AGM?
Was the Assn’s 2016/17 financial statement sent to CAV within a month of the AGM?
Does the new C’tee hold all financial statements for the last seven years?
Did the Assn make a true and correct declaration when the Own Rules Constitution and recent Financial statements were submitted to CAV and the?
If the answers to these questions are not Yes, then a fine of approx $21,300 could be levied against the Assn.
Some of the infringements for which fines can be levied are listed below. The first six attract a penalty of one point, while the penalty for each of the next two is four points and the last 60 points. For 2016/17 the fines for each point was $155. It can be conservatively estimated that this would rise to $165 for this FY.
An incorporated association’s name and registration number must appear on all notices, advertisements and business documents.
An incorporated association must have a registered address and must notify the Registrar of Consumer Affairs Victoria, in the form approved by the Registrar, within 14 days of any changes.
Within 14 days after their appointment, a secretary must give written notification, in the approved form, to the Registrar of their appointment and contact details.
An office holder or member must, within 28 days after ceasing to hold their position, return original copies of any relevant documents to the association’s committee.
After each financial year of the association, the secretary must lodge with the Registrar a copy of the association’s financial statements prepared for that year. The financial statements must be lodged within one month of the annual general meeting. [Dispensation has been allowed, see below]
If asked by the Registrar, an incorporated association must produce an original document within 28 days or a longer period specified by the Registrar.
An incorporated association must keep the financial statements submitted at its annual general meeting for at least seven years.
An incorporated association must keep an original of a document for which a copy has been lodged with the Registrar for seven years. It must also produce that document if requested to by the Registrar.
A person must not, in a document submitted to CAV, make or authorise the making of a statement that the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular.
2016/17 Financial Statement Dispensation.
CAV have advised that they will accept the financial statement if passed by members as a Special Resolution and advised to CAV within six months of the end of the FY.
Of course, there is some work required here in addition to the financial statement. Special Resolution means special general meeting, which requires (i) a quorum (ie 10% of membership either present in person or by proxy) and (ii) the financial statement and resolution to pass it, advised to members at least 21 days before the meeting. This is as it should be, ie. as an alternative to having a financial statement passed by members at the AGM. The idea that a c’tee meeting could approve the financial statement and forward it to CAV would be totally unacceptable.
————————————————————————————————-
12 August 2017
The Role of a Patron
I got it wrong. I thought that a person who accepted the position of being a Patron of an association, giving it his name and reputation, would identify with being seen to be an assurance that the association was governed in an honest and lawful manner .
But … ‘patrons are not trustees/management committee members and do not attend meetings … and do not carry any responsibilities or liabilities’.
‘Generally they simply put their name to your cause – you may have their profile on your website and that is all.’
‘They will ‘put in a good word’ for the organisation when it counts. They will attend selected events and will be quietly supportive of the CEO and Board. They will be seen to be positively supportive of the work of the organisation.’
I had naively thought that a Patron would want to know if ‘his’ association was not meeting compulsory governance regulations and that if he became aware of this, he would ask for assurances from the association’s c’tee that they would take appropriate steps, on behalf of the association’s members, to ensure required standards of governance are met.
At the 2017 1AR Assn AGM, the Patron admitted: “Are we perfect at governance? No“, but also stated that ” I love our association”. On this basis, I emailed in good faith, as follows:
“You know things are in need of improvement re the governance of the Assn. Unfortunately, the situation has become so bad, that we are in danger of joining the likes of the NSW RSL. A few of the regulatory breaches are listed below.
I recommend that you advise the President to establish a Governance C’tee. This would comprise a group of members who do not necessarily actually meet, but communicate with each other to reach a consensus as to what the 1AR Assn Management C’tee should do in relation to specific matters, eg. proxy votes; Financial Statement, Constitution etc. This C’tee would be an advisory one (like the Advisory Board for the RAAC Corporation) and the Management C’tee would not be obliged to accept its advice… it would not have liability for matters decided upon by the C’tee, but would be free to inform the wider membership about the advice given to the Management C’tee.
It was disappointing that no vote of thanks was given at the AGM to the group of members who spent endless hours sorting out the revised Constitution and providing a draft suitable for members’ consideration and Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) endorsement. The President could express his appreciation at the same time as seeking volunteers for a Governance C’tee.”
At the AGM, the Patron stated, in addition to the quotes above, that “Democracy is done by those that turn up”. This would appear to be an expression in support of those present at the AGM. While this might seem to be appropriate, it also disenfranchises all those members who reside interstate or overseas, or are ill, or are incapacitated … and would otherwise have been there if they could. Surely democracy is also done by those who vote by proxy. What a pity it is that there is so much ‘confusion’ as to what happened to their votes.
I have not had a response from the Patron.
———————————————————————————————-
11 August 2017
Defamation and Response
Letter to secretary, 1 AR Assn:
“Crook – On that why has there been no action on Mr Cameron and his continual abuse of his position on his website in denigrating people in this room and of the Corporation and why hasn’t there been any disciplinary action taken?” (Minutes, 2017 AGM.)
Let’s examine each allegation:
I have continually abused my position on my website. Mr Crook is referring to my personal blog. I, alone, decide the content, so it’s impossible for me to abuse my position.
I have denigrated people in this room and the [RAAC] Corporation. I have continually stated on my blog that if I publish anything which is incorrect, as soon as I’m made aware of it, I will retract it and apologize. All material published is based on fact which is truly stated. This is fair comment. This was tested when an Assn C’tee Member (Mr D Paterson) complained to the regulatory authority governing publications such as my blog. The complaint was rejected as the content was assessed to be fair criticism (i.e. not unfair criticism, also known as denigration).
Disciplinary action should have been taken by the 1 AR Assn C’tee against me. For this to be done, I would have to have breached the provisions of the 1AR Assn Constitution. Heaven help us all if fair comment, based on fact truly stated, cannot be made. Democracy would be dead.
I understand that ‘Defamation law deals with protecting reputations. It gives a person whose reputation has been wrongfully attacked the right to take legal action against those responsible for the attack’. Furthermore, published material is ‘defamatory when it conveys a meaning (or imputation) about a person that lowers that person’s reputation in the eyes of reasonable members of the community’.
I think that there is little doubt that I have been defamed by Mr Crook’s comments about me being published in the Minutes of the 2017 1 AR Assn AGM. Does the 1 AR Assn have a justification for this this? If not, I would appreciate the Minutes being amended accordingly.
Note: Justice Connect Victoria advise inter alia:
Defamation Sometimes a secretary will have to deal with potentially defamatory matters in the minutes of AGMs. A chairperson should challenge any defamatory statements at the time they are made in an AGM and have them withdrawn. The statements will then not be recorded in the minutes.
Generally a “defamatory statement” about a person is one that: ● exposes the person to hatred, contempt or ridicule ● tends to lower them in the opinion of other people
If a secretary is concerned about any potential defamatory matters when drafting minutes, they should seek legal advice before finalising and distributing the minutes to anyone.
——————————————————————————————-
10 August 2017
The Capability Gap Affecting the RAAC
I recently listed a number of matters which I thought were of particular importance:
Ensuring the sacrifices and achievements of AFV crews in Vietnam are recorded fully and accurately.
Ensuring full recognition and acknowledgement is given to the unique service of AFV crews in battle.
Overcoming the capability gap currently affecting the RAAC.
Ensuring that RAAC crews (both driver and crew commander) operating Bushmaster PMVs, are trained to endorsed RAAC competency levels.
Equipping RAAC AFV crewmen with a personal weapon which is both suitable (for the confined conditions in which AFV crews operate) and effective for their needs.
Open and transparent governance of the 1AR Assn in accordance with statutory regulations.
Cessation of the targeted human rights abuses meted out by the Communist Party of Vietnam to former members and families of RVN armed forces (our ‘allies’)
Ensuring full recognition and acknowledgement by all Australians of the service and sacrifice of Indigenous Australians during the Frontier Wars.
Re #3 above, the August issue of Defence Technology Review includes a good coverage of the capability gap confronting the RAAC’s light AFV fleets, ie, CRV and M113AS4.
Armouredadvocates has been very vocal in this respect for some time.
The article concludes by stating that: “… there are those in Army and Government who must be hoping like hell that Army is not called upon to take part in a real shooting war”.
The Lack of Approved Training Standards for RAAC Bushmaster Crew Commanders
While the RAAC puts its head in the sand and declares that no PMVs are operated by RAAC units, the blog on 6 August reiterated how wrong this is, emphasising the matter listed at #4 above.
The statement below by the the former CO of an RAAC ARES unit is instructive.
‘An accident that involved one of the PMV’s rolling over during a night move during Ex…., highlighted the risks associated with employing inexperienced crewmen without the benefit of sufficient training. Fortunately the crew and vehicle sustained little injuries or damage and important lessons were learned.”
Seems to me that while no-one was killed or badly injured, the possibility of this happening was very high.
In allowing ‘ad hoc’ crew commander training (at best), the SOA must accept responsibility for this and any other accident resulting from the lack of ‘endorsed training standards’ while PMVs are operated by the ARES (or ARA crews on active service as at present).
PMV is now going to inf battalions and the RA Inf will have responsibility for training crews, however, the employment of the PMV by RAAC ARES units requires the RAAC to accept responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of all crew training. If we as a Corps cannot do this on behalf of our soldiers, we are not worth the cost of fodder.
——————————————————————————————————–
9 August 2017
1AR Assn Governance III
Continuing the list of matters which have been formally raised with the C’tee ….
8. Given that the current Constitution allows for nominations from the floor, a member urged (i) those he knew who would be standing for election to send out brief bio details/quals etc to others, and (ii) members who were not able to attend the meeting, to appoint a proxy so that their votes were not wasted. A former WOI of high standing was advised by someone who had some sort of quasi-legal knowledge, that what the above member had done was illegal and a corruption of the election
process. The WOI informed all members accordingly. When the above allegation was made known to Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) they stated that the quasi-legal opinion was totally false, what had happened was completely lawful and an acknowledged part of the democratic process. Neither apology nor retraction was circulated, however, and the election outcome was undoubtedly influenced by the
false allegation. Wiil the C’tee take action to ensure that the rights of members are made known prior to any fufure election?
9. Accountability for honest financial management is paramount. To this end, rules for associations incorporated in Victoria require that the financial statement be prepared by the Treasurer at the end of the FY and presented to the Management C’tee. The C’tee is required to verify that all transactions were probably recorded, i.e. credit card expenditure had been in accord with the Assn’s rules and all usage had been for approved Assn purposes. Once all questions have been resolved, two members of the C’tee then sign a declaration stating that the financial statement gives a true and fair view of the Association’s financial position. The financial statement is then ready for presentation to the members for consideration at the AGM. The C’tee’s declaration is required to be included in the Minutes of the AGM. The Minutes of the 2017 AGM didn’t include the C’tee declaration certifying the accuracy of the financialstatement. Then again, no such declaration could’ve been made on the basis of information presented. Will the C’tee apologise to members for not following the above process and ensure that this is done in future?
10. The financial statement presented at the 2Ol7 AGM detailed neither the source of income nor how funds were expended … just income and expenditure totals. So members have no idea if all income has been properly recorded, nor whether expenditure was appropriate, nor whether investments have been soundly made. They were asked to accept all this on trust. This is a breach of accountability requirements for incorporated associations. Will the C’tee prepare a financial statement as per the Constitution and circulate it to members as soon as possible?
11. The Constitution requires that the financial statement be presented to CAV within a month of the AGM. CAV advise, however, that if this is not possible, an association can pass a Financial Statement by Special Resolution and present it to CAV within six months of the end of the FY. Will the C’tee undertake to do this?
——————————————————————————————————–
8 August 2017
1AR Assn Governance II
Continuing the list of matters which have been formally raised with the C’tee ….
4. On registering at the AGM, the proxy appointed by one member (D. Hay) was
informed that that member (K. McGuire) was unfinancial; therefore his vote could not
be lodged by the proxy. Unbelievably, the member’s name was subsequently listed in the Minutes
as one of proxy votes which was counted. What happened allows for an abuse of
process. Can the C’tee investigate how McGuire’s vote was cast and by whom and how the false reporting came about?
5. Mr McGuire’s membership was stated to be no longer current when, in fact, he had
a five year membership. Will the C’tee investigate membership records to ensure that all memberships, including those greater than 12 months, are correctly recorded and apologise to Mr McGuire if applicable?
6. The Minutes advised that the votes of those who had nominated the President as
their proxy, were invalid. When this was queried with CAV, the response was that: while the proxy holder can decide to abstain from voting himself, there is an obligation on his part to meet the expectations of those who have trusted their proxy to him.Will the C’tee apologise to those members whose proxies were directed to the President and which were not incorporated in the voting process as they had every reason to expect.
7. Given that the President elected not to use the proxy votes that he held in support
of his own nomination, it is to be assumed that he had decided not to either contest the
election himself or use his votes in support of candidates for other positions. This is
an abuse of process, as the failure to vote on behalf of those who had trusted him as
their proxy, could have affected the outcome of election. Will the C’tee investigate whether or not any deal had been entered into with respect to the outcome of the electiou, which resulted in the President holding back the votes that he controlled?
To be continued ….
——————————————————————————————–
7 August 2017
1AR Assn Governance
The matters below have been raised with the C’tee, as follow-on queries to this (made some time ago) :
This statement is made in the 1AR Assn 2017 AGM Minutes: “Noel McLaughlin – financial affiliate member”. There is no provision in the current Constitution (Model Rules) for affiliate members. Will the C’tee amend membership rules and refund fees accordingly? [The Minutes also require amendment.]
“Dear Committee,
Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) have advised that if a member of an association incorporated in Victoria has any concerns about the regulatory governance of the Association of which he is a member, he should formally advise the C’tee of these and await their response.
To this end, I’d like to bring to your attention the following matters, resulting from the 2017 AGM, which appear to constitute conduct prejudicial to the Association, in breach of the Association’s Constitution (ie. CAV’s Model Rules).
1. When the AGM commenced, those attending were informed that there were 33 financial members present, and 21 proxy’votes’had been received. A total of 54 potential votes. After the AGM, a member asked one of those who had counted the votes, what the result was for the election of the President. He was informed 55 for and 15 against. A total of 70 votes cast. This discrepancy became known among members. When the Minutes were circulated, members were informed that four more financial members had actually been present and another twelve proxy votes had been ‘found’, i,e, 37 members and 33 proxies; a total of 72 potential votes. How was it that the count of potential votes announced at the meeting was 30% less than the number of votes lodged as stated in the Minutes? Where did these additional votes come from?
2. The AGM Minutes list the names of those who had submitted proxy votes. When received, seven members immediately stated that they had submitted proxies, but their names weren’t listed in the Minutes (therefore their votes weren’t counted). At least two of these members had sent their proxy forms to the Secretary. The situation allows for an abuse of process, i.e, proxy votes can be held back to influence the outcome of the election. Will the C’tee implement changes to ensure that all proxy forms sent to the c’tee in the future are acknowledged? (The Assn website would seem the best way to do this.)
3. The constitution (CAV Model Rules) state that “the minutes of each annual general meeting must include the proxy forms given to the Chairperson of the meeting”. The purpose of this is to ensure openness in the management of the election process, i.e. not only is the person who sent the proxy know that it was received, but also the person appointed as proxy is aware that he should have received the proxy form. The present system does not achieve this degree of openness and is open to abuse. Only those who submitted forms are named in the Minutes. Those they appointed as proxies are not named. Will the C’tee implement changes to ensure that both the senders and their appointed proxies are named in the Minutes in future?”
To be continued ….
————————————————————————————
6 August 2017
RAAC Training Standards: One for Some, But Not for Others?
This blog has raised concerns for some time now, that RAAC crews were operating the Bushmaster PMVs, without crew commanders being trained to endorsed RAAC competency levels.
Statements by some in Defence have suggested that no RAAC members now crewed the vehicles (which is just as well apparently, otherwise the RAAC might be lumbered with a responsibility for supplementing the RACT).
I see that the May 2017 1AR Assn newsletter carries a picture on the cover with the caption: “Note the Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV) that the young members of A Squadron are crewing to provide mobility to our training teams”. ( https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/512260_85cd454edd154abf935a87d06de18cae.pdf)
It seems to me that we have PMVs being operated by RAAC Crews. The driver being trained under CATC arrangements (as I believe to be the case), but the crew commander having no formal qualification at all. It might be that those who have qualified as crew commanders in AFVs, are considered to be able to simply transfer their skills to the PMV. Not having to prepare competency training criteria and conduct training/assessments would save money. This would also avoid having to argue the case for specific training for specific vehicles in accord with the roles in which they are utilized.
What would happen I ask, if the PMVs being operated by 1 Armd Regt personnel during Operation Okra were ambushed. Are the crew commanders trained as to how to respond with the PMV, as distinct to an ASLAV or M113AS4? We have already had a PMV overturn (in training) during a night march … the result of inadequate crew training.
Ad hoc crewman training is unacceptable at any time, let alone on active service. I’ve submitted the following question along the C of C: “Could you please advise if the A Sqn crew commanders on Op Okra have been trained to RAAC competency standards for the PMV as used in the role being undertaken. If this training has been developed, has its application been extended to all other situations in which the RAAC employ the PMV (eg. the ARES)?
I feel a question to the Defence Minister might be needed, however … eg. Can you confirm that members of 1st Armoured regiment commanding PMVs on Operation Okra, were qualified to do so according to approved competency standards?
There is, I believe, a similarity with the situation that existed when tanks were deployed to Vietnam. I’ve copied an extract from my book which explains (see under).
“Dropping down into the turret, Clark ordered his operator, Trooper Michael Bidey, to open the breech of the gun, wipe the base of the round, and fire again (suspecting that the failure to fire was caused by dirt which had been picked up in the floor bins). Both operator and gunner protested, referring to the gunnery drill taught during training, i.e. wait 30 minutes before opening the breech (because of the possibility of a slow-burning primer which might suddenly ignite).72 Their protests were overruled.”
Footnote 72: “The situation illustrates a weaknesses in the training system at the time. The 30 mins stand-by period was introduced as an Army wide safety measure for a number of different munitions. Unfortunately no-one looked at this in the context of tanks involved in close combat. Even when training for Vietnam, therefore, gunner/sigs were taught never to unload without waiting 30 mins. Gunnery instructors who queried the procedure were ‘fobbed off’; no-one it seems, was prepared to authorise the earlier removal of a round which misfired in such circumstances. Former Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO), Richard Farrell, believes a ‘hangfire’ would be very unlikely after the first few minutes. Crewmen should have been told this, so that informed decisions could be made in accord with the tactical situation.”
———————————————————————————————-
5 August 2017
The RAAC ARES ‘Crisis’
The questions surrounding the role and platform of the RAAC ARES have been raised on the blog for years now. The role of the ARES as a whole has also been queried.
The Defence Reserves Assn (DRA) is to hold its annual conference in Queanbeyan in a fortnight. One of the aims of the DRA is: “to represent the standpoint of the Defence Reserves in the promotion of an effective tri-service Defence Force”.
Given that 75% of the unit associations which form part of the RAAC Corporation are ARES, will the Corporation be represented at the DRA Annual Conference? When this question asked last year, the answer was no. The same answer was given to the query as to whether or not the RAAC Corporation would be contributing to the DRA paper prepared as part of the Defence White Paper process. It would be nice to think that the precedent was not set in concrete.
While it doesn’t relate to operational aspects, Issue 27 of the DRA Journal ‘The Australian Reservist’, includes an interesting article: “The Community of Australian Veterans” (http://dra.org.au/371/images/TAR2_2016-27.pdf)
Speaking about the RAAC Corporation, it was interesting to see in the Minutes of the 2017 1AR Assn AGM that “T. Crook” (former President 1 AR Assn and presently Director, RAAC Corporation) stated that I should be disciplined because I had denigrated (ie. criticized unfairly) the Corporation. Sadly, he failed to raise this raise this issue with me directly, nor explain what he was referring to.
Nevertheless, I reviewed my blog posts, but could find no incident in which I denigrated the Corporation. There were a number of occasions, such as that above, where I asked questions. I’m sure that Mr Crook is not saying that no-one is allowed to question the RAAC Corporation’s strategic priorities or lack of them (which he is partly responsible for).
Why would Mr Crook use the 1AR Assn AGM as a forum to denigrate me, one might ask? Possibly he has his own agenda.
I repeat, if anything I report on the blog is wrong in any way … let me know, and, if this proves to be the case, I will immediately retract it and apologise.
——————————————————————————————-
4 August 2017
ADF Readiness Level : Have We Got it Right?
Richard Broinowski, a former Ambassador to Vietnam, the Republic of Korea and Mexico, introduces his post on John Menadue’s blog with the following para:
“Exercise Talisman Sabre does not address any of Australia’s main security concerns and sends the wrong messages to Australia’s neighbours. It contributes towards locking Australia into America’s wars, no matter how irrelevant to Australia’s own interests.”
My response, published on JM’s blog, is:
“Hi Richard,
As you would know, Defence strategy starts with two fundamentals: the ‘warning time’ for enemy intentions to become clear; and the ‘lead time’ to acquire equipment and train personnel to operate and maintain it. Coupled with alliances, these considerations drive defence policy, from the size of the standing defence force and readiness levels, to industry participation and stockpiling requirements.
Ex Talisman Sabre is obviously designed to bring ADF training and readiness levels to a standard linked to the existing ‘warning time’. Such high level exercises are cyclical, ie. they occur to complete a training cycle and bring participants to a level of proficiency which allow them to meet the Defence’s contingency planning, should it be needed during the period of their ‘watch’.
Meanwhile, as part of the ADF force preparedness cycle, new elements (ie. military personnel in all positions and at all levels) will undergo training which will result in a future high level exercise to complete their training.
Military personnel are not like, say, staff in a bank … who can retain their skills and proficiency for a whole career. Age is one of the factors that which demands a high personnel turnover in operational roles and necessitates a constant training cycle.
I, for one, would like to acknowledge the proficiency levels that the ADF attain in order to meet current contingency plans. Whether or not this readiness level is justified, depends on assessments of the threat and associated warning time. I have faith in those appointed to undertake these assessments, as well as those whose training levels are determined accordingly. I thank them for their service.”
—————————————————————————–
1 August 2017 (Note: No blog posts will be made for 2 or 3 August)
How Should a Financial Statement be Presented?
Regulations related to an association’s financial statement are very specific for obvious reasons. Those who made donations need to see that their money has been properly recorded and all members must be able to understand exactly how their funds were spent during the past year. Where financial assets are held, members must be informed where these funds are invested and how these investments have performed.
Desirably, the financial statement should be sent to members with the agenda for the AGM. This allows members to review the financial position and prepare any questions.
Of course, accountability is paramount for ensuring honest financial management. To this end, rules for associations incorporated in Victoria require that the financial statement be prepared by the Treasurer at the end of the FY and presented to the Management C’tee.
The C’tee would verify that all transactions were probably recorded, ie credit card expenditure had been in accord with the Assn’s rules and all usage had been for approved Assn purposes. Once all questions have been resolved, two members of the C’tee then sign a declaration stating that the financial statement gives a true and fair view of the Association’s financial position.
The financial statement is then ready for presentation to the members for consideration at the AGM. The C’tee’s declaration is required to be included in the Minutes of the AGM.
What Happened with the 2017 Financial Statement?
The Minutes didn’t include the C’tee declaration certifying the accuracy of the financial statement. Then again, no such declaration could’ve been made on the basis of the detail available. The financial statement detailed neither the source of income nor how funds were expended … just income and expenditure totals. So members have no idea if all income has been properly receipted, nor whether expenditure was appropriate, nor whether investments have been soundly made. They were asked to accept all this on trust.
Of course the C’tee are all volunteers, working on behalf of the members. Their enormous efforts are greatly appreciated and it follows that the C’tee have the trust of members. But … the association is incorporated in Victoria and MUST follow the rules prescribed by law. There are penalties for not so doing.
How Can the Situation be Recovered?
By rights, details of an Assn’s financial position are lodged electronically with Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) within a month of its AGM. In effect, this is a certification that the financial affairs of the Assn are truly and fairly represented. If CAV have any doubt they can request to see the Minutes of the AGM and the C’tee’s declaration to this effect.
However, CAV appreciate that not all Assns are able to meet this requirement. They allow, therefore, an Assn to have its members approve its financial statement by special resolution, provided that this is done and advised to CAV within six months of the end of the FY.
———————————————————————————-
31 July 2017
1AR Assn 2017 AGM : The Tale of an Election
At least one member has called on the President to hold a new election for office bearers. Why?
Fact File
Given that the current Constitution allows for nominations from the floor, a member urged (i) those he knew who would be standing for election to send out brief bio details/quals etc to others, and (ii) members who were not able to attend the meeting, to appoint a proxy so that their votes were not wasted.
A former WO1 of high standing was advised by someone who had some sort of quasi-legal knowledge, that what the above member had done was illegal and a corruption of the election process. The former WO1 informed members accordingly.
When the above allegation was made known to Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) they advised that the quasi-legal opinion was totally false. What had happened was completely lawful and an acknowledged part of the democratic process.
When the AGM commenced, those attending were informed that there were 33 financial members present, and 21 proxy ‘votes’ had been received. A total of 54 potential votes
After the AGM, a member asked one of those who had counted the votes, what the result was for the election of the President. He was informed 55 for and 15 against. A total of 70 votes cast. This discrepancy became known among members.
When the Minutes were circulated, members were informed that four more members had actually been present and another twelve proxy votes had been ‘found’, ie 37 members and 33 proxies; a total of 72 potential votes.
The Minutes listed the names of those who had submitted proxy votes. Seven members immediately stated that they had submitted proxies, but their names weren’t listed.
On registering at the AGM, the proxy appointed by one member was informed that that member was unfinancial (he wasn’t); therefore his vote could not be lodged by the proxy. Unbelievably, the member’s name was listed in the Minutes as one of proxy votes which was counted (how his vote was ‘cast’ and by whom, is unknown).
The Minutes advised that the votes of those who had nominated the President as their proxy, were invalid. When this was queried with CAV, the response was that: while the proxy holder can decide to abstain from voting himself, there is an obligation on his part to meet the expectations of those who have trusted their proxy to him.
Conjecture.
For the first time, a democratic initiative meant that there was a possibility that a number of candidates who were favour of improvements to governance, might be elected … raising the possibility of the Assn being thrown into ‘unknown waters’. The former WO1 and others of his ilk banded together (working on the assumption that only they knew what was best for the Assn). Their first action was to smear the encouragement given to members to appoint proxies, as unlawful. Their attempted smear was shown to be completely false (however, no apology was made).
The next action for the ‘clique’, was to do a ‘deal’ which would see their own candidates elected. They did not know how many proxies in support of the ‘other’ candidates would be received, so they had to take precautions. They decided to have a number of proxy votes ‘held back’, so that there would be no chance that the candidates supported by the pro-governance ‘faction’, could be elected.
This would have worked a treat (with a declaration being made at the meeting that 21 proxies had been received), except that someone discovered the actual number of votes cast … which included 33 proxies. No problems, the Minutes simply recorded different voting figures (ie. another 12 proxies were ‘found’).
This might have been the end to the matter and a victory for the ‘clique’ … except it was pointed out on social media that CAV required details of proxy votes to be included in the Minutes. So the names of 33 who appointed proxies were included (but not who their proxies were). Unfortunately for the ‘deal’ brokers, seven members who had appointed proxies realized that their names weren’t included and came forward.
The Minutes also stated that those members who appointed the President as their proxy, were “invalid”. This would appear to be part of the ‘deal’ to ensure that proxies from the pro-governance ‘faction’ (who had thought they had the support of the President) could not result in their preferred candidates being elected.
The Question at the Start…
Why is it that at least one member has called on the President to hold a new election for office bearers? It’s may or may not be hard to answer … depending on whether or not you support management of your Assn in accordance with governance regulations.
—————————————————————————————
30 July 2017
2017 1AR Assn AGM Minutes: Another Quote
Mr C Fenton OAM*: “The disciplinary committee was legally raised. The outcome of it, purely because the constitution was not correctly lodged had to be made null and void, however the findings of that committee still stands today and we can turn around today and look at the blog and raise those charges again , have another disciplinary committee and the person who is writing that blog has not learnt his lesson. Until we solve this problem we are not going to have the younger members come into our organisation. Our focus should be on the future and the younger generation. We are not going to get the younger members until this problem and all the bickering is stopped.”
Mr C. Fenton OAM’s allegations are these:
“The disciplinary committee was legally raised.” How can this be? It was raised in accordance with the provisions of a Constitution which was unlawful.
“… the findings of that committee still stand today…“. This is garbage. The C’tee paid $960 of members’ funds to a law firm to determine the status of the Constitution. The outcome was that the members were vindicated … it was an unlawful document and anyone who was adversely affected by its provisions had a right to legal redress (ie. compensation).
“… we can turn around today and look at the blog and raise those charges again , have another disciplinary committee…”. What charges are these that are to be brought against me? I have said over and over if there is ever anything stated in my blog which is untrue, then I will immediately withdraw it and make an apology. Mr C Fenton OAM has never once raised any issue regarding the content of my blog. If another disciplinary committee is to be lawfully raised, it has to do done under a lawful Constitution.
“… the person who is writing that blog has not learnt his lesson.” What lesson is it that I am supposed to have learnt? Is it the one whereby anyone who raises an issue of unlawful governance is supposed to be intimidated by a ‘clique’ of his betters?
“Until we solve this problem we are not going to have the younger members come into our organisation.” What is the problem referred to? Is it the one where a member of an Assn raises an issue where governance has not been in accord with the regulations under which an Incorporated Association is required to operate and those responsible don’t respond appropriately? Is it an awareness of this which is stopping younger members joining the Assn?
“Our focus should be on the future and the younger generation.” Some would argue that unless the governance of an Assn can be demonstrated to be ‘in order’, new members (both young and old) are hardly likely to sign up.
“We are not going to get the younger members until this problem and all the bickering is stopped.” Again, ‘the problem’ …see #5 above. There is a new allegation, however, that of “bickering”. The terms means: arguing about petty and trivial matters. Is the governance of the Assn (and therefore its future) a petty and trivial matter?
* Note. I refer to Mr C Fenton OAM as such as I once made the mistake of using his first name “Chris” … he quickly informed me as to how he should be addressed.
——————————————————————————————————-
29 July 2017
2017 1AR Assn AGM Minutes: Two More Quotes
Soutar – “Spoke passionately on his love of the Association and the reason we are losing members is due to what is being written on a blog, and the 2 people that are causing most of the concerns and pulling this Association apart are not present to face the members.”
Fenton OAM – “In the last 12 months things have become worse, not better, if you go through the blog there has been no charge to it. The process that we went through to lodge our new constitution was incorrectly done, but at the same time CAV failed to identify this. “
Well I seem to have got their attention. (Which is the aim of all things published.)
Mr Crook declared at the meeting that there was a split occurring within the Assn. As I mentioned yesterday … I agree. There are those who wish to just have a good time and bugger the regulations and BS (they speak the loudest); and there are those who believe that lawful governance has to come first (they try to influence by reason).
What is being written on the blog that could be construed as causing the Assn to lose members? Some recent regulatory shortcomings are listed at the end. Could it be that prospective members are hesitant to join an organisation which has demonstrated that it’s not capable of meeting regulatory standards? If so, what is the answer?
I’ve suggested that a Consultative C’tee be established. This would comprise a group of members who do not necessarily actually meet, but communicate with each other to reach a consensus as to what the 1AR Assn Management C’tee should do in relation to specific matters, eg. proxy votes; financial statement, Constitution etc.
This C’tee would be an advisory one and the Management C’tee would not be obliged to accept its advice… it would not have liability for matters decided upon by the C’tee, but would be free to inform the wider membership about the advice given to the Management C’tee. I suggest that the C’tee call for volunteers. The fact that there are members who are prepared to give their time to the Assn for such things has been demonstrated by the incredible effort that has been made to redo the draft Constitution.
Some Recent Regulatory Shortcomings.
False reasons were given to members re the need for a new Constitution. The document presented to CAV was accompanied by a fraudulent declaration.
The Assn spent $960 on legal advice to confirm what concerned members had stated, ie. the revised Constitution was unlawful.
The Financial Statement presented to members at the AGM does not meet CAV requirements; in particular, no explanation was given as to how members’ funds amounting to $47,501.94, were spent.
It seems that the President did not exercise the votes of his proxies (and presumably did not vote himself). Members were therefore misled in that he appeared on ballot papers as a candidate and would have been expected to vote accordingly. CAV advise that while the proxy holder can decide to abstain from voting himself, there is an obligation on his part to meet the expectations of those who have trusted their proxy to him.
It seems that at least another seven proxy votes were withheld (ie. members said that they submitted proxy forms, some via the Secretary, but their names weren’t listed among the 33 proxies in the Minutes. One has to ask whether or not a ‘deal’ had been struck in terms of the securing a particular outcome.
Those attending the AGM were advised that there were 33 financial members present and 21 proxies had been received. This raised concerns when a member asked, and was told, that the votes for President were 55 for and 15 against (confirmed in the Minutes). The Minutes subsequently advised that four more members were present and another twelve proxy votes had been ‘found’. Interestingly, one of the proxy voters was deemed to be unfinancial at the AGM and so the proxy was not able to vote on his behalf; yet this person is listed as one of the proxies whose vote was counted. Which candidate received his vote(s), one has to wonder?
————————————————————————————-
28 July 2017
2017 1AR Assn AGM Minutes: Two Quotes
Crook –…why has there been no action on Mr Cameron and his continual abuse of his position on his website in denigrating people in this room and of the Corporation and why hasn’t there been any disciplinary action taken? 2
Crook – In regards to the perceptions and behaviours of the Association. With the split that is appearing there are concerns of the levels of bullying and harassment that are occurring. Mr President what is the role of Mr Baikie within the Association and his official capacity to steer proxy votes?
Mr T Crook is a former Assn president who resigned his position in 2016 after admitting to lying to members.
The allegations he makes above are:
I am continually abusing my position on my website. Given that it’s my individual blog, how can is it possible for me to abuse my own position? Armouredadvocates is not a publication sent to people, those who might be interested in things I try to bring to light … have to go to the blog themselves to read it. It is my belief that ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant for bad ideas’. I appreciate that some disagree … preferring to cloak things in a veil of secrecy. Everyone has a right to their own opinions.
I use my blog to denigrate people and the RAAC Corporation Ltd. (Denigrate: to unfairly criticize) I have continually stated that if at any time I am shown that I have posted something on the blog which is incorrect, I will immediately withdraw it and apologise.
In relation to the Corporation, I currently have a FOI under consideration. Brief details: I submitted a request to the Minister to have eligibility for the Hammersley citation extended; a month later the Corporation submitted a similar request to Defence; five weeks later the Minister informed me the Defence had advised that eligibility could not be extended … problem is that the advice from Defence was wrong; I asked the Corporation if I could see their submission … they refused; hence FOI request (ie. was Defence influenced by the info provided by the Corporation?) This info is sought prior to informing the Minister that he has been wrongly advised. Is explaining this, denigrating or providing sunlight?
There is a split occurring in the Assn. I agree. There are those who wish to just have a good time and bugger the regulations and BS (they speak the loudest); and there are those who believe that lawful governance has to come first (they try to influence by reason). One way of managing this is to appoint a governance c’tee to work alongside and advise the management c’tee.
Bullying and harassment are occurring. I agree. People such as Mr Crook are using their standing (eg. past president, Corporation Director) to intimidate those who argue for governance reform (it was during Mr Crook’s time as President that the Assn’s Constitution was found to be unlawful, the Assn spending $960 of members’ funds to confirm what members had discovered.)
Mr Baikie must have an official capacity within the Assn to be allowed to “steer proxy votes“. This is garbage. The basis of democracy is that any member is empowered to encourage any other member to vote in a particular way (providing this is done in a lawful manner, ie. without inducement). Mr Baikie openly encouraged members to vote for particular candidates. Such action could not be more lawful (or democratic),
——————————————————————————–
27 July 2017
The 1AR Assn AGM and its Governance.
A few quotes from the Minutes are copied below:
“Are we perfect at governance? No we are very good former tank soldiers and future Cavalry soldiers in the Regiment in its new form, but more importantly we are mates and we should look after each other.”
“… where we let ourselves down is the behaviour of ex and current serving members. We are about comraderie and friendship and having a laugh and that’s what we need to get back to”.
“We want the Association to succeed; we want it to be around the camaraderie that it was or what it should be,”
“Our focus should be on the future and the younger generation.”
“…there are a number of people, including Mr Baikie who have put up various ideas over the time…”.
“The process that we went through to lodge our new constitution was incorrectly done, but at the same time CAV failed to identify this. The disciplinary committee was legally raised.”
Wow!
It is acknowledged that the Assn is not perfect at governance … what would you think that would mean? Possibly someone suggesting that an emphasis need to be placed on the Constitution to get that right as a start? Possibly a vote of thanks to Mr Baikie who has spent an enormous amount of time to co-ordinate efforts by a number of members to provide a draft Constitution which is not only comprehensive, but also meets the legal requirements laid down for such documents.
It was CAV’s fault, according to Mr Fenton, that the illegal Constitution was allowed to exist. He fails to mention that CAV accepted the Constitution on the basis of a false declaration. The disciplinary C’tee was legally raised he states, but legal advice obtained by the Assn (at a cost of $960 of members’ funds) has stated that anyone who was penalised under the illegal Constitution has grounds for seeking legal redress (ie. compensation) against the Assn. Why have those who made the false declaration, not apologised to the members? (They’ve been asked to do so.)
A former member of the C’tee once said that he joined the Assn to have a “shitload of fun”. No reference to assisting those who may be in need, no reference to supporting those on active service today … just self interest. That sentiment is echoed above, albeit in terms of camaraderie etc. The latter is important, but so is the former (ie. helping those in need and supporting those serving).
None of this can happen, however, unless good governance is in place. The NSW RSL Executive might have been good at ‘having a laugh’, but it was lax governance which allowed members’ funds to be misappropriated and the organisation brought into disrepute.
Is it not time for the 1AR Assn to get its governance in order? Members are ready and willing to help do this.
BTW. What is it in terms of ‘the behaviour of current serving members’ (above) which is letting the Assn down?
————————————————————————————————–
26 July 2017
The 2017 1AR Assn AGM (Proxies etc)
We know about the problem with the 1AR Assn Constitution not specifying a cut off for nominations, thereby allowing members to specify who they want their proxy to vote for. This is obviously impossible in terms of knowing all candidates prior to the meeting … especially as nominations can be made from the floor at the meeting itself. Interestingly, directing proxies how to vote is the process that Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV) recommend (see below).
Hopefully the Constitution will be amended to stipulate such a process for the 2018 AGM. The failure, and suggestions to rectify it, was mentioned in the blog posts of 9 & 10 July.
So what happened re proxies at the 2017 AGM? Those present at the meeting were informed that there were 33 financial members present and 21 valid proxies. These numbers immediately raised concern when the votes for President were stated to be 55 for and 15 against. Voting numbers were confirmed in the Minutes.
The Minutes, however, raised more questions than they answered. The figure for members attending was changed from 33 to 37, however, only 36 of those listed were eligible to vote.
It’s now been revealed (because he was mentioned in the Minutes) that one member failed to sign in at door, but still voted. How many others might have done the same (with no check as to whether or not they were financial and eligible to vote)? So the number of those known to be present and eligible to vote goes back up to 37.
Now we have the number of proxies; this was changed from 21 to 35, with three others being declared to be invalid (one being unfinancial and two listed as having nominated their proxy to be the President). What is wrong with the latter? … they might well ask.
So in total, the number of eligible votes numbers 72, two more than the votes recorded for President. If we assume that the Patron elected not to vote, this means that someone did also. The main thing, of course, is that we now have more voters than votes (rather than the opposite, as before)
However … given that the Minutes list the names of those voting by proxy, it comes as a surprise that, as soon as the Minutes were circulated, seven members raised concerns that they had submitted proxy forms, but their names are not listed. Two of these sent their forms to the Secretary (with the expectation that they would be passed to the nominated proxy). Another two sent their forms direct to the member they nominated to be their proxy.
There is more. When the member immediately above was presenting his proxy forms for checking, he was told that one of them was not financial and therefore the proxy was invalid. The member, therefore, had his own vote, plus his proxy votes (less one). Surprisingly, the member whose proxy was declared invalid is not listed as such in the Minutes; even more surprisingly, he is listed as one of the valid proxy voters (even though his ‘vote’ had been deleted from the number that his nominated proxy could cast). Who knows how he was supposed to have voted?
So … taking all the above into account, it seems that at least seven proxy votes have been held back. If members nominated a proxy and that person decided not to vote on their behalf, is that allowable?
CAV advise that a person who provides another with his proxy, is doing so with the expectation that his vote will be used to influence the outcome, ie. select the best person for the appointment; he is trusting the proxy holder to represent his interests in this respect.
The best use of a proxy is when the person receiving the proxy is informed how the absentee person wants him to vote on their behalf (it is recognised that this requires a cut-off for nominations prior to the AGM, as well bio details/quals etc of candidates being sent out to members in time for them to select the candidates of their choosing and submit their proxies).
While the proxy holder can decide to abstain from voting himself, there is an obligation on his part to meet the expectation (above) of the person who has trusted his proxy to him.
There is more to this story. One has to hope that recording what has happened will assist in ensuring lessons will be learnt for the future.
————————————————————————–
25 July 2017
Congratulations
Colonel Scott Winter AM (CO 1 Armd Regt Jan ’11 to Dec ’14) is to command 3 Brigade next year. He takes over from distinguished predecessors: Brigadier Chris Field AM CSC (RA Inf) and before that (now) Major General Roger Noble DSC CSC AM (RAAC).
The Townsville based 3 Brigade has tanks co-located with its ACR (2 Cav Regt), a near training area, and responsibility for developing the Army’s amphibious capability.
“Been There, Done That’
“I’ve done London and I’m off to Rome …”.
What’s ‘done’ mean? In common usage, the term refers to someone who’s ticked off all the places in the guidebooks and seen all the sites that people might ask them about.
What’s it mean if someone with an Army background says “I could’ve gone to Malaya and done Vietnam later”.
Seems to me that you can’t ‘do’ a war in the same way that you can ‘do’ a city. Then again, maybe some people think differently.
Possibly for them, ‘doing’ a conflict means ‘notching up’ a campaign ribbon. Surely though, if you’ve been to a conflict, any conflict, you’d be the first to acknowledge that medals come last. Then again, maybe some people just say things.
—————————————————————————————–
24 July 2017
The Army Reserve : Dire Straits?
Recent posts have focused on Conscription and whether or not every conscript who served in Vietnam, volunteered to do so.
Various commentators have made it very clear that our Nation’s defence policy failed at the time, ie. Australia was not able to meet its treaty obligations on which our defence arrangements were based, without resorting to Conscription.
Defence policy and consequent defence arrangements are based on the assessment of the Threat. Of prime importance in this respect, is the warning time (re the enemy’s intentions) and lead times to acquire equipment and train personnel to use it. Coupled with this, is our stockpiling policy (ie. the quantity of defence supplies to be available from within Australia).
Flowing on from the above is the degree of readiness at which our standing army and reserve forces are kept. The Army Reserve is vital to Australia’s defence policy. It is here that military skills which take years to develop can be maintained, either for providing a basis for training others in a time of mobilisation or for supplementing the ARA. An example of failure here is the case of Centurion crew commanders when tanks were sent to Vietnam. The shortage within the ARA would’ve been made good if qualified CMF volunteers could have been deployed (but this was politicly unacceptable).
The whole issue comes down to Defence contingency planning. What part does the ARES play in current contingency plans? I believe the ARES have a vital role and those who currently serve in ARES units deserve our wholehearted support. BUT … they need to be informed of what their role is to be in the contingency plans which form the basis of the defence of our Nation.
Interestingly, the Australian Security Policy Institute (ASPI)’s newsletter ‘The Strategist’ today includes an article in which the a CA initiative is referred to (below). Does this provide confidence that the ARES is included in current Defence planning? There was once a ‘One Army’ concept, I think it’s time is long over as far as Defence planners are concerned. Conscription might have to be the ‘go to’ solution again in the future.
Campbell has ordered the establishment of a new army research centre to identify problems soldiers may face due to the evolving nature of joint land combat, doctrine and training. The centre will identify innovations that can improve army capability, leadership and ethics, and help the army understand how to support the ‘joint’ ADF in current and emerging strategic circumstances.
The Vice President Reserves, Defence Force Welfare Assn stated on 20 July that:
“ARES strengths are near to an all time low”;
“ARES recruiting has been outsourced for some time and seen by many to have failed!” and
“2 Div launched in March 2017 an ‘ARES Transformation Plan’ which needs to be effective to ‘stop the rot’!
If those of us who have had experience in the ADF can contribute to the betterment of those serving today and likely to serve in the future, I suggest that supporting the ARES and its importance in the defence of Australia is a good start.
The RAAC Corporation said not long ago that they had been officially asked to form a ‘Chapter’ in the ACT, based on the 1AR Assn. I suggested to the ACT rep for the IAR Assn that he contact B Sqn, 1/15 RNSWL, based in the ACT. Nothing’s come of the proposed ACT Chapter, nor contact with B Sqn 1/15 RNSWL.
One can’t help but wonder whether one should find out what the parade night for B Sqn 1/15th is, and just go along to offer support. Is the significance of the ARES so far under the radar that nobody cares?
————————————————————————————————–
23 July 2017
Binh Ba II
Continung my attempt to contribute to the accuracy of the account of what happened at Binh Ba. Given the the RA Inf now have the APCs and will soon get MICVs, they’ll have to start thinking of more extensive capability reports than just ‘walking wounded’, stretch cases’ etc.
“MY understanding is that only one [tank] was disabled “.
In technical terms, there are a series of classifications for describing a tank casualty, an ‘F-kill’, for example, refers to a tank that is still able to move, but can’t fire its guns (theoretically the tracks of a 53 tonne tank are a weapon in their own right, providing a crew commander and driver can both function); a ‘K-kill’ is a knocked-out tank, ie. one which can neither move or use its weapons.
Of course, these terms do not just refer to tank itself. If a tank’s driver has been wounded, it’s an ‘M-kill; if a tank’s operator has been wounded, it’s a ‘F-kill’, as the weapons can’t be loaded.
In terms of c/s 21Charlie (Bennett) an RPG penetrated the turret and seriously wounded the turret crew. An ‘F-kill,’ but the radios and IC had been knocked out, so a ‘K-kill’ . The tank was abandoned on the battlefield and crew members were dusted off.
In terms of 22Bravo (Bennier) the crew commander was wounded by spall from an RPG which detonated against the hull … shortly after, another RPG penetrated the turret, all turret crew being wounded including the operator who was temporarily blinded when the RPG jet passed just in front of his eyes. Even if he had been able to see the load the guns, the electrical firing circuit has been cut. Without immediate crew replacements, an ‘F-kill’ became a ‘K-kill’ . Crew members were dusted off and remaining ammo from 22Bravo was redistributed between the other two tanks.
In both cases, “disabled” is as good a term as any. It reflects the fact that RAEME LAD work was needed on both tanks before they could return to action with replacement crews from Forward Delivery Troop, but they weren’t ‘knocked out’ to the extend that they required, say, workshop repair or had to be RTA’d. (Being able to undertake battlefield repair is one of the critical skills of ‘Bluebells’ and the reason they always travel with armour … bless their hearts.)
—————————————————————————————–
22 July 2017
Getting the Facts Right
You can only do so much to ensure historical accuracy. Those who’ve been arguing that no-one was sent to Vietnam against their will, now refuse to accept the testimonials of those who state that a no time were they given an option to go or not go. ‘The ‘all volunteer faction’ declare that as no contemporary evidence has been presented, their assertion is correct.
Binh Ba
I’ve been reading through the drafts of a book about Australians in Vietnam which is being revised. It includes a description of the battle of Binh Ba, I’ve offered the following comment”
“Well done re the revise. Just one point. It’s amazing how just a couple of words can have so much influence. I refer to “… a Centurion tank in company with an Armoured Recovery Vehicle, was travelling north on Route 2 inbound for FSPB Virginia when it was fired at by small arms and hit at close range by an RPG fired from the south-east corner of Binh Ba Village; the round penetrated the turret seriously wounding one of the crew…”.
In this case the two words are “close range“. The impression frequently given in publications was that the tank was driving through Binh Ba when an RPG was fired at it from the window of a house it was passing by. Sure the tank was about half way through Binh Ba when it was fired on (see image at p398 of my book). The AK47 fire could well have come from a house adjacent to the road at that point. The RPG, however, was fired from a different place.
I was particularly pleased when, during research for my book, I was able to track down the tank and inspect the point of the RPG strike (repaired) and associated spall pattern. I say in the book:
“The round narrowly missed the front turret bin, striking the top of the turret where the side slants to become the roof (directly above the ‘pistol port’). The spall pattern suggests that it was fired from a point in the village forward of the tank, possibly from an elevated position.”
If the RPG and AK47 firers had been co-located, the RPG would have penetrated through the side of the turret (not the top). The spall pattern makes it clear that the RPG firer could not have been in the SE corner of the village (ie. the tank would have passed him and the spall pattern would have gone the other way… see photo p397). As you know, range has no effect on the penetration of a HEAT warhead. The firer was more likely to have been at the NE corner of village.
What’s all this mean? Was the RPG firer in a sentry position to provide early warning of any approach from the north? Was there a similar sentry posted at the southern corner of the village? Did he fall asleep and wake up after the tank had passed him? Did another soldier see the tank and open fire with his AK to sound the ‘warning’? Is this when the northern sentry fired his RPG? It seems clear that it was anything but a well executed ambush … but who knows?
Given that Peter Chapman said that he dived into the turret (from the seat he was standing on looking out) after he heard the SA rounds “raking the side of the tank”, I suggest rather than “… fired at by small arms and hit at close range by an RPG fired from the south-east corner of Binh Ba village” “, you say:
‘… hit by small arms fire, with an RPG round penetrating the turret directly above one of the turret crew, shortly after …’.
Hope this helps. Seems to me that there might be more to be discovered re what happened and the more we can get right at this stage the better it will be for those coming after.”
———————————————————————————-
21 July 2017
Vietnam : All Conscripts Volunteers? II
Following from the 17 July post, the following was posted on the ‘other’ Forum” referred to:
“A couple of emails received, both from RAAC members. I think the point is that some (probably the majority) were given the opportunity not to go, while others weren’t. Reference to the latter being “BS” is not correct.
(1) One day towards the end of 1967 not long after the decision was made to send Centurions to Vietnam we were called up to the RSM’s office to be told that the Regiment did not have enough trained men to fill the numbers required for C Squadron to go to SVN and from that day we were to be transferred back to the Regiment, all leave cancelled and we were scheduled to attend the Jungle training course at Canungra, and then off to Vietnam despite the fact we had less than 6 months to go of our two year National Service. It was never a matter of did we want to go it was a matter of you are going we are short of numbers and that was it. If I had been asked or had a choice I would have said no.
(2) I can recall being given this option at briefing one evening about December 1970. I remember a few faces did no show up in Vietnam. Also, there was a Regular Army Trooper who shared a room with me at Armoured Centre (1969) who did not agree with the politics involved in Vietnam and he requested to be trained as a Gunner/Sig Saladin so he would not have to go to Vietnam. I did not see him again so I think his training choice was approved.”
The influential ‘clique’ member who had declared that saying that any conscript was posted to Vietnam without agreeing to it was “BS”, was contacted by person (1) above. An agreed statement was published on the Forum. My response …
“An important outcome is that at least one person who is in a position of considerable influence now accepts that what he previously described as “BS” (ie. not every conscript who went to Vietnam ‘volunteered’ to do so) … is, in fact, correct and forms part of our shared military history.
I think we all have to understand how angry some veterans become (such as the RA Sigs conscript I interviewed … quoted earlier in one of the related threads) when they are told now that they had a choice as to whether or not they went to Vietnam. The majority did, but not all (especially those with ‘critical’ skill sets).
Soon after I’d done the interviews about this, I told a serving major general how I’d been surprised at what I’d discovered. He told me that he’d given the address at the last Anzac Day service, during which he referred to the ‘fact’ that everyone who served in Vietnam had volunteered.
Finishing up re the CMF/ARES … accepting CMF volunteers might not have provided the numbers to prevent the need for conscription, BUT it might well have provided those who had skills which took a lot of training and which were urgently needed (such as Peter’s above). This might have meant that the Government could have adopted a policy whereby no conscript who did not want to go to Vietnam would be forced to do so. The public anger against conscription would have been avoided.”
—————————————————————————————————-
20 July 2017
DVA Initiative : Too Little, Too Late?
The July edition of the DVA e-news advises that:
“As a result of a 2017–18 Budget measure, Gold Cards will be provided to both the surviving Australian participants of the British Nuclear Test (BNT) program in Australia, and Australian veterans who served as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) during the occupation of Japan immediately following the Second World War.
The measure will also provide this healthcare coverage for affected pastoralists, Indigenous people and other civilians determined to be within the same vicinity as the participants of the BNT.
In many cases, people will be automatically issued a Gold Card under this measure. However, those who cannot be identified from DVA records as either a BNT or BCOF participant will need to lodge a claim for the Gold Card.”
Well done to the RAACA (NSW), John Haynes in particular, who have been lobbying for the BCOF gold card for years. One might be thought of as being cynical, to say the initiative is not going to cost the Government very much, given the few veterans of either BCOF or BNT still alive (probably even less, if any, Indigenous people present at the time).
There is, of course, the long standing claims that have been rejected, concerning the health consequences for RAAC crewmen exposed to the residual radioactivity associated with the tank (ARN 169041) that was placed at ground zero for one of the blasts. There is a large file on this at the School of Armour. A number of RAEME personnel were also exposed.
——————————————————————————-
19 July 2017
Personal Weapons
On my blog post on 11 July, I listed the following as matters as some of those I regarded as being of particular importance:
Ensuring the sacrifices and achievements of AFV crews in Vietnam are recorded fully and accurately in the annals of history
Full recognition and acknowledgement of the unique service of AFV crews in battle.
Overcoming the capability gap currently affecting the RAAC.
Open and transparent governance of the 1AR Assn in accordance with statutory regulations.
Cessation of the targeted human rights abuses meted out by the CPV to former members and families of RVN armed forces (our ‘allies’)
Full recognition and acknowledgement by all Australians of the service and sacrifice of Indigenous Australians during the Frontier Wars.
I forgot one:
Equipping RAAC AFV crewmen with a personal weapon which is both suitable (for the confined conditions in which AFV crews operate) and effective. (It could be argued that this is part of the capability gap affecting the RAAC, listed above)
The current handgun issued to AFV crewman is the same Browning 9mm pistol issued to crews in Vietnam. It was of limited use then and is no better today. The fact that it first entered service in 1935 says a lot. Both the British and US Armies have recently updated their issued handguns.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) commented recently that “the current ADF handgun belongs to an era when bolt-action rifles were king of the battlefield. We wouldn’t send our troops into harm’s way with a .303 Lee Enfield rifle today, so why do we send them out with vintage handguns—or none at all? (https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-the-adf-handgun-is-an-ethics-issue/)
ASPI goes on to say that the Australian Army has “a blind spot when it comes to handguns … contrast this with the British Army’s commitment to rushing its newly-acquired Glock pistols [referred to as the ‘Kalashnikov’ of hand guns] to its frontline units deployed in Afghanistan, where pistols have been credited with saving the lives of several soldiers.
I recall leaving my tank after it was stopped by enemy fire. When I got to the ground, I couldn’t see through the foliage immediately in front. I’d have liked to have been sure there were no enemy close by on the other side, but I didn’t bother firing. I returned my pistol to its holster when I realised that it was useless in providing any sort of suppressive fire in such a situation. I needed something with a high rate of fire and good hitting power.
Some commentators have asked why Australian police forces are equipped with better personal weapons than the ADF (ie. AFV crews).
A comment from a reader:
“Have just read your blog today on personal weapons for AFV crews. Could not agree more. I recall on our day at the small arms range to practise with the Browning. The S/Sgt instructor’s message to us was, something like, “the most effective use of this particular weapon is to throw it hard as you can at the target”. I also recall inspecting my target and noting that the round had not even penetrated the plywood. Fortunately, in Vietnam I was able to substitute my 9mm for something more effective; can’t recall who inherited it.”
—————————————————————————————
18 July 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
Time to get back to the above.
On 28 February 2017, I sent a letter to the Minister requesting to have an extension of eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR, to include the supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersley.
The Minister responded on 7 May 17 to say that he’d been advised [by Defence] that eligibility could not be extended because the citation was for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty (i.e. not just Hammersley).
On 5 June I was advised that “On 30 March 17 a completed work [on the same matter] was submitted by the RAAC Corporation … the RAAC have carriage of the submission and it is strongly supported”. I told the Corporation about the Minister’s response and said that I would be putting up a new submission, as the advice that had been given to him by Defence was wrong. The Corporation declined my request to see what they had advised Defence. (Background for the above is at the blog posts for 5 and 16 June 2017.) The Corporation also declined my offer of a copy of my second submission, as well as the opportunity to meet with the Minister as part of a delegation.
I submitted an FOI request to see the Corporation’s submission on 1 July:
On 7 May 2017, Minister Tehan advised me that he was unable to extend eligibility for the award. I have since discovered official documentary evidence which shows that the advice given to Minister Tehan was wrong. Before informing him of this, I would like to know what Defence was advised by the RAAC Corporation, in case that might have contributed to the misinformation given to the Minister. (See blog post for 1 July.)
The FOI team have responded to my request to ask for additional time as the“documents are held in an area staffed by reserve members, some of which are on leave, or only parade one night a week”.
Hopefully the FOI response will not be the same as that concerning the request to see the submission made by the Corporation in respect of the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour (now subject to an independent review by the Information Commissioner), ie the submission cannot be released because:
It contains the opinionsof the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
Release of the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
(See 30 June blog.)
—————————————————————————–
17 July 2017
Did All National Servicemen Who Went to Vietnam, Volunteer to do so?
A debate (of sorts) on another forum …
On the one side: All nsm who went to Vietnam volunteered to do so (ie. they wanted to go);
On the other: Although the majority of those who were conscripted wanted to go to Vietnam, there were some who did not. Intimidated by the threat of going to jail for two years, however, they allowed themselves to be conscripted. They knew that this would mean that they could be sent to Vietnam. Some were lucky to be given a choice and were reposted elsewhere. Others were not. ‘
The proponent for the ‘no-one was sent against their will’ was an instructor who “trained four intakes of National Servicemen, and recognising some 200 National Servicemen died in SVN I don’t know if any or those 200 were men I trained but I also don’t want anybody to think I sent them to SVN against their will because I know that never happened“.
It is understandable that this person wishes to have a clear conscience in this regard (though in reality, the only concern he would have as far as his conscience was concerned, was knowing that he might not have trained them as well as he could’ve and this led to some being killed).
Of interest in this matter, is the support given to this proponent, by a very influential member of the ‘clique’ I’ve referred to in recent days. He says: “One thing remains firmly locked in my memory and that is the fact I have never, ever come across a RAAC Nasho who did not want to go to Vietnam – be they Cav or Tank.”
I would expect most people to realise that his personal contact with a very small number of conscripts, cannot be taken as evidence for all conscripts. He does not stop there, however. Not surprisingly, he goes into the authoritive manner which seems common to those of his ilk: “Let the perception of being sent against one’s will to grow legs, it becomes another gigantic myth. Things like that should be dismissed as BS creep.”
I had offered two quotes from interviews I conducted for my book. Both former conscripts said that they did not volunteer to go to Vietnam (and if given the opportunity would not have gone). What can be deduced from the above BS remark is that either I’m lying or those I quoted, were lying. But as has been seen before, issues of this sort don’t seem to bother clique members … they simply dictate ‘what’s what’ and dismiss any contrary view.
——————————————————————————–
16 July 2017
Allegation of Unlawful Conduct Found to be Groundless
In the 12 July blog (under) I referred to someone who quoted legal opinion to support his view that voting for C’tee position at the 1AR Assn AGM was done under unlawful circumstances which corrupted the entire process. I copied the legal justification in the blog post. If the allegation was correct, all elected C’tee positions would be invalid and another general meeting would have to be conducted.
I informed him the process was conducted in accordance with the regulations set out by Consumer Affairs Victoria (who are the statutory authority for associations incorporated in Victoria). Given that he disagreed, however, I asked if he would take the next step and forward his allegation to CAV. Receiving no response, I did so myself.
CAV responded to me quickly. They stated that the allegation had no basis and the AGM conducted as per their Model Rules was completely lawful. They confirmed the view of another member (who had stood for election):
“The Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) is a commonwealth Act that pertains to business entities that needs to abide by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). Whereas we are a registered entity governed by a state statutory law, i.e. Associations Incorporation Reform Act 2012 and the Associations Incorporation Reform Regulation 2012 that being under the auspices of Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV).”
In lay terms, the person who made the allegation (or whoever advised him) was trying to apply matters that come under the ‘Corporations Act’ to our circumstances which is governed by the ‘Associations Act’ The two matters and the two Acts are completely different and what’s relevant to one does not carry over to the other.
I informed this person that an apology for making the allegation would help remove the tarnish on the Assn’s reputation … we can but wait and see. (An apology for the matters referred to in the 23 June blog post is still outstanding.)
Postscript. The person who made the allegation above, tells me that he has “no respect for Keyboard Commandos [aka me]”. It’s sad really, as I have enormous respect for what the perpetrator of this nonsense has achieved in his career.
Unfortunately, I believe he has been ‘set up’ by another member of the ‘clique’ I referred to yesterday … set up by someone who, not for the first time, has convinced others that he is qualified to provide the ‘legal’ opinions he offers.
—————————————————————————————–
15 July 2017
The Threat of Being Ostracised: Does it Mean that Matters of Principle Have to Come Last? (Part 2)
Yesterday I said that the answer to this question depends mainly on those behind the threat. I quoted a past example which was relevant. Today I describe a current example.
Some time ago, the Member’s Forum on the 1AR Assn website was suddenly closed. The topic being discussed at the time was the mysterious disappearance of items from the Tank Museum. A number of reasons were given for the closure, all of which turned out to be untrue. The President announced via the Assn newsletter that a post on the Forum had brought the Assn into disrepute. Misconduct by members was the reason for the closure. No-one on the C’tee was prepared to say, however, what the post was or who had posted it.
It is my belief that natural justice requires that members should be informed as to what their misconduct was and be given the opportunity to defend themselves. I lodged a grievance on this basis, as provided for under the Constitution. No long after, the Constitution was changed and I was expelled before the grievance was heard. (The then President later admitted that no offensive material had been posted on the Forum.)
Other members investigating the injustice involved, found that the Constitution was invalid, as it had been lodged on the basis of a false declaration. I was reinstated. A number of those on the C’tee resigned.
At the 2017 AGM, a powerful ‘clique’ gathered, intent on installing ‘their men’ in a number of C’tee positions. They addressed the AGM, venting their spleens … I was described as a bully and a coward, “a bad apple who needs to be cut out”. The clique’s candidate for President referred to the need to clear out “disruptive” elements in his pre-election speech. Once a new Constitution was finalised, the findings of the original hearing against me would simply be enforced again. The ‘clique’ didn’t attend the 1AR Birthday Dinner on the evening of the AGM … they gathered instead at a local hotel.
So, will the threat of cutting out a bad apple [me] be carried out, or, as with the earlier case (yesterday’s blog) will a different approach, acknowledging the importance of matter of principle involved, be taken?
Vietnam : Human Rights
Interesting article in yesterday’s ASPI ‘Strategist’:
Do we sometimes take freedom of speech for granted?
———————————————————————————
14 July 2017
The Threat of Being Ostracised: Does it Mean that Matters of Principle Have to Come Last?
The answer to this question mainly depends on those behind the threat. A past example is relevant.
During research for my book, I read widely … trying to identify as many ‘links’ as possible from the widest range of sources. One reference I read was a book written by an infantryman about his time in Vietnam. It contained a Foreword written by a serving Army major general who praised the work, saying “it described service and dedication in the best traditions of the Australian Army” . I purchased it at the AWM bookshop.
Given the Foreword, I was surprised by the content. It included a passage which explained that an ambush had been initiated and when the ‘killing area’ was being cleared, a wounded enemy soldier was found. The ambush commander radioed back to his company HQ and asked what he should do. He was told not to return with a prisoner. The ambush party then lined up and emptied their magazines into the wounded soldier’s body.
This was undoubtedly murder. The statute of limitations doesn’t apply to murder. Worst of all, the action was authoritively described as being in the best traditions of the Australian Army. All Australian soldiers who served in Vietnam were tarnished by this publication (which was being sold through the Australian War Memorial, one of the most popular destinations for overseas visitors). What should I do?
I contacted the author. He stated that what he had described, was what had happened, “right down to last steel jacketed bullet”. I rang the Defence whistleblower reporting line and was told that they don’t deal with murder. I decided to write to the Minister, asking that the incident be investigated and action taken as appropriate. I also requested, given that this behaviour had been ‘endorsed’, that action be taken to assure the Australian public that training with respect to the Geneva Convention would be improved so that such action would never be condoned again.
It didn’t take long for things to happen. While an investigation was being conducted, I was contacted by a representative of the infantry unit involved. A very senior retired officer, who had been the unit’s CO, was not impressed. I formed the impression that I was going to be ostracised for bringing the unit’s reputation into disrespect. A meeting was arranged. I produced the letter I had sent to the Minister which showed that I was not seeking to damage reputations, but improve the integrity of the Army going forward, for the benefit of all.
All was put to rights. The investigation concluded that the author had fabricated the account. The Minister replied to say that training had been reviewed and he was satisfied that such behaviour would not be condoned in any way in the future. (Putting a favourable ‘spin’ on the whole thing, you could say that the morale of the story is to read the book, before you write the Forewood.)
Coming: From a past example, to a current one.
————————————————————————————
13 July 2017
Out Vietnamese ‘Allies’ Living Among Us.
What do you think when the term Vietnam Veterans is raised in an Australian context? I would confidently predict that ‘Regs’, ‘Nashos’, Nui Dat, 1ATF etc are all things that come to mind.
Of course, not all VV were born here. There is a strong case to be made that RVN Armed Forces veterans who are now Australians, should be included when the term Vietnam Veterans is used (rather than allowing its usage, both official and non-official, to apply only to non-Vietnamese born Australian veterans).
The Victorian Parliament has formally acknowledged that the term Vietnam Veteran must include our former Vietnamese Allies, now fellow Australians living among us. This has meant a lot to the Vietnamese community and they are hoping that the Federal Parliament will pass a similar motion.
Another issue of concern to the Vietnamese Community in Australia is that related to the approach made by the Vietnamese President to Turnbull at the recent G20. Turnbull was told that he should step in and outlaw the declaration made by a number of city councils here to designate the yellow and red SVN flag a ‘heritage’ flag, acknowledging that it represents a section of their community. (See SMH article.) Is this the difference between totalitarianism and democracy?
I have a yellow scarf with three red lines along it, which hangs in our hallway when I’m not wearing it. If I was politically correct, I should probably send it to the Vietnamese Embassy and tell them where I got it. Then again, should our former ‘allies’, not still be our mutual friends and comrades … are allegiances forged in battle, that fickle? Should Governments’ desire for mutual trade benefits, mean that I should give up on Democracy?
Tomorrow:
The Threat of Being Ostracised: Does it Mean that Matters of Principle Have to Come Last?
——————————————————————————-
12 July 2017
Progress : In its Many Forms.
I mentioned recently the benefit that an Assn can obtain if members who have some knowledge of statutory requirements which are not being followed, offer this information to the C’tee. (Rather than putting their heads in the sand and just “letting them get on with the job“, which is presumably what the members of the NSW RSL did.)
As with all things, there is a right way and a not so right way. A case in point …
Three weeks prior to the 1AR Assn AGM, a member informed others who were involved in revising the Constitution, that encouraging members to send proxies to those they knew who were attending the meeting, “was a corruption of process”.
He was informed that this was specifically provided for by the Consumer Affairs Victoria Model Rules for associations incorporated in that State. But he knew he was right, as he always “made sure that what [he] said, advised or claimed was in fact correct prior to opening [his] mouth. So presumably he informed the C’tee. There was plenty of time to ensure that all proxy votes were directed to the Assn and not the proxy.
No … he decided not to make known ‘the proof’ he held, because “to disclose these facts prior to or during the Meeting [would mean] that the whole arrangement of the Meeting would have unravelled”. Of course it would not have had any effect as the C’tee were acting completely in accord with the statutory requirements. Now that the AGM is over, however, he has revealed his evidence (see below).
It has been explained to him that ‘doing the right thing’ from this point on is to inform Consumer Affairs Victoria so that they can consider amending their Model Rules for associations incorporated in Victoria. He has been asked if he will do this.
Of course there is always a sting in the tail. I’ve been told that unless I amend my blog posts, he will “throw this out to the world to show [my] ignorance”. I guess that I’ll just have to admit my ignorance. Why do a small group of people always give direction to others using insults and threats?
———————————————————————————————
One member’s evidence that supposedly the AGM voting process was a corrupt one:
“A warning as to the risk of using an intermediate party is discussed by Allen’s Solicitors in respect of a Federal Court decision (unnamed) online at http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/cg/focomdec08.htm in relation to relevant provisions of the Corporations Law – this is directly analogous to the current situation.
“The legislation does not expressly state that the nomination of an intermediate recipient will render a notice of meeting or a proxy appointment ineffective or invalid. However, in my opinion, the legislation’s insistence on receipt by the company appears to contemplate a receipt by an entity managed and controlled by persons subject to onerous fiduciary duties in relation to the proxies, which will safeguard the actual and apparent integrity of the corporate voting process.
The interception of proxy appointment forms by an intermediate party who is under no fiduciary duty or other apparent obligations in relation to their safeguarding, entails an inherent exposure to the possibility of filtering or other inappropriate handling.”
In my opinion, it could constitute a grave defect in the electoral process in respect of any contemplated meeting. In the present case, the specified recipient in both the Notices and the Proxy Forms is not a disinterested party, but in my view, the defect does not depend on that circumstance. The apparent, as well as the actual integrity of the corporate electoral process, is important.
A warning as to the risk of using an intermediate party is discussed by Allen’s Solicitors in respect of a Federal Court decision (unnamed) online at http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/cg/focomdec08.htm in relation to relevant provisions of the Corporations Law – this is directly analogous to the current situation.
His Honour mentions the term “entity” My Butterworth’s Concise Australian Legal Dictionary defines “entity” as:
An individual, association or other legal or administrative arrangement treated as a discrete and particular unit.
In Portman Iron Ore Ltd, Re Golden West Resources Ltd [2008] FCA 1362, per Mc Kerracher J, the Federal Court as discussed by Mondaq, had this to say:
“In conclusion, my view on this topic is that while the Act does not expressly spell out that proxy forms are to be returned only to the company or directly to the company, the reasoning articulated in Bisan Ltd [2002] VSC 430 at [44], reflects, with respect, a good deal of common sense. Also for the additional practical reasons discussed, while I may have been less emphatic about the construction placed on s 250B of the Act, there is no good reason to depart from the construction adopted in Bisan Ltd and I would not do so.”
Mondaq go on to say:
Implications
The Portman decision has significant implications, particularly for shareholders. The decisions of Bisan and Portman mean that proxy forms must be returned directly to the company or to another entity owing material fiduciary obligations to the company, such as its share registry. If any other intermediary party is involved in the receipt or delivery of a proxy form, such proxy form is at risk of being treated as invalid. An application of the strict view taken by the court means that a proxy form sent by a shareholder to a company via that shareholder’s lawyer, accountant or other professional adviser could be held to be invalid. This could cause problems for shareholders who commonly forward signed proxies to their adviser to check that they have been properly completed and signed, or to obtain advice about the proposed resolutions set out in the proxy form, prior to directing that adviser to send the proxy on to the company.
As the facts in Portman reveal, the rule that proxy forms must be delivered directly to the company may cause significant problems for shareholders wishing to requisition a meeting of shareholders. A shareholder or group of shareholders who requisition a meeting often appoint a particular entity (e.g. a major shareholder or a professional adviser) to assist in coordinating the requisition process including informing other shareholders of the reasons for the requisition and collating proxy forms. The collation of proxy forms by an entity other than the company or its share registry is no longer a safe option.
In Portman, the court took the view that if proxies are returned directly to the company, the need toinvestigate or prove tampering with proxies by third parties is eliminated. However, if proxies can only be returned directly to the company, it will be very difficult for a shareholder or other third party to prove whether or not the company itself has tampered with the proxies. Whilst such conduct may be rare, it is nonetheless a possibility, especially in cases where a meeting is requisitioned by shareholders because of dissatisfaction and distrust with the company’s incumbent directors and where the shareholders have proposed resolutions to replace them. Indeed, the decisions could be seen to have the effect of repressing shareholders’ rights in cases where:
a significant number of shareholders have requisitioned a shareholders’ meeting; and
those shareholders propose resolutions which may be adverse to the interests of the incumbent directors of the company.
Unless Bisan and Portman are successfully challenged, in order to ensure its validity, proxy forms should be delivered directly to the company or such other place nominated by the company. Portman also serves as a timely reminder of the importance of the proxy rules and procedures set out in the Act and in a company’s constitution, all of which need to be carefully considered by each of the company, its directors and shareholders, particularly when evaluating proxies received.
The matter of the individuals having proxies sent to them at Mr XXXX’s instigation places them in the role of acting as an intermediate party.
I went back to Austil and visited the entire 77-para decision in Bisan Ltd v Cellante; Eromanga Hydrocarbons NL v Cellante [2002] VSC 430 (15 October 2002) to see what was stated below para 44 in Mondaq’s analysis and I have pasted Her Honour’s comments from paras 45 to47 below. I believe we may need to have regard to what she said in her judgement.
Regardless of her comments, my view remains unchanged – there is a corruption in the process surrounding the use of an intermediate proxy holder who has vested interest in the outcome of the elections. As for XXXXX, he being a candidate (and nominated as a non-authorised intermediate along with XXXXl) the conflict of interest applies to him, also.
Mondaq’s Comments continued:
Any election or other resolution on which such proxy votes were cast would be susceptible to challenge on the grounds that the integrity of the voting process required by the Act could not be established. The problem could not necessarily be overcome by simply disregarding the proxy votes lodged with an intermediate party. Such a course would disenfranchise persons who sought to exercise their votes by proxy. Moreover, it would not be possible confidently to conclude that the relevant resolution would have been carried in any event without the voting of such disregarded proxy votes, as the total number of proxies received would be open to question.
In my opinion, the defects in the Notices and Proxy Forms are not merely technical, but such that they would or may cause substantial injustice that could not be remedied by any order of the court, in the circumstances of the present case. Further, I am not satisfied that the validation of such irregularities would not cause, or be likely to cause, injustice to any person.
I accept that, as Mr Cameron contended, in general proxies should be construed benevolently so that members seeking to rely on them are not denied their voice in the corporate democratic process. However, in the circumstances of this case, a finding that the proxy appointments are defective will not operate to deny appointers a vote on a matter to be decided. Rather, the proposed meeting as a whole will not occur. This would not preclude relevant resolutions from being considered by a different meeting, which is not subject to challenge
Please note the name Cameron in para 47 is purely coincidental and does not refer to the addressee above.
——————————————————————————-
11 July 2017
Matters of Importance.
I regard the following matters as being of particular importance:
Ensuring the sacrifices and achievements of AFV crews in Vietnam are recorded fully and accurately in the annals of history
Full recognition and acknowledgement of the unique service of AFV crews in battle.
Overcoming the capability gap currently affecting the RAAC.
Open and transparent governance of the 1AR Assn in accordance with statutory regulations.
Cessation of the targeted human rights abuses meted out by the CPV to former members and families of RVN armed forces (our ‘allies’)
Full recognition and acknowledgement by all Australians of the service and sacrifice of Indigenous Australians during the Frontier Wars.
The following is relevant re the latter.
Recognising Indigenous Soldiers Who Didn’t Wear Uniforms
The Australian War Memorial (AWM) has argued that its Charter is confined to commemorating the sacrifices suffered by ‘formed units’ of Australian defence forces. This meant that even military actions fought by Colonial forces were sidelined. Times change, however, as seen by the fact that the sacrifices of those serving in peacekeeping roles have finally been acknowledged as worthy of commemoration by the AWM (and, as a consequence by the Nation). I have called on responsible Ministers to change the Charter, but have yet to be successful.
I personally see the sacrifices made by Indigenous Australians (both male and female) in the defence of their country, as being no different to the sacrifices made by later day Australians in conflicts overseas while upholding treaty obligations to secure the security of their Nation. Having been a soldier who has seen operational service, I can’t help but put myself in the soles of our Indigenous brothers endeavouring to protect their families and their land.
I say to all those who have been or are in our military forces, imagine that you were in the same position in 1788 and later; given the differences of firepower, tactics, logistics etc, how would you have responded? Do we not share a bond with Indigenous Australians who displayed bravery and sacrifice of the highest order in defending their people, land and possessions, during the Frontier Wars? Are those who by the hand of God happened to be the ones present at the time, not worthy of our heartfelt acknowledgement?
I, for one, hope for the day when I can stand at the AWM on 25 April and be involved in a commemoration which ‘officially’ pays respect to the Indigenous Australians who gave their lives defending their shores and country during the Frontier Wars (in a way that we all hope generations of modern day Australians will never have to do). I believe that it is only a road which includes this which will eventually lead to shared harmony among all Australians.
—————————————————————————————————-
10 July 2017
How Should the Next AGM be Conducted?
Yesterday’s post was about the recent 1AR Assn AGM. As said then, the new C’tee is to be congratulated. It was mentioned that such a small numbers of members present (9% in person and 6% by proxy) there is considerable scope for behind the scenes ‘lobbying’ to have a significant impact on the outcome.
The election certainly seems to have been well conducted, and the C’tee did well to ensure that this was so. The meeting was informed that 33 financial members were present and there were 21 proxies. When a member asked what the voting figures were for the two candidates for President, he was informed 15 and 55. It would seem that there are lessons to be learnt. The following points might be relevant for the next AGM.
Prior to the Meeting.
A cut-off date should be set for nominations. When received, they should be accompanied by biographical notes for the candidates, coupled with a simple statement as to why they seek election and what their priorities would be as a member of the C’tee if elected.
All members should be sent details re the candidates, together with a proxy form at least four weeks prior to the AGM. Problem … how does a member know who is attending, ie. someone who will vote in accord with their wishes? This, I submit, is why only 6% on members were represented by proxy. A situation which is not healthy for an Assn whose members are spread nationwide.
My suggestion is to allow postal votes … these to be sent the Secretary and opened at the AGM by the scrutineers. If the signature of a member on a proxy can be accepted, why not a signature on a postal vote. (As with proxies, financial status would have to be checked.)
The Meeting
On arrival, members should be required to provide id when their name is being marked against the register of financial members (otherwise any number of so called ‘members’ could be recruited to ensure someone is elected )
Prior to the meeting commencing, members should be advised whether or not a quorum is present (10% required, 15% were at the last AGM).
Those present who are not entitled to vote should be seated separately to others, to ensure that they are not given a ballot paper.
Election of the C’tee.
Before the ballot is taken, each candidate may make a short speech in support of his or her election. If they are not present, they should supply a statement to be read at the meeting. No-one should be allowed to speak on behalf of a candidate, other than by reading this statement.
No other speeches should be allowed to be made, lest unfair influence corrupts the voting process. (A number of such speeches were made at the last AGM. These included defamatory content and were clearly intended to influence voters in accord with views of a powerful ‘clique’ within the Assn.)
When the votes are tallied, members present must be informed what the numbers of votes counted totalled for each candidate (rather than simply being told who had ‘won’).
Financial Statement
A completed financial statement must be presented to members at the AGM. This must include an Income Statement; Balance Sheet; and information necessary to give a true and fair view. (The Financial Statement provided at the last AGM provided detail re the amount of expenditure made, but no info at all about what it was spent on.)
This statement must be lodged with CAV within one month after the AGM, together with the required signed declarations.
Minutes of the Meeting
The minutes of the AGM must include the names of all members attending (both those eligible to vote and those who were not), as well as those who had provided proxies. (Note: CAV require actual proxy forms to be included with the Minutes.) The financial statement presented at the AGM must also be included.
—————————————————————————————–
9 July 2017
1AR Assn AGM
Well it’s over … and a new C’tee has been elected. They are to be congratulated (as are those who were not elected, for being prepared to offer themselves for the good of the Assn and its members.)
Interestingly, of the 348 financial members, 33 were present (including eight candidates). This is a little surprising, given that the Spt Sqn/ B Sqn 3/4 Cav Renaming Parade followed, with the birthday dinner that night. Travel to Puckapunyal imposes constraints, however. Of greater surprise, therefore, was the fact that only 21 proxies had been received. In total, members interested enough to either travel to the meeting or send a proxy, amounted to 15%.
Unfortunately the new Constitution, revised through the considerable efforts of a small group of members, had not yet been adopted. This meant that there was no requirement for members to be informed about those who had nominated; indeed, it was possible for someone to nominate on the day of the meeting. No wonder only 6% of those not present bothered to send proxies. (I have no idea at all about the background and qualifications of the new President.)
When the voting numbers are so small, there is considerable scope for behind the scenes ‘lobbying’ which can bring about a prearranged outcome. Is it right for someone who is not entitled to vote, to address the meeting and influence the votes of those who can? Maybe it is, maybe it’s not. (Allowing everyone, without restriction, to address members before they vote, will obviously affect the outcome. The question is … is this appropriate?) The new Constitution is crucial in these matters, as well as many others.
Hopefully the new C’tee will continue the process started by the immediate past President to ensure that C’tee decision making processes are open and transparent, as well as ethical and honest. It seems a long time since the Members’ Forum was closed and members were not only lied to about why this happened, but also falsely accused of inappropriate conduct. (See A Story in Three Parts above.)
——————————————————————————–
8 July 2017
What Happened?
Does something ever pique your attention? This happened to me while reading John Baines’ latest ‘On This Day in the RAAC’ I couldn’t help myself wondering what eventuated as a result of the following:
12 Jul 1915: Lt James (Reserve of Officers, 3rd Military District) writes to Minister for Defence and Offers to Raise and Equip an Armoured Car Section for the 1st AIF.
A little research and the story got more and more interesting.
Firstly, the Lt James we’re talking about ended the War as Captain Ernest Homewood James, MC and Bar. He not only led the design and development of our first armoured cars, but he raised the the 1st Armoured Car Section/1st Australian Light Car Patrol and led them on operations in the Middle East.
In the extract copied below he describes the start of this incredible journey. This is followed by a description of an exhibit in the AWM which involves the latter part of his wartime experience
THE FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMOURED CAR SECTION
Below is a transcription from a manuscript submitted by Captain E.H. James called “The Motor Patrol“. It is lodged in the AWM as AWM 224MSS 209.
In August 1914 when the dogs of War were let loose a number of motoring enthusiasts met together in Melbourne to talk over a scheme for building Armoured Cars for use with the Allied Armies and to form a unit to volunteer for service abroad. Cold water was thrown on the schema from almost every quarter as there was practically no information available as to what the proper design for an armoured car should be; how the guns should be mounted; what the equipment should consist of and .hat the personnel should be.
Still fools rush in where angels fear to tread and being enthusiasts they persisted. After many months of searching and enquiries from various quarters, enough information was available to enable designs to be got out. Then other obstacles cropped up. Armoured Cars were very expensive luxuries and required commodious high powered chassis to carry then. Armour plating and other expensive equipment was required. Three powerful chassis were donated for the purpose by Mr. John Young of Horsham, Mr. P. Cornwall of Coburg and Mr. Sol Green of Melbourne. Designs and specifications that were drawn up were approved and ultimately through the untiring efforts of Colonel Osborne, authority was given for the unit to be formed and got ready as soon as possible for service at the front, the Imperial Government having accepted the offer of the unit complete. The necessary personnel were soon enrolled as members of the tat. Australian Armoured Car Section and they began to get busy.
History / Summary: Bergmann LMG15nA aircraft machine gun.
Associated with the service of Captain Ernest Homewood James.
James was born in Melbourne on 2 November 1879 and was an engineer on enlistment in the First Australian Armoured Car Section on 16 March 1916. With the rank of Lieutenant, James embarked for overseas service aboard HMAT Katuna on 20 June, arriving in Suez on 9 August. He was promoted to captain on 1 January 1917 and commanding officer of 1 Australian Light Car Patrol. <br/><br/>Two different versions exist as to how this machine gun came to be in James’ possession.
In a personal account of the incident James indicates that this weapon was removed from a German aircraft that landed at a captured enemy aerodrome at El Afule on 20 September 1918. He stated: ‘While we were engaged on this (filling the tanks of the armoured cars) a German aeroplane unsuspectingly landed in the aerodrome and the pilot was promptly made a prisoner to his surprise and anger. Shortly afterwards another plane was seen to be landing but just as he reached the ground something aroused his suspicions and he rose again. One of our armoured cars promptly opened fire on him then and the pilot was killed. The observer was wounded in the head and taken prisoner. He told us afterwards that it was the felt hats of the Australians in the aerodrome that made them suspicious that something was wrong’.
However when the gun arrived at the Australian War Memorial it had a label that stated: ‘This very rare World War 1 German Aircraft Machine Gun was taken from a crashed German Bi-Plane which was shot down from the ground with a 303 rifle used by Captain Ernest Homewood James. The plane with tail gunner already dead was flying low when Capt. James shot the pilot dead. The gun was brought back as a souvenir in his kit bag’. <br/><br/>Both accounts indicate that the gun was taken from the second aircraft. The welded barrel shows that it was cut in half so that it would fit into a kit bag.<br/>
After the war, James was awarded the Military Cross in the 1919 New Years Honours List for ‘continuous good work in command of his unit when he has shown marked zeal and ability, especially when acting with cavalry reconnaissances.’ He was awarded a bar on 8 March 1919. His bar citation noted that ‘At Aleppo, on the 24th and 25th October, 1918, he displayed great dash and perseverance in the way he attacked and drove the enemy cavalry off the hills south of the town. He so disposed his care that he held a strong force of enemy in check and denied them the crest and observation. All through the operation he displayed courage and resource.'<br/><br/>James embarked aboard the Kaiser-i-Hind at Port Said on 16 March 1919 for return to Australia. He disembarked in Victoria on 23 June and his appointment in the AIF was terminated on 29 October 1920.
Destabilisation of 1AR Association by Those Who Should Know Better (Cont)
In the blog posts of 23 June and 2 & 3 July, I referred to a widely circulated email authored by someone whose intentions were quite puzzling. Not to be put off, however, he has followed up on his initial rant with a second, directed at the same person. I have responded as below:
“As I see it, xxxx raised concerns about a clique (ie. a small close-knit inner circle) the leaders of which were former WO1s … who lied to members of the 1AR Assn and have even gone so far as to make a false declaration in order to achieve their ends. Rather than expressing outrage (or even dismay) at the allegations made, you have completely ignored them and instead taken personal umbrage at the reference to “WO1”.
It took me a while to realise why you would take such a stance. Then the penny dropped. You are switching the focus from that of dishonest unethical behaviour by those in positions of trust, to that of the petty misdemeanour of bringing rank into a conversation. You refer to this as “correcting the facts”. I think you can notch up a victory in this respect. It can be argued that the fact that the principals within the clique were both former WO1s is not relevant, in the same way that it would not be relevant to mention that they might both be left handed, or bald, or short. It is relevant, however, in the context that members of a clique often share similar experiences and background. Let’s not be petty and argue the toss … you ‘win’.
The focus can now return to the point of xxxx’s argument, ie. that members of the 1AR Assn have been lied to and misled by those they trusted. Hopefully the efforts of xxxx and others in highlighting this disgrace, will prevent it happening again.”
————————————————————————————-
6 July 2017
On 14 June 2017 I emailed the Assistant Secretary Defence Corporate Communications Branch (see blog post of the date). Yesterday I received the response below. I subsequently congratulated Defence on taking a leadership position which underscores the importance of indgenous heritage in terms of the involvement of all Australians in the defence of their country.
Good morning LTCOL Cameron,
My Assistant Secretary Alex Kelton has passed your email to me for response.
I apologise for the delay in responding to your email. I was seeking advice from historians at the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Army History Unit. I also sought guidance from military historian Prof Peter Stanley.
After considering this advice I acknowledge that the wording in the article should have been more specific. A better statement would have been: Sister Fanny Hines was the first Australian nurse to die on active operational service overseas.
If you agree, I would be keen to publish your email as a Letter to the Editor with the following response:
Dear LTCOL Cameron,
Thank you for your letter and for raising this important issue. After seeking guidance from historians at the Australian War Memorial and prominent military historian Prof Peter Stanley, I acknowledge your concern that by publishing the statement “Sister Fanny Hines was the first Australian woman to die on active service”, we excluded a number of Indigenous women who died during the Frontier Wars after European settlement in Australia. As you rightly point out, a more accurate statement is that Sister Fanny Hines was the first Australian nurse to die on active operational service overseas. Thank you for taking the time to write to Army News. Alisha Welch Managing Editor
Many thanks for taking the time to write to us. Apologies again for the delay in responding.
———————————————————————————————-
5 July 2017
The 1 Armd Regt Assn
Following on from the blog on 2 July about the question posed on the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn Forum, a reader responded by my post which had pointed out the differing paths taken by the two Assns:
“A fair bit of prescience in that decision [to maintain a Vietnam only assn], Bruce, but it still copped a lot of flak from a number of quarters”.
My response:
“In a sense it’s just a developmental thing … the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn copped a lot of flak at one stage, why would it be thought that other associations would not be prone to the same as they grow and evolve.
This Forum is a case in point … the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn operates one (thanks to Steve), but the 1 AR Assn does not. In the view of post Vietnam 1AR Assn generations … ‘everyone uses Facebook, so why do we need a forum as well?’.”
Another reader offered this comment:
“In 2006 I was one who voted to remove the word “Vietnam” from the name of our association, but as time as moved on I now see the logic in remaining a single conflict entity. On a personal level I maintain a much stronger bond with those I shared Vietnam with, rather than those I simply served with. I can clearly relate to Bruce’s explanation of the issues within the 1AR association.”
The 1AR Assn AGM
Only four days to go! Nominations known so far are:
President: Two
Vice President: Two
Secretary: Two
Treasurer: One
Operations Manager: One
Most of the above have circulated CVs, so that members are aware in advance of their qualifications and relevant experience. One has to wonder how many others will simply nominate on the day, expecting they will have sufficient personal ‘followers’ to get them elected. This would be something akin to an ‘ambush’ tactic, ie. don’t declare your intentions in advance, so that there is no opportunity for anyone to ask about or debate your core values and intentions.
—————————————————————————————————-
4 July 2017
Major Issues Confronting the RAAC.
The two publications below (one from Mar 17, the other Sep 16) go a little towards providing an answer to one of the critical questions … which are:
When are the additional Abrams to be procured to enable 2/14 QMI to take its place as an ACR?
Where will the 2/14 QMI ACR tanks (and possibly 2/14 QMI) be based?
What vehicles are going to equip the RAAC ARES units?
What will be the role of the RAAC ARES units?
When will RAAC Bushmaster Crew Commanders be formally trained?
Re Question 1, an excellent summary of the situation is provided in the afr article, ie. to operate three sabre squadrons, you also need three squadrons’ worth of repair pool and forward delivery capability (as well as tanks to meet RAAC and RAEME training needs, and their repair pool). The fleet size being aimed for is 90, an increase of 31 (53%) above the 59 purchased under LAND 907. Apparently 2/14 QMI are expecting to raise their tank squadron next year. Optimistic perhaps?
Re the other questions, no answers … however, the dtr supplement refers to 1,100 Hawkei vehicles being procured, one variant being intended for the recon role. As previously mentioned in these posts, a definite maybe as a platform for RAAC ARES to develop the skills required for recon. When is the outcome of the 2 Div reorg study going to be announced?
In summary, the information presented in the two articles demonstrates what a broad canvas those responsible for RAAC related procurement are dealing with. All those involved continue to do a great job on behalf of all those associated with armoured warfare today and in the future.
Destabilisation of 1AR Association by Those Who Should Know Better (Cont)
The email circulated by former RSM of the Army, WO1 P W Rosemond, CSC, OAM (retd) is still doing the rounds. Not included in the 23 June 2017 blog reference to it, is the following matter he raised:
[Dear Secretary] … the reason I have included you as an addressee is to seek from you an update comparison of Association membership, Current members as at this week and a comparison of current members as at the same time in 2016. I am aware of rumour, but seek clarification of fact. Any inference in the following is not directed at you but to ensure that you are informed.
What rumour? The mere suggestion of rumours, whether there be any or not, is enough to cause uncertainty. This association member seems to be suggesting that other members have resigned or not renewed their membership during the past year. Why create such uncertainty within the membership immediately prior to an AGM?
Is it meant to generate dissatisfaction with the current C’tee (which is substantially different to that of twelve months ago)? If so, why?
The Constitution permits any member to inspect the register of members. It does not give a member the right to expect an analysis of trends in membership figures. It is not an unreasonable question, however … one which most ordinary members would ask through their State representative. Why has this question been posed in the manner it has, ie. via a mass circulated email?
————————————————————
2 July 2017
Destabilisation of 1AR Association by Those Who Should Know Better
The webmaster of the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn forum recently received the email circulated by former RSM of the Army, WO1 P W Rosemond CSC, OAM (retd). See 23 June 2017 blog post. As a consequence he posed the following question on the forum :
“Gents in simple English can some one tell me what this blue in the 1st Armoured Regement [Assn] is all about? It strikes me as a bloody shame men that soldiered together 50 years ago are now at each others throats.”
My reply is as below:
“As I see it … the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Assn is immune from some of the difficulties which beset a number of ESOs (incl the RSL).
The 3 Cav Assn made a conscious decision to remain a single ‘generation’ entity, one sharing similar experiences, friendships and common bonds. You are not looking at a similar assn comprising just those that you “soldiered together with 50 years ago”.
The 1AR Assn made a conscious decision to follow a different path, ie. to make the Assn open to all who served with 1AR at any time (including the present). I support this, however, it means that there are a wide range of different interest groups. One might think that the shared experience of serving in the same unit might be sufficient to create a common bond.
It possibly could, however, there is the compounding issue of the differing social interests and expectations of the different generations of members. I believe that the 3 & 4 Cav Regt Assn faced similar challenges. One way forward might be to appoint representatives of the different eras to bring their views to the C’tee.”
————————————————————————
1 July 2017
FOI Request #2.
The first FOI request (as ‘discussed’ in the past three blog posts) was related to the emblazoning of Vietnam battlehonours. That described below is a separate (but obviously related) FOI request just submitted.
“On 28 February 2017, I wrote to The Hon Dan Tehan MP asking that he extend the eligibility for the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Cross of gallantry with Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation awarded to the 8th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), to units that supported the Battalion during Operation Hammersley.
On 30 March 2017, The Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) Corporation Ltd forwarded a submission to the Department of Defence, supposedly advocating the same thing. I was not permitted to see this submission.
On 7 May 2017, Minister Tehan advised me that he was unable to extend eligibility for the award. I have since discovered official documentary evidence which shows that the advice given to Minister Tehan was wrong. Before informing him of this, I would like to know what Defence was advised by the RAAC Corporation, in case that might have contributed to the misinformation given to the Minister.
I therefore I seek privilege under FOI to see a copy of the submission made to Defence by the RAAC Corporation in relation to extending eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR.”
——————————————————————————–
30 June 2017
Request for Review by the Information Commissioner
Following on from the past two days … parts of the next review request are copied below.
“Summary of why you think the decision is wrong
There are essentially two reasons given for not releasing the document
1. It contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation Ltd and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation; and
2. Release of the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
These reasons raise the question as to what sort of opinions are these that are being referred to? It seems that if the views of individuals of the Executive of the RAAC Corporation as expressed in the document, were to be made public, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Corporation would be harmed. Presumably these are opinions which are damaging to Defence in some way.
There is a conflict of interest involved here. The Department of Defence has decided that views presented to the Minister of Veterans’ Affairs have to be kept hidden from public disclosure for the sake of the RAAC Corporation’s relationship with it. Presumably this also accounts for Reason 2 above, ie. if the RAAC Corporation’s members were to become aware of the Executive’s opinions as expressed to a Government Minister, they would think less highly of the Corporation which represents them. Surely the Department of Defence cannot rule on a matter in which self-interest is involved.
If the opinions of the Executive of an incorporated body, as put to a Minister of the Commonwealth, cannot be released to someone possibly affected by them, then the FOI Act has failed in terms of its purpose of providing the Australian community access to information held by the Government.
Resolution
What action or result would you like from the Information Commissioner?
I would like the Information Commissioner to release the submission made by the RAAC Corporation to Minister Tehan, supposedly in support of my earlier submission to Minister Tehan regarding the emblazoning of Vietnam Battlehonours”
—————————————————————————————-
29 June 2017
The FOI Review Request.
Following on from yesterday … reasons for the request being rejected are set out below. In reading them, it is instructive to be aware that: The objects of the FOI Act are to give the Australian community access to information held by the Government, as information held by the Government is to be managed for public purposes, and is a national resource.
Reasons for Denying the Request
The document contains the opinions of the RAAC Corporation and release of that information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to Defence’s relationship with the RAAC Corporation.
Giving particular regard to the RAAC Corporation’s objections and contentions, releasing the document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Disclosure of the document could have an adverse effect on the RAAC Corporation and its members.
The RAAC Corporation’s membership will be affected by the public release of document.
Release of the document with deletions would involve the deletion of all the material in the document and the blank pages would be meaningless.
Think about it for a minute … if the opinions of individuals from within the RAAC Corporation were to be made known publicly, the relationship between the Department of Defence and the Corporation would be harmed.
What sort of opinions are these? Ones that are damaging to Defence in some way? Maybe, but the RAAC Corporation always speaks highly of its relations with Defence. Maybe they are damaging to something or someone else … such that if Defence became aware of them, they would think less highly of the RAAC Corporation. If true, this would explain why release of the document could also harm the RAAC Corporation’s relationship with its members, ie. they would think less highly of the Corporation because of the opinions expressed by its Executive.
Could it be, that the RAAC Corporation wrote to the Minister to advise that the provisions of the Ceremonial Manual (restricting battlehonours to two per campaign) should be adhered to and my submission to have the five for Vietnam allowed, should be denied?
There is one more FOI review option to follow. Maybe before then, the RAAC Corporation will simply let me have a copy of their submission (supposedly) in support of mine to Minister Tehan. Maybe also, however, there is something which has to be kept hidden from public disclosure for the sake of the RAAC’s relationship with its members and Defence.
——————————————————————————-
28 June 2017
The following letter is self-explanatory. Tomorrow … the response.
“Dear FOI Review Team,
I would like to seek a review of the decision made in relation to FOI 300/16/17 (attached).
Background.
The FOI request was made in connection with a submission to Minister Tehan relating to Army Battlehonours.
Having received my submission. the Minister sought advice from Defence. Army, in turn, sought advice from the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation Limited. Before I had received a response from the Minister, the Corporation Chairman went onto social media to announce that he had made a supporting submission and was very hopeful about its outcome.
I asked the Chairman if I could see the Corporation’s submission. He declined to allow this. I then asked if it was similar to mine, he responded to say that he didn’t know as he had never seen ‘mine’. I found this very surprising for two reasons: (i) how can anyone make a ‘supporting submission’, if the original submission had not been seen, and (ii) I had forwarded my draft submission to the RAAC Corporation two years earlier in the hope that it might be managed ‘officially’ at that level. This option was declined and I subsequently decided to proceed under my own auspices.
Not having seen the supporting submission, I submitted an FOI request so that I might be aware as to whether or not it could have adversely affected the Minister’s consideration of the matter I brought to his attention. Before I had received a response from the Minister, the Chairman went onto social media to proclaim that the Corporation’s submission had been successful. Subsequently I received advice from the Minister (see attached).
The FOI Decision
My FOI request to see the RAAC Corporation’s submission has been refused because ….. (the Accredited Decision Maker) is satisfied that:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with “exempt matter deleted”, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation. The harm to the Corporation’s activities and interests outweighs any benefits that may be gained by public scrutiny.
Reasons for Seeking a Review of the Decision.
How can disclosure of a supporting submission to a Minister, harm an organization to the extent that RAAC member associations would refuse to continue to support the RAAC Corporation? What could the submission possibly contain to have this effect?
The only reason that I could see is that the integrity of the Chairman could be brought into question, if, having stated that he had not seen my submission to the Minister, the RAAC Corporation’s submission was, in fact, based on it. RAAC member associations could well distance themselves from the Chairman (ie. the Corporation) if this was the case. If this was not the reason, the submission must contain material which reflects adversely on the member associations. Why else would they refuse to participate in the Corporation’s activities if they became aware of the content?
Of course, there is also the fact that disclosure of material in the submission would harm individuals. How can this be, unless, of course, they are found not to have been honest in their public statements. It is just not within the bounds of reality to suggest that disclosure could reveal ‘secret’ sources for the information. The Corporation’s submission to the Minister is, after all, a public document.
It will be seen from the above, that the only reason that can be found to deny access to the Corporation’s submission is that to do so would impact on integrity of those involved with it. My initial reason for submitting the FOI request was to know what was contained in the Corporation’s ‘supporting’ submission, if my own submission to the Minister had failed. Now that it has been approved by the Minister, my interest is to do with integrity, ie to know why a submission described as supporting mine, has to be kept secret from me (and the wider public).
Assume that the Minister received the Corporation’s submission, and, as a result, decided not to agree to my request to him. Suppose the information provided by the Corporation was not correct. Is the public interest served by refusing to allow me access to the Corporation’s submission? Surely incorporated organizations are required to conduct their business matters in an open and transparent manner.
Conclusion
If an incorporated organization claims credit for an outcome at Ministerial level as a result of submitting a submission in support of mine, I should be permitted to see it. If the integrity of the organization would be adversely affected by allowing me to see its submission, then this is something which should be made known, rather than being kept concealed. Is this not partly why FOI provisions came into being? Of course, there are ample laws which restrain a person such as myself from making improper use of a third party document.
I suggest that there will be many more FOI requests from member associations of the RAAC Corporation, once it is known to them that the contents of this document could reasonably be expected to cause them to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation.”
————————————————————————————————–
27 June 2017
Denigrating Others : Will it Never End?
It gives me no pleasure to mention Mr C M Fenton OAM (I referred to him once as ‘Chris’ and he immediately informed me how he was to be properly addressed.)
A former RAAC WO1 recently alleged that he’d been told that the President of the 1 AR Assn had informed him that a member of the Assn was a “retransmission station” for me. I contacted the President and he denied that he had said such a thing.
Mr C M Fenton OAM, another former RAAC WO1, decided that, despite the denial by the President, he would take the matter further … contacting the member who was alleged to be my ‘mouthpiece’. I wouldn’t dare consider speaking on behalf of that member. He has responded on his own behalf.
Why would Mr C M Fenton OAM do this?
We have ‘history’. His allegation that I had ‘bullied’ him led, in part, to my being expelled from the 1AR Assn (for a short time until the expulsion was found, through the efforts of a number members, to be unconstitutional).
Did I bully him? I guess this depends on your definition of bullying. When he was the ACT Branch Representative, Mr C M Fenton OAM was asked to provide a report at the AGM. The Minutes stated that he hadn’t done so at the time and that a written report would be forthcoming. After some time had passed, I asked him, as my Branch rep, if he had provided the report. He stated that he had “NTR then and he still had NTR”.
On another occasion, Mr C M Fenton OAM stated on social media that the 1AR Assn Members’ Forum had been closed because no-one was using it. I expressed surprise because the 1AR Assn C’tee had given a completely different reason. Mr C M Fenton OAM then stated that he was only expressing a personal opinion and, therefore, it didn’t have to be true.
A parade was to be held in Canberra to welcome home Afghanistan veterans. I suggested to Mr C M Fenton OAM that it would be good if the 1 AR Assn banner could be displayed. There was no response and it wasn’t.
Why do they behave as they do? Why can’t they ‘do the right thing’ instead?
——————————————————————————-
26 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Continuing the series of posts relating to the genesis, two years ago, of my submission to the Minister ….
Blog 20 July 2015:
“The following is from the July 1AR Assn newsletter:
“Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm Citation. For A Squadron’s actions during Op Hammersley.
A submission is being prepared for A SQN1 AR SVN to receive the Vietnamese Cross of gallantry with Palm Citation as part or the 8 RAR group during OP HAMMERSLEY. The award was intended we believe for the group as a whole but only given to 8 RAR. We believe this is wrong that needs to be rectified. At this year’s AGM it was decided the association should be part of a delegation to press for the award to be passed on to A SQN SVN. More as we progress through the submission.”
I’m surprised that the Submission is referred to as “being prepared”. I thought we’d done a pretty job on it (presumably which is why it was sent as is to 3-4 Cav Regt Assn as had been drafted) … but it’s good to know that we’ll hear more as the 1 AR Assn C’tee ‘finalises’ it.
Interestingly, the following wording has been retained: “This submission is presented by the Chairman and Members of the Advisory Committee of the RAAC Corporation, on behalf of the President and Committee of the 1 Armoured Regiment Association”.
The RAAC Corporation had previously stated that it could not advance the submission as the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation. One would’ve thought that the Corporation could have advocated on behalf of the 1st Armd Regt Assn and 3-4 Cav Regt Assns, both members of the Corporation. Maybe this is to be done (then again, maybe the wording has been overlooked.
I don’t need acknowledgement … but I really do believe that Bruce Scott deserves recognition for highlighting both (i) the scope of the Citation which referred to the ‘forces of 8RAR’ and (ii) the references in the 8RAR history and Michael Jeffery’s address to ‘The CGWP Unit Citation being awarded to 8RAR for Op Hammersley’. If this had not happened, the Submission would not have reached the stage that it has.”
[Note. Interestingly Bruce Scott provided the info above vide the sadly now defunct, 1AR Assn Members’ Forum.]
——————————————————————————–
25 June 2017
Silver Army Combat Badge
Some time ago I formulated a submission to recognise the unique service of AFV crews in battle. I forwarded it to the RAACA (NSW) thinking that they may wish to sponsor the submission or forward it to the RAAC Corporation to do so. (The RAACA had already taken the lead in producing silver Army Combat Badges at minimal cost for those who wished to purchase them.)
A particular supporter of this initiative was the late Brigadier Ian Bryant, AM. At his urging, the following paragraph was included in the epilogue of ‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘:
“The nature of the dangers faced by AFV crews is unique. In the same way that guidons and colours have for centuries acknowledged the pre-eminence of armour and infantry on the battlefield, the RAAC Association took the lead in arguing that an Armour Combat Badge should be awarded to armoured crewmen and those who support them in combat. The official decree was that only infantry deserved individual recognition, an Army Combat Badge being created for all others. The gallant service of past crews demands that appropriate recognition of those involved in armoured combat today be pursued vigorously at all levels, until achieved.”
At it happened, the project was not advanced by either organisation and I opted to forward the submission as an individual. The covering letter is below. The submission has been included previously on the blog. An extract from the response received is copied at the end.
Dear Minister,
Recognition of AFV Crews’ Service at the Very Forefront of Battle.
In 2006, the then Minister for Veterans’ Affairs met with a small delegation comprising the President of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) Association and a former Chief of the General Staff. The purpose of the meeting was to decide how to acknowledge the unique service of Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) crews in battle. At that time, only the Royal Australian Infantry (RA Inf) were entitled to wear a badge to recognise their combat experience. I was asked to prepare an options paper.
The hope was that an Armoured Combat Badge would be approved on the same basis as the Infantry Combat Badge (ICB), given that these were the only two Corps in the Army that closed with and engaged the enemy (hence the only Corps granted the right through history to carry Colours, Guidons and Standards).
In considering options, however, I had to acknowledge that a number of other members of Army also come face to face with the enemy, for example engineers clearing mines and artillery forward observers. I included, therefore, an Army Combat Badge as an option which would recognise, on an equal basis, all those who engaged in direct combat with the enemy. I added the proviso that this would only bea feasible option if the ICB was withdrawn; not to do so would create an ‘infantry’ and a ‘non-infantry’ Army.
As it turned out, the Minister agreed to the Army Combat Badge proposal, but Defence were not prepared to withdraw the ICB. The original challenge remains: how to recognise the unique service of AFV crews doing battle with the enemy, often in front of the infantry.
The attached submission seeks your approval to allow Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) personnel to wear a ‘silver’ version of the Army Combat Badge to acknowledge their place at the very forefront of battle. (All the uniform accoutrements of the RAAC are silver, eg buttons, badges etc.)
Yours sincerely ….
Minister’s response of 19 June (inter alia):
“I am advised that Army does not intend to introduce a new embellishment to recognise service on warlike operations and I support this decision. Army believes that the current embellishments, consisting of the Infantry Combat Badge and Army Combat Badge, sufficiently recognise the unique risks, challenges and training required to undertake service with an Army combat element on warlike operations. These risks are common across many corps and trades, and singling out individual corps for service within a combined arms team would result in inequity in the face of common dangers.
The Infantry Combat Badge remains the sole exception to this decision, due to the unique requirements of service within the Infantry and history associated with the badge.”
In other words … we are all equal, but some are more equal than others. Nevertheless, the question has been asked and a response given. Ministers and CAs change, however, and there is now a basis on which to reapply in the future. Interesting the term [dress] “embellishment” is used. This was the basis for originally denying the right of NOK of those KIA to receive the ACB on behalf of the deceased (who would not be alive to wear it). My subsequent cries of outrage eventually led to this position being reversed. (There are some issues you never give up on.)
———————————————————————————-
24 June 2107
Does the Means Always Justify the End?
Primary school principals have to make sure that kids in their schools wear protective headdress when the ultra-violet index gets above a particular point. I asked the CA at the time if, rather than a blanket ban on berets, a trial could be conducted to see if unit COs could operate in the same way. His response was that a trial had already been conducted and it showed that they couldn’t. Others told me that this was not the case.
I sought access to the documents related to the trial (units involved, trial instruction, results etc) under FOI. The request was approved on the basis that this was a valid public interest matter. The FOI outcome was that no such documents were able to be located. Whether they were there and could not be found or no trial was conducted, will ever be known.
I prepared a submission for eligibility for the Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR to be extended to supporting arms involved in Op Hammersley. I forwarded it to the 1AR Assn, worded such that it could be passed to the RAAC Corporation Ltd for liaison with the Cav and sappers involved to form the basis of a joint submission. Time went by and the Corporation Chairman finally said that he wanted “nothing to do with the bloody thing”. I submitted it to the Minister as a private individual. A month later the RAAC Corporation lodged their own submission requesting the same thing, this time to Defence.
Ten weeks after receiving my submission, the Minister responded to say that his advice was that eligibility could not be extended. I commenced research into the reason given by the Minister. I came across material which proved that this was completely wrong. All these happenings were posted on the blog.
Soon after, I received a request from the RAAC Corporation … don’t make known what you’ve found in the AWM files as it could adversely affect our submission. What does this mean? Presumably the Corporation had developed a line of argument which was at odds with what actually happened. What are the options?
There would be two. Withdraw the Corporation submission and revise it based on the new evidence uncovered, or press ahead, knowing that the case being advanced was without foundation. The Corporation no doubt had their reasons to opt for the latter. Pity really. I offered to share my follow-up submission to the Minister, but the Corporation had no need for it. I guess they realised that, as Defence had had their submission for six weeks before the Minister responded to me, that the case they had made had already been taken into account. As always, the ethics involved are revealing.
————————————————————————————————
23 June 2017
Why a Little Information can be Dangerous (aka Why we Should not go off Half-Cocked)
A retired WO1 with strong standing (now questioned) within the RAAC, recently emailed members of the 1AR Assn to say that he was:”appalled at the disclosure I received from the President yesterday evening“. The President subsequently stated that he had said no such thing. Nevertheless our ‘champion’ went on to say that this was something “which was becoming obvious to many within the RAAC current and retired member group. It is also behaviour that is completely disruptive and inappropriate and prejudicial to the reputation of the Association”.
What he alleged was quite slanderous on a personal level and quite erroneous as far as the 1AR Assn Constitution and AGM process is concerned. It is apparent that the former WO1 has not bothered to spend the time needed to properly examine the issues involved. Another member who has devoted this time (and much more) answers these latter points one by one below. Thank heavens the Assn has members like him who are committed to seeing the right thing done, despite the work involved.
Open debate is healthy and should be encouraged. Opinions must be properly informed however. Those members who take the time to do this must be respected for their commitment. There is no place for personal rants based on a little information and biased views. Those who launch into personal slander must realise that they are only belittling themselves. The fact that they probably see it beneath themselves to apologise, only reinforces this.
WO wrote:I am astounded by the profound corruption of due process of the Annual General Meeting of the 1st Armoured Regiment Association 2017. Comment: As stated in my email of 21 June, there is nothing corrupt, illegal or contrary to any rules, the Act or the Regulations in any actions by anyone (to date).
WO wrote:As a Member, I have not been provided with a meeting agenda. Comment: I also thought that an agenda had not been issued but it was included in the attachment titled “Notice of Meeting” issued by Trevor Watts in May (look for the email from Trevor where he advises he will be out of the country from 29 May to 6 Jun.
WO wrote:I have not been provided with the names of any and all nominations for the Committee Positions to be vacated in accordance with the Model Rules Constitution governing the Association. Comment: No one has; as I said in my email of 21 June, no close-off date for nominations has been established so nominations can be made up to and on the day of the meeting. I have knowledge of and short CV’s for some and my “appeal for proxies” was for 5 candidates that I know of. I think Dave Patterson is nominating and another retired officer who I’ve never met of corresponded with. I’d be happy to passes on their CVs to members I have email addresses for.
WO wrote: In particular the Model Rules MR 36 proscribes Proxy process. Comment: Model Rule 36 is “Quorum at general meetings”, 34 is “Proxies”. I assume you mean “describes Proxy process” as “proscribes” means to forbid. The proxy process described is straight forward. A member can use a form issued by the Committee or “.. may use any other form that clearly identifies the person appointed as the member’s proxy and that has been signed by the member.”
WO wrote: This Solicitation is being undertaken in contravention of the law, in that, under the Associations Incorporation Reform Regulations 2012. Comment: Peter, this has me stumped. There is absolutely nothing in the AIR Regulations or the AIR Act that outlaws a member of an association recommending candidates to other members for them to consider for their proxy votes. I’m sure you and others have been discussing who you intend to support. Would that not also be unlawful? Please advise which law has been contravened.
WO wrote: Put in plain language: Mr xxxx is:
Not a member of the Management Committee
Not an office holder within the Association
Not appointed, delegated or authorised to issue such direction
Not acting on the Directions of the President or Secretary of the Association
Comment: Refer to my email of 21 Jun. I have never claimed any of the above. It was just one member endorsing a group of candidates to other member to consider for their proxy votes. It was clearly titled XXXX to 1ARA members –appeal for proxies 15 Jun 2017 .
WO wrote: It is now within the 21 day period required to notify members of relevant information, such as agenda and nominations for election, process of nomination and closing date, so that informed decisions can be made. Or as in previous years, nominations can be taken from the floor, whereby the non-attending members have no say? Comment. I totally agree – there should have been a close off date for nominations. I refer you back to my email of 21 Jun.
WO wrote: I personally find it offensive and disturbing that solicitation and promotion of a particular group or individual is being undertaken to influence votes without full disclosure of all nominees. Comment: These were the only candidates other than Mr Paterson (and the other) and as I said – There is absolutely nothing in the AIR Regulations or the AIR Act that outlaws a member of an association recommending candidates to other members for them to consider for their proxy votes. I’m sure you and others have been discussing who you intend to support. Should members find that offensive? That’s just democracy, it happens every state, federal or council election.
WO wrote: Due process has been corrupted by the attached mail, by, alteration of the requirements of the Proxy Nomination Form, in contravention of the Model Rules Constitution, in that the form is a formal document and is therefore an auditable document and must be delivered in accordance with the directions, not as xxxx advised. By undertaking his action the process is open to corrupt conduct. (Note: the form is to be delivered to: on the form as determined by the executive committee). Comment: This is entirely wrong. Firstly, I sent with my email the proxy form issued by the Committee. That is entirely consistent with the Constitution (maybe you’re reading an out of date version). Despite this, a member can send a proxy form of his own and it’s still a legit proxy. Rule 34 (4) “..may use any other form that clearly identifies the person appointed as the member’s proxy and that has been signed by the member.”
WO wrote: XXXX previously slandered former Warrant Officers (of which I am one) and suggested that the Committee should seek former Officers to take up leadership roles, “because at least they would have some intelligence”, (suggesting Warrant Officers do not), regardless, he promotes below a committee with no such Officer nominee, regardless also that former Officer Greg Nicholas has nominated for the President Position and this has not been disclosed to members. Comment: Who did I say this to? I have no recollection of saying such a thing.
WO wrote:Now we have a promotion of nominees for the new committee (without notification of all nominees) being created by this same disruptive group. Comment: “disruptive group”. My god! A number of members were outraged at the conduct of the 2015 Committee in their action against Cameron and in the process discovered that the amateurish draft Constitution was presented to members based on lies and then it was submitted to Consumer Affairs Victoria via a FALSE DECLARATION, and you call those outraged members disruptive?
WO wrote: This past year, in my perception (therefore my belief), has been an awful year for this association, and I understand that many members have either actively withdrawn, failed to renew membership or simply decided move on. Unfortunately, and in truth, a fish rots from the head; the leadership group is responsible for the current situation and the method of leadership applied is completely unsatisfactory, accommodating a minority at the neglect of the majority. Comment: That’s totally false. The disharmony in the Association was caused primarily by … and some other (not all) members of 2015 Committee. Kevin Bell and members of the 2016-17 Committee have done a great job of mediating through a very troubling period and they deserve our congratulations and support.
WO wrote: I take exception to the statement that the action recommended by XXXX is necessary to avoid a vote from the floor by those in attendance at the proposed meeting not achieving his proposal of nominees. I put it back that the vote from the floor appointed the current committee and leadership and the wider majority of the membership had no say, resulting in serious detriment. Comment: A vote from the floor is always going to occur; however, all members should be encouraged to vote and to do so via proxy as most live interstate and even overseas. An election is not a healthy situation if it’s decided just by a handful of members.
WO wrote: I put it to you that the Proxy Process is an appropriate one, however all proxy forms must be delivered to a nominated returning Officer appointed by the Committee, others are not valid. As set out in the Model Rules Constitution. Comment: That’s totally wrong. Your suggestion could be accommodated but would require a change to the Constitution. The current “model rules” Constitution states – 34 (6) A form appointing a proxy must be given to the Chairperson of the meeting before or at the commencement of the meeting. 34 (7) A form appointing a proxy sent by post or electronically is of no effect unless it is received by the Association no later than 24 hours before the commencement of the meeting. We clarified this and the sections allow that a member who has an original proxy form (duly signed and dated) from another member may give it to the Chairperson “before the commencement of the meeting”. If it’s sent to the Secretary by post or email, it must be received no later than 24 hours prior to the meeting.
WO wrote: This Annual Meeting will be a watershed for the Association, because the Association is in a crisis and can take one of two directions, 1: Continue down the path of destruction influenced by a minority, 2: rebalance and get back to the core business in fellowship and support of those with a common connection of service in a fine unit (past and present). Comment: No argument with that; let’s not go back to the days of kangaroo courts and lies as was experienced in 2015.
WO wrote:If any addressee has contacts with other states, members or interested parties, I seek that you send my message to each and every one of them. Please do not use the BCC action so that those informed are ignorant of others, as has been the case with all xxxx correspondence. Comment: Of course they’re BCC’d, it would be a breach of privacy not to do so without the addressee’s permission and I would strongly advise the Committee to abide by that principle. They should not disclose a member’s email address without their permission. I was surprised that it was common practice with some in our Association and the RAACA.
WO wrote: We are being deceived in the process of valid conduct and leadership as the Association Currently stands and I am personally saddened by that. Comment: Again, totally false and I hope my comments above have changed your view in that regard.
WO wrote: This association is not about a small group from one small time in history, it is about the service of all those who have served or are serving in this fine unit from establishment to now, regardless of hat badge or gender. Comment: I totally agree with that and of interest and please note that my personal view of the best candidates for the next Committee includes only two 1AR Vietnam Vets, Dr David Hay, who is eminently qualified to be considered for Secretary and Geoff Stelmach MBA, who served many years from the Vietnam era into the 1990’s, as well as Kevin and others I suggested who are latter day ex 1AR members.
——————————————————————————————-
22 June 2017
2 Div Reorg, RAAC ARES
The question as to how the ARES armoured support will be provided to 7Bde as per Plan Beersheba has been answered with confirmation that a 12/16 HRL sqn will be raised in Brisbane. This allows Spt Sqn SOA to be reformed as B Sqn 3/4 Cav. A win win outcome, ie. ARES sqn in Brisbane comes under a regt hq and the proud traditions of 3 and 4 Cav Regts can be maintained. (It will be good to see the 3 Cav Guidon emblazoned with all five Vietnam battlehonours … well done Minister Tehan.) The questions remaining to be answered in terms of the 2 Div reorg are: what the roles of RAAC ARES units will be and what vehicles will they be equipped with to enable the skills of mobile warfare to be developed and maintained.
RAAC Corporation Ltd Changes?
Rumour has it that after five years, there are to be changes in the Executive Council of the RAAC Corporation. Unfortunately the Constitution is not available on the Corporation’s website, so the process for nominations, elections, etc is unknown to outsiders. If a new Chairman is to take over, who might this be? One person comes to mind.
11. Precedents re Extension of Eligibility for CGWP Unit Citations
12. Conclusion
———————————————————————————–
20 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Extract below from an email yesterday .
Thanks very much for getting back to me. I’m quite confident that the decision re eligibility for the 8RAR Citation can be overturned. The reason the Minister gave for not doing so was that it covered the whole tour from 28 Nov 69 to 31 Oct 70. Apart from the fact that the award was presented prior to 31 Oct, the original 1ATF proposal makes the timing clear. Don’t also forget that the 8RAR citation covered both the RVN Meritorious Unit Commendation and the CGWP Unit Citation. The significance of this is mentioned in the attached draft of my covering letter to the Minister. The real proof comes when you compare the original 8RAR proposal for their citation (drafted by Gen Clunies-Ross no doubt) with the changes made by the RVN JGS. when writing up their own citation, 8RAR would have liked it to apply to their whole tour (even though it was being drafted well before the end). I’ve set out at the end the sequence of approvals involved in a RVN decoration.
The other attachment you may find of interest. It sets out the composition of the 8RAR Group. I also have a copy of Tri’s letter that Ewell refers to. (The last para #2 which is Weir’s, is included in The Grey Eight as part of Ewell’s letter … interesting political connotations here.)
Finally, the 8RAR Unit Citation should never have been presented when it was. HM The Queen’s approval for acceptance of the award wasn’t received until early September 1971. The protocol requiring the Queen’s approval before acceptance was realised in time for it to be sought prior to AATTV receiving the CGWP Unit Citation. (For individual, rather than unit, foreign awards, Comd AFV dave approval for acceptance, see below.)
Best wishes, Bruce
The sequence of approvals for an Australian soldier to be awarded an individual RVN CGWP is well documented in files held by the Australian War Memorial. Take, as an example, the case whereby a member of the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) is recommended by his Commanding Officer for such an award. The CO advises HQ 1 ATF, who passes the recommendation to HQ Australian Force Vietnam (AFV) in Saigon; who in turn pass it to the Free World Military Assistance Organisation (FWMAO). It is translated into Vietnamese and the FWMAO liaises with the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS). If the JCS concur, the FWMAO advises HQ AFV that the RVN proposes to award the soldier a CGWP. HQ AFV then advises the soldier via HQ 1 ATF that “the RVN proposes to award you the CGWP”. The soldier is also advised at this time that the Commander AFV has given approval for him to accept the award and has asked that it be approved. Subsequently RVN JGS advise HQ AFV that the award has been approved. HQ AFV request HQ 1ATF to notify the soldier concerned. On average, the time from proposal to approval was three months (a range from two to six months).
—————————————————————————————-
19 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Extract below from an email yesterday ….
“You mentioned 8RAR. You might know that I’m involved in seeking to have the eligibility for the RVN CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Op Hammersley, extended to supporting arms in the ‘8RAR Group’, ie. tanks, APCs and sappers. The 8RAR Assn position is that the Citation was awarded for its whole tour, which I can prove was not the case. (Even Mike Jeffery has stated that it was for Hammersley.)
During my research recently, I came across the proposed wording for the citation forwarded from HQ 1ATF to HQ AFV (suprisingly there are some who still think that the RVN initiatied awards themselves). I’ve copied a quote from it below:
“… and outstanding results. One hundred and eighty six enemy have been eliminated; the Battalion has suffered nineteen fatal casualties, eleven as a result of mine explosions and not as a result of direct enemy action. This comparison is indicative of the high standard of military professionalism displayed by the Battalion”.
I was surprised that mine explosions are not considered the result of direct enemy action. Laying a mine, whether it be anti-personnel or anti-tank, is obviously as much a direct enemy action as an enemy sniper hitting his target. It can be argued, in fact, that mine warfare utilises more enemy resources than anything else. The sourcing of the explosive, the training of the technicians, the building of the mine, the anticipation of the target’s likely movement; the laying of the mine and its concealment; and finally the steps taken to lure the target onto the mine.
Is the author really saying that the comparison which forms the basis of “outstanding results” is 186 enemy KIA to ‘only’ eight own troops KIA and that the eleven of the Battalion’s soldiers who were KIA as a result of mines, should somehow be thought of differently?
The US II FFV HQ estimated from reliable sources that “over 100 enemy were killed” as a result of Operation Hammersley. The proposal for a VN Unit Citation for 8RAR fails to mention the casualties of supporting arms. There is no doubt that Operation Hammersley would not have successfully breached the enemy’s Long Hai defences if it was not for the combined efforts of the “8RAR Group”. It seems strange, therefore, to claim ‘outstanding results’ without acknowledging both the contribution of supporting arms and their casualties (three KIA in Hammersley alone).
Interestingly, one of the points that I made to the AWM when they opened the Vietnam gallery some years ago was:
“Reference is made [in the Gallery] to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well … 3 KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’)…it would seem appropriate to mention them.” [The AWM subsequently amended the relevant information board.]
One of the AWM staff told me at the time that General Clunies-Ross (Chairman, AWM Council) personally checked all references to 8RAR. It seems that sometimes we lose perspective as far as the ‘all arms’ contribution to battle is concerned. ”
————————————————————————————–
18 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Continuing the series of posts relating to the genesis, two years ago, of my submission to the Minister ….
Blog: 7 July 2015
The RAAC Corporation’s Position and the Consequences. As it is understood, President 1 AR Assn supports the RAAC Corporation Chairman’s view that the Corporation cannot take the lead re the CGWP Submission, because the 3 Cav (Vietnam) Association is not a member of the Corporation (the Submission seeks to have those who provided support from 1AR, 3 Cav and RAE, acknowledged). The 1AR Assn, therefore, has to advocate the award alone. If unsuccessful, the RAAC Corporation might then offer support.
What’s this mean in terms of the Submission? The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal (DHAT), where the real power lies in terms of approving the Submission, can only consider it after Defence Honours and Awards (DHA) have ‘knocked it back’. So, 1 AR Assn submits to DHA, it is knocked back (as expected) and is resubmitted to DHAT. If it is knocked back, the new submission, supported by the RAAC Corporation, is submitted to DHA and then, finally, DHAT. The whole process has been made twice as complicated as it need be, with consequential lessening of its chances of approval (compared with a Submission which is supported by the RAAC Corporation right from the start).
The Lack of Moral Justification for This Position. Part of the RAAC Corporation’s Constitution refers to fostering the interests of the RAAC. The members of 3 Cav Regt who served in Vietnam did so as part of the RAAC. Some are members of the 3 and 4 Cav Regt Association (a member of the RAAC Corporation), some are members of the 3 Cav Regt (Vietnam) Association (not a member of the RAAC Corporation), while others are not members of either Association. How petty can we be as former members of the RAAC, to deny to those who fought with 3 Cav Regt during Operation Hammersley,the best opportunity to achieve the recognition that is due to them? Apart from anything else, recognition for them, is recognition for the RAAC. Isn’t this what the RAAC Corporation stands for??.
Reason for 1 AR Assn’s Acceptance of the Position.Whenever a Director of a Corporation is also the President of one of the Corporation’s own member Associations, there is likely to be a conflict of interest. By simply agreeing to the position of the Corporation Chairman, 1 AR Assn is not only a party to denying due recognition of those who served with 3 Cav Regt, but also denying its own members the best chance of due recognition of their gallant efforts.
What Should be Done. The President of the 1AR Assn should step down from his Directorship of the RAAC Corporation and strongly advocate the justification for the RAAC Corporation to support the Submission (noting in doing so that there is minimal work involved … the Submission is complete, it only needs to be submitted.)
I’m reminded that a number of people sign off emails with the words “Yours in Armour”, how hollow this sounds in light of the above
—————————————————————————————
NOTE
Subsequent to the above, the then President 1AR Assn remained as a Director of the RAAC Corporation, but ceased to be the 1AR Assn’s representative on the RAACC Council. Instead, a 1AR Assn member was appointed to fulfill this role (does this really avoid a conflict of interest?). This situation still applies, although a new 1AR Assn President is in the chair. It will be interesting to see if the current President resumes his rightful position on the Council
——————————————————————————–
17 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Continuing the series of posts relating to the genesis, two years ago of my submission to the Minister ….
Blog: 2 July 2015
The 8RAR Association was sent a copy of the submission, in the hope that they would support it.
Their response: “Unfortunately, 8 RAR Association is not in a position to support your draft submission. It is a strongly held belief in the Association, both from Senior Officers present at the time and from Association Research Officers, that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8 RAR as a standalone Meritorious Award for its service in Vietnam from 28 November 1969 to 24 October 1970 – not just for Operation Hammersley that occurred during the period 10 February 1970 to 9 March 1970.”
The submission has been revised according. A copy of the new section and slightly adjusted Conclusion is copied below. The full Submission can be accessed under ‘Articles’.
The Argument Against Extending Eligibility
The 8RAR Association do not support the extension of eligibility on the basis that “Senior Officers present at the time and Association Research Officers [believe] that the CGWP Unit Citation was awarded to 8 RAR as a standalone award for its service in Vietnam from 28 November 1969 to 24 October 1970 – not just for Operation Hammersley”. However, the only ‘deeds of valor or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy‘ (the criteria for award of the CGWP) mentioned in the Citation (copied in full below) relate to “most remarkable military operations [which] took place in the area of the Long Hai hills“, i.e. Operation Hammersley.
Contrary to the assertion above, the fact that the CGWP was awarded to 8RAR for these particular actions was made clear by ‘one of 8RAR’s senior officers at the time’, in a speech at the 2008 Annual Dinner of the Royal Australian Regiment Association (QLD Divison). His Excellency, Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, stated that “3 RAR and D Company, 6 RAR proudly wear the United States Presidential Unit Citation, 1 RAR the United States Meritorious Unit Citation: and in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palmearned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”.
Also contrary to the assertion above, the 8RAR’s principle research officer stated in his history of the Battalion in Vietnam that“Lieutenant-General Do Cao Tri, Commander of III Corps and Military Region III (of which Phuoc Tuy Province was part) presented 8RAR with the Meritorious Unit Commendation of the Vietnamese Armed Forces[it is now known that the Unit Commendation and Unit Citation that 8RAR received, are different awards … DR Hall is referring to the Unit Citation]for its actions in the Long Hai Hills.” Dr Bob Hall (a platoon commander during Operation Hammersley) recently added to his reference above: “it seems to me only logical that the other units that were involved should also be recognised including the Armoured Regiment and the Cav Regiment people, and the field engineers who also did a stirling job during the operation. The operation would have been very different had we not had the armoured and engineer support we had.
——————————————————————————–
16 June 2017
What’s Happening re the Hammersley Submission?
Two years ago I drafted a submission for eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation to be extended to those units that supported 8RAR. I thought that the RAAC Corporation would wish to take the lead in progressing it to the “higher echelons of Government”.
After many months, the Chairman stated that he wanted “nothing to do with the bloody thing“.
As with the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour, I elected to go it alone. I forwarded my submission to the Minister on 28 Feb 17. The Minister responded on 7 May 17 to say that he’d been advised [by Defence] that eligibility could not be extended because the citation was for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty (i.e. not just Hammersley). I immediately set about researching this aspect of the award.
On 3 Jun 17 I was informed that the RAAC Corporation had lodged their own submission with Defence on 30 Mar 17. I told the Corporation about the Minister’s response and asked if I could see their submission. The request was declined. I have no idea, therefore, what affect it might have had in terms of the Minister’s decision.
My subsequent research has revealed that the Minister was wrongly advised and the Unit Citation was NOT awarded for the whole of 8RAR’s tour. I asked the Corporation if they would care to see my follow-up submission, so as to possibly add value. I also advised that I was thinking of presenting the submission to the Minister personally and asked if the RAACC would like to be represented at the meeting.
The Corporation has declined both offers. I continue work on my follow up submission. I will submit an FOI request to see what issues were raised by the RAACC.
——————————————————————————-
15 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Continuing the series of posts relating to the genesis, two years ago. of the submission to the Minister …. (Just to ensure that any researcher who views this post is not misled, havng found the original letter, the quotation below is not completely correct (neither as shown below, nor as published in the 8RAR year book ‘Grey Eight’.)
Blog: 17 June 2015
A Submission to Have Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, Extended to Supporting Arms Involved in the Action.
I had to interrupt my work on the Introduction to the submission to respond, as below, to respond an email I received. Just goes to show the benefit of letting as many as possible know what you’re doing (as more often than not, in my experience, there are others who are able and willing to contribute). The person, whose identity I won’t reveal for the moment, worked for the Vietnamese Head of the FWMAC, Saigon and in this capacity helped with the preparation of 8RAR CGWP Citation.
Hence the request below. Fingers crossed.
“Dear …
I have a question for you … please bear with me for a moment or two. We have this letter:
“Dear Brigadier Weir,
I am enclosing a letter from Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General, 111 Corps and 111 CTZ,commending the 8th Battalion Groupfor its combat achievements on 21st February 1970 in the Minh Dam Secret Zone. It gives me great pleasure to add my commendation to that of General Tri. The dedication and true professionalism demonstrated by your forces have significantly enhanced our Common efforts against a very stubborn enemy.
Only by grinding away at the enemy, capturing his supplies and denying him his sanctuaries as you are doing, will we be able to force the enemy out of Phuoc Tuy Province and eventually out of the Republic of Vietnam.
I wish you continued success in the future and request that you pass on’ to your soldiers our appreciation for their outstanding performance. It will be seen that our continuing combined operations in the Long Hais are significant and important.”
The Citation to 8RAR refers to the whole of their time in Vietnam, but the central part is the following:
“Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit,the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.”
It is our contention that Operation Hammersley (Feb 70 in the Long Hais) was the principle factor in 8RAR being awarded the CGWP Unit Citation and, therefore, if we can show that the supporting arms made a major contribution to the outcome of the Operation, they too should be eligible to receive it. We note the phrases ‘The 8th Battalion Group’ and ‘the forces of the 8th Battalion’ in the references above, and feel that the intention was to recognise those units under command and in support of 8RAR which contributed (in some cases overwhelmingly) to the successful outcome of Operation Hammersley, rather than ‘just’ the battalion itself.
As one who, admittedly a year or two ago, helped with the preparation of the Citation, do you agree with this contention and, if so, would you be prepared to sign a letter to this effect to accompany our submission.
Many thanks for your consideration. We understand fully if the circumstances are too distant for your full recall.”
——————————————————————————-
14 June 2017
Another self-explanatory ‘letter’:
Dear ….
As the Assistant Secretary Defence Corporate Communications Branch, I believe you have an opportunity to advance the ADF’s public image with respect to indigenous affairs.
The latest issue of the Army Newspaper (13 June) includes the following statement “… Sister Fanny Hines, who died of enteritis at Bulawayo, Rhodesia on October 7, 1900 and became the first Australian woman to die on active service“. The article concerned relates to the recent dedication of the Boer War Memorial.
Sister Hines may have been the first Australian women to die on overseas military service, or the first Australian nurse to die on active service, but she was not the first Australian woman to die on active service. (The term ‘Australian’ can be taken to refer to inhabitants of Australia after it officially became known as such in 1824.)
One definition of ‘active service’ is that service rendered in a war as a member of armed forces. Another is that service undertaken to defend a person’s country (i.e.. their family, their property and their values), whether it be within the country itself, or overseas in support of an ally. Under these definitions, indigenous Australians, both men and women, were on active service during the Frontier Wars which are generally accepted as having lasted until at least 1928.
Fanny Hines can be regarded as the first non-indigenous Australian woman to die on active service (though non-indigenous women also died during the Frontier Wars). Unfortunately the name of the first indigenous Australian woman to die on active service may never be known.
I realise that the person who was quoted in the Army Newspaper was simply repeating a commonly accepted ‘fact’. It is because of this gap in community understanding, that I believe you could play a significant leadership role. Your ‘On the Record‘ page on the Defence website provides a great service in correcting inaccurate media reports about Defence, it could also be used to set the record straight in this matter. Similarly, I do not expect the Army Newspaper to print a long Letter to the Editor, however, a short note in the next edition could demonstrate that Defence is serious in terms of respecting the history of all Australians (both indigenous and non-indigenous).
Many thanks for your consideration,
———————————————————————————
13 June 2917
A brief departure from Hammersley. Today’s Canberra Crimes demanded a letter to the Editor:
“Nicholas Stuart makes some valid points in his article “Changing nature of war may undo us’ (Canberra Times, 13 June 2017, p17). Not everything is as he portrays, however. In particular, his assertion that strategic thinking begins and ends with equipment capabilities is not correct, nor is his statement that “Our Abrams tanks are a generation too old to fight in Iraq“.
Defence strategy starts with two fundamentals: the ‘warning time’ for enemy intentions to become clear; and the ‘lead time’ to acquire equipment and train personnel to operate and maintain it. Coupled with alliances, these considerations drive defence policy, from the size of the standing defence force and readiness levels, to industry participation and stockpiling requirements.
It was General Cosgrove as Chief of the Defence Force who stated that our then Leopard tanks could not be deployed to Iraq because “they would be an aging orphan among our allies“. This was not, of itself, reason to prevent them participating in that campaign (our Centurions were operated successfully as aging orphans in Vietnam). The nature of warfare more recently, however, means that inter-operability is essential.
All sea, land, and air platforms in a theatre of operations must be able to communicate with each other, as well as with command centres. It is the responsibility of the ADF to maintain this capability in accord with the relevant warning and lead times (both in terms of equipment interface and logistic support).”
———————————————————————————–
12 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Continuing the series of posts relating to the genesis, two years ago. of the submission to the Minister. Two arguments against the extension of exligibility were put forward: 1. The Citation was awarded for the whole term of 8RAR’s tour and 2. 8RAR was the only ‘Unit’ involved in Hammersley (in strict military terms, a ‘unit’ is a battalion or regiment, a ‘sub-uni’t is a company or squadron). It has now been found that the Citation was NOT awarded for 8RAR’s whole tour of duty (despite my having said in the blog to be “correct”).
If I haven’t stated before, reason for copying these posts is to give me time to prepare the detailed submission to the Minister (plus remind of what happened way back then)..
Blog: 16 June 2015
Two important matters re a Submission to Have Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, Extended to Supporting Arms Involved in the Action.
1. The CGWP Citation was Awarded to 8RAR for Their Whole Tour, not Just Op Hammersley.
Correct …but the 8RAR Citation states “Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.”
It can easily be argued that if Operation Hammersley had not occurred, they would not have received the CGWP. Also, we’ve also got Gen Elwell’s and Tri’s letters confirming the commendation afforded to 8RAR for Hammersley.
I am enclosing a letter from Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General, 111 Corps and 111 CTZ,commending the 8th Battalion Group for its combat achievements on 21st February 1970 in the Minh Dam Secret Zone. It gives me great pleasure to add my commendation to that of General Tri.
2. The CGWP is a Unit Citation, 8RAR was the Only Unit Involved in Op Hammersley.
Right again, but the submission will be based on the fact that the supporting arms under command of 8RAR were also responsible for the success of the Operation and must be regarded as part of the 8RAR ‘Unit’ for that purpose. This was the basis of the extension of eligibility for the 173rd Citation. In that case there was a nominal roll for the ‘Battalion Group’. Unfortunately, there’s no such thing for the 8RAR Bn Gp. This will mean that the submission will have to include names.
The RAR Assn is compiling a submission for the award of the Australian Unit Citation for those involved in Coral/Balmoral. Rusty Dyson and Bill Burton have done a fantastic job, identifying all those from C Sqn who were actually involved in the actions. It’s not easy, but it can be done if there’s the enthusiasm to do so.
The Defence Honours and Awards Tribunal has also been asked if there’s anything in addition to the information re submissions on their website, that needs to be provided (given their experience with the 173rd case).
———————————————————————————
11 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Continuing the series of posts relating to the genesis of the submission to the Minister … in this case the draft structure for the submission was posted to allow input from those who may be able to add value.
Blog: 13 June 2015
The draft structure of the Submission is set out below.
A Submission to Have Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, Extended to Australian Supporting Arms Involved in the Action
Introduction
Refer to Operation Hammerley in general and eligibilty for CGWP Citation being limited to 8RAR
Precedent(The favourable 173D Airborne/1RAR Bn Gp decision dated eight days earlier.)
The Contribution to Operation Hammersley Made by Supporting Arms
1 Armd Regt (whole sqn)
3 Cav Regt (specific APC troops)
1 Fd Sqn (specific fd troops)
161 Fd Bty RNZA
161 Recce Flt (pilots involved).
… including casualties suffered.
The Likely Outcome of Operation Hammersley if Supporting Arms had not Contributed as Above.
The Intent Behind the Award the CCWP Unit Citation
Refer to wording of Gen Ewell’s letter (commending the 8th Battalion Group) and the Citation itself (. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations….).
Support from 8RAR Officers of the Day
Conclusion
Attachments:
(include the Citation and the Elwell letter)
——————————————————
Request for a review of the FOI Decision Relating to the RAAC Corporation
The FOI team have advised that 28 June 2017 is the deadline for me to be advised the outcome of the review. (See 25 May 2017 blog for background.)
————————————————————————————
10 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Another thought bubble as I prepare my submission (see yesterday).
The following is a quote from a 1ATF ‘Proposal for a VN Unit Citation’ for 8RAR (probably drafted by 8RAR):
“… and outstanding results. One hundred and eighty six enemy have been eliminated; the Battalion has suffered nineteen fatal casualties, eleven as a result of mine explosions and not as a result of direct enemy action. This comparison is indicative of the high standard of military professionalism displayed by the Battalion”.
Mine explosions are not the result of direct enemy action? Simply unbelievable!!
Laying a mine, whether it be anti-personnel or anti-tank, is obviously as much a direct enemy action as an enemy sniper hitting his target. It can be argued, in fact, that mine warfare utilises more enemy resources than anything else. The sourcing of the explosive, the training of the technicians, the building of the mine, the anticipation of the target’s likely movement; the laying of the mine and its concealment; and finally the steps taken to lure the target onto the mine.
Is the author really saying that the comparison which forms the basis of “outstanding results” is 186 enemy KIA to ‘only’ eight own troops KIA and that the eleven of the Battalion’s soldiers who were KIA as a result of mines, should somehow be thought of differently?
The US II FFV HQ estimated from reliable sources that “over 100 enemy were killed” as a result of Operation Hammersley (OH, p387). The proposal for a VN Unit Citation for 8RAR fails to mention the casualties of supporting arms. There is no doubt that Operation Hammersley would not have successfully breached the enemy’s Long Hai defences if it was not for the combined efforts of the “8RAR Group”.
It seems strange, therefore, to claim ‘outstanding results’ without acknowledging the contribution of supporting arms and acknowledging their casualties (three KIA and twelve WIA in Hammersley alone).
—————————————————————————–
9 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Quotes from the Blog two years ago will continue, but for today … a thought which arose during the preparation of my (long and detailed) submission to the Minister resulting from the fact that he has been misinformed and misled about the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR :
“A Battle Honour is the public recognition and commemoration of an outstanding achievement on the battlefield by a unit or formation of the Australian Army”. (DOD website) A battle honour was recommended for 1 Armd Regt, 3 Cav Regt and the RAR for Operation Hammersley.
Only five battle honours were approved for the whole of Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. While the assault on the Minh Dam Secret Zone (Long Hai Mountains) was an outstanding achievement of combined arms co-operation, bravery and self-sacrifice, the casualties resulting from anti-personnel mine explosions towards the end, had political ramifications when Australia was withdrawing troops. The battle honour was not approved.
The infantry involved (8RAR) were recognised by the awarding of a RVN CGWP Unit Citation. Such recognition was not extended, however, to AFV crews from 1 Armd Regt and 3 Cav Regt, nor the field engineers (sappers) of 1 Fd Sqn who accompanied both armour and infantry into the battle.
During the fierce assault on the enemy’s entrenched defensive position which led to the battle honour recommendation, casualties to AFV crews providing fire support and armoured mobility to 8RAR were 2 KIA and 11 WIA. These resulted from: two tanks detonating anti-tank mines (one of which was destroyed); two tanks being struck by anti-armour rockets (RPGs); one APC destroyed by an anti-tank mine; one APC destroyed by a satchel charge (thrown by the enemy); and four APCs struck by RPGs. Also unrecognised were the small teams of sappers whose task was to clear anti-personnel mines: one sapper was KIA and another WIA.
——————————————————————————–
8 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Well done that person who suggested that I archive my blog posts. (Go to the very end of the blog for all the 2015 posts.) Following on from the previous two days:
Blog; 10 June 2015
Extension of 8RAR Unit Citation (Operation Hammersley) to A Sqn 1st Armd Regt and Other Supporting Arms.
8RAR were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry With Palm (CGWP) Unit Citation for their efforts during Operation Hammersley in 1970. There is evidence to suggest that the intention was for all the combat arms involved to be so recognized.
Motion [for 2015 1AR Assn AGM]: That the 1st Armd Regt Assn C’tee strive to have eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, extended to A Sqn 1st Armd Regt and other supporting arms. Background notes are herewith. Moved: B Cameron; Seconded, J. Chipman
——————————————————————————–
Blog, 11 June 2015
Extension of Eligibility for Unit Citation for Operation Hammersley.
Email to Jack Chipman (OC A Sqn 1AR, Op Hammersley):
With your help and that of others, we’ll ensure that all facts are correct and presented in the best possible way.
I had been thinking that once you clear it, I’d pass to the 1AR Assn for consideration and passing to the RAAC Corporation.
Unfortunately the Chairman, RAAC Corporation is not supportive at the moment. This results from the Corporation backing Defence’s proposal to include ‘1st APC Troop (4/19 PWLH)’ as the RAAC unit eligible for the 1RAR CGWP Unit Citation. This was a compromise title and no such unit ever existed. With a bit work, the Corporation was overruled and correct titles of ‘1 Troop A Sqn 4/19 PWLH and 1st APC Troop’ were agreed by the Official Historian and Defence, thereby ensuring 1 Tp A Sqn 4/19’s place as the first Australian armour force deployed on active service since the Second World War.
I may have to continue to manage the process, though hopefully with the endorsement of the 1AR Assn and RAAC Corporation. We’ll see …
Meanwhile …guidelines for preparing the submission are provided in the link below.
If you like to give some thought to the structure over the next couple of days, that would be great. I’ve got a few things on over the weekend, but will be back onto it next week. If the motion is passed at the 1AR Assn AGM, we can let them know where things are at and see how they might wish to move forward.
———————————————————————————————–
Minutes, 2015 1AR Assn AGM: “Actions are currently in underway for this to occur”.
There was no further discussion recorded at the subsequent 1AR Assn EGM, RAACC 2015 AGM, nor RAACA 2015 Annual report. The matter seems to have simply disappeared from the radar.
——————————————————————————
7 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
What was happening in this regard two years ago? Following on from yesterday, the Blog for 8 June 2015 is copied below. Interesting how the RAAC Corporation Advisory Board (‘forward the submission to us’) was overruled by their Chairman (‘the bloody thing is a 1AR Assn matter and nothing to do with us’)
8 June 2017 : “Recognition of RAAC Involvement in Operation Hammersley 1970.
RAAC Corporation Advisory Board members have recommended that yesterday’s submission be finalised by the 1AR Assn and forwarded to the Corporation. The submission has been redrafted accordingly. They have proposed that it be listed as an Agenda Item at the Corporation AGM later this year: “It would be great to see this issue rise up from the 1stArmoured Regiment Association to the Corporation and eventually on to a successful result”.
The A Sqn Commander has added his support: “Hi, I am just back from a week in hospital and I am delighted with the news . I must thank you and AR Assoc for keeping up the pressure. If I can add any further impetus please advise.”
I would hate to see this get ‘bogged down’ and have asked for support … “Could I ask if you could follow up with Trevor and David (the 1AR Assn Sec and Asst Sec) re the progress of the submission below. You probably know that I’m currently involved in a bit of an issue with Tony Crook (https://armouredadvocates.wordpress.com/ , ‘The Shame of the Centurion Log Books’). I don’t intend to give up until I get to the bottom of it and get a public apology (that’s just me, there’s a principle here), but I’d hate that to ‘scupper’ the Hammersley issue.
I could do the whole thing myself (such things often get ‘flicked’ to me), but I’m getting a bit ‘tired’, and, while I was happy to initiate it, I think it’s time the Association as a whole got involved. I believe that a lot of time could be saved by getting a copy of the RAR Assn submission to Defence Honours and Awards re the CGWP Unit Citation to 173 Airborne (that’s now been awarded to the supporting 1RAR Bn Gp).
Of course, it’s the RAAC Corporation who should speak to their RAR Assn counterparts; hence the submission [yesterday] for the 1st Armd Regt Assn to request the RAAC Corporation to do so. If you could monitor progress that would be magic [as it would if the award of the Citation could be extended to A Sqn 1st Armd before Jack Chipman moves on]. If it breaks down with the Assn (and therefore, the Corporation), then I’m prepared to do it all myself (with your assistance if you’d wish).
I think this is something which should stand head and shoulders above petty bickering. (It was interesting to see the way that the Assn ‘flicked on’ the preparation of the 1st Armd Regt Nominal Roll for Coral/Balmoral to support the RAR Association submission for the award of the Australian Unit Gallantry Citation … I asked Rusty Dyson to do what he could and he and Bill Burton have done a magnificent job; but the Assn has for all intents, washed its hands of it all.) Of course they’ve done away with the Members’ Forum which means that such things can stay ‘out of sight’.”
Note: The above reference was in relation to the C’tee at the time. It’s a very different situation now under Kevin’s leadership.
—————————————————————————————–
6 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (cont)
Following on from yesterday … how is it that the RAAC Corporation stated very clearly that they didn’t want to have anything to do with the “bloody thing” and then as soon as I forward a submission to the Minister, they follow up with a separate one (which no-one is allowed to see) to Defence. The background from two years ago helps put all this into context. The Blog post for 7 June 2015 is copied below. Subsequent blogs will follow in the days to come.
Dear RAAC Corporation
Recognition of RAAC Involvement in Op Hammersley 1970.
As you know a commemoration is to take place today to mark the 5oth anniversary of 1 Troop A Sqn 4/19 PWLH’s arrival in Vietnam. A deployment which earned them not only their place in history, but also the recognition of our Vietnamese Allies with the award of their Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation (CGWP).
Apart from those who were part of the US 173 Airborne Brigade, other Australian units that have been honoured in this way include AATTV, 2 Sqn RAAF, and 8RAR. Unfortunately the award to 8RAR, like that to 173 Airborne Brigade, did not involve recognition of supporting units. This issue, with respect to the 1RAR Brigade Group, has now been overturned through the hard work of the RAR Association.
The success of Operation Hammersley, for which 8RAR were honoured with the CGWP Unit Citation, was largely dependent of the tremendous fighting spirit of the AFV crews of A Sqn 1st Armd Regt and B Sqn 3 Cav Regt. As per the submission on behalf of the 1RAR Brigade Group, the units supporting 8RAR also deserve recognition. The tank squadron commander, the then Major Jack Chipman, has long called for this.
It will be seen from the extract below, that the Vietnamese clearly intended the citation be awarded to 8RAR and units that provided combat support during Operation Hammersley. Extract of Citation:
“Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.”http://www.vvaa.org.au/8rar.htm
While the recognition of infantry is undoubtedly deserved, unfortunately it has tended to overshadow the efforts of supporting arms which are equally deserving. An example of this was seen in the Vietnam Gallery when it initially opened. The comment below is one of a number that I made at the time (all of which have resulted in changes to the information presented):
“Reference is made to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well…3KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’)…it would seem appropriate to mention them.” The chairman of the AWM Council at the time was a former member of 8RAR and I was told that he vetted everything to do with the unit.
Having said all the above, is it possible for the RAAC Corporation to contact the RAR Association to ascertain the process they followed to have Defence Honours and Awards extend the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to the 173 Airborne Brigade to the 1RAR battalion Group under their command … with a view to making a submission for the CGWP Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR, to be extended to supporting arms involved in Operation Hammersely, particularly A Sqn 1 Armd Regt, B Sqn 3 Cav Regt and the field engineers? In closing, I’ve added some below some references Operation Hammersley in ‘Canister! On! FIRE!’.
Best wishes, Bruce
(i) “Both the ARVN and the local population had been shown that there was no such thing as a safe haven for the VC. It was important now that the Vietnamese Forces build on the success and prevent the enemy re-establishing themselves. Consideration was given to the award of a Battle Honour to 1st Armoured Regiment, 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the Royal Australian Regiment for Operation Hammersley. The Committee responsible decided not to recommend this, however.”
(ii) “8RAR were awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Unit Citation. Understandably, there was considerable disappointment among tank and APC crews that their Units’ involvement was not also recognised in this way.”
———————————————————————————
5 June 2017
Extension of Eligibility for CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
It’s simply unbelievable.
I originally prepared my submission in June 2015. I did so on the basis of it being forwarded from the 1 AR Assn to the RAAC Corporation for further action. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on the 1AR Assn Facebook page that: ‘Theaward for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always …. The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing”. There being no further progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister in February 2017.
A similar situation existed re my draft submissions concerning the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour and the error with the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1AR Standard. Fed up with a lack of action, I forwarded both proposals to the Minister on an individual basis (having checked with the `1AR Assn Patron that I wouldn’t be upsetting any considerations in-progress). The Minister approved both requests and 1AR is now emblazoning the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour for the first time. (I’ve suggested that the Regiment invite Coral Balmoral veterans to the next Cambrai Parade, if that’s to be the first time the ‘new’ Standard is paraded.)
All my endeavours have been posted and made known in an open and transparent manner on the blog. Surprisingly (at least as far as I was concerned) I’ve just learnt that the RAAC Corporation forwarded its own Hammersley submission to Defence on 30 March 2017 —- knowing that I’d already made a submission to the Minister on 28 February 2017.
The Minister responded to my submission on 7 May 2017. He was advised by Defence not to approve the extension of eligibility. Given that Defence had had the RAAC Corporation’s submission for over a month, it has to be assumed that his decision was made having taking into account all the arguments put forward.
So where to now?
My original strategy (formulated after speaking to the 1RAR guys who successfully gained approval for the extension of eligibility for the unit citation awarded to 173rd Airborne) was to ascertain the reason for the initial decision to reject approval and then focus all effort on addressing that in an appeal. (I made this known when I first put forward my submission two years ago.) Following the Minister’s response (which I’d anticipated, having spoken to the 8RAR Assn) I have spent days going through all the relevant files at the AWM. The results of this prove conclusively that the advice given to the Minister was completely false. I am preparing a follow-up submission with supporting documentation in relation to B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 FD Sqn. I provided an update in this regard to the President of the 1AR Assn last week. His response was that the outcome sounded very hopeful.
I am thinking of presenting the submission appealing the Minister’s decision at a meeting with him. I have asked the RAAC Corporation if they would like to be represented as a part of the delegation.
Finally … I asked if I could see the ‘supporting’ submission that the RAAC Corporation had provided to Defence after I had lodged my submission to the Minister re the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour (see any similarities with the above?). I was concerned because I didn’t know how a second submission would impact on the Minister’s decision (another similarity). The Chairman of the Corporation stated that he had not seen my submission despite the fact that it had been provided to him in 2015 and had been publicly available vide this website ever since. How could a ‘supporting’ submission be provided if you haven’t seen the original, I asked. The RAAC Corporation declined to allow me to see their submission (similarity three). As a result I submitted an FOI request to Defence. The response was that I couldn’t see the RAAC Corporation’s submission in support of mine because:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with “exempt matter deleted”, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
Unsurprisingly, I have sought a review of the FOI decision. I suggested that there will be many more FOI requests from member associations of the RAAC Corporation, once it is known to them that the contents of this document could reasonably be expected to cause them to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation.
Getting back to Hammersely, I guess that the Corporation has its own reasons for again not allowing me to see their submission to Defence. I only hope that the result of the subsequent FOI request is not the same as that re Coral-Balmoral.
———————————————————————————
1 June 2017
NO further blog posts until Monday 5 June
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
Listing of references (found so far) which refute the Minister’s advice that the CGWP Unit Citation (as distinct to the meritorious Unit Commendation) was awarded to 8RAR for its tour of duty up to 31 Oct 70.
Wikipedia: In early 1970 8 RAR took part in Operation Hammersley, a reconnaissance operation in the Long Hải area. This operation began on 10 February and on 18 February it captured a large bunker complex after the Vietnamese Communist defenders withdrew following air raids. The operation continued until 9 March, with the battalion carrying out patrols and conducting ambushes in order to engage Communist troops. These operations were successful, and 8 RAR was awarded the South Vietnamese Government’s Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation for its role in the operationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8th_Battalion,_Royal_Australian_Regiment
8RAR History [‘The Combat Battalion’, Dr Robert Hall, former 8RAR officer] :“Lieutenant-General Do Cao Tri, Commander of III Corps and Military Region III (of which Phuoc Tuy Province was part) presented 8RAR with the Meritorious Unit Commendation of the Vietnamese Armed Forces[i.e. the CGWP]for its actions in the Long Hai Hills.”
Former Governor General and 8RAR Coy Comd: In a speech at the 2008Annual Dinner of the Royal Australian Regiment Association (QLD Divison). His Excellency, Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC, GG and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, stated that “3 RAR and D Company, 6 RAR proudly wear the United States Presidential Unit Citation, 1 RAR the United States Meritorious Unit Citation: and in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palmearned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”.
US Commanding General 11 Field Force Vietnam:“Dear Brigadier Weir [Commander, 1stAustralian Task Force], I am enclosing a letter from Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General, 111 Corps and 111 CTZ, commendingthe 8th Battalion Groupfor its combat achievements on 21st February 1970 in the Minh Dam Secret Zone. It gives me great pleasure to add my commendation to that of General Tri. Brig Weir forwarded the letter to the units comprising the “8RAR Group”, viz. 8RAR, A Sqn 1AR, B Sqn 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn
Commanding Officer 8 RAR Lt Col K. O’Neill accepts the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Citation from ARVN Lt Gen Do Cao Trifor the Bn’s efforts in the Long Hai’s during 1970.
——————————————————————————
31 May 2017
The Boer War Memorial Dedication
Sunny, but a chilly wind. Many black berets in attendance. The man of the moment, Colonel John Haynes, OAM, wore his with pride. This was no mean feat for someone who will be 88 this year. Well done that man (and his supporting c’tee over the many years it has taken to reach this point). The fact that volunteers enlisted in colonial forces made it a truly national occasion. Organizing sub-c’tees had been active in every state and territory, and government leaders were represented at the dedication. Two state governors (one current and one former) were also present.
Have received advice that National Archives (NAA) and the AWM have agreed on a means by which readers can be informed of known errors in official military records (without contravening the Archives Act). This is a good outcome, one which will help ensure that the public are not misinformed (any more than they otherwise would be).
———————————————————————————-
30 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
The AWM states that “The battalion [8RAR] was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamese government for its involvement in Hammersley.
‘Fighting to the Finish’, the Official History (p813) also refers to 8RAR being awarded the “RVNAF Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation.
The CGWP Unit Citation is awarded to units in ‘recognition of deeds of valour or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy’. The RVNAF Meritorious Unit Commendation is awarded for meritorious achievement.
In the case of 8RAR, one citation covered both awards. Only one action was described in relation to deeds of valor and heroic conduct in combat with the enemy … that for Operation Hammersley. References to “civic action” and the “Pacification and Development Programme of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam” can be taken to relate to the Meritorious Unit Commendation.
Confirmation of the importance placed on Operation Hammersley in terms of the CGWP Unit Citation are emphasised in a comparison between the citation proposed by HQ 1ATF and the citation which accompanied the awards.
The wording of the Australian proposal devoted half as much space again to that used for Operation Hammersley, to describe Operation Phoi Hop , a joint operation with ARVN local forces which assisted the Pacification and Development Programme.
The Vietnamese responsible for the citation wording looked at this and increased the space given to the description of Operation Hammersley by one third and decreased the space given to Operation Phoi Hop by half. The bravery and sacrifices made during Operation Hammersley were undoubtedly, in their eyes, the justification for the CGWP Unit Citation in terms of deeds of valor and heroic conduct.
Operation Phoi Hop and civic action program achievements undoubtedly provided justification for the RVNAF Meritorious Unit Commendation.
——————————————————————————-
29 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
A few points:
The Minister has been advised by Defence that the Citation covered the Battalion’s operations from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970. This is not supported by the Citation which refers to operations from “28 November 1969 to the present” (as well as the undeniable fact that fact that the Citation was presented prior to 31 October 1970).
The fact that the Minister was incorrectly advised is supported by a 1ATF proposal for the award which appears to have been finalised in August 1970, as necessitated by the length of the approval process for an award to be presented two months later. Discussions associated with the Citation between HQ AFV, FWMAO, and RVN JGS, would have been initiated well prior to this.
The Citation states that the Battalion participated in “almost every military” operation from 28 November 1969. In fact, it took part in eleven of the twenty seven 1ATF operations during its tour of duty.
The RVN CGWP is awarded in recognition of deeds of valour or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy. The only example of this specifically referred to in the Citation is Operation Hammersley. The 1ATF citation proposal referred to the Hammersley operations as being “of particular significance“. This was replaced in the RVN Citation with the words “their most remarkable military operations“.
The letter of commendation “to elements of 1ATF” for Op Hammersley from the Comd III Corps (Lt Gen Tri) to the US Comd II FFV (Lt Gen Ewell) was dated 6 March 1970. Ewell forwarded the letter to Comd 1ATF, adding his congratulations to the “8RAR Group“, on 22 March 1970. Three days later, Comd 1 ATF forwarded the letter to CO 8RAR, OC A Sqn 1AR, OC B Sqn 3 Cav and OC 1 Fd Sqn (the component forces of the “8RAR Group” which conducted Op Hammersley).
It was announced in April 1970 that 8RAR would not be replaced when they left in October. It is possible that the idea of an award was sparked at this time in relation to Operation Hammersley.
If the idea of a unit citation came from the RVN rather than HQ AFV/1 ATF as happened with individual awards, discussion between RVN JGS, FWMAO, HQ 1ATF would have been conducted prior to a citation proposed being drafted by 1ATF (eg. is the award suitable? … is it able to be accepted?).
HQ AFV had no experience with foreign unit awards. While Comd AFV could approve the acceptance of individual awards, this was not the case for a unit citation. This required the Queen’s approval (which was granted retrospectively). Army HQ Canberra advised HQ AFV on 5 September 1971 that HM the Queen had approved acceptance of the award (it was gazetted on 9 Sep 71) The Queen’s approval was obtained prior to the presentation of the RVN Unit Citation to AATTV.
———————————————————————————-
28 May 2017
References to Casualties in Official Reports and Publications
A recent email:
“Dear AWM
‘On the Offensive’ (p334) states “On 1 March [1968] …. an APC was destroyed by enemy rocket fire but without casualties”. The reference to no casualties was likely to have come from the vehicle’s operational damage report.
Advocates have found that trying to get veterans’ medical claims accepted is hindered when DVA refers to official reports and publications as evidence that no-one was hurt.
What happened in this particular incident has recently been described by someone there at the time:
“… the RPGs came flying across my scone and hit C/S 33. I was driving C/S 33A with Scobie Aitkin as my CC. I still remember the look on Snow Croydon’s face as he realised they were Charlie he was waving to and not Kiwis and his hand going down for the M60. He was sitting on the drivers hatch. I can see him going A over T and John Fogarty picking himself up and feeling for Pom in the drivers hatch. Pom had gone by then. The vehicle burnt to the ground after the two RPGs ignited the WP grenades in a bag on the commander’s cupola.”
The War Wounds Conference at the AWM some years ago indicated that the medical system today treats blast victims very differently to the Vietnam era. Supposedly the med file for anyone involved in such an incident is always ‘open’ as far as any hidden wounds (medicos call them ‘occult’ wounds) are concerned and follow-up checks are made.
Would it be possible for future Official Histories such as that for Afghanistan to use the phrase ‘no apparent casualties’, rather than ‘no casualties’ for those service personnel exposed to blast in its many forms.”
I added a report from an advocate:
“My major concern with many reports is that there are many instances where AFV crewman received “minor injuries”, that were in fact life long serious disabilities. My involvement as a volunteer veterans’ advocate over a period of some 15 years was often hampered by ‘official’ reports that were used
extensively by DVA. The worst of these reports was the one dealing with damage to AFVs during the Vietnam war. One example is a mine blast where the report stated the driver received ‘minor injuries and remained on duty’. The reality was serious back & neck injuries combined with deafness and
tinnitus.”
The Official Historian of Australian Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Australian Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor, Professor Craig Stockings, replied to say:
“I take your points on board. My thanks for the interest and advice“.
Now we have to hope those people writing official documents such as battle damage reports for AFVs also acknowledge the unintended impact that their wording can have on the future health of wounded soldiers.
——————————————————————————–
27 May 2017
Official Records and the Public Interest.
I recently had reason to ask if an official file could be notated to alert readers to a known error in one its folios. I was advised that it is against the Archives Act (when a record is more than 25 years old) to make any amendment or correction.
I was concerned that the public interest might be jeopardised if a known error in an official record could not be notated in some way (as distinct to changing it) in order to prevent readers being misled. I was thinking of possibly significant issues that could be involved here.
Following an enquiry as to how seek an amendment to the Archives Act (I assumed it was through the AG), National Archives have advised that my concern could, in fact, be dealt with in two ways:
(i) “If the subject of the record wished to correct information in the file which they believe is incomplete, incorrect, out of date, or misleading, they can ask that a correcting statement be placed on the file under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (sections 48 to 51). The right of correction is not automatic, but must be assessed by the controlling agency. When a correcting statement has been made under FOI through the controlling agency, the Archives will place it on the file“.
(ii) In other cases, the NAA can “add a note to the item details on our collection catalogue (Record Search) against the particular item. This is a straightforward process from our end …”. If the record is held by another agency, then the NAA would need to liaise with them.
It was never my intention to concern myself with a specific document. In terms of basic principles, however, I’m pleased to know that known errors in an official record can be addressed in some way or other, so as to protect the public interest.
——————————————————————————–
26 May 2017
FOI Request.
Background is provided by the 5 April 2017 blog post. In essence, I asked to see a copy of the submission made by the RAAC Corporation in support of mine seeking approval for the Coral-Balmoral Battlehonour to be emblazoned on the 1AR Standard. Surprisingly, the Corporation stated that they had not seen my submission, yet they had prepared another submission in support of it (which I was not permitted to see).
The FOI Decision
My FOI request to see the RAAC Corporation’s submission has been refused because the Accredited Decision Maker is satisfied that:
(i) the effect of disclosing the Corporation’s submission could have an adverse effect on the membership of the Corporation and its operations, in that member associations could reasonably be expected to refuse to participate in future activities conducted by the Corporation; and
(ii) information in the Corporation’s submission could reasonably be expected to harm the interests of an individual or group of individuals and prejudice the Corporation’s ability to obtain similar information in the future.
The Decision Maker considered releasing the submission with “exempt matter deleted”, but decided that, as there would be nothing left, the document would be meaningless. He concluded that releasing the whole document could reasonably be expected to harm the operations and membership of the RAAC Corporation.
How can disclosure of a supporting submission to a Minister (a public document), harm an organization to the extent that RAAC member associations would refuse to continue to support the RAAC Corporation? What could the submission possibly contain, to have this effect?
I have requested a review of the decision. (As they say … sometimes truth is stranger than fiction.)
———————————————————————
25 May 2017
Email to National Archives follows. It relates to a matter in which the AWM states that it can’t provide a notation on a file to advise that something is known to be wrong.
Dear NAA, Many thanks for your response.
“The Archives Act prohibits the alteration of records over 25 years old (section 26 of the Act), and it does not provide a right of amendment or correction.”
I guess my next step is to seek an amendment to the Archives Act. I presume I do this through the Attorney General. If you can offer any other advice as to how to initiate an amendment to the Act, I’d be very grateful if you could provide this.
I acknowledge that the Act prevents any correction or amendment to records more than 25 years old. What I am proposing is an appended notation to a record. This notation could link to a separate record where the originator of the original certifies that he made an error in writing it and offers explanation.
As you know, there is public interest involved here. Say the original record related to the Maralinga Atomic Tests and the originator (someone involved with the Tests) realised that he had made a mistake in writing the record. Correcting this might be of immense public benefit. Are we saying that it is impossible to make any correction? Presumably the originator can always make a new record … what I’m proposing is a means by which a link is made between the new and the old records. If this cannot be done, the ability to serve the public interest is denied.
I appreciate that the possibility of someone wanting to ‘dress up’ or fraudulently correct his original record is always present. This could be limited if a ‘stat dec’ was used as the basis for any new record.
I will forward my proposal to the Attorney General is you think that is the best course to follow. Your advice is appreciated.
——————————————————————————-
24 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
I almost missed it. I saw it and flicked over it and put the file aside. Of course, I went back to it and looked again. Problem was that it was very hard to read. Photocopy of a photocopy perhaps. Finally the penny started to drop.
Firstly, this was a HQ 1ATF file. What made me flick over it at first, was that it the 1ATF file related to the AATTV RVN Unit Citation. Buried within it, was a page headed ‘Proposal for VN Unit Citation’. The title gives it away, This was the 1ATF draft citation for the 8RAR RVN Unit Citation. Who is most likely to have drafted this for 8RAR? Obviously 8RAR … possibly the 2IC, the then Maj Clunies-Ross.
As we know, those advised the Minister have told him that the Unit Citation awarded to 8RAR was for the whole of its tour up to 31 Oct 70. The proposed wording states: “During nine months of almost continuous contact with the enemy …”.
Given (i) that the battalion arrived in SVN in Nov 69 and it’s first operation was Atherton in Dec 69, the proposal must have been drafted in Aug 70. Given (ii) the liaison necessary between 1ATF, HQ AFV (and Australia), FWMAO, and ARVN JGS in relation to such awards, it is probable that idea had been raised in Jun-Jul 70, if not earlier (ie, following Lt Gen Tri’s commendation for Op Hammersley in on 25 Mar 70).
So … the Minister has been misled in being advised that the award was presented in recognition of 8RAR’s contribution to operations up to 31 Oct 70. I feel a a second letter to the Minister coming on.
(Interestingly, protocol required that the Queen give approval for the award to be accepted. AHQ Canberra was advised of this on 5 Sep 71, not 70. The award was gazetted on 9 Sep 71.)
————————————————————————————
23 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
Dear AWM,
“I’m doing some research re Operation Hammersley at present and thought I should bring the following to your attention..
‘Fighting to the Finish’, p383, states “Lieutenant General Tri added his congratulations in a personal letter to Weir“. The reference given relates to a letter copied in “The Grey Eight in Vietnam“.
I’ve attached copy of this letter from AWM 103 R212/1/1/3. You’ll see that it was actually a letter to Brig Weir from Lt Gen Ewell, not Tri, that is quoted. This letter was sent on 25 March 1970, and enclosed a letter to Ewell from Lt Gen Tri dated 6 March 1970.
It seems that receipt of Tri’s letter (also on the above file) was the only reason for Ewell to write to Brig Weir [coming as it did some time after Operation Hammersley].
The letter from Weir is significant [to me] for two reasons. Firstly it clearly identifies the units which comprised the “8 RAR Group” and, secondly, it shows that the last sentence was written by Weir, not Ewell. (It has been wrongly included as part of Ewell’s letter in a number of publications, including ‘The Grey Eight’.)
As an aside, Tri’s commendation (and Ewell’s) is for actions on 21 Feb 70. As we know, this was essentially a battlefield clearance day, following the delayed B52 strike. It would seem that Tri is responding to reports from the two ARVN (RF) companies involved on that day and wanted to emphasis the importance [in his view] of joint ops.”
‘Fighting to the Finish’, p815/816
A copy of the letter from Minister Tehan re the changes to battlehonour protocols was attached.
“Thought you’d be (also) interested in the attached (should there be a new edition to the Official History).
The submission was made in relation to 1 Armd Regt (ie. additional battlehonour and amendment to Theatre Honour to read 1968-1971), but the decision means that all five battlehonours can be emblazoned on the 3 Cav Regt Guidon and RAR Colours.”
————————————————————————————–
22 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
Yesterday’s blog post copied the letter of commendation from Gen Tri. It was sent to Lt Gen Ewell, Comd II FFV. Gen Ewell forwarded this to the Comd 1ATF under his own covering letter. He refers to the ‘8RAR Group’ in place of Gen Tri’s reference to ‘elements of 1ATF’. Again, the battlefield clearance on 21 February is the subject of the commendation.
The Task Force Comd, Brig Weir, attaches Gen Tri’s letter to his own letter quoting Gen Ewell. This can be seen vide the link below. Who does Brig Weir send his letter to? The component members of the “8 RAR Group” who took part in Op Hammersley, of course. Who are these?
The Distribution List is: CO 8RAR; OC A Sqn 1 Armd Regt; OC B Sqn 3 Cav Regt; and OC 1 Fd Sqn. The latter three being exactly those for whom the extension of eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation is being sought.
Related matters:
Brig Weir’s letter contains two paragraphs. A number of publications have included his second para as part of Gen Ewell’s latter. This is significant in terms of the political debate about continuing ops in the Long Hai area and the extent to which 1ATF was being urged to disregard casualties.
The Official History refers to Gen Ewell sending a personal letter of commendation to CO 8RAR.
What a disappointment, the National Archives are closed for access to records until 1 July. Will check then, but I think the file is probably just the GG’s involvement in the Queen’s approval for 8RAR to accept the citation (which was granted on 5 Sep 71. Gazetted 9 Sep 71.
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
Lt Gen Tri (Comd III Corps) wrote to Lt Gen Elwell (Comd II FFV) on 6 Mar 70 to congratulate 1ATF for its operation against the Long Hais on 21 Feb 70. He’d heard about this through “reported information”. Link below. What happened on the 21st to warrant this commendation?
On 18 Feb 70, immense bravery was shown by combat arms in attacking the enemy’s defended position. The attack was to be resumed at first light next day, but a withdrawal was ordered. A ‘political’ decision was made to seek a B52 mission instead. Approval procedure for the bombing meant that villages in the vicinity had to be informed. Rather than taking place on 19 Feb, it was delayed until the next day. The enemy withdrew and the operations on 21 Feb largely amounted to battlefield clearance, BUT two companies of ARVN (RF) were involved. Extract from COF:
“Interestingly, the plan devised for the follow-up to the B52 strike involved the ARVN. As well as C Company 8RAR, together with 2 and 4 Troops (Brennan and Cumper), the force to return to the enemy position and conduct bomb damage assessment included two RF companies. Allowing the Vietnamese to enter the Minh Dam Secret Zone and to be associated with the capture of the significant facilities which were expected to be found was important.”
So the Comd III Corps was particularly pleased to see ARVN troops associated with a successful operation, especially one which forced the enemy from one of its Secret Zones. This wasn’t a letter of congratulation for Op Hammersley as a whole.
What’s this mean in terms of the CGWP Unit Citation?
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
How to target the search? I’ve scanned the titles of some 6000 HQ 1 ATF files and 7000 HQ AFV files. I’m yet to see all the actual files of interest, however, I don’t have proof as yet that the Unit Citation for 8RAR was awarded for Op Hammersley. I can prove that it wasn’t awarded for “its tour of duty from 28 Nov 69 to 31 October 70″ as stated by the Minister, but that’s something different. Whereto from here?
If the Citation was awarded for 8RAR’s “contribution in operations against the enemy throughout it’s deployment”, what is there that sets this battalion apart from the others at the time (apart from Op Hammersley)? Leaving aside Hammersley, was 8RAR responsible for more enemy casualties or capture more weapons and equipment, than any other Battalion?
What do we know of the CGWP medal and unit citation?
“The medal was created on August 15, 1950 and was awarded to military personnel, civilians, and Armed Forces units and organizations in recognition of deeds of valor or heroic conduct while in combat with the enemy.”
“Known as the Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation with Palm …the Unit Citation … was created on January 20, 1968. The former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) Armed Forces awarded the Gallantry Cross to specific military units that distinguished themselves to the same level as would be required for the individual award” (Wikipedia)
Given the above, ie. being an award for deeds of valor or heroic conduct, the reference to civil action in the Citation (below) is not really relevant.
Did 8RAR indeed Force “participate in almost every military operation to search out and destroy the enemy in Phuoc Tuy province” during their tour?
Was 8RAR a ‘stand out’ in terms of close co-ordination with the Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces, organising patrols and ambushes around villages and hamlets?
I think I’ve got enough to go on with.
——————————————————————————————
Citation for the Eighth Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment
The Eighth Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force.An excellent combat unit, always displaying high morale while co-operating and assisting the Vietnamese people in their struggle against Communism and to defend peace and freedom. While operating in Military Region III, Republic of Vietnam from 28 November 1969 to the present, the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force participated in almost every military operation to search out and destroy the enemy in Phuoc Tuy province.
Though fighting under the most difficult conditions, the members of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force still fought bravely and determinedly and had many glorious victories.Their most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.
Besides their own military operations, the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force co-ordinated closely with the Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces in Long Le sub-sector, organised patrols and ambushes around villages and hamlets, caused heavy casualties to the communists and thereby greatly assisted the Pacification and Development Programme of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.
Together with their military effort, the members of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force participated in the civic action programme to assist the local population to reconstruct their houses, roads, bridges, markets and schools etc., and achieved excellent results.Through their glorious activities outlined above, the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force contributed significantly to the anti-communist struggles of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, thereby bringing great credit to the Royal Australian Armed Forces.
——————————————————————————-
19 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR (Cont)
The search for the ‘defining’ document goes on. I’ve already mentioned the trap of searching under ‘8RAR’, rather than ‘8 RAR’. Another trap, I believe, is to limit the search to a date range, eg. ‘1970’. You’d think that that would mean that those files listed as ‘1969 –1971’, would be included? Wouldn’t you?
So, what to do? I’ve decided to scan all the ‘unit’ files. For ‘HQ 1 ATF’ this means running through almost 6,000 titles. It’s a bit tiresome, but worthwhile. I’d not have thought to search under keywords such as, for example, ‘Briefings’, ‘Conferences’, and ‘Letters. (Those demi-official letters from commanders contain some wonderful ‘pearls’.)
Meanwhile, the files retrieved after my searches under keywords such as ARVN Awards, Citations, Letters of Commendation, have provided some wonderful reading. I hope the Tank Museum has copies of the letters of commendation for RAAC personnel, as well as the award certificates (incl those for the SVN Armor Badge). Interestingly, when you read the originals, you sometimes find differences with the documents as published. The letter of commendation from the US Commanding General II FFV to Comd 1ATF re Op Hammersley is a case in point (when compared with the version published in the 8RAR history, ‘The Grey Eight’, edited by A. Clunies-Ross).
The files confirm that those who drafted Minister Tehan’s response to my submission (see earlier blog posts) have misinformed him. For those who haven’t heard of it, FWMAO stands for Free World Military Assistance Office.
Let’s look at a case whereby an Australian soldier is recommended by his CO for a Vietnamese award. The CO advises HQ 1 ATF, who passes the recommendation to HQ AFV in Saigon; who in turn pass it to FWMAO. It is translated into Vietnamese and the FWMAO liaises with the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). When the JCS concur (or don’t disagree), the FWMAO advises HQ AFV that the RVN proposes to award the soldier a ……. HQ AFV then advises the soldier via HQ 1 ATF that “the RVN proposes to award you the ….. “. The soldier is also advised at this time that COMAFV has given approval for him to accept the award and has asked that it be approved. Subsequently, HQ AFV inform the soldier that the RVN JGS have approved the award. On average, the time from proposal to approval was three months (a range from two to six months).
PS. Nearly caught myself out re searching techniques… HQ 1 ATF is the correct title and searches under that will return all files so titled. But some files were mistitled as HQ 1ATF (no space) and so a search has to be conducted on this basis as well (otherwise these files are missed).
————————————————————————————-
18 May 2017
Memories of a Distant Past
Some time ago, the Dorrigo Railway Museum acquired ARN 169037 to place on a flat bed wagon as part of their yet to be opened railway display. The curator expressed interest in the history of the tank and the following info has been passed onto him (via a former mini-team member who took the photo).
Centurion 169037 was callsign 32A until Sep 68 then 32C until Feb 69, then 22C until Mar 69, then 22B for Apr until it RTA’d in Jun 69. (Thanks to Shane Lovell’s book for this info.)
It was 32A (the troop sergeant’s tank) during the defence of FSB Balmoral. I’ve attached a short extract from Canister! On! FIRE!
“Alert to such a threat, 32Alpha’s crew used their IR equipment to scan the ground across as wide an arc as possible. It was not long before their efforts paid off. Observing a party of seven pushing a Bangalore torpedo96 through the wire, Sergeant Len Allen ordered the adjoining tank (Corporal Dennis Britten) to illuminate with white light.
Although not quick enough to prevent a gap in the perimeter defences being blown, the retreating sappers were treated to twenty pounder canister and .30cal at a range of less than 50m. The engagement drew professional praise from an Australian sapper officer who witnessed it: ‘The entire enemy breaching team was destroyed; had the tank not been there, the outcome would have been a fierce hand-to-hand fight for our forward pits’.”
Interestingly, while moving to FSB Balmoral a couple of days earlier:
At the same time, a quick check was conducted of the area engaged by 32Alpha. A body was located, the first confirmed enemy casualty from action by Australian tanks since the Second World War. It was no surprise when his pith helmet and webbing showed him to an NVA regular.
Months later, on 10 Dec 68, while 33C, it detonated a mine, Extract from COF:
More base camps and caches were discovered in coming days. Meanwhile, back at Nui Dat, 1 Troop (Sullivan) commenced infantry-tank training with 9RAR. On 10 December, 2 Troop were tasked to help B Company 1RAR secure an area prior to the establishment of a new fire support base, Diggers Rest. Moving along a firetrail just east of Thai Thien, 32 Charlie (Corporal Robert ‘Bluey’ Jay) detonated a mine, damaging the front left suspension station. 3 Troop came forward and escorted the damaged tank to Dyke for repair, while 3ZeroDelta took its place in 2 Troop. (There is a photo of the mine damaged tank at p284, I could send you a copy.)
The tank served a second time in SVN from Jan to Sep 71 as callsign 3 (troop leader’s tank, 3 Troop). While the troop leader was on R&R in Jun 71, the tank was taken over by a replacement crew commander and became 3B. Extract from COF below:
Soon after advancing again, the left flank of the assault was slowed by a thick clump of bamboo. Corporal Anderson (3Bravo) took the initiative and proceeded to break it down. This was an obstacle that the enemy would have expected to be by-passed, channelling attackers in the process. They were now forced to reveal their position prematurely.
At 4.15pm, two RPG rounds were fired at 3Bravo as it crashed through. One went high, but the other hit the commander’s machine gun. The blast inflicted massive wounds to the head and upper body of both Anderson and his operator, Trooper Phil Barwick. The sound of the explosion was the first indication of the contact. Sergeant Phil Reeves, in 3Alpha, could not see the tank to his left because of the thickness of the jungle, nor could he raise the crew on the radio. (The shrapnel that entered the turret and wounded Barwick, also damaged their wireless sets.)
There is a photo of the damaged MG in COF which I could copy to you. The actual weapon is in the Tank Museum at Puckapunyal. Phil Barwick is deceased, but I’m in contact with Andy Anderson and his troop sergeant at the time.
———————————————————————————
17 May 2017
New Boer War Memorial
For those who haven’t seen the press release …
More than a thousand visitors will gather in Canberra on 31 May to witness the dedication of a newly completed National Memorial on Anzac Parade, in memory of the Australian men and women involved in the Boer War from 1899 to 1902.
The Boer War was Australia’s very first war, and now, for the first time, there is a National Boer War Memorial facing Anzac Parade, Canberra, taking its place among memorials to all of the other conflicts involving our nation.
Four meticulously sculpted bronze statues — 150% of life size — depict Australian mounted troopers riding the African veldt, whilst copper wall panels show extracts from letters written by one of the 23,000 Australians who served in the Boer War. Descendants of Boer War veterans and well-wishers from every State and Territory of Australia are visiting Canberra for the Dedication of the Memorial.
The Dedication Ceremony is due to be live-streamed on the Internet from 10.30am to about 11.30 am Eastern Standard Time on Wednesday 31 May so anyone who can access live streaming on the Internet can easily tap into the Ceremony as it happens – or replay the Ceremony after the event if that is more convenient.
Designed by Melbourne sculptor, Louis Lauman, the first of the four bronze statues is now in position on Anzac Parade, Canberra.
The Memorial has been achieved after many years of planning and fund raising by a dedicated team of volunteers, headed by Colonel John Haynes OAM, former President of the DFWA NSW Branch [and RAAC Assn NSW Branch]
I’ll be attending the Dedication wearing a relative’s Queen’s South African Medal. I think ‘Artie’ (3rd WA Bushmens Contingent) was one of the very few to receive his QSA medal from the King (Edward VII). Queen Victoria had just died, Artie was recuperating in London and received an invite (with black order) to the medal presentation. (They later minted the KSA Medal.) Interestingly, Artie was the first person to ride a push bike around Australia (1899). All the unit’s equipment was paid for by public subscription and he was presented with a bike to take with him.
—————————————————————————
16 May 2017
Getting it Right
If you use the National archives site, you have to get it right. If you search for ‘8RAR Honours and Awards’ you’ll find that there no records. If you search for ‘8 RAR Honours and Awards’, you’ll get a completely different result. This is fair enough after all … it’s just that you get used used to Google saying “Do you mean …?”
Unfortunately, the file titled ”Headquarters, Australian Force Vietnam (HQ AFV):] Honours, Decorations and Commendations – Foreign Awards and Decorations’ has been “missing for 15 years”. There are lots more, however. Will just take a few days to dig them out.
Surprise.
Speaking of the Internet … I was looking at Facebook the other day and came across something called ‘Messenger’. This seems to be an email like facility whereby you send messages from one Facebook site to another. Now the only reason I joined Facebook was so that I could easily view photos from family members who were travelling overseas. It also allows me to view 1AR Assn ‘happenings’.
Imagine my surprise when I discovered that there were messages for me on Messenger. None of them really needed a response, but presumably the senders thought that I’d read them. In one a former WO1 told me that I didn’t have his permission to use his name on my blog (which I write while hiding behind the keyboard … or something like that). It won’t come as a surprise that I won’t be accessing Messenger on a routine basis (if at all).
I must say, knowing how to use the Block Sender facility on Internet Explorer is a blessing. Not only do all the spam emails go straight to the Delete folder, but so too do emails from a couple of people with whom I don’t care to communicate. Sometimes when I ‘delete all’ the emails in the folder, I see their name. You’d think they’d wonder why they don’t get a response. Ignorance is bliss sometimes.
——————————————————————————-
15 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
How to proceed with the appeal (this might be the wrong word)?
Remember the response from the Minister, “The Citation was awarded for the 8th Battalion’s contribution in operations against the enemy throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, rather than Operation Hammersley alone. As such, consideration of extending eligibility for the Citation to units that supported the Battalion during this operation would be inconsistent with the original award.”
Unfortunately, to say that the Citation was awarded for operations against the enemy throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, is plain rubbish.
To do so, the award would have been made after, not prior to, 31 October (it was announced by the Chairman RVNAF Joint General Staff on 24 October 1970). The Minister was obviously poorly advised.
It’s not just a matter of a few days, however.
The award process involved a recommendation going from HQ 1AFV to HQ AFV to MACV to Free World Military Command HQ (for translation) to RVNAF JGS and back again. This would’ve taken some months.
I’ll be checking the HQ AFV, HQ 1ATF files at the AWM for the original recommendation.
Meanwhile, the Wikipedia entry is interesting:
“In early 1970 8 RAR took part in Operation Hammersley, a reconnaissance operation in the Long Hải area. This operation began on 10 February and on 18 February it captured a large bunker complex after the Vietnamese Communist defenders withdrew following air raids. The operation continued until 9 March, with the battalion carrying out patrols and conducting ambushes in order to engage Communist troops. These operations were successful, and 8 RAR was awarded the South Vietnamese Government’s Meritorious Unit Commendation, including Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation for its role in the operation.”
———————————————————————————–
14 May 2017
ACT Black Hat Gatherings (RAAC Corporation Sub-Branch?)
An extract from the RAAC Corporation Limited 2015 Annual Report stated:
Branch/Chapter for ACT–based Black Hats. Following a series of meetings with Maj Gen Roger Powell, Maj Gen Mike Krause and the now RSM-A Don Spinks OAM, the Corporation was asked to look at the viability or otherwise of establishing a Sub-branch or Chapter for ACT-based serving RAAC members and former members living in the area. The proposal for a sub-branch is to enable serving RAAC members and former ACT-based members to have a more formalised grouping for social and commemorative events. This is something that has sadly been lacking in the ACT for a long time. The 1AR Association’s newly-elected ACT Representative WO1(Ret’d) Ian “Gooch” Cummings, has taken this matter up. It now appears Ian has been successful and has received an agreement with the Dock at Kingston to become the ACT Back Hat RV for get-togethers.
Does anyone know what’s happened to the proposal to “rectify something that’s been lacking in the ACT for a long time“? Are there any other RAAC Corporation Sub-Branches that have been more successful in creating “a more formalised grouping“?
Ian Cummings seems to have retired from his 1AR Assn responsibilities (the ACT Rep is vacant on the 1AR Assn website). When the concept of an ACT ‘Chapter’ first arose vide the above, I suggested that a questionnaire to ascertain black hats’ views re things like ANZAC Day/Cambrai Day/social gatherings etc, might be worthwhile … but the idea didn’t ‘fly’ (as far as I know).
——————————————————————————–
13 May 2017
Extension of Eligibility for the CGWP Unit Citation Awarded to 8RAR
Minister Tehan has written to say that “The Citation was awarded for the 8th Battalion’s contribution in operations against the enemy throughout its deployment from 28 November 1969 to 31 October 1970, rather than Operation Hammersley alone. As such, consideration of extending eligibility for the Citation to units that supported the Battalion during this operation would be inconsistent with the original award.”
The above is factually incorrect. The CGWP Unit Citation was presented on 24 October 1970. It could hardly be awarded in respect of operations up to 31 October 1970. The award, in fact, was one of a number which the South Vietnamese Government had decided to make. Preparations to do so would have commenced well before 24 October. Just weeks before, the 35th Tactical Fighter Wing, US Air Force, also received the same award. There was no mention of 2 Squadron, RAAF, in the Citation; however, being part of the 35th, eligibility for the CGWP was automatically extended to the Australian bomber squadron.
If the above Ministerial decision was to stand, the following references will need to be amended:
8RAR History:“Lieutenant-General Do Cao Tri, Commander of III Corps and Military Region III (of which Phuoc Tuy Province was part) presented 8RAR with the Meritorious Unit Commendation of the Vietnamese Armed Forces [i.e. the CGWP]for its actions in the Long Hai Hills.”
AWM: “The [8RAR] battalion was awarded …the Cross of Gallantry with Palm Unit Citation, by the South Vietnamesegovernment for its involvement in Hammersley.”
Governor General: In a speech at the 2008 Annual Dinner of the Royal Australian Regiment Association (QLD Divison). His Excellency, Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC, GG and Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Forces, stated that “3 RAR and D Company, 6 RAR proudly wear the United States Presidential Unit Citation, 1 RAR the United States Meritorious Unit Citation: and in the near future members of the re-raised 8th/9th Battalion will wear the South Vietnamese Unit Citation, Cross of Gallantry with Palm earned by 8 RAR in the Long Hais”.
US Commanding General 11 Field Force Vietnam:“Dear Brigadier Weir [Commander, 1st Australian Task Force], I am enclosing a letter from Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General, 111 Corps and 111 CTZ,commending the 8th Battalion Groupfor its combat achievements on 21st February 1970 in the Minh Dam Secret Zone. It gives me great pleasure to add my commendation to that of General Tri. The dedication and true professionalism demonstrated by your forces have significantly enhanced our Common efforts against a very stubborn enemy. Only by grinding away at the enemy, capturing his supplies and denying him his sanctuaries as you are doing, will we be able to force the enemy out of Phuoc Tuy Province and eventually out of the Republic of Vietnam. I wish you continued success in the future and request that you pass on’ to your soldiers our appreciation for their outstanding performance. It will be seen that our continuing combined operations in the Long Hais are significant and important.”
CGWP Unit Citation (Extract) Their [8RAR’s] most remarkable military operations took place in the area of the Long Hai hills. This area is known as ‘Minh Dam Secret Zone’, a base area of the main force Communist units in Phuoc Tuy province. This zone was strongly protected by mines and ditches and had caused many losses to the Allied Forces. But with modern tactics and a determined spirit, the forces of the 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force conducted continuous operations against the area and destroyed the enemy’s secret zone, causing great casualties to the communists and forcing them from the area, thus bringing peace to the Vietnamese people living there.
An appeal will be lodged with the Defence Force Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal.
History. I originally prepared the submission in June 2015 and provided it to the 1AR Assn. After some discussion as to the way forward, in March 2016, the Chairman of the RAAC Corporation stated on Facebook that: ‘Theaward for Hammersley is a [1AR] Assn responsibility, first, last and always…. The [former] President of the 1AR Assn has referred the application to Maj Gen Mike Krause of the [RAAC Corporation] advisory board to proof the submission. Other than that we have no input into the bloody thing”. There being no progress on the matter, I forwarded the submission in the Minister in February 2017. His response was received yesterday. This is positive. The reason for the decision has been formally stated. This provides the basis for appeal.
The attitude of the RAAC Corporation is disappointing. A valuable liaison role could be played, given that the submission seeks to recognise the service of not only 1 AR personnel, but also those from 3 Cav and 1 Fd Sqn (sappers) involved. One might hope that the RAR Association would also be willing to assist, given that they are now able to emblazon all five Vietnam battlehonours thanks to RAAC efforts. I guess I’ll just have to fit it in.
Interestingly, I had to point out the following to the AWM (appropriate corrections were made, but it illustrates that sometimes a narrow lens is used in looking at such matters) :
“Reference is made [in the Vietnam gallery] to 8RAR suffering 8 KIA and 16 WIA during Operation HAMMERSLEY. I think these are ‘just’ 8RAR’s casualties from the mines at the end (in fact, one of those WIA, later died of wounds). The important point, however, is that there were casualties from other Corps as well … 3 KIA and 13 WIA to be precise. These were mainly RAAC. Given the subject of the panel (‘Armoured Operations’)…it would seem appropriate to mention them.”
——————————————————————————–
12 May 2017
M113A1 Logbooks
Nobody cares. That’s as it seems. Mind you, much the same was the situation re Centurion logbooks.
These are official records, yet in the case of the M113A1s they are just not available to authenticate the service history of AFVs which now stand as Memorials.
I recently endeavoured to find one on behalf of an RSL in WA. Relevant posts from the 3 Cav Forum are copied below.
“Hi Guys [Defence Disposals],
I’m writing on behalf of the Three Springs WA RSL Sub-Branch whose members have received M113A1 ARN 134340.
The APC will be positioned adjacent to their Memorial and the members hope to find out something about its service history, so as to include this information on the plaque next the vehicle. The President advises that the log book was NOT received in conjunction with the vehicle.
This same issue has arisen previously. In April 2016, I emailed the Defence Disposal Agency to ask if you could “… please advise what has happened to the log books of the M113A1s allocated to RSLs and museums? I have been advised that they have not accompanied the vehicles.”
On 21 April 2016, I received the response copied below. Can you please advise if M113A1 ARN 134340 is one of the APCs for which its log book has unaccountably gone ‘missing’.
Many thanks, Bruce Cameron
“Good afternoon Bruce,
I am the project manager responsible for the M113A1 Family of Vehicles allocated for disposal to heritage organisations. Your enquiry has been passed onto me for response.
The ‘log books” for the vehicles that were sold to RSLs and Museums were not originally part of the disposal process. However, staff within the Joint Logistics Unit Victoria contacted the National Fleet Manager and the AMSO [Australian Military Sales Office] regarding the books.
At that time it was decided that if a Log Book was available it would be handed over to the recipient organisation when they collected their vehicle(s) to provide each organisation a more detailed aspect of their vehicles history.
Unfortunately not all Log Books were available for every vehicle that was allocated, but the majority of RSLs and Museums did receive one.
The recent response re the logbook for the M113A1 held by the WA RSL (from Material Logistics Disposals and Sales) was
“Log books were not part of the original offer, but during the disposal some were found and were passed on to the recipient organisations. There was not a Log Book for every vehicle sold. Unfortunately, if no log book was provided with the Three Springs Arrino vehicle then it was not available to be provided because Defence no longer has it.”
Individuals can only go so far in chasing up such matters. Seems to me to be a possibility that a pile of M113A1 logbooks is sitting within Defence somewhere and asking the right questions of the right people could turn them up. Pity that the RAAC Corporation Limited won’t assist in matters such as these. (The first step might be to find out which RSL sub-branches have received M113A1s and contact them to ascertain if they hold the logbook.)
Of course no-one will do anything if no-one cares.
———————————————————————————–
11 May 2017
Finishing off the discussion from the past couple of days re the ACB … a short piece from a year or so ago:
The Army Combat Badge Issue.
For many years, the RAAC Association (NSW) campaigned for an Armoured Combat Badge to acknowledge the service of AFV crews in closing with and engaging the enemy [as the Infantry Combat Badge (ICB) acknowledges such action by the infantry]. A number of us did what we could to help with the campaign.
Eventually a meeting with the Minister was arranged. While not participating, I was asked to prepare an options paper as the basis for discussions.
One of my options was an Army Combat Badge. I argued in the paper that this would only be a viable option, if the ICB was withdrawn. If both combat badges were to exist together, a ‘them’ and ‘us’ situation was likely to occur. I warned that this would be divisive and contrary to the combined arms concept being advanced at that time.
We all know what happened. The Army Combat badge option was chosen, but the ICB was allowed to remain. Having been involved at the outset, I was interested to read the relevant Defence Instruction (DI) when it was produced.
I could not believe my eyes when I read that if someone was killed in action, they would not be eligible for the Army Combat Badge, as it was classed as a ‘dress embellishment’ (presumably, in the eyes of the bureaucrats involved, to save money).
Lobbying through the then RSM-A led to an amendment to the DI and the Army Combat badge is now awarded to the NOK of anyone who is KIA. There was another issue that I raised at the time, however, that has not been resolved.
DI PERS 119-1 states that: “Each eligible serving member will be issued two full-size ACB. Officers and senior non commissioned officers (SNCO) are also entitled to one miniature ACB at public expense. Ex-service members are entitled to one full-size ACB. Ex-serving officers and SNCO are also entitled to one miniature ACB at public expense”.
The thinking here is that those who do not achieve SNCO rank while serving, will never rise to a position after their service in which they are likely to be required to wear formal attire (and therefore require a miniature Army Combat Badge). In my submission, I argued the case of someone like Graeme Edwards, MP … WIA while serving as a national serviceman, later a Member of Parliament, but required to personally pay for his miniature Army Combat Badge because he was not classed by Defence bureaucrats as someone likely to achieve such rank in society.
Rather than going ‘head to head’ about cost, I proposed a compromise; instead of an automatic issue … why not provide a means by which former members could apply for a miniature Army Combat Badge to be issued to them if they were in need of wearing one (I was thinking of an Application Form as part of the DI). No answer. Is this something worth pursuing? Definitely. Why should the perceived lack of social status of someone who has served their country in action, be used as the basis for not providing a miniature Army Combat Badge at public expense, when it is provided to those with perceived higher social status. Such class distinction goes against all tenets of our egalitarian Australian society, as it does in terms of recognition of those who serve our nation in combat.
———————————————————————————-
10 May 2017
Following on from yesterday … the letter to the Minister:
Dear Minister,
Recognition of AFV Crews’ Service at the Very Forefront of Battle.
In 2006, the then Minister for Veterans’ Affairs met with a small delegation comprising the President of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) Association and a former Chief of the General Staff. The purpose of the meeting was to decide how to acknowledge the unique service of Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) crews in battle. At that time, only the Royal Australian Infantry (RA Inf) were entitled to wear a badge to recognise their combat experience. I was asked to prepare an options paper.
The hope was that an Armoured Combat Badge would be approved on the same basis as the Infantry Combat Badge (ICB), given that these were the only two Corps in the Army that closed with and engaged the enemy (hence the only Corps granted the right through history to carry Colours, Guidons and Standards).
In considering options, however, I had to acknowledge that a number of other members of Army also come face to face with the enemy, for example engineers clearing mines and artillery forward observers. I included, therefore, an Army Combat Badge as an option which would recognise, on an equal basis, all those who engaged in direct combat with the enemy. I added the proviso that this would only be a feasible option if the ICB was withdrawn; not to do so would create an ‘infantry’ and a ‘non-infantry’ Army.
As it turned out, the Minister agreed to the Army Combat Badge proposal, but Defence were not prepared to withdraw the ICB. The original challenge remains: how to recognise the unique service of AFV crews doing battle with the enemy, often in front of the infantry.
The attached submission seeks your approval to allow Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) personnel to wear a ‘silver’ version of the Army Combat Badge to acknowledge their place at the very forefront of battle. (All the uniform accoutrements of the RAAC are silver, eg buttons, badges etc.)
Yours sincerely,
—————————————-—————————————–
9 May 2017
Silver Army Combat Badge.
This will undoubtedly be the hardest approval to gain. Four initiatives ran out of official support, ie. came up against the apathy of those who don’t want to ‘rock the boat’. Three submissions have been made to Minister Tehan. He approved two (emblazoning of the Coral-Balmoral battlehonour and correction to the Vietnam Theatre Honour on the 1AR Standard), while a decision on the third (extension of eligibility for the Vietnamese unit citation awarded to 8RAR for Op Hammersley) is awaited. The time has come to seek an official decision re the fourth … approval for RAAC personnel to wear a silver Army Combat Badge (ACB).
I have somewhat of a vested interest in the matter, having come up with the idea of an Army Combat Badge and prepared the options paper referred to below. I also had to fight to overturn the Defence Instruction which stated that the ACB would not be presented to the NOK of those KIA because it was classed as a dress embellishment. Unfortunately when proposing the ACB as an option, I was naïve enough to do so with the proviso that the ICB be withdrawn, so as to ensure the ‘combined arms’ concept was maintained and we did not return to a ‘two army’ organisation (the infantry and the rest).
The letter to the Minister will require some careful wording. Background is provided by the earlier blog post below.
Blog; 5 November 2015
It was in early August [2015] that a submission was drafted for RAAC personnel to be awarded ‘silver’ ACB (rather than bronze ones). As with submissions for the battlehonour Coral-Balmoral to be emblazoned of the Standard of 1st Armd Regt and for eligibility for the award of the Vietnamese CGWP unit citation awarded to 8RAR for Operation Hammersley, to be extended to supporting arms, the silver ACB proposal seems to have run out of ‘official’ supporters. Lacking any feedback, Armouredadvocates will forward it to the Minister for an official response.
A particular supporter of this initiative was the late Brigadier Ian Bryant, AM. At his urging, the following paragraph was included in the epilogue of ‘Canister! On! FIRE!‘:
“The nature of the dangers faced by AFV crews is unique. In the same way that guidons and colours have for centuries acknowledged the pre-eminence of armour and infantry on the battlefield, the RAAC Association took the lead in arguing that an Armour Combat Badge should be awarded to armoured crewmen and those who support them in combat. The official decree was that only infantry deserved individual recognition, an Army Combat Badge being created for all others. The gallant service of past crews demands that appropriate recognition of those involved in armoured combat today be pursued vigorously at all levels, until achieved.”
Submission Seeking Approval for RAAC Personnel to Wear a ‘Silver’ Version of the Army Combat Badges.
Background.
For many years, the Royal Australian Armoured Corps (RAAC) Association campaigned for an Armoured Combat Badge to acknowledge the service of Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) crews in closing with and engaging the enemy (in the same way that the Infantry Combat Badge, ICB, acknowledges the equivalent action by the infantry).
Eventually a meeting with the Minister was arranged. An options paper was prepared as the basis for discussion. One of the options was an Army Combat Badge.
It was recommended that if this option was chosen, the ICB should be withdrawn to avoid a situation which could be seen as contrary to the concept of combined arms operations. This proposal was rejected, however. Only the Royal Australian Infantry (RA Inf) were considered to warrant individual recognition. An Army Combat Badge would be created to acknowledge all others who participated in combat.
While this decision corrected the anomaly whereby members of other Corps who accompanied infantry into battle, e.g. Royal Australian Artillery (RAA) forward observers, were previously denied any recognition, RAAC members lost their bid for acknowledgement of their unique place at the forefront of battle.
Aim
This submission argues that the importance of the RAAC’s role on the battlefield and the nature and extent of the dangers faced by the crews of AFVs in combat, warrant specific recognition and they should be allowed to wear silver (in accord with all their uniform accoutrements), rather than bronze coloured, Army Combat Badges.
Justification.
Gallantry of AFV Crews. The right to carry guidons and colours has for centuries acknowledged the fact that two corps are central to the conduct of warfare. Armour and infantry provide the complementary manoeuvre elements by which a commander can dominate the battlefield. The decision not to acknowledge the unique role of armour in this respect, shows a lack of understanding of the inherent gallantry of AFV crews when committed to combat.
An AFV is more that simply an armoured vehicle. Having closed with the enemy, it is the crew who bring its guns to bear. It is their spirit and determination to achieve fire superiority at the point of battle, despite the risks, that is at the heart of modern warfare.
Vulnerability of AFVs. The combat power that the crews of AFVs bring to bear has a force multiplier effect which helps win battles and save lives. This capability has been known since the First World War. It was emphatically demonstrated by Australian armour in the jungles of New Guinea during the Second World War and more recently in Vietnam. Rather than being immune to enemy fire, the opposite is the case.
In Vietnam and Afghanistan, AFV crewmen knew only too well that their vehicles could be penetrated by the numerous anti-armour weapons possessed by the enemy, and even their heavy machine guns. Furthermore, because they were compelled to operate with open hatches, crews were vulnerable to sniper fire, shrapnel, and satchel charges. Not always being able to travel off-road, AFVs were susceptible to mine attack, something that the enemy exploited. Success on the battlefield was achieved through the bravery and boldness of vehicle crews and the shock action which resulted.
Infantry Support. It is unlikely that the RA Inf would object to the proposal. The fact that armour and infantry personnel share the dangers of close combat on the battlefield is inescapable. The extract below is from a letter written by the CO, 4RAR/NZ to the OC C Squadron, 1st Armoured Regiment, when the tanks were withdrawn from Vietnam:
“It was indeed a sad day when your tanks ceased to be operational. The effort and outstanding esprit-de-corps of your unit have truly been a major factor in the operational success of 1ATF units. There is no doubt in my mind that casualties would have been much greater without your unfailing support and willingness to accept calculated risks to assist my men, especially in bunker contacts, and thereby carry the day in the true spirit of armoured-infantry co-operation.
I do not believe that there is one man under my command who would not feel a great sense of personal relief and pride in Australian arms when observing C Squadron press home the attack with typical aggression and determination. Without you, our task is obviously more difficult, but should we ever be committed to fight a war again – and we probably will be – then the infantry could ask for no better comrades in arms… .”
Cost. The proposal is at no cost to Army. Silver Army Combat Badges are already available through the RAAC Association. Unit regimental funds can meet the small cost involved for serving members; while former members can purchase their own.
Eligibility. Eligibility is as specified for the Army Combat Badge. Units can purchase in bulk and issue, while former members can be required to attach a certificate of eligibility from their unit association.
Conclusion.
The gallantry of AFV crews in facing the unique dangers presented by close combat on the battlefield warrants specific recognition. Approval should be granted for RAAC personnel to wear a silver version of the Army Combat Badge.
—————————————————————————–
8 May 2017
The Art of Insulting
The blog on 3 May 2017 was titled: ‘Why do Some People Habitually Insult Others?’
I referred to a person I know who does this and concluded that: “He has an inflated sense of his own importance, a deep need for admiration and a lack of empathy for others; as a result he pronounces judgments on people he perceives as inferior. This provides a way to exert control and feel powerful.
Given that mature people are supposed to be able to debate matters with others without insulting them, it is all the more surprising that he resorts to base insults to reinforce his arguments. In his latest foray he refers to the person with whom he is debating as being a “tiresome”, “little man“, who uses “querulous repartee“, based on “shallow fallacies“.
In plain words, the ‘other’ person is of no importance or significance, displaying an irritating and boring manner. His petulant complainants are founded on unsound arguments, as is typical of someone incapable of serious thought.
At first I thought the reference to “little man” might have been related to Wilhelm Reich’s book ‘Listen, Little Man’, but it quickly became apparent that it is in the vein of ‘orrible little man or irksome little man, as used to describe an inferior person.
Interestingly, the person of habitual insults concludes his tirade by accusing the ‘other’ person of not being tolerant of other people’s points of view. Something about the kettle ….
The art of belittling people crops up in all contexts. The following is an extract from an interview published in a French newspaper:
“French Prime Minister Manuel Valls has accused the likely Republican nominee Donald Trump of being “little” and a “bad man”, stating that the unpopularity of globalism is a “challenge” to be confronted.
In the interview with France’s Public Senat channel, Mr Valls said, “Look at what is happening in the United States, we have great challenges but at the same time…,” before being interrupted by his interviewer, who suggested: “Little men?”
“Yes, yes, yes, yes. Little men,” said Mr Valls, and when asked if Trump was a “little man”, he said: “Yes, and probably a bad man.””
——————————————————————————–
5 May 2017
What Does the 2017 Budget Mean for the RAAC?
Will enough money be provided to:
acquire the twelve additional Abrams necessary to meet the peacetime equipment tables (three tank troops, each with four tanks) for the three ACR sqns plus SOA, RTC and repair pool;
acquire sufficient Hawkei or other platforms to equip the RAAC ARES units in a way in which they can maintain mobile warfare skills and provide support to the Beersheba brigades;
acquire additional land for the Shoalwater Bay Training Area suitable to enable mobile ops training;
acquire suitable AFV crewman personal weapons;
fund the accommodation necessary (wherever it is to be) for the 2/14 QMI ACR tank sqn;
fund the 2 Div RAAC ARES reorganization decisions (incl the possible re-raising of 3/4 Cav Regt as 7 Bde’s ARES armour support);
fund the training of RAAC Bushmaster crew commanders to meet the requirements of active service duties;
fund the Plan Beersheba force regeneration cycle; and
meet revised LAND 400 vehicle numbers given the changes to brigade structure (ie. inf operating MIV and two Cav Sqns per bde)
SOA Professional Papers.
Military papers written by SOA staff are available at:
ANZAC Day Means Many Things to Different People … But Should It?
Following on from yesterday’s post, a view has been expressed that the greeting ‘Happy ANZAC Day’ should be “received for what it is-a genuine outpouring of the expression of the human spirit; to take it any other way is to react without soul and spirit; only the desiccated soulless pedants could take umbrage in either case”.
Many “desiccated soulless pedants” have expressed different views, as can be seen on the Internet. Doesn’t seem to be much scope for alternative viewpoints in this person’s mind, especially given some of the other contexts of his chosen words:
The generosity of their help to and concern for others goes far to dispel the popular image of the Webbs as a desiccated, soulless couple concerned only with …( Beatrice And Sidney Webb: Fabian Socialists)
… back and forth, lightning strikes that sent heads and limbs flying and made a growing mountain of the desiccated,soullessbodies of the Lament Brood. (The Hounds of Avalon: The Dark Age 3 )
Ecclesiastes, the Preacher, proclaims the earth desiccated, soullessplace, A heap of broken images, where the sun beats, And the dead tree gives no shelter, … (Power to Hurt: The Virtues of Alienation)
Interesting that the above refer to ‘desiccated, soulless (things)’, whereas the correspondent says ‘desiccated soulless pedants’. Now there’s a subject for his pedants!
Vale: Lt Col Jim Ellis (ret’d)
Jim passed away yesterday, in Brisbane. RIP
NOTE: No blog posts tomorrow or Sunday … interstate trip.
——————————————————————————–
4 April 2017
Anzac Day Means Many Things to Different People … But Should It?
Some people just head to the coast for the holiday … some people feel it’s appropriate to wish a veteran ‘Happy Anzac Day’ … some people feel that it’s a celebration of national spirit and identity … some people feel that it is a “day of remembrance of those in the military who gave the ultimate sacrifice protecting our freedom”. Of course, one cannot think of those who have fallen in war, without reflecting on those who have been wounded and carry that legacy among us.
Interestingly, the US have both Memorial Day to remember the men and women who died while serving; and Veterans’ Day to commemorate the service of all military veterans.
Unfortunately some parts of ANZAC Day do look like a celebration … the beer, the two-up, the flag waving and the patriotic speeches.
I raised the issue on a veteran’s forum. One correspondent responded, in part, to say: We should all lighten up for Heaven’s Sake. …. Quiet sadness and reflection trumps moroseness in my book any day, broken by all the shared funny memories and not the bad ones.
One would expect that the AWM would provide the definitive meaning of the day. However its website (https://www.awm.gov.au/commemoration/anzac/anzac-tradition/), simply states that: “Anzac Day is a time at which Australians reflect on the many different meanings of war”. Is this all it is? What’s it mean to those who fought in war?
While I won’t attempt to discuss the question at this time, the following edited extract from the account by an Australian veteran of a recent war which was published in the media in April 2016, illustrates some of the underlying issues involved. He chooses to remember both the good and the bad:
“Anzac Day is an appropriate time to reflect on why our more recent veterans are being left behind in theday’s social and nationalist resurgence. As the number of Australians wanting to become involved increases, unforeseeable changes in the fabric of the day and its meaning are occurring.
That’s only natural: Anzac Day means many things to different people, and culturally constructed movements are seldom stable.
There have been well-meaning but disrespectful changes. In many cases, Anzac Day has gone from being a solemn event to one with a carnival atmosphere. Images of casually dressed young men with Australian flags tied around their necks are hard to look at when I’m reflecting on a friend who recently tried to commit suicide because of the burden of his military service.
Rather than being a time for us to reflect on sacrifice and service, it’s increasingly become a celebration of nationalistic spirit and identity. This isn’t a criticism, but the focus on our national Anzac identity has left behind those who have served.
I was deployed overseas on military operations in Bougainville and East Timor for almost two of my daughter’s first four years. For those of us who have served, the value of our service and its personal costs appear to have precious little value on a day when everyone is the custodian of the Anzac spirit.
Then there are those who say the day in a literal sense is about Anzacs. Comments such as, “It is not Veteran’s Day, it’s Anzac Day, it doesn’t mean others can’t march”, illustrate the growing divide between descendants of veterans and those who have served.
In Melbourne this year some descendants of World War I veterans, most whom have not themselves served, are complaining about having to wait for two hours to march. They appear happy for those who have served their country more recently to wait behind them, because “Anzac day isn’t Veterans Day”.
Eight years ago I dealt with this change in the fabric of Anzac Day by disengaging from it. These days I choose to head out into the Australian bush surrounding Canberra. Well before dawn’s first light I make my way to a piece of high ground overlooking a valley floor. I stand too with dawn’s first light, sitting silently and generally shivering in the pre-dawn chill.
To the cacophony of bush noises, I reflect on those who made the ultimate sacrifice while on operations, or after they’d returned home. I think about the cost of our service: both the physical and psychological. I remember our stories, good and bad.
After the sun’s rays warm me up I make my way back to my car and return to my family. I have chosen this “dawn service” because I’m not sure there’s a real place for contemporary veterans in Australia’s new-found shared Anzac spirit. This year I think I’m going to bring a couple of mates with me.
Tomorrow: What does the Budget mean for the RAAC?
——————————————————————————
3 May 2017
Why Do Some People Habitually Insult Others?
“We should be too big to take offense and too noble to give it.”~ Abraham Lincoln.
I know a person who continually insults others (including me) when presenting his point of view. Why does he, and others of his ilk, do this? The literature, as they say, is full of various answers, some psychological and others philosophical. I had no idea that this was a subject which was studied as much as it is. It seems that the personality type involved is easily able to be identified.
Some of the observations are:
Mature people can communicate with others without insulting them.
Most people who insult other people are insecure. They think that insulting the person will make them feel better, or they insult the other person to take attention off of themselves and their issues. They pronounce judgments on people they perceive as inferior—which is almost everyone. They only hear what they want to hear.
“When suppressed concerns and feelings, such as lack of self-esteem; self-defeating thoughts and behaviours; guilt; and anger, for example, are not treated or dealt with, the person uses insults to unleash anger, to escape dealing with the pain or trauma experienced or as a way to exert control [over another person] and feel powerful.”
People high on narcissistic* tendencies see themselves as being more important than others and therefore deserving of better treatment, a quality called narcissistic entitlement.
‘* Narcissism is personality disorder is a mental disorder in which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for admiration and a lack of empathy for others.
People with narcissistic tendencies tend to be particularly likely to hurl an insult your way so that they can feel better about themselves.
It is the social hierarchy game that makes insults sting. We are wired so that it feels bad to lose social status and feels good to gain it. That’s why a teasing jibe from a good friend isn’t painful—we haven’t lost status from it—but an unanswered email from our boss or a dilatory response to an invitation can diminish our sense of self-worth. Those playing the social hierarchy game try to score points by insulting others, who respond with counter-insults.
Elements of the above that resonate regarding the person I know are:
He has an inflated sense of his own importance, a deep need for admiration and a lack of empathy for others; as a result he pronounces judgments on people he perceives as inferior. This provides a way to exert control and feel powerful.
———————————————————————————–
2 May 2017
Australian Arms Sales
The posts from the past couple of days have posed the question as to whether or not Australia should sell arms to Saudi Arabia. For those who aren’t aware, all Australian arms sales have to be vetted and approved by Defence. There are strict guidelines as to the countries to which military equipment can be made. As with all things, however, there are grey areas that the public has a right to question.
The following link is to the Australian Military sales Equipment Catalogue:
(ii) What do you say when someone says that they “Hope you had an enjoyable ANZAC Day” or “Happy ANZAC Day”.
—————————————————————————-
1 May 2017
Australian Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia : Part 3
Part 1 dealt with UK arms sales, Part 2 examined the conflict itself; this Part looks at the dilemma facing countries supplying arms to the Saudi coalition. .
UN resolutions have called for the rebels to lay down their arms and have endorsed sanctions on Yemen. Australian arms exports to the Saudi coalition, therefore, have received Government approval. The dilemma is that the manner in which actions against the rebels are undertaken, involves extensive civilian casualties. Should the UN take action which could possibly help avoid civilian casualties, but give the rebels greater opportunity to overthrow Yemen’s Government. One view is expressed below.
“Australia Should Suspend Military Sales to Saudi Arabia”
by ELAINE PEARSON. Director of Human Rights Watch Australia. This statement was first released on April 19, 2017.
TheAustraliangovernment should immediately halt military sales toSaudi Arabiafollowing numerous unlawful Saudi-led coalition airstrikes inYemen, Human Rights Watch said today in aletterto Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Australia should also release details about military weapons and material it has sold to other members of the Saudi-led coalition carrying out the Yemen campaign and whether any Australian-made arms have been used in unlawful coalition attacks.
In the past year, based on media reports, the Defence Department has approved four military export licenses to Saudi Arabia, but it has not released information on the types or quantities of arms and equipment sold. Since the Saudi-led coalition began its military campaign in Yemen in March 2015, the United Nations and nongovernmental organisations, including Human Rights Watch, have documented numerous unlawful coalition airstrikes, some of them apparent war crimes, on homes, markets, schools, and hospitals.
“Prime Minister Turnbull has approved military sales to Saudi Arabia when he should be using Australia’s leverage to press Riyadh to end unlawful airstrikes in Yemen,” said Elaine Pearson, Australia director at Human Rights Watch. “Until the Saudi-led coalition credibly investigates and curtails its unlawful attacks, Australia should stop selling them arms and equipment.”
After two years of fighting, at least 4,773 civilians have been killed and 8,272 wounded, the majority by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The coalition has not seriously investigated alleged laws-of-war violations, and has provided almost no information on which country’s forces participated in such attacks.
The coalition has also imposed a naval blockade on Yemen that has exacerbated the country’s grave humanitarian crisis, which the UN recently declared one of the world’s worst. The blockade has diverted ships carrying life-saving medical supplies and delayed shipments of civilian goods for up to three months. Nearly 19 million Yemenis – over two thirds of the population – need humanitarian assistance, and seven million are facing starvation.
Opposing Houthi-Saleh forces have also been implicated in numerous serious violations of the laws of war, including using antipersonnel landmines and restricting and impeding the flow of aid.
Several countries are showing increasing reluctance to supply Saudi Arabia with weapons, Human Rights Watch said. In March 2016, the Dutch parliament voted to ban arms exports to Saudi Arabia. United Kingdom arms sales to Saudi Arabia are currently under judicial review.
Several United States senators recently introduced a bill to limit the sale of US weapons unless Saudi Arabia acts to minimize civilian casualties in Yemen.
“Halting defence sales to Saudi Arabia would send a strong signal to Riyadh that the Australian government is committed to ensuring respect for the laws of war, and to the Australian people that the lives of Yemeni civilians are of genuine concern,” Pearson said.
——————————————————————————-
30 April 2017
Australian Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia : Part 2
Part 1 dealt with UK arms sales, this part examines the conflict itself.
Yemen crisis: Who is fighting whom? BBC World News,
28 March 2017 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423
Yemen, one of the Arab world’s poorest countries, has been devastated by a war between forces loyal to the internationally-recognised government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and those allied to the Houthi rebel movement.
More than 7,600 people have been killed and 42,000 injured since March 2015, the majority in air strikes by a Saudi-led multinational coalition that backs the president.
The conflict and a blockade imposed by the coalition have also triggered a humanitarian disaster, leaving 70% of the population in need of aid.
How did the war start?
January 2015
The conflict has its roots in the failure of the political transition that was supposed to bring stability to Yemen following an uprising that forced its longtime authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to Mr Hadi, his deputy, in November 2011.
Mr Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by al-Qaeda, a separatist movement in the south, the continuing loyalty of many military officers to Mr Saleh, as well as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity.
Presidency after an uprising in 2011
The Houthi movement, which champions Yemen’s Zaidi Shia Muslim minority and fought a series of rebellions against Mr Saleh during the previous decade, took advantage of the new president’s weakness by taking control of their northern heartland of Saada province and neighbouring areas.
Disillusioned with the transition, many ordinary Yemenis – including Sunnis – supported the Houthis and in September 2014 they entered the capital, Sanaa, setting up street camps and roadblocks.
In January 2015, the Houthis reinforced their takeover of Sanaa, surrounding the presidential palace and other key points and effectively placing Mr Hadi and his cabinet ministers under house arrest.
The president escaped to the southern port city of Aden the following month.
The conflict in Yemen in March 2015
The Houthis and security forces loyal to Mr Saleh then attempted to take control of the entire country, forcing Mr Hadi to flee abroad in March 2015.
Alarmed by the rise of a group they believed to be backed militarily by regional Shia power Iran, Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states began an air campaign aimed at restoring Mr Hadi’s government.
The coalition received logistical and intelligence support from the US, UK and France.
What’s happened since then?
After two years of fighting, no side appears close to a decisive military victory.
Pro-government forces – made up of soldiers loyal to President Hadi and predominantly Sunni southern tribesmen and separatists – were successful in stopping the rebels taking Aden, but only after a fierce, four-month battle that left hundreds dead.
Having established a beachhead, coalition ground troops landed in Aden that August and helped drive the Houthis and their allies out of much of the south over the next two months. Mr Hadi and his government returned from exile at the same time and established a temporary home in Aden.
But since then, despite the air campaign and naval blockade continuing unabated, pro-government forces have been unable to dislodge the rebels from their northern strongholds, including Sanaa and its surrounding province.
The Houthis have also been able to maintain a siege of the southern city of Taiz and to continue firing missiles and mortars across the border with Saudi Arabia.
Jihadist militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and rival affiliates of so-called Islamic State (IS) have meanwhile taken advantage of the chaos by seizing territory in the south and stepping up their attacks, notably in government-controlled Aden.
What’s been the impact on civilians?
Civilians have borne the brunt of the fighting and repeatedly been the victims of what activists have described as serious violations of international law by all parties.
By 26 March 2017, at least 4,773 civilians had been killed and 8,272 others injured,according to the United Nations. With just under half of the population under the age of 18, children constituted a third of all civilian deaths during the first two years of the conflict.
The destruction of civilian infrastructure and restrictions on food and fuel imports have also pushed Yemen to the brink of famine.
Some 17 million people are considered food insecure and 6.8 million severely food insecure.
About 3.3 million children and pregnant or breast-feeding women are acutely malnourished, including 462,000 children under five who face severe acute malnutrition.
The UN says 2 million Yemenis are internally displaced and 180,000 others have fled the country.
Only 45% of the 3,500 health facilities surveyed by the UN in November were fully functioning.
Why have peace efforts failed?
envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed wants a “sustainable solution to the conflict”
The UN has organised three rounds of peace talks. There was hope of a breakthrough at the last round, which opened in Kuwait in April 2016, with both the Houthis and the Saudis seemingly under pressure and willing to negotiate.
However, the talks collapsed three months later, triggering an escalation in the fighting that the UN said resulted in the number of civilian casualties rising dramatically.
Mr Hadi’s government says the political process can only proceed if UN Security Council resolution 2216, which calls for the rebels to withdraw from all areas they control and lay down their arms, is fully implemented.
Why should this matter for the rest of the world?
What happens in Yemen can greatly exacerbate regional tensions. It also worries the West because of the threat of attacks emanating from the country as it becomes more unstable.
Western intelligence agencies consider AQAP the most dangerous branch of al-Qaeda because of its technical expertise and global reach, and the emergence of IS affiliates in Yemen is a serious concern.
The conflict between the Houthis and the government is also seen as part of a regional power struggle between Shia-ruled Iran and Sunni-ruled Saudi Arabia.
Gulf Arab states have accused Iran of backing the Houthis financially and militarily, though Iran has denied this, and they are themselves backers of President Hadi.
Yemen is strategically important because it sits on the Bab al-Mandab strait, a narrow waterway linking the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, through which much of the world’s oil shipments pass.
——————————————————————————
29 April 2017
Australian Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia : Part 1
The following newspaper excerpts provide some background to the issue. [While BAE Systems is one of the contenders for LAND 400 Phase2 (CRV), it is not suggested that the behaviour mentioned is still part of the company’s culture.]
Guardian, UK (February 2010)
The arms giant BAE yesterday agreed to pay out almost £300m in penalties, as it finally admitted guilt over its worldwide conduct, in the face of long-running corruption investigations.
For 20 years, the firm refused to accept any wrongdoing, despite mounting evidence of alleged bribes and kickbacks, much of it uncovered by the Guardian.
But BAE yesterday said it would plead guilty to charges of false accounting and making misleading statements, in simultaneous settlement deals with the Serious Fraud Office in the UK and the department of justice in Washington.
The admissions in the US covered BAE’s huge £43bn al-Yamamah fighter plane sales to Saudi Arabia and smaller deals in the Czech Republic and elsewhere in central Europe. In the UK, the admissions cover a highly controversial sale of a military radar to poverty-stricken Tanzania, which the development secretary Clare Short said at the time “stank” of corruption, but which the then prime minister, Tony Blair, forced through the cabinet.
The Serious Fraud Office said in its announcement yesterday that some of the £30m penalty BAE was to hand over in the UK would be “an ex gratia payment for the benefit of the people of Tanzania”.
The Guardian, UK (July 2015).
The extent to which Margaret Thatcher personally lobbied the Saudi royal family, flattering them at every opportunity to secure Britain’s biggest arms deal, is revealed in newly released documents.
They show how anxious British ministers and diplomats pursued the Saudis to buy Tornado and Hawk aircraft in what became a £43bn deal known as al-Yamamah (Arabic for dove). Many documents have been withheld and passages removed to suppress embarrassing disclosures.
One document refers to a meeting between British officials and Prince Sultan, the Saudi defence minister, in September 1985. It reads: “At the meeting, the prince indicated that, particularly in view of our willingness … [passage deleted] … there might be further UK orders in connection with construction work …”
A number of pages have been removed after a document refers to “offset” arrangements and “payment methods”. The papers refer to a press report that £600m backhanders were passed to arms dealers known as the four cavaliers.
The Yamamah deal became mired in a long-running controversy over allegations that BAE, Britain’s biggest arms dealer, made huge illicit payments to Saudi royals to land the contract. In 2006, Tony Blair’s government abruptly halted a Serious Fraud Office investigation into the allegations following pressure from the Saudis and the firm. In 2010, BAE agreed to pay almost £300m in penalties, to settle an investigation by US and UK authorities into alleged corruption in its deals with the Saudis and other countries.
The Economist, UK (November 2016)
CONTROVERSY over the relationship between BAE Systems, Europe’s largest defence company, and one of its main customers, Saudi Arabia, was raging when Ian King, its chief executive, started his job in 2008. BAE’s link to Saudi Arabia was forged 30 years ago with the first “al-Yamamah” arms deal. It saved the firm amid a difficult business environment, but embroiled it in a long-running corruption scandal that even led to Mr King’s immediate predecessor, Mike Turner, being briefly detained by America’s Department of Justice just before he stepped down.
The new boss’s mandate eight years ago was to banish BAE’s old, buccaneering ways and make it the acme of squeaky-clean corporate governance. Now, as Mr King prepares to leave and hand over to a successor, the firm is once again under fire for its ties to the house of Saud, this time for supplying its wares to support the kingdom’s war in neighbouring Yemen. A rising chorus accuses the Saudi-led coalition of using its Western-supplied and maintained air power indiscriminately in its campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.
Human-rights activists are trying to use Britain’s ratification of the multilateral Arms Trade Treaty in 2014 as a legal tool against the government and BAE. They have won a High Court judicial review into the use of British-made weapons in the Yemen conflict, but since the coalition’s intervention has legal backing from the UN and is supported by the British government, the most the court can do is to order the government to look again at whether Britain is meeting its treaty obligations. Nevertheless, if it did, BAE would find itself in an uncomfortable spot.
—————————————————————————–
28 April 2017
What is Bullying?
One definition of bullying is “when an individual or a group of people with more power, repeatedly and intentionally cause hurt or harm to another person or group of people who feel helpless to respond“.
There have been a barrage of posts on the 1AR Assn Facebook page in recent days regarding an alleged complaint made by one member about being ‘bullied’ by another.
I have a personal association with bullying. It was one of the reasons given for expelling me from the 1AR Assn. (The expulsion has since been found to have been invalid.) What happened?
A state rep accused me of having bullied him. He did not inform me of this, nor was I given any details of the accusation he made to the Disciplinary C’tee. With no basis on which to offer any defence I was very much disadvantaged.
What had I done in relation to this particular person? The minutes of an AGM stated that state reps who had not provided a report to the meeting would be doing so in writing. I subsequently asked my state rep if he’d done this. His response: “I had NTR then, and I have NTR now”. Later, members of the Assn were informed that by-laws would be introduced in the near future. I asked my state rep if I could see the draft by-laws. He finally provided a copy of what was a first draft, many months out of date.
So … was I guilty of bullying?
Seems to me that any attempt to hold someone to account for their responsibilities, can be described as bullying. Was I trying to cause hurt or harm to my state rep? No, I was simply asking him for information I was entitled to receive. (He subsequently resigned.)
There is no excuse for bullying (see definition above). It can cause untold emotional harm. If everyone who is asked to meet his responsibilities cries ‘bullying’, however, the significance of the offence is lessened … the abhorrent nature of bullying becomes lost in the plethora of accusations. This is something no-one wants.
Subsequent posts on the Facebook site have referred to the member having been “threate
Photo: AWM
armouredadvocates 